ARGUING SECURITY: RHETORIC, MEDIA ENVIRONMENT, AND THREAT LEGITIMATION

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ABSTRACT

Arguing Security: Rhetoric, Media Environment, and Threat Legitimation

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In this dissertation, I study the process of gaining public consent about a security threat, or threat legitimation. Threats require legitimation because they are social facts and not objective truths or subjective perceptions. I argue rhetorical resources and strategies affect threat legitimation. Political actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies in order to generate consent. The rhetorical resources connect together the rhetorical resources to construct a threat narrative used in the public debates. Moreover, I argue that the media environment influences how rhetorical strategies affect threat legitimation, acting as a conditional variable. Therefore I trace the threat narratives in six episodes in the history of United States foreign policy. Through process tracing, I highlight how rhetorical resources and strategies changed the public debates and level of consent about a threat, and how the media environment influenced these rhetorical strategies.

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DEDICATION

For Talene and Angel Rose, with all of my love

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In his memoirs, President Reagan comments that, "For eight years the press called me the 'Great Communicator.' Well, one of my greatest frustrations during those eight years was my inability to communicate to the American people and to Congress the seriousness of the threat we faced in Central America" (Reagan 1990; Edwards III 2003). These failures raise several important questions about threat, communication, and foreign policy. Why does a president succeed or fail at communicating a threat to the public? Numerous studies tell us that presidents hold vast amounts of institutional and political powers for public communication, especially concerning foreign policy events and issues (Tulis 1987; Hinckley 1994; Meernik 1994; Kernell 1986; Peterson 1994). Moreover, as noted by President Reagan, the abilities and skills of an individual president do not seem to determine successful threat communication. Even more important, why does a threat need to be communicated? Foreign policy decision makers, bureaucratic experts, journalists, politicians, and even academics reference threat in their speeches, papers, and discussions as if threat is self-evident. If any communication is needed, it is simply to draw public attention to an easily discernable reality.

To begin to understand these questions, I study the process of gaining public consent about a security threat, or threat legitimation. I argue that a threat needs legitimation because it is a "social fact" and not an objective truth or

subjective perception (Ruggie 1998b, 44; Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 159; c.f. Goddard 2006).[1] As a social fact, a threat requires communication in order to reach an intersubjective understanding about what it is and why it is a threat. Threat is of course 'real' and at times material, but the material reality does not explain itself. Political actors undertake this process of threat legitimation, trying to gain consent for a particular interpretation about the world. Legitimation is not a normative endpoint but a political and social practice that can be studied empirically.[2]

As suggested by President Reagan's quote, I argue that institutional and political power alone does not determine threat legitimation. Since threat legitimation is a social process that depends on communication, I argue rhetoric is central for understanding its success or failure. As E.H. Carr stated, "power over opinion is…not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of political leader. Rhetoric has a long and honoured record in the annals of statesmanship" (Carr 1940). As this quote affirms, rhetoric lies at the nexus of leaders, foreign policy, and the public as a form of power, just as important as military and economic power. Foreign policymakers and other political actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to construct, reproduce, and change narratives about a threat. Through rhetoric, political actors attempt to legitimate threats in the public discourse.

[1] See Chapter 2 for a further discussion about threat as social fact.
[2] See Chapter 2 for a further discussion about legitimation, legitimacy, and threat.

Therefore, threat legitimation is not only a rhetorical process but also social, in that it is a "symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Burke 1969, 43). This sociological approach to rhetoric focuses on how people interact and arrive at understanding, rather than defining rhetoric simply as persuasive communication (Potter 1996; Billig 1987). A sociological approach avoids the instrumentalism and individualism found in other rhetorical studies, such as the persuasion literature (Payne 2001a; Checkel 2001, 562; Simons, Morreale, and Gronbeck 2001, 7). Rhetoric articulates intersubjective meanings in the public discourse, rather than being the property of an individual. Individuals cannot simply use rhetoric as they choose, but rather depend on social and intersubjective understandings about the world. Rhetoric simultaneously produces and is a product of these meanings and interactions (Tilly 2001). Other factors, such as material conditions or subjective perceptions, are important for threat legitimation, but rhetoric is necessary to explain and communicate their meaning.

To understand legitimation, I study narratives about a purported threat in the public rhetoric. Narratives give meaning and coherence about a threat, making it "real" (Bially Mattern 2005, 107). Narratives create connections by grabbing attention, tapping into values, inducing reactions, and transporting place, time, and culture (Rowland 2005, 138). A threat consists of numerous, often competing, narratives that define, explain, and specify its meaning. I identify the critical threat narratives involved in threat legitimation. Different political and social actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to construct,

change, reproduce, and/or silence narratives about a threat for legitimation. But an actor cannot own the rhetoric, in the sense of fixing the meaning. Therefore, I look at the different rhetorical resources, practices, and strategies for gaining consent about threat narratives, an on-going social process found in the public discourse. Rhetorical strategies connect together rhetorical resources – the "cultural tool kit" of symbols or "commonplaces" - in order to fashion a narrative about a threat (Barnett 1998; Jackson 2006; Shotter 1993).

Since this public debate about a threat occurs in the media, the media emerges as important for understanding threat legitimation (Gurevitch and Levy 1985; Gamson et al. 1992). Media become "a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality" (Chesebro and Bertelsen 1996, 21). Threat is no different, where political and social actors advance arguments, reach audiences, and receive feedback through the media. But questions emerge, how do media affect the process of threat legitimation? Do media impact the rhetorical strategies? Or the relations of social actors involved in the process of threat legitimation?

Instead of simply studying the content of the message, I focus on the environment, or the structural features of the media. Previous studies of foreign policy and international relations assume media are neutral channels that simply communicate messages between groups, sometimes acting as instruments for specified foreign policy actors or as independent actors involved in the foreign

policy process.[3] Instead, I argue that media are not instruments or independent actors, but rather the media environment affects the meaning of message. Each media environment has particular biases, especially concerning space and time, affecting perceptions and interpretations, and generating different information than the content (Deibert 1997a; Deibert 1999). While the media environment is not necessary for threat legitimation, I argue that it can strengthen or weaken a rhetorical strategy. In Van Evera's terminology, the media environment is a conditional variable that influences how rhetoric affects threat legitimation, not whether it affects it or not (Van Evera 1997). Therefore I study how the media environment affects the relationships between social and political actors and how people imagine their collective existence.

In this sense, the media environment affects how people think about the world and imagine their collective existence. Drawing from medium theory, I argue the type of media has constitutive effects on the relationships between social actors (Deibert 1997a). Each media environment provides opportunities and limits to certain political actors and relationships, since how information is produced and received depends on the media environment through which it is transmitted (Horten 2002). As such, the media environment determines not only who speaks but how, a power previously ignored by argumentation theories

[3] The most recent version of the media as an independent actor in the foreign policy process is found in the CNN effect literature (Bahador 2007; Gilboa 2005; Gilboa 2002; Robinson 2002) The contemporary versions of the media as an instrument include manufacturing consent literatures and "indexing" (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Bennett 1990) For a further discussion of these two literatures on the media, see Chapter 2.

(Crawford 2002). The relationship between sender and receiver changes with different media, e.g. the Internet requires a more active receiver than television.

In this dissertation, I argue that rhetoric affects the process of threat legitimation. Political actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to order to generate consent. The rhetorical strategies connect together the rhetorical resources to construct a threat narrative used in the public debates. As I discuss in Chapter 2, I find that rhetorical resources and strategies are important for threat legitimation. In the subsequent empirical chapters, I highlight when and how rhetorical resources and strategies affected threat legitimation. When political actors effectively deployed rhetorical strategies to connect together rhetorical resources, the audience identified with the threat narrative. The deployment of rhetorical resources and strategies changed the public debates and the level of consent about a threat. Political actors used rhetorical resources and strategies to change public debates by silencing or polarizing the opposition, and by mobilizing greater support. Moreover, I argue that the media environment influences how rhetorical strategies affect threat legitimation, acting as a conditional variable. Specific media environments favor certain rhetorical strategies. In the empirical chapters, I find the newspaper media environment favored logos rhetorical strategy, the radio media environment favored ethos rhetorical strategy, and the television media environment favored pathos rhetorical strategy. When political actors used the rhetorical strategy favored by the specific media environment, there was a greater chance the audience identified with the threat narrative.

Security Studies and Threat Legitimation

The field of international politics continues to debate about security and how to study it (for overviews see Baldwin 1996; Baldwin 1997; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; McSweeney 1999; for constructivist security studies see Farrell 2002). The traditional definition of security is the prevention of external military attack from other states. Honed in the realist paradigm, this definition provided the analytic framework for security studies that flourished throughout the Cold War (Walt 1991). Security remains the cornerstone of realism, since "in anarchy, security is the highest end" (Waltz 1979, 126). Yet due to the definition, security studies primarily focus on the means to security, military force.

Several critics questioned this narrow focus on military threats for security studies, as well as its state-centric nature and the concentration only on external threats (Baldwin 1997; Rothschild 1995; Hafterndorn 1991). Two different critical approaches to security emerged – broadening the agenda to include other threats besides the military and deepening the agenda to include individual or human security (Wyn Jones 1999). Perhaps the most developed issue that moved outside the traditional paradigm of security was environmental (Matthews 1989; Ullman 1983; for critique see Deudney 1990); but the range of issues has proliferated in past ten years to include immigration, economics, and human rights (Waever et al. 1993; Lipschutz 1995; McDonald 2002; for overviews see Krause and Williams 1996; Krause 1998). Besides broadening the agenda to include other threats, other critical approaches deepened the security agenda beyond the nation-state.

This change in the referent for security stemmed primarily from *Peoples, States, and Fear* (Buzan 1983), and encouraged studies on societal security and human security, and most recently regional security (Waever et al. 1993; Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; McDonald 2002; Buzan and Waever 2003). As evidenced by the literature on human security, the change in the referent for security to the individual level impacted the conceptualization of threats, as security studies deepens, different threats outside the traditional paradigm become important, widening the agenda (Paris 2001).

However traditional security studies rejects these challenges, arguing that it "runs the risk of expanding security studies excessively; by this logic issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to 'security.' Defining the field this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions" (Walt 1991, 213). Loosely defined security prevents a clear explanatory model or solid empirical testing (Mearsheimer 1995; for other skeptical views see Mearsheimer 1994/95; Walt 1991). This theoretical debate on how to study security mirrors the positivist/post-positivist "third debate in IR theory," since post-positivist literature provided many of the critiques to broaden and deepen the field of security studies (Lapid 1989).[4] However related, these debates are distinct, not all

[4] Following the standard approach of the discipline, I recognize post-positivism as including critical theory, feminist theory, and post-structuralism despite important ontological and epistemological distinctions. (e.g. see Lipschutz 1995; Wyn Jones 1999; Enloe 2000; Sylvester 2002; Campbell 1992) It is also important to note that literature outside of post-positivism made significant contributions to the idea of broadening and deepening the security agenda, especially *Peoples, States, and Fear* (Buzan 1983)

positivists believe that security studies should be relegated to military threats, while post-positivists differ about the proper referent for security.

While these debates have produced significant attention to the concept of security, academia still under-explores the concept of threat and treats it as self-explanatory despite its central role for international politics and foreign policy. For example, Rousseau examines how threat plays the central role of general theories of international relations (Rousseau 2006, 17-38). Yet realism conflates power and threat, arguing that power is a "complete measure of threat" (Doyle 1997). Threat emerges if another state or group of states holds more power than you. However, this step leads realists to focus exclusively on power and conceptually ignore threat. Threat also plays a central role for liberalism, not as a function of power, but from problematic states (Rousseau 2006). Liberalism often explains these rogue states as due to bad leaders, flawed political and economic structures, or robust international organizations. However, the attention of liberalism focuses on these factors, and not the concept of threat itself.

From a different perspective, Buzan attempted to reorient the concept of security and the discipline of security studies (Buzan 1983; Buzan 1995). Buzan argues that security relates to specific threats, however, the conceptual attention remains on security rather than threat (Buzan 1983). Threat is classified into sectors - military, political, economic, and ecological; and also intensity - spatial, temporal, probability, historical (Buzan 1983, 75, 84-86). Buzan realizes that

threats are ambiguous, but he fails to explore the nature of threats any further, leaving several questions unanswered.

Securitization literature picks us the reconceptualization of security and the reformation of security studies (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998). Securitization moves away from an objective analysis of threats by arguing that threats are socially constructed through an intersubjective process. Therefore, securitization literature does not analyze what a threat is, but rather the interactions and processes that determine a threat. The threat does not determine foreign policy behavior, but rather the practice of actors securitizing an issue, "'security' is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in the practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 24).

Securitization theory attempts to incorporate the intersubjective aspects about threats within a coherent framework by defining security as existential threats to a specific referent object (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; Buzan 1983). However these threats are not objectively determined; instead securitizing actors through "speech acts" move an issue from the political domain to the security realm (Onuf 1998; cf. Searle 1969; Austin 1962). An issue enters this security realm when emergency measures beyond the accepted norms and rule are enacted; however, this process is not unilateral since the securitizing actor must generate an endorsement of these emergency measures (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, 31). However, the emphasis on speech acts as "self-referential

practices" undermines the intersubjective nature of the process, minimizing both the role of the audience and importance of power and context (Balzacq 2005). The growing securitization literature exemplifies this problem through methodological adherence to speech acts and their performative role, while overlooking the audience endorsements, intersubjective understandings, and social relationships that I focus on in this dissertation.

Although this dissertation is broadly situated in constructivist security studies, I take an interdisciplinary approach, drawing insights from sociology, rhetoric, political communication, media studies, and even rationalism.[5] The intersubjective and relational nature of threats and the importance of communication agree with constructivism. However, in many other ways, I disagree with other constructivist security studies, which often focus on international norms and ignore domestic political processes. More important, empirical constructivist literature drifts towards individual-level explanations (Tilly 1998; Jackson 2003). Threat legitimation takes intersubjectivity seriously, where the emphasis shifts from "consciousness to conversations, from action to interaction, and selves to sociabilities" (Tilly 1998, 400)

Tilly's critique of *Security Communities* exemplifies the problems of moving towards the individual or subjective explanation where "the main causal story concerns alterations in consciousness" (Tilly 1998). Keck and Sikkink's transnational advocacy networks exemplify this same problem (Keck and Sikkink

[5] As this suggests, I attempt to advance the continuing dialogue between constructivism and rationalism, and incorporates elements from both approaches despite some of the ontological differences. (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1999)

1998; Payne 2001b). Persuasion becomes the primary causal mechanism, depending on frames to change of individual beliefs or preferences. Securitization theory slips into the same problem within the field of security studies (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998; Waever 1995; Buzan and Waever 1997; Buzan and Waever 2003; Guzzini and Jung 2004).

Outside of securitization theory, studies that do analyze threat almost exclusively focus on threat perception. One of the more important articles for security studies and international relations, Walt argues that states do not balance against power, rather they balance against threats (Walt 1985). Several studies have continued along this path, producing works about how and under what conditions threats are perceived. Two broad paradigms of threat perception emerged, objectivist and subjectivist. Studies in the objectivist paradigm argued that threats exist independent of beliefs and perceptions, with some inherent property. One example of current research is the idea of "threat inflation" (Kaufmann 2004). Studies of threat inflation believe that threats can be independently measured and assessed, and then judged in comparison to how threats are portrayed. Threats are considered inflated when the assessment exceeds this objective standard (Kaufmann 2004). A similar line of research is the idea of "threat exaggeration" (Mueller 2005).

Subjective approaches believe that threats are reducible to individual or group perceptions, beliefs, or interpretations. Problems with the idea of objective threats led several different studies towards subjective analyses, including neoclassical realist scholarship (Wohlforth 1987a; Wohlforth 1993; Christensen

1997; Van Evera 1998; Schweller 2006). As Schweller notes, “threat perception is a crucial intervening variable between changes in relative power and reaction in the form of balancing power” (Schweller 2006, 37). Including perceptions and intentions into the analysis solves various empirical problems for these studies. However, subjective approaches move the analysis away from the environment to the decision making process and the individual decision maker.

By making this analytical move, studies of threat perception fall into the same problems previously mentioned about constructivism and securitization theory. Reducing threat to the individual level creates significant analytical and empirical problems. As a recent example, Schweller studies the role of threat perception and foreign policy (Schweller 2006; Schweller 2004). The proximate cause of foreign policy behavior, specifically underbalancing, is shared elite perception about a threat. However, Schweller does not explain how perceptions become “shared” (Schweller 2006). There is no role for communication - why and how do perceptions get communicated between individuals and groups? Instead, perception is treated as an individual activity and remains subjective.

In Chapter 2, I highlight and expand on the problems of both objectivist and subjectivist studies when I review the literature. However, it is important to note that despite a recent focus on threat, academia still does not have a good idea about how political actors convince others which threats exist and deserve priority over other threats. By taking insights from political communication and media studies, I provide a different approach than traditional security studies. By staying in the framework of traditional security studies, the extant literature

ignores the role of communication and the importance of legitimation. Traditional security studies defines national security as the prevention of military attacks from other states, and therefore concentrates on external threats objectively determined by material capability and remains wedded to a state-centric framework. Since threats are 'self-regarding', in the sense of state power that is measurable, there is no need to legitimize threat determination (Wendt 1999, 33). For neorealism, the determination or perception of threats becomes automatic based on the logic of the external environment. Furthermore, the unitary state actor assumption of traditional neorealist security studies suppresses inquiries about the nature of threats, assuming the autonomy of the state as an actor, and considers the role of society as a passive audience. Decision-making and organization-bureaucratic approaches open up the unitary state actor model, but fail to integrate the role of society (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962; Allison and Zelikow 1999). Pluralist approaches incorporate society, but the logic remains the same as traditional security studies only reversed – the state becomes the passive audience and society, primarily through pressure groups, determines national security and what is a threat (Levy 1998). Each of these theories and approaches naturalize the concept of threat, presuming that threats are descriptions or perceptions of reality.

None of these approaches incorporate communication of threat as important for security studies or foreign policy behavior. They assume that the process of public consent about a threat is automatic – where the state acts as a security agent for society, determining and reacting to various external threats to

the nation-state. I argue communication is critical to establish the meaning and priority of a threat. As E.H. Carr noted, convincing others is a critical component of power that is often overlooked (Carr 1940). Leaders need support for conducting foreign policy, and communication is a critical process necessary for gaining support.

Constructivism, on the other hand, includes communication as a critical process for international politics, believing "communication plays a central role in the social construction of phenomenon" (Rousseau 2006, 41; Wendt 1999, 346). However, constructivism has primarily focused on international communication while ignoring domestic processes (Wendt 1999; Hopf 2002). Even in the field of security studies, constructivist research focuses on whether a state adheres to international norms (Hopf 2002). The most influential constructivist project in security studies, the *Culture of National Security*, highlights both the advantages and problems of the mainstream constructivist approach (Katzenstein 1996). A major positive step was including communication, where the development and spread of ideas, or norms, required communication (Price and Tannenwald 1996; Finnemore 1996). But this study also highlights the problems of constructivism. For one, constructivism does not include the domestic component for explaining state behavior. Global civil society is considered the important arena of communication for international politics. Second, the research focuses on norms and the logic of appropriateness (Risse 2000). As a result, "the constructivist account is quickly reduced to the choice or rejection of the norm by a decision maker rather than a social account of the

configuration of intersubjective meanings that made possible the very thinkability or imaginability of the choices" (Hopf 2002, 280). Finally, as noted earlier, the causal mechanism for this decision is persuasion.

I believe and argue throughout this dissertation that persuasion is a problematic causal explanation for threat legitimation. For one, it requires getting inside the heads of individuals in order to measure its effectiveness, creating various empirical problems since it is difficult to determine whether an argument was internalized by an individual (Payne 2001b). An analysis that focuses on inner mechanisms needs to understand individually held beliefs or preferences, and look at psychological, cultural and normative dispositions, as well as the intentions of individuals. This micro-level approach is not only inconsistent with the theoretical approach of this project, it creates several problems. For one, persuasion requires a distinction between sincerely embracing a threat claim as opposed to agreeing for strategic or other reasons (Payne 2001b). Furthermore, knowing the true intentions of social actors is problematic since researchers cannot observe directly what people think. Studying these preferences is also less interesting because it does not matter if an individual believes a threat claim – the feedback and its effects is more important than the reasons for the feedback. Since I am interested in studying how a threat gains public consent, I investigate the social processes rather than individual mechanisms involved (Jackson 2003). Studying persuasion examines what

individuals believe, reducing the analysis to the content of an argument rather than the context and process of legitimation.[6]

Therefore, I believe this study on threat legitimation is important for academic purposes. For one, the fields of international relations and security studies under-explore the concept of threat. Second, I move beyond the traditional objectivist and subjectivist paradigms about threat and move the focus to rhetoric and communication. Third, I begin to highlight the importance of legitimacy and rhetoric in foreign policy making.

Beyond filling this academic gap, I hope to make a practical contribution as well. The idea of threat is found in public discourse about foreign policy, and also among foreign policy practitioners. Foreign policy decision makers, bureaucratic experts, journalists, and politicians, among others, reference threats in their speeches, papers, and conversations. Without a greater understanding of how threats are constructed, however, we have an incomplete picture of how they explain behavior. Referring back to the introductory quote, President Reagan's failure to legitimate the Sandinista threat in Nicaragua had significant foreign policy implications. The lack of public consent prevented the Reagan administration from enacting the policies they wanted. Therefore they were forced to undertake covert operations that eventually undermined the goals in Nicaragua and hurt their political power at home.

Outline of Dissertation

[6] This is a significant problem for political communication literature on framing, as I discuss in Chapter 2.

In Chapter Two, I define and further explain threat legitimation, rhetorical resources and strategies, and the media environment, with the goal of specifying their relationships and delimiting the nature of the project. This includes situating each of the concepts in the current literature. Threat legitimation is the dependent variable, affected by the rhetorical strategies used to form a narrative about a threat. The media environment impacts the effectiveness of the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation, acting as a conditional variable. At the end of Chapter 2, I provide the research design, explaining the causal relationships between these key variables, case selection, and the methods of observation.

In Chapter Three, I study two episodes, the Baltimore Affair between the United States and Chile in 1891-1892, and the War of 1898 between Spain and the United States. The Baltimore Affair offers an episode of unsuccessful threat legitimation, despite the effort of President Harrison and others in the administration. While this is a rarely discussed event in United States foreign policy, there are competing theories explaining the outcome. Not only is the Baltimore Affair theoretically and empirically interesting, it also provides significant "within case" variation of threat legitimation. There exist several changes in the level of public consent about the Chilean threat, allowing comparisons between the causal mechanisms involved. Instead of power or perceptions, it is rhetoric that influences United States foreign policy towards Chile. The Harrison administration unsuccessfully deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to connect the honor and reputation of the United States to its position in the international community. On the other hand, the opposition effectively

deployed logos rhetorical strategies to explain why Chile was not a threat, and how the administration was using the Baltimore Affair for electoral gain instead of defending the honor of the United States.

The War of 1898 provides an example of successful threat legitimation only seven years after the Baltimore Affair. Not only does this allow me greater explanatory leverage by comparing the causal mechanisms, it also offers an opportunity to explore the role of the newspaper media environment on the process of threat legitimation. To my knowledge, no studies have explored the role of newspapers in the Baltimore Affair.

On the other hand, several studies argue that newspapers played a central role in the War of 1898 (Perez Jr. 1998; Paterson 1996; Hamilton 2006). This episode of successful threat legitimation involves not only newspapers, but also several competing theories about why Spain was a threat to the United States. Both objectivist and subjectivist scholars make arguments about why Spain was a threat, but fall short in various ways. By tracing the narratives about the threat, I argue that rhetorical resources and strategies explain the successful legitimation of the Spanish threat. President McKinley deployed logos rhetorical strategies to connect how the United States was the defender of Cuba to the interests of the United States, reorienting intervention as an economic benefit instead of a cost. An independent Cuba would benefit United States investments and trade. In both the Baltimore Affair and the War of 1898, the newspaper media environment favored logos rhetorical strategies.

In Chapter Four, I study the threat of Nazi Germany prior to World War II and the threat of Soviet Russia after World War II. During the late 1930s, President Roosevelt tried to convince Americans that Nazi Germany was a threat to the United States. Various sources mention that President Roosevelt wanted to go to war with Germany (Dallek 1979, 285; Trachtenberg 2006). Despite his perception and numerous attempts to convince the American public, President Roosevelt never successfully legitimated the German threat. Both objectivist and subjectivist studies struggle to explain these failures, especially in light of President Roosevelt's strategic use of radio throughout his presidency. President Roosevelt primarily relied on logos and pathos rhetorical strategies to connect together the rhetorical resources of balance of power, European market, civilization, and democracy to fashion a threat narrative about how Germany would take over Europe and then attack the United States. Anti-interventionists used ethos rhetorical strategies, relying on political and social authority to connect together the rhetorical resources of Neutrality, American exceptionalism, World War I, and Democracy to argue that Germany would not and/or could not attack the United States.

During the late 1940s, the Truman administration argued that the Soviet Union and the spread of communism presented a threat to United States. Even though most do not consider President Truman a better politician or rhetorician than President Roosevelt, he succeeded in legitimating the threat of the Soviet Union after World War II. Increased levels of defense spending and war-time mobilization occurred despite the relative weakness of the Soviet Union

compared to the United States, and the domestic weariness in the United States because of World War II. Unlike the Roosevelt administration, President Truman and his supporters relied on ethos rhetorical strategies to connect together the rhetorical resources of communism, totalitarianism, Nazi Germany, appeasement, democracy, civilization, and isolationism. Just as in the Nazi Germany episode, the radio media environment favored these ethos rhetorical strategies.

In Chapter Five, I study the Sandinista threat in Nicaragua and the Noriega threat in Panama to the United States. Nicaragua (1982-1988) provides an example of unsuccessful threat legitimation concerning the spread of Communism. Significant efforts by important political actors, including the Reagan administration, did not receive public support. The Reagan administration relied on logos and ethos rhetorical strategies to explain how communism would spread from Nicaragua through Central America, threatening the Panama Canal and the southern United States. The opposition successfully undermined this threat narrative by connecting it to Vietnam through pathos rhetorical strategies.

Within the same television media environment, Sandinista Nicaragua is compared to the successful threat legitimation of Noriega Panama (1989). Panama was presented as a threat to the United States because of drug-trafficking and existence of a Central American dictatorship. These two Central American cases provide some interesting comparisons, especially since the success of threat legitimation seems counter-intuitive. President Bush

successfully deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to identify Noriega as a drug trafficking dictator. In both episodes, the television media environment favored these pathos rhetorical strategies.

In Chapter Six, I conclude by comparing and analyzing the previous empirical cases in order to flush out the process of threat legitimation. I argue objectivist and subjectivist studies fail to fully explain threat legitimation. A rhetorical approach, focusing on rhetorical resources and strategies, provides a more complete understanding of threat. Furthermore, I explore the role of the media environment and how it conditions the impact of rhetorical strategies used for threat legitimation. Finally, I comment on the process of threat legitimation for contemporary world politics, how it has changed and also remained the same.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I define and further explain threat legitimation, rhetorical resources and strategies, and the media environment, with the goal of specifying their relationships and delimiting the nature of the project. This includes situating each of the concepts in the current literature. Threat legitimation is the dependent variable, affected by the rhetorical resources and strategies used to form a narrative about a threat. Political actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies in order to construct a narrative about a threat. The media environment impacts the effectiveness of the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation, acting as a conditional variable for threat legitimation. At the end of the chapter, I explain the causal relationships between these key variables, case selection, and the methods of observation in the research design section.

What is a Threat?

Security studies conceptualize threat in two different ways. Game theorists and deterrence studies define threat as a strategy, where an actor promises punishment in order to influence behavior. The second definition of threat describes a relationship between two actors, often states for international politics, where one actor anticipates harm from the other (Schweller 2006; Baldwin 1971). I use this second definition because it is the most widely used for security studies and international politics.

Early in the discipline of security studies, threat became associated with an objective condition. Realists argued states anticipated harm based on power relations – another state was considered a threat if they had more power. As discussed in Chapter 1, realists conflated power and threat, measuring state power in terms of material capabilities in order to explain international politics. However, empirical problems with this argument led realists to include other factors, in particular the concept of revisionist states (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985). Eventually the concept of threat disappeared from the theories and models.

However, Walt reintroduced the concept of threat to explain the shortcoming of balance of power theories, arguing states balance against threat (Walt 1985). This distinction between threat and power differs from most realists, arguing "rather than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most *threatening* power" (Walt 1985, 8-9). It is not the distribution of power among states that determines foreign policy behavior, but the existence of threats to the state. The factors that determine the level of threat include 1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3) offensive capability; and 4) offensive intentions.

The first two factors remain within the material framework, with aggregate power referring to state resources and proximity to the geographic position of state in the system. However, offensive capability introduces an element of perception, with a state judging whether another state's capabilities are offensive or defensive. Van Evera's Offense-Defense Theory explicates this distinction,

suggesting that when offense dominates there is a greater chance for war (Van Evera 1998). Van Evera admits, “offense dominance is more often imagined than real”, which makes the perceptions of states more important than material capability (Van Evera 1998, 6).

The concept of offensive intentions moves Walt’s threat perception further away from material considerations about foreign policy. Threat requires interpretation, where “perceptions of intent play an especially crucial role in alliance choices” (Walt 1985, 12). It is not the simple aggregation of opposing military power that determines foreign policy, but “the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing coalition” (Walt 1985, 13). Therefore, states balance against external threats, and not power.

Therefore, Walt needs interpretation in his theory for states to determine threats, since states balance against the perceived offensive capabilities and intentions of other states when conducting foreign policy. Christensen further develops the need for including perceptions to explain the empirical anomalies for state behavior (Christensen 1997, 66). While states desire to balance through alliances, misperceptions can lead to counter-intuitive choices since “misperceptions of either of the bedrock realist factors - the distribution of capabilities or the relative efficacy of offensive or defensive doctrines - should lead to behavior radically different from what we would expect from actors with more accurate perceptions” (Christensen 1997, 68). This highlights the problems of determining and measuring power, and the difficulty of reaching an objective indicator.

The importance of perception is also emphasized by Wohlforth, where "if 'power' influences international relations, it must do so through the perceptions of those who act on behalf of states" (Wohlforth 1987b, 353). There are no objective measures of power and how it is distributed, and therefore decision-makers are important to consider when understanding state behavior and foreign policy. This important modification explains several empirical problems with balance of power theories. However, the inclusion of threats by Walt and others includes some theoretical baggage. Most important, threats are perceived phenomena. This perceptual patch onto balance of power theory moves the analysis towards a subjective and individual analysis.

Two broad paradigms of threat perception emerged in security studies, objectivist and subjectivist.[7] Scholars in the objectivist paradigm continue to assert that threat exists independent of beliefs and perceptions, with some inherent property. One interesting example of current research that follows this logic is the idea of "threat inflation" (Kaufmann 2004; Cramer 2004).[8] Studies of threat inflation generally hold that threats can be independently measured and assessed, often by focusing on the international environment and state power, and then judged in comparison to how threats are portrayed. Threats are considered inflated when the assessment exceeds this objective standard

[7] These approaches are general paradigms about how to think about threats. They do not represent the particular positions and many differences among the individual theories and theorists mentioned. The goal is to highlight the main trends and differences in the current literature about threats. I would argue that both objective and subjective analyses of threats can contribute to understanding national security and foreign policy, depending on the research question.

[8] A similar line of research is the theory of 'threat exaggeration' which also takes an objective approach (Mueller 2005).

(Kaufmann 2004). Realists, as one group of objectivists, argue that states balance against a rising power or a change in the distribution of power because of the threat of asymmetric power relations in an anarchic international system (Rousseau 2006; Schweller 2006). Having as much or more power than other states is the only way to ensure survival. Therefore power replaces threat since "balance of power doctrine makes the special claim that power – capacity – is the valid and complete measure of threat and that we need to balance against capacity, whatever the intentions that the states are currently expressing" (Doyle 1997, 168; Rousseau 2006). As this quote suggests, the objectivist paradigm faces analytical and empirical challenges. Analytically, power as threat becomes reduced to material capabilities to avoid tautology and allow measurement (Guzzini 1993; Barnett and Duvall 2005). This narrow conception of power and threat as capability fails to include non-material and non-state sources of power and threat. Empirically, the objectivist paradigm struggles to explain international outcomes and state behaviors. States often do not balance against capabilities or consider power as threat (Schroeder 1994; Schweller 2006).

Scholars in the subjectivist paradigm assume that a threat is reducible to individual or group perceptions, beliefs, or interpretations. Problems with the idea of objective threats led several different studies, starting with Walt, towards the subjectivist paradigm (Walt 1985; Wohlforth 1987a; Wohlforth 1993; Christensen 1997; Van Evera 1998). These realist studies, often referred to as neo-classical realism, attempt to meld objective and subjective theories about threats. The international environment, as an objective reality, is filtered through

the subjective perceptions, intentions, and motives of foreign policy makers. Therefore neo-classical realism explains the empirical anomalies of foreign policy, e.g. why states do not balance when objective conditions warrant. However, the proximate cause for state behavior is the perception of foreign policy makers and not the international environment, and therefore fits into a subjectivist paradigm about threat. For example, Schweller studies the foreign policy of under-balancing, where states fail to respond to a threat. Schweller juxtaposes an objective assessment of the threat with state behavior – both Britain and France should have balanced against Germany prior to World War II. However, the proximate cause for state behavior is elite perceptions, a subjectivist study of threat. Non-realist subjectivist scholars tend to focus exclusively on individual and group decision making, including cognitive or motivational biases, to explain threat and state behavior. (Nash and Scott 2001; Knorr 1976).

Including perceptions and intentions in the analysis solves various empirical problems for subjectivists. The explanation moves away from the international environment to the decision-making process and the individual decision maker. However, this poses several problems. Analytically, subjectivism reduces a threat to the property of an individual. This requires getting inside the head of decision-makers to understand threat, an inherent flaw since researchers are unable to have complete access to an individual's motives, perceptions, or intentions (Krebs and Jackson 2007). Even if this was possible, individual level factors cannot fully explain social outcomes (Tilly 2005; Mayntz 2004).

Empirically, a subjectivism cannot explain why and how perceptions get communicated between individuals and groups. Even though a foreign policy maker perceives a threat, such a President Reagan about Sandinistas in Nicaragua, it does not necessitate that the perception is shared by other foreign policy elites or the American public. Individuals are unable to determine threat since it is a social process and outcome, as I will demonstrate below.

In this dissertation, I attempt to address these problems by moving beyond the objectivist and subjectivist paradigms. I argue that threat is a social fact that is not objectively or subjectively determined by environmental factors or individual actors. Instead, threat is socially constructed. Threat is of course 'real' and at times material, but the material reality in the environment requires an intersubjective understanding about what it is and why it is a threat. Therefore, political actors undertake a social process of threat legitimation, which is crucial to our understanding of international security, yet outside the scope of either objectivist or subjectivist studies.

Threat Legitimation

Threat legitimation is a process of gaining consent for a particular interpretation about the world – that an issue or event is a threat, or a threat claim. Interpretation, however, is not an individual-level process like subjectivist paradigm about threat where the "main causal story concerns alterations in consciousness" (Tilly 1998, 400). Instead, the focus is on gaining consent and an intersubjective understanding about a threat, where the emphasis shifts from

"consciousness to conversations, from action to interaction, and selves to sociabilities" (Tilly 1998, 400).

Threats require legitimation because they are "social facts" and not objective truths or subjective perceptions (Ruggie 1998b, 21; Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 159; c.f. Goddard 2006). Social facts are "produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they exist" (Ruggie 1998b, 12). A social fact "having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations" gives meaning to human action and behavior (Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 59). Numerous social theorists from different traditions, from Durkheim and Weber to Bordieu and Searle, explore similar ideas though in different forms (Ruggie 1998c).

This definition of threat legitimation is influenced by Max Weber and political sociology (Beetham 2001). Legitimacy is not the claim to speak on the behalf of society or have the authority to act (monopoly of force), but instead a practice – achieving consent for those rights. This focuses on how legitimacy is not an endpoint or realized ideal, but a continuous process that involves both the state and citizens revolving around consent. Therefore, I agree with Weber's suggestion about measuring legitimacy from an intersubjective rather than normative stance. The researcher should not measure legitimacy based on a universal standard apart from the practice of legitimation, but drawn empirically as a general understanding from the actual subjects being governed. Taking the empirical track avoids judging whether a threat claim was right or wrong.

This definition and study of threat legitimation also draws from Alexander George's idea of policy legitimacy (George 2002). George argues that a fundamental problem for presidents is to legitimate foreign policy so that "forces of democratic control and domestic pressures do not hobble him and prevent him" from conducting foreign policy (George 2002, 321). Without a "stable national consensus," presidents could not effectively conduct foreign policy (George 2002, 321). Presidents cannot simply invoke national interest (George 2002). Instead, presidents must explain and justify their foreign policy to other foreign policy elites, Congress, and the public.

This concept of legitimation agrees with studies of American domestic politics and international relations. Chilton argues that leaders need to legitimate their policies to themselves, legislators, and electorates (Chilton 1996a). Risse agrees that leaders must increasingly justify their foreign policies to international and domestic publics (Risse-Kappen 1991). Crawford also argues that the process of foreign policy making is a nest of arguments among elites, within organizations, and between elites and publics (Crawford 2002, 13).

Communication and Rhetoric

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the above discussion suggests the importance of communication. Previous studies of the presidency and political communication confirm the need for president to communicate with elites and the public in order to get support for domestic policies (Tulis 1987; Kernell 1986). George extends this insight to foreign policy, arguing that presidents need to

communicate for effective policy legitimation (George 2002). Presidents need elite and public support for conducting foreign policy, and communication is a critical process for gaining support. Therefore presidents, and other political actors, attempt to legitimate a threat in order to get consent from various political and social groups necessary for enacting foreign policy.

Unfortunately, the extant security studies literature ignores the role of communication. Security studies do not have a good idea about how political actors convince others what threats exist and deserve priority over other threats. As a recent example, Schweller argued shared elite perceptions cause states to under-balance against threats, as mitigated by other domestic factors such as elite and social cohesion (Schweller 2006). However, Schweller never addresses how these perceptions are communicated – are they simply individual decisions arrived independently of one another? Do presidents try to convince members of the administration about a perceived threat, or vice-versa? Are elite perceptions an example of group decision making? More important, how do elites convince (or fail to convince) the public about their perceptions?

Since security studies rarely take communication seriously, I rely on constructivist international relations literature as well as studies about the presidency and political communication. While constructivist international relations often limit its focus to international communication, there are some important insights especially in the growing literature about rhetoric. I believe that rhetoric is central for understanding the success or failure of threat legitimation, since it is a social process that depends on communication. As E.H.

Carr stated, “power over opinion is … not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of political leader. Rhetoric has a long and honoured record in the annals of statesmanship” (Carr 1940). Threat legitimation occurs in the public discourse through rhetoric. As I discuss below, political actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to construct, reproduce, and change narratives about a threat.

The study of rhetoric has two dominant traditions in political science and international relations. The first tradition considers rhetoric as simply “cheap talk” that can be ignored or epiphenomenal to strategic interaction (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; see Mearsheimer 2001; Fearon 1994).[9] Rhetoric masks reality such as underlying power or institutional relations. Often this coincides with the contemporary and mainstream definition of rhetoric as “eloquent language” which carries a negative connotation, i.e. “mere rhetoric.”

The second tradition considers rhetoric as an important explanans of international relations (Beer and Hariman 1996). This growing literature includes studies on persuasion and framing (Checkel 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Meyer 1995). More and more studies include language as an important factor for explaining international relations, especially constructivism (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). This definition of rhetoric as the art of persuasion matches most academic traditions, including rhetorical analysis and political communication.

[9] It is important to note that bargaining scholarship does not always fall into the ‘cheap talk’ category (see Sartori 2002).

Perhaps the most developed literature on rhetoric and political science concerns the presidency. Two fields have emerged over the years, the rhetorical presidency and presidential rhetoric (Medhurst 1996). The former concerns itself primarily with the presidency as an institution, exemplified in the seminal work by Tulis, *The Rhetorical Presidency* (Tulis 1987). Tulis argues that the ability of the president to directly communicate with the mass public changed the presidency. With the rise of the modern presidency, rhetoric has become the "principal tool of presidential governance" (Tulis 1987, 4). Studies of presidential rhetoric often reside outside the disciplinary boundaries of political science and focus on the rhetoric rather than the institution. For example, Bostdorff argues that presidents use rhetoric to promote foreign crises (Bostdorff 1993).

While encouraged and influenced by the proliferation of both types of studies in this second tradition, I argue they suffer from two main deficiencies. One problem is the focus on the individual level, in particular how the causal mechanisms operate. A main reason is because linguistic studies, such as rhetorical analysis, view the text as the object of analysis rather than a "window into human experience" (Ryan and Bernard 2000, 769). Even disciplines such as political science and political communication remain at the individual level when analyzing rhetoric. For example, studies of presidential rhetoric focus on the persuasive influence of individual presidents or how the institutional power in foreign policy gives the president a persuasive advantage (Parry-Giles 2002).

The problem is not methodological, but theoretical – the linkage between rhetoric and persuasion limits the investigation to individual level causal

mechanisms. Persuasion occurs at the individual level, where non-coercive communication changes the attitude, belief, or behavior of another person (Checkel 2001, 562; Simons, Morreale, and Gronbeck 2001, 7). However persuasion assumes that the researcher can determine a priori individually held preferences – requiring an understanding of psychological, cultural, and normative dispositions, as well as the intentions of individuals (Payne 2001a). Knowing the true intentions of social actors is problematic since researchers cannot directly observe what people think. Just as important, persuasion assumes that a researcher can determine why the preferences change – that an actor sincerely embraces a threat claim as opposed to agreeing for strategic or other reasons (Payne 2001a). Treating rhetoric as persuasion turns it into an exercise of cognitive psychology – whether rhetoric is effective or not requires assessing whether or not there has been a change in the mental state of the audience (Potter 1996, 108). This moves the analysis to the individual level, where the "main causal story concerns alterations in consciousness" (Tilly 1998, 400).

The second deficiency, stemming from the first, is the instrumental nature of rhetoric within this literature. This leads other studies to imagine rhetoric solely as an independent variable (even if some postmodern studies are loath to frame it in this fashion). Actors use rhetoric – causing changes in behavior for more positivist literature, or constituting more power for post-positivist literature. Once again, instead of being a methodological choice, it becomes a theoretical necessity because of the commitment to individualism. Rhetoric slips

into instrumentalism through the ontological stance that individuals have control over the rhetoric they do or do not use. Both the individual and instrumental nature of rhetoric leads to a top-down bias, e.g. how a president can change the beliefs of the mass public. This is both empirically and theoretically flawed – other political actors and institutions are discounted, including Congress and the public, and public debate is dismissed as epiphenomenal.

To correct both of these problems, this study takes a sociological approach to rhetoric, focusing on how people interact and arrive at understanding, rather than defining rhetoric simply as persuasive communication (Potter 1996; Billig 1987). Instead of persuasion, rhetoric is the "symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Burke 1969, 43). This definition complements recent studies, where rhetoric is "the strategic use of communication, oral or written, to achieve specifiable goals" (Kuypers 2005, 5) and Billig's charge that rhetoric should not be limited to explicitly persuasive communication (Billig 1987).

A sociological approach avoids the instrumentalism and individualism found in other rhetorical studies, such as the framing and persuasion literature (Payne 2001a; Checkel 2001, 562; Simons, Morreale, and Gronbeck 2001, 7). Rhetoric articulates intersubjective meanings in the public discourse, rather than being the property of an individual. Individuals cannot simply use rhetoric as they choose, but rather depend on social and intersubjective understandings about the world. This is different from subjectivist research, which takes a top-down approach to the foreign policy process. It is not enough for a leader or even

a group of elites to perceive a threat. Instead, foreign policy elites must construct an intersubjective meaning of threat, around which other political and social actors can mobilize support while also silencing or marginalizing criticism. Through this process, rhetoric simultaneously produce and is a product of these meanings and interactions (Tilly 2001). Therefore, a threat requires these legitimation processes in order to become a social fact. Taking a sociological and relational approach to rhetoric incorporates these ideas and includes the coercive nature of language, and the power relations found within and behind the words, unlike studies of persuasion or framing (Jackson and Nexon 1999).[10]

This sociological and relational approach to rhetoric complements a growing literature in international relations. Primarily this literature is outside of security studies, but I believe its theories, insights, and findings are important for understanding threat legitimation. I address a number of these studies in the next section, including ones about public debates, communication, and rhetorical resources and strategies (Barnett 1998; Lynch 1999; Beer and Hariman 1996; Goddard 2006; Jackson 2006; Krebs and Jackson 2007). While I disagree with these studies at various points, as seen below, all of them stress the need to focus on communication and rhetoric for international politics.

Rhetorical Resources and Strategies

[10] For relational sociology, social actors are always embedded in time and space, therefore agency cannot be analyzed apart from the relations that provide capacity for action (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Relational sociology helps provide a coherent approach to the nature of agency for rhetoric, where structure and agency are co-constituted (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1987) and agency is path-dependent and contexualized (Jackson and Nexon 1999; Jackson 2003).

Since threat legitimation is a social process in the public discourse, I focus on rhetorical resources and strategies. Rhetorical resources exist in the public discourse as important signifiers of meaning. Barnett calls them cultural symbols which derive meaning from historical and cultural context (Barnett 1998, 42). Political actors draw from a "cultural tool kit" in order to define events or issues, using them in public debates (Barnett 1998, 10). However, political actors cannot conjure symbols or rhetorical resources from nothing (Barnett 1998, 43). Rhetorical resources are powerful because they have "cultural resonance" (Barnett 1998, 43). However, rhetorical resources are also ambiguous, allowing political actors to use and deploy them in order to construct narratives (Barnett 1998, 43). Jackson makes similar arguments, but calls rhetorical resources "commonplaces" (Jackson 2006, 28). This concept of commonplaces highlights the shared but contested nature of rhetorical resources. Rhetorical resources can be used in different ways, and often by both sides in the public debate (Jackson 2006). As such, rhetorical resources are important social sites in that they are relatively stable but contested nodes found in the public discourse (Hansen 2006; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Jackson 2006). Rhetorical resources are not ahistorical or universal, but depend on culture and context.

The idea that political actors use rhetorical resources in public debates highlights their strategic nature. Rhetoric bolsters particular interpretations of the world and protects them from criticism (Potter 1996). Rhetorical strategies connect together rhetorical resources in order to fashion a narrative about a threat (Barnett 1998; Jackson 2006; Shotter 1993). Rhetorical strategies alter the

connections between and among rhetorical resources and people through the process of identification. Rhetorical strategies attempt to alter how an audience identifies with a rhetorical resource in order to win a debate. Identification connects the audience to a rhetorical resource. If a political actor can connect a rhetorical resource to the audience, he can produce and reproduce the meaning of the rhetorical resource. This process shapes the scope, visibility, intensity, and direction of the debate since "the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power" (Schattschneider 1960, 68). For instance, a political actor can mobilize support for an argument if the audience identifies with the meaning of the rhetorical resource. Additionally, opposition support can also be divided or polarized through this same process of identification. William Riker points out how a rhetorical strategy can divide the opposition by forcing a choice about how they identify with a rhetorical resource (Riker 1996; Riker 1986). As this suggests, rhetorical resources are rather elastic and often are shared "commonplaces" that are used by both sides in a debate (Jackson 2006).

Furthermore, rhetorical strategies can also alter how rhetorical resources relate to one another through identification. Rhetorical strategies try to combine or break apart these rhetorical resources in order to win the debate (Jackson 2006). These relations between the resources give the resources meaning while producing the threat narrative. For instance, combining "democracy" and "American exceptionalism" identifies democracy as a uniquely American political system and discourages intervention to help or promote other democracies. As I follow the public debates forward, I trace how a threat narrative is produced

through the actual rhetoric deployments, noting how the narrative is constructed rather than why. I connect the turning points in the narrative to the rhetorical strategies used by the political actors (Barnett 1998, 19). In this sense, identification is a relational and social process, in that it alters the connections among people and groups, as well as social sites (Potter 1996). Instead of reifying identity, this type of analysis focuses on the practice of identification which avoids the theoretical and analytical problems of traditional studies of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).

This study returns to the classical roots of rhetoric and uses Aristotle's classification of rhetorical strategies, logos, pathos, and ethos. Referred to as "appeals" (which marries nicely with the idea of rhetoric as identification) in classical rhetorical analysis, these three rhetorical strategies have a long and widespread acceptance.

Logos loosely translates as an appeal to reason. A logos strategy means that political actors use logical reasoning in order to connect together rhetorical resources and attach the audience to the argument. A political actor appeals to the audience's rationality through inductive or deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning includes using examples or evidence to make an argument, such as statistics, factual data, quotations, or citations from experts. This includes legal arguments. Deductive reasoning uses syllogism or an enthymeme where a premise in the syllogism is assumed. This requires the audience to fill in the gap, often with commonly held beliefs or assumptions about the world.

Ethos relies on authority to makes these connections between rhetorical resources and the audience. Ethos appeals to the audience's view of the actor as an authority. An actor presents herself as a credible authority by citing their qualities or traits, like having expertise, moral character, or even rationality. A similar ethos strategy involves claiming the authority of the majority. For instance, President Nixon often referred to the "silent majority" as supporting his policies in Vietnam (Kernell 1986). Political actors often use public opinion (even without citing polling data) in order to present themselves as an authority for the sake of appealing to the audience. Another ethos rhetorical strategy occurs when a political actor demonstrates competence on the subject matter. The political actor presents themselves as an authority, especially in the view of the audience. This includes using appropriate language or signaling audience-specific knowledge. As audiences change, the ethos appeal needs to change or the audience no longer identifies the speaker as an authority.

Pathos uses emotions and empathy to connect the rhetorical resources and the audience. Pathos appeals to the emotions of the audience by developing an empathetic relationship. The actor engages the emotions of the audience. The actor provokes audience emotions for the sake of creating a bond. Therefore it is important to see the emotional appeals within the discourse. Emotions are relational because they produce recognition through shared feelings (Farrell 1993). Pathos strategies create a commonly held identity through an emotional bond. Rarely do you see direct appeals, but instead recreating an event or retelling a story to arouse emotions. Often political actors use the national voice

of “we” to make this emotional appeal and connect to the idea of a shared community.

Media Environment

Since public debates about a threat occur in the media, I study the role of the media for threat legitimation (Nacos, Shapiro, and Isernia 2000). Political actors advance arguments, reach audiences, and receive feedback about threat legitimation through the media. Instead of simply studying the content of the message, I also focus on the environment, or the structural features of the media. Previous studies of foreign policy and international relations assume media are neutral channels that simply communicate messages between groups, sometimes acting as instruments for specified foreign policy actors or as independent actors involved in the foreign policy process.

The CNN effect literature is the most recent argument treating the media as an independent actor in the foreign policy process. In the CNN effect literature, the transformative nature of communications technology gives the media more power in the foreign policy process. This conceptualizes the media as an actor who influences foreign policy through various mechanisms, such as agenda setting or undermining public support (Bahador 2007; Gilboa 2002; Gilboa 2005). For example, Martin Shaw points out how the media brought about Kurdish safe havens in Iraq, and similar arguments have been made about intervention in Somalia and Kosovo (Shaw 1996, 88; Bahador 2007; Robinson

2002). Others argue the media have a more indirect influence on foreign policy, but still conceptualize the media as an independent actor (Robinson 2002).

In the debate about the CNN effect, scholars who disagree that the media is an important actor in the foreign policy often conceptualize the media as instrument of foreign policy elites. This conceptualization of the media has a long tradition in several different literatures. The manufacturing consent literature argues that governments influence the media through direct and indirect methods (Herman and Chomsky 1988). The indexing literature makes a similar argument, where the media simply channel elite debates (Hallin 1986; Bennett 1990; Mermin 1999b). For example, Hallin argues the media only opposed the Vietnam War after political elites began criticizing the war (Hallin 1986). Rather than acting independently as suggested by the CNN literature, indexing scholars believe political elites use the media for public support of their position in the debates. Other scholars limit the scope of political elites to the executive branch, but still conceptualize the media as an instrument (Entman 2004; Western 2005).

These literatures share the idea that the media is a neutral channel, transmitting the views of political actors. This assumption is made in other literatures as well, including studies of framing and argumentation (Entman 2004; Crawford 2002). Both literatures focus on the content of the message, ignoring how new communication technologies change how the message is delivered or received. While the media is "a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social

reality," this site is not neutral since it favors certain actors, institutions, and arguments (Gurevitch and Levy 1985; Gamson et al. 1992).

Therefore I study the media environment in addition to the content of the message, noting how it affects the meaning of the message. The media environment is classified by the dominant information and communications technology (ICT), as determined by the people physically interacting with it (Holmes 2005). Each medium has particular biases, providing opportunities and limits to certain political actors and relationships since how information is produced and received depends on the media environment through which it is transmitted (Deibert 1997a). The media environment determines not only who speaks but how, a power previously ignored by argumentation theories (Crawford 2002). The relationship between sender and receiver changes with different media e.g. the Internet requires a more active receiver than television.

However, unlike the extant literature on ICT found in International Relations and Security Studies, I take a relational and sociological approach to technology. Individualist and instrumental perspectives view ICT as an exogenous variable, acting independently. In these studies, ICT contributes greater (or lesser) capabilities for an actor, e.g. the new powers of non-state actors (e.g. terrorists) or even increased abilities for states (e.g. Revolution in Military Affairs) (Nye and Owens 1996; Cohen 1996). Or ICT itself acts as a threat (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Castells 2000). As an exogenous variable, however, ICT becomes either instrumental or deterministic. Rejecting the technological essentialism inherent in these approaches, this project understands ICT as

neither teleological or exogenous to its socio-historical context (Feenberg 1991).[11] Therefore ICT does not independently empower an actor to legitimize a security issue or determine the particular outcomes of threat legitimation. ICT is relational and therefore exists only in terms of its interaction with political and social actors, constituting opportunities for threat legitimation. This relational and socio-historical approach critiques the radical claim that new ICT have transformed world politics and media-state relations (Volkmer 1999). By taking a historical view, I note both the power and limits of ICT. ICT empower certain political actors while constraining others.

One of the important actors affected by ICT is the media itself. Media are important political actors for threat legitimation. This project argues that media function as both a contested social space and distinctive kinds of actors (Shaw 2000; Shaw 1999).[12] As political actors, media operate within this contested social space at the individual level (journalists writing a story), and at the collective level (a newspaper takes an editorial stance). The media environment changes the role of the media in the public debates about a threat. New gatekeepers become empowered, while previous power brokers get by-passed. However, I do not treat the media as an independent actor in the foreign policy process, since its power as an actor depends on the socio-historical and relational context of the media environment.

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[11] Technological essentialism argues that technology is beyond the control of individual actors and is moving towards a determined solution (Feenberg 1991). For a critique of technological essentialism for information technology see (Herrera 2002).

[12] Throughout this project, media environment refers to the contested social space, while media designates the political actor who is vying for influence and brokering information in this social space.

This approach about the media is not new or completely radical. In fact, Habermas first pointed out how the structural characteristics of the media have a major impact on the society and polity (Habermas 1989). However, argumentation and communication action literatures, based on Habermas, ignore the media environment and focus on the content of the message (Crawford 2002; Homer-Dixon and Karapin 1989). Castells makes a similar argument to mine, claiming contemporary political debates take place in "media space" structured by electronic media environment (Castells 1996). The electronic media environment leads to news as entertainment (Benson 2004). In a more sophisticated empirical study, Baum argues the media environment affects how American became engaged and how the media covered foreign policy issues (Baum 2003b). Brown argues new ICT produce a more open media environment, which influences the success of political strategies (Brown 2005). However, each of these studies focuses exclusively on the contemporary media environment, rather than taking a historical and comparative approach as I do here.

As mentioned earlier and specified below, I argue that the media environment influences how rhetoric affects threat legitimation, not whether it affects it or not, acting as a conditional variable. I argue that each media environment is conducive to certain rhetorical strategies. The newspaper media environment encourages logos rhetorical strategies, radio favors ethos, and television prefers pathos. I conduct a more comprehensive literature review of the specific media environment in the relevant empirical chapter, as well as explicate the interaction between rhetorical strategies and the media

environment. For instance, I review the literature about newspapers and how they encourage logos rhetorical strategies in Chapter 3.

Research Design

This goal of this dissertation is theory development, where the identification and isolation of causal mechanisms becomes central (George and Bennett 2005). Causal mechanisms "form a delimited class of events that change relations among a specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (Tilly 2001, 25). Causal mechanisms alter connections between entities to generate outcomes, but these changes are not invariant or mechanical in the sense of linearity or universality (Tilly 2001; George and Bennett 2005; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Mayntz 2004). Instead of looking for generalized covering law theory about threat legitimation, this project notes the recurrence of these mechanisms and processes. The relationships and interactions between political actors and rhetoric become the focus, rather than reducing the analysis to subjective motivations, preferences, or actions.

Comparative historical analysis is valuable for initial studies of causal mechanisms (Legro 2000; Tilly 2001). Comparative historical studies employ systematic and contextualized comparisons of historical causal processes (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). However, comparison is not based on "methods of similarity or difference" between the cases, but the processes themselves (Van Evera 1997). Moreover, these processes are historically

grounded. Taking this comparative historical approach matches with calls for middle-range theories rather than covering-law models of causal explanation (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Tilly 2001; Tilly 1995; George and Bennett 2005; Mayntz 2004). Therefore comparative historical analysis is particularly useful for explaining a social process like threat legitimation (Pierson 2003).

Key Variables and the Causal Relationships

As noted in earlier in the chapter, threat legitimation is a social process where political actors try to gain consent that an issue or event is a threat in the public discourse. While this process continuously occurs, I limit the analysis to specific episodes, or "bounded and connected sequences of social action" where political actors attempted to legitimate a threat (Goodin and Tilly 2006, 15; Tilly 2001). In order to simplify the research design, I consider successful threat legitimation as a threshold achieved in the public discourse (Pierson 2003). This simplification is warranted since the project is not designed to make predictions about threat legitimation but to isolate the causal mechanisms. The idea of a threshold points out how there can be significant changes in the level of legitimation, but not reaching the outcome of success.[13] Furthermore, this highlights how successful legitimation is not permanent or fixed. A successful outcome could eventually lead to failed threat legitimation. For example, while the communist insurgency in Vietnam was successfully legitimated as a threat to the United States in the middle 1960s, by the early 1970s the threat lost its

[13] This within case variation actually proves useful for tracing the effects of the causal mechanisms in each foreign policy episode, as noted below.

legitimacy. This conforms to the general argument by comparative historical analysis that processes are on-going, but can be studied by bracketing a specific time period.

Threat legitimation is considered successful when it reaches the threshold, and failed when it is below the threshold. Complete legitimation would mean the absence of any public debate about whether or not an issue or event is a threat. This level of hegemony is exceptional and improbable. Achieving the successful threshold means that public debate about a threat is rarer, less virulent, and less concentrated. The best way to measure this is to look at the mainstream media. For this, I use the New York Times editorial section. If a threat is not argued in this section of the paper, then it has been accepted in the general public discourse. Of course, there will always be smaller, independent media that will make subaltern arguments and continue to debate the existence of the threat. But the New York Times serves as a reliable proxy for the mainstream media in foreign policy issues and events (Bennett 1990; Entman 2004; Mermin 1999a). However to insure reliability, I use two other sources to measure the level of success for threat legitimation. One is congressional debates. If Congress is not debating the existence and importance of a threat, then the threat has been successfully legitimated. The other is public opinion polling. If the majority of the public believes that something is a threat, then it is successfully legitimated. Unfortunately, it is rare for public opinion polls to ask, "Do you think that Canada is a threat to the United States?" But for most cases, there are insightful questions that suggest whether or not the public believes that a threat exists.

Taken together, these three proxies give me an idea whether a threat has been successfully legitimated. While the threshold is not an absolute standard, it is safely surmised that if a majority of the public believes that Canada is a threat, Congress is not debating about whether Canada is a threat or not, and the New York Times editorials do not challenge the existence and definition of Canada as a threat, then the threat has been successfully legitimated.

As outlined earlier, since threat legitimation is a social process in the public discourse, I focus on rhetoric resources and strategies. I argue that rhetoric is necessary but not sufficient for threat legitimation. Rhetoric is necessary to explain and communicate material conditions and subjective perceptions. Political actors ultimately have the choice and responsibility for their rhetoric, even though they might not realize the full range of options available. Rhetoric is causal in the sense of "allowing something to happen" or playing a "significant" role in "producing or influencing an effect, result, or consequence" (Schweller 2006, 17; Ruggie 1998a, 94; Jackson 2006). Comparative historical analysis favors this probabilistic notion of causality because causal mechanisms are not always determining (Legro 2005, 47).

Rhetorical strategies connect together rhetorical resources - the "cultural tool kit" of symbols or "commonplaces" - in order to fashion a narrative about a threat (Barnett 1998; Jackson 2006; Shotter 1993). I focus on three rhetorical strategies, logos, ethos, and pathos. A logos strategy means that political actors use logical reasoning in order to connect together rhetorical resources and attach the audience to the argument. Ethos relies on authority to makes these

connections between rhetorical resources and the audience. Pathos uses emotions and empathy to connect the rhetorical resources and the audience. In order to identify the rhetorical strategy, I study the actual debates and see how a political actor connects the rhetorical resources together in order to fashion an argument. Do they use deductive reasoning or employ facts and figures in order to connect these symbols together and attach the audience to the argument? Do political actors appeal to authority or to emotions? At times, a political actor can use all three rhetorical strategies in one debate. But often there is a critical point in the debate, the crux of the argument, and this is the focus on the empirical research.[14] What rhetorical strategy was deployed at this time in the public debates? How did these deployments impact the public debates?

The media environment is classified by the dominant communication technology, as determined by the people physically interacting with it (Holmes 2005). To measure interaction, I look at multiple indicators of consumption and ownership. The emergence of a new communication technology does not eliminate the old forms of technology, but transforms the media environment in which all communication technologies operate. As such, the media environment is a conditional variable that influences how rhetoric affects threat legitimation, not whether it affects it or not (Van Evera 1997). While the media environment is not necessary for threat legitimation, I argue that it can strengthen or weaken a rhetorical strategy. Therefore I study how the media environment affects the relationships between social and political actors and how people imagine their

[14] As noted below, I identify these critical junctures through secondary sources before I study the public debates.

collective existence. Who speaks? Who is the audience? Who is part of the public sphere? How does the speaker interact with the audience? These empirical questions focus on the media environment and how it influences the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation.

Case Selection

Cases are selected based on the study variable, or threat legitimation. There are several reasons for why this is the best practice for studying threat legitimation. For the one, the focus of the dissertation is "cause of an effect" rather than the "effects of a cause" (Bennett and Elman 2006, 457-458). Furthermore, selection on the dependent variable is justified "to study a case in which the outcome is known if the purpose is to determine whether a purported necessary cause is operating" (Bennett and Elman 2006, 462). In this dissertation, I want investigate if rhetoric affects threat legitimation, the known outcome or dependent variable, or is threat legitimation caused by other factors. Furthermore, I mitigate selection bias by relying on process-tracing to explain causal mechanisms rather than covariation between cases (Bennett and Elman 2006, 461; George and Bennett 2005).

The criteria for case selection are based on four dimensions. One, I select "episodes" of attempted threat legitimation where competing theories make divergent claims (Van Evera 1997; Goodin and Tilly 2006). This criterion follows the tradition of comparative historical analysis to use cases with important outcomes, and the suggestion by other authors to use cases that are theoretically

and empirically rich (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Van Evera 1997). By having episodes with diverging theoretical claims, I can begin to answer the research question, how do rhetorical resources and strategies influence threat legitimation? Whenever possible, the competing explanations represent actual scholarly arguments about the existence and definition of a threat. In the empirical chapters, I outline the competing theories and explanations for the episode in question. However, some of the episodes have not been addressed by either objectivists or subjectivists, or both. In these cases, I attempt to derive concrete hypotheses from the general assumptions of the respective paradigms.

Two, I select episodes with extreme "within case" variation of attempted threat legitimation, with both low and high levels of public consent about a threat in the episode. This should identify the causal mechanisms causing the changes within the episode, allowing a comparison between rhetorical causal mechanisms and ones offered by other theories. Does the episode unfold through the mechanisms of my argument, or the mechanisms offered by other arguments?

Three, I also select paired episodes within a distinct media environment, with one episode of successful threat legitimation and another episode of failed threat legitimation. This "within environment" variation provides more explanatory leverage by comparing the rhetorical causal mechanisms between the two episodes. Furthermore, this begins to explain the role of the media environment in the process of threat legitimation by identifying the causal mechanisms.

Finally, I select episodes across three different media environments, newspaper, radio, and television. This "between environments" variation compares how the media environment impacts the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation. This further isolates the causal mechanisms of each media environment.

Methods of Observation

I start with historical texts about each episode. Realizing that histories are interpretations of actual events, I use at least five different scholarly texts recognized by other historians as important. Each text makes distinct, and often diverging, arguments about the episode. Often these are diplomatic histories, but at times I use texts from other fields, including political science.

These secondary sources bound the episode and specify the critical junctures. Instead of assuming an episode of threat legitimation, I use these sources to define when threat legitimation starts and ends. I take a broad standard for inclusion – if one source believes an episode begins in March 1898 and another argues January 1897, I start with January 1897. For critical junctures, if one source identifies an event as critical while another includes a different event, then I include both events. Then I investigate the public debates around each of these critical junctures. Who are the key actors in the debates? What are the arguments in the debates? What are the threat narratives in the debates?

Next I study primary sources. Since threat legitimation occurs in the public discourse, I focus only on public speeches and arguments. To find these public statements, I use presidential public papers, congressional records, vital speeches of the day, memoirs, and secondary sources. I do not have to examine each and every public statement to understand the process of threat legitimation. Relevance and importance is determined by the previous historical research which identified the critical time periods, debates, and actors.

Through these public statements, I identify the rhetorical resources – also called by other authors commonplaces or cultural symbols – used by the political actors in the debates (Jackson 2006; Barnett 1998). Importance is determined by the context rather than frequency of usage (Jackson 2006). I then see how these resources are deployed, or the rhetorical strategy, do the political actors use logical reasoning, authority, or emotions? What other means do they use to deploy rhetorical resources? I then investigate whether and how rhetorical strategies led to a change or shift in the legitimation process. The primary causal mechanism for how rhetorical strategy affects threat legitimation is identification.

Rhetorical strategies alter the connections between and among rhetorical resources and people through the process of identification. Rhetorical strategies attempt to alter how an audience identifies with a rhetorical resource in order to win a debate. Identification connects the audience to a rhetorical resource. If a political actor can connect a rhetorical resource to the audience, he can produce and reproduce the meaning of the rhetorical resource. This process shapes the

scope, visibility, intensity, and direction of the debate since "the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power" (Schattschneider 1960, 68). For instance, a political actor can mobilize support for an argument if the audience identifies with the meaning of the rhetorical resource. Additionally, opposition support can also be divided or polarized through this same process of identification. William Riker points out how a rhetorical strategy can divide the opposition by forcing a choice about how they identify with a rhetorical resource (Riker 1996; Riker 1986). As this suggests, rhetorical resources are rather elastic and often are shared "commonplaces" that are used by both sides in a debate (Jackson 2006). Therefore, I trace the public debates to find out if a rhetorical strategy changed how the audience identifies with rhetorical resource. Did this process of identification alter the public debate about a threat?

Furthermore, rhetorical strategies can also alter how rhetorical resources relate to one another through identification. Rhetorical strategies try to combine or break apart these rhetorical resources in order to win the debate (Jackson 2006). These relations between the resources give the resources meaning while producing the threat narrative. For instance, combining "democracy" and "American exceptionalism" identifies democracy as a uniquely American political system and discourages intervention to help or promote other democracies. As I follow the public debates forward, I trace how a threat narrative is produced through the actual rhetoric deployments, noting how the narrative is constructed rather than why. I connect the turning points in the narrative to the rhetorical strategies used by the political actors (Barnett 1998, 19). Do rhetorical strategies

produce these turning points through the identification of rhetorical resources? By combining or breaking apart these resources? In this sense, identification is a relational and social process, in that it alters the connections among people and groups, as well as social sites (Potter 1996). Here rhetorical resources are important social sites in that they are relatively stable but contested nodes found in the public discourse (Hansen 2006; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Jackson 2006). Instead of reifying identity, this type of analysis focuses on the practice of identification which avoids the theoretical and analytical problems of traditional studies of identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).

To understand the influence of the media environment, I compare the deployment of rhetorical strategies in distinct media environments. Using episodes of both successful and failed threat legitimation not only increases the number of observations, but also highlights whether and how the media environment contributes to the process of threat legitimation. The primary causal mechanism between the media environment and rhetorical strategy is representation. The media environment affects how rhetorical resources get represented to the audience. It changes the level and type of exposure and consumption. Representation can impact how a political actor can define rhetorical resources or connect them to each other and the audience.

I believe this is the best method of observation for threat legitimation. Instead of trying to get inside the heads of individuals, I study the intersubjective space between individuals (Jackson 2006). I look at the actual rhetorical resources and strategies and how these deployments shape threat legitimation.

Furthermore, this method of observation highlights the dynamic and shifting nature of public debates.

CHAPTER 3

CHILE AND SPAIN

In this first empirical chapter, I analyze two episodes, the Baltimore affair between the United States and Chile in 1891-1892, and the War of 1898 between Spain and the United States. The Baltimore Affair exemplifies an episode of attempted threat legitimation that failed, despite the efforts of President Harrison and others in the administration. While this is a rarely discussed event in United States foreign policy, the Baltimore Affair is theoretically and empirically interesting while providing significant "within case" variation of threat legitimation. The level of public consent about the Chilean threat changed several times, allowing comparisons between the causal mechanisms involved. Instead of power or perceptions, rhetoric undermined the attempted threat legitimation.

The Baltimore Affair is also an interesting comparison to the War of 1898, or the Spanish-American War. The War of 1898 illustrates an episode of successful threat legitimation only six years later. This provides greater explanatory leverage by comparing the causal mechanisms involved while providing an opportunity to explore the role of the newspaper media environment in the process of threat legitimation. To my knowledge, no studies have explored the role of newspapers in the Baltimore Affair.

On the other hand, several studies argue that newspapers played a central role in the War of 1898 (Perez Jr. 1998; Hamilton 2006; Paterson 1996). This

episode of successful threat legitimation involves not only newspapers, but also several competing theories about why Spain was a threat to the United States. Both objectivist and subjectivist scholars make arguments about why Spain was a threat, but fall short in various ways.

Therefore the War of 1898 provides a case of successful threat legitimation with important theoretical and empirical consequences. This is a major episode in the foreign policy history of the United States, with numerous interpretations and arguments about the start of the war. Bound in these explanations of war are assumptions about the Spanish threat. By studying these assumptions, I analyze the process of threat legitimation and the critical causal mechanisms. Several times during the build-up to the war, the understanding about the Spanish threat changed, reflected in the public and congressional debates.

By tracing the threat narratives, I argue that rhetorical resources and strategies explain the unsuccessful legitimation of the Baltimore Affair and the successful legitimation of the Spanish threat. In the Baltimore Affair, President Harrison and his supporters deployed the rhetorical resources of honor, naval power, American hemisphere, and anti-British. They tried to connect the honor and reputation of the United States to its position in the international community, especially relative to Great Britain. Moreover, President Harrison argued if the United States does not punish Chile for its "barbaric behavior," then Chile and other countries will take advantage of the United States. To connect together these rhetorical resources, President Harrison relied on pathos rhetorical strategies. In contrast, the opposition deployed logos rhetorical

strategies to connect together democracy, Chilean weakness, American hemisphere, and honor. Chile was not a threat because it was a "sister republic" and American. Instead of pathos, the opposition used international law to build a case against going to war with Chile, and also used logic to connect United States honor with interests, explaining how shared democratic values meant Chile was not a threat.

For each episode, I provide a brief summary and then analyze the role of rhetoric for threat legitimation. Then I compare objectivist and subjectivist explanations to the rhetorical explanation of threat legitimation. Finally, I explore how the newspaper media environment favored logos rhetorical strategies in both episodes.

Summary of the Baltimore Affair

The first case is an example of failed threat legitimation, where several political actors, including President Benjamin Harrison, favored going to war against Chile in response to the killing of several sailors from the USS Baltimore. The Baltimore Affair has receded into the history of United States foreign policy, rarely referred to or mentioned as important. However, the Baltimore Affair was a significant crisis that engulfed the attention and focus of President Harrison. President Harrison pushed for war against Chile in response to the Baltimore Affair, attempting to legitimate the Chilean threat to the American people and Congress.

On 16 October 1891, several sailors from the USS Baltimore were killed and others injured in a riot in Valparaiso, Chile. At the time, Chile and the United States competed for dominance in the Western Hemisphere, especially over naval power in the Pacific. During the War of the Pacific (1879-1881), the United States intervened in favor of Peru and Bolivia against Chile, with Secretary of State James Blaine attempting to mediate between the warring states (Healy 2001, 643; Holden and Zolov 2000). The United States wanted to end the war early, but Chile ignored the presence of the United States navy. Containing only a few obsolete wooden ships, the United States was clearly outmatched by Chile's brand new British built warships. In fact, Chile directly threatened the United States and continued to prosecute the war (Goldberg 1986). Moreover, this attempted intervention fed into increasingly negative public opinion in Chile about the United States, with Chile believing that the United States favored its enemies, especially Peru (Crapol 2000).

The War of the Pacific affirmed Chile as the dominant military and naval power in South America. Secretary Blaine and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy realized the naval disparity between the United States and Chile, clearly highlighting the importance of ironclads versus wooden ships. This led to the reconstruction of the United States Navy, with increased amount of funding for new ironclads (Healy 2001; Cooling 1973)

The War of the Pacific also led to the Chilean control of important nitrate fields in the Atacama Desert (Goldberg 1986). This important military resource elevated the global role of Chile, produced an economic boom, and increased

connections with Great Britain (Blakemore 1974). By 1890, Great Britain controlled ninety percent of the nitrate industry. Secretary Blaine publicly blamed the War of the Pacific on Great Britain and British nitrate investors, stating "it is an English war on Peru, with Chili [sic] as the instrument" (Goldberg 1986, 23; LaFeber 1963, 130). At the end of the war, Chile replaced Peru as the highest per capita economy in Latin America (Goldberg 1986). Just as important, British commercial ties increased dramatically, especially relative to the United States. Furthermore, Chile developed strong military connections with Great Britain, modeling their navy on the British system and training on British warships (Goldberg 1986).

However, Jose Manuel Balmaceda, elected president in 1886, wanted to decrease British influence. President Balmaceda depended on revenue from nitrate exports for increased public works and social programs. A sharp decrease in nitrate prices in 1890 led to lower production and lower revenues for Chile. This spurred President Balmaceda to call for greater Chilean control over the nitrate industry, scaring both British investors and northern nitrate producers. Led by Admiral Jorge Montt, the northern nitrate regions joined the growing opposition in Congress to President Balmaceda's expansion of executive powers. The Chilean Navy sided with the oppositional leaders in Congress, transporting them to the anti-Balmaceda nitrate region. These Congressionalists controlled the nitrate exports and the Navy, while President Balmaceda controlled the Army and the more populous south (Goldberg 1986).

When Secretary Blaine returned as Secretary of State under President Harrison in 1889, he wanted to turn Latin America, especially Chile, away from British influence (Smith 1979). Secretary Blaine agreed with Balmaceda's anti-British stance and appointed an adamant anti-British Irishman, Patrick Egan, to serve as the United States minister to Chile. Despite these anti-British sentiments, Secretary Blaine attempted to steer the United States towards neutrality during the civil war. However, neutrality at the time also meant continued recognition of the de jure government, thereby refusing to recognize the Congressionalists (Goldberg 1986; Hardy 1928). Egan also argued in public and private that President Balmaceda would prevail in the civil war, convincing Secretary Blaine and President Harrison to maintain the status quo relationship with the Chilean government (Hardy 1928; Goldberg 1986; Healy 2001). The Congressionalists and the Chilean public perceived Egan, and thereby the United States government, as supporting Balmaceda (Pike 1963).

Several further incidents heightened these suspicions. The United States seized a ship, the Itata, carrying arms from the United States to the Congressionalists (Healy 2001). In addition, the USS Baltimore, stationed in Chile to protect American interests and lives during the revolution as requested by Egan, helped the New York based Central and South American Telegraph Company reroute the telegraph cable to bypass the Congressionalist capital (Goldberg 1986). Furthermore, the Congressionalists believed that the United States Navy spied on the movements of their navy for Balmaceda (Healy 2001). Finally, as the Congressionalists won the war and took control of Santiago, Egan

provided asylum to Balmaceda supporters and safe passage for some aboard the USS Baltimore (Goldberg 1986).

The USS Baltimore remained in the Valparaiso harbor even after the Congressionalist victory. On 16 October 1891, the captain of the USS Baltimore, Winfield Scott Schley, granted 117 sailors shore leave. Two sailors ended up in a barroom fight, which quickly turned into a street riot. One sailor was killed by the mob, while another was shot by the police. Seventeen others were seriously wounded as the riot spread throughout the city, leading Captain Schley, Egan, and others to believe that US sailors were targeted (Healy 2001, 216; Goldberg 1986, 13). President Harrison and his administration agreed, believing the riots were a premeditated and unprovoked attack on the United States (Goldberg 1986). Increasing hostilities further, the Chilean Foreign Minister Antonio Matta wrote a public note that insulted President Harrison and encouraged the Chilean government to challenge the United States over the Baltimore Affair (Goldberg 1986, 85-86).

Analysis of the Baltimore Affair

Unfortunately, most scholars of United States foreign policy either start with the War of 1898 or gloss over the Baltimore Affair when recounting the United States rise to power. For example, the Baltimore Affair appears in only one paragraph in May's classic diplomatic history about the rise of American power in the late 19th century, *Imperial Democracy* (May 1961). There is actually only one monograph that exclusively focuses on this event, *The Baltimore Affair*

by Joyce Goldberg (Goldberg 1986). To complement this monograph, I also base my research around several general diplomatic histories that include the Baltimore Affair, *The New Empire* by Walter LaFeber, *Chile and the United States* by Fredick Pike, *Chile and the United States, Empires in Conflict* by William Sater, *First Great Triumph* by Warren Zimmerman, and *The Second Century* by Mark Gilderhus (LaFeber 1963; Pike 1963; Sater 1990; Zimmermann 2002; Gilderhus 2000). I also use several historical biographies around important participants, including President Harrison, Secretary of State James Blaine, and Secretary of Navy Benjamin Tracy (Calhoun 2005; Crapol 2000; Healy 2001; Cooling 1973). I also include *Liberal Peace, Liberal War* by John Owen since the Baltimore Affair is an important case study for his argument.

From these various secondary sources, I determined the critical junctures and important political actors. Four critical junctures included 1) Chilean civil war beginning in January 1891, in particular the crisis about the Itata starting in May 1891, 2) riots in the streets of Valparaiso that killed two American soldiers, 3) President Harrison's annual message on 8 December 1891, and 4) President Harrison's ultimatum speech to the United States Congress on 25 January 1892. Each of the secondary sources highlighted five important political actors, 1) President Harrison, 2) Secretary of State James Blaine, 3) Secretary of Navy Benjamin Tracy, 4) business community, and 5) newspaper editors. There were several other political actors that emerge through the debates, but they tended to appear only once or twice.

Starting with these critical junctures and political actors, I researched the public speeches and arguments using various primary sources including presidential papers, congressional records, memoirs, newspaper articles and editorials, and the *Public Opinion*. While there are no public opinion surveys or polling data, records exist from *Public Opinion*, an important journal from the time that compiled editorials from local newspapers around the country. *Public Opinion* provides a proxy for the general sentiment since it used a diverse selection of newspapers from different regions and political affiliations. Newspapers during the 1890s were explicitly partisan or independent. Even more important, using editorials to gauge public opinion was a method used by politicians at the time. For example, President McKinley appointed a press secretary to clip editorials from newspapers around the country so that he could get a feel for public opinion.

I combined the editorials from *Public Opinion* and the *New York Times* with congressional debates to assess the failed attempts of threat legitimation. As shown below, the Baltimore Affair did not cross the threshold for successful threat legitimation. Editorials from both partisan and independent newspapers never took the threat seriously. In fact, many newspapers either blamed the administration for damaging relations between Chile and the United States, or accused the administration of war-mongering for electoral advantage. Congressional debates practically did not exist. Occasionally an administration supporter would defend President Harrison's arguments. However, the focus

often shifted from the Chilean threat to another issue, such as the need to support our sailors.

Through these public statements, I identified two competing narratives framing the debate about the Baltimore Affair. The narrative about how Chile was a threat to the United States focused on the reputation of the United States. Advanced almost exclusively by the administration, the rhetorical resources included honor, naval power, American hemisphere, and anti-British. The primary rhetorical strategy used to connect these rhetorical resources was pathos. By trying to produce an emotional connection with the audience, the administration tried to construct this narrative that tied together honor and reputation with the position of the United States in the international community. However, the rhetorical resources and strategies of this narrative left a number of rhetorical gaps for the opposition to exploit. The opposition consisted of newspaper editors, such as E.L. Godkin, the business community, in particular Andrew Carnegie, and some members of Congress, including Representative Breckinridge (Democrat, Kentucky) (Goldberg 1986, 111; Tompkins 1970). The opposition narrative argued Chile was not a threat to the United States since it was a "sister republic" (New York Herald 3 November 1891). The rhetorical resources for this narrative included democracy and Chilean weakness, combined with some of the same resources as the other narrative such as an American hemisphere and honor. Here the rhetoric of an American hemisphere undermined the administration argument, where a democratic Chile was part of the New World and not associated with European power politics. Instead, Chile

was American, on the same side as the United States and not Great Britain. Furthermore, Chile was considered weak, suggesting a war with Chile would be dishonorable. In addition, the narrative claimed President Harrison and the administration were "playing politics" with the crisis and bullying Chile for electoral gain and parochial interests (Goldberg 1986). This rhetorical strategy weakened portrayal of President Harrison defending the honor of the United States and instead defined the administration as "war-mongering" (Goldberg 1986).

Chilean Revolution and the Itata Crisis

Public debates about the Chilean civil war remained mostly in the newspapers. Congress did not address the events, since it was in recess during the bulk of the fighting and the crisis about the Itata, from 3 March 1891 to 7 December 1891. During the civil war and the Itata crisis, most editorials opposed the Congressionalists, arguing it was against the interests of the United States to intervene. Using logos, the newspapers deduced how helping the Congressionalists, especially during the Itata crisis, would hurt the United States. This strategy gained traction in the editorials throughout the country, and generated significant public support.

The first rhetorical strategy argued supporting the Congressionalists would increase the power of Great Britain in the hemisphere relative to the United States. Editorials connected the Congressionalists to the British. The *Detroit Free Press* argued the Chilean civil war was an "expansion of the sphere

of British influence in South America" and the United States needed to prevent any increased role for the British in South America (Detroit Free Press 14 June 1891, 245). The Chilean civil war favored British interests, rather than the United States or even Chile (Manby 1891). If President Balmaceda stayed in power, British control of the nitrates would be significantly reduced. The connection between Chile and Great Britain also involved a political dimension. Great Britain was never referred to as a democracy, but rather an "empire" that threatened the United States (Detroit Free Press 14 June 1891). As a political extension of Great Britain, the Congressionalists were aristocrats rather than democrats or republicans (Boston Herald 11 July 1891, 350).

The second rhetorical strategy cited international law and legal precedent for not supporting the Congresssionalists. By using past cases of international law, the legal rhetorical strategy deduced why the United States should prevent the Itata from shipping arms to the Congressionalists. The primary argument centered on maintaining neutrality in the civil war. The *New York Times* published eight editorials concerning the Itata crisis (Detroit News 1 November 1891). For example, the editorials compared the Itata crisis to a recent legal decision about a British ship, the Alabama, aiding the Confederacy during the United States civil war. This not only provided a legal basis for preventing the Itata from shipping arms to the Congressionalists, it also offered a poignant description of the Congressionalists as Confederates. While this suggests that the Congressionalists were wrong, it more directly argued that the United States should not get involved in a potentially bloody and long-lasting civil war. Only

thirty years removed from its own civil war, the people and leaders of the United States remembered the devastation and also opposed the role of an intervening power, especially Great Britain. This argument furthered the logical argument for not recognizing the Congressionalist government, a source of contention in future relations.

As the civil war came to an end, editorials changed course to support the Congressionalists and encouraged the United States government to do the same. By the end of August 1891, editorials called Balmaceda a dictator (Washington Post 2 August 1891; Nashville American 29 August 1891). The *Washington Post* argued "the Government of the United States has perhaps unjustly been charged with playing into the hands of Balmaceda during this protracted conflict" and therefore should recognize and back the new regime (Washington Post 31 August 1891, 527). The newspapers in the United States seemed to recognize the negative perceptions of the new Chilean government and the Chilean people.

However, there was a significant debate about the role the United States during the conflict. Both Democratic and Republican newspapers criticized Secretary of State Blaine and especially Foreign Minister for Chile Egan, demanded his recall (Chicago Times 31 August 1891; Cleveland Leader 30 August 1891; New York Evening Post 7 September 1891; New York Herald 8 September 1891). Some Republican newspapers supported Egan, arguing that he acted lawfully during the civil war (New Haven Palladium 7 September 1891; Milwaukee Sentinel 8 September 1891). Most newspapers defended the actions of the United States during the civil war (Philadelphia Ledger 31 August 1891).

Editorials claimed the United States was following the law, or doing its duty. Even if an editorial took the side of the Congressionalists, it would defend the role of the United States. Despite these arguments about the role of the United States during the civil war, a consensus emerged once the United States recognized the Congressionalist government. The Congressionalists were democratic, making Chile an American republic. Most believed that this was the end of any conflict, resolving any previous issues between the Congressionalists and the United States (Washington Post 8 September 1891).

Many of the rhetorical resources and strategies used in these arguments provided a backdrop for later debates. The successful arguments against intervening in the Chilean civil war used logos to connect the interests of the United States to both anti-British sentiment and the need for neutrality. Once the civil war ended, the editorials defined the Congressionalists as democratic. Tensions between the United States and Chile existed because of the meddling of Great Britain and how they provoked the civil war, and now relations would improve because of shared democratic values.

Riots in Valparaiso

After the riots in Valparaiso and the killing of the sailors from the USS Baltimore, public debate immediately became about what to do. Led by President Harrison and loyal newspapers, the administration constructed a narrative about the Chilean threat. The first aspect of this narrative focused on the honor of the United States, using emotional appeals or a pathos rhetorical strategy. Several

Republican newspapers argued that the United States should be "outraged" (Baltimore American 26 October 1891; Philadelphia Press 26 October 1891). The Chilean government was responsible for this purposeful attack on the United States. The United States was a "friendly power" but the Congressionalists have "for years bitterly opposed the United States, derided our influence, scouted our policy, repeatedly declared in its newspapers that the Chilean fleet could shell San Francisco" (Philadelphia Press 26 October 1891, 79).

These emotional appeals also attacked the Chilean "civilization" or "character," contrasting it to the United States. The editorials claimed that Chile is a "hot-tempered country" and Chileans are an "excitable" people that "flare up" (Philadelphia Press 26 October 1891, 79; Leavenworth Times 1 November 1891, 103). These cultural typifications continued by claiming the Chileans were uncivilized, "Chilean barbarity makes victims of men wearing the naval uniform of the United States" and "underneath the thin coating of civilization covering the Chilean character there is a ferocity and savagery closely akin to that of the American aborigine or the African barbarian" (New York Press 16 November 1891, 150; St. Louis Globe-Democrat 4 December 1891, 221). This contrasted with the United States, who was "polite, just, and reasonable" while following international law (St. Louis Globe-Democrat 7 November 1891). President Harrison argued that the "trouble with these people and their kindred seems to be that they do not know how to use victory with dignity and moderation; and sometime it may be necessary to instruct them" (Harrison and Blaine 1940, 196). Therefore because of the Baltimore Affair, it was "time for the United States to

teach a lesson that will prevent the outrage from being repeated" (New York Press 16 November 1891, 150). The honor of the United States became connected to reputation of the United States through this emotional appeal - if the United States does not respond to such barbaric acts, like the killing of the USS Baltimore sailors, then such outrages would continue. With the international community watching, Chile needed to be punished to deter future attacks.

However, most newspapers immediately disagreed with the administration narrative. Several editorials argued that the Chilean people had a right to be angry (Macon Telegraph 25 October 1891). This opposition narrative derived from the aftermath of the civil war, where consensus emerged about the problematic relationship between Chile and the United States. The editorials often blamed Egan, who was still the United States representative, or Secretary Blaine for continuing to meddle in Latin America (Philadelphia Record 3 November 1891; Macon Telegraph 25 October 1891; Detroit News 1 November 1891). The Navy, in particular Secretary Tracy, was criticized as an instigator, wanting a war for "useful practice" (New York Herald 3 November 1891).

Newspaper editors and Democratic congressmen also argued President Harrison was making the Baltimore Affair into a great international crisis because of the upcoming elections (Philadelphia Record 3 November 1891; Detroit News 1 November 1891). The New York Times believed the "Administration is posing a little" because of the closeness of the elections. President Harrison is trying to get more public and partisan support, especially since Secretary Blaine was more popular than him (New York Times 26 October

1891). The newspapers derided President Harrison's declaration that he would resign if he could not respond to the "Chilean insult" (Detroit News 1 November 1891).

In their arguments, the opposition emphasized the relationship between Chile and the United States. Chile was referred to as a "sister republic" (New York Herald 3 November 1891). This linked Chile to democracy, the American form of government. New York Tribune argued, "We do not believe that the most progressive and enlightened State in South America will refuse to make proper reparation for the affront" (Detroit News 1 November 1891). Other editorials pleaded for patience and restraint, as afforded to other democracies (St. Paul Pioneer-Press 31 October 1891; New York Herald 3 November 1891). Andrew Carnegie also called Chile as sister republic and appealed to patience since "Chile very weak and sorely tried…Her giant sister should be patient" (Goldberg 1986, 177).

The opposition narrative used the same rhetorical resources, honor and reputation, to critique the interventionist narrative. The honor and reputation of the United States required not going to war with Chile. Editorials stated the United States should not do anything about the Baltimore Affair and "keep our hands off" in Chile (Macon Telegraph 25 October 1891; New York Herald 3 November 1891, 101; Atlanta Constitution 1 November 1891; St. Paul Pioneer-Press 31 October 1891). Several times these editorials connected together the honor the United States to the interests of the United States, using the rhetorical strategy of logos. The editorials provided deductive and logical appeals, making a

legal case as to why Chile was not a threat to the United States. Honor was also connected to "civilized" nature of the United States, arguing that a war against Chile was wrong. The United States was a "civilized Christian nation" and war with Chile would be "atrocious barbarism, aggravated by the wildest folly" (Detroit News 1 November 1891, 103). Arguments ranged from Chile was too small to Chile was a sister republic. There is no honor attacking a small weak country, especially another democracy.

Annual Message of President Harrison, 8 December 1891

President Harrison continued to push for war in his State of the Union message on 8 December 1898. The message spent a long time on the Baltimore Affair, describing the incident as "so serious and tragic in circumstances and results as to very justly excite the indignation of our people and to call for prompt and decided action on the part of this Government" (Harrison 1891). President Harrison called the attacks on United States sailors "savage and brutal" with the Chilean police participating in the attacks (Harrison 1891). President Harrison then argued that hostilities were directed towards the government of the United States (Harrison 1891). As such, the attacks were an "insult" to the United States. President Harrison then demanded reparations from Chile, and stated that if Chile did not comply, then he would address for Congress for "such action as many be necessary" (Harrison 1891).

The New York Times pointed out that "the intimation of the President plainly means that unless Chile apologized for its assault upon our sailors and

makes an explanation satisfactory to our Government, Congress will be asked to authorize the President to employ the military and naval forces of the United States to compel reparation" (1891; Goldberg 1986, 83). The Secretary of the Navy James Tracy followed with an annual report that absolved the United States sailors and blamed the Chilean government for the incident, since the mob was "aided and abetted by a police guard which should have suppressed them" (Department of Navy 1891-1892, 21-30).

However, many newspaper editorials opposed the threat narrative of President Harrison. Several editorials once again argued the President was "playing politics" with the Baltimore Affair for the appearance of a "vigorous foreign policy" (Baltimore News 12 December 1891). The Nashville American argued that the Baltimore Affair was a war scare "began in the search of Republican politicians for a subject to distract the public mind from the issues of the last campaign" (Nashville American 13 December 1891, 240). Other editorials emphasized the need for patience and not jumping to conclusions, often referring to international law and precedent (New York Evening Post 12 December 1891). Other editorials argued to wait for the consent of Congress, dismissing the role and position of the administration (Washington Correspondence Springfield Republican 27 December 1891).

Andrew Carnegie directly challenged the threat narrative about Chile. Carnegie represented a significant portion of the business community which opposed war with Chile. Carnegie went to Washington D.C. to speak with President Harrison. Carnegie directly challenged the threat narrative about

defending the honor of the United States and maintaining its reputation in the international community. Chile was a weak sister republic and going to war would be dishonorable, since "honor wounds must be self-inflicted" (Goldberg 1986, 110)

In the following weeks, the opposition editorials dismissed the Chilean threat as illogical and against the interests of United States. The *Baltimore American* (Republican) argued the United States would not benefit from a war against Chile – there was "no interest or glory" (Baltimore American 28 December 1891). The *New York Herald* (Independent) stated the United States needed to maintain friendly relations with Chile for its own interests (New York Herald 28 December 1891). Along the same lines, several editorials felt war was not the logical response to the crisis (Boston Post 11 January 1892; Pittsburgh Times 11 January 1892). The United States should remain patient and wait for diplomacy to resolve the issue instead of going to war with a friendly democratic Chile (Savannah News 4 January 1892; New York Tribune 19 January 1892). Here logos connected democracy to the interests of the United States and explained why Chile was not a threat.

War Message by President Harrison, 21 January 1892

In early January, the Chilean government released the findings about the Baltimore Affair. The court finding described the incident as a brawl caused by drunken sailors from the USS Baltimore, and sentenced three Chileans and an American to prison (Goldberg 1986, 99). In communicating the report to the

State Department, the Chilean government expressed regret, but defended the government and the police while arguing these drunken brawls frequently happen between sailors. President Harrison and the rest of the cabinet, especially Secretary of Navy Tracy, wanted war but "Blaine alone prevented Harrison from sending an ultimatum" (Sievers 1968, 194-195; Owen 1997, 156). On 21 January 1891, President Harrison took the reins from Secretary Blaine, and issued an ultimatum that unless Chile withdrew the Matta letter and issued a public apology for the Baltimore incident with full reparations, the United States would terminate diplomatic relations with Chile (Goldberg 1986, 102-103). While the Chilean government did not receive the ultimatum until 23 January, a Saturday, President Harrison sent a message to Congress on Monday, 25 January 1892 that asked Congress to declare war against Chile (Goldberg 1986, 104-107).

President Harrison began the war message by defending the Minister to Chile, Patrick Egan. Then President Harrison dismissed the Chilean judicial finding on the Baltimore Affair, referencing international law, testimony by the captain and sailors of the Baltimore, and the Navy report. The war message recounted the incidents and provided graphic details of how the sailors were beaten - making special note about how they were "stabbed in the back" (Harrison 1892). President Harrison believed "the injury was to the Government of the United States, not to these poor soldiers who were assaulted in a manner so brutal and so cowardly" (Harrison 1892). Furthermore, President Harrison implicated the Chilean police in the incidents. Not only did the police not do

enough, they actively participated in the riots and killed one of the sailors from the Baltimore.

After recounting the riots in graphic detail, President Harrison continued by criticizing the Chilean government for its response to the Baltimore Affair and subsequent communications, in particular the Matta letter. The Chilean government was "offensive" and "insulting" (Harrison 1892). President Harrison concluded the "dignity as well as the prestige and influence of the United States" was at stake in the Baltimore Affair (Harrison 1892). The United States "must protect those who in foreign ports display the flag or wear the colors of this Government against insult, brutality, and death" (Harrison 1892).

President Harrison's message clearly made a case for war and invited Congress to declare war (Owen 1997, 156). The entire cabinet, except for Secretary Blaine, supported going to war (Goldberg 1986, 108). However, Congressional and public reaction to the war message was muted at best. Congressional leaders asked for more information and time to deliberate. The Senate quickly referred the President's message and documents to the Committee on Foreign Relations instead of addressing the issue (United States Congress 1892a).

In the House of Representatives, Representative Breckinridge (Democrat, Kentucky) proposed a resolution that the House of Representative receive all communications between the Chile and the United States, including any response to the ultimatum by Chile (United States Congress 1892b). In his remarks about the resolution, Representative Breckinridge referred to Chile as an "American

Republic" and that war was "only the last resort, especially so when the war must be with a republic like our own" (United States Congress 1892b, 550). Furthermore, Representative Breckinridge believed in bringing the "nations of the American hemisphere together" and opposing European intervention and influence in the Americas (United States Congress 1892b, 550). Representative Breckinridge argued that the message of the President to Congress is an "action looking not to peace, but to war; looking not a communion, but to bloodshed" (United States Congress 1892b, 550).

The Republicans, primarily led by James Blount (Republican, Georgia), the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wanted the matter discussed in committee instead of on the floor, but also desired more information. Representative Blount argued for a "deliberate, calm course" and that his committee should be the place for addressing the Baltimore Affair (United States Congress 1892b, 551). Representative Breckinridge countered that he only requested more information, insinuating that President Harrison has not been completely honest about the communications with Chile, and that "war might be forced upon us that was not necessary for the honor of the American Republic" (United States Congress 1892b, 552). At this point, the House of Representatives referred the President's message to the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Owen 1997).

The war message received even less support in the newspapers. Editorials repeated this opposition narrative, using the same rhetorical resources and configurations. Chile was a republic, Chile was weaker than the United States,

and there was no honor in going to war with the weaker sister republic. The *New York Herald* (Independent) exemplified this narrative, arguing the "American people do not war with weaker sister republic" (New York Herald 27 January 1892, 420). Instead of going to war for honor, as President Harrison argued, the honorable thing for the United States was peace. Several newspapers even accepted that Chile was wrong; however, it did not mean Chile was a threat or the United States should go to war (Boston Globe 26 January 1892; Cleveland Plain-Dealer 26 January 1892; Detroit Free Press 26 January 1892). Instead of offering ultimatums, the United States should be "patient" (Detroit Free Press 26 January 1892; Cleveland Plain-Dealer 26 January 1892; Atlanta Constitution 26 January 1892). War was dismissed as an option to resolve the issue (Boston Herald 26 January 1892). It would be "brutal and shameful" for the United States to wage war on Chile (New York World 27 January 1892, 420). Instead, "American nations should cultivate brotherhood" (Atlanta Constitution 26 January 1892, 420). Several newspapers ended up criticizing President Harrison's speech as counter-productive and warmongering (Philadelphia Record 26 January 1892; Providence Journal 26 January 1892). The *Providence Journal* stated that President Harrison was "excitedly bellicose," "impatient," "blind to the horrors of war," and "believes hot-headedness to be courage" and "might right" (Providence Journal 26 January 1892).

Most Republican newspapers simply argued that Chile should concede to the United States and simply apologize, rather than supporting the war message and ultimatum. Few supported a declaration of war (New York Recorder 27

January 1892). Many of the Republican papers accepted the rhetorical configurations of the opposition narrative. The *Cincinnati Commercial Gazette* (Republican) accepted Chile as a "sister republic" (Cincinnati Commercial Gazette 26 January 1892, 421). The *New York Tribune* (Republican) stated the American people were not outraged at Chile (New York Tribune 27 January 1892). There were no "jingoistic cries for an immediate call to arms" but rather a desire for Chile to apologize in order to avoid war (Goldberg 1986, 108). Clearly, the Harrison administration failed to legitimate the Chilean threat. Some prominent members of the Administration still wanted to go to war, including Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Steven B. Elkins, but the lack of public support prevented any further action (Goldberg 1986).

Summary of the War of 1898

The War of 1898, often referred to as the Spanish-American War, was short but often considered a watershed moment in United States foreign relations (May 1961; LaFeber 1963; Zakaria 1998).[15] The conventional historiography often attributes the war to public opinion, driven by reports in the newspapers (Perez Jr. 1998). For example, Cortada argues that the *New York Journal*, owned by William Randolph Hearst, and the *New York World*, owned by Joseph Pulitzer, sensationalized the Spanish atrocities. This "yellow journalism" aroused anti-Spanish public opinion and influenced Congress (Cortada 1978, 113). Studies of international politics often agree, citing the War of 1898 as evidence of the

[15] Historians have begun to use "War of 1898" instead of "Spanish-American War" because the old name marginalized the role of both Cubans and Philippinoes in fighting the wars (Perez Jr. 1998).

influence of public opinion and the media in United States foreign policy (Kennan 1984).

From 1868-1878, Cubans fought the Ten Years' War against Spain. Spain finally conceded political reforms, but retained sovereignty over the island. By 1892, Jose Marti, a Cuban poet and writer, organized the Cuban Revolutionary Party, or the Junta, in the United States. Tomas Estrada Palma, the former President of the Cuban Republic during the Ten Years' War, coordinated revolutionary activities from New York City (Trask 1981, 2). Marti also recruited a hero of the Ten Years' War, Maximo Gomez, to serve as the military commander of the revolutionary army (O'Toole 1984). The Cuban Revolutionary Party launched their uprising on 25 February 1895 and conducted a guerilla war against the Spanish colonial power. The strategy was to destroy the Cuban economy while outlasting the Spanish military (Trask 1981, 5).

Early success by the insurrection led the Spanish government to assign General Valeriano Weyler as the commander officer on 10 February 1896 (Trask 1981, 8). Less than a week later, General Weyler instituted reconcentration, where the Spanish military rounded up and put Cubans into camps and severely limited in their movements (Cortada 1978). Military law took over the island, and commanders arrested or shot anyone aiding the revolution (Trask 1981, 8). Designed to limit guerilla movements and support, reconcentration instead increased the amount and intensity of the fighting while destroying the Cuban economy and killing nearly half the population (May 1961, 94-111; Trask 1981).

President Cleveland and his Secretary of State Richard Olney did not support the Cuban insurrection because they did not want a war with Spain (Cortada 1978, 113). This was despite public and congressional pressure on President Cleveland (McCartney 2006, 90). Congress favored intervention, especially after the policy of reconcentration. On 6 April 1896, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed a joint resolution that asked President Cleveland to recognize the Cuban revolution (Trask 1981, 11). President Cleveland once again rebuffed the congressional pressure.

Despite the lack of government action, private citizens in the United States aided the Cuban insurrection (Cortada 1978, 113; Hamilton 2006). The Junta received broad support throughout the United States, especially in Cuban immigrant communities in Florida and New York City (Offner 1992, 5). The Junta, based in New York City, lobbied the United States government and conducted propaganda campaigns in favor of Cuban independence (Hamilton 2006, 112). The Junta also established the Cuban League, a network of various clubs that organized meetings and collected money throughout the United States (Hamilton 2006, 112). Part of the propaganda effort included relationships with major newspapers and reporters. The Junta provided information to newspapers on a daily basis, primarily recounting Spanish atrocities (Hamilton 2006, 112). Most importantly, the Junta obtained the De Lome letter and sent it to the New York Journal (Trask 1981; Offner 1992).

Despite the public and congressional interest, Cuba was not debated or addressed in the 1896 presidential election between William McKinley and

William Jennings Bryan. Once elected, President McKinley wanted to continue a policy of neutrality in order concentrate on the domestic economy (Trask 1981). He appointed General Stewart Lyndon Woodford as the United States minister to Spain and sent a trusted advisor, William J. Calhoun to Cuba on a fact finding mission (Cortada 1978, 114; Offner 1992, 47). After several diplomatic exchanges, Spain agreed to replace General Weyler and declare autonomy for Cuba starting 1 January 1898 (Trask 1981, 19; Offner 1992, 86). However, the Junta declared "independence or death" and Maximo Gomez threatened to shoot any member who supported autonomy (Trask 1981, 20).

President McKinley focused on Cuba and these new developments in his first State of the Union message to Congress on 6 December 1897, praising the new policies of Spain (Offner 1992, 86; Trask 1981, 21). On 12 January 1898, Spanish supporters and soldiers rioted in Havana to reject Cuban autonomy and to support General Weyler, who was recently recalled to Spain. President McKinley sent the USS Maine in order to protect American citizens in Havana (McCartney 2006, 98; O'Toole 1984).

On 9 February 1898, the New York Journal published a letter written by the Spanish ambassador to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lome (Cortada 1978, 115). The headline read "Worst Insult to the United States in History" (McCartney 2006, 95). The letter called President McKinley a "weak politician" who pandered to the masses and jingoes in his party (de Lome 9 February 1898).

On 15 February 1898, less than a week after the de Lome letter was published, the USS Maine exploded in Havana harbor killing 250 sailors. The

Naval board of inquiry found on 24 March 1898 that an external explosion caused the Maine to sink. President McKinley demanded Spain close the reconcentration camps and grant Cuban autonomy. After weeks of diplomatic negotiations, Spain acquiesced to President McKinley's ultimatum. However, President McKinley already sent a message to Congress proposing intervention without recognizing Cuban sovereignty (Perez Jr. 1998, 20; Trask 1981, 52). Congress authorized President McKinley to intervene on 19 April 1898, and on 22 April 1898, President McKinley ordered a naval blockade of Cuba, effectively starting the war with Spain (Trask 1981, 191).

Analysis of the War of 1898

Unlike the Baltimore Affair, there are numerous studies about the War of 1898. In order to narrow down the sources, I started with historiographies of the war (Perez Jr. 1998; Paterson 1996). Then I chose historical texts that were the most cited, while also choosing texts with different interpretations about the war in order to provide significant breadth. For example, I used *From Wealth to Power* and *First Great Triumph* for an explanation rooted in geopolitical opportunism (Zakaria 1998; Zimmermann 2002). For an economic explanation, I used *The New Empire* and also *The War of 1898* (LaFeber 1963; Perez Jr. 1998) . Both *The War with Spain* and the *Mirror of War* advance the "psychic crisis" theory of Richard Hofstadter (Trask 1981; Linderman 1974; Hofstadter 1965). Other domestic level explanations include *Power and Progress* which focuses on culture and identity, *The Unwanted War* which argues that electoral politics

explains the war, and *McKinley, War, and Empire* which emphasizes the role of interest groups (McCartney 2006; Offner 1992; Hamilton 2006). I also use *Liberal Peace and Liberal War* for an alternative argument from an international politics perspective, while providing some continuity with the Baltimore case along with *New Empire, First Great Triumph*, and *From Wealth to Power* (Owen 1997).

From these secondary sources, I identified five critical junctures, 1) the policy of reconcentration in February 1896; 2) the de Lome letter on 9 February 1898; 3) sinking of the USS Maine; 4) speech by Senator Redfield Proctor (Republican, Vermont) on 17 March 1898; and 5) 11 April 1898 Message to Congress by President McKinley. These critical junctures primarily involved President Cleveland, President McKinley, Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day, Senator Proctor, Tomas Estrada Palma, and Horatio Rubens.

Starting with these critical junctures and political actors, I researched public speeches using primary sources, including presidential papers, congressional records, memoirs, newspapers articles and editorials, and *Public Opinion*. Just like the Baltimore Affair, there were no public opinion surveys or polling data, so I used *Public Opinion*. To assess the level of threat legitimation, I combined the editorials from *Public Opinion* and the *New York Times* with congressional debates about Spain and Cuba. As I show below, Spain was widely accepted as a threat.

Through the public debates and speeches, I identify three narratives about the Spanish threat. The first narrative framed the United States as the "defender"

of Cuba. Spain threatened the United States, and all of the New World, with its continued oppression of Cuba. Therefore it was the duty and mission of the United States to save Cuba (McCartney 2006). The rhetorical resources used in this threat narrative included civilization, Christianity, morality, democracy, self-determination, and liberty. Spain was considered barbaric while the United States was civilized, exemplified by the reconcentration camps. The United States represented the New World and the future of civilization, a Protestant mission to save humanity and an American duty to defend liberty and democracy. Using the Monroe Doctrine, pro-intervention narrative linked the history of the United States to the Cuban insurrection. Supporting Cuban "patriots" was not only a humanitarian issue, but also about American sacred values. Americans identified with the Cuban struggle for political and economic freedom (Offner 1992, 228). Although this narrative generated significant public support, it did not convince the business community or President McKinley about the Spanish threat.

The business community and its leaders provided the main opposing narrative, arguing that war with Spain would be bad for business and hurt the economy of the United States. The primary rhetorical resources were stability, prosperity, war debt, recession, and export markets. At the time, the United States economy just finished recovering from the largest depression in its history. War would mean a significant reduction in all exports, with international trade coming to a halt. With no export markets, the economy would slip back into a recession. At the same time, the war would lead to increased national debt, creating even more recessionary pressure. War with Spain would be a significant

loss of national "blood and treasure" for little economic gain. The return to prosperity would end.

The third narrative argued for intervention but used elements of the other narratives. More importantly, the primary rhetorical strategy of logos connected the normative argument about the United States as "defender" of Cuba to the second argument about the interests of the United States. Logos undermined the opposition narrative, reframing intervention as an economic benefit instead of a cost. From the first narrative, the rhetorical resource of liberty became linked to the rhetorical resource of prosperity in the second narrative. The market was the important rhetorical resource combining them together. An independent Cuba was an open market, offering increased investments and trade for the United States economy. Even more important, the economic growth of Cuba, considered inevitable with the liberty and democracy of independence, would only benefit the United States. The spread of the free market could also potentially engulf the rest of the New World, feeding back into rhetorical resources of the first narrative. In this narrative, Spain threatened the prosperity of the United States by remaining in Cuba and therefore the United States needed to intervene.

Reconcentration, February 1896

While American support for the Cuban insurrection emerged almost as soon as the revolution started, the public debates began in earnest when General Weyler instituted reconcentration. The Spanish military camps led to mass starvation and disease, with estimates of 400,000 deaths between 1896-1898

(Trask 1981, 9). There was not enough food or other essential supplies, yet anyone trying to leave was shot (McCartney 2006, 93). Reconcentration devastated the entire Cuban economy, and also international trade and investment. Several sources highlight how the policy of reconcentration aggravated public opinion in the United States (Trask 1981; McCartney 2006; Offner 1992).

On 20 February 1896, congressional debate about a series of resolution addressed the protection of United States citizens, information about the insurrection, and the recognition of Cuban independence (Offner 1992, 18). Senator John Sherman (Republican, Ohio), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee at the time and eventually Secretary of State for President McKinley, received significant attention for his speech on the condition in Cuba (Offner 1992, 19). Senator Sherman called the Spanish "barbarous robbers and imitators of the worst men who ever lived in the world" (United States Congress 1896; Offner 1992, 18). The Spanish crimes in Cuba were "beyond description" (United States Congress 1896). The leading Democrat on the committee, Senator John Morgan (Democrat, Alabama), reiterated these depictions, where the "horrors of persecution, rapine, and extermination visited upon the people of Cuba" were "incredibly inhuman and so disgraceful to the civilization of this age that it stuns the mind into disbelief that such things can be true" (United States Congress 1897a). Intervention by the United States was "a duty that we owe to humanity, to Christian civilization, to the spirit and tradition of our country and our people" (United States Congress 1897a; McCartney 2006). The pathos

rhetorical strategy used emotional appeals to define Spain as barbarians and the United States as civilized. Moreover, the rhetoric identified the United States as a righteous defender, with its "duty" to civilization. The rhetorical strategy also linked this duty to the traditional values of the United States, intimating the Founding Fathers would want to intervene in Cuba (McCartney 2006).

Moreover, Spanish civilization became linked to Catholicism. As May points out, the "Cuban cause was taken up in the name of Republicanism, patriotism and Protestantism" (May 1961, 74). For many in the United States, Spain was still Catholic and therefore on the wrong side of history (McCartney 2006, 95). The Spanish inquisition remained an important rhetorical resource to generate Protestant support and demonize Spain. Mass demonstrations supporting Cuba included various anti-Catholic organizations and leaders (McCartney 2006, 95).

Editorials also attributed the policy of reconcentration as a consequence of Spanish civilization and culture rather than a military decision (McCartney 2006, 88). While Spain barred press coverage, which led yellow journalists to become even more pro-Cuban, the Junta fed stories and pictures to the newspapers. (McCartney 2006, 91). Horatio Rubens, the legal counsel for the Junta and a primary spokesperson, organized the "Peanut Club" (O'Toole 1984, 77). The Peanut Club consisted of reporters from forty different newspapers that met every afternoon at 66 Broadway in New York City, including the yellow journals the *New York Journal* and *New York World* (O'Toole 1984, 77). Rubens gave reports each day about Spanish atrocities and the Cuban patriots. These reports

allowed newspapers to publish about the Cuban war on a daily basis without any cost.

Supporters of the insurrection also utilized the rhetorical resources of liberty and self-determination, attempting to tie the Cuban struggle to the American Revolution (McCartney 2006, 87). This continued the argument by Senator Morgan about the "spirit and tradition" of the United States. The New *York Times* argued the administrative reforms proposed by the Spanish government were not substantial and that "Spain is keeping a colony without representation" (New York Times 11 February 1897). The *New York World* argued the plan did not give any power to the Cubans, depriving them of self-determination (New York World 11 February 1897). The *New York Sun* called the Spanish plunderers and the Cubans "patriots" (New York Sun 11 February 1897). Spain only offered the administrative reforms to trick the United States and prevent democracy in Cuba (New York Sun 11 February 1897). The rhetorical resources of liberty and self-determination were linked to the interventionist narrative by identifying Cubans as "patriots" just like the Founding Fathers. The United States was the defender of liberty, and therefore the defender of Cuba.

President Cleveland resisted the public and congressional pressure to intervene in Cuba. Responding to a congressional delegation, President Cleveland stated "I happen to know that we can buy the Island of Cuba from Spain for $100,000,000, and a war will cost vastly more than that and will entail another long list of pensioners. It would be an outrage to declare war" (McElroy 1923, 249-250; Campbell and Jamieson 1990). This was a simplified version of the

opposition narrative, war with Spain would hurt the prosperity of the United States. The business community supported this narrative, not wanting to intervene in Cuba because it would hurt international trade (LaFeber 1963, 287). When a resolution recognizing Cuban independence came out of committee in 1896, the New York stock market plummeted (Hamilton 2006). Senator Eugene Hale (Republican, Maine) noted, "I have had hundreds of letters from businessmen all over the country…protesting against this whole crusade" (Zakaria 1998, 155). Biographies of many business leaders highlight their anti-war position, in particular Andrew Carnegie and J.P. Morgan, often arguing how war would disrupt international trade and hurt the domestic economy (Hamilton 2006, 122). Henry Johnson (Republican, Indiana) declared a war against Spain would "shake the business interests of this country to the foundation" and prevent "recuperation and development" from the recession (United States Congress 1898, 800). General Greenville M. Dodge, an important railroad executive, claimed the United States could not afford a war at the time (Trask 1981, 30)

The newspapers that opposed the war included the primary business journals of the day, such as the *Wall Street Journal*, *Banker's Magazine*, *Journal of Commerce*, *United States Investor* (Gleijeses 2003). The *United States Investor* argued war would cause "a complete disorganization of our finances" (1898b, 497). *Bankers' Magazine* argued "a war between Spain and the United States would incalculably increase the loss to business interests" ("Bankers' Magazine" 1898, 358). Some of these newspapers speculated the war would cost

more than $500 million or greater than the expense of the Civil War altogether (1898b). Many of these business publications argued Cuban intervention was a plot by pro-silver politicians, where war would increase national debt and force the government to abandon the gold standard (Gleijeses 2003, 702). Boards of trade and chambers of commerce joined the newspapers, forming "anti-war solidarity of the financial interests and their spokesmen" (Hamilton 2006, 120)

President McKinley came to office in the middle of this public debate about reconcentration. Unsure about the actual situation on the ground, President McKinley sent William K. Calhoun, a trusted advisor, to Cuba (Offner 1992). In the meantime, President McKinley backed legislation for $50,000 to help United States citizens in Cuba (Offner 1992). Although House Republicans wanted to do more, the Speaker of the House, Thomas B. Reed, prevented any other resolutions for coming to the floor and waited to appoint members to the Foreign Relations Committee (Offner 1992). Speaker Reed opposed the Cuban insurgency from the beginning, allying with President McKinley who wanted to avoid going to war with Spain (Offner 1992).

Therefore congressional debate only occurred in the Senate, where pro-interventionists argued how Spain threatened civilization and American values and therefore the United States had a duty to defend the New World. Senator Morgan (Democrat, Alabama) reintroduced another resolution recognizing Cuban belligerency, giving Spain and Cuba equal rights (Offner 1992). Senator Morgan claimed public support, producing thirty-nine petitions "from all parts of the country" and claiming many more (Hamilton 2006, 108). In the debates,

Senator Morgan used reports and information provided by the Junta (Hamilton 2006, 217). Once again, Senator Morgan called Spain "vicious and inhumane" (United States Congress 1897b). Although the resolution passed, several Republicans abstained because they did not want to undermine the new president (Offner 1992, 45). When the resolution reached the House, Speaker Reed killed the resolution through parliamentary tactics. Instead, Speaker Reed passed $50,000 relief for United States citizens in Cuba (Offner 1992, 45).

This pathos rhetorical strategy of making emotional appeals to connect American values and civilization to a Spanish threat faced significant opposition in the newspapers. While some editorials wanted to "support the Cuban struggle for liberty" (New York World 27 May 1897, 643) or believed it was the "universal desire of the American people to stop the hellish atrocities which for two years have on in Cuba" (New York Sun 27 May 1897, 644), more newspapers wanted to wait for the Calhoun report before recognizing Cuban belligerency (New York Evening Post 20 May 1897; Columbus Dispatch 20 May 1897). The *New York Times* argued the Morgan resolution for Cuban belligerent rights was an attempt by jingoes to start a war with Spain (New York Times 27 May 1897). Belligerent rights would allow Spain to board United States ships heading to Cuba, provoking the American people into a war (New York Times 27 May 1897). The *New York Times* claimed the majority of the American people do not want a war with Spain (New York Times 27 May 1897). The rhetorical resources of American values and civilization and the pathos strategy used to link them to the Spanish threat failed to generate public support.

Calhoun returned from Cuba early June 1897. In the report, Calhoun argued the United States cannot simply wait for the conflict between Cuba and Spain to end because of the reconcentration camps (Offner 1992, 47). Throughout the countryside, “every house had been burned, banana trees cut down, cane fields swept with fire, and everything in the shape of food destroyed” (Offner 1992, 47). Reconcentration devastated the Cuban economy. Calhoun pointed out how American trade and investment suffered from reconcentration and the civil war. It was in the United States economic interest to end the war as soon as possible. The Calhoun report advanced one of the first economic arguments for intervening in Cuba.

Another economic argument for intervention came from Hannis Taylor, the former United States ambassador to Spain under President Cleveland. Taylor undertook a public relations effort to promote intervention by the United States ("Hannis Taylor on Cuba" 1897; Offner 1992). This private effort involved speaking engagements, rallies, and articles about the Spanish atrocities in Cuba (Offner 1992). For example, Taylor wrote an article in the North American Review justifying intervention through the Monroe Doctrine and international law. The United States held a “clear legal right to intervene in order to put an end to the war in Cuba” (Taylor 18 November 1897, 645-647). Intervention was “self-defense” because the United States was directly affected by the situation in Cuba, in particular the economy of the United States (Taylor 18 November 1897). This self-defense argument shifted the pro-intervention narrative towards national interest. It also started to undermine the opposition narrative by arguing the

situation in Cuba hurt the prosperity of the United States. Furthermore, the rhetorical strategy used legal reasoning to explain how Spain was a threat to the United States.

In the newspapers and editorials, more public statements appeared espousing the economic interests of the United States in Cuba. The United States needed to protect current investments. In 1895, American investment in Cuba totaled nearly $50 million, and total trade between the two countries reached about $100 million (Offner 1992, 15). Furthermore, future investments would help the struggling economy of the United States and the problems for the sugar industry in general (Pierra 1897). The United States was beginning to recover from economic recession, but the war in Cuba did not help.

Anti-Spain rallies and public events drew large crowds, and numerous editorials supported the Taylor article and publicity tour. The Louisville Courier-Journal and Salt Lake Herald argued Taylor was truthful, and Spain was cruel and blind (Louisville Courier-Journal 18 November 1897; Salt Lake Herald 18 November 1897). The New Orleans Times-Democrat believed Taylor's argument would finally push Congress to act, even if the administration continued to prevent intervention (New Orleans Times-Democrat 18 November 1897).

Late in 1897, the Spanish government recalled General Weyler and promised to improve the reconcentration camps (Offner 1992). In addition, Spain agreed to political reforms in Cuba, including partial autonomy starting 1 January 1898. President McKinley's first State of Union highlighted these important shifts in Spanish policy.

However, President McKinley warned Spain that America wanted these policies enacted quickly, “If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world” (McKinley 1897). President McKinley deployed the rhetorical resource of civilization; however, instead of pathos he utilized a logos rhetorical strategy. President McKinley claimed the United States as the defender of civilization and humanity with legal right to use force in Cuba. Much of the Cuban section focused on international law. This rhetorical strategy echoed the successful arguments of Hannis Taylor.

President McKinley also connected American values of self-determination and liberty to prosperity in Cuba. Defending the role of the United States, President McKinley argued “We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self-control which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country” (McKinley 1897). With self-determination and political liberty, the Cuban economy would enjoy economic growth. While he denied any hidden intentions, President McKinley connected Cuban prosperity to the economic interests of the United States. The deployment of “inalienable right of man” also hinted at the Founding Fathers and traditional values of the United States. As the defender of American values and civilization and the protector of American economic interests, President McKinley logically argued the United

States had a duty to intervene. By continuing the civil war, Spain committed "horrors and dangers to our own peace" that required action by the United States (McKinley 1897). However, if Spain continued to change its policies in Cuba, especially with the new political reforms and the end to reconcentration, then the United States did not need to intervene.

Reaction to the speech split mostly along partisan lines in the newspapers. Democratic editorials called President McKinley a coward, not willing to do the "right" thing, which is intervene in Cuba (New York World 9 December 1897; New York Journal 9 December 1897; Kansas City Times 9 December 1897). Editorials attacked the economic arguments for not intervening on moral grounds. President McKinley was "controlled by Wall Street" who was doing nothing while "Cuban patriots are suffering starvation and death" (Kansas City Times 9 December 1897, 775). Spanish control of Cuban was a "crime against human liberty" and the United States should intervene (Louisville Courier-Journal 9 December 1897).

Republican editorials called the speech moderate, reasonable, and courageous (New York Commerical Advertiser 9 December 1897; Chicago Times-Herald 9 December 1897; Columbus Dispatch 9 December 1897). President McKinley did not succumb to the jingoes, but rather took a position supported by the majority of the American people (Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette 9 December 1897). Yet these editorials often repeated the rhetorical configuration of the pro-intervention narrative. For example, non-intervention editorials accepted the humanitarian arguments – Spain was barbarian, Cubans were patriots, and the

United States was the defender of civilization. (Charleston News and Courier 9 December 1897). The reason for not intervention was national interest – these Spanish atrocities did not affect the security of the United States.

De Lome Letter, 9 February 1898

In analyzing the President McKinley's State of the Union speech, the Spanish ambassador to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, wrote a letter to a friend. The Cuban Junta acquired the letter and gave it to the *New York Journal*. The Journal published the letter on 9 February 1898 with the headline, "Worst Insult to the United States in History" (McCartney 2006, 95).

In the letter, Minister de Lome said the State of the Union speech "shows once more that McKinley is weak and catering to the rabble, and beside a low politician who desires to leave a door open to mean and stand well with the jingoes of his party" (de Lome 9 February 1898). Not only did the insults to President McKinley cause public outrage, but also how the letter admitted Spain was deceiving the United States in trade negotiations and the future of Cuban autonomy (Perez Jr. 1998; Offner 1992, 116). De Lome suggested the only reason why Spain opened trade negotiations was to prevent the United States from intervening in Cuba. Moreover, both the trade negotiations and political autonomy for Cuba were delay tactics, requiring no substantial concessions by Spain.

Editorials called the letter an "insult not just to the president but to the entire nation" (Philadelphia Times 17 February 1898; Baltimore Herald 17

February 1898). The “honor” of the United States was at stake (Washington Post 17 February 1898). The United States has run out of patience with Spain (New York Mail 17 February 1898). “The history of the dealings of the United States with Spain has been a history of dignity and patience repaid by insult…[Spain] is our deadly enemy, treacherous, cruel, and unforgiving” (1898a, 4). Spain deceived the United States while oppressing Cuba (St. Louis Globe-Democrat 17 February 1898; Philadelphia Times 17 February 1898). Those in favor of intervention continued to demonize Spain, using the letter as evidence of “treachery” and “lies.” This pathos rhetorical strategy used emotion to identify Spain as the enemy of the United States. This rhetorical strategy attempted to sever attachments between the public and Spain, rather than making Cuba more attractive.

On the other hand, the opposition used logos rhetorical strategy, arguing the letter was not enough of a reason to go to war with Spain (New York Press 17 February 1898; Chicago Times-Herald 17 February 1898). Although the letter was insulting, honor was not a sufficient cause for war. The letter did not make Spain a threat. Despite pro-intervention outrage, there was little public reaction to the letter. Most of the editorials criticized de Lome, but did not call for war with Spain (Hamilton 2006, 180). Public opinion agreed, with little public outrage about the letter (Offner 1992; Hamilton 2006).

Sinking of the USS Maine, 15 February 1898

The immediate dismissal of de Lome as the Spanish ambassador to the United States quelled the controversy (Offner 1992, 120). However, less than one week after the letter was published, the USS Maine exploded in the Havana harbor. The Maine was stationed in Havana at the request of the United States minister to Cuba, who was worried about American lives especially after anti-American riots in January.

Pro-intervention editorials called the sinking of the Maine a "fatality in the history of our navy which finds no parallel" (Army and Navy Journal 24 February 1898, 229). Several labeled the incident as a national tragedy, with one editorial saying it was "more horrible than war" (Philadelphia Inquirer 24 February 1898, 229; New York Tribune 24 February 1898; Boston Globe 24 February 1898). This was the "biggest disaster in the history of the American navy" (Richmond Times 24 February 1898, 230). Several editorials blamed Spain, either directly as the perpetrators of this "great crime" or indirectly for fostering hostility and mobs in Cuba (Chicago Record 24 February 1898; Baltimore Herald 24 February 1898). Editorials claimed public opinion was against Spain and felt they were responsible (Richmond Times 24 February 1898; Providence Journal 24 February 1898). The United States needed to end the war in Cuba to prevent future tragedies like the USS Maine (Chicago Record 24 February 1898).

Quickly some editorials turned to the military situation. Arguments about how the Maine needed to be replaced insinuated a naval race between the Spain and the United States (Savannah News 24 February 1898; Boston Journal 24

February 1898; St. Louis Republic 24 February 1898). In the next weeks, editorials believed the United States would win a war against Spain, even though Spanish culpability had not been proven (New York Sun 3 March 1898). Several editorials pushed for greater military spending, especially for the navy (Pittsburgh Chronicle-Telegraph 3 March 1898; Concord Monitor 3 March 1898).

Pro-intervention editorials began to directly address the opposition narrative about how war was bad for business. The *Chicago Daily News* pointed out that the financial and business communities were against war (Chicago Daily News 3 March 1898). However, the editorial argued the United States had a surplus and loaned money to Europe for the first time in history. This economic position allowed not only for more defense expenditures, but also a more expansive foreign policy. Isolation was no longer an option in "today's world" so the United States needed to be prepared for war (Detroit Tribune 3 March 1898). Pro-intervention editorials switched to a logos rhetorical strategy, explaining why war was not bad for business. Furthermore, this connected non-intervention in Cuba with isolationism, an uncomfortable position for business leaders.

Pro-intervention editorials continued by arguing neutrality was becoming too expensive for the United States (Philadelphia Record 17 March 1898). United States intervention would prevent any more waste or bloodshed (Philadelphia Record 17 March 1898). No longer was it simply a humanitarian argument, but also about protecting "commercial rights" (Spokane Spokesman-Review 17 March 1898). The current conflict ended trade between the United States and Cuba with "over 200 million dollars lost" and the property of American citizens destroyed

(San Francisco Examiner 17 March 1898). The Cincinnati Enquirer argued the United State must "guarantee that rich island as a republic in the western world" (Cincinnati Enquirer 17 March 1898). The Cuban market was introduced as a rhetorical resource, which become adjoined to prosperity on the one side and liberty on the other. Here a logos rhetorical strategy showed how intervention was good for business and the interests of the United States.

Non-intervention editorials focused on the media, in particular "yellow journalism," as the problem rather than Spain or Cuba. The New *York Evening Post* called the reporting about Spanish involvement in the Maine tragedy "journalistic lying" (New York Evening Post 3 March 1898). The other New York newspapers were simply trying to make money through these lies. However, the *Evening Post* argued the public was not fooled by yellow journalism. Other editorials disagreed, worried about "Parisian mobs" or "feeding the fires" of the mass public (Kansas City Journal 3 March 1898; Columbus Dispatch 3 March 1898). The *Kansas City Journal* called yellow journalism as "unpatriotic" (Kansas City Journal 3 March 1898). The opposition narrative moved away from logos, explaining why war was against the national interests of the United States.

The congressional response was overwhelming where "nine out of ten congressmen believed that the Spanish were responsible for the catastrophe" (Offner 1992, 123). Despite the tensions between Spain and the United States, there was little public outrage immediately after the sinking of the Maine (Offner 1992). Individuals or groups who did not favor intervention believed the sinking of the Maine was an accident. Most notably, the business community provided

"little support for intervention" (Hamilton 2006, 125). Even those who favored intervention recommended waiting for an official report (Offner 1992, 123).

Speech by Senator Proctor, 17 March 1898

Senator Redfield Proctor (Republican, Vermont) toured Cuba in order to see the conditions (McCartney 2006, 100). When he returned to Washington D.C., Senator Proctor made a critical speech on the Senate floor that shifted public opinion, in particular the business community. Senator Proctor's speech altered the public discourse because it seemed to provide objective confirmation about the reconcentration camps and Spanish policies toward Cubans (Proctor 1898; Pratt 1936).[16]

There are several reasons why Senator Proctor's speech had such a significant impact on the business community. For one, he was a Republican with "impeccable conservative credentials," long known as a representative of the business community (Trask 1981, 36). Not only did Senator Proctor often vote in favor of business, but he also was a self-made millionaire and one of the wealthiest members of the Senate at the time (Offner 1992, 130). The business community also considered Senator Proctor credible because he was a skeptic of the newspaper reports, and "went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents" (Offner 1992, 131). Moreover,

[16] In one of the first critiques of the economic expansionist explanation for the War of 1898, Pratt argues the business community responded to Senator Proctor's speech, evidenced in the *Wall Street Journal* and *American Banker*, rather than imperial motivations (Pratt 1936).

Senator Proctor spoke to numerous officials and members of society while in Cuba, where "inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief communities, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians, and lawyers" (Offner 1992, 132). Second, Senator Proctor was also considered rational and reasonable, appearing calm and detached. He rarely gave speeches in the Senate, so when he spoke, colleagues and reporters listened and believed him. When making the speech, Senator Proctor used sober and measured language to describe the conditions in Cuba (Trask 1981, 36). As Senator William Frye (Republican, Maine, President Pro Temp of the Senate) stated at the time, "It is just as if Proctor had held up his right hand and sworn to it" (McCartney 2006, 101). Senator Proctor described the reconcentration camps in graphic details, validating many of the stories reported in the yellow newspapers but using logic and reasoning rather than sensationalism (McCartney 2006, 101). Finally, Senator Proctor was a former secretary of war under President Harrison and a friend of President McKinley. This gave the perception of being an insider (Offner 1992).

Many of the editorials supported Senator Proctor's speech by referring to his reputation. The Brooklyn Eagle called Senator Proctor a "man of high reputation" who has "no reason to exaggerate" (Brooklyn Eagle 24 March 1898). The Boston Globe, another Democratic paper, said Senator Proctors was "one of the most level headed business men of the country, cool, careful, and conservative" (Boston Globe 24 March 1898). Other noted Senator Proctor's

"judgment is well know for accuracy, conservatism, and placidity" (New York Mail and Express 24 March 1898). The New York Journal stated that "Proctor is a leader of the senate and former secretary of war" giving him special standing as a witness to the conditions in Cuba. Editorials and the audience identified Senator Proctor as a businessman. When claiming intervention was necessary and beneficial for United States interests, Senator Proctor actually represented the business community in the public debates.

As such, editorials frequently and liberally recited Senator Proctor's testimony, often noting how it was free from sensationalism or exaggeration (Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette 24 March 1898; New York Tribune 24 March 1898). According to these editorials, Senator Proctor finally confirmed the terrible conditions in Cuba for the American people (New York Tribune 24 March 1898). Cuba was a "country robbed of its own life" and now oppressed with "foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food" (New York Mail and Express 24 March 1898). The speech described the countryside in "desolation and distress, misery and starvation" (Proctor 1898). The reconcentration camps were "virtual prisonyards" with people unable to return to their homes, many of which were burned by Spanish soldiers. Senator Proctor claimed of the total population of Cuba, "one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they can not be saved" (Proctor 1898). Senator Proctor argued the yellow newspapers did not exaggerate the conditions.

In the speech, Senator Proctor also compared the conditions in Cuba to St. Bartholomew's massacre and the Spanish Inquisition (Proctor 1898; Offner 1992,

131). Both events served as important reminders for Protestants about the vicious and repressive nature of Catholicism. While the war in Cuba was not religious, these rhetorical resources highlighted how Catholic Spain was a threat to Protestant America.

Other editorials continued the civilization argument, using a pathos rhetorical strategy connecting the United States to the defender of civilization. The duty of the United State was to intervene for "humanity and civilization" (Brooklyn Eagle 24 March 1898). United States should respond for Christianity and civilization (New York Mail and Express 24 March 1898). Also this argument identified Spain as the barbarian, threatening civilization.

Senator Proctor's speech affected the business community in particular. Before the testimony, most business journals and individuals opposed intervention (Offner 1992, 134). Even after the sinking of the Maine, businessmen opposed intervention (Hamilton 2006, 125). The *Journal of Commerce* argued on 5 March 1898,

> the antiwar class comprises those who are engage in the creation and distribution of the national wealth – the industrialist, the merchant, the railroad investor and we ought to be able to say the working masses, and could, had not their passions been swayed by the sensational press. The interests on whom the country is dependent for its daily bread, for prosperity and progress, and for a plethoric condition of bank accounts are almost unanimously against war or a policy towards Spain that might drift into that catastrophe (Journal of Commerce 1898, 6).

However, *Wall Street Journal* noted "Senator Proctor's speech converted a great many people in Wall Street, who have heretofore taken the ground that the United States had no business to interfere in a revolution on Spanish soil"

("Editorial" 1898). “Prosperity and progress” became co-opted by Senator Proctor and the pro-intervention narrative. The future of Cuba provided excellent investment opportunities, since Cuba was an island of “surpassing richness” (Proctor 1898).

Maine Report, 28 March 1898

President McKinley received a summary of the Maine report on 21 March 1898, and deliberated with his cabinet about the course of action. The report concluded a mine explosion sank the Maine. After cabinet, congressional, and diplomatic consultation, President McKinley sent the Maine Report to Congress on 28 March 1898. In the attached note, President McKinley asked for “deliberate consideration” (Offner 1992, 136). Congress expressed “shock, disbelief, and outrage at President McKinley’s message of transmittal” (O'Toole 1984, 161). As a result, there were five resolutions introduced in the Senate, and eleven in the House. House Republicans threatened to revolt against party leadership since Speaker Reed refused to allow floor votes on Cuban issues (Offner 1992, 151). Only direct meetings with President McKinley satisfied Republican congressmen, and in those meeting President McKinley asked for patience for a diplomatic solution (Offner 1992, 151-152). The Republican congressmen agreed to wait until 4 April for a Spanish reply to an ultimatum for armistice in Cuba (Offner 1992).

In the meantime, Democrats continued to attack the Republicans for failing to support the Cuban insurrection (Offner 1992). The Democrats saw Cuba

as an opportunity for the upcoming congressional elections (Offner 1992, 153). Numerous Republican elites, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, and Theodore Roosevelt believed a failure to intervene in Cuba would mean "destruction" of the Republican Party and the "elevation" of Democrats to power (Offner 1992, 153).

The Associated Press obtained a summary of the report and published it also on 28 March 1898 (O'Toole 1984). The New York Times called the sinking of the Maine a "deliberately organized massacre" (New York Times 31 March 1898). Spain organized a "conspiracy" against the United States (New York Times 31 March 1898). Every one of the editorials called for retribution. The "whole civilized world holds Spain responsible" for the sinking of the Maine (Denver Republican 7 April 1898). The sinking of the Maine was an example of "Spanish treachery and villainy" (Cleveland Plain-Dealer 7 April 1898). Once again, the argument returned to driving "the Spaniard from this continent" (Detroit News 7 April 1898).

Although these civilization arguments persisted, many editorials began making more legal references. A logos rhetorical strategy appealed to the audience's reason. First, editorials defined the sinking of the Maine as a legal proceeding, arguing the "evidence is strong enough to convict" (Cleveland Plain-Dealer 7 April 1898). The *Philadelphia Inquirer* stated how the court laid out the facts of the case (Philadelphia Inquirer 7 April 1898). *New York Tribune* argued the "logic of events and established facts" explained how Spain sunk the Maine (New York Tribune 7 April 1898). Framing the Maine report as a legal proceeding

appealed to reason and convinced skeptics who did not like the emotional and sensational appeals of yellow journalism and jingoistic speeches. Logos successfully vilified Spain without making these emotional appeals. Additionally, a logos rhetorical strategy explained why Spain was a threat, and not just a villain. Editorials showed how the interests of the United States were at stake with the sinking of the Maine. No longer could the United States ignore the civil war – Spain directly attacked the United States. Moreover, editorials proceeded to link security interests to economic interests, explaining that "geographically and commercially, the struggle in Cuba in on American soil" (Atlanta Constitution 24 March 1898). This rhetorical strategy combined the Monroe Doctrine, strategic interests, and economic prosperity to explain why Spain was a threat to the United States.

President's War Message, 11 April 1898

Although the President agreed to address Congress on 4 April 1898, the administration requested a two day extension. President McKinley then asked to delay the message until 11 April, all the while conducting secret diplomatic negotiations with Spain and other Great Powers, including Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary (Offner 1992, 168). On 9 April, Spain agreed to suspend hostilities. President McKinley wanted to postpone the Cuban message again, however he was unable to convince Republican congressmen (Offner 1992, 180-181). Any further delay would divide the party and lead to electoral defeat (Offner 1992).

When listing the grounds for intervention, President McKinley included the “barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries” as well as the “very serious injury to commerce, trade, and business of our people” (McKinley 1898). The most important reason for intervention was how the “conditions of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace and entails upon this Government an enormous expense” affecting “trade and business relations” where the “lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined” (McKinley 1898). President McKinley adopted both of the interventionist narratives. The rhetorical resources of both narratives were connected through logos.

The message was long and legalistic, failing “to capture the emotions of the occasion; House members clapped only briefly and in a perfunctory manner” (Offner 1992, 182). President McKinley built his argument methodically, starting with a description of the Cuban devastation because of the civil war. Then he explained how this devastation cost the United States. Next, President McKinley argued Spain could not resolve this conflict and if it continued, the war would hurt the United States even more. Since negotiations failed to end the civil war, the United States needed to intervene immediately.

Several studies criticized the speech for its lack of emotion or appeal. However, this analysis missed the critical audiences for the message. For one, President McKinley needed to shore up support in the business community for intervening in Cuba. This did not require emotional or humanitarian appeals. Instead, President McKinley attempted to win over the business community by

taking the opposite track of the yellow journalists and try to present a logical and reasoned argument. Furthermore, this type of appeal would also calm European powers who were concerned about American jingoes and the potential expansion of the United States. For example, the British ambassador to the United States worried the United States would start taking all European colonies in the Caribbean (Offner 1992, 185). Several editorials warned about possible European intervention, with Russia, France, and Austria potentially allying with Spain (Gleijeses 2003).

Finally, the message also appealed to various political leaders and groups hesitant about the United States intervening in Cuba. This included conservative Republican Senators, such as Senator George Hoard who believed intervention should be "based on facts and not rumor" or "excitements of the moment" (Hamilton 2006, 227). Also some southern Democrats and Republicans worried about Spanish naval attacks on their port cities (Gleijeses 2003). Furthermore, various liberals and anti-imperialists, including ex-President Cleveland and William Graham Sumner, believed the war was an excuse for imperial expansion. Although these groups were not in the majority in Congress, they held important positions and represented critical constituents.

Most arguments against the speech actually came from pro-interventionists. The Cuban Junta made a statement to the press about how the United States should recognize the Cuban revolutionaries. The United States policy was "treating Cubans like children instead of men fighting for liberty" (Rubens 6 April 1898). Most of Congress agreed, wanting Cuban recognition as

well. A majority of both Democrats and Republicans accepted the fact of a Spanish threat. The public debate switched from "is Spain a threat, and should the United States intervene in Cuba" to "what should be the goal, and how will the United States win?"

The House of Representatives passed on 13 April by vote of 325 to 19 a resolution to authorize the president to intervene to stop the war in Cuba (Offner 1992, 188). However, the House resolution did not recognize the Cuban Republic. In the Senate, an amendment was attached for recognizing the Cuban Republic. President McKinley threatened to veto any resolution that recognized Cuba, while pro-Cuban senators wanted either Cuban recognition or independence. Congress dropped Cuban recognition or independence and President McKinley accepted the joint resolution with the Teller Amendment, which "served as a disclaimer of mischievous intentions" (Perez Jr. 1998, 20-21). The House voted 311 to 6 and the Senate 52 to 35 in favor (Offner 1992).

Alternative Arguments

These two episodes provide some interesting insights about threat legitimation and rhetoric, while raising some important questions. Most important, why was the War of 1898 successfully legitimated and the Baltimore Affair was not?

Explanations from the extant literature are incomplete. Objective explanations suggest Spain was a greater threat to the United States than Chile. For example, Spain could prevent or limit two important strategic goals, 1) the

building of an isthmian canal and 2) military bases in the Caribbean. However, several scholars have dismissed these arguments, pointing out “our national security, as we think of it today, was not threatened (Kennan 1984, 45). The Nicaragua canal was still in the early planning stages and Spanish Cuba would not prevent access or control of the canal by the United States. Military advisors and analysts at the time thought the United States held the strategic advantage and that Spain did not present a threat (O'Toole 1984). The war would be conducted in the Caribbean and with the transatlantic voyage the Spanish navy would have problems refueling. The United State navy was stronger, faster, and better equipped than the Spanish navy (O'Toole 1984).

On the other hand, Chile in 1891 presented a more probable threat to the United States, yet the threat was never successfully legitimated. Chile potentially challenged the political, military, and economic expansion of the United States. Chile had already defeated the United States navy in the War of the Pacific, and the “Chilean navy could shell America’s Pacific coast with impunity” (Moore 2001, 718). In addition, Chile acquired the Easter Islands, which gave them control of two major inter-oceanic passages in the Pacific (Moore 2001). Related to this argument, Chile developed close political and economic relations with Great Britain, effectively reducing the role of the United States in the region. Chile was the leading economic power in South America and held the greatest supply of nitrates in the world, an essential mineral at the time, and Great Britain dominated the Chilean market (Goldberg 1986). A Great Britain-Chile alliance threatened the strategic and economic interests of the United States, including

access to the Latin American and Chinese markets, and the development of an isthmian canal.

Subjective explanations fail to explain threat legitimation as well. In the War of 1898, President McKinley did not want war. He did not perceive Spain as a threat because he felt war was unnecessary. Moreover, President McKinley believed Spain was trying to maintain peaceful relations between the two states. President McKinley postponed his war message to Congress several times because he believed a diplomatic solution could be reached (Offner 1992). Spain continually signaled their willingness to acquiesce to the demands of the United States, and President McKinley believed war would be averted (Offner 1992).

However, in the Baltimore Affair, President Harrison and his administration clearly wanted to go to war against Chile (Goldberg 1986). More important, President Harrison perceived Chile as a threat to the United States, especially as Chile tightened its relations with Great Britain. Moreover, the Matta note signaled Chilean hostility towards President Harrison and the United States (Goldberg 1986, 86). According to President Harrison, failure to act against Chile would hurt the reputation of the United States and limit its role in South America and the Pacific. This threat perception however, failed to generate public support.

A rhetorical approach to threat legitimation provides a more complete understanding of foreign policy. For example, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War* and *From Wealth to Power* use both of these episodes for their theories (Owen 1997; Zakaria 1998). Each takes a subjectivist approach, relying on the perceptions of foreign policy makers to explain foreign policy behavior. Owen argues United

States foreign policy elites perceived Chile as liberal and Spain as illiberal, which explains why Spain perceived as a threat. Zakaria focuses on how United States foreign policy makers perceived their state power as weak during the Baltimore Affair and strong before the War of 1898.

While both studies offer interesting and important insights, they fall short in several ways. For one, a problem emerges for interpreting elite perceptions. This is a particular problem for the War of 1898 because President McKinley did not leave any personal memoirs or written records. Nevertheless, both *Liberal Peace Liberal War* and *From Wealth to Power* rely on perceptions of foreign policy makers that are disputed by historians. For example, historians argue that President Harrison and other key foreign policy makers perceived Chile as illiberal, as seen in some of the civilization and character references that I highlighted previously (Goldberg 1986). President Harrison and the administration also seemed to perceive the United States as more powerful than Zakaria claims during the Baltimore Affair (Goldberg 1986). These mixed interpretations also exist for the War of 1898, where President McKinley believed the new Spanish regime in 1897 was liberal (Offner 1992). Moreover, President McKinley was not as sure about the power of the United States as Zakaria suggests, with Secretary of the Navy John D. Long warning President McKinley against going to war (Offner 1992; Trask 1981, 30).

This highlights another problem for subjective explanations of these two episodes. Both Owen and Zakaria rely on public declarations to identify the perceptions of President Harrison and President McKinley. However, I argue this

becomes a slippery slope, where scholars conflate perceptions with justifications. As Owen points out, liberalism is an important concept for explaining foreign policy behavior. However, I argue it is a critical rhetorical resource used in public debates rather than simply an idea that shapes perceptions of foreign policy makers. This is true for state power as well, where pro-interventionists and later the McKinley administration justified going to war with Spain because it would be easy.

Finally, neither Owen nor Zakaria explain how perceptions get enacted as policies. Perceptions may be important, but how do foreign policy actors communicate these perceptions to other government officials and the public? A rhetorical approach highlights how political actors inside and outside the government configure liberalism, state power, and other rhetorical resources to allow foreign policy. Before the War of 1898, pro-interventionists deployed liberalism and democracy in order to legitimate Spain as a threat to civilization. During the Baltimore Affair, editorials argued Chile was a sister republic in order to undermine the threat narrative. This is not to say that liberalism or democracy always works as a rhetorical resource. Therefore I argue it is important to study not just the rhetorical resources but also the rhetorical strategies in the public debates about a threat.

Newspaper media environment

Since threat legitimation occurred in the media, the question emerges, did newspapers influence how rhetoric affected threat legitimation? I argue the newspaper media environment favored logos rhetorical strategies.

At the beginning of the Baltimore Affair, editorials used logos to successfully argue against intervening in the Chilean Civil War. The interests of the United States were linked to both anti-British sentiment and the need for neutrality. By using international law, anti-intervention arguments built a case against getting involved in the civil war that became widely supported. With the end of the civil war, the same international laws helped redefine the Congressionalists and Chile in the public debates. During the civil war, the United States was just following the law, but after the war, international law allowed recognition. It was logical to resume relations because it was in the best interests of the United States. Logos connected the interests of the United States to democracy, arguing for improved relations with a "sister republic." The tensions during the civil war were really about the meddling of Great Britain and how they provoked the civil war, and now relations would improve because of shared democratic values.

After the riots in Valparaiso and the killing of the sailors from the USS Baltimore, President Harrison and loyal newspapers primarily used pathos rhetorical strategies to construct a narrative about the Chilean threat. The administration attempted to generate shared feelings about the United States and Chile. The United States was honorable and civilized, while Chile was savage. The administration appealed to emotions for defending the honor of the United States

against Chilean barbarity. The administration hoped pathos would break the public away from Chile in order to generate support for its narrative. Furthermore, the honor of the United States became connected to reputation of the United States through this emotional appeal - if the United States does not respond to such barbaric acts, like the killing of the USS Baltimore sailors, then such outrages would continue. With the international community watching, Chile needed to be punished to deter future attacks.

However, the opposition primarily used a logos rhetorical strategy to explain how Chile was not a threat to the United States. Their arguments emphasized the relationship between Chile and the United States, in particular the shared democratic values. Chile was referred to as a "sister republic" (New York Herald 3 November 1891). By using logos, the opposition attempted to bring the audience closer to Chile in order to generate support for its narrative.

At first, the opposition narrative critiqued the administration narrative by using the same rhetorical resources, honor and reputation. Through logic and reason, the opposition explained how the honor and reputation of the United States required not going to war with Chile. Several times editorials connected together the honor the United States to the interests of the United States, using the rhetorical strategy of logos. The editorials appealed to the reasoning of the audience, almost appearing to make a legal case as to why Chile was not a threat to the United States. Honor was also connected to "civilized" nature of the United States, arguing that a war against Chile was wrong. The United States was a "civilized Christian nation" and war with Chile would be "atrocious barbarism,

aggravated by the wildest folly" (Detroit News 1 November 1891, 103). Arguments ranged from Chile was too small to Chile was a sister republic. There is no honor attacking a small weak country, especially another democracy.

In the following weeks, the opposition focused on this shared democratic relationship between the United States and Chile. However, the primary rhetorical strategy remained logos, using reasoning to explain how shared democratic values meant Chile was not a threat. The opposition used logos to connect democracy to the interests of the United States. The United States should remain patient and wait for diplomacy to resolve the issue instead of going to war with a friendly democratic Chile (Savannah News 4 January 1892; New York Tribune 19 January 1892).

In his war message, President Harrison continued to use pathos rhetorical strategy. However, the war message received little support in Congress or the newspapers. Even Republican editorials rejected the administration narrative, believing Chile was not a threat to the interests of the United States. Moreover, the opposition succeeded in connecting the honor of the United States to not going to war, undermining the administration narrative. Chile was a democracy, Chile was weaker than the United States, and there was no honor in going to war with the weaker sister democracy. The *New York Herald* (Independent) exemplified this narrative, arguing the "American people do not war with weaker sister republic" (New York Herald 27 January 1892, 420).[17]

[17] Interestingly, President Harrison had several opportunities to use a logos rhetorical strategy to explain how Chile was threat to the interests of the United States. For instance, in the 1891 State of the Union message, President Harrison promoted the building of an isthmian canal, calling it critical for the

In the debate about the Spanish threat, pro-interventionists started by using pathos rhetorical strategies in appealing to audience emotions about the reconcentration and Cuban suffering. In editorials and congressional debates, pro-interventionists used emotional appeals about how Spain threatened civilization and American values and therefore the United States had a duty to defend the New World. The opposition countered by using logos to explain why a war with Spain would hurt the prosperity of the United States. The business community supported this narrative, not wanting to intervene in Cuba because it would hurt international trade (LaFeber 1963, 287).

Emotional accounts of Cuban suffering and appeals to American values and civilization failed to generate public support about the Spanish threat. Pro-interventionists began incorporating logos rhetorical strategies with campaign by Hannis Taylor and the Calhoun Report. Taylor used legal arguments, citing the Monroe Doctrine and international law as giving the United States a right to intervene. A logos rhetorical strategy defined intervention as "self-defense" (Taylor 18 November 1897). Spain was a threat to the United States, since Cuban directly affected the economic and political interests of the United States. Therefore logos undermined the opposition narrative by arguing the situation in Cuba hurt the prosperity of the United States.

President McKinley's first State of Union message deployed the rhetorical resource of civilization; however, instead of pathos he utilized a logos rhetorical

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"commercial growth and progress of the United States" (Harrison 1891). As some objectivist scholars attest, Chile could prevent the expansion of the United States in the Pacific (LaFeber 1963). However, President Harrison never used this argument or used logos to connect together the interests of the United States and how Chile was a threat.

strategy. President McKinley claimed the United States as the defender of civilization and humanity with legal right to use force in Cuba. Much of the Cuban section focused on international law, echoing the logos rhetorical strategies of Taylor. However, President McKinley still opposed intervening in Cuba; however he retained the right to use force in the future.

While pro-interventionists criticized President McKinley's State of the Union message, most editorials supported not intervening. Often the editorials accepted the humanitarian arguments, but reason and logic explained how the Spanish atrocities did not affect the security of the United States. The distinct rhetorical strategies continued when debating the de Lome letter and the sinking of the Maine. Those in favor of intervention continued to demonize Spain, using the two events as evidence of "treachery" and "lies." This pathos rhetorical strategy used emotion to identify Spain as the enemy of the United States. This rhetorical strategy attempted to sever attachments between the public and Spain, rather than making Cuba more attractive. On the other hand, the administration and anti-interventionists used logos rhetorical strategy, arguing the events were not enough of a reason to go to war with Spain (New York Press 17 February 1898; Chicago Times-Herald 17 February 1898). Neither event made Spain a threat. Despite pro-intervention claims, there was little public outrage to either event, rejecting the interventionist narrative.

After the Proctor report, pro-interventionists began using more logos rhetorical strategies, explaining why war was not bad for business. At the same time, anti-interventionists moved away from logos. Instead of explaining why war

was against the national interests of the United States, anti-interventionists started blaming yellow journalism for sensationalizing the de Lome letter and sinking of the Maine. Editorials used ethos rhetorical strategies to claim public support for their position, giving them authority in the public debates.

Senator Proctor used primarily used logos rhetorical strategy, but also used ethos to gain public support about the Spanish threat, especially within the business community. In the speech, Senator Proctor used official sources as authorities in defense of his arguments. Many of the editorials supported Senator Proctor's speech by referring to his reputation, an ethos rhetorical strategy. Also, editorials used logos when recounting Senator Proctor's testimony, often noting how it was free from sensationalism or exaggeration (Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette 24 March 1898; New York Tribune 24 March 1898). Senator Proctor used logical and legal argument to explain the Spanish threat.

Editorials picked up on using logos. Although emotional appeals persisted, many editorials began making more legal references. Pro-interventionists defined the sinking of the Maine as a legal proceeding. Framing the Maine report as a legal proceeding appealed to reason and convinced skeptics who did not like the emotional and sensational appeals of yellow journalism and jingoistic speeches. Logos successfully vilified Spain without making these emotional appeals. Additionally, a logos rhetorical strategy explained why Spain was a threat, and not just a villain. Editorials showed how the interests of the United States were at stake with the sinking of the Maine. No longer could the United States ignore the civil war – Spain directly attacked the United States. Moreover, logos rhetorical

strategy linked security interests to economic interests, explaining that "geographically and commercially, the struggle in Cuba in on American soil" (Atlanta Constitution 24 March 1898). This rhetorical strategy combined the Monroe Doctrine, strategic interests, and economic prosperity to explain why Spain was a threat to the United States. In his war message, President McKinley adopted the logos rhetorical strategies of the interventionists, bridging the two narratives.

As seen throughout the context of both episodes, the logos rhetorical strategy helped generate more public support for a threat narrative. Audiences were more agreeable to how rhetorical resources became connected and configured through logos. On the other hand, pathos rhetorical strategies rarely helped generate consent about a threat. Although pathos successfully defined Cuba as a humanitarian cause, pro-interventionists did not or could not link humanitarianism to the Spanish threat and therefore the interests of the United States. The pathos rhetorical strategy did mobilize the Protestant church networks at the time, in particular churches and missionaries who agreed with the narrative that the United States was the defender of civilization and Christianity. While this group was important, most of the public did not support pro-intervention at the time. Therefore, the question arises as to what about the media environment favored logos rhetorical strategies during the process of threat legitimation?

By the time of the Baltimore Affair, the newspaper became a mass medium. Numerous inventions, such as the rotary press, electricity, and the

Linotype machine, lowered the cost of printing newspapers and allowed mass circulation (Dudley 1991, 235-236). Lower costs combined with increased literacy rates allowed access for a majority of the American public. Newspapers became the primary source of information for a majority of Americans.

Mass circulation also allowed many people to read the same information. By allowing people to read the same information, the newspaper removed individuals from the tribal web (McLuhan 1964b, 82). Individual no longer depended on face to face personal contact for information. The end of personal relations for information removed the emotional connections and gave individuals more freedom to interpret events for themselves (McLuhan 1964b, 82). The ending of parochialism and tribalism allowed for nationalism, unifying people together in "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991).

The newspaper changed social groups and communities while empowering new information brokers. Editors and journalists became the important information brokers rather than party leaders. Even Presidents needed to persuade these new gatekeepers to publish their message in spite of newspaper party affiliation. President Lincoln spent a significant amount of time trying to convince Republican editors and publishers to support his Civil War policies and limit bad press (Ponder 1999).

As newspapers transformed into mass media, they became less dependent on political sponsorship. Advertising revenue allowed newspapers to become independent of political parties (Ponder 1999). Editors were no longer beholden to party leaders but rather to advertisers, who wanted greater audiences.

Moreover, editors gained new sources of information from the Associated Press and other news gathering institutions (Chesebro and Bertelsen 1996).

The newspaper media environment provided an individual direct access to information, while allowing everyone access to the same information. This democratic nature of newspapers promoted independence and community at the time (McLuhan 1964b). Individuals no longer needed others for information – they could experience events and issues themselves. Meanwhile, they experienced these events and issues at the same time as others, creating a mass public. This participation helped build a democratic community.

The newspaper media environment also affected the episteme. Newspapers privileged logical sequences, encouraging linear and causal information processing (McLuhan 1964b, 85). The audience needed to follow along, so order and logic dominated. The structure of the story was just as important as the content (Chesebro and Bertelsen 1996). The newspaper led to the inverted pyramid and privileged the journalist as the authority rather than sources or experts (Schudson 1995). Furthermore, newspapers allowed the audience to be detached and uninvolved, "the power to separate thought and feeling, to be able to act without reacting" (McLuhan 1964b, 173). Newspapers favored and idealized disinterest – from its journalists, publishers, and audience. Newspapers differed from oral debates, which forced reactions and interests from the audience. Without a human voice, newspapers removed emotions from the public discourse (Barnouw 1956, 101).

The newspaper media environment changed how threat narratives were represented in the public discourse. No longer did the audience have personal and emotional connections with the narrative through the storyteller. Instead, threat narratives represented logical sequences that the audience could follow. Without these logical representations, the audience would be lost since there was no longer an interpreter or even interlocutor to help the reader. As such, logos rhetorical strategies help connect together rhetorical resources for the audience in the newspaper media environment. Moreover, logos rhetorical strategies help the audience identify with the rhetorical resources. Since the rhetorical resources are connected through logical and legal terms, the audience better follows and understands the threat narrative and identifies with it.

Conclusion

When tracing the public debates for both episodes, rhetorical resources and strategies emerge as important explanation for threat legitimation. Each episode highlights how rhetoric plays an important role ignored by alternative explanations. For example, studies of the War of 1898 provide different explanations for United States foreign policy. National interest, humanitarianism, liberalism, economic prosperity, and domestic politics are all advanced as reasons for going to war. However, instead of competing explanations, I argue these were competing justifications, or rhetorical resources, used by political actors in order to generate public consent for going to war. This alternative model highlights how and why definitions of national interest or

liberalism, for instance, changed during the legitimation process. While national interest or liberalism is an important explanation for why a state is considered a threat or not, it is not simply the perceptions of foreign policy elites or material realities that determine this shared value. It matters how and why foreign policy elites generate public support, often using national interest or liberalism as a rhetorical resource. In the meantime, scholars interpret these rhetorical resources as motivations or explanations rather than attempts at legitimation.

Taking a rhetorical approach also offers some further insights about United States foreign policy behavior. For example, Zakaria argues that the War of 1898 was an opportunity for expansion by the United States because President McKinley perceived an increase in state power. However, it does not explain why the United States only took Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and the Philippines, even though the United States could have significantly increased its political and military power by taking Spanish colonies in the Atlantic or Mediterranean. However, a rhetorical approach notes how President McKinley and other pro-intervention political actors only legitimated the Spanish threat through the rhetorical configuration of civilization, liberty, and prosperity. Cuban liberty, supposedly guaranteed through the Teller Amendments, was critical for legitimation. It is important to note the anti-imperialist movement in the United States primarily focused on the acquisition of the Philippines, a foreign policy not legitimated in the public debates.

Rhetoric matters because it affects how foreign policy gets defined. For example, since the War of 1898 became linked to liberty and self-determination

for Cuba, the reneging of promises by the United States, with the Platt Amendment and protectorate status, helped produce historical resentment. Moreover, the rhetorical configuration combining prosperity with liberty and self-determination elevated the role of the economic interests of the United States in future relations. The relationship between Cuba and the United States became defined in terms of prosperity and an open market for the United States and independence and liberty for Cuba, a conflict that emerged almost immediately.

CHAPTER 4

GERMANY AND RUSSIA

In this second empirical chapter, I analyze two episodes, the threat of Nazi Germany prior to World War II and the threat of Soviet Russia after World War II. From 1938-1941, President Roosevelt and other political actors failed to convince Americans that Nazi Germany was a threat to the United States, even as Germany began to control Europe. This episode of failed threat legitimation provides an opportunity to investigate an important event in United States foreign policy. Even though this is a well covered episode in the fields of history and international relations, some important questions remain. Why did President Roosevelt fail to rally support for American intervention against Nazi Germany? The extant literature makes divergent claims, making this episode both theoretically and empirically important to study further. Moreover, this episode provides extreme "within case" variation, where public support about the Nazi German threat waxing and waning at different times.

I argue rhetorical resources and strategies explain the failed legitimation of the Nazi German threat. President Roosevelt and other interventionists advanced a threat narrative that Nazi Germany would take over Europe, especially Great Britain, and then attack the United States. At the very least, Germany would exclude the United States from the European market, and potentially the Latin American market as well, threatening the prosperity of the United States. Interventionists relied on logos rhetorical strategies to connect the

rhetorical resources of balance of power, European market, and civilization. Later in the public debate, President Roosevelt also deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to connect shared democratic values and civilization between the United States and Great Britain. The United States needed to defend democracy from dictatorships for the future of civilization. On the other hand, anti-interventionists successfully argued Germany would not and/or could not attack the United States. Undermining the threat narrative of President Roosevelt and other interventionists, the anti-interventionists connected the rhetorical resources of neutrality, American exceptionalism, World War I, and democracy through ethos rhetorical strategies. Instead of becoming involved in another European war, if the United States remained neutral, Nazi German would not attack. Intervention was the greater threat to democracy because it would turn the United States into a garrison state.

Just after World War II, President Truman argued the Soviet Union and the spread of communism represented a threat to the United States. Even though the Soviet Union was relatively weak and the United States was war-weary, the Truman administration succeeded in legitimating the threat and increasing defense spending. Why and how was President Truman successful, even though most historians do not consider him a better politician that President Roosevelt? I argue rhetorical resources and strategies explain this successful episode of threat legitimation, rather than simply objectivist or subjectivist explanations. President Truman deployed ethos rhetorical strategies to connect together the rhetorical resources of communism, totalitarianism, Nazi Germany,

appeasement, democracy, civilization, and isolationism. Totalitarianism linked the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, and Stalin to Hitler. The rhetorical resources of appeasement furthered these associations, while also justifying anti-Soviet foreign policies such as containment. Moreover, the Truman administration argued communism threatened liberty and democracy, the core values of the United States. The opposition argued the Soviet Union was not a threat to the United States, desiring security rather than world domination. They primarily deployed logos rhetorical strategies to connect together the rhetorical resources of cooperation, allies, spheres of influence, balance of power, and stability. The United States should cooperate with Soviet Russia and continue the wartime relationship. It was not in the strategic interests of the United States to confront the Soviet Union.

For each episode, I provide a brief summary and then analyze the role of rhetoric for threat legitimation. Then I compare objectivist and subjectivist explanations to the rhetorical explanation of threat legitimation. Less than five years from the Nazi German episode of failed threat legitimation, the Soviet Russia episode provides an interesting and important comparison. By comparing the causal mechanisms between episodes, I gain greater explanatory leverage about the role of rhetorical resources and strategies for successful threat legitimation. Moreover, both of these episodes occur during the radio media environment, providing an opportunity to explore how radio favored the ethos rhetorical strategies deployed by anti-interventionists in the Nazi Germany episode and the Truman administration in the Soviet Russia episode.

Summary of the Nazi Germany

The first episode is an example of failed threat legitimation, where President Roosevelt and other important political actors did not generate public support about the Nazi German threat to the United States. While Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, marched into Czechoslovakia, invaded Poland, and conquered France, the United States refused to intervene despite the continued warnings by President Roosevelt about the Nazi threat.

Hitler first demanded autonomy for the German population of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, and then cessation of the entire region. When the government of Czechoslovakia refused, Germany moved troops to the border. To avoid war, France and Great Britain met with Germany and Italy in September 1938. In exchange for Hitler's promise for no more territorial claims, including the rest of Czechoslovakia, Great Britain and France agreed to turn over the Sudetenland (Herring 2008). In March 1938, Germany marched into Austria and united the countries as Anschluss. In the summer of 1938, Hitler threatened war if Sudetenland, part of Czechoslovakia was not reunited with Germany as well. The war crisis ended with the Munich Conference, where France and Great Britain agreed to transfer Sudetenland to Germany in exchange for Hitler promising no more territorial demands (Ninkovich 1999b, 119).

In March 1939, Hitler violated his promises at the Munich conference by invading and acquiring the rest of Czechoslovakia. Then Hitler threatened Poland, and when France and Great Britain promised war, Germany signed the

nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in August 1939. Germany subsequently invaded Poland on 1 September 1939.

Analysis of Nazi Germany

I started my research with historiographies on the United States entry into World War II, as well as bibliographies compiled by Richard Immerman, Marc Trachtenberg, and Justus Doenecke (Cole 1957; De Benedetti 1984; Immerman; Trachtenberg 2006; Doenecke 1987). Just like the other empirical chapters, I used the bibliographies and historiographies to establish the most cited historical studies, as well as studies with different interpretations for a wide range of perspectives. My central histories included *The Undeclared War*, *Roosevelt Confronts Hitler*, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, *Toward an Entangling Alliance*, *Cautious Crusade*, and *Threshold of War* (Langer and Gleason 1953; Hearden 1987; Dallek 1979; Cole 1983; Powaski 1991; Casey 2001; Heinrichs 1988). I also supplemented these diplomatic histories with journal articles and studies of international relations and political science in order to include different arguments and perspectives (Farnham 1997; Donovan 1951; Baum and Kernell 2001; Frieden 1988).

From these secondary sources, I identified five critical junctures, 1) Munich Crisis 1938; 2) Invasion of Poland, September 1939; 3) Fall of France, June 1940; 4) War with Soviet Union, Summer 1941; and 5) Attacks on United States ships, Fall 1941. During the debates over these critical junctures, political actors attempting to legitimate the Nazi German threat included President

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickles, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of Navy Frank Knox, and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, in particular William Allen White. William Allen White was a prominent Midwestern Republican who became the national chairman of the Committee to Defend American by Aiding the Allies. White and other committee leaders consulted with the Roosevelt administration, including the president, in order to coordinate their speeches with administration positions (Cole 1983, 367). On 20 June 1940, President Roosevelt replaced the two most prominent isolationists in his cabinet, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring and Secretary of Navy Charles Edison. In their place, President Roosevelt appointed two prominent interventionist Republicans, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox. They joined Secretaries Morgenthau and Ickes as the spokesmen for United States intervention in the European war. Secretary of Interior Secretary Ickes often served as the primary attacker for the administration against non-interventionists, linked to the Fight for Freedom Committee (Cole 1983, 470).

Political actors arguing there was no Nazi threat to the United States included the America First Committee, in particular the National Chairman General Robert E. Wood and primary spokesperson Colonel Charles Lindbergh, Congressman Hamilton Fish, and a group of Senators that included Burton K. Wheeler (Democrat, Idaho), Hiram Johnson (Republican, California), Gerald Nye (Republican, North Dakota), William Borah (Republican, Idaho), and Robert Taft (Republican, Ohio). Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh served in the Air Force

Reserves and was considered an American hero for his solo flight across the Atlantic for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor. By 1941, Senator Wheeler was the most able and aggressive leader in the Senate, while Colonel Lindbergh was the biggest challenge to President Roosevelt (Cole 1983, 458) Other important political actors included former President Herbert Hoover, who wrote a book critical of President Roosevelt's foreign policy (Hoover 1939), radio commentators Boake Carter and Father Charles E. Coughlin, and publishing tycoon William Randolph Hearst.

Starting with these critical junctures and political actors, I researched public speeches using primary sources, including presidential papers, congressional records, memoirs, newspapers editorials, and radio addresses. In combination with the newspaper editorials, I used public opinion surveys to assess the levels of threat legitimation. Although the public opinion surveys of the time had significant gaps and issues, I included them to get a general idea about public opinion, as Baum and Kernell did when measuring President Roosevelt's overall public approval ratings (Baum and Kernell 2001). I highlighted the public opinion trends in Figure 1, and noted shifts in public opinion surveys below.



Figure 1. Germany public opinion

The above chart provides the best available time-series polling data about the German threat. From June 1940 to October 1941, the American public was asked about going to war with Germany and Italy. At no time did more than 30 percent of the respondents favor going to war, suggesting that Germany was not the pressing and immediate threat as argued by President Roosevelt and other political actors favoring intervention. Most Americans did not like the Nazi regime, but believed that Atlantic Ocean defended the United States from attack (Donovan 1951, 316; Baum and Kernell 2001). Even lesser policies, such as aid to

Britain and rebuilding United States military strength faced significant opposition (Casey 2001, 23). In November 1939, only 20 percent of Americans wanted to aid democracies short of war. A 54 percent majority favored selling goods to both sides (Langer and Gleason 1953, 198, 568). A majority of the public opposed changes to the Neutrality Law to allow United States ships to supply Great Britain, even after the fall of France and the Battle of Britain in 1940 (Langer and Gleason 1953, 198). American public opinion about whether the United States should risk war to aid Britain changed little from 1939 to 1941, reaching a high in January 1941, but then dropping through July 1941. In October 1940, a poll indicated 83 percent did not want the United States to enter the war against Germany and Italy (Langer and Gleason 1953, 198). Little changed by March 1941 – when Americans were asked whether to go to war, an overwhelming number wanted to remain out (Steele 1985, 113). At no time before Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 did a majority of the American people favor going to war against Germany. During most of 1940 and 1941, over 80 percent of Americans opposed war against Germany (Cole 1983, 364). Furthermore, the public discourse during this time period was filled with debates about the German threat, both on the radio and in editorials. Newspaper editorials often disputed the claim of a Nazi threat. Congressional legislation and debates also challenged President Roosevelt and the existence and priority of a Nazi German threat. These intense public debates and numerous mass rallies highlight how the Nazi German threat was not legitimated.

In these public debates and speeches, I identified two narratives about the German threat. Advanced by the Roosevelt Administration and pro-interventionists, the first narrative argued Germany would take over Europe, in particular Great Britain in the later years of the debates, and then attack the United States. The rhetorical resources centered on balance of power, European market, civilization, and democracy. Pro-interventionists primarily used logos rhetorical strategy to connect these rhetorical resources. Using logic and reasoning, the Roosevelt administration and its supporters tried to construct a narrative explaining how German control of Europe would make them too powerful in relation to the United States, tilting the balance of power. Control over Europe would give Germany the resources to invade the Americas - if not the United States, then at least Latin America. Furthermore, Germany would exclude the United States from the European market (and potentially the Latin American market as well), threatening the prosperity of the United States. Finally, Germany was a threat to the United States because it was not a democracy. Pro-interventionist used pathos rhetorical strategy to connect democracy and civilization, constructing a narrative of how the United States needed to defend democracy from dictatorships for a future of peace and prosperity. The administration tried to produce an emotional connection between the United States and Great Britain in particular, arguing German control of Europe threatened the future of democracy and therefore civilization. However, these rhetorical resources and strategies left a number of rhetorical gaps exploited by anti-interventionists.

Anti-interventionists advanced a second narrative consisting of two parallel arguments about how Nazi Germany would not and/or could not attack the United States.[18] The first version in particular highlighted how Germany was only a threat if the United States decided to intervene in Europe or help Great Britain. The rhetorical resources found in this narrative were neutrality, American exceptionalism, World War I, and democracy. By remaining neutral, the United States would avoid being dragged into another European war like World War I. Germany would not attack the United States if it remained neutral. Balance of power politics and war infected Europe, and if the United States intervened, it would become poisoned. For example, the most powerful anti-intervention organization, America First Committee, argued the war in Europe was not ideological or moral, but another round of the endless struggle for power and empire (Herring 2008, 521). American exceptionalism described Europe as fatally diseased, and World War I confirmed that Europe was a "cesspool of competing antagonisms and perfidious diplomats" (Lake 1999, 80). Other anti-interventionists argued Germany could not attack the United States, and the greatest threat to democracy was intervening in Europe. Involvement by the United States with European power politics could infect American democracy. War would lead to a garrison state, threatening domestic liberty. In particular, pacifists and progressives in the United States argued that war-making destroys

[18] I purposely avoid the term isolationists and isolationism for several reasons. For one, the label anti-interventionist is more accurate and more neutral. Many of the groups and individuals were actually unilateralists. Moreover, the label isolationist was primarily employed by the Truman administration in the debate about the Soviet Russian threat, seen later in this chapter. This is one of the reasons why isolationism is not an important rhetorical resource during the debate about the Nazi German threat. For further discussion about isolationism, see the alternative explanations section later in this chapter.

democracy in general, transferring power to the military and the executive (Jonas 1966). This also helps explain the minimal success of the pro-democracy interventionist narrative. American exceptionalism dismissed Great Britain and other European democratic regimes as different and lesser than American democracy. There was no "shared democratic community" even between Great Britain and the United States. To construct this anti-interventionist narrative, political actors used ethos rhetorical strategy, relying on political and social authority to connect together rhetorical resources. This included deploying important political and social leaders in public debates, such as Colonel Lindbergh, citing public opinion, and using mass demonstrations to claim authority.

President Roosevelt and other pro-intervention actors failed to use ethos to legitimate the German threat. Instead, they often relied on making logical arguments, giving Americans "just the facts" about current events to build public consent about the German threat (Casey 2001, 36). President Roosevelt wanted to "educate the public" about the danger of a German controlled Europe, but used facts and figures instead of ethos rhetorical strategies (Ninkovich 1999b, 123).

President Roosevelt was reluctant to use radio to spread make his argument, despite his previous success with the New Deal. While President Roosevelt was relatively silent, other actors pursued an ethos rhetorical strategy while helping construct the anti-interventionist narrative. President Roosevelt did not get fully involved in the public debates until the Lend Lease Act in 1941

(Steele 1985, 113). This rhetorical strategy failed to take advantage of presidency, which established the president as the authority in foreign policy and crises.

Munich Crisis, 1938

While debates about the Nazi German threat existed prior to 1938, the Munich Crisis represents an important turning point for the Roosevelt Administration. President Roosevelt and others seriously began their efforts to legitimate the German threat during and after the crisis. Historians agree, even the critical ones, that President Roosevelt desperately wanted to revise the Neutrality Acts after the Munich conference (Farnham 1997, 208). The Roosevelt administration attempted to connect democracy, civilization, and self-defense to construct a narrative about the Nazi German threat. This narrative claimed Nazi Germany would conquer Europe and then attack the United States. The United States needed to support democracies in Europe in order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful. Without American support, democracy and civilization faced an existential threat in Nazi Germany.

The public debate about the Munich Crisis became subsumed into the larger debate about the Neutrality Acts. From 1934 to 1936, Senator Gerald Nye (Republican, North Dakota) headed an investigation about the role of the munitions industry influencing the United States involvement in World War I. The commission, fueled by anti-business agrarian progressives and the Great Depression, blamed the shipbuilders, arms manufacturers, and international bankers for the United States entering World War I for individual profits (Cole

1983, 143-144). At the same time, *Fortune Magazine* published an investigation about munitions makers and a popular book, *Merchants of Death*, argued the munitions industry encouraged arms races and war for profits (Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1934).

Anti-interventionists cited Washington's Farewell Address calling for no "entangling alliances" and a belief in neutrality. This matched a public sentiment about foreign wars after the devastation of World War I. To stay out of war, it was necessary to avoid internationalism and intervention, rather than pursue the right of foreign trade (Donovan 1951). This marries with the story of "merchants of death," where American businessmen and British officials pushed the United States into World War I for their own interests (Dallek 1979; Ninkovich 1999b; Casey 2001). Foreign trade with belligerents became legitimated as a cause of war, rather than an important national interest of the United States, as argued by the Roosevelt administration. Media and popular culture promulgated this story, and the Nye Commission supported its premises and inferences in 1936 (Dallek 1979). "Merchants of death" not only blamed businessmen, an easy target in the Depression era, but also "Perfidious Albion," a popular enemy of several large immigrant groups and anti-imperialists (Steele 1985, 85). The Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937 followed these stories by changing neutrality from an impartial international right to trade with belligerents to a prohibition on involvement with belligerents, including the United Kingdom (Casey 2001). The Neutrality Acts included an arms embargoes, loan bans, and significant limits on presidential powers and freedom of the seas (Cole 1983, 164). The Neutrality Acts directly

referenced the rhetorical resource of World War I, while also conferring foreign policy authority to Congress.

President Roosevelt opposed the Neutrality Acts even before the Munich Crisis, arguing in the famous Quarantine Speech of October 1937 that "a reign of terror and international lawlessness…reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened" (Roosevelt 1937a). Clearly referring to Nazi Germany, President Roosevelt famously called for quarantine in order to prevent war from spreading. President Roosevelt used a pathos rhetorical strategy, attempting to build a shared identity between the American people and Europeans through the rhetorical resource of civilization. The various emotional appeals tied the fate of the United States with the events in Europe. One week later in a fireside chat about the domestic economy, President Roosevelt ended the speech by making many of the same arguments. America needs "the continuance of world civilization in order that their American civilization may continue to be invigorated by the achievements of civilized men and women in the rest of the world (Roosevelt 1937b). Moreover, President Roosevelt deployed logos rhetorical strategy connecting the European market to the economic recovery of the United States. Using reason, President Roosevelt argued Nazi Germany threatened the economic prosperity of the United States since the European market was critical for international trade and improving American standard of living (Roosevelt 1937b). Therefore President Roosevelt pushed Congress to loosen up the restrictions of the Neutrality Acts and build public

support for international cooperation. However, the public reaction to both of these speeches was almost exclusively negative (Ninkovich 1999b, 123).

Therefore, President Roosevelt backed off on revising the Neutrality Acts until the Munich crisis. President Roosevelt argued that Munich crisis was an opportunity to begin rearming democracies against the German threat rather than permanent peace (Dallek 1979, 171). In a radio broadcast on 16 August 1938, Secretary of State Hull argued the crisis in Europe threatened the "very foundations of our civilization" (Cole 1983, 283). This continued to connect self-defense, democracy, and civilization. Secretary Hull believed an "isolationist position would not protect them [the United States] from the effects of a major war elsewhere" (Hull 1948 1, 586-587). War in Europe threatened the United States, in particular if democracies lost to Nazi Germany.

President Roosevelt continued deploying pathos rhetorical strategy connecting civilization and democracy to the Nazi threat. On 18 August, President Roosevelt argued that "Civilization, after all, is not national – it is international" (Roosevelt 1938-1950 7, 491-494). Instead of viewing Europeans as foreigners, President Roosevelt argued for a common transnational identity. Civilization as a rhetorical resource meant part of the West, a democratic community with a common history and tradition. Nazi Germany therefore threatened democracy and civilization, and thereby extension, threatened the United States. Pro-interventionists wanted Americans to identify with other democracies. Nazi German threat to European democracies presented an existential threat to the United States, to the point of self-defense. If European democracies fell, then the

United States would be alone in the world, vulnerable. This threatened not just the United States, but the existence of democracies and civilization as a whole.

President Roosevelt shifted to logos rhetorical strategies using reason and logic to deduce why Nazi Germany was a threat to the United States. In a radio address on 26 October 1938, President Roosevelt argued the United States could not avoid "the disaster of war" (Roosevelt 1938). The massive German rearmament meant the Nazis would eventually attack the United States. In a press conference on 15 November, President Roosevelt continued this strategy, explaining how the United States was no longer safe from attack, "As a result of world events in the last few years, and as a result of scientific advancement in waging war, the whole orientation of this country in relation to the continent on which we live…has had to be changed" (Roosevelt and Schewe 1979 7, 1409). Due to military technology, the strategic situation was different than World War I.

This quotation also highlights the threat narrative that South America was the weak flank for the United States. President Roosevelt constantly referred to the invasion of Germany from the South or at the least, the takeover of South America by totalitarian regimes that would undermine the economic interests of the United States. Two articles in Foreign Affairs supported this idea of a Nazi threat to South America, "Totalitarian Inroads in Latin America" and "Latin America, Germany, and the Hull Program" (Beals 1938; Bidwell 1939). The argument about totalitarian regimes in South American revisited the argument about the Nazi German threat to European democracies, once again deploying democracy as an important rhetorical resource.

In his Annual Message to Congress, President Roosevelt continued this pathos rhetorical strategy and the rhetorical resource of democracy, arguing the "aid short of war" would both eliminate the Nazi German threat and prevent the United States from going to war (Roosevelt 1939b). Democracies "cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations…We, no more than other nations, cannot afford to be surrounded by the enemies of our faith and our humanity" (Roosevelt 1939b). These emotional appeals attempted to build a common identity between Americans and other "sister" democracies. This common identity meant the Nazi German threat was much closer and immediate to the United States. Moreover, if these democracies became totalitarian regimes, the United States would be surrounded. By supporting democracies now with armaments, the United States could prevent this strategic threat and eliminate the Nazi threat through a proxy preventive war.

Anti-interventionist Senators once again railed against revising the Neutrality Acts, revisiting the rhetorical resources of World War I and neutrality. Senators used their experience on the Nye Commission and their expertise about the Neutrality Acts to claim authority about how and why Nazi Germany was not a threat to the United States. The United States was being deceived, mirroring the experience of World War I. The failure of remain neutral during World War I led the United States into an "unnecessary" war in Europe. For example, Senator William Borah blamed the United Kingdom for the Nazi annexation of Czechoslovakia in a national radio speech (Borah April 1939). The matched the

"perfidious Albion" complaint about the United States entry into World War I. Anti-interventionists senators also used ethos rhetorical strategies to connect democracy with American exceptionalism. Senator Hiram Johnson argued war would mean the end of democracy (Cole 1983, 313). World War I hurt American democracy, and another European war would lead to a garrison state. Moreover, European democracies had nothing in common with American democracy. Therefore, the United States needed to distance itself from Europe, which was corrupted by years of empire building and power politics.

The Roosevelt administration attempted to counter by having by former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, a conservative Republican, testify to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Neutrality Acts should be completely repealed (Stimson 1939). President Roosevelt argued in his Pan American speech that the United States is threatened by Nazi Germany because technology and development made the world smaller (Roosevelt 1939a). The situation was different from World War I; Europe was even more important strategically. In additional President Roosevelt continued the rhetorical resource of civilization, comparing Nazis to the Huns and Vandals (Roosevelt 1939a).

Debate over revising the Neutrality Acts occurred during various European crises. On 15 March 1939, Hitler took over the rest of Czechoslovakia despite the Munich agreements. Hitler demanded Danzig and the Polish Corridor from Poland (Cole 1983, 319). Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson argued the European crisis would have been avoided if Congress approved the administration proposal for revising the Neutrality Acts; moreover, revision

would be necessary to keep the United States out of war (Dallek 1979, 200). During these debate, President Roosevelt began associating leading isolationists with Hitler and the Nazis (Cole 1983, 315). Despite this international context, the Senate refused the revisions desired by President Roosevelt on the Neutrality Acts (Dallek 1979, 192; Cole 1983, 315). The House of Representatives also rejected the extraordinary public and private efforts by President Roosevelt (Farnham 1997, 206). Numerous telegrams and petitions to Congress against revising the Neutrality Acts (Dallek 1979, 179).

German Invasion of Poland, 1 September 1939

On 1 September 1938, Hitler invaded Poland in concert with the Soviet Union. Great Britain and France declared war against Germany on 3 September 1939 after Hitler rejected their ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of German troops from Poland. Within weeks, the Polish army was defeated.

President Roosevelt addressed the Nazi German invasion of Poland in a fireside chat on 3 Sep 1939. Continuing the pathos rhetorical strategy, President Roosevelt claimed the invasion of Poland threatened the United States since "when peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger" (Roosevelt 1939c). President Roosevelt continued to try and build a transnational identity that would empathize with Europe, especially in this case with Poland. In a rhetorical twist seen from this point until Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt also claimed in this speech that the United States needed to intervene for peace in Europe. By providing military supplies to Great Britain and

France, the United States would force Nazi Germany to accept a cease fire. Therefore the arms embargo section of the Neutrality Acts actually led to the invasion of Poland (Roosevelt 1939c; Roosevelt 1939d).

In response to the fireside chat, Senator Borah gave a national radio broadcast on 14 Sep 1939. Senator Borah rejected President Roosevelt's request to repeal the arms embargo, claiming it would lead the United States into war with Germany, just like World War I (Borah 1939). Senator Borah also deployed the rhetorical resource of neutrality, invoking George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. Moreover, Senator Borah used ethos rhetorical strategy to connect World War I and neutrality to the current debate about the Neutrality Acts and the arms embargo. Just as important, Senator Borah used ethos rhetorical strategy to undermine the rhetorical resources and strategies of President Roosevelt, in particular the emotional appeals to create a transnational identity between Americans and Europeans. Senator Borah cited not only Washington as an authority on neutrality and foreign policy, but also appealed to his own expertise of World War I and the Neutrality Acts (Borah 1939).

Colonel Charles Lindbergh on 15 Sep 1939 delivered his first national radio broadcast opposing United States involvement in the European war (Lindbergh 1939a). Colonel Lindbergh also cited George Washington and tried to undermine any American connection with Europe. Colonel Lindbergh also used his military expertise to claim Nazi Germany was not a threat to the United States, arguing "we need fear no invasion of this country" (Lindbergh 1939a, 752).

On 21 Sep 1939, President Roosevelt addressed the special joint session of Congress concerning the war in Europe. President Roosevelt argued that revising the Neutrality Laws would keep the United States from being drawn into a war. President Roosevelt mostly deployed logos rhetorical strategy to connect repealing the arms embargo to peace. President Roosevelt deductively presented his argument point by point. He also tried to address the World War I rhetorical resource, arguing repealing the arms embargo "means less likelihood of incidents and controversies which tend to draw us into conflict, as they unhappily did in the last World War. There lies the road to peace!" (Roosevelt 1939e). However, President Roosevelt also deployed ethos rhetorical strategy, appealing to his own expertise, "I give to you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today" (Roosevelt 1939e). President Roosevelt throughout the speech claimed he correctly predicted the events in Europe and therefore should be given the authority to conduct foreign policy as he sought fit.

Isolationist Senators began organizing opposition to President Roosevelt, led by Senators Nye, Johnson, La Follette, and Vandenberg (Cole 1983, 326). They coordinated radio addresses and mailed their speeches to their constituents (Cole 1983, 327). Senator Nye argued the repeal of the embargo would be "the first step in that tramp, tramp of American sons in Europe's war" (Dallek 1979, 203). On 4 October 1939, Senator La Follette, Jr. deployed on a national broadcast the rhetorical resource of World War I and neutrality to undermine

President Roosevelt's speech (La Follette Jr. 1939). Colonel Lindbergh gave his second national broadcast on 13 October, distinguishing between offensive and defensive armaments (Lindbergh 1939b). Throughout the speech, Colonel Lindbergh used ethos rhetorical strategy by claiming his authority as a military expert to explain why Nazi Germany was not a threat to the United States. Senator Johnson delivered a speech broadcast on network radio on 24 October 1939 arguing "The repeal of the embargo can serve but one purpose, and in Washington that is frankly and freely avowed, to have us take sides in a war to which we are not parties by 'methods short of war' at first, but inevitably by methods that will make us wholly partisans" (Johnson 1939). Senator Taft argued the "real danger to American democracy from our participation in a war" and that even if Germany defeated France and Great Britain, it could not attack the United States (Taft 1939). Congressional offices received over a millions letters against changing Neutrality Laws (Dallek 1979, 200). Public opinion surveys agreed with this sentiment, wanting to keep the United States out of war.

As a result, President Roosevelt was forced to accept significant congressional changes to his proposed revisions of the Neutrality Laws, but did achieve partial success in the arms embargo (Dallek 1979, 205). This success was due to couching the argument in terms of peace, where lifting restrictions would keep the United States out of a war. President Roosevelt also deployed a rhetorical strategy of ethos at time, claiming foreign policy authority, arguing only he could prevent the United States from going to war, and therefore needing his hands free to ensure peace.

However, despite the success of ethos rhetorical strategies and rhetorical resource of peace, President Roosevelt changed course in the 3 January 1940 State of the Union address. President Roosevelt shifted back to logos rhetorical strategies, attempting to use logic and reasoning to legitimize the Nazi German threat. The United States was no longer separate from the rest of the world. The United States needed to intervene before Germany become too strong, suggesting the need for a preventive proxy war by supplying France and Great Britain. Moreover, President Roosevelt also deployed pathos rhetorical strategies, once again arguing the United States needed to support fellow democracies in France and Great Britain, "vast difference between keeping out of war and pretending that war is none of our business. We do not have to go to war with other nations but at least we can strive with other nations to encourage the kind of peace that will lighten the troubles of the world, and by so doing help our own nation as well…For it becomes clearer and clearer that the future world will be a shabby and dangerous place to live in – yes, even for Americans to live in – if it is ruled by force in the hands of a few" (Roosevelt 1940a).

Colonel Lindbergh rebutted these arguments, emerging as the primary spokesperson for the anti-interventionists. On 19 May 1940, Colonel Lindbergh argued in a national radio address that the United States was not in danger of an attack and if prepared, the United States could repel any assault. The oceans protected the United States from Germany. Instead of sending planes to Great Britain or Germany, the United States should build its own military defenses (Dallek 1979, 225). In these arguments, Colonel Lindbergh relied on his authority

as an expert in military aviation. This referred to his first hand knowledge from inspecting the Luftwaffe in the late 1930s. Public opinion concurred with Colonel Lindbergh. A 29 May 1940 public opinion survey showed that 9 percent of Americans favored selling all of United States military planes to Allies, 38 percent favored selling some of the planes, while 49 percent thought the government should sell none of its planes to Allies (Cantril 1940a).

Fall of France, June 1940

As Germany conquered the Low Countries and invaded France, President Roosevelt increasingly spoke about the Nazi threat to the United States. In a fireside chat, President Roosevelt deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to build American empathy for Europeans, especially citing women and children (Roosevelt 1940e). In addition, President Roosevelt highlighted how current military technology made Germany a threat, an argument repeated in speeches about increasing military expenditures (Roosevelt 1940g; Roosevelt 1940h). President Roosevelt issued several warnings about Nazi invasion of Latin America (Dallek 1979, 233).

Senator Wheeler delivered a broadcast on 7 June 1940 that disputed the Nazi German threat to the United States. Senator Wheeler was a potential Democratic candidate for the president as a progressive anti-interventionist. He argued against the “mad hysteria…produced in New York and Washington” with “bogey stories” about Nazi planes bombing American cities (Cole 1983, 387). Several military officials leaked information to Senator Wheeler that disputed the

claims of the administration, noting that Germany did not have a long range bomber capable of attacking the United States. In addition, military officials also pointed out how the United States military aircraft were unfit for the European war. Germany was unable to attack the United States, and the United States could not win against Germany (Cole 1983, 388). This confirmed the arguments made by Colonel Lindbergh in the 19 May 1940 national radio broadcast (Lindbergh 1940). Senator Wheeler continued this argument at the Keep America Out of War Congress rally in Chicago on 1 July 1940 (Cole 1983, 388). Both Senator Wheeler and Colonel Lindbergh relied on ethos rhetorical strategies, citing their expertise to explain why Nazi Germany was not a threat to the United States.

By late June 1940, only 10 percent of Americans favored increasing aid to the Allies. Colonel Lindbergh and General Hugh Johnson broadcast on national radio that helping Great Britain would force the United States into a war that it would not win. The Senate blocked selling torpedo boats to Great Britain and inserted significant limitations on future military aid (Dallek 1979, 231). Also, intense public debate emerged over the military draft during the summer of 1940. Despite originally supporting the draft, President Roosevelt was forced to back off (Dallek 1979, 248). These public opinion setbacks occurred even as the Battle of Britain raged throughout the summer. Great Britain faced constant bombing raids and the imminent threat of a German invasion.

In the meantime, President Roosevelt declared his candidacy for an unprecedented third term. In his acceptance speech for the Democratic

nomination, President Roosevelt continued to connect democracy through pathos rhetorical strategies, urging Americans to "not substitute appeasement and compromise with those who seek to destroy all democracies everywhere, including here" (Roosevelt 1940i). The United States faced choices of "people versus dictatorship," "freedom versus slavery," and "religion against godlessness; the ideal of justice against the practice of force," and "moral decency versus the firing squad; courage to speak out, and to act, versus the false lullaby of appeasement" (Roosevelt 1940i). By linking together the rhetorical resources of democracy, freedom, and justice, President Roosevelt arguing compromising with Nazi Germany was a threat to American values and would destroy all democracies, including American democracy.

The Republican Party nominated Wendell Willkie, the only candidate who supported aiding Great Britain. At the start of the campaign, there was little debate about foreign policy, primarily due to the shared policy positions.

On 4 September 1940, various anti-intervention individuals and groups formed the America First Committee. The national chairman became General Robert E. Wood, chairman of Sears, Roebuck, and Company. Prominent leaders and speakers at America First rallies included Senator Wheeler (Democrat, Montana), Senator Nye (Republican, North Dakota), and Colonel Lindbergh (Cole 1983, 381). In the fall of 1940, America First placed full page advertisements in major newspapers and sponsored radio addresses (Cole 1983, 381). The Chicago Tribune published the founding statement of the America First Committee on 5 September 1940. The statement argued 1) the United States must

build an impregnable defense for America; 2) No foreign power, nor group powers, can successfully attack a prepared America; 3) American democracy can be preserved only by keeping out of the European war; and 4) “Aid short of war” weakens national defense at home and threatens to involve America in war abroad (1940).

America First Committee did not support Willkie at first since it was a nonpartisan organization and Willkie did not challenge the foreign policies of President Roosevelt. However, as the campaign entered the fall, America First Committee began to support Willkie, especially when he decided to attack on foreign policy (Cole 1983, 403).

By late September 1940, Willkie continued to trail President Roosevelt in the polls (Dallek 1979, 249). Therefore Willkie decided to abandon the bipartisan approach to foreign policy and attacked President Roosevelt as a warmonger. He blamed President Roosevelt for not building up the United States military, while warning if President Roosevelt was reelected, the United States would soon be at war (Cole 1983, 396). Criticizing the proposed draft and military aid for France and Great Britain, Willkie argued American boys were “almost on the transports” already (Cole 1983, 396). The more he repeated these attacks in the closing weeks, the more Willkie improved his standings in the polls (Cole 1983, 396).

Willkies’ change of campaign strategy cut into President Roosevelt’s lead. In response, President Roosevelt argued he was committed to peace (Dallek 1979, 249). On 23 October 1940, President Roosevelt delivered a national radio address to rebut these arguments. President Roosevelt argued the draft was a program of

"defensive preparation" for the "cause of peace" (Roosevelt 1940d). The next day in another radio address, President Roosevelt quoted Abraham Lincoln warning against "appeasers" (Roosevelt 1940j). At a campaign address in Madison Square Garden, President Roosevelt continued the rhetorical resource of appeaser, attempting to link Willkie to Neville Chamberlain and the Munich Crisis. Appeasement failed to stop Hitler at Munich, and it would fail to stop Hitler from attacking the United States. President Roosevelt argued criticism about the state of national defense and the military was simply "the whisperings of appeasers…Republican leaders played politics with defense in 1938 and 1939. I say that they are playing politics with our national security today" (Roosevelt 1940c). President Roosevelt also continued pathos rhetorical strategy trying to build a shared identity between Great Britain and the United States, arguing the repeal of the arms embargo as help for Great Britain. Previously, President Roosevelt argued the arms embargo was about neutrality and staying out of the war. However, President Roosevelt also claimed "there has been no entanglement and there will be no entanglement" (Roosevelt 1940c).

On 30 October 1940, Willkie polled four points behind President Roosevelt (Cantril 1951, 601-602). In response to the tightening race, President Roosevelt declared "your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars" (Roosevelt 1940b).

After the election, the Roosevelt administration intensified the attacks on anti-interventionists, defining them as narrow, self-serving, partisan, conservative, antidemocratic, anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi, treasonous members of the

fifth column (Cole 1983, 411). Secretary Ickes was the primary attacker on Colonel Lindbergh, describing him as an “appeaser” ("Ickles Denounces "Appeasers" Here" 1940).

The public debate narrowed over whether the United States should provide military aid to Great Britain. President Roosevelt outlined the threat narrative in his famous fireside chat on 29 December 1940, “The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world” (Roosevelt 1940f). President Roosevelt compared Nazis to a gang of outlaws surrounding the United States and threatening its extermination, “If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas – and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere” (Roosevelt 1940f). Both of these quotes highlight the rhetorical resource of balance of power. Nazi Germany threatened the United States since “a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender” (Roosevelt 1940f). The United States needed to support Great Britain now in order to prevent a war with Germany in the future. As such, the United States “must be the great arsenal of democracy” (Roosevelt 1940f).

Senator Wheeler delivered the anti-interventionist response to President Roosevelt’s fireside chat in a 30 December 1940 radio broadcast. Senator Wheeler attempted to distance himself from Hitler and Nazis while sympathizing with the British. However, Senator Wheeler argued Germany could not invade

the United States even if they defeated Great Britain, using ethos rhetorical strategies to claim expert authority. More importantly, going to war would destroy democracy in the United States. Instead, "the offer of a just, reasonable and generous peace will more quickly and effectively crumble Hitlerism and break the role of the German people that all the bombers that could be dispatched over Berlin" (Wheeler 1941). Senator Wheeler argued "before we lend or lease arms and before we lend or lease American boys to England, we should know whether it is possible to have a negotiated peace…We should act as peacemakers, not war-mongers" (Wheeler 1941). Supporting Great Britain would only prolong the war in Europe.

On 6 January 1941, President Roosevelt proposed the policy of Lend-Lease in his annual message to Congress, where the United States would provide armaments to Great Britain in exchange for basing rights instead of cash. President Roosevelt rejected "peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers," once again defining anti-interventionists as appeasers (Roosevelt 1941a). Furthermore, President Roosevelt continued a pathos rhetorical strategy of identifying America with Great Britain, arguing an Allied victory would mean "a world founded upon four essential human freedoms" and suggested Nazi German victory would threaten American freedom (Roosevelt 1941a). In response to the speech, the White House received more mail opposing lend-lease than favoring it (Cole 1983, 415). Public opinion did not favor greater involvement in the war – therefore President Roosevelt described Lend-Lease as avoiding war rather than increasing American involvement. America First Committee framed

the debate as war or peace, since 80 percent of Americans opposed a declaration of war against Germany (Cole 1983, 448).

On 12 January 1941, Senator Wheeler participated in a national radio debate, calling Lend-Lease "the New Deal's triple A foreign policy – it will plough under every fourth American boy" (Cole 1983, 415). Anti-interventionists tied Lend-Lease to the policies that led the United States into World War I. Members of America First Committee testified to the House Foreign Affair Committee against Lend-Lease. Hanford MacNider, a decorated hero of World War I, argued Lend-Lease "would mean the beginning of the end of the Republic with consequent disaster not only to the American people but to free men everywhere" (1941b).

Colonel Lindbergh also testified against Lend-Lease on 23 January 1941, arguing the United States was "greatly strengthened for defense and greatly weakened for attack" (Cole 1983, 416). Colonel Lindbergh drew on his authority as a military expert, stating, "I do not believe there is any danger of an invasion of this continent, either by sea or by air, as long as we maintain an army, navy, and air force of reasonable size and in modern condition, and provided we establish bases essential for defense" (Cole 1983, 416). Air invasion across the ocean was "absolutely impossible" even in the future (Cole 1983, 416). Colonel Lindbergh also argued that attacking Germany would lead to defeat, where "almost every advantage we have in defense would be a disadvantage to us in attack" (Cole 1983, 417). Through his expert testimony, Colonel Lindbergh brought together

the two anti-interventionist narratives, that the United States could easily defend itself from Nazi Germany but could not successfully attack it.

Colonel Lindbergh also continued the internal threat narrative of anti-interventionists that connected democracy and American exceptionalism. Using ethos rhetorical strategies, Colonel Lindbergh testified that "I do not believe that the danger to America lies in an invasion from abroad. I believe it lies here at home in our own midst" (Cole 1983, 419). Senator Nye built on this narrative, arguing in a speech on the Senate floor that Lend-Lease gave President Roosevelt the power of a dictator, allowing him to take the United States into war (1941a). Senator Wheeler argued Germany and Hitler would "never dominate the world so long as American remains a strong democracy" but America would "cease to be a democracy the minute it actually goes to war" (1941a).

Throughout these congressional hearings and debates, both the Committee to Defense America by Aiding the Allies and the America First Committee attempted to generate public support through rallies, broadcasts, meetings, debates, articles, and editorials (Cole 1983, 421). A new interventionist group emerged in April 1941, Fight for Freedom Incorporated, taking a more aggressive stance than even the administration. They argued for full United State involvement in the war (Cole 1983, 428).

On 13 April 1941, four days before Colonel Lindbergh gave another radio address sponsored by the American First Committee, Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes called him the "Number one Nazi fellow traveler" and the "first American to raise aloft the standard of pro-Nazism" (1941b). Secretary Ickes claimed

Colonel Lindbergh was "the proud possessor of a Nazi decoration which has already been well earned" (1941b). President Roosevelt compared Lindbergh to Clement L. Vallandingham, the leading Civil War Copperhead (1941c). Colonel Lindbergh responded by resigning from the Army Air Corps Reserve, an action he regretted since "the Air Corps is one of the things that has meant most to me in life…second only to my right as a citizen to speak freely to my fellow countrymen, and to discuss with them the issues of war and peace which confront our nation in this crisis" (Cole 1983, 461-462). The media reaction supported Colonel Lindbergh and criticized President Roosevelt (Steele 1985, 83). The rhetorical strategy of attacking the isolationists failed, with attempts of linking isolationists to the Nazis producing a backlash among the press and the public (Steele 1985).

In order to get congressional approval, President Roosevelt accepted a number of amendments to Lend-Lease (Dallek 1979, 259). President Roosevelt himself argued the American public did not accept Germany as a threat to the United States (Dallek 1979, 264). 79 percent of Americans wanted to stay of the war, and 70 percent thought the President had gone to far in helping Great Britain (Dallek 1979, 267).

War with Soviet Union, Summer 1941

Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, which altered various public debates about the role of the United States. The public strongly opposed aiding the Soviets, often believing Stalin worse than Hitler. *Time* magazine called

Stalin an “unwashed Genghis Khan…with blood dripping from his fingertips” (Herring 1973, 22).

Anti-interventionists used the Russian-German war as another reason to not enter the European conflict. No longer was the war for democracy, exemplified in the America First Committee statement, “The entry of Communist Russia into the war certainly should settle once and for all the intervention issue here at home. The war party can hardly ask the people of America to take up arms behind the red flag of Stalin. With the ruthless forces of dictatorship and aggression now clearly aligned on both sides the proper course for the United States becomes even clearer. We must continue to build our own defenses and take no part in this incongruous European conflict” (Cole 1983, 434). Once again, anti-interventionists linked the rhetorical resources of democracy and American exceptionalism.

Using his authority as an former president, President Herbert Hoover argued in a radio broadcast that “the whole argument of our joining the war to bring the four freedoms to mankind a gargantuan jest” because of the new alliance with Soviet Russia (Cole 1983, 435). In a network radio broadcast, Congressman Hamilton Fish (Republican, New York) stated “I am opposed to Nazism, and can think of nothing too bad to say against it aggressions and ideology, but there is one thing worse, and that is the bloody hand of Communism” (Cole 1983, 435). Colonel Lindbergh stated Soviet Russia had a “record of cruelty, bloodshed, and barbarism” was “without parallel in modern

history" (Cole 1983, 435). Public opinion polls showed a majority of Americans opposed giving help to Russia (Dallek 1979, 278).

President Roosevelt continued a pathos rhetorical strategy to connect together Great Britain and the United States through the rhetorical resource of democracy. To generate more public support for aiding Great Britain, President Roosevelt announced the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. The Atlantic Charter highlighted the shared values of democracy and freedom. However, 74 percent of Americans still opposed intervention in the war, only a one percent drop in a pre-conference poll (Dallek 1979, 285). The inclusion of Soviet Russia helped undermine the pathos rhetorical strategy linking democracy and support for Great Britain to the Nazi German threat.

As of 5 August 1941, only 38 percent of Americans favored of Lend-Lease for Russia (Dallek 1979, 298). President Roosevelt tried to convince Americans that Germany was a greater threat than Russia, framing the Nazis as a greater threat to religion than communism. President Roosevelt highlighted in a 30 September press conference that Article 124 of the Russian Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, even comparing it to religious freedom in the United States (Dallek 1979, 297).

Attacks on United States ships, Fall 1941

On 4 September 1941, a German submarine fired two torpedoes at the USS Greer. On 11 September, President Roosevelt gave a fireside chat informing Americans of the attack on the USS Greer. President Roosevelt primarily used

logos and pathos rhetorical strategy in order to legitimize the German threat. The first part of the speech outlined the legal argument, describing the event as "piracy legally and morally" (Roosevelt 1941b). President Roosevelt described a number of other incidents with United States ships, arguing this was "part of a general plan" by the Nazis "to abolish the freedom of the seas" calling the Nazis "international outlaws" (Roosevelt 1941b). Then President Roosevelt deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to claim self-defense and the need for pre-emptive war, because "When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has stuck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic" (Roosevelt 1941b). The attack on the USS Greer "was one determined step toward creating a permanent world system based on force, on terror, and on murder" because "to be ultimately successful in world mastery, Hitler knows that he must get control of the seas" (Roosevelt 1941b). Here President Roosevelt connects self-defense with civilization and democracy rhetorical resources in order to construct a narrative about the Nazi German threat to the United States. However, public opinion turned against President Roosevelt when a Senate hearing revealed the USS Greer trailed and attacked the German submarine (Cole 1983, 445).

On 17 October 1941, a German submarine torpedoed the USS Kearny, killing 11 sailors and on 31 October 1941, a German submarine sank the USS Reuben James, killing 115 sailors (Cole 1983, 445; Dallek 1979, 291). President Roosevelt spoke in a national broadcast about these German submarine attacks, once again arguing Nazi Germany wanted to control the Atlantic Ocean for a

future attack of the United States. President Roosevelt also claimed to have a secret German map proposing an invasion of South and Central America, as well as "a plan to abolish all existing religions" in favor of "an International Nazi Church" where "in the place of the cross of Christ will be put two symbols – the swastika and the naked sword. The god of Blood and Iron will take the place of the God of Love and Mercy" (Cole 1983, 449). However, as seen in Figure 4-A, neither the public or Congress agreed that Nazi Germany was a threat to the United States. President Roosevelt had to wait until after Pearl Harbor and a German declaration of war against the United States.

Summary of Soviet Russia

Even though most do not consider President Truman a better politician or rhetorician than President Roosevelt, he succeeded in legitimating the threat of the Soviet Union after World War II. During World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States were allies against Nazi Germany. As the war came to a close, several conferences between the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain promised continued cooperation in the post-war international system. However, within one year, American officials identified the Soviet Union as a threat, and two years after Victory Europe, President Truman outlined the foreign policy of containment to Congress. By 1950, the Soviet threat was legitimated to the point that debates did not exist in the public discourse, often labeled as the "Cold War Consensus" (Wolfe 1984). As Samuel Huntington pointed out, "Congress approved anything necessary for what seemed to be an imminent general war

with the Soviet Union. The absence of public debate over the long-term objectives and implications of the arms program speeded up the process of rearmament" (Huntington 1962, 63). Not only did the public consent to the existence of the threat, it also agreed to its definition and priority.

Analysis of Soviet Russia

The standard historiography about the origins of the Cold War divides the literature into three groups, orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist (Gaddis 2007). Orthodox scholars argued that Stalin was untrustworthy and the USSR was aggressive. United States foreign policy reacted to the threat of the Soviet Union (McNeill 1970; Herz 1966). Revisionists argued the United States threatened the security interests of the USSR, in particular through economic expansionism (Williams 1972; LaFeber 1997). Post-revisionists believe the conflict was inevitable, due to growing powers and/or conflicting ideologies (Gaddis 2000; Leffler 1992; Trachtenberg 1999). Therefore I chose the most cited secondary sources from each of the categories.

From these secondary sources, I identified five critical junctures, 1) Potsdam and the Polish question in August 1945; 2) the Iranian crisis in Spring 1946; 3) the Turkey crisis in Fall 1946; 4) the Truman Doctrine March 1947; and 5) Marshall Plan June 1947. These critical junctures primarily involved President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes 1945-1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall 1947-1949, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson,

Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, and Walter Lippmann.

Starting with these critical junctures and political actors, I researched public speeches using primary sources, including presidential papers, congressional records, memoirs, and Vital Speeches of the Day. To assess the level of threat legitimation, I used public opinion polling data, which became more scientific and rigorous after World War II. However, instead of relying exclusively on public opinion polls, I also use editorials from the New York Times and congressional debates to assess the level of threat legitimation. By the time NSC 68 was proposed, Soviet Russia was widely accepted as a threat.

The public debates became completely one-sided, with few disagreements about the definition and priority of the Soviet threat. Congressional legislation and debates focused only on how to deal with the Soviet threat, rather than whether it is a threat. Furthermore, the American public agreed as seen in public opinion surveys. For example, Figure 2 provides a time-series of Gallup polls showing that Americans stopped believing Russia would cooperate with the United States. By May 1949, only 20 percent of Americans thought Russia would cooperate in world affairs.



Figure 2. Russia public opinion

Other public opinion surveys highlight how the American increasingly believed that the Soviet Union was a threat to the United States. In a Fortune/Roper survey from 18-35 June 1945, only 38 percent of Americans believed that Russia was an aggressive nation that threatened the United States. By 5-10 March 1948, 77 percent of Americans thought Russia trying to rule the world.

Through the public debates and speeches, I identify two narratives about Soviet Russia. The Truman administration and other cold warriors argued the

Soviet Union was a threat to the "way of life" of the United States. The Soviet Union threatened democracy and all of western civilization, including the United States. The rhetorical resources used in this threat narrative included communism, totalitarianism, Nazi Germany, appeasement, democracy, civilization, and isolationism. Totalitarianism linked the Soviet Union to Nazi Germany, and Stalin to Hitler. The rhetorical resource of appeasement furthered these associations, while also giving the United States a moral justification for anti-Soviet foreign policies, such as containment. Linking Soviet behaviors to Nazi Germany through the rhetorical resource of appeasement portrays them as aggressive, and the United States as a pacific victim that responds only in self-defense (Kuypers 1997). This threat narrative fits the public perception about World War II and the future internationalism of the United States, while reproducing the narrative about totalitarianism. The American public identified totalitarian regimes as striving for world domination. Furthermore, this narrative put the United States on the side of protecting the world. Stories about communism spreading throughout the world and infecting the United States rearticulated the Red Scare of 1919.

President Truman blurred the differences between the Communist Russia and Nazi Germany, arguing "there isn't any difference in totalitarian states. I don't care what you call them, Nazi, Communist, or Fascist" (Johnson 1994, 52). Administration officials reminded the American public about the Nazi-Soviet connections at the beginning of World War II (Johnson 1994, 53) . Several of State Department officials even felt that Nazi German was "far less malevolent"

than the Soviet Union (DeSantis 1983, 199-200). Even administration critics linked the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. John Foster Dulles believed that "Stalin's book 'Problems of Leninism' was the Soviet equivalent of 'Mein Kampf" (Hoopes 1973, 64).

Communism therefore threatened liberty and democracy, the core values of the United States. Rhetorical resources of Western civilization and a shared democratic community further reproduced this narrative. Similarly, stories about the "alien-ness" and "other-ness" of Soviet Russia and the Soviet political culture distinguished the two sides (Cox 1985). Even before communism, Russia was portrayed as alien, as Slavic rather than European, in a West versus East context (Chilton 1996b, 163). The United States was the protector of western civilization, embodied through these core values of liberty and democracy. In deploying these rhetorical resources, the cold warriors often relied on ethos rhetorical strategies, claiming expertise about foreign affairs and authority over foreign policy.

The second narrative, advanced primarily by Secretary Wallace and other pragmatists, such as Walter Lippmann, argued the Soviet Union was not a threat to the United States. The Soviet Union desired security, rather than power or world conquest. The primary rhetorical resources included cooperation, allies, sphere of influence, balance of power, and stability. The United States should cooperate with the Soviet Union, continuing the wartime relationship with the Soviet Union. The narrative of cooperation argued for continuing the wartime relationship with the Soviet Union. Secretary of Commerce and later presidential candidate Henry Wallace argued that the Soviet Union was not aggressive, but

desired security (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991). Instead of ethos or pathos rhetorical strategies, however, Wallace argued by "marshalling facts and presenting pragmatic arguments based on spheres of influence" (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 208-209). The logic of spheres of influence did not resonate with the American public, as recognized earlier by President Roosevelt when constructing postwar international order (Ruggie 1997).

Pragmatists advanced some of the same arguments about spheres of influence and balance of power. Realists, such as Walter Lippmann, argued about the strategic interests of the United States, criticizing ideological crusade of democracy that advanced universal foreign policies. Pragmatists also relied on logos rhetorical strategies using logical arguments and reasoning. However, these individuals and groups shared many of the same interpretations about Soviet behavior, and also defined the Soviet Union as a threat. If anything, the public discourse centered on how much a threat the Soviet Union was and how to combat it, rather than if the Soviet Union was actually a threat. Democrats and Republicans competed in their rhetorical claims about the level of Soviet threat, each group outbidding the other.

Potsdam and the Council of Foreign Ministers, August-December 1945

In July and August 1945, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met at Potsdam in order to resolve issues about post-war Europe, in particular German reparations and borders, including the Polish borders. Several issues were pushed to later Councils of Foreign Ministers,

including disputes about Poland, Straights of Bosporus and Dardanelles, and Iran. At the London Council of Ministers in September 1945, Secretary Byrnes failed to resolve any of these critical issues, and the conference fell apart. Secretary Byrnes took a more pragmatic approach when negotiating with the Russians in December 1945, making tit-for-tat agreements based on sphere of influence principles (Herring 2008, 602). This included recognizing the pro-Soviet governments in Bulgaria and Romania. Admiral William Leahy, President Truman's military chief of staff, denounced the negotiations as "appeasement" (Offner 1999, 121). President Truman responded with a "personal declaration of Cold War," declaring he was "tired babying the Soviets" (Offner 1999, 124).

After the December Council of Foreign Ministers, President Truman took control of foreign policy away from Secretary Byrnes, but failed to replace him. Eventually Clark Clifford stepped in, but since he was new to foreign affairs, he relied on Admiral William Leahy (Leffler 1992, 104). Key political advisors such as Undersecretary of States Dean Acheson viewed events in the Balkans and Poland as a new Czechoslovakia (Leffler 1992; Isaacson and Thomas 1986). Political and social actors outside the administration repeated the appeasement story, comparing Soviet behaviors to Munich (Chilton 1996b). Time Magazine called Secretary Byrnes a "habitual compromiser" (1946a, 25). President Truman followed up with his Navy Day speech of October 1945, arguing he would not "compromise with evil" (Truman 1945). These references to the rhetorical resource of appeasement connected together the growing Soviet control of Eastern Europe with the foreign policies of Nazi Germany.

Iran Crisis, March-April 1946

Both the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to control oil resources in Iran (Paterson 1992, 62). The Soviets left troops in Iran after a March 1946 deadline for withdrawal. The Soviets also supported a secession movement in the northern region of Azerbaijan and demanded oil concessions. President Truman and the administration argued these actions exemplified the Soviet expansionist threat in the Middle East (Offner 1999, 138-140). The United States military forged connections with the Iranian Army. The Soviet Union agreed to remove its military forces after an agreement to establish a joint Iranian-Soviet oil company. At the urging of the United States, Iran reneged on the agreement, and "Iran entered the American sphere of influence" (Paterson 1992, 63). During the Iranian crisis, newspaper and radio headlines continually imagined war and conflict (Leffler 1992, 110).

Prior to this confrontation over Iran, Stalin delivered a pubic speech on 9 February 1946, the eve of the Soviet Supreme election. Stalin argued Russia defeated Nazi Germany because of his policies in the 1920s and 1930s, such as industrialization and collectivization (Leffler 1992, 103). By winning World War II, "the Soviet social system proved its complete vitality" (Stalin 9 February 1946). Therefore Stalin argued the Soviet Union needed to reconstruct and increase production to become stronger and his new policies could accomplish this (Leffler 1992). The speech was directed at the Soviet domestic audience,

trying to build support for a new five year plan and rally election turnout (Paterson 1992, 63).

Secretary Wallace argued Stalin's speech was due to American military expansion. The United States "setting up bases all the way from Greenland, Iceland, northern Canada, and Alaska to Okinawa, with Russia in mind…We were challenging him and his speech was taking up the challenge" (Wallace and Blum 1973, 547). Secretary Wallace deployed the rhetorical resource of spheres of influence, using reasoning and logic to explain why the Soviet Union was not a threat to the United States but was instead just insecure about post-war Europe.

In a major speech to the Senate, Senator Vandenberg criticized the administration for appeasing the Soviets, citing the comments by Secretary Wallace (Vandenberg 1946; Powaski 1991, 177). Following along, the Truman administration argued Stalin's speech signaled a Soviet desire for expansion despite its domestic audience and context (Leffler 1992, 103). President Truman ordered Secretary Byrnes to take a harder stand in future negotiations and defend the administration in public (Leffler 1992, 107). At the same time, Secretary Byrnes wired George Kennan at the Moscow embassy for an interpretation of the Stalin speech, resulting in the "Long Telegram" (Chilton 1996b, 135).

The Iranian crisis also coincided with a speech by former Prime Minister of United Kingdom, Winston Churchill. Churchill argued Communism threatened "Christian civilization" (Churchill 1947). Churchill deployed the rhetorical resources of Soviet alien-ness and other-ness throughout the famous

Iron Curtain speech. The Iron Curtain metaphor sharply differentiated the West from the Soviet Union. It was first used in the 1920s to highlight how the 1917 revolution stopped the Westernization of Russia (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 101-102). At the beginning of his speech, Churchill referred to his own shared British and American heritage, tying together Great Britain and the United States through story of kinship, and defining the Soviet Union as foreign and alien (Churchill 1947). Churchill continued to use ethos rhetorical strategy, claiming he was right about Nazi Germany and therefore he knows the intentions of the Soviet Union. This not only established Churchill as an authority, it also connected Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union. Churchill continued the story of we-ness and kinship by imaging a Anglo-American "family" that protects the home against the outside threat of the Soviets (Churchill 1947). This rhetorical strategy of pathos attempted to forge a "fraternal association of English speaking peoples" (Churchill 1947). Churchill's Iron Curtain speech changed the public discourse about the Soviet Union. In particular, the media focused more on the Soviets with "growing damnation" (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 137). The media accepted Churchill as a authority, as he claimed through the ethos rhetorical strategy. However, the public "reacted negatively to Churchill's call for a military alliance" and rejected the identification of Anglo-American identity (Leffler 1992, 109).

The beginning of March also saw massive Soviet troop movements in Iran. On 16 March, Secretary Byrnes signaled "should the occasion arise, our military strength will be used to support the purposes and principles of the Charter"

(Byrnes 1946). Soon after, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops. The American public agreed with the strong stance, with 60 percent believing the United States approach with the Soviet Union was "too soft" (Gaddis 2000, 315). Due to Republican criticisms, Secretary Byrnes invited Senator Vandenberg to Paris Council of Foreign Ministers in the spring and summer of 1946.

Turkey, Fall 1946

For many years, Russia wanted to revise control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus straights. During World War II, Germany used the Dardanelles to attack the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union requested revision of the Montreux Conventions which governed the Dardanelles and Bosporus, the straits provided access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union requested joint control with Turkey over access to the straits. President Truman accused the Stalin of grabbing the straits in order to expand into the Mediterranean. Acheson argued the straits were "the stopper in the neck of the bottle" that prevented Soviet expansion to Turkey, Greece, and the Middle East (Herring 2008, 609). The United States rejected Soviet requests for joint control over the straits, and dispatched an armada to the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union conceded and also pulled troops out of the Balkans. However, the administration argued Stalin would continue to expand to the Mediterranean unless "contained" by the United States military (Mark 1997).

Around the same time as the Turkish crisis, Kennan's "Long Telegram" was leaked to the press to shape public opinion (Kennan 1946). Time Magazine

used the Long Telegram to write a story about the "Communist Contagion" which listed "Iran, Turkey, and Manchuria as infected" and "Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, and India as exposed" (1946b). The accompanying map depicted the Soviet threat as growing rapidly throughout the world. The Long Telegram concluded that "much depends on the health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue" (Kennan 1946). This disease expressed the internal and external threat of communism, while prescribing the solutions of democracy and containment. Clearly this complimented the threat narrative that communism would spread like "dominoes" and leave the United States isolated and insecure (Jervis and Snyder 1991; Kennedy 1987).

Disagreeing with the hard-line stance by the administration, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace wanted the United States to compromise with the Soviet Union. In a major speech, Secretary Wallace put forth the rhetorical resource of spheres of influence, allowing the Soviet Union to have a buffer zone to satisfy its security concerns, "we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States" (Wallace 1946, 740). Secretary Wallace deployed logos rhetorical strategy explaining how previous invasions and interventions, as well as geography, left Russia feeling insecure. Secretary Wallace also criticized British imperialism, "Make no mistake about it – the British imperialistic policy in the Near East alone, combined with Russian retaliation, would lead the United States straight to war" (Wallace 1946,

739). Secretary Wallace directly challenged the Anglo-American alliance championed by Churchill, and blamed the crises in Turkey and Iran on the British. Throughout the speech, Secretary Wallace deployed the rhetorical resource of cooperation and a logos rhetorical strategy explaining why cooperation with Soviet Russia was in the national interests of the United States.

Both Secretary Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg objected to the Wallace speech from the Paris peace conference where they were collaborating. Senator Vandenberg helped develop and defended in the Senate the administration's hard line approach (Leffler 1992, 139). President Truman fired Secretary Wallace, not wanting to send mixed signals and ensure bipartisan support for foreign policy.

Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947

The Soviet Union made a number of important concessions in late 1946 and early 1947. In the media, numerous individuals supported softening the United States policy towards the Soviet Union. *Newsweek*, *U.S. News*, and *Business Week* argued for a more positive relationship (Leffler 1992, 144). The newly elected Republicans often favored economic and political nationalism, wanting to limit United States involvement in Europe (Leffler 1992, 145). However, the Truman administration on the other hand feared the Greek Communist would gain power in a civil war and align Greece with the Soviet Union. The British government informed the United States it could not provide military or financial support for the pro-Western Greek government or Turkey.

In order to generate support for aid for Greece, the Truman administration met with Republican congressional leaders. Secretary of State Marshall invoked the story of dominoes in that "we are faced with the first crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia" (Jones 1955, 141). Undersecretary Acheson framed the argument in ideological terms, equating the battle to democracy and individual liberty versus dictatorship and absolute conformity (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 139). This connected anti-communism as a foreign policy to anti-communism as a domestic policy and the need to protect American values at home.

Senator Vandenberg famously replied at the end of the meeting, ""If that's what you want, there's only one way to get it. That is to make a personal appearance before Congress and scare hell out of the country" (Jones 1955, 142). The Republicans were willing to support the administration if it could make its case to the American public (Chilton 1996b, 179). As such, the President Truman undertook an intense public relations campaign even before the speech to Congress (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 143). The administration designed a "Public Information Program" to persuade the media about its foreign policy (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 140).

President Truman pursued rhetorical strategies of ethos, while deploying the rhetorical resources of totalitarianism and democracy. The rhetorical resource of democracy defined the Soviet Union as a threat to the American political system and values. This complemented the rhetorical resource of totalitarianism, and drew from many of the same stories found in the public

discourse. When arguing for aid to Greece and Turkey, the Truman administration framed the choice as between "democracy and totalitarianism" (Johnson 1994). Referencing World War II, President Truman argued the Soviet Union "sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations" just like Germany and Japan (Truman 1947b). Moreover, President Truman claimed that if Greece or Turkey became Communist it would "endanger the peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation" (Truman 1947b). The speech focused on the "universal rhetoric of Wilson (of making the world safe for democracy) and the war rhetoric that had rallied the American people against the fascists" (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 145). By putting the situation in war terms, President Truman claimed his authority over foreign policy, seen throughout the speech.

The primary critique of the speech came from Walter Lippmann, who argued containment was not a realistic strategy (Lippmann 1947). Lippmann deployed logos rhetorical strategy, logically explaining why a universalistic foreign policy would lead to imperial overstretch. The United States should only confront the Soviet Union when it is in its strategic interests, rather than everywhere in the world. However, Lippmann accepted the nature of the Soviet threat, but wanted a more strategic foreign policy, "My objection, then to the policy of containment is not that it seeks to confront the Soviet power with American power, but that the policy is misconceived, and must result in a misuse of American power" (Lippmann 1947, 49).

President Truman's speech was widely supported. Not only did the media approve of the speech, several presumed political opponents supported President Truman (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 150). This public support defies the political context. Republicans controlled both houses of Congress for the first time in twenty years. President Truman's popularity ratings hovered around 35 percent at the time of the speech (Leffler 1992). The polls "showed increasing support for both the president and his policy" (Gallup Organization 13-18 December 1947; National Opinion Research Center March 1947). In a December 1946 poll, a plurality of the public (43 percent) believed that Russia would cooperate with the United States in foreign affairs, while 63 percent did not believe Russia would cooperate in March 1947 (Office of Public Opinion Research February 1945). This shows significant changes from February 1945, when 58 percent of the pubic believed Russia would cooperate with the United States (Roper Organization 1-9 June 1947).

Marshall Plan, 1947

While President Truman requested support for Greece and Turkey, Secretary Marshall traveled to Europe in preparation for his first Council of Foreign Ministers (March 10-April 24). To continue Congressional bipartisan support, Secretary Marshall included John Foster Dulles, a Republican foreign policy advisor. When in France and Germany, Secretary Marshall witnessed the economic distress of Europe, which Dulles argued threatened "western civilization and personal freedom" (Leffler 1992, 152). Yet at the Council of

Foreign Ministers, negotiations fell apart on most issues, in particular the reconstruction of Germany which Marshall and Dulles felt vital for the European economy.

On his return to the United States, Secretary Marshall gave a national radio address titled “Patient Sinks While Doctors Deliberate” (Marshall 1947b). Secretary Marshall blamed the Soviet Union from preventing German reconstruction. Secretary Marshall worried the economic recovery of Europe depended on Europe, but the Soviet Union would allow Europe disintegration for political reasons. This analysis was supported by Dulles in his own national radio broadcast (Dulles 1947). Both Secretary Marshall and Dulles used ethos rhetorical strategy, citing their own expertise for analyzing the situation. Both speeches also deployed the rhetorical resources of democracy, freedom, and western civilization, arguing economic recovery was necessary for democracy and freedom in Europe, and Europe is the “cradle of Western civilization” (Dulles 1947). Moreover, Dulles supported the authority of Secretary Marshall, citing his expertise and leadership during the Council of Foreign ministers.

On 5 June 1947, Secretary Marshall announced the European Recovery Program, dubbed the Marshall Plan. Secretary Marshall suggested the Soviet Union wanted “to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically” (Marshall 1947a). President Truman and Undersecretary Acheson followed with speech tying together economic prosperity with political freedom and democracy in order to address the Communist threat (Truman 1947a; Acheson 1947).

In order to gain political support for the Marshall Plan, the State Department published captured German documents about the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 (Paterson 1988, 13). When the papers were released, the New York Times stated they proved "the initiative toward the conspiracy did not come from the Nazis, but from Moscow, behind the backs of France and Britain" (1948). The administration helped form the Committee for the Marshall Plan from a bipartisan group of elites. The committee began a public relations campaign with articles, petitions, and radio broadcasts, to the extend "there was never such a propaganda in the whole history of the nation" (Wala 1986, 264).

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan marked critical junctures in the legitimation process. In the subsequent years, the public debates decreased in number and intensity. During the 1948 presidential election, Thomas Dewey never challenged the definition or priority of the Soviet threat. While Henry Wallace disputed the nature of the Soviet threat, his third party presidential campaign sputtered, receiving no electoral votes. In congressional elections, Republicans actually argued that Democrats did not take the Soviet threat serious enough. President Truman continued to receive bipartisan support on foreign policy throughout the late 1940s. The public debates shifted from whether or not the Soviet Union was a threat to the United States to disagreements about how to respond to this threat.

This is directly seen in the creation and support for National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68). Written in the spring of 1950, NSC-68 outlined an increasing Soviet threat and requested massive budget increases. NSC-68

claimed that the Soviet Union would exceed the United States in military capabilities and desired to dominate the world. Most telling is that "NSC provoked no great debate" (Leffler 1992). Administration officials accepted NSC-68, even though several realized it exaggerated the capabilities of the Soviet Union (Wells Jr. 1979; Leffler 1992). Moreover, Congress and the American public pressed for greater mobilization. A Gallup poll cited 70 percent of Americans favoring higher taxes for a larger military. Gallup noted that "rarely has the Institute in its fifteen years of measuring public opinion found such heavy majorities expressing a willingness to pay more taxes for any public purpose" (Casey 2005). Congress quickly approved funding for NSC-68, doubling the size of the military and increasing defense appropriations by 262 percent (Casey 2005). The American public continued to support the idea that the Soviet Union was a threat to the United States. Even more important, President Truman and his administration no longer needed to deploy rhetoric for threat legitimation. In fact, the administration took a "subdued and low key" rhetorical strategy, wanting to prevent war-hysteria and to leave open political options (Casey 2005). The "Cold War Consensus" was established, legitimating the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to the United States.

Alternative Arguments

Just as in the previous chapter, the explanations offered in the extant literature fail to completely address why the Soviet Russia threat was legitimized and the Nazi German threat was not. Objective explanations suggest that threat

is self-evident by assessing state power and the international environment. This logic dictates that Germany was not a threat to the United States. However, the distribution of power between the United States and Germany shifted considerable during the 1930s. Germany controlled most of Europe, especially after conquering France and defeating the British army in June 1940. German domination of Europe not only created a change in the distribution of power, it also challenged a long-standing United States policy about maintaining a balance of power in Europe. The United States historically believed that a single dominant European power is a threat (Morgenthau 1950). Germany also began to consolidate control over North Africa, which allowed a trans-continental projection of power into South America. Moreover, as Dallek points out, Nazi Germany attempted to install Fascist governments throughout Latin America, "By 1938 the German and Italian governments had carried out effective programs of political, military and economic penetration of Latin America, they had organized Fascist and Nazi parties, established propaganda organs, dispatched military missions, underwritten arms sales, gained control of commercial airlines, and expanded trade through barter deals detrimental to the United States" (Dallek 1979, 175).

The threat of a German controlled South America included more than a military dimension. South American countries needed the European markets for exports, and therefore they began making trade agreements. Germany could exert significant economic pressure on South America (Dallek 1979, 233; Casey 2001, 11). This potential alliance (or informal empire) between South America

and Germany posed a military risk to the southern border of the United States. It also threatened the United States goal of an open and stable international economic system. By the late 1930s, the administration and most political elites desired an open international economic system, passing various reciprocal trade agreements and currency stabilization policies, directly in conflict with Nazi economic nationalism with strict controls, especially for international trade (Frieden 1988, 83-86).

Another objectivist argument suggests Germany was not a threat because the United States was able to "pass the buck" where France and the United Kingdom would provide security against Germany (Mearsheimer 2001). Yet even after France fell and the Soviet Union suffered major defeats, the American public still did not view Germany as a threat. Furthermore, military and political elites in the government, especially President Roosevelt, did not believe that the United States could "pass the buck" and allow German control of the Europe (Trachtenberg 2006).

Objective explanations also fail to fully explain why Soviet Russia was legitimized as a threat to the United States. For example, Mearsheimer argues that the Soviet Union was the "left standing as the most powerful state in Europe" making the Soviet threat self-evident (Mearsheimer 2001, 322). As noted earlier, the United States believed that a single dominant European power is a threat (Morgenthau 1950). Furthermore, the absence of other great powers prevented a strategy of "buck-passing," forcing the United States to balance against the Soviet Union (Mearsheimer 2001, 323).

However, several studies point out the power disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Using the Beckman model, the United States scored a fifty-three while the Soviet Union scored a nine in 1947 (Beckman 1984, 207-209).[19] Lebow points out that using various realist measures, the Soviet Union did not challenge the United States in terms of capabilities (Lebow 1994). The industrial and technological capabilities of the Soviet Union did not compare to the United States. While the Soviet Union tested a nuclear weapon in 1949, it still did not have the capacity to produce and deliver a significant amount until the mid 1960s (Lebow 1994, 254).

Moreover, even if the Soviet Union managed to invade Western Europe, it would control a region dependent on the United States for food and fuel. Unable to inflict damage on the United States, the Soviet armies would be exposed to the air power of the United States, both conventional and nuclear (Leffler 1992, 96). Army intelligence estimated it would take the Soviet Union fifteen years to overcome manpower losses, five to ten years to build an air force, fifteen to twenty-five years to build a navy, and three to ten years to develop a nuclear weapon (Leffler 1992, 134).

The Truman administration admitted in internal memos the Soviet Union adhered to wartime military agreements (Leffler 1992, 132). General Clay pointed out the Soviets never violated agreements about Germany, and the only disagreements came from different interpretations of ambiguous language (Leffler 1992, 132).

[19] Beckman measured power levels based on industrial capacity (steel production), population, and political stability (Beckman 1984).

Subjectivist explanations about threat legitimation focus on individual and group decision-making, studying perceptions or motives. However, these explanations for why the United States did not respond to the German threat also fall short. Key political and military elites, especially President Roosevelt, believed Germany was an immediate and pressing threat even earlier than 1940 (Casey 2001, 11). President Roosevelt clearly diagnosed the need to balance against Nazi Germany during the Munich Crisis, stating on 14 November 1938, "the recrudescence of German power at Munich had completely reoriented our own international relations…for the first time since the Holy Alliance in 1818 the United States now faced the possibility of an attack on the Atlantic side in both the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres" (Farnham 1997, 137). Oceans could not longer protect the United States from a long range bombing campaign based in North Africa or a possible invasion through Brazil (Casey 2001). Not only did both political and military elites perceive the German threat, they also believed that the United States was capable of defeating Germany. However, this "widow of opportunity" only existed because Germany had not fully consolidated control over Europe, therefore the United States needed to strike quickly (Trachtenberg 2006).

Historians have previously highlighted the role of isolationism for explaining President Roosevelt's inability to mobilize the United States against Germany. Previous explanations argue that since the American public overwhelmingly favored isolationism, President Roosevelt was constrained by public opinion (Leigh 1976). If President Roosevelt responded to the growing

German threat, he would lose the upcoming elections. A similar argument suggests that while President Roosevelt might not have been electorally constrained, Congress was sensitive to the isolationist attitude of the American public (Dallek 1979).

These pluralist arguments about threat legitimation are theoretically and empirically problematic. Pluralism is a society-centered approach, where threat legitimation either reflects the preferences of the dominant group in society, or results from the struggle between interest groups or political parties. Theoretically, pluralism envisions the state as an arena for political conflict, rather than an active political actor. This ignores the role of government officials in the process of threat legitimation. More importantly, pluralism assumes that group preferences do not change during the process. Changes occur according to shifts in alliances or increases in group power, rather than changes in the preferences of a group. This is problematic with referring to a threat (or any social fact) where meanings are contested and evolving. For example, one pluralist explanation of foreign policy argues that overexpansion occurs when imperialist groups capture the state (Snyder 1991). However, this argument turns on how these interest groups begin to believe their own "myths" through the process of "blowback" (Snyder 1991, 40-41). The internalization of myths changes the preferences of the interest groups involved in the foreign policy coalition. Finally, pluralism reduces communication action to instrumental action. Yet as seen with "blowback," interest groups do not simply bargain with fixed preferences. Preferences can change through rhetorical actions and challenges,

where political actors are persuaded by arguments, even if the arguments are their own (Snyder 1991; Risse 2000).

Empirically, a pluralist argument reduces isolationism either to an idea held by a majority of the American public or to an interest held by politically powerful groups. However, isolationism as the majority public opinion about America's role in the world falls short on several levels. For one, isolationism was never a homogenous foreign policy position, with some believing pacifism while others unilateralism, or even others being pro-Nazi and some anti-British (Leigh 1976; see Jonas 1966; Ninkovich 1999b). More important, these arguments conflate isolationism with non-involvement in the European war. Americans were more unilateralist than necessary isolationist, thinking that staying out of the war was in the interest of the United States. In fact, other foreign policies, such as relations with Latin America and international trade, highlight how Americans were more internationalist than isolationist (Legro 2000). The Good Neighbor Policy established military and economic relations with Latin America (Ninkovich 1999b, 111-113). The Roosevelt administration passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934, lowering tariffs and promoting international cooperation (Smith 1994; Frieden 1988).

The success of internationalist foreign policies during the 1930s exemplifies how isolationism was not simply an interest held by political powerful groups. In fact, some pluralist explanations of foreign policy believe that internationalism overtook isolationism in the middle of the 1930s (Trubowitz 1998). Internationalists controlled political and economic power in the United

States by the mid 1930s (Frieden 1988; Trubowitz 1998). The Roosevelt administration contained almost exclusively internationalists by 1935, while isolationists were only a minority group in Congress (Frieden 1988; Donovan 1951). But this suggests that President Roosevelt and other interventionists should have succeeded in legitimating the German threat. Foreign policy never reflected the growing powers of internationalist interest groups (Legro 2000, 18). Moreover, the public debates increased and intensified instead of waning towards the end of the 1930s.

Isolationism was not an individual or group interest or idea that was fixed and settled. Instead, it was a contested narrative in the public discourse that affected threat legitimation. Individuals and groups debated and discussed isolationism, including the government actors excluded by pluralism, helping form a narrative about the Nazi threat. This agrees with other authors who argue that "American isolationism is a myth. The word – which did not come into common use until the 1890s, when propagandists for empire flung it at their Mugwump critics – should be struck from America's vocabulary" (McDougall 1997, 137; see also Lake 1999).

Subjectivist explanations also fall short about the Soviet Russia threat. These explanations argue that President Truman and his administration perceived the Soviet Union as threat and therefore the American public followed. For example, Larson provides a psychological explanation for the perceptions of President Truman, which led to confrontation and conflict with the Soviet Union (Larson 1985). Several studies argue that the differences between President

Roosevelt and President Truman explain why the Soviet Union became a threat to the United States (Theoharis 1972; Offner 1999).

One problem with subjectivist paradigm is that President Truman believed that the Soviet Union and the United States could cooperate in the postwar world (Gaddis 2000). Moreover, key military leaders such as Eisenhower, Marshall, and Clay perceived the Soviet Union as an important and trusted ally (Leffler 1992, 46). Public opinion about the threat of the Soviet Union seems to shift even before President Truman's perceptions. In August 1945, fifty four percent of the American public believed that Russia would cooperate with the United States, while only thirty five percent believed it in February 1946 (Gallup Organization 10-15 August 1945; Gallup Organization 28 February - 5 March 1946). Yet Kennan only submitted his "Long Telegram" in February 1946, and Churchill made his "Iron Curtain" speech in March 1946. More important, the subjectivist paradigm does not explain how President Truman generated consent from a war-weary American public and Congress that was predisposed to not getting involved in European foreign relations and not maintaining a peacetime military establishment.

Radio media environment

In this chapter, I argue the transformation from a newspaper to a radio media environment affects the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation. Just as radio did not determine the failed legitimation of the German threat, neither did radio determine the successful legitimation of the Soviet threat. However, I

argue the radio media environment favored ethos rhetorical strategies. President Truman could have failed to legitimate the Soviet threat to the American public and Congress. Instead of relying on the rhetorical strategies of ethos, the Truman administration might have pursued a logos strategy, making more pragmatic arguments. This does not mean there would have been no Cold War. But perhaps the Cold War would have started differently and taken another path. President Truman used and benefited from the radio environment, changing how the Soviet threat became legitimated. But political actors are not completely aware of how the media environment impacts their ability to legitimate a threat. As noted by medium theory, once communication technologies are embedded in the media environment, they become transparent as a "way of living" (Holmes 2005). This starts to explain why political actors struggle to legitimate a threat, even though they follow the lessons of the past. As the media environment transformed from newspaper to radio (and in the next chapter television), the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation change.

As medium theory suggests, the emergence of a new communication technology, in this instance radio, did not eliminate old forms, such as the newspaper, but transformed the media environment in which the newspaper operated (McLuhan 1964a; Holmes 2005).

Radio emerged as an important communication technology during the late 1920s as national networks replaced independent transmitters (Barnouw 1968). Technological improvements and government regulations during this time period favored the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) and the Columbia

Broadcasting System (CBS) (Douglas 2004). Eventually NBC and CBS consolidated control of stations and undermined the local base of radio (Hilmes 1997). Advertising became the primary source of revenue, directly competing with newspapers and winning, "Between 1928 and 1934, radio advertising had grown by 316 percent, while newspaper advertising dropped by 30 percent and magazine by 45 per cent. Some 245 daily newspapers had ceased publication entirely" (Marquis 1984, 392)

Radio was primarily a form of entertainment during the 1920s, only providing broadcasts of special news events or speeches. However, popular and successful radio broadcasts of the 1932 election worried newspaper publishers, and the Associated Press decided to no longer provide news to the radio networks. In response, both CBS and NBC began gathering news, and emerged as an important news medium.

By the late 1930s and early 1940s, radio dominated the media environment, becoming the favorite American media (Horten 2002). One estimate claims 67 percent of American families had a radio in 1935, but by 1940, 81 percent did (Douglas 2004, 162). More Americans owned radios than subscribed to newspapers or magazines (Cantril 1940b). By the early 1940s, there were 60 million radio receivers throughout the United States with 90 percent of Americans owning at least one radio set and listening to three hours of broadcasting a day (Casey 2001; Horten 2002). Crises in Europe played a critical role in the growing demand for radio. More Americans bought radios in the three weeks of the Munich crisis of 1938 than any three week period of time (Douglas

2004). Radio emerged as the primary source of foreign news, making the newspaper 'extra' obsolete (Horten 2002; Douglas 2004). Americans followed events in Europe, and eventually World War II, through the radio.

The move from newspaper to radio as the dominant media environment affected how Americans thought about the world and imaged their collective existence. Since radio depends solely on sound, it requires listeners to complete the picture. Radio is inherently active, where listeners internally produce images themselves and provide individual meanings and reactions to mass produced broadcasts (Douglas 2004, 35). For example, radio news about international crises before and during World War II "required the imagining of national and international maps" and focused on "fateful relationships between the individual, the family, and the world" (Storr 1992, 26; quoted in Douglas 2004, 23). Hearing also creates different responses than seeing since "at an emotional level, there is something 'deeper' about hearing than seeing, and something about hearing other people which fosters human relationships even more than seeing them" (Douglas 2004, 30). Humans learn speech and social relations through hearing (McLuhan 1964a, 301).

Marshall McLuhan notes the primitive nature of radio, likening it to a primal drum that revived "the ancient experience of kinship webs of deep tribal involvement" (Hilmes 1997, 11). Other authors stress this tribal effect of collectivism and community on America. Radio created the "imagined national community" of America between 1920 and 1940 (Douglas 2004, 24). While Benedict Anderson argues that the newspaper created the imagined community

of a nation, radio actually completed this process in America by making the community more tangible (Douglas 2004, 24). Events were shared at the exact same moment from one common voice, rather than from different perspectives or interpretations. People were transported to these events, often to parts of America never seen or visited. Networks and advertisers encouraged this national approach for radio, and promoted radio as a nation-building technology (Horten 2002, 178; Douglas 2004, 19). Radio constructed a newly imagined American nation, and forever changed social and political relations.

Radio transformed the nature of the public sphere as well. The public sphere and American society became more privatized, and at certain levels, the private and public spheres merged together (Douglas 2004, 9). The boundary between the private and domestic nature of family life was transcended and blurred by the introduction and invasion of the public and political nature of social life through radio (Horten 2002, 3). Political campaigns and speeches entered the living room. Just as important, radio revolutionized economic relations in America. Radio helped reaffirm business in American culture and the role of corporations in American politics and society to post-depression Americans (Horten 2002, 177; c.f. Crenson and Ginsberg 2002). Radio developed a "consumer-oriented ideology" and American citizens were increasingly defined a consumers (Baum 2003a). This consumerism spilled over into the political arena, "transforming voters into consumers and policies and politicians into competing commodities" and therefore became dependent on advertising (Craig 2000, 173).

Radio changed the political and social relations in the United States. Radio became the most important source of news and also entertainment. Radio was the favorite recreational activity, with 80 percent of Americans willing to give up going to the movies rather than listening to the radio in a 1939 survey (White 1947, 1-13; quoted in Horten 2002, 25). With the explosion of radio, new segments of the American public became engaged with current events. Newspapers were "written at a level above the reading ability of many Americans" while radio "reached Americans in simple, direct English" (Lazarsfeld 1940; Horten 2002, 25). While radio included lower and middle class Americans in the public discourse, radio reached and became the preferred news source for all Americans, and changed political and social relations throughout the country (Douglas 2004, 175).

News programs surged in the late 1930s, with 61.5 percent of Americans listening regularly to radio news in 1939 (Steele 1985, 143). Along with news programs, a number of commentators and analysts emerged as important sources of information and became celebrities, such as Walter Winchell, Edward R. Murrow, H.V. Kaltenborn, Lowell Thomas, and Boake Carter. Winchell in particular blurred the lines between news, editorial, and entertainment, at times reducing the "great foreign policy debate of the early 1940s to a parody of Broadway/Hollywood intrigue" (Douglas 2004, 180). Winchell's use of storytelling helped develop large audiences and gave him considerable influence about current events. However, Winchell was not the only one on the radio using this rhetorical strategy. Morrow explicitly claimed authority in his reporting,

trying “to create concrete mental images” in order to show “how the war was affecting everyday people” (Horten 2002, 33). Instead of prose or arguments, Murrow fashioned dramatic stories. The audiences responded strongly to these stories. Just as important was that Americans “viewed radio as a friend” which affected their ability to critically evaluate radio news (Horten 2002, 27). This was due to the medium itself, not just the personal connection to individual commentators, where “Americans simply trusted radio more” imbuing the speaker with authority (Douglas 2004, 4).

Political actors increasingly used radio to reach the public. The most famous example is the fireside chats of President Franklin Roosevelt. During 1933, President Roosevelt successfully used four broadcasts to generate support for the New Deal (Barnouw 1968). Even more important, political actors adopted rhetorical strategies designed for the radio. As early as the 1928 election, candidates reduced the length of their campaign speeches for better radio coverage (Lewis 1992). Political speeches not only became shorter because of radio, but returned to rhetorical strategies used for live audiences rather than newspapers. President Roosevelt, in his fireside chats, undertook a causal style where the audience felt “that Roosevelt was talking to them directly as individuals, knew their problems, and was interested in them” (Barnouw 1968, 7). Instead of the logical and linear speeches that fit into the newspaper environment, the radio encouraged speeches designed for an audience directly in front of the political actor.

Radio therefore favors ethos, or the rhetorical strategy of appealing to the authority of the speaker. The relationship between the speaker and the audience becomes central for gaining consent, where the speaker possesses qualities or demonstrates knowledge as an authority. Radio depends on this close relationship, instead of relying on the logical reasoning of an argument. Radio did not eliminate the newspaper, but altered the media environment where newspapers operated. Editors and publishers lost control of information, where radio broadcasters provided new sources of information. New actors gained access, such as the NBC broadcast of the "University of Chicago Round Table" every Sunday (Slotten 2005). Radio replaced tabloid newspapers, as the target audience moved to the new medium and took advertisers with it (Esser 1999). Furthermore radio changed how news stories were written (McLuhan 1964a).

However, President Roosevelt and other pro-intervention actors failed to use ethos to legitimate the German threat. Instead, they often relied on making logical arguments, giving Americans "just the facts" about current events to build public consent about the German threat (Casey 2001, 36). President Roosevelt wanted to "educate the public" about the danger of a German controlled Europe, but used facts and figures instead of stories (Ninkovich 1999b, 123).

President Roosevelt also tried to use pathos rhetorical strategy to connect America in a "democratic community" with Great Britain. But this rhetorical resource of democracy was not enough, especially since President Roosevelt did not undertake this rhetorical approach really until 1941. Furthermore, Anglophobia still existed in the United States, especially in the post World War I

historical memory and the stories of "Perfidious Albion" being involved with the "merchants of death." In order to legitimize the threat, the public needed another source of identification – Nazi Germany. However, President Roosevelt did not vilify the Germans and Hitler, rarely mentioning them and instead focusing on "helping Britain" or other general arguments.[20] The similar strategy of saving democracy also did not work because the public did not identify with the British Empire. Anti-interventionists successfully tied their position to rhetorical resource of American exceptionalism, further distancing American democracy from the British Empire. The radio media environment supported the ethos rhetorical strategies deployed by anti-interventionists, rather than rational and impartial arguments favored by President Roosevelt. As this suggests, radio did not determine the failed legitimation of the German threat, since the choices of the political actors were necessary. But this case also highlights how political actors do not realize transformations in the media environment and what constraints they face for threat legitimation.

Interestingly, President Roosevelt was reluctant to use radio to spread make his argument, despite his previous success with the New Deal. He believed the public would quickly tune him out if he constantly mentioned the German threat because "people tire of seeing the same name day after day in the important headlines, the same voice night after night on the radio" (Steele 1985, 8). Therefore, President Roosevelt delegated the task of threat legitimation,

[20] Interesting enough, President Roosevelt successfully vilified the Germans after the start of the war in order to consolidate consensus about military strategy and foreign policy, which ultimately "rhetorically trapped" the US into a policy of unconditional surrender.

making few public appearances and limiting the number of radio broadcasts (Steele 1985, 111). Even when he spoke about the wars in Europe and Asia, President Roosevelt only made general comments (Steele 1985, 125).

This rhetorical strategy failed to take advantage of presidency, which established the president as the authority in foreign policy and crises. This was a critical mistake because the radio media environment calls for ethos, appealing to the authority of the speaker. While President Roosevelt was relatively silent, other actors pursued an ethos rhetorical strategy while helping construct the anti-interventionist narrative. For example, the America First Committee coordinated broadcasts for anti-interventionists, even non-members (Cole 1983, 477). Charles Lindbergh exploited his status as an American hero to support hemispheric defense, making speeches covered by the national radio networks. Furthermore, the Nye Commission established many leading anti-interventionists senators as expert on foreign policy issues.

President Roosevelt often remained outside the public debate, relying on key allies inside and outside of the government. President Roosevelt encouraged key interventionist Republicans, such as Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, and William Allen White, to "make aggressive speeches" (Dallek 1979, 201-203). Just before the 1940 presidential election, President Roosevelt appointed Stimson to Secretary of War, and Knox to Secretary of the Navy in order to gain bipartisan political support (Steele 1985, 69). However, Stimson warned President Roosevelt that the continued power of the isolationists required the president's personal and direct participation to overcome (Steele 1985, 82). But President

Roosevelt did not get fully involved in the public debates until the Lend Lease Act in 1941 (Steele 1985, 113). President Roosevelt also relied on allies outside the government, in particular independent interventionist organizations, at times giving the groups direction (Casey 2001, 33). However, interventionist rhetoric attacked the credibility and loyalty of anti-interventionists instead of deploying ethos rhetorical strategies to construct a threat narrative about intervention. For example, President Roosevelt compared Charles Lindbergh to Civil War Copperheads in a 25 April 1941 press conference, and the media reaction was highly critical (Steele 1985, 83). The rhetorical strategy of attacking the isolationists failed, with attempts of linking isolationists to the Nazis producing a backlash among the press and the public (Steele 1985).

In contrast, President Truman and other cold warriors often used the radio and deployed ethos rhetorical strategies when legitimating the Soviet threat. President Truman often claimed foreign policy authority as the president, as well as expertise when dealing with Soviet Russia, despite his lack of foreign policy experience. Winston Churchill also deployed ethos in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech, claiming he was right about Nazi Germany and therefore he knows the intentions of the Soviet Union. Both Secretaries of State Byrnes and Marshall used ethos rhetorical strategies, citing their own foreign policy expertise of World War II. George Kennan often used ethos by claiming expertise about Russian intentions.

Furthermore, by firing Secretary Wallace, President Truman undermined his authority and his ability to use ethos rhetorical strategies, as well as his radio

exposure. In addition, Secretary Wallace became linked to communism by various political actors, hurting his ability to delegitimize the Soviet threat. Secretary Wallace also chose to deploy logos rhetorical strategies when outlining why Soviet Russia was not a threat to the United States. The other important political actor opposing the administration threat narrative, Walter Lippmann, also used logos instead of ethos rhetorical strategies. Lippmann also primarily used the newspaper instead of the radio to distribute his arguments. Even more important, Lippmann often agreed with the existence of the Soviet threat, disputing only the nature and priority of the threat. Therefore the debate became more about strategy than goals.

Conclusion

For both of these episodes, I argue that rhetorical resources and strategies affected threat legitimation. President Roosevelt failed to generate public consent about the German threat. President Roosevelt primarily relied on logos and pathos rhetorical strategies to connect together balance of power, European market, civilization, and democracy. Anti-interventionists used ethos rhetorical strategies, relying on political and social authority to connect together rhetorical resources. This included deploying important political and social leaders in public debates, such as Colonel Lindbergh, citing public opinion, and using mass demonstrations to claim authority. On the other hand, President Truman and cold warriors relied on ethos rhetorical strategies to connect together communism, totalitarianism, Nazi Germany, appeasement, democracy,

civilization, and isolationism. President Truman successfully legitimated the Soviet Russia threat through these rhetorical resources and strategies.

A rhetorical approach also provides a different perspective about United States foreign policy behavior. President Roosevelt failed to legitimate the German threat, and therefore resorted to various measures to provide aid to Great Britain, some of which authors have argued were illegal (Herring 2008, 522). The day after the House vote to keep the arms embargo during the Munich Crisis, President Roosevelt wrote to the Attorney General about how to circumvent the Neutrality Act, "As you know, the V.P. takes the definite position that the President should not be bound at all by [neutrality] legislation as such legislation offends his constitution powers. If we fail to get any Neutrality Bill, how far do you think I can go in ignoring the existing act – even though I did sign it?!" (Roosevelt and Schewe 1979 9, 1906). During the destroyers for bases deal in 1940, President Roosevelt used an executive order to circumvent Congress. He ordered military leaders to declare the ships obsolete to avoid congressional debates on military funding. President Roosevelt also could not publicly reveal his policy of escorting American ships to deliver war materials to Great Britain. (Dallek 1979, 286). Finally, President Roosevelt misled the country about the attacks on USS Greer. As noted by Senator William Fulbright, "FDR's deviousness in a good cause made it easier for LBJ to practice the same kind of deviousness in a bad cause" (Dallek 1979, 289).

CHAPTER 5

NICARAGUA AND PANAMA

In this final empirical chapter, I analyze the threat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and the threat of the Noreiga regime in Panama (1987-1989) to the United States. From 1981-1986, the Reagan administration, especially President Reagan, failed to legitimate the Nicaraguan threat, despite extraordinary efforts. Just as in previous chapters, this episode is important theoretically and empirically because of its importance for United States foreign policy and the existence of diverging explanations. I argue rhetorical resources and strategies explain the failed legitimation of the Nicaragua threat. The Reagan administration advanced a threat narrative on how communism would spread from Nicaragua through Central America, threatening the Panama Canal and the southern United States. By deploying logos and ethos rhetorical strategies, President Reagan tried to connect the rhetorical resources of balance of power and containment. Communist Nicaragua would tilt the balance of power to the Soviet Union. Later in the public debates, President Reagan deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to connect the rhetorical resources of freedom and democracy. Anti-interventionists also deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to connect together Vietnam, human rights, democracy, and diplomacy. Vietnam undermined the Reagan administration arguments about containment and dominoes. Communism would not spread through Central America. Instead,

non-military solutions would be better to deal with the Sandinista regime and improve United States relations.

On the other hand, the Bush administration succeeded in legitimating the threat of Noriega Panama. I examine the episode of Noriega Panama (1988-1989), where President Bush eventually overthrew the Noriega regime in Panama with significant public support. I argue that rhetorical resources and strategies explain this successful episode of threat legitimation, rather than the explanations found in the extant literature. President Bush argued Noriega was a threat to the Panama Canal and to American society. Using pathos rhetorical strategies, the Bush administration connected together the rhetorical resources of dictator, drug dealer, justice, and democracy. Noriega would take over the Panama Canal and threaten the security of the United States. Moreover, Noriega was a critical actor in drug trafficking which threatened American society. Finally, Noriega prevented the democratization of Panama, which threatened United States interests. The opposition argued invading Panama was illegal, primarily relying on logos rhetorical strategies to connect together the rhetorical resources of international law and constitutional authority.

Both episodes provides important insights about threat legitimation and the role of rhetorical resources and strategies, while also being in the same television media environment. The final section of the chapter highlights some interesting comparisons and discussions about these two Central American cases, noting how the television media environment favored the pathos rhetorical strategies used to legitimate threats.

Summary of Sandinista Nicaragua

The Reagan administration failed to legitimate the threat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, despite President Reagan's widely documented ability to communicate successfully with the American public. President Reagan comments on this paradox in his memoirs, already quoted at the start of this study, "For eight years the press called me the 'Great Communicator.' Well, one of my greatest frustrations during those eight years was my inability to communicate to the American people and to Congress the seriousness of the threat we faced in Central America" (Reagan 1990; Edwards III 2003).

When President Reagan assumed office in January 1981, the administration immediately changed foreign policy direction and purpose, especially focusing on Latin America and Nicaragua. In 1979, the pro-United States Somoza dictatorship fell to the Sandinista revolution, which was allied to Cuba and the Soviet Union. As a candidate in the 1980 presidential election, Reagan criticized President Carter for losing Nicaragua to communism (Kagan 1996, xiii). Once elected, the Reagan administration attempted to overthrow the Sandinista regime. However, failing to legitimize the Sandinista threat, the administration pursued covert intervention in Nicaragua. This covert intervention and its funding led to significant clashes between the Reagan administration and Congress, and eventually the Iran-Contra affair in 1987.

Analysis of Sandinista Nicaragua

I started my research with historiographies about United States foreign policy with Nicaragua in order to include varying perspectives and arguments. I relied on a variety of secondary sources, including diplomatic histories, foreign policy studies, journalistic analyses, and personal accounts. This included *Banana Diplomacy*, *Twilight Struggle*, *Inevitable Revolutions*, *Not Condemned to Repetition*, *Living in the Shadow of the Eagle*, and *In the Name of Democracy* (Gutman 1988; Kagan 1996; Lafeber 1983; Pastor 2002; Walker 2003; Carothers 1991).

From these secondary sources, I identified five critical junctures, 1) Opposing the Sandinistas, 1981-1982; 2) Contra Aid, Spring 1983; 3) Kissinger Report, January 1984; 4) 1985 State of the Union and Return of Contra Aid; 5) 1986 Battle for Contra Aid. The important political actors attempting to legitimate the Nicaraguan threat included President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of State George Shultz, Deputy Secretary of State and National Security Advisor William Clark, Assistant Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey, and United States Representative to the United States Jeane Kirkpatrick.

The political actors debating there was no Nicaraguan threat to the United States included Speaker of the House Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Edward Boland, Congressman Michael D. Barnes, and Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Daniel

P. Moynihan. Other political actors consisted of a broad coalition of church groups, peace activists, and human rights organizers (Kagan 1996, 369).

Starting with these critical junctures and political actors, I researched public speeches using primary sources, including presidential papers, congressional records, memoirs, newspapers articles, and television addresses. I used public opinion surveys as well as newspaper editorials and congressional debates to asses the level of threat legitimation. Although there was no specific question about the Nicaraguan threat, I use three different questions that were consistently asked throughout the Nicaragua episode, asking respondents if they favored overthrowing the Sandinista regime, if they supported Contra aid, and if they approved of President Reagan's policies on Nicaragua (Figure 3 below).

As Figure 3 highlights, President Reagan consistently failed at legitimizing the Nicaraguan threat to the American public. The president lamented his failure,

> Time and again, I would speak on television, to a joint session of Congress, or to other audiences about the problems in Central America, and I would hope that the outcome would be an outpouring of support from Americans who would apply the same kind of heat on Congress that helped pass the economic recovery package. But the polls usually found that large numbers of Americans cared little or not at all about what happened in Central America – in fact, a surprisingly large proportion didn't even know where Nicaragua and El Salvador were located – and, among those who did care, too few cared enough about a Communist penetration of the Americas to apply the kind of pressure needed on Congress (Reagan 1990, 479)

Percentage of Responents Favoring Overthrowing Sandinista Regime



Percentage of Respondents Favoring Contra Aid





Figure 3. Nicaragua Public Opinion

Sources, (Louis Harris and Associates 1-5 June 1984; Louis Harris and Associates 29 April - 1 May 1983; Los Angeles Times 4-10 April 1983; Newsweek/Gallup 28-29 April 1983; ABC News/Washington Post 11-15 May 1983; CBS News/New York Times 20-26 June 1983; ABC News/Washington Post 28 July - 1 August 1983; Louis Harris and Associates 9-14 September 1983; CBS News/New York Times 26 October 1983; ABC News/Washington Post 3-7 November 1983; Gallup Organization 18-21 November 1983; ABC News/Washington Post 12-17 January 1984; CBS News/New York Times 23-26 April 1984; Louis Harris and Associates 10-13 May 1984; CBS News/New York Times 14-17 October 1984; CBS News/New York Times 23-25 October 1984; ABC News/Washington Post 22-26 February 1985; Louis Harris and Associates 2-5 March 1985; ABC News/Washington Post 21-25 March 1985; USA Today/Gordon S. Black Corporation April 1985; Louis Harris and Associates 9-12 May 1985; CBS News/New York Times 29 May - 2 June 1985; ABC News/Washington Post 13-22 June 1985; Gallup Organization 12-15 June 1985; Louis Harris and Associates 12-15 June 1985; Newsweek/Gallup 27-28 August 1985; ABC News 6 March 1986; Gallup Organization 7-10 March 1986; ABC News 16 March 1986; ABC News/Washington Post 20-24 March 1986; USA Today/Gordon S. Black Corporation 25 March 1986; Louis Harris and Associates 5-8 April 1986; CBS News/New York Times 6-10 April 1986; NBC News/Wall Street Journal 13-15 April 1986; ABC News/Washington Post 24-28 April 1986; NBC News/Wall Street Journal 28-29 April 1986; ABC News/Washington Post 15-19 May 1986; Louis Harris and Associates 29 October - 1 November 1986; AP/Media General 7-10 November 1986; NBC News/Wall Street Journal 17-18 November 1986; NBC News/Wall Street Journal 1-2 December 1986)

No time did even a plurality of Americans support Contra aid (Sobel 1993, 8; LeoGrande 1993b, 171). The percentage of respondents who favored overthrowing the Sandinista regime never reached 35 percent. In addition to public opinion polls, newspaper editorials during this episode often disputed the existence and nature of the Nicaraguan threat. Even more vocal was congressional opposition, highlighted in the analysis below. The Reagan administration realized their inability to legitimize the Nicaraguan threat, and therefore pursued more covert activities. Robert McFarlane noted in the Iran-Contra hearings that the administration "turned to covert actions because they thought they could not get Congressional support for more overt activities…No one making these important decisions in the Reagan administration viewed covert action as the best way to pursue our aims in Nicaragua" (LeoGrande 1993b). Lack of congressional and public consent lead to covert military activities and eventually secret Contra funding (Gutman 1988, 115-116).

Through the various public debates about the Nicaraguan threat, I identify the dominant narratives as well as the rhetorical resources and strategies. President Reagan and other pro-interventionists argued Communism would spread from Nicaragua through Central America, threatening the Panama Canal and the southern United States. The rhetorical resources deployed were balance of power and containment of communism. Communism control of Nicaragua would tilt the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. Moreover, other countries would become communist in the region, falling like dominoes.

In order to construct this threat narrative, President Reagan and other interventionists primarily focused on logos rhetorical strategies, in particular appealing to the rationality of national security through containment and balance of power. In addition, President Reagan depended on ethos rhetorical strategies, found in the authority appeals about Presidential power and executive privilege in foreign policy. Only when President Reagan deployed pathos rhetorical strategies, in conjunction with the rhetorical resources of freedom and democracy seemed to generate some public and congressional support. The Reagan administration linked democracy and the Contra rebels, arguing they were freedom fighters. Moving the rhetoric away from containment and toward democratization supported the preferred administration policy of regime change, while avoiding the baggage of anticommunism and containment.

However, the Reagan administration was slow to pursue these rhetorical resources and strategy, and therefore faced several important problems. For one, rhetorical resources of freedom and democracy opened the door for human rights questions about the Contra rebels, an argument already well established in the public discourse through various news reports and congressional hearings. Finally, the rhetorical resource of democracy offered different, and at times more appealing, policy options than military support of the Contras, the preferred policy of the Reagan administration, helping delegitimize the threat narrative.

The anti-interventionists narrative rejected Sandinista Nicaragua as a threat to the United States. Communism would not spread through Central America, since communism was not monolithic. Instead, non-military solutions

would better deal with the Sandinista regime and improve relations with the United States. The rhetorical resources included Vietnam, human rights, democracy, and diplomacy. The history of Vietnam undermined the rhetorical resources and strategies of the interventionist threat narrative, in particular containment of communism and dominoes. Furthermore, the covert activities pursued by the Reagan administration reinforced the rhetorical resource of Vietnam. By relying on these emotional appeals, anti-interventionists successfully undermined the threat narrative of the Reagan administration.

Opposing the Sandinistas, 1981-1982

Nicaragua emerged as central to administration thinking about Central America, the communist threat, and the security of the United States. Often United States foreign policy focused on the stability and order in Central America, leading to numerous interventions throughout history. Any instability could invite intervention by outside powers. This fear about extra-hemispheric intervention revisited the tradition and ideology of the Monroe Doctrine and subsequent manifestations. Historically, the United States understood and justified various interventions into Central America through this framework (Johnson 1994, 171; Lafeber 1983, 13-16).

In this case, the United States worried about Nicaragua turning to the Soviet Union for political and economic support (Pastor 2002, 11). The United States originally supported the new Sandinista regime after it overthrew the Somoza government in 1979. However, eighteen months later with newly elected

President Reagan, the United States financial aid to Nicaragua stopped and then the United States began to finance a covert war to overthrow the Sandinistas (Pastor 2002, 6). During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan defined the problem as Soviet expansion and the solution as American power, "The inescapable truth is that we are at war, and we are losing that war simply because we don't or won't realize we are in it…there can only be one end to the war…War ends in victory or defeat" (Dugger 1983, 351). Governor Reagan linked President Carter to future defeat in the Cold War, and advanced a military solution to the global struggle against communism. Governor Reagan further identified this struggle as centering on Central America, arguing the "Caribbean is rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American pond and the United States resembles a giant, afraid to move" (Dugger 1983, 518-519). Presidential Reagan defined Central American in terms of the global balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. A failure to contain the Soviet Union, especially in America's "backyard," directly threatened the United States since it tipped the balance of power towards the Soviet Union.

After getting elected, the Reagan administration told the Nicaraguan government that financial aid would resume if they would stop funding Salvadoran insurgents. Despite various confirmations about the end of Nicaraguan military aid to El Salvador, the Reagan administration terminated financial aid to Nicaragua (Pastor 2002, 191-192). The campaign rhetoric locked the administration into a policy of opposing the Sandinista government (Pastor 2002, 192).

From the beginning, anti-interventionist deployed the rhetorical resource of Vietnam, using pathos to define Nicaragua as a foreign policy mistake waiting to happen. House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Clarence Long stated on 21 February 1981 that Reagan administration policies were "creating a situation in which we may be doing what we did in Vietnam saying, 'Move over boys. We're going to fight this war'" ("Congressional Leaders See Threat to El Salvador and Back Military Aid Pledge" 1981).

In a 21 March 1981 speech, Ambassador Kirkpatrick argued that Central America and the Caribbean was "the most important place in the world for us" and tied the security of the United States, Western Europe, and Asia to the "defense of ourselves in our own hemisphere" (Lafeber 1984, 1; Gutman 1988, 31).

The Reagan administration did not want the Sandinista regime to consolidate power. The new Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, wanted to send two signals right away – one, warning the Soviet Union to get out of the third world, and two, that United States foreign policy was based on good relations with the United States, and not human rights (Pastor 2002, 190). Secretary Haig, and other cabinet members, were given a great amount of power, especially in foreign policy because the president was focused on fiscal policies and other domestic issues (Gutman 1988, 24-25, 90). Secretary Haig also signaled in the first year of the administration the potential for military action in Nicaragua, including a naval blockade (Gutman 1988, 84). Secretary Haig requested Robert McFarlane, a State Department assistant and eventually National Security

Advisor, to examine the policy options. McFarlane wrote a report titled “Taking the War to Nicaragua” that focused on how to block the shipment of arms from Cuba (Gutman 1988, 63). This plan became leaked to the press.

The administration decided on 16 November 1981 to have the CIA fund and direct a covert anti-Sandinista insurgents, referred together as the ‘Contras’ (Pastor 2002, 194). Military leaders opposed the policy drift from arms interdiction to regime overthrow, and in typical fashion informed Congress about the situation (Gutman 1988, 119).[21] Congress also realized that the administration misrepresented the capabilities and intentions of the Sandinistas – public statements about Nicaraguan aggression contrasted with intelligence and other inter-governmental reports (Walker 2003, 48).

In February and March 1982, the Washington Post and New York Times revealed the covert program in Nicaragua. On 11 March 1983, Congressmen David Bonoir and Michael Barnes criticized the Reagan administration for “trying to overthrow the legitimate government of Nicaragua” (1982a, 3951). Congressman Barnes argued “the administration wants a war in Central America” (1982b, 3759). Anti-interventionists spread the fear of another Vietnam, where covert operations would eventually lead to United States troops (Kagan 1996, 235).

In November 1982, a Newsweek cover story titled “A Secret War for Nicaragua” quoted a United States official warning “this is the biggest fiasco in this administration…This is our Bay of Pigs” ("A Secret War for Nicaragua" 1982).

[21] Instead of leaking information through the media, uniformed military usually talk with trusted members of Congress (Gutman 1988).

CIA Director Casey promoted the Nicaraguan covert war in the article. Public reaction was negative, with the Boston Globe writing an editorial that might have influenced key Democratic representatives from Massachusetts, Edward Boland and Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill (Gutman 1988, 116-117). Representative Boland was the chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, and Representative O'Neill was the Speaker of the House at the time of the story. Representative Boland sponsored an amendment that banned the use of United States funds for overthrowing the Sandinista government, which the House of Representatives unanimously passed 411-0 on 8 December 1982 (Pastor 2002). In the congressional debates over this amendment, Congressman Thomas Harkin (Democrat, Iowa) argued the United States was "becoming mired in the jungles and swamps of Latin America" clearly evoking the images of Vietnam (1982c, 29458). Congressman George Miller (Democrat, California) continued the Vietnam rhetorical resource and plying pathos rhetorical strategies to stir up emotions, "This is not speculation about another Vietnam. This is a first step of our Vietnam. Some of us came here to stop Vietnam. And here is a chance to stop this one" (1982c, 29359). Moreover, Congressman Harkin argued the United States was aiding the Somocistas, "the most hated group of Nicaraguans" who were "vicious, cutthroat murderers" (1982c, 29359). These emotional appeals undermined the attempts by the Reagan administration to generate support for covert activities.

President Reagan Speech to Congress, April 1983

Public criticisms continued, with retired military leaders warning about United States intervention in the region, and the policy drift of the administration (Pastor 2002, 199). The Reagan administration tried to respond to increased congressional and public opposition to funding the Contras by undertaking a widespread public relations campaign. Secretary of Defense Weinberger argued that communism in Central America would force United States troop withdrawals in Europe and Asia creating a "Fortress America" so the United States could protect the southern border (1983a). President Reagan continued to invoke rhetorical resources of containment and balance of power, arguing that "Central America constitute this nation's fourth border. If we must defend ourselves against large, hostile military presence on our border, our freedom to act elsewhere to help others and to protect strategically vital sea-lanes and resources has been drastically diminished" (Reagan 1983b).

President Reagan addressed a special joint session of Congress on 27 April 1983 (Reagan 1983a). President Reagan argued that Nicaragua was an existential threat to the United States where "the national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America" (Reagan 1983a). Furthermore, Reagan denied the policy of trying to overthrow the Sandinistas while invoking rhetorical resources about balance of power and containment, "We do not seek its overthrow. Our interest is to ensure that it does not infect its neighbors through the export of subversion and violence" (Reagan 1983a). Framing the conflict in Cold War terms, President Reagan linked Nicaragua to the Soviet Union and also Cuba, while explicitly citing President Truman's speech to Congress about Greece and

Turkey. President Reagan also shifted blame to Congress for Central America potentially becoming communist, “Who among us would wish to bear the responsibility for failing to meet our shared obligation?” (Reagan 1983a).

Ambassador Kirkpatrick followed the speech by claiming “some members of Congress who want to see Marxist victories in Central America” (LeoGrande 1993a, 32). The administration also began to leak stories about drugs and munitions coming from Nicaragua (Gutman 1988, 142).

Despite these persistent efforts by the Reagan administration, the House intelligence committee voted to end funding for the covert program in Nicaragua on 3 May 1983. On 28 July 1983, the House voted 228-195 against Contra aid. Secretary Shultz claimed this vote was “the worst legislative defeat of the Reagan administration to that date” (1983b). The American public was also not convinced, with 78% of the US public opposed to overthrowing the Nicaraguan government and only 13% in favor (Pastor 2002, 330).

Kissinger Report, January 1984

Despite these failures, the Reagan administration continued to argue that Sandinista Nicaragua was a threat to the United States. Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle argued in a 12 September 1983 speech that Nicaragua “would become an arsenal for insurgency, a safe haven for the export of violence” (Gutman 1988, 187). Other administration officials gave speeches and interviews about the military importance of Nicaragua and necessity of United States

involvement (Pastor 2002; "Heat on Central America, The Three Big Words around Washington These Days Are 'Whatever is Necessary'" 1983).

On 11 Jan 1984, the Kissinger Commission completed a report that argued that the Sandinistas posed a threat to the security of the United States (Kissinger 1998, Chapter 6). The report reiterated many of the same rhetorical resources and strategies, such as believing Central America was strategically vital for the United States southern border. Nicaragua was essential for United States security because of the Panama Canal and access to shipping lanes. The United States ability to fight either European or Asian wars depended on the canal and these shipping lanes. Therefore Nicaragua was critical for the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and preventing war in Europe and Asia. Further drawing on the balance of power rhetorical resource, Nicaragua would serve as a “steppingstone” for spreading communism throughout the region (Kissinger 1998, 91). This would redirect United States military and economic resources to defend the southern border (Kissinger 1998, 93). Finally, the report also argued that U.S. global credibility and prestige would be affected by the growth of communism in the Americas (Kissinger 1998, 93). Therefore, the report recommended military and economic aid for the region, as well as diplomatic negotiations.

More important, the Kissinger Report gave the Reagan administration more confidence and support in making its case to Congress about the Nicaraguan threat and the need for contra aid. President Reagan built on the Kissinger Report arguments, and continued emphasizing balance of power and

containment, in a nationally televised speech on 9 May 1984 about Central America. President Reagan argued that “if we do nothing, if we continue to provide too little help, our choice will be a Communist Central America with additional Communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere and Communist subversion spreading southward and northward” (Reagan 1983a). Moreover, President Reagan relied on logos and ethos rhetorical strategies, often using reasoning to link together why Nicaragua was important for balance of power but also his authority as president. President Reagan claimed that he knew what was going on in Nicaragua rather than Congress. To emphasize the spread of communism and the threat to national security, President Reagan quoted President Truman and his speech that outlined containment, while noting the bipartisan support President Truman received (Reagan 1984). President Reagan concluded by making reference to United States history linking his political opposition to isolationists in the 1930s. Critics of United States intervention in Nicaragua are appeasers just like the isolationists, and the results would be the same, since isolationists “didn't stop the aggressors; they emboldened them. They didn't prevent war; they assured it” (Reagan 1983a).

Both Congress and the public did not believe Nicaragua posed a threat to the United States. On 24 May 1984, the House voted against Contra aid 241-177. President Reagan realized the political reality (over the objections of several hard-liners in the admintration), and shifted the focus to the negotiation process rather than aid to the Contra rebels (Pastor 2002, 204). Secretary of State Schultz traveled to Nicaragua, mainly to satisfy Congress which was “beating the

administration to pieces" by voting against Contra aid and calling for a diplomatic solution (Gutman 1988, 209). President Reagan avoided Contra aid in the 1984 presidential campaign, and all aid to the Contras officially ended on 1 October 1984 (Pastor 2002, 204).

1984 Election and 1985 State of the Union Address

The Reagan administration viewed the 1984 electoral landside as a mandate for their positions on Nicaragua and Contra aid, even though polling numbers still opposed Contra aid (LeoGrande 1993a, 34; Kagan 1996, 345). On 9 January 1985, CIA Director Casey resumed the aggressive stance on Nicaragua and the necessity for Contra aid in a speech to the New York City Union League. Director Casey identified five states in the third world – Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua – where communism was "imposed or maintained by external forces" (Gutman 1988, 269). In these states, "there has occurred a holocaust comparable to that which Nazi Germany inflicted in Europe some forty years ago" (Gutman 1988, 269). The comparison between communism and Nazism continues throughout the speech, as well as the idea of containment. Instead of the United States, however, Contras prevented the spread of communism, "The good news in that the tide has changed…the 1980s have emerged as the decade of freedom fighters resisting Communist regimes" (Gutman 1988, 269). Director Casey returns to the moral necessity of US support of the Contras, stating that "the Communists…are spending close to $8b a year to snuff out freedom in these countries, it is not necessary to match this in money,

manpower, or military weapons. Oppressed people want freedom and are fighting for it. They need only modest support and strength of purpose from nations which want to see freedom prevail and which will find their own security impaired if it doesn't" (Gutman 1988, 269). The rhetorical resource of freedom fighters is tied to Contra aid through pathos rhetorical strategies, attempting to forge a shared identification and emotional connection with the Contras.

President Reagan utilized the same rhetorical resources and strategies in the 1985 State of the Union speech. The Contras were not only freedom fighters, they represented the values of America and support was a moral necessity, "we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth" (Reagan 1985a). Contra aid became linked to self-defense rather than aggression, since Nicaragua "arms and provides bases for Communist terrorists attacking neighboring states. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and totally consistent with the OAS and UN charters" (Reagan 1985a). According to President Reagan, Contras defended freedom and democracy, important rhetorical resources that evoked emotional responses.

Democracy became a codeword for overthrowing the Sandinistas (Gutman 1988, 317). President Reagan and other members of the administration emphasized this rhetorical resource after the State of the Union in order to get Contra aid, comparing Nicaraguan "freedom fighters" to the "Founding Fathers" (Reagan 1985c). In televised news conference, President Reagan called Nicaragua a "Communist totalitarian state" and the United States owed "an obligation to be

of help where we can to freedom fighters and lovers of freedom and democracy, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua" (Reagan 1985b). Secretary Schultz argued Nicaragua was now "behind the Iron Curtain" and offered support to democratic freedom fighters in a 22 Feb 1985 speech (Gutman 1988, 273). President Reagan focused on human rights violations in Nicaragua, and the repression of Catholics, Jews, Evangelicals, and Miskito Indians depending on the audience (Storrs and Serafino 1993, 129). Director Casey reiterated this growing internal repression in a May 1985 speech at the New York Metropolitan Club.

This connection between supporting anti-communist insurgents and democracy became known as the Reagan Doctrine (Gutman 1988, 268). The Reagan Doctrine argued the United States should support democratic movements in overthrowing Communist regimes. This targeted conservative and hawkish Democrats in Congress who disagreed with post-Vietnam liberal colleagues over foreign policy. The rhetorical resource of democracy highlighted on the moral necessity of Contra aid, making an emotional appeal to American values. The choice was distinct – a congressperson supported either freedom fighters and democracy or Communists. The Reagan administration followed this rhetorical strategy by describing Contra aid as humanitarian (LeoGrande 1993b, 173).

However, anti-interventionists undermined these humanitarian arguments by citing reports of human rights abuses by the Contras. The Brody report described Contra "assassination, torture, rape, kidnapping, and mutilation of civilians" (Rohter 1985). Americas Watch cited the Contras for the "deliberate

use of terror" (Brinkley 1985). Congressman O'Neill called humanitarian aid a "dirty trick" since Contras were "butchers…killing people out there, ravishing the villages" (Roberts 1985).

On 12 June 1985, the House approved $27 million in humanitarian aid after the administration committed to a political rather than military solution in Nicaragua (Gutman 1988, 290). Even though the administration won Contra aid, this vote suggests that Congress still did not believe in the Nicaraguan threat by approving only humanitarian aid. In addition, many of the Democrats voted for humanitarian aid because of anger that Daniel Ortega traveled to the Soviet Union and the potential political consequences (Kagan 1996, 375). Furthermore, Congress forced the administration to abandon military solutions in Nicaragua, especially the overthrow of the Sandinistas, rejecting the argument that Nicaragua is a threat to the United States.

1986 Contra Aid Funding Request

Undeterred by prior failures, the Reagan administration increased the funding request in 1986 to $100 million with 75 percent for military aid (Pastor 2002, 207). The administration almost exclusively focused on Contra aid, culminating in the nationally televised speech by President Reagan (Reagan 1986a). In the speech, President Reagan resumed the rhetorical resources of balance of power and containment, arguing the defeat of the Contras meant Soviet nuclear missiles in the United States backyard and the loss of the Panama Canal (Reagan 1986a). Once again, Reagan tried to shift moral responsibility to

Congress where “those who would invite this strategic disaster by abandoning yet another fighting ally of this country in the field will be held fully responsible” (Reagan 1986a). This not only links Nicaragua to Cuba (along with the reference to missile bases), it also links Nicaragua to Vietnam and the interpretation that the United States abandoned Vietnam. Using Cuba and Vietnam as rhetorical resources helped gain political support from conservative Democrats who viewed them as foreign policy failures. Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, one of these conservative Democrats, continued to use Cuba as a rhetorical resource, testifying to Congress about a “massive Cuban intervention” where “Cubans move into a combat role” in Nicaragua (Omang 1985). This argument about a Cuban and Soviet invasion imagined the spread of Communism throughout Latin America and the need for the United States to contain it. Secretary Shultz continued the rhetorical resource of containment by telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Sandinistas were a “cancer, right here on our land mass” (Gutman 1988, 322).

The Reagan administration probably increased the funding request and returned to the rhetorical resource of containment because of the congressional elections in 1986. Moderate Democrats, especially from the South, signaled the desire to provide some support for the Contras, probably for political cover in the upcoming election (LeoGrande 1993a, 36). The Reagan administration tried to exploit divisions within the Democratic Party. The White House Director of Communications, Patrick Buchanan, conducted various television interviews and wrote an editorial arguing the “Democratic Party has now become, with Moscow,

the co-guarantor of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Central America…With the vote on Contra aid, the Democratic Party will reveal whether it stands with Ronald Reagan and the resistance – or Daniel Ortega and the Communists" (Buchanan). President Reagan continued "if the members of Congress hide their heads in the sand and pretend the strategic threat in Nicaragua will go away, they are courting disaster and history will hold them accountable" when Latin American is "covered in a sea of red, eventually lapping at our own borders" (Weinraub 1986). Democrats accused the Reagan administration of McCarthyism (LeoGrande 1993a, 40). Various Republican colleagues criticized the administration for the attacks, even if they supported Contra aid (LeoGrande 1993a).

On 16 March 1986, President Reagan attempted to appeal directly to the public with a nationally televised speech during primetime. He deployed the same rhetorical strategies and resources. Using logos rhetorical strategy, President Reagan argued "using Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South American…threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital sea lanes, and ultimately, move against Mexico" (Reagan 1986a). President Reagan referred a map during the televised address showing various states in Central American as being overrun by Nicaragua, creating an image of Communism spreading. President Reagan also deployed pathos rhetorical strategies to link freedom and democracy to the contras while criticizing the human rights record of the Sandinistas throughout the speech.

The Democratic response by Senator Jim Sasser (Republican, Tennessee) conceded much to President Reagan about containing Communism and the evils of the Sandinistas. However, Senator Sasser argued "as a father of a 17 year old son, Mr. President, let's not rush blindly into that quagmire. We've done that before" clearly referencing the rhetorical resource of Vietnam (Kagan 1996, 427). Despite the effort of the Reagan administration, the polling numbers still showed a majority opposed Contra aid. However, a significant number of previously undecided respondents began to support Contra aid, with one ABC poll showing a twelve point increase (Kagan 1996, 427). With southern Democrats concerned, the House vote on Contra aid was close. However, the House defeated Contra aid 222-210 on 20 March 1986 (LeoGrande 1993a, 41). A number of northern Republicans defected, with their constituents reacting negatively to the speech (Kagan 1996, 429).

On 23 March 1986, the Sandinistas conducted a small military operation against the Contras according to military and intelligence reports (Gutman 1988, 324). CIA Director Casey labeled the operation as an attempt to "knock the Contras out while we debated in the United States" (Gutman 1988, 324). Portraying the Sandinistas as aggressors complemented the rhetorical resource of self-defense and the moral necessity of Contra support. President Reagan argued this was a "slap in the face to everyone who voted against aid to the freedom fighters" (Reagan 1986b). Directed towards conservative Democrats, President Reagan let them know that political solutions were no longer acceptable, and the only option was increased Contra aid. On 24 June 1986, President Reagan made

another nationwide television address that quoted President Truman in order to build bipartisan support for Contra aid in Nicaragua. President Reagan combined the rhetorical resource of containment with democracy and freedom, and challenged the American identity where "the question before the House is not only about the freedom of Nicaragua and the security of the United States but who we are as a people" (Reagan 1986b). However, President Reagan also appealed both to moderate Republicans and Democrats giving the most conciliatory Nicaragua speech (Kagan 1996, 458). On 25 June 1986, the House approved Contra aid 221-209.

Even though the Reagan administration won congressional approval, they did not convince the public (see again Figure 5-A). During all of 1986, the highest amount of support for Contra aid was 42% of the public, with 53% opposing, and this was immediately after President Reagan's March national televised speech (Edwards III 2003, 52). By December 1986, only 23% of the public agreed with Nicaraguan policy (LeoGrande 1993a). Just as telling, the Democrats made considerable gains in the November 1986 elections, winning back control of the U.S. Senate.

Summary of Noriega Panama

Unlike President Reagan and Nicaragua, President Bush successfully legitimated the threat of Noriega Panama. Manuel Noriega was once considered an important United States ally, providing information about narcotics trafficking and communist organizations in Latin America (Crandall 2006). As

Noriega consolidated power in the Panamanian military in the 1980s through his newly created Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), numerous incidents shifted United States policy. For one, Seymour Hersh wrote a New York Times front page expose about Noriega's connections with drug traffickers, leading to major national coverage on NBC "Today" and "McNeil-Lehrer News Hour" (Scranton 1991, 92; Hersh 1986). Subsequent allegations from Noriega's chief of staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, created political tensions in Panama and the United States (Scranton 1991). Colonel Herrera not only confirmed the various drug trafficking connections, he also stated that Noriega fixed the 1984 Panamanian elections, killed opposition leaders, and stole government funds (Scranton 1991; Crandall 2006). Over 100,000 people marched in the street of Panama, while the United States Senate passed a resolution calling for Noriega to relinquish power (Crandall 2006). Finally, two United States grand juries indicted Noriega for drug trafficking on 5 February 1988.

All of these incidents contributed to the new United States goal of removing Noriega, and the primary policy mechanism was through economic sanctions. These economic sanctions led to bank closings and rising unemployment in Panama (Scranton 1991). While it did not have the intended affect of driving Noriega out of power, the economic sanctions contributed to making Noriega the "most unpopular public figure in Panama" according to opinion polls (Scranton 1991, 159). Therefore the environment just prior to the May Panama elections was extremely tense. Noriega faced popular resistance and dissention within the PDF, as well as opposition from the United States. The

Bush administration provided opposition groups $10 million of covert aid for the election (Conniff 2001). Even though Noriega was not himself running for president, since he employed public figureheads to run the government, the election was considered a referendum on Noriega (Scranton 1991, 159).

Analysis of Noriega Panama

Similar to previous episodes, I used historiographies about United States relations with Panama in order to include a range of perspectives. Unfortunately, there were only a few academic studies of the Panama invasion. Most of the literature was done by journalists, and either criticized the invasion or supported it. This included *Operation Just Cause*, *Panama, The Whole Story*, *Divorcing the Dictator*, and most famously, *The Commanders* (Donnelly, Roth, and Baker 1991; Buckley 1991; Kempe 1990; Woodward 1991). The most regarded diplomatic history was *Panama and the United States* (Conniff 2001). There were two significant political science studies, the *Noriega Years* and the *Panama Invasion Revisited* (Scranton 1991; Gilboa 1995-1996).

From these secondary sources, I identified three critical junctures, 1) Panama Election, May 1989; 2) Failed Coup, October 1989; and 3) Killing of U.S. Serviceman, December 1989. These critical junctures primarily involved President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Speaker of the House Thomas Foley (Democrat, Washington), Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Senator Jess Helms, and Representative Charles Rangel (Democratic, New York).

Starting with these critical junctures and political actors, I researched public speeches using primary source, including presidential papers, congressional records, memoirs, and television transcripts. To assess the level of threat legitimation, I used public opinion polling data. However, since no time-series questions existed about the threat of Noriega or Panama, I used several proxy questions as well as editorials from the New York Times and the congressional debates to assess the level of threat legitimation. By the time of the invasion and its aftermath, all of the measures confirmed that the Bush administration successfully legitimated the threat of Noriega Panama.

In Congress, there was wide bipartisan support that Noriega was a threat to the United States. Public opinion agreed, as seen in Figure 4 below. Only one time did a poll ask if Noriega Panama was a threat to the United States – on 19-23 May 1989, 26 percent of respondents agreed (ABC News/Washington Post May 19-May 23, 1989). However, three different questions in Figure 4 provide some insights about the legitimation of the Panama threat. The first question is overall presidential job approval. While President Bush consistently held high approval ratings in the first year of his presidency, the number jumped from the fifties in May 1989 to the seventies and eighties during and after the invasion. While this data alone is not convincing, combined with the other two questions, it confirms the public support for the Panama threat. The second question asked the American public if they approved of how President Bush was handling the situation in Panama. Positive responses went from 57 percent in May 1989, down to 29 percent around the coup attempt, and reached a high of 79 percent during

the invasion (Gallup Organization May 15-18, 1989; Hart and Teeter Research Companies November 4-7 1989; ABC News December 21, 1989). The third question asked the American public if they approved of sending United States troops to Panama. In May 1989, 45 percent agreed (CBS News and New York Times May 9-11 1989). During the failed coup in October 1989, the number dipped to 26 percent (Newsweek and Gallup Organization October 5-6, 1989). However, at the time of the invasion, 80 percent favored sending military troops to overthrow Noriega (ABC News December 20, 1989).







Figure 4. Panama Public Opinion

Through the pubic debates and speeches, I identify two threat narratives about Noriega Panama. President Bush and other pro-interventionists argued Noriega was a threat to Americans living in Panama and the United States troops stationed there. Moreover, the Noriega regime in Panama threatened all Americans because of the importance of the Panama Canal for United States security and Noriega's role in drug trafficking. The rhetorical resources included identifying Noriega as a dictator and a drug dealer, using pathos rhetorical strategies to appeal to emotions of public and Congress. The rhetorical resource of justice became linked to drug dealer. Related to the dictatorship rhetorical resource, pro-interventionists often deployed the rhetorical resource of democracy, arguing that Noriega Panama was a threat to the United States because it was not a democracy.

Anti-interventionists advanced a narrative that invading Panama was illegal. The rhetorical resources included international law and constitutional authority, using logos rhetorical strategies to build a case against intervention. Rarely did they challenge whether Noriega was a threat to the United States, but rather the policy option. In fact, there were very few anti-interventionists, in particular before the invasion. Most anti-interventionists did not enter the public debate until after the invasion and sometimes long after.

Panama Election, May 1989

President Bush deployed rhetorical resources and strategies before the 7 May election. President Bush deployed the rhetorical resource of democracy,

where free and fair elections would solve the problems of Panama. Panama was invited to join the "community of democratic nations" since the "days of rule by dictatorship in Latin America are over" (Bush 1989g). Implicitly, Panama became tied not only to regional democratization, but also to global democratic movements, including the April 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square, China. Furthermore, President Bush tapped into the American faith in public opinion, found throughout the history of United States foreign policy and Wilsonianism, claiming the "spotlight of world opinion" can prevent electoral fraud and bring democratization to Panama (Bush 1989g; Ninkovich 1999a).

The United States felt they boxed Noriega into a corner – legitimate elections would remove him from power, while electoral fraud would lead to a popular uprising. A senior administration official outlined the plan just prior to the election, stating that the United States would "let things collapse of their own weight" (Smolowe 1989). Numerous independent organizations sent observer groups to judge electoral fairness, including United States Congressmen, Organization of American States, the Catholic Church, and two former United States presidents in Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford (Scranton 1991). Exit polls by these electoral observers indicated a 3 to 1 victory by opposition candidates (Cole 1995). Demonstrations began on 10 May 1989 and were violently repressed by the PDF special forces and paramilitary groups (Crandall 2006). The opposition Presidential candidate, Guillermo Endara, and Vice-Presidential candidate, Guillermo "Billy" Ford, were attacked, with both of their bodyguards killed (Scranton 1991). Images of a bloodied and helpless Ford next to a PDF soldier in

full riot gear appeared the next day on United States national television news and newspapers (see Figure 5-D below). The government announced the elections as void, with Noriega declaring "the normal electoral process was altered by the obstructionist actions of a number of foreigners" and citing United States covert aid (Harding 2006, 112).

In a 11 May 1989 White House televised press briefing about the Panama situation, President Bush reiterated how the "days of the dictator are over" and the "democratic community" needed to respond to Noriega, deploying the rhetorical resources of democracy and dictator (Bush 1989f). After the violent repression of the public protests and the nullification of the electoral results, President Bush framed the conflict as "between Noriega and the people of Panama", with the United States on the side of the people (Bush 1989f). The United States is the leader of the democratic community and a foremost defender of democracy, a remnant of the last days of the Cold War. President Bush argued that Noriega is a "threat to democracy from the stealing of this election, or the threat to democracy in the hemisphere from totalitarianism" (Bush 1989f). President Bush discredited Noriega by calling him a "bully" and a "dictator" which also recalled the image of a bloodied Ford (Bush 1989f). President Bush attached his credibility to the independent observers and reiterated two interests, democracy in Panama and the protection of Americans in Panama. However, a Gallup poll after the May election showed that 59% of the public opposed a military invasion to overthrow Noriega (Newsweek and Gallup Organization May 11-12, 1989). An ABC News poll found that 26% of the public felt the situation in

Panama was a major threat to the security of the United States (ABC News/Washington Post May 19-May 23, 1989).

Failed Coup, October 1989

References to Panama began to disappear by the end of May and the beginning of June 1989. Panama did not return to public discourse until the failed coup of 3 October 1989. By then, United States economic sanctions caused the PDF to miss a paycheck (Conniff 2001). A major coup occurred on 3 October 1989, led by the commander of the Panama City police, Major Moises Giraldi (Conniff 2001). The leaders of the coup captured the PDF headquarters and Noriega. However, PDF forces loyal to Noriega eventually recaptured the headquarters and freed Noriega. While the United States knew and approved the coup attempt, they gave minimal assistance and did not attempt to overthrow Noriega. Panamanian mismanagement and delays undermined Bush administration opinions about the possible success of the coup (Scranton 1991); and General Thurman, the new United States Southern Commander, felt the coup was "ill-conceived, ill-motivated, and ill-led" (Cole 1995, 15).

Just before the coup, the Bush administration changed the key leadership positions of the United States military involved in Panama. General Maxwell R. Thurman assumed United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) based in Panama, replacing General Fred Woerner (Crandall 2006). General Woerner was critical of using force in Panama, and the choice of General Thurman signaled a shift in United States policy from diplomacy to combat readiness (Cole 1995).

Around the same time, General Colin Powell became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Powell felt United States policy needed to include regime change and the dismantling of the PDF, “I thought that we would have to eventually take it all down. We would really have to take the PDF down or else you couldn’t solve the problem. And I came into office with that mindset. There were lots of budding Noriegas throughout the PDF and to take Tony out just wouldn’t do it” (Crandall 2006, 198).

Despite Bush administration and United States military doubts, the failure of the coup produced significant responses, primarily from Congress. Senators Alfonse D’Amato (Republican, New York), Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina), and John Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts) held a joint press conference in support of the coup as it was unfolding (Crandall 2006). Senator Helms publicly criticized the administration and challenged their version of the coup, while Senator David Boren (Democrat, Oklahoma) expressed frustration with the lack of support for the coup and empathized with the Panamanian people, “Here you have the brave people of Panama…trying to rid themselves of a drug dealer and a thug who’s taken over their country” (Towell 1989). Representative Les Aspin (Democrat, Wisconsin), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said the United States should be "ready at any opportunity to use the confusion and the uncertainty of a coup attempt…to do something about Mr. Noriega" (Hoffman and Branigin 1989). Congressman Dave McCurdy (Democrat, Oklahoma), Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, criticized President Bush, "Yesterday makes Jimmy Carter look like

a man of resolve. There's a resurgence of the wimp factor" (Hoffman and Branigin 1989). Even one of the members of the Panamanian opposition, Ricardo Arias Calderon, appeared on ABC News on 4 October 1989 to warn the Bush administration that “A dog that barks better have a bite behind its bark, or otherwise it better shut up” (Scranton 1991, 191).

A week later, on 13 October 1989, there was a televised Presidential news conference to address the failed coup. Until this point, other administration officials defended the position of the Bush administration about the coup. In the news conference, President Bush emphasized the idea of justice. Two objectives are outlined, “one, Noriega brought to justice; and very important, a Panama under democratic rule” (Bush 1989d). Justice was tied to War on Drugs since “he [Noriega] is an indicted drug dealer and I would like to see him brought to justice” (Bush 1989d). President Bush also pursued the rhetorical resource of self-defense, appealing to the American identity of non-aggression, and focusing on protecting the “lives of American kids” (Bush 1989d). On 25 October 1989, President Bush continued this rhetorical strategy when defending the administration decision about the coup attempt. He argued that critics are “hawks” that would “send somebody else’s kid into battle” (Bush 1989b). President Bush identified himself with the American public by claiming the “American people support me by over 2 to 1” (Bush 1989b). But President Bush returned to the rhetorical strategy of democracy, claiming the United States is “hostile to a man who aborts democracy” and emphasized wanting “Noriega out, democracy in” Panama (Bush 1989b).

After the October failed coup, 74 percent of the public still opposed a military invasion to overthrow Noriega (Newsweek and Gallup Organization May 11-12, 1989). A Time/CNN poll found that only 28 percent of the people felt the US should use military force to get Noriega out of office (Time October 9-10, 1989). Yet there was a going sentiment about 'doing something' in Panama, spurred by congressional and public pro-interventionists. A Newsweek poll found that 60 percent of the public felt it was very important for the United States that Noriega give up power in Panama (Newsweek and Gallup Organization October 5-6, 1989). In a USA Today poll, 81 percent of the people disapproved of President Bush doing nothing to remove Noriega from power (USA Today and Gordon S. Black Corporation October 4, 1989).

Killing of United States Soldiers, December 1989

After the coup attempt, the Bush administration clearly decided that invading Panama was a best policy option. Senior advisors, including President Bush, met on 16 October 1989 to discuss revising and ramping up an invasion of Panama, particularly looking for "trigger events" (Cole 1995; Woodward 1991). The trigger event occurred just two months later.

On 15 December 1989, Noriega was given the title of Maximum Leader by the legislature (Scranton 1991). In front of the legislature, Noriega declared a "state of war existed" with the United States, due to the economic sanctions and United States aggressions (Harding 2006, 114; Cole 1995). The Bush administration initially responded this was "another hollow step" and simply

"reckless threats" (Scranton 1991, 197, 203). Noriega made a similar statement in March 1988, with Panama and the United States in "an undeclared war" (Scranton 1991, 197). On the night of 16 December, United States Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz and three other officers ran through checkpoints near PDF headquarters, drawing significant fire. Lieutenant Paz died of his wounds shortly after. The PDF arrested a United States Navy lieutenant and his wife who were then interrogated, tortured, and threatened (Cole 1995). Several administration officials were unsure these events was "enough of a smoking gun to go to war" since four United States officers next to the PDF headquarters could be construed as either reconnaissance or provocation (Cole 1995). However, all of the Joint Chiefs, including General Powell, and Secretary Cheney wanted to take action against Noriega (Cole 1995). On 17 December, Secretary Cheney and General Powell briefed President Bush, and General Powell recommended a full invasion to guarantee both the removal of Noriega and "Noriegaism" (Crandall 2006, 201; Harding 2006). One of the operation commanders recommended changing the codename at this point to 'Just Cause' in order to "inspire the forces and the people back home" once again deploying the rhetorical resource of justice to legitimate the threat (Cole 1995, 32).

Just prior to the invasion on 16 December, President Bush attempted to isolate Noriega by harkening back to the May election where Noriega "single-handedly aborted the free will of the Panamanian people" (Bush 1989c). These actions were "unacceptable" as the world became more democratic (Bush 1989c).

In the National Address on 20 December 1989, President Bush argued that "Last Friday, Noriega declared his military dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. The very next day, forces under his command, shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman; wounded another; arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman; and then brutally interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That was enough" (Bush 1989a). This built on the rhetorical resource of self-defense, suggesting that force was being used as a last resort. The decision was "not lightly" reached after "two years, the United States, nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have worked together to resolve the crisis in Panama" but "diplomacy and negotiation" did not resolve this crisis (Bush 1989a). The speech connected the need to protect American lives to preference for non-coercion in resolving conflict in the conclusion, "I took this action only after reaching the conclusion that every other avenue was closed and the lives of American citizens were in grave danger" (Bush 1989a). Economic or diplomatic solutions would not work since Noriega was a drug dealing dictator. Most important, the speech reflected the rhetorical resource of democracy, with President Bush recalling the publicized images of the failed elections, "You remember those horrible pictures of newly elected Vice President Ford, covered head to toe with blood, beaten mercilessly by so-called 'dignity battalions'" (Bush 1989a).

The next day, President Bush resumed the rhetorical resource of democracy. President Bush emphasized the United States "efforts to support

democratic processes in Panama" (Bush 1989e). President Bush continued to connect the Panama threat to the May elections and disapproval of the international community, suggesting that the international community would support the invasion. This continued in the claims of "strong support – from the United States Congress, from our Latin American neighbors, from our allies, from the American people" (Bush 1989e). Other administration officials focused on democracy, with both Secretary Cheney and General Powell stressing the "return to democracy" on ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN morning talk shows (Bostdorff 1993, 234).

While there was widespread public approval of the invasion, with 80% approving in an ABC poll (ABC News December 20, 1989), the public did not seem to support arguments about security and national interest, with only 31 percent of the public believing that Americans were in a "great deal of danger" (ABC News December 20, 1989). Furthermore, a Los Angeles Times poll found that only 37 percent of the people believed the invasion made the lives of Americans in Panama more secure (Los Angeles Times December 21, 1989). The drug argument also did not generate support. While 80 percent felt the invasion was justified in a Gallup poll, only 18 percent believed that the overthrow of Noriega would have a big reductions on the flow of drugs into the United States (Newsweek and Gallup Organization December 21, 1989). However, rhetorical resource of democracy did seem successful, with 59 percent of the people believing that the invasion brought the chances of democracy in Panama in one poll (Los Angeles Times December 21, 1989). A later poll increased the numbers

to 73 percent (ABC News/Washington Post January 11-16, 1989). The rhetorical resource of democracy and the associated pathos rhetorical strategies worked with the United States public.

Furthermore, overwhelming bipartisan majorities in Congress expressed support for the invasion in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (Mermin 1999a). Electoral politics does not seem to have generated this bipartisan support. The next election was nearly 10 months away, and the Democrats did not have to demonstrate anti-communism with the changing US-USSR relationship (Mermin 1999a). The only significant opposition came from international actors. Numerous countries voiced outrage and two international organizations criticized the invasion. The Organization of American States "deeply deplored" the invasion, marking the first time in history of the organization that the United States received a formal censure (Goshko and Isikoff 1989). The United Nations General Assembly also condemned the invasion as a "flagrant violation" of international law (Associated Press 1989). Representative Charles Rangel (Democrat, New York) also deployed the rhetorical resource of constitutional authority, "I oppose the invasion of Panama…As much as I would like to get rid of the bum in Panama, I do not see the legal authority of the use of the military. What is the purpose of the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare war if the president can do it unilaterally?" (Towell and Felton 1989, 3535). However, almost all criticism occurred after the invasion occurred. Furthermore, domestic criticism was mostly directed at the tactical level. Expert commentators debated about how the United States invaded, e.g. the level of

civilian causalities, rather than whether the United States should have invaded at all, highlighting how the Noriega threat was successfully legitimated.

Alternative Explanations

Similar to the trouble of President Roosevelt, President Reagan and his administration failed to legitimate the threat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua throughout the 1980s. Security should have been a high priority for the United States at the beginning of the 1980s. The Soviet Union seemed resurgent with the invasion of Afghanistan, while the economy of the United States struggled with stagflation and unemployment. Even with this international environment, the objectivist paradigm might argue that Nicaragua did not pose a significant threat to the United States and that is why it was never legitimated. However, several different sources assessed Nicaragua as a strategic interest for the United States at the time. Furthermore, communist control of Nicaragua seemed to challenge several popular beliefs about the security of the United States. United States foreign policy has always focused on Central America, with various interventions for a variety of goals. Often the United States worried about stability and order in Central America, especially since it could invite intervention by outside powers, for example if Nicaragua turned to the Soviet Union instead of the United States for support (Dugger 1983, 518-519; quoted in Pastor 2002, 190).[22] From a geopolitical standpoint, the spread of communism could affect the

[22] This fear about extra-hemispheric intervention revisits the tradition and ideology of the Monroe Doctrine and various implementations. Historically, the United States framed various conflicts in Central America in this manner.

balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. In particular, communist (or any hostile) regime in Nicaragua posed a danger to the Panama Canal, a key strategic interest for the United States. Sandinista Nicaragua undermined United States power in the region, while potentially increasing the power of the Soviet Union.

Objectivist explanations also do not completely explain the successful threat legitimation of the Noriega regime in Panama. Unlike just a couple of years before, United States relations with the Soviet Union significantly improved. By the time of the Panama invasion, the Soviet Union withdrew troops from Eastern Europe and permitted the peaceful overthrow of communist regimes, including the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Malta Conference on 2-3 December 1989 marked the ending of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Clearly, communism and the Soviet Union no longer presented an external threat to the Panama Canal and Central America. As for the need for a friendly regime in Panama, Noriega was considered a staunch United States ally throughout the 1980s. Noriega provided military armaments, information, and money to fight communist regimes and insurgencies in Latin America, including Nicaragua and Cuba (Scranton 1991). Noriega also helped the United States Drug Enforcement Agency against drug traffickers. Finally, Noriega seemed to promote democratization in Panama, leaving United States officials to proclaim Panama as “calm, serene, and stable” and Noriega as a “valuable asset” (Scranton 1991, 81, 84).

Subjectivist explanations also fall short in explaining threat legitimation for these two episodes. Nicaragua emerged as central to administration thinking about Central America, the communist threat, and the security of the United States. President Reagan believed the global military struggle against communism centered in Central America, where the "Caribbean is rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American pond and the United States resembles a giant, afraid to move" (Gutman 1988, 83). Nearly the entire Reagan administration was determined to make Nicaragua a central issue in foreign policy.

For the Panama episode, subjectivist explanations suggest that President Bush and the administration perceived Noriega as a threat. Yet the record is decidedly mixed, most evident in the administration response to the failed coup in October 1989. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney refused to help the coup attempt by blocking the roads with United States troops (Scranton 1991, 188). President Bush was also undecided about the nature of the Noriega threat, leading to the various criticisms from Congress. By the time of the invasion, the Bush administration perceived Noriega regime as a threat, partially agreeing with subjectivist explanations.

Television Media Environment

In this chapter, I argue that television affected rhetorical strategies and the process of threat legitimation. These effects are different from the ones I explained in previous chapters about newspaper and radio media environments.

As communication technology emerges and matures, the opportunities and constraints on rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation change. In particular, television privileges pathos rhetorical strategies, unlike newspapers and radio which favor logos and ethos respectively.

The attempted threat legitimation of both Nicaragua and Panama occurred in the 1980s when television dominated the media environment, especially in providing news to the American public. Television became the primary source of political information for a vast majority of Americans (Baum 2003a). For example, Americans overwhelmingly use television for Presidential campaign news rather than the newspaper (Cohen 2004, see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Television versus Newspaper Usage

Source, ANES 1948-2000 (see The American National Election Studies)

With television becoming the dominant media, especially for political information, it becomes important to understand how television affects political and social practices, including the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation. I argue television favors pathos rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation, rather than logos or ethos. Pathos rhetorical strategies appeal to the emotions of the audience by developing an empathetic relationship. Political actors emphasize values and identities to gain consent from the audience, rather than appealing to the rationality of the argument (logos) or the authority of a speaker (ethos).

Television favors pathos rhetorical strategies by depending on images and stereotypes, encouraging emotions and intimacy, and emphasizing stories and personalities. Television most obviously differs from radio by adding the visual image. This helps create a virtual reality where the environment becomes mediated rather than imagined by the audience (Chesebro and Bertelsen 1996, 148. 149). However, this process makes the audience passive receivers of information. Unlike the radio, television provides the image and the makes the connections for the audience while blurring together the real and the imagined (Deibert 1997b).

Furthermore, this extra dimension constrains reporting, since the "small screen requires visual economy, and because of both its technical constraints and the nature of its economic support, it relies on visual stereotypes that reduce uncertainty and confusion" (Douglas 2004, 20). For example, various studies highlight the limited space of television news with less coverage and information (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Druckman 2005). These constraints favor "visual assertions" and "synecdochic phrases" instead of the defined and reasoned political arguments of logos appeals (Jamieson 1988).

Therefore television often does not produce a linear narrative, but rather "a collage of images" (Deibert 1997b, 191). These images often rely on stereotypes and familiar ideas because of the loss of imagination with the television environment. But often television impacts the ability to perceive reality as well, and changes social understandings. The classic example is how individuals who watch television excessively believe that there is more crime than what crime

statistics indicate, and that people who do not watch television are more accurate in reporting the amount of crime (Chesebro and Bertelsen 1996, 37)

Television also encourages emotions and intimacy, rather than rationality and distance (Jamieson 1988). The images and drama of television produce emotional reactions that "short-circuit the audience's search for evidence" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, 46). Several studies point to how television emphasizes the dramatic, focusing on personalities and stories (Jamieson 1988; Hogan 1994, 142). Even television news focuses on personal stories (Hogan 1994, 148; Bennett 1996; Druckman 2005). Television prefers spontaneous stories to the staged events, and therefore is biased against campaigns and electoral politics (Hogan 1994, 141).

With these various biases, it is no surprise to see the growth of info-tainment (Baum 2003a). Television includes a greater amount of the public in the discussion and debate about foreign policy by breaking the attention barrier about issues (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992, 114). Yet the inclusion of new groups to the process of threat legitimation raises new questions and possibilities. Rhetorical strategies need to adapt to ideas about 'sound-bytes' and cultural images, but also take into account these new audiences.

Early failures of threat legitimation forced the Reagan administration to adopt different rhetorical strategies. The logos rhetorical strategy about balance of power and containment did not work during this television environment. The Reagan administration continually appealed to rationality of the audience by arguing about the strategic importance of Nicaragua to the global balance of

power. Containment would prevent the spread of communism throughout Central America. The speeches and interviews tried to reason with the audience, making deductive arguments that Nicaragua was close to the United States border or to Panama, and since communism expands, then Nicaragua threatens the United States. The Kissinger Commission report embodied this argument, and the Reagan administration tried to make the same deductive arguments about the nature of the threat. However, television already provided an image of containment with the pictures of Vietnam and the body-bags of United States soldiers. The idea of dominoes and communist expansion did not hold the same deductive powers as before.

The Kissinger Report also represents a failure of ethos rhetorical strategies. The Reagan administration began, with less frequency, to make appeals to authority in order to generate consent. One strategy was having the Kissinger Commission, designated as a foreign policy authority, validate the Reagan approach to Nicaragua. In addition, President Reagan and other administration officials argued executive authority in foreign policy, claiming they possessed restricted and privileged information, especially when dealing with Congress.

Despite the overall failure of threat legitimation, two pathos rhetorical strategies had partial success. By identifying the Contras as freedom fighters, the Reagan administration created a successful sound-bite that tapped American values and linked the Contras to the American Revolution. However, this rhetorical resource was already developed and subsequently discredited during

Vietnam. In fact, the anti-interventionists successfully deployed Vietnam as a rhetorical resource in the public debates. The covert activities with the Contras reinforced the images of Vietnam.

Furthermore, television requires more than just sound-bytes – it requires the personal stories and complete images. There was no heroic figure, a George Washington of the Contras, for the American public to identify with. The Contras were made of several different groups with different political and military leaders throughout Central America and the United States. In fact, members of the same organizations struggled to communicate and articulate shared goals and objectives. The image of the freedom fighter was incomplete without a sympathetic leader.

Democracy was the other partially successful rhetorical resource. Democracy became emotionally linked to the American identity and shared American values. Moving the rhetoric away from containment and toward democratization supported the preferred policy of regime change, while avoiding the baggage of containment. Yet the rhetorical resource of democracy created various problems for the Reagan administration. For one, appealing to an American identity held the Contras to be judged by American standards. Human rights violations by the Contras were widely publicized through reports, books, and congressional testimony (Brody 1985; Asman). Furthermore, this rhetorical resource contributed to the problem of having a leader emerge that would appeal to the American public. Focusing on democracy turned the attention back to the authoritarian and oppressive Somoza regime, since numerous Contras were

former members of the National Guard, including the military leader Colonel Enrique Bermudez Varela (Gutman 1988). President Reagan spent significant rhetorical effort to distinguish the Contras from the Somoza regime, but early reports and Sandinista propaganda about the "Somocista" created a lasting image. Finally, rhetorical resources of democracy and human rights provided an opening for non-military solutions. Congress only approved humanitarian aid for the Contras in 1985, and continued to push for political and diplomatic solutions such as the Contadora negotiations.

Unlike the Reagan administration in the Nicaragua episode, the Bush administration successfully deployed pathos rhetorical strategies, especially when focusing on the rhetorical resource of democracy. Moreover, President Bush relied on the democratic images on television at the time. Television images included the peaceful overthrow of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, including the fall of the Berlin Wall. President Bush built on these images with the sound-byte about how the "days of the dictator are over," tapping once again into American exceptionalism. The United States was not only winning the Cold War, but its ideals and principles were spreading throughout the world. In addition, the images of Tiananmen Square in May and June 1989 reinforced the story that democracy was spreading throughout the world.

Furthermore, President Bush did have the personal stories favored by the television media environment. Stories about Noriega created the prototypical villain, while the stories and images of the Panamanian democratic movement were positive, especially how the opposition was brutally repressed. The

Presidential candidate was hit on the head with an iron pipe. He addressed reporters the next day in a wheelchair, with a man in the back holding up his bloodied shirt. More famously, the picture of the Vice-Presidential candidate reached the front page of the New York Times, the cover of Time Magazine, and United States nightly news formats.

Conclusion

For both of these episodes, I argue rhetorical resources and strategies are important to understand threat legitimation. In the Nicaragua episode, the Reagan administration and pro-interventionists deployed the rhetorical resources of containment and balance of power with the rhetorical strategies of logos and ethos. Later in the public debates, the pro-interventionists deployed freedom and democracy with pathos rhetorical strategies with partial success. However, these rhetorical resources and strategies also ended up failing to legitimate the Nicaraguan threat. Anti-interventionists successfully constructed their own narrative, which undermined containment and balance of power as well as democracy and freedom. Pathos rhetorical strategies connected the rhetorical resources of Vietnam, human rights, democracy, and diplomacy. As with previous chapters, these two episodes shared the rhetorical resource of democracy. However, their success differed significantly, in part because of the rhetorical strategies deployed to construct the threat narratives.

Another interesting comparison between the two episodes highlights the role of Congress and critics of the administrations. Congress almost immediately

opposed the arguments about Nicaragua, conducting hearings and passing legislation rejecting the idea of a Nicaraguan threat. Congressmen appeared on numerous television programs to counter the arguments of the Reagan administration (for example, the MacNeil/Lehrer Report). In comparison, Congress seemingly initiated many of the argument about Panama and the Noriega threat. Hearings, reports, and legislation provided support to later administration arguments and strategies (e.g. Subcommittee on Terrorism 1988). This difference emerged even though Congress remained controlled by Democrats and the Presidency by Republicans in both cases.

Other theories of foreign policy focus on domestic institutions, but in these cases Congress held rhetorical powers, rather than institutional powers, in foreign policy. Congress provides important narratives that support or criticize the administration, while relying on relevant rhetorical resources and strategies. Congress emerges as not just a source to draw argument from, but an important political actor. However, Congress was not the only critical political actor in the public discourse. Early opposition by the military on Nicaragua alerted Congress to the problems, while President Bush was able to generate military support for the Panama threat. Other important actors included human rights organizations that criticized the Contras for human rights violations in Nicaragua, while constructing negative images of Noriega and positive images of the opposition in Panama. These images proved critical since the television environment calls for images, stories, and personalities that emotionally appeal to the audience.

This highlights why democracy worked as a rhetorical resource for the Bush administration. Unlike radio and newspapers, television seems to help the pathos rhetorical strategies deployed by President Bush in the Panama episode and the anti-interventionists in the Nicaragua episode. Moreover, both actors took advantage of the images associated with respected rhetorical resources.

Just as important, the focus on rhetorical resources and strategies provides an important perspective on United States foreign policy. Unable to generate Congressional or public consent, the Reagan administration turned to covert operations and then pursued illegal means to fund these operations. Robert McFarlane noted in the Iran-Contra hearings that the administration "turned to covert actions because they thought they could not get Congressional support for more overt activities…No one making these important decisions in the Reagan administration viewed covert action as the best way to pursue our aims in Nicaragua" (LeoGrande 1993b). Just as important, the pathos strategies later utilized by the administration allowed Congress to approve only humanitarian aid and moved away from the administration policy of regime change. The Sandinista government seemed to realize this position, as they made overtures toward democratization in order to prevent regime change.

The case of Panama further illustrates how even successful threat legitimation affects foreign policy. The rhetorical resource democracy deployed with pathos rhetorical strategy encouraged regime change as a policy option, instead of the exile or assassination of Noriega. Yet democracy suggests even more than regime change; it required United States consolidation of the

Panamanian democracy, with significant political and economic investments, including the withdrawal of United States military bases and control over the Panama Canal.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In the introduction, I argued that rhetorical resources and strategies affect the process of threat legitimation. Rhetorical strategies connect together rhetorical resources to construct a threat narrative used in the public debates. Political actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to build support for their threat narrative. As I speculated in the introduction, if rhetorical resources and strategies were important for threat legitimation, then I would see changes in the public debates and in the level of consent about a threat. Moreover, I argued that the media environment influences how rhetorical strategies affect threat legitimation, acting as a conditional variable. If the media environment was important for rhetorical strategies, then specific media environments would be more conducive to certain rhetorical strategies. In addition, if the media environment impacted rhetorical strategies, then when the media environment changed, the influence of rhetorical strategies on the public debates would also be impacted.

In the empirical chapters, I presented strong evidence that rhetoric matters for threat legitimation. As I traced the various threat narratives, I highlighted how rhetorical resources and strategies helped change the public debates and the level of consent about a threat. Rhetorical strategies altered how the audiences identified with rhetorical resources. Rhetorical strategies also connected rhetorical resources together in order to produce the threat narrative.

For instance, anti-interventionists successfully identified Chile as a "sister republic" through logos rhetorical strategies. Moreover, they identified democracy with honor and reputation, the other critical rhetorical resources, constructing a narrative about why Chile was not a threat. This also helped undermine the threat narrative of President Harrison since he also deployed the same rhetorical resources.

Furthermore, the empirical chapters confirm that the media environment influences the impact of rhetorical strategies, serving as a conditional variable between different strategies on one hand and legitimation outcomes on the other. The newspaper environment favored logos rhetorical strategies. President Harrison primarily used pathos rhetorical strategies to construct a narrative about the Chilean threat, while the opposition relied on logos. In the debate about the Spanish threat, pro-interventionists initially failed when using pathos rhetorical strategies. Once they focused on more logos rhetorical strategies, anti-interventionists generated more public support about the Spanish threat. This changed in the radio media environment, which favored ethos rhetorical strategies. President Roosevelt mostly relied on pathos and logos rhetorical strategies and failed to generate public support about the Nazi German threat. On the other hand, President Truman deployed more ethos rhetorical strategies to construct the threat narrative about Soviet Russia. This changed again with the television media environment, further confirming that different media environments favor specific rhetorical strategies. President Reagan primarily relied on logos and ethos, while the anti-interventionist deployed pathos

rhetorical strategies about the Nicaraguan threat. On the other hand, President Bush successfully deployed pathos rhetorical strategies when legitimating the Noriega threat.

It is critical to note, however, that rhetoric did not determine threat legitimation. International and domestic events played an important role in each episode. For instance, the successful legitimation of the Noriega threat in Panama depended on the killing of Lt. Paz. However, without rhetoric, events or perceptions do not get translated into a narrative, limiting the ability to convince the public and Congress about a threat. This suggests that even if Lt. Paz was not killed, there might have been another event that the Bush administration could have used to legitimate the threat by successful deploying rhetorical resources and strategies.

Despite the importance of rhetoric for threat legitimation, these six episodes also suggest some important qualifications. The Reagan administration did deploy pathos rhetorical strategies in the later years about the Nicaraguan threat, yet the results were decidedly mixed. While I posited several reasons why this happened in the Chapter 5, it does suggest that the rhetorical strategies alone do not determine the success of threat legitimation. The rhetorical resources that the strategies connected together were also important, as well as the competing threat narratives. Although the Reagan administration used pathos rhetorical strategies to connect together freedom fighters and democracy to fashion a narrative about the Nicaraguan threat, anti-interventionists already linked these rhetorical resources to Vietnam through pathos.

Moreover, rhetorical resources alone do not lead to successful threat legitimation. President Bush successfully deployed democracy as a rhetorical resource, while President Reagan failed. In fact, democracy was often deployed throughout these episodes. Simply using democracy, or any other important rhetorical resource, did not generate consent. These qualifications suggest there needs to be further study about the interaction of rhetorical resources and strategies in order to explain threat legitimation.

Despite some reservations, I believe a rhetorical approach holds promise for studying threat legitimation. I argue that rhetorical resources and strategies provide a more complete explanation than objectivist or subjectivist paradigms. Moreover, as I pointed out throughout the empirical chapter, a rhetorical approach offers some important insights about United States foreign policy. Therefore I suggest some avenues for future research to help specify how rhetoric affects threat legitimation.

One important opportunity for future study is how rhetoric affects contemporary episodes, such as the 2003 Iraq War. How did President Bush convince the American public that Saddam Hussein was a threat to the United States? It would also be important to study episodes of failed threat legitimation. In addition, I propose studying whether technology has transformed the television media environment, and how this influences the rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation.

Another important avenue for future study is a more comparative study of rhetoric and threat legitimation. Does rhetoric have the same impact in other

political and social systems? For instance, did rhetoric affect the process of threat legitimation in Great Britain for the 2003 Iraq War? How was the process of threat legitimation different?

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