INSURGENTS, INCUBATION, AND SURVIVAL: HOW PREWAR PREPARATION FACILITATES LENGTHY INTRASTATE CONFLICTS

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ABSTRACT

Since 1945, insurgents around the globe have increasingly dragged comparatively larger, better funded, and militarily superior regimes into protracted intrastate conflicts. The theory posited in this dissertation claims insurgents are able to do so because of choices made *before* large-scale conflict erupted—or during a period of time I call, incubation—because it prepares them to endure conflict. After controlling for standard explanations, I offer statistical evidence that proto-insurgent incubation duration is statistically significant and positively related to conflict duration. Using case studies of Latin American insurgencies—Sendero Luminoso, the MIR, and the FMLN—I demonstrate the capacity to endure conflict long-term was a direct cause of both length and quality of prewar preparation. Sendero and the FMLN used incubation to set up efficient processes for tasks like recruitment, combat training, and coordinating personnel, which prepared them for wartime, and consequently, facilitated lengthy intrastate conflicts. The MIR however, squandered its time in incubation. Despite failing to adequately accomplish most of the prewar preparation tasks outlined in this dissertation, this insurgency challenged the government anyway; and was thus defeated brutally and swiftly. This dissertation turns our attention to insurgents before conflict and the important role antecedent behaviors play later on during conflict. Before now, precious few conflict scholars have taken the prewar time period seriously or even considered the ways this segment of time can condition insurgent behavior during wartime. By turning attention backwards in time to the prewar period, this dissertation provides a new approach for explaining insurgent war duration.

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CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's 1967 Bolivian insurgency should have been a success. Yet without sufficient planning even the world's most experienced, skilled, and crafty insurgent in a setting particularly suited for insurgency was still destined to fail. Jump-starting an insurgency from the ground up[1] was not a particularly flawed proposition per se. The FSLN[2] in Nicaragua and the FAR[3] in Guatemala had done this only a few years prior. Geographically, Bolivia was also an insurgent's dream. There were "five borders, valleys and mountains, tropical and snow-covered regions;"[4] a near perfect environment for hiding basecamps and establishing nearby cross-border sanctuaries.[5] There were already established bases of support in Bolivia;[6] revolutionary sympathizers there had supplied material backing during the early days of the July Twenty-Sixth Movement.[7] Bolivia was also significantly underdeveloped[8] and the military regime helmed by General René Barrientos Ortuño was weak and unstable.[9]

The story from here is remarkably well known and has been elsewhere chronicled in meticulous detail. Despite a setting where he should have been successful for so many reasons—favorable geography, sympathetic comrades, widespread poverty, and a weak government—Che was killed and his insurgency vanquished less than a year after it was launched. Could his missteps have been avoided? Would the Bolivian foco succeeded

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[1] According to Castañeda (1997, 339), "Che and the Cubans did not sweep down upon Bolivia to join a

[2] Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front)

[3] Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces)

[4] Castañeda (1997, 334)

[5] For a discussion on terrain favorable to insurgency, see Fearon and Laitin (2001). For a discussion on cross-border sanctuaries as favorable to insurgency, see Salehyan, Idean (2009) *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*, Cornell University Press

[6] According to Castañeda (332), there was already "within the Communist Party (PCB), a nucleus of cadres linked with Cuba. Similarly, a small group of Bolivian students had received training in Cuba in 1965."

[7] McCormick (1997, 12)

[8] Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Country Profile: Bolivia, January (2006, 4)

[9] Biggeman et al. (2014, 262)

had its helmsman prepared differently? In this dissertation I argue that prewar preparation is one of the most important factors for explaining long-lasting, durable insurgency.

1.1 The Puzzle of Protracted Insurgent War

Intrastate conflicts over the last half-century have become bloodier, longer, and have seldom ended neatly, if at all[10]—take the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan as cursory examples. "The average civil war lasts over six times longer than the average international war."[11] This is compounded by the fact the average duration of intrastate conflict has steadily increased from two years in 1945 to more than 16 years today.[12] While intrastate conflict outbreak has remained steady at around 2.3 per year since 1945,[13] they conclude at a far less rate.[14] What has resulted is an "almost linear accumulation of unresolved conflicts since 1945."[15] This puzzle—how comparatively weak insurgents survive for years or even decades against state-backed armed forces—has preoccupied the minds of many conflict and civil war scholars. This dissertation joins the debate by introducing a novel concept to explain insurgent wartime survivability; a theory I call, *incubation*.

At its core, I claim incubating advantages the aspiring insurgent (proto-insurgent[16] hereafter) and facilitates protracted conflict. The notion that then drives this dissertation is rather simple: it is always better to be prepared. More specifically, I claim a proto-insurgent that takes a longer period of time to prepare for conflict will last longer than a proto-insurgent that takes less time, and unquestionably longer than one that forgoes

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[10] See, Lyall and Wilson (2009); Lyall (2010); Fearon and Laitin (2003)
[11] Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004, 253)
[12] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 1)
[13] From the paper presented by Fearon and Laitin (2001, 1) at the 2001 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 30-September 2
[14] According to Fearon and Laitin (2001, 1), only 1.7 conflicts end per year, on average.
[15] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 1)
[16] I borrowed this term from Daniel Byman (2008).

prewar preparation altogether. Wartime survivability is thus a function of the proto-insurgent's behavior during the prewar period.

Insurgent goals vary widely. While many harbored lofty ambitions of producing a revolution where the incumbent will be ousted, I begin with the assumption that insurgents do not necessarily have to topple the state in order to 'win.' To be sure, there have been cases of all-out insurgent victory—take the aforementioned July Twenty-Sixth Movement as a classic example. But there are a growing number of cases where insurgents have either failed to topple a government[17] or have dragged them into long, protracted, and exceptionally violent wars.

While no two insurgencies are exactly alike—their specific organizational make-ups and strategies vary from case to case—I argue durable proto-insurgents solve a very specific set of real world, though largely generic problems, *beforehand*. These include figuring out how to develop clever talent acquisition strategies and effective marketing campaigns to sell their product (revolution) to consumers, organizing a workforce, managing resources to finance operations, and keeping their presence unbeknownst to the state while they solve these problems. If they devise strategies to resolve these beforehand, when they are at their weakest and most vulnerable, I claim the probability the state will crush them in short order once conflict erupts is significantly reduced.

1.2. Duration versus Outcome

With the pervasiveness of protracted insurgent wars, I argue a win-lose-draw dependent variable, as is often used in extant literature,[18] misses an important piece of the story. To

[17] According to Lyall and Wilson (2009), approximately a third of all post-WW1 insurgents failed to "win." According to Fortna (2004) "draws" have become evermore prevalent since the 1960s.
[18] See for example, Lyall and Wilson (2009); Lyall (2010); Balcells and Kalyvas (2010); or Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), to name a popular works that utilize the win-lose-draw coding method.

illustrate, insurgents can attain a level of quasi-sovereignty in territories they control that effectively makes them the highest political authority in the area,[19] as ISIS was for a time in parts of Iraq and Syria, as Mao was in parts of China, and as the Taliban are in southeastern Afghanistan today. Incumbents may lay claim to such areas, but who was levying taxes and enforcing rules on the ground? If the answer is the insurgent, then they have effectively carved out of the kingdom a principality for themselves, which is the next best thing to being king.[20] This is an important bit of nuance missed by the win-lose-draw approach because running the whole state is not the entire game. Insurgents can still accrue myriad benefits from wielding however much power they can for however long they are able.

Because the proto-insurgent likely starts from nothing, any scraps they can pick up along the way—a village here, an oilfield there—goes into the plus column. Rewards from protracted conflict might also include holding as much of the countryside as possible for as long as possible; [21] enjoying the benefits one gets from so doing, including but not limited to the admiration of followers, tribute from locals, undeniable authority over many people, wealth, slaves; and of course the likelihood of being able to negotiate a settlement that will allow them, in the end, to hold some legitimate political power in the incumbent's political system.[22] At the very least I claim having the capacity to drag out conflict puts insurgents in a position to enjoy the spoils of war, for however long that

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[19] For an exceptionally well-done study of insurgent wartime governance, see Mampilly, Zachariah (2012) *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*, Cornell University Press

[20] Mampilly (2012, 64) argued insurgents set up a whole host of wartime governance structures including but not limited to: "a force capable of policing the local population," "a broader dispute resolution mechanism," the provision of "additional public welfare goods," and "educational and health systems."

[21] In an intellectual tip-of-the-hat to Tilly (1978) and Olson (1993), Ana Arjona (2014, 1361) claimed violent actors set up wartime institutions as means to control territory so that they can "extract resources from local inhabitants" and "promote capital accumulation."

[22] Heger, Lindsay L. and Danielle F. Jung (2017) "Negotiating with Rebels: The Effect of Rebel Service Provision on Conflict Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(6), 1203-1229

may last. At best, they may win a seat at the political table. I maintain both scenarios are far better than imprisonment or death—the most likely outcomes for short, failed insurgencies.

If an insurgent has control over territory and resources for a decade or more before being stamped out, or disbanding to form new splinter groups, I argue this represents a far more successful insurgency than one whose ambitions were snuffed out in its first year. By this logic, the longer an insurgency can survive despite the sovereign's attempts to destroy the threat to its legitimacy and authority on the ground,[23] the more successful the insurgency is. I claim we should thus assess insurgent success by measuring conflict duration rather than outcome.

Conflict duration is actually a more logical measure of insurgent success than conflict outcome since insurgents are assumed to be largely rational actors[24] and must know they will be unlikely to oust the incumbent. Longer duration is actually a win for the insurgent, even if the conflict ultimately ends in their loss. For the incumbent to win, having entered the conflict with control of the state, they must at least maintain the government and at best, control all of the state's territory. Accordingly, longer duration of conflict is a better outcome for insurgents, all else equal. A win-lose-draw dependent variable makes no distinction here, thus losing important variation in insurgent success.

If we look at insurgents in this light, we can begin to understand they need only possess the capacity to drag out conflict long enough to enjoy the spoils of territorial

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[23] In *Terrorism in Context* (Penn State University Press), Martha Crenshaw (2007, 17) claimed the "costs" of engaging a government force can be offset by prewar preparation. Here she specifically referred to Sendero Luminoso as a case that "spent 10 years creating a clandestine organizational structure before launching a campaign of violence…"

[24] See Jacob N. Shapiro's similar argument regarding the 'rationality' of terrorist organizations in, *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (2013) Princeton University Press

control or to get the state to consider alternative options, like concessions or negotiations, when counterinsurgency operations have stalled or failed. However, achieving the capacity to do so is far easier to propose than to execute, as we will see.

1.3 The Challenges Facing the Proto-insurgent

Regardless of who or what prompted a would-be insurgency or rebellion, the proto-insurgent faces a tall task in challenging the sovereign's claim to rule. For example, figuring out how to get enough willing participants and financial and material support to actually get a proto-insurgency off the ground—and to sustain it once it becomes a viable threat—is especially troublesome for the proto-insurgent leader to accomplish. They also need time to consider the military component, as violence is their primary tool.[25] To successfully achieve these and other prewar preparation processes takes careful planning, and most of all, time. While extraordinarily simple in theory, this is monumentally difficult for the proto-insurgent to pull off in practice. Almost half of all the insurgent organizations coded in this dissertation's data spent one year or less in incubation. And 34 out of the 120 insurgent organizations used here incubated for three weeks or less! If preparation is such a critical factor, why have so few proto-insurgents taken it seriously?

For starters, duration is key for a *high quality* incubation period because some of the preparation processes require considerable attention and time to undertake successfully. For example, a proto-insurgent leader cannot realistically expect to take on the sovereign singlehandedly. They must, among other tasks, devise way(s) to persuade some analogous threshold of people[26] that a burgeoning insurgency enterprise is not only

[25] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2001,6) described insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas."

[26] According to Fearon and Laitin (2001, 8), "The total number of active rebels in many wars in which thousands of civilians have been killed (through the actions of both governments and rebels) is often in the

a good idea, but that they should also carry out violence on its behalf. For this civilians are routinely tapped but revolution is a tough sell because civilians could find themselves in the government's sights if they are caught supporting the cause.[27] How a proto-insurgent leader actually convinces others to sign up for such an endeavor presents an intriguing puzzle. Even more baffling is how they manage to keep their followers to stay the course even (especially) when they are losing.[28]

Research has demonstrated that "skilled resisters,"[29] or insurgents residing in places with histories of violence or with previous experience with social movements tend to have better results building rebellions than those lacking such traditions.[30] Put otherwise, some proto-insurgent leaders have more success than others because they harbor *experiential endowments*, or "organizational legacies"[31] from which they can draw when engaging in subsequent rebellion building. These entrepreneurs of violence are more deliberate and *strategic* in their decision-making—identifying those preparation processes that are most critical and require more time and effort to accomplish, leveraging the particular contexts in which they find themselves,[32] and recognizing the optimal time to launch. In short, context matters but it does not predetermine whether a proto-insurgent leader will take strategic and adequate measures when building a movement during incubation.

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hundreds. Even in relatively 'big' cases such as Kashmir or Algeria the number of active fighters rarely exceeds 10,000."

[27] See Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge University Press

[28] On this, see Oppenheim, Ben, Abbey Steele, Juan F. Vargas, and Michael Weintraub (2015) "True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 59(5) 794-823

[29] Finkel, Evgeny (2015, 339) "The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust," *American Political Science Review* 109(2), 339-353

[30] ibid

[31] Daly, Sarah Zukerman (2012, 473) "Organizational legacies of violence: Conditions favoring insurgency onset in Colombia, 1964–1984," *Journal of Peace Research* 49(3), 473-491

[32] According to Daly (2012, 487-488), insurgent leaders drew on the "organizational fodder" of *La Violencia* to build the ELN, EPL, and the FARC.

1.4 Why Studying Incubation Matters

In wrestling with the puzzle of insurgent survival, this dissertation hopes to make at least three contributions. From a theoretical perspective, getting a clearer sense of how insurgents problem solve is valuable in its own right. Furthermore, I claim understanding how prewar problem solving influenced insurgent's capacity to survive conflict is equally valuable. This can only be accomplished by moving beyond the widely accepted assumption that insurgents are empowered and constrained primarily by their wartime decision-making and/or the wartime environment in which they find themselves.[33] In studying the ways proto-insurgents prepped for wartime, we can better understand what they did that enabled wartime survivability.

From an empirical perspective, our current standard datasets do not code for the prewar period.[34] This is a problem. We cannot hope to make full sense of insurgents if we have yet to take into account their entire lifespans, including initial formation and what they did (or did not do) before conflict began. Incubation might indeed also condition the relationships between a variety of other variables and conflict duration.

Lastly, from a policy perspective, the ever-growing prevalence of long and drawn out conflicts is one of the more disconcerting truths in today's world. Despite evidence[35]

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[33] The majority of conflict and civil war literature has focused on wartime factors; including state-side measures like regime type, state capacity, military capacity, and newness of regime; and/or insurgent-side measures like foreign patronage, lootable resources, and insurgent military capacity. The theoretical and empirical efficacy of these approaches and their influence on conflict duration will be thoroughly vetted in the next two chapters.

[34] Heretofore, none of our widely utilized datasets including the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010); James Fearon and David Laitin's (2003) dataset; Nicholas Sambanis's (2004) dataset; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO ACD) (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015) have a coded measure for incubation.

[35] According to Reiter and Stam (2002, 29); Reiter and Stam (2003); and Lake (1992); and Lyall (2010, 168) *International Organization* 64, 167–92, states, and especially democracies, "have won a staggering 93 percent of the interstate wars they initiated since 1815." States have had far less success when compared to intrastate COIN wars.

that states have found it increasingly more difficult to defeat insurgents and that insurgent wars seem to be lasting longer, politicians and military professionals continue to proffer variations on the same approaches. In point of fact, General John W. Nicholson, Jr., the current commander of US forces in Afghanistan recently reaffirmed America's intention to "bomb"[36] the Taliban into submission. We cannot expect to have different outcomes by continuing on with the same standard practices. The theory and empirical evidence presented here provides a fresh perspective for explaining insurgent war duration. In so doing, we might be able to develop more effective policy approaches for dealing with future insurgents before they become viable.

1.5 Why Compare?

In the words of Arend Lijphart: "Among the several fields or subdisciplines into which the discipline of political science is usually divided, comparative politics is the only one that carries a methodological instead of a substantive label."[37] It has been more recently said comparativists seem to be less picky about the particular methodologies used for making comparisons.[38] Indeed, those in the subfield do seem to apply a variety of 'instruments' including: "deductive modeling, large-N quantitative methods, archival research, … extensive ethnography,"[39] and case studies analysis. Though from the perspective here, the question about which method or methods—each with virtues and shortcomings—are best for making comparisons is a far less interesting one than *why* we use such a wide range of methods. Sure, we compare things to see how they are similar

[36] https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-strategy-afghanistan-requires-diplomacy-and-military-power
[37] Lijphart, Arend (1971, 682) "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method " *The American Political Science Review*, 65(3), 682-693
[38] Katznelson, Ira (2009) "Strong Theory, Complex History," in Lichbach/Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics*
[39] ibid (102)

and how they differ.[40] But fundamentally, comparativists use a variety of methods not because we want to demonstrate the breadth and depth of our methodological toolkit, but rather because the questions we ask are so challenging.[41] Put otherwise, our questions drive the methods. Often that means we *must* use a range of methods.

Here I use a nested[42] mixed methods approach that included both large-N quantitative analyses (LNA) and intensive case studies (SNA). I do so because the question I pose—*how can comparatively weak insurgents survive for years or even decades against seemingly superior state-backed armed forces?*—calls for a mixed methods approach. The primary goal of this dissertation was to develop a more complete understanding of why insurgents are able to prolong conflict. I begin that effort in the next chapter by demonstrating how incubation has been largely absent in most popular accounts.

Chapter 3 outlines the theory of incubation; why the processes make sense, the pitfalls associated with each process, and why incubation is the best time for insurgents to conduct these processes. The question of why longer incubation leads to longer conflict necessitated a new unified theory of proto-insurgent preparation. I provide that in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 tests the explanatory power of incubation on conflict duration, along with a number of industry-accepted variables, including terrain, state capacity, regime type, lootable resources, and foreign patronage. I do so by introducing a novel

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[40] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 13) referred to the former as the "parallel demonstration of theory" and the latter as the "contrast of contexts."

[41] See a far more eloquent discussion on this in "Strong Theory, Complex History" (2009), by Ira Katznelson (2009) in Lichbach/Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics*

[42] Lieberman, Evan S. (2005, 435) "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review* 99(3), 435-452

methodology for coding proto-insurgent incubation and testing the explanatory power of the variable on conflict duration. Using 120 cases of insurgency (1945-present), I find clear evidence that one of the key features differentiating insurgents with short conflict duration from those with lengthy conflict durations was incubation duration. I find longer incubation duration significantly increases the probability insurgents will survive conflict longer.

The explanatory power of my theory is borne out in the aggregate data, but to provide evidence that the specific mechanisms theorized in Chapter 3 actually produced such a result, a micro-level in-depth approach was needed as well. This is how the SNA in this dissertation came to be. The value in combining statistical analysis and intensive case-study analysis in comparative research has been heretofore described in great detail by Evan S. Lieberman.[43] "Despite the constraints of a relatively small, finite, complex, and heterogeneous universe of cases for analysis…"[44] a nested[45] strategy that combines both approaches "provides a stronger basis for causal inference than the sum of its small-N and large-N parts. Rather than emphasizing the *common* inferential logic of qualitative and quantitative research strategies—which is the hallmark of King, Keohane, and Verba's (1994) influential treatment of research methodology—the nested analysis approach emphasizes the complementary distinctiveness in these two modes of analysis and strategies for causal inference."[46]

Per Lieberman, I chose one case that was "*well predicted* by the best fitting

[43] ibid
[44] ibid (450)
[45] ibid (435)
[46] ibid (450) emphasis in the original

statistical model."[47] This can be found in Chapter 5 and examines incubation within the context of the Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru. I also chose two cases that were not well predicted by the model to determine the efficacy of alternative explanations. This comparative analysis can be found in Chapter 6 with the study of the incubation periods of the MIR in Peru and the FMLN[48] in El Salvador.

Sendero fits the archetypal case that conforms well to my theory: long incubation period followed by long conflict duration. The MIR and the FMLN do not. The former actually incubated for approximately five years but was stamped out after only five months. The latter is coded in these data with no incubation period yet survived conflict as long as Sendero. The purpose of Chapter 6 is to demonstrate that the theory of incubation can travel[49] to explain cases beyond the parameters set by the data. Surely I do not presume to insinuate that *all* insurgencies can be explained using the theory of incubation. However, I do propose it serves to explain a nontrivial share of variation in insurgency duration.

In the final chapter, I review the evidence and comment on the US' current COIN policies in light of the fact that America is presently mired in the longest running conflict in its history and is (possibly) on the precipice of a third long and drawn out conflict in less than 20 years. I offer a few policy recommendations and some future implications informed directly by this dissertation's analysis.

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[47] ibid (444) emphasis in the original
[48] Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front)
[49] In *Social Science Methodology (Strategies for Social Inquiry)*, Cambridge University Press (2011, 139), John Gerring wrote "traveling" a concept is used for establishing "resonance, consistency, and coherence across a broad domain." Here that domain is insurgency.

CHAPTER 2—INCUBATION, HOW IT IS MISSED, WHY THAT MATTERS, AND HOW TO (HELP) FIX THE PROBLEM

2.1 Introduction

To serve the broader effort of this dissertation, this chapter does the following. I first demonstrate how most scholars that have studied insurgency have spent a large share of their time trying to explaining outcomes but have produced limited overall consensus—and very little of their time trying to make sense of conflict duration. Second, I show how these studies have mostly ignored incubation or insurgent prewar preparation. Third, I review some of the (limited) work on incubation, the strengths but also the gaps. Last, I explain how this project fills in some of these gaps through a unified theory of incubation that is important for explaining insurgency duration.

2.2 The Current State of Insurgency Literature

Standard social science studies of insurgency have mostly focused on wartime factors to explain conflict. They point to similar 'culprits' that seem to favor insurgents over government forces. Fearon and Laitin for example, blamed rough terrain, poor economic opportunities, and bureaucratically weak states as factors that likely contribute to protracted insurgent conflicts.[50] Yet despite a discussion on the "steady, almost linear accumulation of *unresolved conflicts* since 1945,"[51] these authors were more interested in identifying the "conditions that favor insurgency"[52] onset. They did not test the explanatory power of these variables on conflict duration. As such, readers are left to draw their own (plausible) indirect causal inferences of these variables on conflict duration.

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[50] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 28) claimed the ability to hide was a significant factor in insurgent war.
[51] ibid (1) emphasis added
[52] ibid

Elsewhere, James Fearon concluded conflicts involving "land or natural resource conflicts between state-supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group and the ethnically distinct 'sons of the soil' who inhabited the region,"[53] along with access to "contraband goods like opium or cocaine"[54] tended to produce longer wars. Lootable resources have been touted as significant conflict duration influencers for a number of reasons.[55] For example, due to "strong demand, high profit margins, limited barriers to entry, and few interdiction opportunities, narcotic drugs disproportionately benefit rebel groups as a source of funding in civil wars."[56] Likewise, insurgents have sometimes procured long-term funding from the illicit smuggling of lootable gems, such as diamonds.[57]

Comparatively, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom[58] pointed to low per capita income, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic division"[59] as significant determinants of conflict duration. The ethnic division finding in particular runs counter to Fearon and Laitin's[60] findings.

In terms of outside support, Idean Salehyan found "bad geographic

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[53] Fearon (2004, 297)
[54] ibid
[55] Weinstein, Jeremy M (2005) "Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4), 598–624; Weinstein, Jeremy M (2007) *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge University Press; Jonsson, Michael; Elliot Brennan, and Christopher O'Hara, Christopher (2016) "Financing War or Facilitating Peace? The Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in Colombia and Myanmar," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21,1-18; Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, "Diamonds, Blood and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4) (2005), 563–597; Aderoju Oyefusi, "Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation Among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria," *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4) (2008), 539–555.
[56] Jonsson et al. (2016, 542)
[57] Smillie, Ian (2013, 1005) "Blood diamonds and non-state actors," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 46(4), 1003-1021. The most infamous example is likely the RUF in Sierra Leone, though rebel groups in Angola, Botswana, Congo, Russia, and West Africa have also procured long-term funding thanks to illicit diamond smuggling.
[58] Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004)
[59] ibid (253)
[60] Fearon and Laitin (2001)

neighborhoods"[61] and "international rivalries exert a significant influence on civil conflict because international enemies provide support and sanctuary to rebel groups."[62] The presence or absence of foreign patrons and/or cross-border sanctuaries may help rebels protract conflict because they are not constrained by "the geographic area of any one state..."[63] This 'transnational' component in turn makes it harder for COIN forces to limit rebel access to outside support and more 'legally' problematic for them to pursue and attack them if they are hiding in neighboring countries. Daniel Byman et al.[64] similarly found not only foreign patrons significant but also other international groups such as religious leaders, refugees, and Diasporas.

In contrast, Jeremy Weinstein[65] found that while insurgents were sometimes recipients of foreign patronage, external sources of support were not constant[66] and were therefore poor predictors of insurgent success and failure.[67] Likewise, Timothy Wickham-Crowley's[68] study of guerilla movements in mid-century Latin America also examined training and financing courtesy of foreign patrons (primarily from Cuba) and found tactics and moneys imported into countries like Venezuela and Colombia *may* have played an important role but were too varied in their levels of provision to make any

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[61] Salehyan (2011, KL 3072-3074)
[62] ibid
[63] Salehyan (2001, 147)
[64] Byman, Daniel; Peter Chalk; Bruce Hoffman; William Rosenau; and David W. Brannan (2001) *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, National Security Research Division; International Security and Defense Policy Center; Rand Corporation; US Department of Defense, Office of Transnational Issues
[65] Weinstein (2007, 259)
[66] "Sources of economic wealth are exhausted or disappear as geopolitical considerations alter the calculations of external patrons. Economic endowments can also emerge as groups take control of new territories in the course of the violence or as external actors gain interest in the conflict. Even social endowments may be affected by shocks as civilians reconsider the meaning of particular identities or ideologies" (261), Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2006) *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), Cambridge University Press
[67] It is important to note that Weinstein was primarily concerned with "why similar patterns of abuse appear[ed] in groups with other sources of finance beyond those provided by external patrons" (Weinstein 2007, 259)
[68] Wickham-Crowley (1992)

meaningful causal inferences between them and conflict duration and outcome more broadly. Lastly, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson found an association between "external support for insurgent organizations […and] a decrease in the likelihood of state victory," though the relationship became increasingly less significant after World War II.[69]

This brief literature survey illustrates there is limited overall consensus about the causes of protracted conflicts, mostly because duration has been framed as less important than conflict outcome. This is particularly puzzling as insurgent wars are lasting longer than ever before and seldom end neatly with a win, draw, or loss. It is thus difficult at this point to make any systematic claims about the mechanisms that lead to protracted conflict. To demonstrate the shortcomings of the current standard practices at the micro-level, let us briefly survey two cases.

2.3 Studying Insurgents Without Incubation

The following insurgent movements in Sub-Saharan Africa campaigned under similar conditions but with very different conflict durations. M23[70] rebelled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2012-2013. Al-Shabaab has been waging an insurgency against the Somali government since 2008.[71] Let us briefly unpack the two using standard conflict measures.

From the outset, M23 was well-financed thanks to the lucrative smuggling of minerals into Rwanda, well outfitted with weapons, and enjoyed considerable patronage from many states within the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—

[69] "Indeed, the expected probability of an incumbent's victory diminishes by -87 percent when facing an insurgency with substantial external support (2) compared to an insurgency without patrons or a safe refuge (95 percent confidence interval at -119 percent to -52 percent). Interestingly, the impact of support is itself reduced if we restrict our analysis to the post-1945 period. Here, the likelihood of an incumbent win decreases by -68 percent when we shift the nature of insurgent support from none to substantial (95 percent confidence interval at -111 percent to -22 percent)" (Lyall and Wilson, 90).

[70] Mouvement du 23 Mars (March 23rd Movement)

[71] As coded by UCDP (2016)

especially South Africa, Rwanda, and Uganda—who saw the insurgency as an opportunity to upset the regional balance of power in their favor.[72] Its ranks and domestic support grew quickly.[73] Its foe, the Congolese national army was a disjointed, hodge-podge of "belligerents"[74] gleaned from the then-defunct FARDC,[75] the RCD-G,[76] and ex-CNDP[77] fighters.[78] The government was also functionally weak as it was still reeling from a not-so-far-removed failed democratization process. A continued flow of refugees from neighboring Rwanda also had the government scrambling to make economic ends meet. The GDP per capita average for 2012-2013 was approximately $472.[79] Between 2009-2013, Polity considered the DRC an "Open Anocracy."[80] The ethnic fractionalization score was 0.878 out of 1,[81] which signified extraordinary ethnic divisiveness. According to Fearon and Laitin,[82] the terrain measure in the DRC was 903, a very low "roughness' score.

The Al-Shabaab insurgency is a mixture of clans[83] held together by a common nationalist thread.[84] This one mutual factor notwithstanding, the very fact Al-Shabaab's "titular leader … Sheikh Mohamed Mukhtar Abdirahman, also known as Abu Zubeyr,"[85]

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[72] Koko (2014, 265)
[73] ibid
[74] Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Judith Verweijen (2013) "The Volititility of a Half-baked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and Conflict Dyamics in Eastern DRC," *African Affair*s, 112(449), 563–582
[75] Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the DRC)
[76] Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma)
[77] Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
[78] Baaz, Maria Eriksson and Judith Verweijen (2013) "The Volititility of a Half-baked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-Military Integration and Conflict Dyamics in Eastern DRC," *African Affair*s, 112(449), 563–582
[79] World Bank (2017)
[80] Marshall, Gur, and Jaggers (2017)
[81] Fearon, James D. (2003) "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country" *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2), 195–222
[82] ibid
[83] Solomon, Hussein (2014) "Somalia's Al Shabaab: Clans vs Islamist nationalism," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 21(3), 351-366
[84] ibid
[85] Nicoll, Alexander and Jessica Delaney (2010, 1) "Somalia's al-Shabaab steps up attacks;" *Strategic Comments* 16(6), 1-4

was able to unite but also hold together a group of otherwise distinct clans, has been elsewhere described as a "remarkable"[86] but puzzling organizational phenomenon. Like M23, Al-Shabaab is a recipient of considerable foreign patronage. Its "Saudi-inspired Wahhabi version of Islam"[87] also prompted substantial material and financial support from al-Qaeda.[88] Both insurgencies lured sympathetic fighters from neighboring countries.[89] Al-Shabaab did so regionally as well as from Europe,[90] "Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya, and from the Somali diaspora in the US."[91] Like the Congolese government, the Somali government is considered bureaucratically weak, though enjoys some backing from UN forces.[92] Al-Shabaab's primary target, the Somali military also enjoy some bolstering from African Union (AU) forces in Somalia (AMISOM).[93] Between 2009-2013, Polity likewise considered Somalia an "Open Anocracy."[94] GDP per capita averaged approximately $420 between 2013-2016.[95] The ethnic fractionalization score was 0.812 out of 1,[96] which like the Congo, signified extraordinary ethnic divisiveness. According to Fearon and Laitin,[97] the terrain measure in Somalia was 2416, a low 'roughness' score.

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[86] Solomon (2014, 352)
[87] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689
[88] Solomon (2014, 357)
[89] Many Tutsis from Rwanda joined M23.
[90] Solomon (2014, 357); http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689
[91] Nicoll and Delaney (2010, 3)
[92] "Somalia: Al-Shabaab Attack on Army Camp," *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, July 2015, 52(6), 20616A-20616C
[93] Mueller, Jason C. (2018, 121) "The Evolution of Political Violence: The Case of Somalia's Al-Shabaab," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30(1), 116-141
[94] Marshall et al. (2017)
[95] World Bank (2017)
[96] Fearon, James D. (2003) "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country" *Journal of Economic Growth* 8(2), 195–222
[97] ibid

Table 2.1: *Conflict Duration Measures: M23 (DRC) v. Al-Shabaab (Somalia)*

	M23	Al-Shabaab
Polity IV	Open Anocracy	Open Anocracy
Ethnic Fractionalization Score	0.878	0.812
GDP per capita	$472	$420
Terrain	903	2416
Foreign Patronage	Yes	Yes
Loot	Yes	Yes
Gems	Yes	Yes
Drugs	No	No
Cross-border Sanctuary	Yes	Yes

Polity IV: Marshall, Gur, and Jaggers (2017); Ethnic: Fearon (2003); GDP: World Bank (2017) Terrain: Fearon and Laitin (2003); Foreign Patronage: Wood (2010); Loot, Gems, Drugs: UCDP (2016); Sanctuary: Wood (2010)

These cases look very similar across most standard conflict variables with but one notable disparity: terrain. While the terrain measure for Somalia is more than twice than that exhibited by the DRC, both scores are on the low end of the 'roughness' scale when compared to other African countries that have been plagued by intrastate conflicts, such as Uganda, Ethiopia, or Kenya.[98] Moreover, countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia exhibit low terrain scores but nonetheless suffered from lengthy conflicts.[99]

[98] Fearon and Laitin (2003). The National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda for example, waged a 'successful' insurgency against the government (1981-86). According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), Uganda's terrain score was 4489. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia continues to wage a nearly 20-year insurgency against its government. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), Ethiopia's terrain score was 4745. The Mau Mau in Kenya waged an approximately 10 year insurgency (1952-64) before they were defeated by British forces. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), Kenya's terrain score was 5199.

[99] Fearon and Laitin (2003). The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone for example, waged a failed 11-year insurgency (1991-2002), though later transformed into a political party. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), Sierra Leone's terrain score was 1948. The National Patriotic Front in Liberia (NPFL) fought between 1989-96. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), Liberia's terrain score was 1380.

As for M23 and Al-Shabaab, the conflict durations are very different. On the one hand, the Congolese Army trounced M23 rather quickly—19 months. There is an inverse relationship between ethnic fractionalization and duration, which diverges from extant literature. On the other hand, Al-Shabaab endures today after almost 10 years. Here the relationships between ethnic fractionalization and GDP per capita, and duration conform to conventional wisdom. Sure, these cases are not as clear-cut as made out to be here. There are far more nuances that are beyond the scope of this cursory illustration. The story told by the data is less ambiguous however.

2.4 Why Missing Incubation Matters

Though the variables of our cases under scrutiny here are remarkably similar, one (Al-Shabaab) conforms to conventional wisdom and the other (M23) does not. We must assume there are other confounding variables influencing conflict duration. This is where my theory of incubation comes in: *there is a positive relationship between incubation duration and conflict duration*. However, we do not yet have a measure for incubation to test any hypotheses across the aggregate. Let me illustrate.

As it stands, most studies of insurgent war have relied heavily on one, a few, or all of the following datasets: the Correlates of War (COW) dataset;[100] James Fearon and David Laitin's (2003) dataset; Nicholas Sambanis's (2004) dataset; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO ACD).[101] While heretofore, these data have been exceptionally useful for those conducting large-N conflict analyses, insurgent groups first appear in these data

[100] Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
[101] Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002); Pettersson and Wallensteen (2016)

when they reached some measurable battle-related death threshold.[102] Using the precise date when battle-related deaths reached a measurable threshold is a reasonable empirical method for coding the start of conflict. But these data are incomplete because we do not yet have a variable that captures when insurgencies actually formed and how long they were in existence before conflict began.

The primary methodological shortcoming here is there is (often) a discrepancy between the precise date when fighting reached a threshold (e.g., 25 battle-related deaths as used by UCDP) and the date when the insurgent organization actually formed. Presumably there were some insurgent organizations that formed long before they challenged a state, some who challenged states straightaway, and many somewhere in between. I argue this is important because insurgent prewar activities could illuminate why cases exhibit divergent durations. Yet our data are incomplete. Consequently, our analyses are wanting. Let us return to the aforementioned cases to illustrate this shortcoming.

M23 was initially formed on April 4, 2012, by the CNDP's former military chief of staff, Bosco Ntaganda, but does not appear in some datasets until June 6, 2012.[103] A 64-day discrepancy between M23's initial formation date and the precise date the 25 battle-related death threshold was reached is not a particularly excessive empirical flaw (maybe). Comparatively, Al-Shabaab was initially formed on January 2, 2006[104] when

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[102] UCDP use the precise date when fighting reached 25 battle-related deaths, COW, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004) use 1,000 over one year, 100 over one year, and 1,000 over three years, respectively)

[103] As coded by UCDP (2016)

[104] Veenhoop, H. R. De. (2007) "Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Cases of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU." *Conflict & Transition Consultancies;* International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005) "The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and For All," *Policy Briefing* 25

Abu Zubeyr united the aforementioned clans.[105] The organization does not appear in some datasets until January 17, 2008.[106] This constitutes a 746-day (approximately 2 year) discrepancy between initial formation and the date at which the 25 battle-related death threshold was reached—a two year disparity is hardly the most egregious example of this type shortcoming as a result of this widespread coding standard. This gap serves as my point of entry into this area of study.

The prewar "micro-foundations"[107] of insurgent group formation have been largely ignored in the literature because proto-insurgents often tend to consolidate in secret. Thus the gathering of "systematic evidence about how violence initially *begins*"[108] is often forgone in favor of more easily obtainable evidence. This has resulted in less "fine-grained data."[109] In so doing we have largely developed pictures of insurgent groups that are only partially complete or misinformed.[110] While I am not wading into uncharted water here, precious few scholars have made clear the importance of studying prewar preparation of insurgents as a strategy for making sense of conflict.

2.5 The Current State of Incubation Literature

To begin, Daniel Byman tried to better understand why some proto-insurgencies became "full-blown insurgencies"[111] and others failed. His analysis of Hezbollah in Lebanon and a duo of Egyptian jihadist groups concluded the former became a full-blown formidable insurgency because they were able to "create a politically salient identity, harness a

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[105] Solomon (2014, 351); Marchal, Roland (2011) "The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia" (Paris: Sciences Po, 2011), 12; Mueller, Jason C. (2018, 116)
[106] As coded by UCDP (2016)
[107] Lewis (forthcoming, 5)
[108] ibid
[109] ibid
[110] ibid
[111] Byman (2008, 165)

compelling cause, create an effective sanctuary, and defeat both violent and peaceful organizational rivals."[112] The Egyptian jihadist groups did not become viable insurgencies because they failed to establish most of these qualities and so rather lingered around for 7-8 years as hybrid proto-insurgent/terrorist groups—though both seemed to qualify as insurgencies within the boundaries of the author's scope conditions.[113]

In one respect, Byman's study began as a story about the ambiguities between insurgents and terrorists. Though this has been largely settled elsewhere,[114] the author himself appears to have gotten lost somewhere "at the nexus between terrorism and insurgency."[115] The problem of scope condition rigor aside, Byman made clear processes like creating a salient identity and building sanctuaries were important for the proto-insurgent-to-full-blown-insurgency transformation. Though according to him, these processes can be conducted at any time and in this study, most of them occurred *after* conflict had erupted. Hence, Byman's work under scrutiny here is not fundamentally about prewar preparation but rather how proto-insurgencies went about accomplishing these tasks—or in the Egyptian cases, how they failed to do so—*during* wartime. His work is rather a comparative analysis regarding the struggles associated with *simultaneously building organizations and fighting*. According to Byman, Hezbollah managed these concurrent tasks successfully and thus transitioned into a full-blown insurgency. The Egyptian jihadist groups did not, though still managed to survive as proto-insurgent/terrorist hybrids for the better half of a decade. We can surmise from this

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[112] ibid (165)
[113] Byman (2008) used the definition for insurgency from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pamphlet Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency.
[114] See for example, Paul Staniland (2014), Jessica Stanton (2015, 2016), or any of the numerous works from Jacob N. Shapiro.
[115] Byman (2008, 168)

study that the wartime context makes organization building particularly difficult in some cases.

Now let me discuss a study that focused *explicitly* on the prewar period and tackled one of the more divisive topics in conflict literature: ethnicity. Janet I. Lewis' forthcoming study on proto-rebel groups in Uganda found "only groups that formed in homogeneous areas became viable."[116] She also found that "ethnic mobilization was unimportant to the *initial* formation of rebel groups—but mattered *after* nascent groups had already formed,"[117] at least with respect to Ugandan rebel groups since 1986. According to some of her interviews, Lewis also found 'secrecy' to be an important consideration for leaders of proto-rebel groups.[118]

One of the major differences between Lewis and Byman is that Lewis' study is far more rigorous and precise on purpose and scope. She (accurately) claimed our datasets only include insurgent and rebels that reached some measurable threshold of violence and omit cases that did not, which has led to widespread selection biases in these data. Lewis' coding methodology is of particular interest here as she is one of the first to address this shortcoming in these data.

According to Lewis, conflict began when rebel groups formed, as operationalized by "a discernable command and control structure, and had committed or clearly planned to commit at least one act of violence against the state."[119] That is, initial rebel group formation and the start of armed conflict are one and the same in her study. She

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[116] Lewis (forthcoming, 24)
[117] ibid (1) emphasis in the original. According to Lewis (dissertation, 58), "The importance of managing relationships with civilians and maintaining secrecy from the government was a recurring theme in several interviews…"
[118] Lewis (forthcoming, 19)
[119] ibid (2-3)

operationalized 'viability' as having occurred when "the group was able to maintain a base on Ugandan soil of at least roughly 100 people for at least three months."[120] This methodology is an improvement over previous work in important ways.

First, it draws attention to and chiefly focused on the importance of rebel groups before conflict, which I have demonstrated has been largely overlooked by conflict scholars to this point.[121] Indeed, this call for a redirection of our attention 'backwards' in time—before large-scale violence occurred—was the theoretical launching pad from which this dissertation was sprung. Second, her work highlighted the importance of sequencing. That is, when studying conflict, we must take into account the behaviors of would-be rebels; the political factors; and the specific contextual milieu that existed before conflict onset or we run the risk of drawing incomplete or outright erroneous causal inferences.[122] While Lewis' work is an important intellectual step forward, this dissertation aims to improve upon her methodology. For example, the measurement thresholds used in this dissertation do overlap but also differ from hers in two substantive ways.

With regard to initial formation, I combined and modified elements from her initial formation *and* viable threat methodologies to operationalize initial formation of proto-insurgents—defined in this dissertation as having occurred when there was a discernable leader or leadership assembly and at least 50 members. I omit the "committed or clearly planned to commit at least one act of violence against the state"[123] portion of her operationalization from my methodology because I assume an inherent disparity in

[120] ibid (22)
[121] ibid (2)
[122] ibid (36)
[123] ibid (3)

operational capacity between groups that committed an act of violence or clearly planned to commit violence, and groups that just formed. For example, I argue foot soldiers need to be recruited, trained, and indoctrinated at the very least, before leaders produce violence or even plan to produce violence. This dissertation decouples the two because I claim proto-insurgents undergo incubation in the time period *between* initial formation and the moment they possess the capacity to clearly plan acts of violence. Moreover, I proffer there is an even wider gap in operational capacity between proto-insurgents that just formed and those with the capacity to actually commit violence.

I claim in the very least there is a difference between groups that intended to challenge the government through violence and groups that actually initiated the planning process to commit that violence. Even planning requires coordination, resources, and some minimal level of operational capacity that many groups do not embody at initial formation. As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, the founder and helmsman of Sendero Luminoso originally decided to challenge the Peruvian government through violence in 1970 but did not begin planning its first operation until approximately nine years later;[124] and furthermore, did not actually commit its first act of violence until almost a year after that.[125] Between 1970-1980, Sendero recruited and trained foot soldiers; gathered resources and intelligence; and developed an internal structure to organize members, among other things. Only after they developed these capacities did the proto-insurgency begin planning operations. Thus, I assume there is both a theoretical and operational distinction between groups that just formed and do not yet possess the capacity to pose a

[124] Guzmán R., Manuel Rubén Abimael, "Interview with Chairman Gonzalo," Berkeley: Committee to Support the War in Peru (1991, 36)
[125] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 3)

credible threat[126] and groups that exemplify a viable and credible threat to the sovereign's rule on the ground. The operationalization used in this dissertation makes a clear distinction here.

Second, with regard to the start of conflict, I take the position that insurgents must be able to practically *demonstrate* the operational capacity to commit acts of violence that fundamentally threaten the sovereign's rule on the ground. I do not adopt the view that the capacity to commit a few isolated acts of violence—whether a large-scale bombing that results in many deaths or a small-scale probing attack that does not[127]—to constitute a viable and credible threat to the sovereign.[128] I thus operationalize a viable, credible threat, and subsequently the start of conflict, as having occurred when at least 25 people have been killed in associated violence over the course of single year (including combatants on both sides as well as civilians). I chose this threshold because I think conceptualizing onset of violence in this way is more useful for my purposes because it fundamentally differentiates between those groups that, as Lewis wrote: "achieved capacities that are fundamental to threaten the authority of the state,"[129] and those that actually demonstrated they really possessed that capacity in practice. As this dissertation is interested in conflict duration as a function of prewar preparation, I propose duration of incubation as a proxy for the quality of preparation and I claim the effects of incubation

[126] Lewis (dissertation, 8) In keeping with Lewis, I am chiefly concerned with the capacity to carry out violence to denote the start of conflict and not the capacity to control territory.
[127] Ibid (136)
[128] In *The Terrorist's Dilemma* (2013, 1), Jacob N. Shapiro wrote "Individuals can conduct assassinations to be sure, and will occasionally kill tens or even hundreds, as Timothy McVeigh did in the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City" but "No individual or small group acting alone, nor even a group of individuals acting under a common rhetorical banner but without any coordination, can achieve the scale of violence that makes [them] a real threat to modern society." I take the position here that even the capacity to plan or coordinate any act of violence takes a considerable amount of time to establish and must be achieved beforehand. I claim groups that have just formed do not yet possess this capacity and need to first undergo incubation before they can pose a credible threat to the state.
[129] Lewis (dissertation, 8)

on conflict are sufficiently captured in my model. With regard to Lewis' findings on ethnicity, and the expanse of literature her work engaged, I do include a measure of ethnic fractionalization in this dissertation's model to further test the explanatory power on conflict duration.

As for studies that touch on incubation in cursory ways, Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elizabeth Jean Wood argued insurgent leaders should take time to adopt a coherent ideology as a "means to socialize the members of the group into compliance with its commands and discipline."[130] These scholars claimed ideology was important for socialization because leaders needed to get individual preferences aligned with those of the group. This in turn helped them boost in-group morale and ensure members adhered to top-down mandates during wartime. They also claimed ideology was important for providing non-combat related behavioral guidelines such as regulating the "sexual life of their members."[131]

Like Byman's aforementioned study, Gutiérrez and Wood largely looked at the implications of their theory during conflict. That is, ideological appeals are effective for building institutions for wartime processes like recruitment,[132] coordination,[133] and behavioral control,[134] as well as for providing "blueprints for strategies."[135] The author's do not *explicitly* discuss the advantages or pitfalls of using ideology to motivate institutions before conflict versus after conflict has begun. To be fair, they do subtly allude to an *implicit* implication of their theory in the prewar context. For example, they

[130] Gutiérrez and Wood (2014, 218)
[131] ibid (220)
[132] ibid (218)
[133] ibid
[134] ibid
[135] ibid

claimed "a founder might choose an ideology—at least in theory [because it might help] provide a blueprint for institutions and strategies…"[136] Leading from this study, I later argue in this dissertation that ideology is indeed one of the many elements proto-insurgent leaders sometimes use to motivate institutional processes during incubation; like those discussed here by Gutiérrez and Wood in the context of wartime. Though I claim building institutions for processes like recruitment, coordination, and behavioral control is fundamentally easier to pull off before conflict starts.

While Gutiérrez and Wood do not directly invoke it, they allude to the notion that if groups fail to accomplish organizational tasks in effective ways early on, they "will struggle to organize the high-risk collective action of warfare."[137] Thus as with Byman's study, we can here too plausibly claim there are (plausible) inherent complications if insurgents wait to conduct organizational problem-solving chores until after conflict has begun. Though the authors did not explore this in any satisfactory way in the work under scrutiny here.

Elsewhere, Sarah Parkinson and Sherry Zaks claimed rebel organizations should take adequate measures to assign membership roles; create both intra and extra-organizational linkages, develop behavioral constraints for members; and identify short and long-term organizational goals.[138] Roles, controls, and goals create important bonds among rebel group members and ensures coordinated activity. Citing the works of Paul Staniland,"[139] Roger Peterson,[140] and Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger,[141] Parkinson and

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[136] ibid (220); Gutiérrez (2008)
[137] Gutiérrez and Wood (2014, 214)
[138] Sarah Parkinson and Sherry Zaks (forthcoming)
[139] Staniland, Paul (2014) *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, Cornell University Press
[140] Petersen, Roger D. (2001) *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe,* Cambridge University Press

Zaks did briefly discuss the influence "*pre-conflict* [social] relations"[142] likely have on insurgent and rebel organization structures. Though they did not explore this in any satisfactory way in the work under scrutiny here.

The intellectual roots of Staniland's work can be traced to the previous scholarship of Peterson, and Pedahzur and Perliger. These works, as well as Staniland's, focused nearly entirely on the prewar relations between insurgents and society. For example Staniland claimed the "absence of strong preexisting bonds of trust and commitment linking leaders to one another and to their local communities degrades organizational function, even if the organization's structures appears to get the incentives right."[143] He argued, proto-insurgent leaders need to take time before war to leverage preexisting personal and community relationships—or create ones where they are not present—if they are to have any hope of setting up long-lasting and durable resource networks. These networks, Staniland claimed, are important because they help proto-insurgents grow themselves before conflict and sustain their organizations during wartime.

Yet, to what extent do prewar social networks condition proto-insurgent organization building success or failure during incubation or even after conflict has started? Clearly some level of membership, support, and resources are necessary to help get proto-insurgents off the ground and to sustain them during wartime. But how much is necessary or sufficient? Proto-insurgent (and insurgent) resource endowments vary widely across cases. Likewise, not all insurgents procured financing through social

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[141] Pedahzur, Ami, and Arie Perliger (2006) "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," *Social Forces* 84(4); Pedahzur, Ami, and Arie Perliger (2011) *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*, Columbia University Press

[142] Parkinson and Zaks (forthcoming, 26) emphasis added

[143] Staniland (2010, 12)

networks. Many have helped fund their movements and enticed combatant to join using opportunities for exploiting lootables,[144] which do not require any pre-existing social networks. Moreover, other insurgents have used coercive forms of recruitment, which also do not require networks. For example, according to Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone "was a group of mutual strangers, largely recruited by force."[145] "87% of RUF combatants reported being abducted into the faction"[146] and "new RUF recruits typically knew nobody in their factions."[147] Yet the RUF survived conflict for more than a decade. Thus prewar social networks might be only part of the story. In the very least, there are still questions about whether prewar social networks are necessary for insurgent wartime survival or if the real key to protracting conflict could be by building effective prewar resource and recruitment processes, *by any means*.

Lastly, Amelia Hoover Green claimed, "to succeed (indeed, even to remain in the fight), military commanders must first create a fighting force that is capable of great, unhesitating violence."[148] She argued this is far easier said than done for proto-insurgent leaders because training a combatant to kill requires a variety of lengthy pre-combat "processes designed to strip away pre-military norms and identities, and to replace them with group norms and identities."[149] These include but are not limited to "political training, formal and informal socialization experiences, and disciplinary regimes (rules,

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[144] Jeremy M. Weinstein's 2007 book, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) is one of the most prominent works on the subject.
[145] Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein (2004, 2) "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, June-August 2003," Interim Report: July 2004, *THE POST-CONFLICT REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND EMPOWERMENT*, Columbia University and Stanford University
[146] ibid (25)
[147] ibid (24)
[148] Green (2016, 621)
[149] ibid

rewards, and punishments)."[150]

When compared to behavioral control mechanisms that used "pecuniary or non-pecuniary rewards and punishments,"[151] Green found that the rebel groups with the most effective behavioral control during wartime tended to be those that had employed "institutions intended to align combatants' preferences with those of commanders."[152] Her findings supported those proffered by a whole host of previously published studies on the necessity of pre-combat behavioral modification processes.[153]

While this is certainly not an exhaustive list, the works briefly surveyed here that have touched upon the prewar activities of insurgents constitute some of the most well-sourced and well-respected treatments available on the market today. There are further unanswered questions and some gaps yet to be filled however.

2.6 The Problems and How to (Help) Fix Them

Like most organizations, it is clear proto-insurgents face various generic problems. In review, Byman claimed the most important processes for the proto-insurgent are creating an identity with salience, establishing sanctuaries, and coming up with ways to effectively deal with rival competitors. Thanks to Lewis we know some Ugandan rebel leaders were particularly concerned about 'secrecy' during nascent stages. It is plausible proto-insurgents were so elsewhere. And what happened to those that were not especially secretive? It also seems ethnicity plays (different) roles before and after conflict.

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[150] ibid (620)
[151] ibid (619)
[152] ibid
[153] Brotz and Wilson (1946); Shils and Janowitz (1948); Moskos (1975); Faris (1975); Grossman (1996); Cooper-Thomas and Anderson (2002); Kelty, Kleykamp, and Segal (2010)

Thanks to Staniland we know some proto-insurgents conducted prewar social networking. Social networks from which recruits and resources were culled have proven valuable for bolstering and sustaining proto-insurgents, in some cases. But clearly some have gotten around establishing networks and still managed to survive. It is also plausible proto-insurgents have also conducted some of the same processes proffered by Byman, Gutiérrez and Wood, Parkinson and Zaks, and Green before conflict as well because they yield more efficiency and productivity.

Thanks to Byman, and Gutiérrez and Wood we know wartime presents a variety of organization-building challenges, which not all insurgents surmount. However, there seems to be less of consensus about *when* is the best time to conduct these processes. Though some of the literature surveyed here indicated the (plausible) problems associated with waiting to conduct these processes until after conflict has started, it is likely some proto-insurgents had the foresight to attempt to solve these challenges beforehand. It also appears ideology is one element around which insurgents build their organizations. Though in lieu of ideology, some insurgents have used external inducements that appealed to notions of greed or fear to accomplish these same tasks. How important is ideology then?

And thanks to Green we know prewar preparation, especially with regard to behavioral modification processes, are especially important for preparing combatants for the wartime stresses. She claimed conditioning foot soldiers to kill on command is an especially important prewar process. It is plausible some proto-insurgents attempted to do similar behavior modification processes beforehand too.

There are likely some tasks on which proto-insurgents must concentrate that will

increase their wartime survivability. Yet it is not surprising that due to the relative 'newness' of this area of study we neither have a unified theory that bridges the gap between the prewar and wartime nor a comprehensive dataset to test the explanatory power of the former on the latter. We first need a unified theory that focuses on the prewar activities of the proto-insurgent—and in particular, a theory that identifies meaningful trends across cases—in order to determine causal relevance on conflict duration. I outline such a theory in the next chapter where I claim some proto-insurgents solve these problems during wartime while others, and indeed the more successful cases, tackle these issues before wartime—or during incubation.

Solving these organizational problems during incubation is not easy. Select previous[154] and emerging[155] scholarship has highlighted the oft-ignored notion that most proto-insurgents encounter a variety of stumbling blocks over which many either trip or fail to surmount altogether before they ever get to challenge a state.[156] In light of this, I lay out a comprehensive set of problems proto-insurgents face and the ways they can build organizations during incubation to solve them. Incubation is thus a proxy for prewar preparation at large, and in essence a measurement of insurgent quality—a standard by which we can assess any one insurgent's survivability against the survivability of other insurgents as a function of prewar behaviors.

As for usefulness of such a theory, ostensibly, examining the things an insurgent did before they launched a violent campaign—as well as the length of time they took to do those things—is not only practically important for rounding out the full picture of insurgents' lifespans but it is also possible that the prewar time period could be relevant

[154] Byman (2008)
[155] Lewis (forthcoming)
[156] Byman (2008, 167)

for understanding conflict duration. Incubation could condition the relationship of a number of previously proffered variables. To do this we next need a methodology for coding incubation to add to the industry-accepted datasets so that we can test the explanatory power of the unified theory of incubation on conflict. In so doing, we should be able to better explain why some, like Al-Shabaab, persisted and why others, like M23, were quickly defeated. I proffer such a methodology and test its explanatory value on conflict duration in Chapter 4.

To summarize, solving organizational problems one way or another is critically important for insurgent longevity. In point of fact, I argue no insurgency, no matter how large or small, can expect to produce the magnitude of sustained violence needed to threaten the sovereign without first solving a number of critical, though generic, organizational issues. Yet discussions about what insurgents did before they used large-scale violence as a strategy for challenging a sovereign are mostly absent. Thus we do not have a sense of how, and to what extent, the prewar period influenced wartime. If we continue to omit the prewar time period we cannot expect to fully explain why some insurgencies dragged on in the past or develop strategies to halt future proto-insurgents in their tracks.

CHAPTER 3—THE THEORY OF INCUBATION

3.1 Introduction

Now that I have argued we should at least consider the prewar time period if we want to round out the complete picture of insurgent's lifespans and reconcile some of the divergent findings in the literature with regard to insurgent war duration; this chapter develops the theoretical framework to address the central question that underlies this dissertation: *how can comparatively weaker insurgents survive for years or even decades against state-backed armed forces?* In contrast to most works on insurgency, the theory of incubation proffered here does not seek to explain the capacity of insurgents to survive wartime as a function of the challenges and choices made during conflict but rather as a consequence of the extent and type of preparation undertaken before large-scale conflict erupted—that is to say, during incubation. The notion that drives the theory is rather simple: it is always a good idea to be prepared. More specifically, I claim a proto-insurgent that took a longer period of time before conflict to prepare, survived wartime longer than a proto-insurgent that took less time; and unquestionably longer than one that forwent incubation altogether. Taking a lengthy incubation period is the pragmatic option for the proto-insurgent and is thus necessary for lengthy wartime survival.

Proto-insurgents must *specifically* use incubation to build organizations to address a set of problems that will increase their wartime survival probability. Some of these include developing clever talent acquisition strategies[157] to recruit a workforce, managing resources to finance operations, and combat training. A concerted organization-building effort that addresses these problems over a lengthy incubation period will reduce the likelihood of defeat. This chapter thus proceeds in the following manner.

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[157] Bloom (2016)

I begin with a brief discussion of the problems proto-insurgents face during incubation and the incubation processes themselves. That proto-insurgents *should* want to prepare themselves before they challenge the sovereign's claim to power is a modest notion, but I follow this section with a brief discussion about *why* prewar preparation, compared to waiting until after conflict has begun, is preferable for the proto-insurgent. I also discuss why some are prone to greater success than others.

Next, I systematically proffer a variety of ways proto-insurgents can successfully overcoming these problems. I describe the problems and the processes. Some are more difficult than others. Some take longer than others. But to be sure, the proto-insurgent addresses these problems if they are to have any hope of developing the capacity to challenge incumbents long-term during wartime. I conclude with a discussion about how these processes facilitate lengthy conflict.

I penned this chapter to be rigorously informed by theory but so too as a work grounded in pragmatism. In addition to the theoretical justifications for studying the incubation processes of the proto-insurgent, there are normative implications as well. The reader will find that much of theoretical framework has been reinforced by real-world illustrations. Though I have highlighted a number of clear preference choices with regard to 'successful' incubation practices, I have endeavored to forgo any defensible conclusions regarding the motivation(s) underlying the proto-insurgent's decision to resort to violence as a means to trigger political change. I hope the reader can move beyond the sensationalized nature of the topic and understand that proto-insurgents overcome (and succumb) to a variety of practical organizational pitfalls during incubation.

3.2 Using Incubation to Solve Problems

Incubating insurgents are exemplary units of analysis, both theoretically and practically, for studying goal-oriented problem solving largely because erroneous decisions have habitually dire consequences. Perhaps nowhere else can we find the disincentives greater than for those who intend to use violence to challenge the sovereign's claim to rule. More often than not, insurgencies will be loathed, underfunded, understaffed, outnumbered, ill-equipped, and likely ill-fated. Political violence is thus an especially problematic product to peddle.

Despite such meager prospects, the theory of incubation posits that proto-insurgents build the foundations for organizations that can protract conflict when they successfully accomplish the following tasks during incubation: a) attract recruits and material resources, b) foster cohesion and establish control, c) train members, d) establish secret bases or camps, e) avoid premature detection, and f) manage resources. At its core, the theory proposed here claims insurgents who survived conflict the longest were those that devised ways to solve these problems before conflict. Put otherwise, insurgent wartime survival capacity is attained during the prewar incubation period vis–à–vis these organization-building processes.

Aspiring insurgent leaders must undergo incubation for as long as is needed to build adequate organizational underpinnings to address these problems and longer still to demonstrate they have developed contextually relevant and sustainable solutions for them. The theory proffered here argues that an insurgency is more challenging to defeat if it has already demonstrated that it has done the groundwork to tackle these problems during incubation. I argue the wartime survival capacity of an insurgent organization is

causally related to the quality of problem-solving competence developed during incubation. Incubation is thus a method to assess the quality of prewar preparation.

3.3 Why Incubate?

The processes listed above are not endogenous to incubation. Indeed, they continue after conflict has erupted. Some insurgents even wait to undergo processes, like recruiting and training, until after conflict has begun—though I argue they need to be initiated during incubation to facilitate long-term survival. This is largely because some processes take a considerable amount of time to implement successfully.

For example, the aspiring proto-insurgent leader cannot expect to take on the sovereign before having first figured out way(s) to convince some threshold of people[158] that joining or supporting the insurgency is a good idea. This is not easy and is often prone to failure more than success.[159] Still, some "rebel entrepreneurs"[160] have persuaded people to join and still, others to carry out violence on their behalf. Incubation affords the proto-insurgent time to come up with a plan to market their product, the chances to test its persuasive value, and the opportunities to modify it as needed.[161]

Assuming some people do buy in and because they will likely be militarily weaker when compared to the armed forces they intend to oppose[162]—access to military technology and the balance of insurgent foot soldiers to state-backed troops is almost

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[158] According to Fearon and Laitin (2001, 8), "The total number of active rebels in many wars in which thousands of civilians have been killed (through the actions of both governments and rebels) is often in the hundreds. Even in relatively 'big' cases such as Kashmir or Algeria the number of active fighters rarely exceeds 10,000."

[159] Byman (2008, 166), Lewis (forthcoming, 8)

[160] Lewis (forthcoming, 3); Hirshleifer, Jack (1994, 6) "The Dark Side of the Force: Western Economic Association International 1993 Presidential Address," *Economic Inquiry* 32(1), 1–10

[161] Byman (2008, 167)

[162] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 8) called this "absolute weakness"

always be tipped in favor of the latter[163]—if incubating proto-insurgents are to have any hope of surviving, they need to take time to train the first wave of foot soldiers before thrusting them into battle. Leaders cannot have people who have no idea how a rifle or bomb works going up against professional military, police, and security services and expect them to pull off attacks in any proficient way. There is basic competence to consider and turning a farmer, factory worker, or college student into a willing and capable killer rarely happens over night.[164] Pre-combat training also gives leaders and commanders time to asses who is better at performing certain tasks, which leads to delegation of responsibilities in a way that ought to yield more efficiency and productivity down the road.

Aside from the recruitment and training of personnel, proto-insurgents cannot expect to last without pre-establishing some measure of supporting infrastructure. At the very least they require food and places for themselves and foot soldiers to train, hide, and rest.[165] Incubation ought to also provide opportunities to learn geography and topography, build infrastructure (including camps, or trails and tunnels that might facilitate guerrilla tactics), and cripple or destroy infrastructure that would enable incumbent forces to penetrate areas of the country important to insurgents. Like recruitment and training, building infrastructural and resource support takes a long time to get just right. Incubation is thus important for beginning processes like harnessing a "compelling cause,"[166] training recruits, and establishing supporting infrastructure. These tasks are among the most crucial for the proto-insurgent to initiate during incubation because they are crucial

[163] See Wood (2010), and Lyall and Wilson (2009)
[164] See Green (2016) for a complete discussion on this subject.
[165] Byman (2008, 187)
[166] ibid (167)

to survival once conflict starts. They are developed through a long process that necessitates refinement and amendment. While not easy to accomplish during incubation by any stretch, once conflict has ensued insurgents no longer operate in isolation and these tasks become extraordinarily more difficult to undergo, thanks to a variety of wartime-specific factors.

For example, after conflict begins, insurgents can no longer be primarily concerned with preparing for war because they must also actively wage war at the same time. This means the difficulties associated with organization building during incubation are compounded and frequently overshadowed during wartime by the insurgent's most fundamental task of all—fighting. When incumbents are capable and committed (and even if they are not),[167] COIN efforts are a real threat to insurgent survival. In addition to COIN, states often launch campaigns of misinformation designed to sully the reputations of insurgents. They also "disrupt organizations through various forms of policing and repression and can co-opt potential leaders and make them allies of the state."[168]

Furthermore, civilians frequently get caught between an insurgency and the state during wartime.[169] Intrastate conflicts are "commonly associated with significant human suffering, particularly for noncombatant populations."[170] The associated violence tends to make insurgents (and incumbents) less popular.[171] It has been elsewhere demonstrated that *both* insurgents and incumbents frequently and strategically used violence to deter

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[167] According to Fearon and Laitin (2001, 7-8), "If government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. This is typically true even in states whose military and police capacities are low."
[168] Byman (2008, 192)
[169] Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War, *Cambridge University Press*
[170] Humphreys, Macartan; Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2006, 429) "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 100(3), 429-447
[171] See for example, Stanton, Jessica (2013) "Terrorism in the Context of Civil War", *The Journal of Politics*, 75(4), 1009–1022

civilians from rendering support to the opposite side.[172] For example, "by attacking the wider civilian population, as the PKK did in bombing hotels and shopping areas, a rebel group can increase the costs of the conflict in the hope that the government will make concessions rather than endure continuing losses."[173]

Insurgents likewise often target infrastructure, such as "power stations, oil pipelines, or bridges."[174] While civilian casualties tend to be lower or even rare when insurgents utilize this type of wartime violence, "attacking these types of targets imposes high costs on civilians by disrupting services or impeding transportation…"[175] Thus, while insurgents are mostly unpopular in the first place, wartime violence can make them even less lovable; which compounds the difficulties already associated with getting civilians on their side.

The ways civilians behave in response to wartime violence has been studied elsewhere at length. The simplest conceptualization is the Olsonian view: individuals weigh the benefits and costs of participating versus staying on the sidelines.[176] More nuanced approaches claim the degree of frustration associated with political marginalization,[177] "pleasure in agency,"[178] or the "depth of an individual's discontent with his or her economic position in society [are significant casual factors that often

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[172] Stanton (2013, 1009); Kalyvas (2006)
[173] Stanton (2013, 1010)
[174] ibid (1015)
[175] Stanton (2013, 1015)
[176] Olson, Mancur (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard University Press. See also Lichbach (1995), Popkin (1979). As for supporting rebellion, see Goodwin and Skocpol (1989), Kuran (1989), Skocpol (1982).
[177] Merton, Robert (1949) *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Free Press; Richards, Paul (1996) *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone*, Oxford
[178] Wood (2003)

differentiate] participants in rebellion from nonparticipants."[179] Related economic, political, or ethical motivations can certainly influence whether civilians decide to support or eschew incubating proto-insurgents but previous research has demonstrated civilian preferences are endogenous to conflict and are extremely hard to predict.[180]

3.3.1 Section Conclusion

Incubation offers the proto-insurgent opportunities to transform from a rag-tag gaggle of revolutionary aspirants into a moderately effective, durable insurgency. It affords them the critical time and the essential opportunities to figure out how to establish a preliminary force and support networks; train foot soldiers in the art of guerrilla warfare; build base camps as hubs for training, resting, and hiding; and for figuring out ways to keep members committed and subservient to top-down directives. This time is critical because it allows them to acquire the numbers, skills, and develop the strategies that will be needed during wartime while not having to worry about actually fighting the state at the same time.[181] Once conflict begins, competition both on and off the battlefield increases. They not only compete militarily against the state, but so too for "recruits and defectors,"[182] backing from the international community,[183] and civilian support.[184] Civilian responses to violence are also endogenous to wartime.

In sum, organization building is difficult enough during incubation because proto-insurgents have to devote considerable time and attention to detail. These tasks become

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[179] Humphreys, Macartan; Weinstein, Jeremy M. (2008, 440) "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War Author," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2), 436-455; Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004) "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4), 563-595
[180] Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006, 385) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge University Press; Kalyvas, Stathis N., Ian Shapiro, and Tarek E. Masoud (2008) *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, Cambridge University Press
[181] Ritter and Conrad (forthcoming)
[182] Gates (2002 121)
[183] Byman (2008)
[184] See the many works of Stathis N. Kalyvas.

exponentially more problematic when insurgents are engaged in full-on combat at the same time.

3.4 Context or Strategy?

As Fearon and Laitin[185] and Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner[186] have previously noted, though the motivations that undergird rebellion are almost universally present, insurgency is a relatively rare phenomenon. In his summation of Paul Collier's work, John Sherman remarked: "What is critical is not whether people actually have reason to commit violence, but what enables them to carry it out in particular circumstances ... feasibility is a rare phenomenon."[187] What then is more important for facilitating insurgents: context or strategy? I take the position here that while context is important, what matters for proto-insurgent success during incubation is the decision-making of leaders. That is, context should inform the proto-insurgent's choices—and not all are systematically strategic.

Though less popular in rebel and insurgency literature, framing violent non-state actors as strategic decision-makers has gained traction amongst scholars studying terrorist groups. Mia Bloom for example, argued it is accurate to depict terrorists as both "malevolently creative, and capable of perpetrating well-planned mass casualty attacks in the heart of European capitals… [and] imbeciles, incapable of carrying out the most basic tasks, who mostly end up blowing themselves up by accident."[188] In a comparative analysis of the recruitment strategies of the PIRA, al-Qaeda, and ISIS, she concluded

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[185] Fearon and Laitin (2003)
[186] Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009)
[187] Sherman, John (2001, 28) The economics of war: The intersection of need, creed and greed: A conference report. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC
[188] Bloom, Mia (2016, 1) "Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and "Talent Spotting" in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and ISIS", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*

"violent extremist organizations can and do act rationally,"[189] make strategic choices about recruitment that are informed by organizational needs, and will refine and amend their approaches accordingly over time. Elsewhere, Jacob N. Shapiro[190] demonstrated that due to the often-complex internal dynamics of terrorist organizations, leaders make strategic (or foolhardy) choices regarding funding, personnel, and targeting. I take a similar position here: incubation success hinges largely on the capacity of proto-insurgent leaders to make strategic, contextually informed organization-building decisions.

Sure, across cases proto-insurgent leaders vary widely in this capacity. For example, previous research has demonstrated leaders' prior experiences can have exponentially positive implications for newly forming rebel groups.[191] That is, aspiring proto-insurgent leaders residing in places with a history of violence or with organizational experience in previous rebellions and/or social movements tend to have better success when building subsequent movements. These "skilled resisters"[192] with "organizational legacies of war"[193] can call on their experiential endowments when building new rebellions and insurgencies and ought to have better success than those lacking similar knowledge. To illustrate, Evgeny Finkel's study of anti-Nazi Jewish resistance groups in WWII found those that successfully made the "transition from mobilization to sustained resistance [had] a specific set of skills and that exposure to past

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[189] Bloom (2016, 15)
[190] Shapiro, Jacob N. and David A. Siegel (2007) "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations", *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(2), 405-429; Shapiro, Jacob N. (2013) *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*, Princeton University Press
[191] Finkel, Evgeny (2015, 339) "The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust," *American Political Science Review* 109(2), 339-353; Daly, Sarah Zukerman (2012, 473) "Organizational legacies of violence: Conditions favoring insurgency onset in Colombia, 1964–1984," *Journal of Peace Research* 49(3), 473-491
[192] Finkel, Evgeny (2015, 339) "The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust," *American Political Science Review* 109(2), 339-353
[193] Daly, Sarah Zukerman (2012, 473) "Organizational legacies of violence: Conditions favoring insurgency onset in Colombia, 1964–1984," *Journal of Peace Research* 49(3), 473-491

selective repression is an important… pathway to acquiring such a skill set."[194] In sum, experiential endowments may constitute a critical component for strategic rebellion building.

3.5 Triggering Support with Interpretive Discourse

Let us assume a proto-insurgent has decided to foment political violence—something that has transpired during the last 200 years far more times than we have cared to tally.[195] While civilians-turned-rebels have turned to violence for a variety of reasons, I argue these reasons are largely inconsequential and theoretically irrelevant[196] for our purposes here because once the decision to pursue violence has been made, *the first thing all proto-insurgents must do is figure out how to go about enticing individuals to get on board*.

Since "larger size is a great benefit in insurgent war"[197] and because the proto-insurgent is almost always strapped for money and material resources (especially at the beginning), they need to attract the necessary start-up capital to get their would-be state-challenging effort off the ground. Here, warm bodies, funding, and material resources constitute the primary organization-building capital and my theory posits the successful proto-insurgent needs to devise ways to attract all three.[198]

Proto-insurgent leaders have sought to mobilize recruits, money, and material resources from a whole host of places including but not limited to: political parties,

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[194] Finkel (2015, 351)

[195] Industry-accepted datasets identify more than 300 actual cases of insurgency since 1800. However, the real number of proto-insurgents who have attempted (but failed) to get violent a movement off the ground is probabilistically far higher. It should be noted that in Lewis' forthcoming study: "Only four of the 16 groups became a viable threat to the Ugandan government…(22)."

[196] Ethnicity's influence on conflict for example, has produced widely divergent results and scholars generally fall into one of two camps. On the one hand, Toft (2002, 2003); Østby (2008); Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009); Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011), among others, have found ethnicity to be a reason insurgents rebel. On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Goldstone et al. (2010), among others, have found little evidence that ethnicity plays a major role in conflict onset.

[197] Byman (2008, 170)

[198] See Paul Staniland (2012) for a similar argument.

colleges and universities, disaffected youth groups, ethnic groups, religious organizations, poorer communities, disenchanted military or police personnel, and civilian populations that are oppressed or ignored by the government. But *how* does the proto-insurgent go about convincing these people that challenging the state through violence is a good idea? They begin this long process by developing a particularly salient narrative of the world.

According to David Apter,[199] we can think of insurgents as agents of interpretive discourse. Put otherwise, proto-insurgents (try) to foment political violence by persuading others to get involved by marketing systems of meaning, language, and tones that portray the world in a very specific way. For Apter,[200] most events in the world are alone insufficient fodder for fomenting political violence but rather hinge on the presence of an extreme narrator or commentator who can leverage, engineer, or manipulate these events to further her or his revolutionary agenda.

In order to foment political violence proto-insurgent leaders use a whole host of ideas to undergird a self-validating, self-sustaining[201] interpretive discourse. They draw on "certain ingredients, paradigms, or examples; doctrines, myths, and theories; magic or fantasy and logic; metaphor and metonym; narrative and text."[202] These range from those that stress extremist or political ideology, religion, ethnic demonization, anti-western establishment rhetoric, anti-foreign occupation, anti-immigrant, and so on.[203] Proto-insurgent leaders can also arouse support by appealing to or by exploiting some mixture

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[199] Apter (1993, 1997)
[200] Apter's work cited here, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic* (1994), was coauthored with Tony Saich
[201] Degregori et al. (2012, 72)
[202] Summed up by Degregori et al. (2012, 72)
[203] Oppenheim et al. (2015, 798)

of intense group-level grievances.[204] They likewise develop discourse that sets them apart from the herd or differentiates their organization from others (both violent and non-violent, state and non-state). This is often accomplished using anti-government/society sentiment. That is to say, they purport to represent those who are oppressed or ignored by the state or society, as manifested through political alienation, economic and/or gender inequality, and that the insurgency is: a) aware and attentive to these grievances, and b) the catalyst for change.[205]

To illustrate, there is an interesting and emerging field of study on the discourse used to recruit female combatants.[206] The Chechen rebel group Al-Ansar al-Mujahedeen recruited women by framing violence as a path towards empowerment.[207] Likewise, the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka attracted large numbers of female militants by appealing to "personal grievances, revenge, or 'nationalist' reasons for liberating their homeland…"[208] Elsewhere, some have marketed discourse that incorporated gender grievances with ethnic-based *and* economic motivations.[209] As for non-political or non-social-based discourse, proto-insurgent leaders sometimes attempt to trigger support using "pecuniary or non-pecuniary rewards and punishments."[210] They offer promises of income via paid wages, opportunities for looting or extortion, or they hype the thrill of

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[204] Fearon and Laitin (2003, 76); Byman (2008, 181)
[205] Horowitz (2000); Tilly (1978); Gurr (1970)
[206] See for example, Bloom, Mia (2007) "Female Suicide Bombers," *Daedalus* 136(1), 94-102
[207] Bloom (2007, 97)
[208] Bhatia, Vandana and W. Andy Knight (2011, 11) "Female Suicide Terrorism in South Asia: Comparing the Tamil Separatists and Kashmir Insurgents," *South Asian Survey* 18(1) 7–26. According to these scholars, "Women formed a vital component of the LTTE. Not only were they central to the LTTE's frontline combat, they also engaged in suicide missions. It is estimated that approximately one-third of the LTTE organization was comprised of women; that is, roughly 3,000 out of a total of 11,000 cadres."
[209] For a detailed study on this, see Gates, Scott (2002) "Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion , Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1), 111-130. See also, Alison, Miranda H. (2009) *Women and Political Violence: Female Combatants in Ethno-national Conflict*, Routledge
[210] Green (2016, 619)

combat as a means to scratch the itch of adventure seekers.[211] They also use threats of violence, slavery, rape, or destruction of property.[212]

However, in my theoretical framework, I argue no one single (or combination of) philosophies, ideologies, myths, or doctrines constitute an "organizational genius"[213] given the range of variation from which the proto-insurgent has drawn. The ideas that undergird proto-insurgent discourse vary substantively and are only theoretically important inasmuch as they actively contribute to practical systems of meaning that effectively prompt, signal, or trigger support from some segment(s) of the local population and/or potentially amendable foreign patrons. It is the language or tone used to market arguments and proto-insurgents need it to persuade people of their proposition's value and to the time to successfully coax some measure of them to actually lend their support. Thus, in the framework here, *the sole purpose of interpretive discourse is to create a narrative that has gainful, support-triggering value*.

Sometimes it is easier to lure support when the proto-insurgent has pre-existing social ties.[214] To illustrate, years before civil war onset, the leader of Sendero Luminoso in Peru leveraged his position as a university professor to recruit both female and male college students. But preexisting social ties are not necessary. Recall the RUF in Sierra Leone forcibly recruited from villages at random.[215]

It is important to reiterate here that mixing together the right 'ingredients' to form interpretive discourse that effectively triggers revolutionary mobilization is a truly

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[211] Bahney et al. (2013); De Mesquita (2005); Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
[212] Weinstein (2007, 4)
[213] Staniland (2010, 48)
[214] On this, Staniland's (2010, 2014) work, in addition to that of Petersen (2001), and Pedahzur and Perliger (2006), all highlighted the importance of "pre-war social relations."[214]
[215] Humphreys and Weinstein (2004, 24)

monumental and time-consuming task for the proto-insurgent. Indeed, "revolutionary mobilization is not a grand process, but instead the accumulation of successes, village-by-village..."[216] While it is true some created (or adopted) a coherent discourse in a relatively short period of time, I claim those who survived conflict longer took more time during incubation to develop and modify their discourse to suit their target audience(s)—particular segment(s) of the population and/or foreign patrons[217]—and longer still to mobilize them. Interpretive discourse takes a long time to develop and needs to be open to *contextual* modification over time,[218] lest the proto-insurgent run the risk of marketing a discourse of poor triggering quality.[219]

To summarize, the proto-insurgent develops and refines discourse to tap into contextually relevant group-level characteristics among various segments of the population. It is the language or tone used to market arguments and must be modified because their appeals are likely to fall on deaf ears when they have not taken the time to suss out the specific contexts of their target audiences. For example, gender empowerment discourse, like that marketed by Al-Ansar al-Mujahedeen in Chechnya, can lose triggering value if societal gender norms become more liberal over time.[220] Thus, valuable discourse requires proto-insurgents to have an acute sense of the broader sociopolitical environment *and* the willingness to adapt their discourse accordingly to leverage their specific environments effectively. This is a slow arduous process, subject to failure more than success. But it is a necessary process if the proto-insurgent expects to

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[216] Staniland (2010, 49)
[217] Byman (2008, 181)
[218] Weinstein (2007, 52)
[219] Over the course of this study I have found that theoretical or empirical thresholds for critical mass on paper do not necessarily align in any useful way with actual patterns in reality. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2001, 7) argued, a successful insurgency may need little more than "small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas."
[220] Bloom (2007, 96)

cull enough support to mount any credible threat against the state.

3.6 Fostering Cohesion and Establishing Control

Now let us assume the proto-insurgent leader has developed and marketed interpretive discourse with gainful, support-triggering value. This means the organization has started to (slowly) increase in size and is thus in need of plans to manage its growing numbers; control behavior, and unify recruits into one cohesive group in ways that do not cause them unsustainable costs. Leaders must also deter defection and desertion. Foot soldiers will be expected to risk their lives for the cause and proto-insurgent leaders cannot have a revolving door through which recruits come and go as they please or have them creating their own wartime agendas that do not align with organizational goals. Alec Worsnop for example, demonstrated JAM[221] fighters in Iraq were more committed to the cause than to following orders.[222] This was not an issue when JAM leaders advocated violence but became problematic with the advent of a ceasefire negotiation because foot soldiers "did not want to put their arms down."[223] I claim here the (in)capacity of the proto-insurgent leader to manage her or his subordinates in an orderly way during wartime is a direct cause of the cohesion-building processes and control mechanisms established during incubation.[224]

While most early members of a proto-insurgency tend to share two fundamental characteristics, "conviction and idealism,"[225] leaders still need to motivate them and justify their involvement in an enterprise that could ultimately result in their death. They likewise need to get them to obey any number of organizational mandates during

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[221] Jaysh al-Mahdi
[222] Worsnop (forthcoming, 16)
[223] ibid
[224] ibid
[225] Byman (2008, 171)

wartime[226]—like where to direct violence[227] and when to "turn violence on and off."[228] When leaders fail to foster in-group cohesion or establish control mechanisms during incubation, members tend to be less committed[229] and are more likely to defect[230] or side-switch[231] when faced with the perils of wartime. Others, such as adventure seekers[232] or those motivated by greed or fear are likely to behave in ways that do not align with organizational agendas.[233] To illustrate, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda "killed civilians individually or in small groups as part of targeted assassinations and executions of defectors"[234] while foot soldiers of the RENAMO insurgency in Mozambique became increasingly more challenging for André Matsangaissa and his successor, Ossufo Momade to monitor after conflict erupted. As a result, many RENAMO foot soldiers often killed civilians indiscriminately and participated in unsanctioned "looting and destruction of civilian property."[235]

According to Weinstein,[236] RENAMO enjoyed considerable foreign patronage and still had difficulty controlling behavior. By comparison, the NRA had far less resource endowments yet exhibited considerably more effective cohesion and control.[237] Greater funding was thus not an effective long-term replacement for cohesion and control in the RENAMO case.

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[226] Hoover Green (2016, 620) concluded, "extrinsic incentives will typically be insufficient to ensure restrained behavior. Thus, a critical characteristic of an armed group is the extent to which, in addition to providing extrinsic incentives, the group builds institutions to create intrinsic incentives for behaviors that match commander preferences.
[227] Weinstein (2007)
[228] Worsnop (forthcoming, 2)
[229] Oppenheim et al., (2015, 794)
[230] Kalyvas (2007)
[231] Oppenheim et al. (2015)
[232] Bahney et al. (2013); De Mesquita (2005); Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
[233] Kalyvas and Kocher (2007); Weinstein (2007)
[234] Weinstein (2007, 243)
[235] ibid (218)
[236] ibid (15)
[237] ibid

For our purposes here, successful cohesion and control does not necessarily mean combat effectiveness for the proto-insurgent on the battlefield.[238] Rather, cohesion and control mechanisms established during incubation sway the insurgent leader's (in)capacity to oversee and manage all types of individual and group-level behavior during wartime—like who to kill or not kill, when to stand and fight, and when to run and hide. When proto-insurgent leaders get members to surrender personal autonomy in favor of the organization and they set up control mechanisms during incubation, insurgent groups are likely to last longer in wartime. When taken together, cohesion and control mechanisms established during incubation lead to a loyal, disciplined, and unified organization that stays true to organizational mandates once the bullets start flying. Put otherwise, tending to these processes during incubation leads to an insurgency that is better prepared to manage behavior once conflict has erupted.[239] This is especially important because monitoring and controlling foot soldier behavior in accordance with organizational mandates once they have dispersed from hidden sanctuaries is a difficult task in-and-of itself—and is exceptionally more difficult thanks to the fragmentation of space caused by conflict.[240]

3.6.1 Cohesion versus Control

Cohesion and control are frequently intertwined in the literature and so too in practice. Control is normally framed as a cohesion-sustaining mechanism used by the proto-insurgent leader.[241] For example, Paul Staniland conceptualized cohesion as the "*nature*

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[238] See Staniland (2012) for more on this.
[239] Staniland (2012, 33)
[240] Arjona (2014, 1363); McColl (1969); Kalyvas (2006, 88)
[241] See Wendy Pearlman, (2011); Staniland (dissertation); Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries," 56, no. 1 (2012): 16–40; Fotini Christia, (2012); Mitchell Brown, Victor Asal, and Angela Dalton (2012) "Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East," 56(1) 94–117

and level of internal control within a group"[242] measured along a scale where unity and fragmentation resided on opposite ends.[243] In practice, small and large unit cohesion building exercises and inculcating new recruits on the workings of various command and control structures are among the processes most frequently utilized by conventional militaries before recruits are sent into combat.[244] Here, I intend to disentangle the two to illustrate how they are *individual but complimentary* processes deserving of the proto-insurgent's attention during incubation.

Here, we might think of cohesion as a function of the proto-insurgent's loyalty-building approaches. These are designed to take individual members[245] and turn them into a unified and cohesive collective. Cohesion is an important individual concept here because it helps pre-establish the foundation that will hold an insurgency together even (especially) when they are being walloped by state-backed armed forces or when incumbents are unwilling to negotiate concessions. Carl von Clausewitz often highlighted the necessity of fostering loyalty through cohesion. In Chapter 5 of Book 111, of *On War* he wrote:

> An army that maintains cohesion under the most murderous of fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its *might;* that, proud of its victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; a force that regards such efforts as a means to victory rather than a curse on its cause; that is mindful

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[242] Staniland (dissertation, 38, emphasis in the original)
[243] ibid
[244] For more on this see Samuel Stouffer, *The American Soldier* (1949); Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II" *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): *280-315;* Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (1957); Charles Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man: the Rank and File in Today's Military* (1970)
[245] "The literatures on insurgency, revolution, and terrorism have identified a range of motivations that prompt individuals to engage in high-risk collective action activities that hold an uncertain payoff for both the individual and the group" (Oppenheim et al. 2015, 798). For more on what motivates individuals, see Collier et al, (2003); Abrahms (2008); Kalyvas and Kocher (2007); Young (1997); Nussio and Ugarriza (2013); Peterson (2001); Staniland (2014); Gutie´rrez San´ın (2008).

> of all these duties and qualities by virtue of the single powerful idea of the honor of its arms—such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit.

Likewise, 19th-century French author and military theorist, Colonel Ardant du Pioq argued cohesion building was important for inculcating a 'fighting spirit' to offset human nature. That is, cohesion building helps would-be combatants learn to "overcome fear and the natural instinct to preserve life and limb."[246] One who is effectively affiliated to the organization in this way will also "posses the motivation and individual initiative that will not require constant supervision of superiors"[247] because feeling accountable to his or her immediate peers[248] is enough to justify individual-level involvement and obedience.

Control is an equally important individual concept because it helps leaders ensure foot soldiers are organized and privy to wartime directives from above. "Civil war has a tremendous capacity to segment space,"[249] and insurgent foot soldiers are often spread out along various, decentralized fronts. [250] Decentralization can impede the insurgent leaders' ability to control members[251] and ensure violence is directed in accordance with top-down mandates—especially "once the fog of war rises."[252] Control here thus constitutes: a) structures leaders set up during incubation to organize and oversee subordinates, and b) inducements they will employ to get them to follow orders both during incubation and later on down the road. However, a high level of control is not the

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[246] Wong (1985, 2)
[247] ibid (3)
[248] Accountability as a function of organizational cohesion comes to us courtesy of Guy L. Siebold (1999, 21), "The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion," *Military Psychology* 11(1): "a structural definition of group cohesiveness that focuses on the pattern of relationships among group members as held together through the forces of social control…"
[249] Arjona (2014, 1363); McColl (1969); Kalyvas (2006, 88)
[250] Worsnop (forthcoming, 10)
[251] Gates (2002, 120)
[252] Worsnop (forthcoming, 8)

only way to get foot soldiers to obey. In point of fact, insurgent leaders have often compelled non-committed foot soldiers into following orders by using a variety of control mechanisms such as fear, money, or by framing combat as a way to scratch the itch of adventure seekers. While it is true the proto-insurgent leader can sometimes get foot soldiers to obey orders without fostering cohesion amongst the ranks, the theory of incubation posits cohesive organizations are far easier to control in the long-term than those that are fragmented. Proto-insurgencies staffed by those that are less committed incur greater opportunity costs than groups made up of highly committed ideologues and require considerably more oversight during wartime to ensure they act in accordance with organizational mandates rather than self-interest.[253]

3.6.2 Cohesion

One of the problems associated with creating a cohesive organization before combat is the complexity of motivations recruits have when joining in the first place. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate the reasons why people choose to join (or are compelled to join) armed groups that intend to challenge a state authority.[254] Here, cohesion building is chiefly concerned with the ways proto-insurgents get members to forgo individualism in favor of the group after they have joined, but before they engage the state through violence. To that end, loyalty-building approaches serve to affiliate members on a permanent basis to the organization and is accomplished through one

[253] See Weinstein (2007) for more on this argument.

[254] For more on this, see the theoretical framework I laid out for recruiting. For more on why people undertake violent collective action, see Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein (2008), "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2); Nichole Argo (2009) "Why Fight?: Examining Self-Interested versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion," *Security Studies* 18, 651–680; Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman (200), "Introduction," in V. Das, ed., *Violence and Subjectivity,* University of California Press; John Horgan (2008)"From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618

primary mode: fostering allegiance to the overall organization by nurturing rapport and cohesion amongst individual members. The successes of these approaches are reflected in levels of morale, esprit de corps, levels of retention, and the frequency and intensity of internal feuds and splits.[255]

Incubating insurgent leaders exploit a variety of tactics to foster cohesion. For example, requiring new recruits to engage with religious texts like the *Quran* or with political manifestos such as Mao's *Little Red Book* help make core individual-level motivations more homogenous by delimiting the desirable ideological or political boundaries of the organization. These boundaries provide "fighters with tools that allow them to remain committed to the armed group despite the inevitable hardship and risks that insurgency imposes and despite outside offers by the state and paramilitaries to defect."[256]

Leaders also sanction group-level exercises like singing and chanting, ritualistic scaring and tattooing, or even group rape.[257] As it turned out, group rape was one of the RUF's most widely employed cohesion-building strategies both before the onset of violent conflict and during much of the war, thereafter.[258] Group-level socialization, including practices that are violent, can be both formal and informal[259] and are effective for "severing previous social ties and building new loyalties."[260] They make a "coherent fighting force out of a collection of strangers"[261] by creating bonds,[262] boosting in-group

[255] Humphreys and Weinstein (2006); Johnston (2008); Wood (2009); and Staniland (2012) all developed useful measures of internal organizational cohesion.
[256] Oppenheim et al. (2015, 799)
[257] Amir (1971); Cohen (2013); Benard (1994); Card (1996); Sanday (2007)
[258] Humphreys and Weinstein (2004); Cohen (2013)
[259] Morris (1996); Wood (2009)
[260] Cohen (2013, 464); Morris (1996)
[261] Cohen (2013, 461)

morale,[263] and increasing mutual esteem.[264] Loyalties forged through intensive (even violent) group-level socialization practices tightly tie members to each other and to the organization at-large, are difficult to severe, and help keep members from abandoning the organization in the face of wartime hardship.[265] Strong group-level loyalties also help ease the burden of leaders having to constantly oversee subordinates, and also eliminate the need to channel scarce resources for continued economic inducements.

3.6.3 Control Through Inducements, Rewards, and Punishments

Control manifests in two ways: a) behavioral inducements, and b) organizational structure. With regard to the former, the proto-insurgent leader needs to figure out ways to motivate members to obey orders and reward for compliance or punish for disobedience before they actually send them off to fight.

To begin, following orders can be framed as the duty of the devout. That is, for those loyal to the insurgency, complying with top down directives is an extension of ones lifetime commitment[266] to ones immediate peers, and by extension, the organization. Proto-insurgent leaders can parlay strong commitment to the organization into staunch obedience because members would rather behave in ways that bring them individual honor and respect in the eyes of their cohort and shun conduct that might sully their reputation as a team player.[267] Absent this commitment,[268] the proto-insurgent leader calls

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[262] Cohen (2013, 461); Amir (1971); Groth and Birnbaum (1979); Benard (1994); Card (1996); Sanday (2007); Bijleveld and Hendriks (2003); Franklin (2004)
[263] Cohen (2013, 461); Amir (1971); Groth and Birnbaum (1979); Benard (1994); Card (1996); Sanday (2007)
[264] Cohen (2013, 464); Benard (1994); Card (1996); Sanday (2007)
[265] Oppenheim et al. (2015, 797)
[266] Shils and Janowitz (1948) studied cohesion within the German Army during WWII and concluded loyalty was a critical factor in keeping soldiers disciplined and compliant to their unit, even until their own death or the unit's destruction.
[267] Wong (1985, 3)
[268] Oppenheim et al. (2015, 797)

on a whole host of contextually relevant behavioral inducements, like rewards for compliance or punishments for disobedience. Pecuniary extrinsic rewards include money or promises of opportunities for looting for the greedy. Hyping the excitement or thrill of combat is used to trigger the intrinsic reward system of adventure seekers. Threats of beatings or the fear of death (for members and/or their families) are effective punishments for inducing compliance, especially when proto-insurgent leaders have shown they are willing to follow through with coercive methods.

It is important to note however that in lieu of strong in-group cohesion, rewards and punishments are ineffective long-term command and control strategies.[269] When proto-insurgent leaders fail to follow through with rewards and punishments, if looting opportunities dwindle (or if better opportunities present themselves elsewhere), the less committed tend to demobilize, defect, and/or desert during wartime operations.[270] To illustrate, RENAMO applied a variety of punishments including execution and deprivation as ways to get foot soldiers to follow orders.[271] Leaders and mid-level commanders however, doled out punishments unevenly and intermittently across the ranks. As a result, its "organizational culture lacked a basis for cooperation from its earliest days"[272] and because of its ineffective command and control system the insurgency was plagued by desertion and defection during most of its lifespan.[273] Thus, a long-term strategy incorporates a precise combination of processes that "align combatants' preferences with those of commanders"[274] rather than an approach that relies

[269] See Oppenheim et al. (2015)
[270] Weinstein (2007); Oppenheim et al. (2015)
[271] Young (1996, 184)
[272] Weinstein (2007, 145)
[273] Worsnop (forthcoming, 17)
[274] Green (2016, 619)

on rewards or punishments (or both).

3.6.4 Control Through Organization

Proto-insurgents employ a variety of structures in order to organize, oversee, and control members during incubation and throughout combat thereafter. While "all armed groups arrange themselves hierarchically—all insurgent groups have, at the least, formal leaders, commanders, sub-commanders, and foot soldiers"[275]—practical structural arrangements are essential. For example, there are vertical or unitary (U-form), horizontal or multidivisional (M-form),[276] or those that incorporate some complex amalgam of both. Though the fundamental reasons for employing organizational structure does not change—organize, oversee, and control—like interpretative discourse, the type of hierarchical form[277] a proto-insurgent leader chooses should be contextually-informed and significantly influences whether the organization holds together or dissolves. Indeed, the organizational structures of armed groups may be one of the most critical factors in determining the duration of insurgent war.[278]

Any organizational structure surely has virtues and shortcomings. On the one hand, vertically built insurgencies enable leaders to personally oversee and direct mid-level commanders and foot soldiers. Unitary forms are most frequently utilized by conventional militaries because they enable leaders to directly disseminate information

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[275] Johnston (2008, 109)

[276] In "The Geography of Insurgent Organization and its Consequences for Civil Wars: Evidence from Liberia and Sierra Leone," Patrick Johnston (2008, 113) borrowed this typology from Alexander Cooley's *Logics of Hierarchy: Problems of Organization in Empires, States and Military Occupations,* wherein Cooley introduced "this logic as a predictor of institutional outcomes and governance patterns in a number of different contexts, including empires, states, and military occupations."

[277] Johnston (2008, 109)

[278] According to Johnston (2008, 110), "both LURD [Liberia] and the Kamajors [Sierra Leone] outperformed the NPFL [Liberia] and the RUF [Sierra Leone] despite the latter groups enjoying significant material advantages in wealth and weapons [suggesting] that armed groups' organizational structures may be of equal or greater importance than their material capabilities in shaping the outcomes of civil wars."

and commands; organize units by function; and coordinate large-scale operations.[279] This type works particularly well for those that plan to stay small and geographically concentrated as the burden of monitoring becomes increasingly more challenging if the organization grows in size or when members disperse ever further from the center.[280] On the other hand, when proto-insurgencies adopt a multidivisional structure—or are compelled to adopt such a structure due to size and/or because areas of intended operation are not geographically concentrated near the central command—leaders are forced to cede some oversight as cells become more autonomous. "As organizations grow territorially and numerically, M-form organization becomes difficult to avoid unless commanders [have figured out ways to] overcome monitoring and disciplinary deficiencies."[281] That is, multidivisional setups are not a problem for organizations with efficacious cohesion building practices because members tend to exhibit strong commitment to the organization's cause. Governance costs[282] also tend to be low when groups are cohesive regardless of the type of command and control structure. The overall organization is also less susceptible to collapse in the event mid-level commanders or members of the central leadership are captured or killed.

In any event, the effectiveness of control structures established during incubation should be a function of contextually relevant factors—size of the movement, geographical considerations, and level of internal cohesion. Less cohesive proto-insurgents can counterbalance with an organizational structure that facilitates stricter oversight. This works only so long as the organization stays small and mostly

[279] Cooley (2005)
[280] Johnston (2008, 114)
[281] ibid (115)
[282] Cooley (2005)

geographically condensed. While there can be control without cohesion, it is short-sighted approach for incubating insurgents because leaders have to be certain they will have access to a steady stream of inducements and rewards during wartime and that they will maintain their staying power—a tenuous assumption, at best—especially when violence levels increase or conflict drags on for longer periods of time. Furthermore, controlling members with fear, threats, or promises of scratching the adventure seekers proverbial itch are equally problematic because this approach locks leaders into a continual cycle of dishing out enforcements or promises, which is unsustainable in the long run. This type of control also places limits on the kinds of organizational structures proto-insurgent leaders can build; and thus limits the organization's size and geographic mobility down stream.

Comparatively, when proto-insurgent leaders give cohesion-building practices priority early on, members are far easier to control during wartime and require fewer behavioral inducements to get them to follow orders. More cohesive groups also give leaders far more options with regard to organizational structure and places fewer constraints on size and geographic mobility. Investing in this type of approach is more costly up-front, more complicated, and more time-consuming because it necessitates the development of *coordinated* cohesion and control processes. But such an approach is more cost effective in the long-term and ensures greater command and control efficiency.

In sum, the proto-insurgent leader uses behavioral inducements and structural arrangements to manage the behavior of forces. Cohesion-building practices are designed to affiliate members both to each other and to the organization as a whole. This often requires a variety of socialization and indoctrination methods—from individual-level to

group-level reprogramming—or a combination of both. Durable insurgents are those who develop cohesion-building processes that are specifically designed to address the breadth of recruit's extant identities. Command and control structures are designed to organize and oversee behavior. Structures vary in form and should be adopted pursuant to the level of member cohesion and operational goals. Cohesion and control are most effective and will be long lasting when they are developed in a coordinated, symbiotic fashion.

3.7 Training

By and large, there are two kinds of warfare: conventional and unconventional.[283] The former was meticulously examined by Herbert Wulf[284] and denoted any conflict where two or more sides engaged each other face-to-face on the battlefield with the expressed intent of defeating the opposing side with superior military might. As for the later, more than half a century ago, Samuel Huntington defined guerilla warfare as "an approach whereby the generally strategically weaker side assumes tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places."[285] It was also (in)famously laid out by Moa Tse-tung[286] (among others) and denoted "peculiar"[287] and "distinctive"[288] revolutionary bands defined by "alertness" and "mobility."[289] Against a more powerful enemy, they "withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws…"[290] Many scholars, including myself, still utilize Huntington's definition today. While the conventional warfare is historically more

[283] I use unconventional, asymmetric, irregular, guerrilla, and insurgency interchangeably here.
[284] Wulf, Herbert (1979), "Dependent militarism in the periphery and possible alternative concepts," in Stephanie Neuman and Robert Harkavy, *Arms Transfers in the Modern World,* New York
[285] Huntington (1962) "Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Practice," in Franklin Marc Osanka, *Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1841-1861* (The Free Press of Glencoe)
[286] Tse-tung, Mao (2005) *On Guerilla Warfare*, Dover Publications
[287] ibid (42)
[288] ibid
[289] ibid
[290] ibid (44)

common, guerrilla warfare has become evermore prevalent in our contemporary world.[291] Indeed, meeting state-backed armed forces head-on is a strategy insurgents have used less frequently since 1945. Research indicates more than 55% of insurgencies since 1944 have preferred guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare.[292]

1945 signified a critical juncture in insurgent warfare strategy, worldwide.[293] Before this time, "Great Powers"[294] defeated insurgents more than 80% of the time, and did so rather swiftly.[295] After 1945, and especially during the Cold War, insurgents ever-increasingly moved away from more conventional-style warfare towards irregular warfare strategies.[296] This shift also coincided with a slow decrease in Great Power victory[297] and a steady increase in conflict duration.[298] Insurgents en masse began hiding out in remote or at least secret locations, emerged only long enough to pull off a strike, and quickly fled before their comparatively stronger opponents had the chance to return in kind. Fearon and Laitin[299] referred to this military mismatch as "absolute weakness." Balcells and Kalyvas[300] called it "technologies of rebellion." Reed Wood[301] wrote about "relative rebel capability." But this notion was first coined in 1975 by Andrew J.R.

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[291] That is, post-WWII.
[292] Jones and Johnson (2013, 6). According to these authors, 32% of insurgencies since 1944 have utilized conventional approaches. Balcells and Kalyvas (2014, 1398) found "conventional wars last on average 39.82 months, irregular wars last on average 113.32 months, and SNC wars last 49 months."
[293] Lyall and Wilson (2009, 75) claimed signs of this critical juncture were present as far back as 1918. They argued this year signified a fundamental shift away from, what they denoted as the "foraging model" (74) towards "machine war," (74) that is, a new era characterized by the ever-increasing use by states of mechanized equipment such as tanks.
[294] Lyall and Wilson (2009, 69)
[295] ibid
[296] Balcells and Kalyvas (2014, 1393)
[297] Lyall and Wilson (2009, 69)
[298] Balcells and Kalyvas (2014, 1398)
[299] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 7) claimed, "if government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured..."
[300] Balcells and Kalyvas (2014, 1391)
[301] Wood (2010, 606) developed a measure of insurgent warfighting capacity by using the "ratio of insurgent troops to the scaled number of government troops…"

Mack[302] when he introduced the term "asymmetric conflict"[303] to denote any protracted violent conflict waged between a formal military and an informal, unconventional, comparatively undermanned and less-equipped, yet resilient resistance force.

As far as I am concerned here, the most compelling of Mack's assertions—which has not always been carried forward in subsequent literature—was his argument that in order to 'win' an unconventional-style war, insurgents need not actually possess the military capacity to summarily defeat their opponents on the battlefield. He wrote: "in such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate *or even defeat*."[304] Put otherwise, insurgents need merely possess enough military competence to drag out conflict to sufficiently exhaust or frustrate their opponent's 'will.'[305]

While hubris has convinced many insurgents to adopt early on, or to later switch to conventional warfare to challenge their more formidable foes,[306] insurgents have been comparatively more durable when they have chosen guerrilla warfare.[307] To illustrate, the Hukbalahap rebellion (1946-54) in the Philippines applied "hit-and-run"[308] style techniques such as ambushes, raids, and small-scale assaults with exceptional precision, especially during the early and middle years of the insurgency. Comparatively, the

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[302] Andrew J.R. Mack (1976) Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", *World Politics* 27(2), 175–200
[303] Also knows as asymmetric warfare.
[304] Mack (1975, 177, emphasis in the original)
[305] Immediately in the wake of the Vietnam War, Mack (1975) wrote, "in war the ultimate aim must be to affect the will of the enemy."
[306] According to Katagiri (2013, 357), approximately 56% of all insurgent wars since 1816 have been conventional conflicts
[307] According to Katagiri (2013, 357), insurgents using guerrilla warfare-style strategies were twice as likely to succeed when compared to their counterparts who adopted conventional warfare.
[308] Zimmerman (2007, 57)

Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF, 1962-76) successfully used "stand-off"[309] methods of attack early on but later traded up for more straightforward conventional military operations. They quickly found they were hopelessly outmatched using a conventional strategy against Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur's SAS-backed[310] military forces.[311]

More recent extent literature has found unconventional, irregular guerilla warfare tends to prolong conflict and is effective for frustrating conventional militaries.[312] For example, Laia Balcells and Stathis Kalyvas argued guerrilla warfare has given "militarily weaker rebels, who otherwise would have been unable to challenge these governments, the ability to do so…"[313] because the specific less-direct attack tactics[314] that define guerrilla warfare-style fighting has essentially balanced out the asymmetry in military capacity. Hence, proto-insurgents should prefer to adopt unconventional warfare and focus on training foot soldiers in guerrilla warfare-style tactics like ambushes, raids, or infrastructure sabotage. Thus should be the focus of combat training during incubation.

There are three reasons why incubation lends itself to guerrilla warfare-style training. First, proto-insurgencies are typically small and geographically concentrated (at least at first) and most conventional, formal military maneuvers are designed to efficiently coordinate the actions of large elements spread out across multiple areas of operation. Thus, training in large-scale conventional maneuvers is impractical and unnecessary for the proto-insurgent. Second, proto-insurgencies rarely possess the material or technological capabilities that might enable them to challenge a more

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[309] ibid (102)
[310] The Special Air Service (SAS) is the premier Special Forces unit of the British Army.
[311] Zimmerman (2007, 104)
[312] Balcells and Kalyvas (2014, 1391) found "irregular conflicts last significantly longer than all other types of conflict."
[313] ibid (1392)
[314] ibid (1395)

formidable state-backed army in conventional ways. They rarely possess conventional weaponry or equipment like tanks or helicopters. Third, proto-insurgencies are trying to avoid being found out during incubation and guerrilla warfare-style training can be accomplished in small remote spaces and in relative obscurity. Indeed, a proto-insurgent that decides to utilize remote-detonated bombs needs little else than intent, know-how, and a limited workspace.

If we take a cursory look across the insurgent organization case study pool, it is fairly obvious that insurgent foot soldier's capacity to frustrate their more formidable foes using guerilla warfare has varied greatly. I argue this is a function of the training processes used to develop the competence necessary to do so, which varies across cases as well. For example, some proto-insurgents pushed recruits through lengthy rigorous guerrilla warfare preparation at remote base camps or secret training schools.[315] Others received training insofar as they were given a gun and taught how to shoot it (sometimes).[316] While armed belligerents vary in motive and organizational structure, I argue that those who survived conflict the longest all tended to place considerable emphases on guerilla warfare training during incubation.[317] This training essentially transformed noncombatants into moderately effective wielders of violence.[318]

Coupled with combat training is dehumanization, or the disposition to kill when the time comes. Dehumanization[319] is an important, though seldom discussed component

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[315] The FARC and the Taliban, for example.
[316] This characterized the RUF in some cases early on.
[317] Oppenheim and Weintraub (2017); Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas* (1997) Oxford University Press; James Currey and Peter W. Singer, (2006) *Children at War*, University of California Press; Elisabeth Jean Wood (2009) "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" *Politics and Society* 37(1), 131–62
[318] Janowitz, Morris (1964) *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations: The Military in the Political Development,* University of Chicago Press
[319] Green (2016)

of combat training. Even practicing shooting at targets that resemble a human silhouette has been shown to have a dehumanizing effect.[320]

Practical combat training is sometimes distinguished from cohesion building, though I argue the usefulness of one tends to influence the effectiveness of the other. For example, the RUF placed considerable emphasis on in-group cohesion for new recruits and used a number of group-level socialization processes.[321] After cohesion building, "they became part of the fighting forces"[322] and were trained extensively in guerrilla warfare tactics, physical conditioning, and even espionage.[323] This 'culture' of training was carried over into the ensuing conflict.[324]

Elsewhere, rebel and insurgent groups in mid-century Latin American countries as well as a number of Islamists mandated combat training with *concurrent* cohesion-building practices, which together lasted for months or even years and continued throughout conflict. Combat training that is "routinized and intense"[325] includes various *ongoing* practical components that serve to "acclimate soldiers to follow orders and maintain discipline, and to build a sense of shared identity, trust, cohesion, and coordination within and among small group units."[326] This process normally begins with proto-insurgent leaders developing a core cadre that is reasonably proficient in guerrilla-warfare style techniques. They do so by learning, borrowing, adopting, and improving on tactics and strategies gleaned from regional players, neighboring states, disillusioned ex-

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[320] See Green (2016) for a full discussion on this topic.
[321] "CHILD SOLDIERS IN SIERRA LEONE: EXPERIENCES, IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR REHABILITATION AND COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION" (2005, 5), Canadian International Development Agency
[322] ibid
[323] ibid
[324] ibid
[325] Oppenheim and Weintraub (2017, 1128)
[326] ibid

military, or from nomadic entrepreneurs of violence.[327] Proto-insurgent leaders and core cadre have frequently traveled to places abroad, like China, Libya, Afghanistan, and Chechnya where they underwent lengthy onsite combat training, first-hand. With the advent of the Internet however, proto-insurgents can view guerrilla warfare instructional videos or read how-to blogs on websites maintained by subversives residing thousands of miles away whom they will never meet face-to-face.[328] The core cadre then passes along this acquired knowledge to new recruits in what ultimately becomes a slow process of refinement. Foot soldiers drill operational procedures to ensure a relatively smoothly running execution of tactics and techniques. Logically, tactics and techniques are amended to suit the specifics of the terrain, weapons, and material resources on-hand.

Recall, proto-insurgents need not develop a level of combat proficiency that matches the state. They can also get away with a much lower degree of targeting precision than can state-backed forces.[329] Furthermore, they need not even train to target military personnel to achieve the desired outcome. For example, learning how to disable or sabotage electric power sources or public water pipes tends to sully the public's opinion of the state.

In sum, the theory here argues the competence to deploy military tactics long-term against comparatively superior state-backed armed forces is an essential component utilized by would-be armed actors[330] and is developed during incubation *in conjunction with cohesion-building processes*. The most effective for producing long-term conflict is

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[327] Che Guevara was one of the more prominent nomadic entrepreneurs of violence.
[328] The US DoD for example, lists hundreds of websites flagged for maintaining such material.
[329] On this, see Kalyvas (2006) and Stanton (2013). Broadly speaking, insurgents can be far less discerning in the targeting of civilians and military forces yet still reap the benefits. In contrast, state-backed armed forces tend to be careful about indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian property for fear of pushing the population into the arms of the insurgents.
[330] Janowitz (1964)

unconventional or irregular warfare.

3.8 Bases, Camps, and Sanctuaries

Like most of the aforementioned processes, sanctuary building and avoiding detection are interconnected with both each other and other processes like cohesion and control. The theory here posits that while it is necessary to set up sanctuaries to conduct important internal organization-building processes like socialization and combat training, it is critical that sanctuaries *stay hidden* from the incumbents' prying eyes and that members do not divulge their locations. Fearon and Laitin argued, "what matters is whether active rebels can hide from government forces [and] having a rural base"[1] greatly favors insurgency to that end.

The geographic landscape in which incubating insurgents find themselves will influence how and where they build sanctuaries. Some like the mujahedeen in Afghanistan built sanctuaries in hard-to-reach mountains and remote countryside locales.[331] Alternatively, "the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola … both [built] their primary bases outside of the country…"[1] But the precise location of a sanctuary is not nearly as crucial as *what* the sanctuary exemplifies—a safe haven hidden from the government's prying eyes. Secret camps and sanctuaries only remain secret if proto-insurgent leaders have previously ensured that members are loyal, which makes them less likely to divulge their locations, even if they are captured and interrogated by state security or police.

3.9 Avoiding Detection

[331] For a complete and detailed discussion of the Afghan mujahedeen, see Barfield, Thomas (2010) *Afghanistan (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)*, Princeton University Press

The proto-insurgent aims to threaten the sovereign's claim to rule within a relatively defined territory. States are incentivized to protect their ruling monopoly from such challenges and the truly staggering breadth of COIN literature is a testament to the power of this incentive.[332] Yet COIN is for dealing with insurgents after conflict has erupted—the very prefix, 'counter' (in counterinsurgency), implies a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* dimension to these efforts. Rather, what I am concerned with here is the steps proto-insurgents take to actively avoid detection from security, intelligence, and police agencies before conflict.[333]

During incubation, there is always the risk the state might find and attack the proto-insurgent before they are ready to launch. Proto-insurgents have routinely wrestled (and succumbed) to the challenge of staying hidden from the prying eyes of state security, police, and intelligence agencies. Some, like the MIR[334] in Peru, which is explored in Chapter 6, were (unnecessarily) compromised long before they ever fired a shot, thanks to their leader's loud and often public posturing. Furthermore, as incubation duration increases, so too does the probability they will be found out. Tasks like recruitment might increase the proto-insurgent's odds of getting caught; so longer incubation might lead to more strength but also greater chance of not controlling the start of conflict.

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[332] For example, see the United States Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, FM3–24, M3–24/MCWP 3–33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006); British Army Field Manual, Vol. 1, Part 10, *Countering Insurgency* (Warminster: Ministry of Defence, 2009)

[333] Recall, "military forces play little if any role in many instances" in pre-combat security, intelligence, and policing (Byman 2008, 67).

[334] Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement)

According to Janet I. Lewis, the "primary goal is total secrecy (from both civilians and the government) because of their vulnerability."[335] Maintaining secrecy is a similar challenge for all proto-insurgents lest they run the risk of being found out and derailed by the state apparatus before they have sufficiently worked their way through the processes.[336] This means assuming the state has working institutions tasked with finding them (especially when they do but even if they do not) and acting as if these institutions are moderately effective in their tasking (especially when they are but even if they are not). In so doing, they must avoid sending up any red flags that might make the state take notice to what they are doing.[337] The proto-insurgent who manages to successfully mobilize "despite obstruction are systematically different than groups thwarted by preventive [or preemptive] actions."[338]

Maintaining secrecy is largely a matter of the proto-insurgent's capacity to: 1) minimize perceived threats as much as possible by conducting prewar preparation with as much secrecy as possible, and by 2) avoid policing and intelligence gathering activities when they do arouse suspicion.[339] To illustrate, when discussing the initial stages of insurgent group formation in Uganda, former rebel leaders told Janet I. Lewis: "We had to maintain *secrecy*, so we only relied on the most reliable people. We kept the group

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[335] Lewis (dissertation, 91)
[336] Byman (2008, 166) claimed, "For every group that becomes an insurgency, dozens–or perhaps hundreds–fail." In "The Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence: An Overview," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (1994, 115) 17, 115–50, J. Bowyer Bell claimed, "Over 200 insurrections were patterned after on Fidel Castro's Cuban success, and all failed…" Many failed to muster enough support or were found out by the government apparatus before they became viable.
[337] This notion has been applied to terrorist groups has been explored at length by Jacob Shapiro in *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (2013)
[338] Ritter Conrad (2016, 85)
[339] This same logic has been elsewhere applied specifically in the study of terrorist organizations.

intentionally small... We needed to start as a small, core group, and then slowly enlarge."[340]

Once proto-insurgents announce themselves using violence, I argue elements of the wartime context such as fighting, death and destruction, fragmentation of space, and COIN efforts make it even more difficult for insurgents to remain a secret. Indeed, large-scale violence fundamentally differentiates incubation from combat.[341] While some proto-insurgents tested government response during incubation with small-scale probing attacks,[342] even here "the pre-insurgency stage is difficult [for the state] to detect because most activities are underground and the insurgency has yet to make its presence felt through the use of [large-scale] violence."[343] Even so, the state is incentivized to protect its ruling monopoly and will either employ preventative measures to discourage would-be state challengers from forming, or will launch preemptive countermeasures when threats are known. During incubation, these tasks are largely the responsibility of state security or police; "military forces play little if any role in many instances."[344] The state's incentive to root-out potential monopoly challenging threats increases as *perceived threat*[345] increases. In some cases, states tend to employ ever-increasing forms of

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[340] Lewis, Janet I. (forthcoming, 19) emphasis added

[341] In Chapter 4, I operationalize the start of conflict as the precise date when combat-related deaths numbered 25. This tally includes combatant deaths on both sides, as well as non-combatant deaths.

[342] According to interviews conducted by Lewis (dissertation, 136, emphasis in the original), "The first acts of violence that the UPA [in Uganda] committed were selected in order to *not* attract significant attention. At this point, the rebels were not seeking to engage in open confrontation with the government forces, but were rather "testing the enemy," gaining information about their military strength and resolve, and "grooming units" to later face the NRA

[343] "Guide to the Analysis of Counterinsurgency" (2012, 5), CIA. The term "pre-insurgency stage" used in this guide refers to the time period before the onset of large-scale conflict and is not operationalized in any substantive way.

[344] Byman (2008, 167)

[345] According to Sullivan (2016, 651), "for governments seeking to maximize the security of their office, employing repression against mobilization activities, even when dissidents are not actively challenging the government, can prevent the occurrence of overt, collective challenges by depleting the organizational resources necessary to inspire and sustain such activities."

preemptive repression[346] in response to ever-increasing presence of overt challenges.[347] Others use a variety of preventative[348] measures like "curfews and prohibitions on assembly—to undermine mobilization"[349] and discourage would-be state challengers from organizing in the first place.[350]

I argue some proto-insurgents are able to maintain secrecy because while they start from a relative warfighting disadvantage, they have a comparative strategic advantage during incubation with regard to information. For example, they have access to and can make use of a wide range of intelligence about the state they intend to challenge––general sizes and locations of military bases and outposts; security and police forces, identities of key personnel; equipment and capabilities, and past practices[351]—while the state knows next-to-nothing about them (at least as first). The proto-insurgent just needs to figure out how to keep it that way until they are ready to launch their campaign.

I should (again) belabor the point that the incubation processes proffered in this dissertation are tightly entwined; successes (or failures) in one process can bolster (or undercut) others. Avoiding government detection is no different. In point of fact, the active detection avoidance measures outlined here work well only if proto-insurgent members are trustworthy and follow orders; a function of effective cohesion and control processes.

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[346] For more on the impacts of repression, see Tarrow (1998); Beissinger (2002); Brocket (2005); Conrad and Ritter (2013); Young (2013); Ritter (2014); Ritter and Conrad (2016)
[347] Sullivan (2016, 649)
[348] Preventive measures are those launched to destroy a potential threat even though an attack is not imminent. Preemptive measures in contrast, are those launched when an attack is imminent.
[349] Ritter and Conrad (forthcoming, 85)
[350] Sullivan (2016); Walter (2006); Herreros and Criado (2009); Nordas and Davenport (2013); Danneman and Ritter (2014); Ritter and Conrad (2016)
[351] ibid (89)

Secrecy is the proto-insurgents best friend and they have a better chance of staying a secret if they conduct strict vetting processes before granting new recruits access to the inner workings of the organization. Vetting ensures members are committed and limits the likelihood of infiltration by those seeking to gather intelligence or erode the organization from within. As it turns out, subversion through infiltration tends to be an oft-employed strategy of police and intelligence agencies.[352] Informers[353] and covert agents of the state have frequently tried infiltration as a means to gather intelligence or to encourage side-switching, desertion, defection, and demobilization.[354]

Proto-insurgent leaders should also err on the side of caution when it comes to internal dissemination of information, even when members are committed. Knowledge of broader tactical or strategic plans should be mainly restricted to need-to-know leaders and mid-level commanders. Moreover, hidden sanctuaries, base camps, and safe havens are effective for shielding the proto-insurgent's activities only if they remain secret. It is why some leaders kept the locations of all training camps, weapons caches, and the routes connecting them largely concealed from most of the organization's members.[355]

One of the prices most proto-insurgents pay when they successfully undertake prewar preparation in secret is that they tend to alienate themselves from the broader population. But to be sure, proto-insurgents cannot entirely cut themselves off from the world. Recruiters need to recruit; inroads with the population need to be built; and potential foreign patrons are often probed. But efforts to recruit members or "generate

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[352] Gutie´rrez San´ın (2008, 16)
[353] Leahy, Thomas (2015) "The Influence of Informers and Agents on Provisional Irish Republican Army Military Strategy and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy, 1976–94," *Twentieth Century British History*, 26(1) 122–146
[354] Oppenheim et al. (2015); Gutie´rrez San´ın (2008)
[355] See Sendero and the FMLN in the coming chapters

popular collaboration,"[356] are not always welcomed with open arms. Some civilians denounce[357] proto-insurgents, some have a change of heart after they have rendered support, and others feign support. All are potentially precarious situations for an organization that is trying to maintain anonymity from the state. These risks can be minimized if the proto-insurgent is discerning with their audience, and 'persuasive' with their recruiting and marketing campaigns. This means using contextually relevant discourse but also credible threats or protection. For example, in the words of Charles Tilly: "coercion works; those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance."[358] Elsewhere, Stathis Kalyvas showed rebels in Greece promised civilians protection from violence.[359]

Still, recruiters need to take care not to openly arouse suspicion. This can be accomplished in at least two ways. First, recruiting efforts can be conducted in a clandestine fashion. To illustrate, according to an interview with Eduardo Sancho,[360] a former member of the leadership of the ERP,[361] the FARN,[362] and later of the FMLN's[363] central command; early meetings designed to raise support amongst students and faculty at the University of El Salvador were closely guarded and conducted in strict secrecy. Other efforts that serve to minimize the proto-insurgent's footprint include shunning the

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[356] Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2000, 3) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*, Cambridge University Press
[357] "A secret revelation to government representatives of some kind of illegal activity" (Kozlov 1996) in, Kalyvas (200, 193)
[358] Tilly, Charles (1992, 70) *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992*, Blackwell
[359] According to Kalyvas (2000, 124), rebels promised civilians protection from the state apparatus but also from rival rebel groups.
[360] San Salvador (January 27, 2011)
[361] Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, or People's Revolutionary Army
[362] Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional, or Armed Forces of National Resistance
[363] Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, or Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional

media,[364] actively concealing connections or even severing ties with high-profile organizations altogether, and/or staying on the periphery or entirely absent from political protests and social movements. The state apparatus tends to keep tabs on groups, organizations, and high-profile persons with links to media-attention grabbing political protests and social movements, especially those that turn violent.[365] It was standard practice for Guatemalan police and intelligence services to conduct surveillance on "groups of organizers and community leaders"[366] suspected of fomenting dissent during the 1980s.

In other cases, political protests and social movements can be leveraged in the proto-insurgents favor because they can help disguise more overt incubation activities amongst the broader milieu. According to the CIA's *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, the state apparatus must be vigilant because "actions conducted in the open [by proto-insurgents] can easily be dismissed as nonviolent political activity."[367] State security, intelligence, and police can often "confuse opposition political activists with those who intend to use violence or confuse one group of extremists with another at the proto-insurgency stage."[368] This is an effective detection avoidance tactic if proto-insurgents find themselves in a state with a legacy of popular collective action and a government that is prone to use repressive forms of response.

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[364] The founder and helmsman of the MIR in Peru was hardly bashful about overtly promoting his agenda through news media outlets.
[365] I have found comparative analyses of pre-war and wartime internal state documents to be a useful qualitative tool for assessing the level of state awareness and threat perception of organizations and persons with ties to proto-insurgencies.
[366] Sullivan Christopher, "Political Repression and the Destruction of Dissident Organizations" *World Politics* (2016, 649)
[367] *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (2012, 5)
[368] Byman (2008, 193)

Proto-insurgents also have agency in picking the places where they intend to conduct incubation processes. When available, they can opt to set up base camps and training schools in remote or hard-to-reach locations or in busy cities or densely populated hubs. If they do not have direct, personal knowledge of spaces located off the beaten path or in densely populated urban areas, they can still leverage familiarity of the "local terrain and conditions"[369] to maintain secrecy. For example when in incubation, Hezbollah in Lebanon developed a vast and committed intelligence network of Shia sympathizers familiar with the local terrain and cities who helped pinpoint places where safe houses and training schools would likely go unnoticed by the broader population and the state intelligence apparatus.[370]

More recent avoidance methods include watching what is said over the phone, written in emails, or viewed on social media outlets and websites. Police, security, and intelligence gathering bodies tend to monitor such platforms as a preventative measure or as a preemptive countermeasure when a threat is perceived or known.[371] Even something as simple as changing the organization's name from time to time can help proto-insurgents stay off the government's radar.[372] To illustrate, El Grupo in El Salvador reconstituted itself as the ERP just as the government was starting to take notice that the radical organization was starting to represent a viable threat.[373] Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, a high-ranking mujahedeen leader (and later in the Taliban) went by various names like

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[369] ibid (176)
[370] ibid
[371] CIA *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* (2012)
[372] I found that name changing has not always been a concerted strategy used to throw off the state. Some name changes were for (re)branding purposes vis-à-vis public opinion/local support, such as in cases where the group is getting a reputation for doing things that might turn the public against them.
[373] According to Álvarez and Orero (2014, 672), El Grupo got the government's attention after the 1971 "kidnapping of a well-known representative of the Salvadorean economic elite, Ernesto Regalado Dueñas, carried out with the aid of Guatemala's Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces, FAR), through one of their cells."

Abdul Zaeef and Ibn Noor Mohammad, which often confused Soviet intelligence in Afghanistan during the 1980s.[374] More recently, insurgent leaders in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan often went by multiple names[375] in order to throw off intelligence services that used lexicon to monitor for subversive activity in paper correspondence, email, cellphone chatter, and bank account transactions.[376]

To summarize, the state is incentivized to protect its ruling monopoly through preemptive and/or preventative measures and security, police, and intelligence services have gotten evermore creative with their subversive-catching approaches.[377] Proto-insurgents must at least keep up with or at best, outpace these efforts if they expect to avoid detection. Those who make detection avoidance a priority during incubation are more likely to stay hidden from the state apparatus while they attempt to exploit organization-building opportunities. As such, it is pragmatic for incubating insurgents to take extreme measures to avoid government detection when they are the weakest. This approach places the burden on the proto-insurgent rather than the state. That is, whether or not the proto-insurgent stays hidden during incubation is a function of the proto-insurgent's detection avoidance strategies and tactics.

3.10 Resource Management

Conflicts are costly and insurgents and their resources have garnered considerable

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[374] Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef (2010) *My Life with the Taliban*, Hurst and Co., London

[375] According The US 9/11 commission on border control (2004, 569), *Population and Development Review* 30(3), in order to throw of intelligence services, persons of interest often acquired credit cards or opened bank accounts using different names.

[376] "Electronic surveillance in an era of modern technology and evolving threats to national security" Young, Mark D., *Stanford Law and Policy Review* 22(1), 11-50; "Follow the money: leveraging financial intelligence to combat transnational threats (Espionage Exposed)," Levitt, Matthew, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 12(1), 34-44

[377] According to, From hunted to hunter Deploying Marines get proactive training for catching insurgents Talton, Trista, Marine Corps Times, Apr 7, 2008, p.18, observing "how they dress, whether they have cell phones, how many people are on their cell phones at one time" have become new insurgent-catching tactics.

attention in the literature. Foot soldiers need food, supplies, weapons, and sometimes compensation;[378] and violence wielders are usually ill-equipped and underfunded.[379] That insurgents need to "marshal ever-greater resources in order to pose a direct challenge to the recognized sovereign"[380] is a commonly held notion.

As it turns out however, studies of the influence of material resources on insurgent capacity have produced mixed conclusions. For example, Fearon[381] found certain kinds of illicit currency-generating activities including narcotics trafficking or gemstone trading tended to prolong conflict.[382] Yet, illicit currency-generating activities like these tend to wax and wane over time. As examples, illegal diamond smuggling out of Sierra Leone helped fund the RUF's early efforts but became an evermore-problematic and risky source of funding later on thanks to international community crackdowns. Elsewhere, the FARC[383] in Colombia and the UWSA[384] in Myanmar did not begin trafficking in narcotics until after both conflicts had raged for 30 years or more.[385]

Elsewhere, Byman,[386] Regan,[387] and Staniland[388] found insurgencies likely last longer if bolstered by generous foreign patrons. But Weinstein,[389] and Collier and

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[378] Worsnop (forthcoming, 11)
[379] Shapiro and Siegel (2007)
[380] Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian. *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War* (KL, 550-551), Cornell University Press
[381] Fearon (2004)
[382] It should be noted here that Reed Wood (2010, 607) found no statistical relationship between accesses to "gems (diamonds, rubies, jade, etc.) or drugs (cannabis, opium, or coca)" and levels of rebel violence.
[383] Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC)
[384] United Wa State Army
[385] Jonsson, Michael, Elliot Brennan, and Christopher O'Hara (2016) "Financing War or Facilitating Peace? The Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in Colombia and Myanmar," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39(6), 542-559
[386] Daniel Byman et al., (RAND Corporation, 2001)
[387] Patrick M. Regan, (University of Michigan Press, 2002)
[388] Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency"
[389] Weinstein (2006)

Hoeffler[390] concluded insurgents with greater resources tend to attract self-interested, profit-seeking, shortsighted roving bandits[391] that are difficult to control and often act in ways that do not align with the organization's directives. Additionally, Johnson found insurgent resource endowments do not necessarily correlate in any meaningful way with insurgent warfighting competence.[392]

I argue conclusions drawn about the capacity of insurgents to survive wartime using a purely economic framework tend to be largely circumstantial. In some cases substantive resources and conflict duration correlate.[393] Whereas in others, insurgents either failed to become viable or were summarily defeated in short order. There are also numerous cases where insurgents lacked substantive resources and withstood counterinsurgency efforts for many years[394] while others met a quick and timely death. Elsewhere, some comparatively 'wealthy' insurgents managed to endure even after many of their resource flows were severed.

Targeting insurgent's funding constitutes one of the foundational pillars of most counterinsurgency operations.[395] Both during incubation and after conflict has begun, insurgents are constantly forced to re-evaluate sources; seek new opportunities when a source declines or runs out, or compile the resources from many smaller sources to make

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[390] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–595
[391] Tilly
[392] Johnston (2008)
[393] The Viet Cong and Taliban are examples of comparatively "wealthy" and long-lasting insurgencies. Likewise, Iran funneled significant support to the Badr Brigade in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon and both of these organizations endured for some time.
[394] According to Kalyvas "Book Review: Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, Cambridge University Press," *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (9), RENAMO was ill equipped and poorly funded yet carried on a particularly effective insurgency.
[395] For further discussions about how violent sub-state actors raise money and the countermeasures employed by states designed to root out and disrupt these sources of funding, see Jacobson (2008, 2010); Passas and Jones (2006); Oyefusi (2014); Napoleoni (2005, 2006); Freeman (2011); FitzGerald (2004); Shetterly (2006); Levitt and Jacobson (2008); Kelman (2015); Tofangsaz (2015).

ends meet.[396] However, resource inflows tell us next to nothing about the ways proto-insurgents manage the internal distribution of those resources in order to build organizations, finance operations, or to simply keep the insurgency afloat.

In light of this, it should come as no surprise that we have not yet developed a unified theory of insurgent capacity vis-à-vis resource endowments—though the theory proffered here does not intend to fill this gap either, per se. Rather, in my framework the kinds of resources or the extent of resource endowments is theoretically and empirically irrelevant for making sense of insurgent survival capacity. Put otherwise, resources themselves do not actually tell us anything useful about the ways proto-insurgents (un)successfully *manage* their resources to improve longevity. Furthermore, since most insurgencies lack the military capacity to competitively challenge the state head-on on the battlefield,[397] forces are often scattered across multiple fronts. This brings about a whole new set of problems for insurgents, even for those that are well financed and equipped. Fragmentation of space created by conflict reduces oversight and increases the chances for misuse or squandering of resources by mid and lower-level commanders. Misuse and squandering is highly inefficient for organizations and especially for those already operating under extreme scarcity. Thus, in my framework, resources themselves do not explain the proto-insurgent's capacity to survive conflict but rather how well (or badly) they figured out how to manage them. If we want to meaningfully explain insurgent wartime survival (in)capacity we must disentangle resources from resource

[396] Illicit financial activities on the whole are nearly "impossible to measure with any degree of precision," Friman, H. Richard (2009, 1) *Crime and the Global Political Economy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers
[397] Clayton (2013, 611)

management.[398] This approach reconciles the contradictory findings in the literature.

The minimum procedural definition implemented here posits mere inflows of resources is necessary for insurgent groups to function but is insufficient for explaining survival. My theory posits proto-insurgents are more likely to survive conflict if they demonstrate the capacity to manage their resources during incubation, regardless of source, type, or magnitude. Those who went on to survive conflict the longest actually developed complex resource management processes during incubation that administered resources in ways that minimized waste, squandering, and misallocation. A successful resource management process—one that prepares proto-insurgent organizations to endure conflict—forms resource dependency amongst the ranks *and* increases the utility of accessible resources. This is accomplished when proto-insurgent leaders have previously developed and instituted effective cohesion and control, which allows them to a) withhold knowledge of the extent of the organization's resource coffers from lower level commanders and foot soldiers, and b) limit power to delegate the distribution of resources to one or a select few, and c) use resource needs to tightly tether members to the organization.

Using material and financial needs-based control mechanisms to tightly tether members to an organization is not a novel notion.[399] It also has the added benefits of minimizing information flow costs and increasing resource utility. For example, it is hard for lower level commanders and foot soldiers to discern whether or not they are being

[398] I should note that Paul Staniland (dissertation) claimed prior social structures, rather than the resources themselves, explains the variation we see in insurgent behavior.
[399] See Worsnop (forthcoming) for a complete discussion of this regarding forces in Iraq.

shortchanged if the extent of the organization's resource coffer is unknown to them.[400] In the event of capture (or defection), secrecy also limits the intelligence-gathering value of those captured when they have little understanding of the extent of the organization's ledger and resource portfolio.

Subordinates who have been effectively affiliated and controlled are strongly dependent on the one or a select few who hold the power to delegate resource distribution. If proto-insurgent leaders situate themselves as the *exclusive* proprietor of critical resources, members become "demonstrably loyal"[401] because their fate is tied to central leadership decision-making. This creates resource dependency but also further entrenches leaders' claims to power. Lower level commanders and foot soldiers are also forced to pull off operations with the resources they get from above,[402] reducing the likelihood of squandering and waste. The Viet Minh in the First Indochina War is an exemplarily illustration of the theory of effective resource management in practice.

The Viet Minh, an anti-French, anti-Japanese resistance group in Vietnam, culled recruits with varying identities and from a wide variety of places[403] but effectively affiliated them to the organization via intensive cohesion-building processes.[404] Though resources were limited, the central leadership situated itself as the sole proprietor and maintained strict distributional oversight to its various fronts.[405] Foot soldiers became

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[400] According to Eli Berman (2009, 113) *Radical, Religious, and Violent*, MIT Press, "members who would have considered leaving the club when outside options were good will instead remain demonstrably loyal if the club suddenly becomes their sole provider of necessary services."
[401] ibid
[402] Though predominantly focused on terrorist organizations, Shapiro (2013), and Shapiro and Siegel (2007, 406) argued violence wielders are often forced to carry out operations with "inadequate funds" and resources.
[403] Alexander Woodside (1976, 179*) Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam*, Houghton Mifflin
[404] Worsnop (forthcoming, 39)
[405] Greg Lockhart (1990, 160) *Nation in Arms: The Origins of the People's Army in Vietnam*, Allen and Unwin

dependent on the central leadership for material supplies despite significant geographical distance between the movement's fronts in the north and south of the country. The combination of a centralized resource management setup with highly committed members meant foot soldiers were easily controlled even when resource flows waned over time.[406]

In sum, insurgencies can be, and often are, successful despite minimal financial or material backing. Yet, this is impossible when proto-insurgent leaders fail to develop strict resource management during incubation because supplies will be squandered or misused both during incubation and during conflict down stream.

3.11 Chapter Conclusions

When a proto-insurgent decides to challenge a sovereign using violence there are a number of quandaries to consider. Proto-insurgents build organizations that can protract conflict when they successfully accomplish the following tasks during incubation: a) attract recruits and material resources, b) foster cohesion and establish control mechanisms, c) train members, d) establish secret bases or camps, e) avoid premature detection, and f) manage resources. In many ways they are entrepreneurs. People must be recruited and the degree to which a revolutionary organization effectively mobilizes support relies primarily on its capacity to trigger some segment(s) of the population. Proto-insurgents have mobilized under a variety banners and communist-inspired revolutionary movements such as Marxist-Leninist or Marxist-Maoist are some of the most shop-worn models. But some have exploited a mixture of intense group-level

[406] See Alec Worsnop (forthcoming) for a complete discussion on this. It is important to note that Worsnop did not directly trace the origin of the Viet Minh's resource management to the prewar period, though he did allude to the idea that the cohesion-building and resource control processes were established prior to large-scale conflict. Resource control was intended to explain outcome.

grievances,[407] ethnic, gender, or religious identity,[408] or anti-state or western rhetoric. Others appealed to ideology. Some exploited all of these. But if an incubating proto-insurgent expects to convince others that challenging the state is a good idea, they need to develop *relevant and contextually-informed* discourse. While proto-insurgent organizations vary in discourse, I argued this axis of variation is theoretically irrelevant because they all have to solve the same problems, not the least of which is convincing civilians to support a high-risk violence-wielding movement intent on challenging the government. This requires an acute sense of the broader sociopolitical environment in which they find themselves. Therefore, discourse is only important inasmuch as it represents an effective signaling mechanism.

Leaders must also establish way(s) to organize, oversee, and control members. They organize distinct units responsible for combat, training, or bookkeeping. Organizational models vary considerably across cases and exhibit divergent outcomes but the kind of organizational structure they develop during incubation is not relevant to my framing because previous studies of organizational structure in insurgent[409] and terrorist[410] organizations have produced interesting but varied results. For example, centralized structures imbue those at the top of the hierarchy the power to direct the operations of the entire organization but are also "more vulnerable to attacks targeting the leaders."[411] Decentralized structures allow dispersed units to operate with relative autonomy and are more impervious to overall collapse in the event leaders are captured or killed, but can be difficult to monitor and are susceptible to the divergence of

[407] Fearon and Laitin (2003, 76)
[408] Weinstein (2007, 52)
[409] ibid; Kenny (2010); Arjona (2014)
[410] Xu, Hu, and Chen (2009)
[411] Xu, Hu, and Chen (2009, 1)

preferences in middlemen and small unit commanders.[412] Thus, like discourse, organizational structures must be designed to fit the contextually specific needs of the environment in which the proto-insurgent operates.

Members must also be indoctrinated and trained in guerrilla warfare and they need bases and camps where they can do both. Incubating proto-insurgents exploit cohesion-building practices to reprogram members and foster loyalty.[413] Approaches vary here as well. Some claim economic incentives keeps soldiers fighting.[414] Others think fostering social solidarity provides combatants with reasons to stay and fight.[415] Organizations also differentiate tasks, facilitate proficiency in those tasks, and foster dedication[416] through group socialization and training.

Mobilizing resources is not enough to sustain an insurgency. Leaders must establish an effective strategy to manage the distribution of their resources that will yield more efficiency and reduce waste. If all of these processes were not hard enough for the proto-insurgent to accomplish, they must so too be undertaken while paying careful attention to secrecy, lest they run the risk of being found out and defeated by the state before they are sufficiently ready.

Certainly many insurgents have waited to do these processes until after conflict has erupted. But lengthy incubation is necessary for insurgent wartime survival, though it is not alone sufficient. I argued here proto-insurgents that take time a long time before conflict to undergo preparation carefully, deliberately, and in very a specific and orderly progression are the very same insurgents that develop quality organizations that protract

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[412] Shapiro (2007)
[413] Cohen (2013); Benard (1994); Card (1996); Sanday (2007)
[414] Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
[415] McClauchlin (2014, 1421), Wickham-Crowley (1993, 63-68); Costa and Kahn (2003, 2008)
[416] Bateson (2017, 637); Saks and Ashforth (1997)

conflict. I have also argued that these processes, while exceptionally difficult to accomplish to begin with, become far more problematic to pull off after wartime thanks to a variety of endogenous factors. I claimed those that wait to do these processes until after conflict starts are less likely to survive when compared to those that did so during incubation.

To summarize, a proto-insurgent is more likely to protract conflict if it has already demonstrated during incubation that it can mobilize a sizeable, trained, sufficiently supported, and cohesive force and has previously established sanctuaries where they can rest and train, and to which it can flee in the event the government comes looking for them. Regardless of size or make-up, the ultimate goal of any organization should be to develop processes to successfully accomplish critical tasks that will make them more durable once conflict starts. Proto-insurgents, who take into account their distinctive environmental conditions when they design and build their organizations, are able to tackle these challenges productively at the outset and will be better prepared to do so in the long-term. In the end, the proto-insurgent has one fundamental task for which they must prepare—using violence to challenge the sovereign's claim to rule with a relatively defined territory. I have argued here that it is always better for them to prepare to do so beforehand and presented the theoretical framework for how successful proto-insurgents go about doing so.

CHAPTER 4—CODING AND TESTING INCUBATION

4.1 Introduction

Recall from Chapter 2, M23 and Al-Shabaab looked quite similar in terms of several variables but exhibited divergent outcomes—the former survived for approximately 19 months while the latter continues to endure after nearly 10 years. I exposed a gap in the data by demonstrating these insurgent groups are first coded when they reached a measurable battle-related death threshold,[417] even though they initially formed prior; the former existed for 64 days before the battle-related death threshold was reached while the latter was approximately two years. It is common for these data to exhibit a gap between the date when the insurgent organization actually formed and the date when fighting reached a battle-related death threshold. I argued this is a critical shortcoming, both theoretically and methodologically, because I suggested M23's short incubation period and Al-Shabaab's lengthy incubation period might help shed light on the difference in conflict duration between the two cases.

In Chapter 3, I laid out the theoretical framework for incubation. I explained how proto-insurgents use it to build the foundations for movements that address a variety of problems, which makes them more likely to protract conflict. Unfortunately, these data do not code for incubation and we cannot yet test the explanatory power of the theory on conflict duration. Thus the purpose of this chapter is as follows. I first introduce a methodology for coding proto-insurgent incubation periods. Second, I test the explanatory power of the new variable on conflict duration. Last, I demonstrate how I selected the cases used in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.[418]

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[417] UCDP, the precise date when fighting reached 25 battle-related deaths
[418] In keeping with Lieberman (2005, 444)

4.2 Scope Conditions

A reasonable starting point for our statistical analysis would be to take some time defining: *what counts as insurgency*? Fearon and Laitin defined insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas [and] are weak relative to the governments they are fighting."[419] Lyall and Wilson described insurgency as "protracted violent struggle by non-state actors to obtain their political objectives—often independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of existing authorities—against the current political authority (the incumbent)."[420] The *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide* defined insurgency as "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region."[421] Insurgency likewise differs from a military or political elite-led coup d'état in that the conflict must occur between agents of the state (military, police, or other state-backed armed forces) and a non-state actor not backed by any factions of the challenged incumbent. Here insurgency is defined as: *asymmetric violence against an incumbent perpetrated by a non-state actor in an attempt to further political and/or socioeconomic objectives.* This yielded a large universe of potential cases.

For example, there are more than 300 known cases of viable insurgency since 1800 that fit this definition but given the dearth of available information on important control variables, I restrict my analysis to the period since 1945. The logic to restricting the time series in this fashion is two-fold. First, it has been elsewhere demonstrated that

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[419] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 7)
[420] Lyall and Wilson (2009, 70)
[421] *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (2009, 2) US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State

pre-1945 insurgencies[422] are likely significantly underreported and lack crucial data on control variables. Second, because the historical record for pre-1945 insurgencies is far less "clear"[423] with regard to the type of warfare, including such cases might combine "disparate types of conflict that may not represent a homogenous population…"[424] The potential pitfalls of pooling disparate observations has been explored elsewhere at length.[425]

Data for the insurgencies used in this dissertation was derived and cross-referenced using James Fearon and David Laitin (2003); Nicholas Sambanis (2004); Lyall and Wilson (2009); the Correlates of War (COW) (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010); Reed Wood (2010); and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO ACD) (Gleditsch et al. (2002).[426]

4.3 Dependent Variable

Because my theory claims incubation duration influences conflict duration, I am interested in testing insurgent war duration as a function of incubation duration. To measure conflict duration, I use years as the metric of time (denoted as *time* in the model) to count the number of years within each insurgency such that the first year of conflict was numbered '1' and the last year was equal to the total number of years the group survived. For example, an insurgency with a duration of nine years meant that case ranged from 1 to 9, where year '1' corresponds with conflict onset year, as measured by

[422] According to Lyall and Wilson (2009, 70), pre-1900 cases are likely significantly underreported.
[423] ibid (71)
[424] ibid; For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Arregufn-Tof (2001) combined insurgencies, coups, and conventional wars in their data.
[425] For a complete discussion on this, see Bartels, Larry M. (1996) "Pooling Disparate Observations," *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3), 905-943
[426] 2016 version

the 25 battle-related death threshold,[427] and where year '9' denotes the last year of the conflict.[428] I also needed to code for the end of conflict so I introduced the dependent variable (*exit*), which was set equal to '0' for all of the non-final years of the group's existence and '1' for the year of exit.[429] That is, the year of exit signifies the end of conflict. Observations in-progress (ongoing conflicts) were coded '0' to denote that they had not yet reached an exit year.

Using months or weeks (or even days) as opposed to years would require all of the covariates to be measured in the same scale of time, which is neither feasible nor available for a variety of standard controls. I thus used years as the metric of time because it represents the most widely existing, specified interval for most other covariates in the model. There is considerable variation in the months corresponding to exit years, which suggests there is no systematic bias in this measurement approach. Such an approaches yields the following hypothesis:

H_1: The probability of insurgent exit should decrease as incubation duration increases.

4.4 Independent Variable of Interest

My independent variable of interest (*incubation*) was defined here as *the duration in days between the precise date of insurgent organization initial formation and the precise date when fighting reached 25 battle-related deaths*. I borrowed and modified Janet I. Lewis' (forthcoming) methodology and operationalized initial insurgent formation as the most

[427] As per UCDP (2016) coding rules.
[428] This model did not make distinctions among conflict outcomes (i.e., win/draw/loss/ongoing). I conduct robustness checks (see Appendix 1) using outcome as the dependent variable.
[429] Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino (2010) "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data," *Political Analysis* 18, 271–292; Lindstädt, Vander Wielen, and Green (2017 appendix)

precise date when the organization had a discernable leader or leadership assembly[430] and exhibited at least 50 members.[431] In most cases, the insurgency's original founding member(s) were used here as the discernable leader or leadership assembly. Data for this novel variable was obtained and cross-referenced using a variety of sources including extant literature, elite-level biographies, news media outlets, and state-produced documents.[432]

It should be noted that "roughly 100 people for at least three months"[433] signified a *viable threat* in Lewis' coding but I did not use this methodology here because I assume proto-insurgents need to demonstrate the capacity to use violence to be considered viable and credible threat to the sovereign.[434] I do not assume a single act of violence—a small-scale probing attack[435] or the intent to commit violence[436]—to constitute a viable threat. Thus I count the insurgency as exhibiting a viable threat to the sovereign when associated violence resulted in 25 battle-related deaths.[437] At this point proto-insurgents are no longer in incubation and conflicts are considered 'active.'[438] As I am interested in explaining insurgent wartime survival, I included only insurgents that met this specified

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[430] Lewis (forthcoming, 3) "operationalized this concept by counting groups as having formed if they had a discernable command and control structure…"
[431] ibid (22) counted groups when they had "at least roughly 100 people for at least three months." In her dissertation, this number was 200 (Lewis, dissertation, 7).
[432] See Appendix 2 for the full insurgent organization bibliography.
[433] Lewis' (forthcoming, 22)
[434] It should be noted that the 'number' of insurgents needed to produce a real, viable threat to the state has been debated at length. These range from "small numbers of rebels" (Fearon and Laitin 2001, 11) to some "ratio of insurgent troops to the scaled number of government troops… (Wood 2010, 606)."
[435] According to Lewis (dissertation, 136), some proto-rebel groups in Uganda used small-scale probing attacks to 'test the enemy,' gain "information about their military strength and resolve, and…[to groom] units' to later face the NRA."
[436] Lewis (forthcoming, 3) counted "groups as having formed if they had a discernable command and control structure, and had committed or clearly planned to commit at least one act of violence against the state."
[437] As per UCDP (2016) coding rules. It is important to note this measure tallies combatant and noncombatant deaths.
[438] UCDP Codebook (2016, 5)

threshold.[439] Thus incubation measures the time between initial formation and viability. This produced a dataset of 120 insurgent organizations (1945-present day).

Observe Figure 1. A simple bivariate regression that tested the relationship between incubation duration and conflict duration offers preliminary evidence to support my theory and the first hypothesis. Notice the greatest density of cases is where incubation duration is short and conflict duration is short. I would also note that while there is variation in outcome, many cases fall fairly close the regression line, which denotes the relationship between incubation and duration (excluding covariates).

Figure 4.1: *Relationship Between Incubation Duration and Conflict Duration*



Now that we have a measure for the concept of incubation, it is time for further

[439] As per UCDP (2016) coding rules.

testing with a more fine-grained logistic regression model and its expected outcomes, using additional covariates. A model of this type will provide a much more nuanced picture of the relationship between incubation and insurgency survival.

4.5 Covariates

I include control variables that have been elsewhere demonstrated to influence conflict duration.[440] I considered a measure for the following: state capacity, regime type, GDP per capita, terrain, ethnic fracturalization, support from foreign patrons (both material and financing, as well as cross-border sanctuaries, both with and without host state consent), and the presence of lootable resources such as drugs and gems.

4.5.1 State Capacity

State capacity has been utilized in the literature as a way to get at 'governance quality.' That is, using measures of state capacity to conceptualize governance in this way should help us get at the state's ability to administer policy across the sovereign territory vis-a-vis "executive branches and their bureaucracies."[441] Here I used the state's capacity to conduct a census[442] because it is not conditional on regime policy choices (or institutional capacity) regarding redistribution.[443] Elsewhere, the census has been used to represent the state's ability to collect *legible* information about every person in the country,[444] which is closely related to the intelligence collection needed for counterinsurgency.[445] In keeping

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[440] Covariates used in this analysis have elsewhere exhibited mixed results, yet constitute some of the most frequently tested variables.
[441] Fukuyama (2013, 347)
[442] Soifer (2009)
[443] According to Soifer (2009, 2), "To avoid this problem of endogeneity, an exogenous measure of state power—one that is not affected by the type of regime—is needed."
[444] Scott, James C. (1998) *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Yale University Press; Lee, Melissa M. and Nan Zhang (2017) "Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity," *The Journal of Politics* 79(1), 118-132
[445] Fearon and Laitin (2001); Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) are but two among the vast expanse of literature that claim state weakness/strength influences conflict onset and/or duration.

with Hillel Soifer's methodology, I constructed "a binary index for each country year that takes a value of '1' if a census has been carried out in the previous ten years, and '0' otherwise."[446] Such an approaches yields the following hypothesis:

H_2: The probability of insurgent exit should increase with higher levels of state capacity.

4.5.2. Regime Type

Regime type has often been considered influential in conflict studies.[447] "To date, a near consensus exists among scholars, policymakers, and journalists around the belief that democracies are uniquely deficient when fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns."[448] This view is mostly thought of as function of public cost [in]tolerance. In other words, citizens in democratic regimes are thought to be less approving of protracted wars because they incur high costs in lives and material and financial resources. Thus, democratic regimes are more likely to abandon insurgent wars before they become protracted.[449] This of course relies on the fundamental assumption that states are receptive to an aggregate citizen opinion on the matter and at least care sufficiently enough to act accordingly. In contrast, leaders of non-democracies tend to be more cost tolerant because they are less sensitive to public perception.

In order to assess the influence of regime type on insurgent war outcome and duration, Jason Lyall previously conducted a matched sampling of democracy/non-democracy pairs that were similar on confounding variables.[450] His "findings [were] counterintuitive: democracy appear[ed] to exert almost no causal effect on either war

[446] Soifer (2009, 15)
[447] See Lyall (2010), for example.
[448] Lyall (2010, 167)
[449] Jentleson (1992); Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Horne (1977, 545–48); Galula (2006, 44–45)
[450] Lyall (2010)

outcomes or duration."[451] Though Lyall's study produced results that diverged from conventional wisdom, there is still nearly two decades worth of research that has found regime type to significantly impact both conflict outcome and duration. As such, the regime type measure used here was the 21-point indicator from the Polity IV dataset.[452] This is a uni-dimensional scale whereby increasing values represent movement away from hereditary monarchy towards consolidated democracy. I considered the following hypothesis:

H_3: The probability of insurgent exit should increase with higher levels of political democracy.

4.5.3. GDP Per Capita

Income per capita is one of the most widely applied measures in studies of insurgent war. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom[453] is among the most prominent that has utilized this variable to assess duration. However, there are divergent explanations for what GDP per capita exactly captures. Indeed, "per capita income is correlated with so many other characteristics that it is difficult to interpret."[454] Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom[455] for example, claimed it might proxy for social costs—the hazard for peace or the level of citizen acceptance of their government to get involved (and stay involved) in a potentially lengthy insurgent war. Hence, GDP per capita may actually tap into similar mechanisms as those captured by standard regime type measures.

Elsewhere studies have demonstrated a robust relationship between poorer

[451] Lyall (2010, 168)
[452] Marshall, Gur, and Jaggers (2017)
[453] Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004, 262)
[454] ibid
[455] ibid

countries, civil war onset, and conflict duration.[456] As for duration, GDP per capita has been used to proxy grievance.[457] The rationale behind this argument is that poorer citizens are more likely to be pushed into the arms of insurgents because they negatively evaluate the state's performance. Insurgents likely survive conflict longer because they have a near endless supply from which to cull new recruits. In either case, GDP per capita is expected to exhibit some significant explanatory power. Here GDP per capita data was sourced from the World Bank.[458] Such an approach yields the following hypothesis:

H_4: The probability of insurgent exit should increase with higher levels of income per capita.

4.5.4. Terrain

That the 'roughness' of terrain makes it hard for state-backed armed forces to find and destroy insurgents has been frequently touted in the literature. It has been argued[459] rough terrain (noncontiguous territory that exhibits a mountainous landscape, swamps, and/or dense jungles) favors insurgency because they are able to use this terrain to set up bases that are hard to reach and/or hard to find. Thus, rough terrain effectively helps comparatively weak insurgents hide from their more powerful foes, which could consequently extend conflict duration. Here, terrain measures were derived from Fearon and Laitin.[460] I thus considered the following hypothesis:

H_5: The probability of insurgent exit should decrease with higher levels of rough terrain.

4.5.5. Ethnic Fractionalization

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[456] see Fearon and Laitin (2001), and Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004)
[457] Tor Georg Jakobsen, Indra De Soysa, Jo Jakobsen (2013) "Why do poor countries suffer costly conflict? Unpacking per capita income and the onset of civil war," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 30(2) 140–160
[458] World Bank (2018)
[459] Fearon and Laitin (2001)
[460] Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. (2003) "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1), 75-90

Ethnic fractionalization is one of the most divisive of measures in conflict and civil war literature. "Recent social science research on ethnicity and conflict has generally proceeded in two waves."[461] According to Lewis, on the one hand, the first 'wave' found little correlation between ethnicity and conflict.[462] In comparison, the second 'wave' "revitalized theories of ethnically-motivated rebellion."[463] In light of these divergent findings, I use Fearon's[464] widely utilized measure of ethnic fractionalization. I thus considered the following hypothesis:

H_6: The probability of insurgent exit should decrease with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization.

4.5.6 Additional Covariates Controls

The following additional covariates have had far less robust results on the aggregate[465] than the aforementioned but have nevertheless been demonstrated to influence conflict in some select cases.[466] For example, there is evidence to suggest lootable resources and foreign patronage are important factors influencing conflict.[467] Insurgents are thought to use these to fund ongoing conflicts. In keeping with standard practice,[468] gems and drugs

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[461] Lewis (forthcoming, 11), "borrow[ed] and simplif[ied] this analogy of 'waves' to describe these sequential areas of work on ethnic conflict from Roessler (2011, pp. 1–2)."
[462] see for example, Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Goldstone et al. (2010)
[463] Lewis (forthcoming, 11). According to Lewis (forthcoming, 11) "studies have found a statistically significant relationship between civil conflict onset and within-country, ethnic group-level variables – particularly exclusion from a central government, economic inequality between ethnic groups, and ethnic group geographic concentration." See also, Toft (2002, 2003); Østby (2008); Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009); Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011)
[464] Fearon, James D. (2003) " Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country ."Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 195-222
[465] Wood (2010) found 'mixed' results for loot, drugs and gems.
[466] In *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (2011) Idean Salehyan found cross-border sanctuaries to be important facilitators in Nicaragua, for example.
[467] Hovil and Werker (2005); Weinstein (2005, 2007)
[468] See Wood (2010); Gilmore, Elisabeth; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Pa¨ivi Lujala and Jan Ketil Rød (2005) "Conflict diamonds: A new dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(3), 257–272; Lujala, Pa¨ivi (2009) "Deadly combat over natural resources: Gems, petroleum, drugs, and the severity of armed civil conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(1), 50–71; Lujala, Pa¨ivi (2003) "Coca bush, opium poppy, and cannabis cultivation." *Mimeo*. Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

were coded separately using binary variables where '1' represented their presence in the conflict zone and '0' otherwise. Information on foreign patronage (material, financing, and cross-border sanctuaries) was taken from data available in the UCDP database.[469] These binary variables were coded where '1' represented that the insurgency enjoyed funding, material assistance, or cross-border sanctuaries and '0' otherwise, respectively.[470] I thus considered the following hypotheses:

H_7: The probability of insurgent exit should decrease when they have:

(a) access to lootable gems
(b) material assistance from foreign patrons
(c) funding from foreign patrons
(d) cross-border sanctuaries

I also included a variable to denote the interaction between incubation and terrain, as sanctuary building is one of the processes outlined in Chapter 3. I wanted to test whether the relationship between incubation and exit is conditioned by terrain. I thus considered the following hypothesis:

H_8: The probability of exit for insurgents with long incubation periods should decrease as terrain roughness increases.

4.6 The Model

The primary motivation of this dissertation was to test the relationship between insurgent incubation duration and conflict duration. While a standard survival model would estimate the relationship between incubation duration and conflict duration (or insurgent survival), models of this type do not as efficiently account for variation in covariates over time. Disaggregation of cases into years[471] solves this problem and allows the use of a

[469] UCDP (2016)
[470] Wood (2010)
[471] Lindstädt, Vander Wielen, and Green (2017, appendix 11)

standard logistic regression model. Disaggregated event history model permits all of the other variables (covariates) to vary across years. Carter and Signorino (2010) demonstrate that the inclusion of a cubic polynomial of time in these logistic regression models is a highly effective means of modeling myriad types of hazards, and is therefore a straightforward way to account for time dependence. There is also an emerging methodological precedent amongst conflict scholars for using disaggregated event history data in this way.[472] Best practices of modeling time[473] with disaggregated event history data entail the use of a cubic polynomial term (denoted in the equation used here as: *Time, Time*^{2}*, Time*^{3}. Thus my model permits all of the other variables (covariates) to vary across years.

The resulting logit model is as follows, where $incubation_i$ denotes the duration (in days) of the incubation period for insurgent group *i*, with coefficient β. Let $\mathbf{x}_{it}$ denote the vector of all other variables (excluding *incubation*), for insurgent group *i* and time *t*, with the corresponding vector of coefficients $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. Note that the inclusion of the subscript *t* indicates that these covariates are permitted, when applicable, to be time-varying within insurgent groups.[474] Finally, I included the aforementioned cubic polynomial of the duration, in years, between the operational starting point of the insurgent group and its failure, denoted $years_{it}^{j}$ for $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ (with corresponding coefficients δ_j). I could thus

[472] See for example, Raleigh, Clionadh and Kars De Bruijne (2017) "Where Rebels Dare to Tread: A Study of Conflict Geography and Co-option of Local Power in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(6), 1230-1260; Carboni, Andrea and James Moody (2018) "Between the Cracks: Actor Fragmentation and Local Conflict Systems in the Libyan Civil War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 29(3), 456-490

[473] Carter and Signorino (2010); Lindstädt and Vander Wielen (2014); Lindstädt, Vander Wielen, and Green (2017 appendix)

[474] Nine of the 12 controls used in this model vary by year depending on the duration of conflict for each specific case. GDP, state capacity, and regime type are the three controls that exhibit the most variance within cases. Ethnic fractionalization, terrain, and incubation do not vary within cases.

model the exit of groups from existence.[475] Because of the presence of repeated measures within groups,[476] I estimated the model with robust standard errors clustered on unique insurgent groups to account for dependency in the errors. [477]

$$Exit_{it} = \alpha + \beta incubation + \boldsymbol{\theta}\mathbf{x}'_{it} + \sum_{j=1}^{3} \delta_j years_{it}^{j}$$

4.7 Results

Table 4.1: *Probability of Exit*

	full model
incubation	-.0003781** (.0001452)
terrain	-.0004888** (.0001673)
statecap	.8725904 (.4977825)
percapita	-.0001193 (.0000697)
ethfrac	-.924675 (.9275231)
loot	-.1348917 (.8642036)
drugs	-.1338119 (.5580063)
gems	-.2994593 (.7322345)
patron	.7613615 (.526498)
support	.4257922 (.5837202)
sanctuary	-.6622755 (.5715178)
regimetype	.0208781 (.0375567)
incubation • terrain	4.20e-08 (3.13e-08)
constant	-.936144 (.8974698)
Wald chi^2 39.79	Prob > chi^2 0.0008 Pseudo r^2 0.1967 *n*=1,096 *p<0.05 **p<0.01

[475] Carter and Signorino (2010)
[476] Repeated measures always include ethnic fractionalization, terrain, and incubation. State capacity, regime type, drugs, gems, loot, and sanctuary may repeat in some cases, depending on the duration of conflict for specific cases.
[477] Lindstädt, Vander Wielen, and Green (2017 appendix, 6)

Incubation is negative and statistically significant ($p<.01$), as expected. This finding indicates that lengthier incubation periods reduce the probability of failure at any given period of time. Moreover, the effect of incubation proves to be of a magnitude of interest. Figure 4.2 provides the predicted probability (center line) and 83.5% confidence interval (outer lines) of insurgency failure in its ninth year of existence—the average for the dataset—setting all other covariates to their means.[478] The probability of failure falls, on average, by approximately 10 percentage points over the range of *incubation*.

Figure 4.2: *Exit as a Function of Incubation* (all variables except *incubation* set their means)



[478] Since I am interested in making inferences on the basis of comparing confidence intervals across different values of incubation duration, it is appropriate to use 83.5% confidence intervals to attain a conventional type I error rate of 5% (Goldstein and Healy, 1995). Per best practice. According to Arceneaux, Kevin and Ryan J. Vander Wielen (2013, 33) "The Effects of Need for Cognition and Need for Affect on Partisan Evaluations," *Political Psychology* 34(1), 23-4: "It has been shown elsewhere that when making statistical inferences from the comparison of confidence (credible) intervals, using 95% intervals is an overly conservative test for statistical differences (Goldstein and Healy, 1995)."

Under average conditions, incubation is statistically meaningful and has a negative effect on the probability of exit occurring;[479] the longer a proto-insurgency incubates, the less likely the conflict is to end in any given year when all covariates are held at their means. This finding lends considerable support to the hypothesis that incubation plays a powerful part in determining insurgents' ability to survive. Since there are several cases with covariates that deviate (at times substantially) from their mean, I also estimate predictions involving several other scenarios of interest (see Appendix A).

In terms of the other covariates, the results are relatively straightforward—*terrain* is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. As a country's elevation delta increases, the likelihood of exit decreases (negative beta). This finding conforms to conventional wisdom. Thanks to Fearon and Laitin and others,[480] the presence (or absence) of terrain favorable to insurgency is widely considered a favorable condition for sustaining conflict. The rough and rugged terrain in Afghanistan for example, has often been cast as one of the culprits for facilitating protracted conflicts there—for the current conflict[481] but likewise for most others in the country over the last 100 years or more. The standard industry-accepted measure of terrain (also utilized here) speaks to the "proportion of the country that is 'mountainous' according to the codings of geographer A.J. Gerard;"[482] and as an example, Afghanistan exhibits one of the highest recorded measures of ruggedness of any case cataloged amongst most insurgency datasets (including the one utilized in this dissertation).

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[479] The highest line is the upper bound of the predictions, the lowest line is the lower bound, and the middle line is the point estimate of the predictions. The expected outcome should fall somewhere between the upper and lower bounds. The point estimate is the halfway mark between the upper and lower bounds; the likeliest place for the expected outcome to fall.
[480] Collier and Hoeffler (2001); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Raleigh (2004)
[481] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/world/asia/nuristan-afghanistan-taliban.html
[482] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 11)

Obviously the magnitude of effect on conflict duration by using a measure of terrain in this way tells only half (or likely only part) of the story. It is important to note this measure "does not pickup other sorts of rough terrain that can be favorable to guerrillas such as swamps and jungle…"[483] Further study on their influence (and perhaps that of dense cities) is needed elsewhere.

As for the other covariates, *state capacity* and *GDP per capita* have relative proximity to significance but were not overall statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. They thus had no systematic effect on *exit*. *Ethnic fractionalization*, *loot*, *drugs*, *gems*, *foreign patronage (material, funding,* and *sanctuary*) were all insignificant at the 95% confidence level.

4.8 Robustness Checks

Since the majority of extant studies use outcome (win-draw-loss) as the dependent variable of interest, I conducted additional robustness checks using the same aforementioned covariates (including *incubation*) with outcome as the dependent variable. I subset the data for each outcome (win-draw-loss), and estimated the model shown in Equation 1 for each subset of data. When taking into consideration the outcome of the conflict, we can refine the expectations. In particular, we might hypothesize that incubation discourages exits to losses and encourages exits to victories. The results of this analysis can be found in Appendix A, and support these hypotheses. *Incubation* was found to be statistically significance ($p<.05$) and in the expected direction for wins and losses, and is not statistically significant for draws.

4.9 Case Selection

[483] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 11). See for example, Albertus, Michael and Oliver Kaplan (2013) "Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(2), 198-231, who found rural frontier areas in Colombia to be associated with guerrilla activity.

Now that there is LNA evidence to support the theory, the next step in Evan S. Lieberman's nested analysis as a mixed-methods strategy[484] is the selection of cases from which to draw "causal inferences about the primary unit under investigation…"[485] Recall, "the promise of the nested research design is that both [large-N analysis] and [small-N analysis] can inform each other to the extent that the analytic payoff is greater than the sum of the parts."[486]

In response to the explanatory power of the model, I split the cases into four quadrants (cut points at the median of incubation duration and conflict duration). Divvying up the case pool into a simple 2x2 table (Figure 4.3) allowed me to narrow the selection process. Using a crosstabulation of incubation duration and conflict duration, I created four quadrants: QA) short incubation/short conflict duration, QB) short incubation/long conflict duration, QC) long incubation duration/short conflict duration, and QD) long incubation/long conflict duration. 38.33% of cases fell into QA, 25% into QB and QD, respectively, and 11.67% into QC. Together, QA and QD (about 64% of cases) were 'on-the-line' and conformed nicely to the theory; with QD cases as the archetypal embodiment of the theory: long incubation duration/long conflict duration. QB and QC (about 36% of cases) did not conform to the theory and were not well predicted by the model. There were some questions left open about these cases after the statistical analysis and perhaps this is where the rival explanations discussed in Chapter 2 held some explanatory power? As per Lieberman, I want to "select cases for further

[484] Lieberman, Evan S. (2005) "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review* 99(3), 435-452
[485] Lieberman (2005, 436)
[486] ibid

investigation that are *well predicted* by the best fitting statistical model,"[487] and thus selected a case from QD. I also wanted to further explore cases that were not well predicted by the model to test rival explanations and thus chose one case from QB and QC, respectively.

Figure 4.3: *Incubation and Conflict Duration 2x2*



4.10 Introduction to the Case Studies

Chapter 3 proffered the theory that incubation duration was an apt proxy for the quality of proto-insurgent prewar preparation. Those who survived conflict the longest were those who took the longest to develop movements that efficiently and effectively adressed a variety of problems, given their particular environments, *before* they actually launched their violent campaigns. Insurgent wartime survival capacity is therefore a function of prewar preparation during incubation. To argue the wartime fate of insurgent

[487] ibid (444)

organizations largely hinged on the length and quality of their prewar preparation is a significant departure from our current theories of conflict duration. The data utilized in this chapter provided strong evidence to support this claim.

Sure, the duration of proto-insurgent incubation periods vary considerably. The data utilized here indicated some prepared for years before they challenged incumbents, some challenged incumbents with little or no preparation, and many fell somewhere in between. But as demonstrated, there is a positive relationship between the duration of proto-insurgent incubation and how long they survived during wartime. Despite such powerful evidence, it is still useful to take a closer look at some cases to see if the theory and data are consistent with the practical behaviors exhibited by real-world proto-insurgents on the ground. Case studies likewise help trace the causal processes of the theory, investigate elements of the theory—like prewar preparation quality is as important as duration—that were not tested in the quantitative study, and draw additional theoretical propositions.

Like the MIR and the FMLN discussed in the next chapter, I chose Sendero because there was sufficiently available and corroborated source evidence. Furthermore, I selected Sendero because it was well predicated by the robust statistical model.[488] Sendero represents an archetypal case study that conforms to both the theory and the data; an incubation period of 3652 days (approximately 10 years) and conflict duration of 4648 days (approximately 13 years). I chose the MIR and the FMLN because they were not well predicted by the model and thus needed to assess the power of the alternative explanations discussed in Chapter 2. The MIR had an incubation period of 2067 days (five years, seven months, four weeks), which was greater than the median incubation

[488] Lieberman (2005, 444)

duration of these data.[489] Its campaign however, lasted only 136 days. The FMLN is coded in these data with no incubation period but with conflict duration of 4739 days (12 years, 11 months, three weeks). These two are harder cases for the theory and were not well predicted by the statistical model.

Finally, these cases are similar in motivation, time period, geographic context, *and* familiarity among Latin Americanists. One might argue that selection biases may be 'baked in' to cases chosen by virtue of their location;[490] however, while these cases were not selected at random,[491] their geographical location does not correlate with the dependent variable or independent variable of interest.[492] Indeed, they fall into separate quadrants on both: Sendero had a long incubation period and long conflict, the MIR had a long incubation period and short conflict, and the FMLN had a short incubation period and long conflict. If we hold constant similar structural features on which the outcome may be contingent,[493] it becomes possible to directly examine the relationship between incubation and conflict. They were also deliberately selected because the researcher had "substantive interest in the cases, but little prior knowledge of case specifics,"[494] which helps capture "most of the benefits of the random selection procedure."[495]

4.11 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter tested the explanatory power of incubation duration on conflict duration. I did so by introducing a novel methodology for coding proto-insurgent incubation. Along with a whole host of standard conflict duration measures including terrain, state capacity,

[489] For all cases, the median level of incubation is 1175 days, or 3.2 years.
[490] Geddes (2003, 101)
[491] See Lieberman (2005, 447) for a complete discussion on the inherent pitfalls and biases of choosing cases at random.
[492] Geddes (2003, 111)
[493] ibid (112)
[494] ibid (448)
[495] ibid

regime type, lootable resources, and foreign patronage, I tested the explanatory power of my novel variable on conflict duration. Using 120 cases of insurgency (1945-present), I found clear evidence that one of the key features differentiating insurgents with short conflict duration from those with lengthy conflict durations was incubation duration. I find longer incubation duration significantly increases the probability insurgents will survive conflict longer. Further investigation is needed to confirm these results at the individual level and I turn to the case studies in the next chapters to do so.

CHAPTER 6—SENDERO LUMINOSO

5.1 Introduction

The following discussion of Partido Comunista del Perd-Sendero Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path, Sendero hereafter) highlights how a lengthy *quality* incubation period produces an effective and durable insurgency.[496] Building an insurgency from the ground up demands a great deal of care, judicious decision-making, and patience. I have argued a proto-insurgent that understands the interconnectedness of each incubation process and how particular environments require calculated and varied approaches are those who become formidable, state-challenging revolutionary movements with survival capacity. Sendero is an exemplarily illustration of this process in action. This chapter is guided by three central questions that relate to core aspects of the incubation period.

First, amongst Peru's contextual milieu, how did Sendero manage to get anyone to buy into its particular narrative at a time when most discontents were committed to nonviolent collective action? Second, why did it take a decade before Sendero actually launched its revolutionary campaign? The insurgency had ample opportunity to join the fray—especially during the large wave of protests in the late 1970s—but rather bided its time. Third, how exactly did Sendero go about fomenting political violence largely unnoticed from behind the scenes? Guzmán's movement incubated largely unbeknownst to the state. Using the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, I address each of these questions in turn.

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[496] In *Terrorism in Context* (2007, 17), Penn State University Press, Martha Crenshaw specifically referred to Sendero Luminoso as a case that "spent 10 years creating a clandestine organizational structure before launching a campaign of violence…"

What follows is a detailed analysis of Sendero's incubation activities during the 1970s. I show how it slowly and deliberately underwent the organization-building processes, how success in one area of organization building often relied on the achievements of others, and how each incubation process was integrally linked. I provide evidence that Sendero took considerable time to prepare before conflict and that its emergence, organizational structure, and the particular external political dynamics of the prewar timeframe influenced the way the insurgency ultimately formed—and how it performed during wartime. Put otherwise, my framework illuminates how Sendero's capacity to endure large-scale dyadic conflict was a direct correlate of prewar organization-building choices.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I first set the stage with a brief overview of the conflict (1980-1992) followed by a discussion of the sociopolitical context before and in which Sendero incubated. I next discuss the early years of incubation—which were largely dominated by recruitment efforts. I demonstrate how Sendero's founder took approximately four years to develop his core cadre using interpretive discourse that was well defined and resonated powerfully amongst college students, teachers, and political party members. Sendero then spent six years building an extensive civilian support network through a multi-dimensional peasant recruiting campaign.

The rest of the incubation processes dominate the remainder of the chapter. I demonstrate how Sendero established a complex, compartmentalized internal structure, and bases of operation that organized members and managed effective resource distribution across the ranks. I likewise show how Sendero managed to mostly avoid government detection during incubation because Guzmán and his Senderistas took

deliberate measures to avoid tipping their hand to the state. In the end, Sendero incubated for approximately 10 years. The purpose of this chapter is to thus demonstrate how the processes developed during incubation prepared the insurgency to challenge the Peruvian state, long-term.

5.2 Sources of Evidence

The revolutionary movement known as Sendero has been well studied and features in numerous oft-lauded, oft-cited academic works.[497] The Peruvian Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación[498] (CVR, or Truth and Reconciliation Commission) has exceptionally detailed accounts of Sendero's violence-laden campaign. There have also been some terrifically well-executed historical accounts of Sendero's prewar activities.[499] While my interpretation of these sources largely reflects conventional wisdom, there are a number of pragmatic limitations with our current understanding of Sendero.

For example, extant literature on Sendero predominately focus on only one of two time intervals: prewar (approximately 1970-1982) or wartime (approximately 1982-1992). There is little discussion of how the former influenced the latter. This chapter bridges that gap. The evidence undergirding this chapter came from extant literature, historical and journalistic sources, and elite-level biographies, both in English and Spanish. These were complemented by an array of declassified era-appropriate documents penned by various US and Peruvian government agencies.

5.3 The Sendero Insurgency (1980-1992)

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[497] Jeremy Weinstein *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*, to name only two

[498] The CVR was established in 2001 to investigate serious acts of political violence that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.

[499] See for example, the many works of Gustavo Gorriti and Carlos Iván Degregori.

On May 17th 1980, as Fernando Belaúnde Terry prepared for his *Palacio de Gobierno*[500] homecoming, Sendero initiated its own campaign in the remote mountain village of Chuschi in the Ayacucho Region[501] with acts of burglary and arson that went largely unnoticed. It is terribly ironic that the official coming out party for the most violent and prolonged insurgency in Peru's history was met with little fanfare by the Peruvian news media at the time. Preeminent scholars have argued that both the media and the Peruvian government paid scant attention to Sendero early on because it seemed the insurgency had basically come out of nowhere.[502] The government in particular thought there was no real reason to take the onset of this 'people's war' too seriously.[503] However, the somewhat lackluster introduction was eclipsed two years later by an exceptionally large and violent attack on the University of Huamanga's agricultural experimental farm.[504] This got the government's full attention.

What followed was a particularly aggressive guerrilla war whereby Sendero attempted to 'cleanse' the countryside using violence.[505] State officials and those "sympathetic"[506] to the government were early targets but as the conflict wore on, few were safe from the seemingly unrestrained violence. Military and police but also—and frequently—civilians were targeted. Senderistas also attacked infrastructure. A favored target were pylon towers that fed electric power to Peru's capital, Lima. Over the course

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[500] Also known as House of Pizarro, the *Palacio de Gobierno* has been the official residence of Peruvian Presidents since its construction in 1535.
[501] "On the eve of the first presidential elections in seventeen years, after more than a decade of military rule, on May 17th of 1980, a handful of hooded individuals ransacked an electoral center and burned the ballot boxes in the small village of Chuschi, Ayacucho" (Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 3).
[502] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 2); DeGregori (1992, KL 1264-65) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[503] Degregori et al. (2012, 21)
[504] Lewis Taylor (1983)
[505] Weinstein (2006, 13)
[506] Heilman, Jaymie (2010, 160) *Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980*, Stanford University Press

of the conflict, they crippled or destroyed nearly a quarter of Peru's 5,000[507] pylons.

By Christmas 1982, Sendero had achieved what preeminent Peruvian scholar Carlos Iván Degregori called the "semi-liberation"[508] of most of Ayacucho's rural areas and were poised to beset the capital city. By the end of the decade, 43% of Peru's total land area,[509] including much of the Andean highlands, jungle valleys, and urban centers were either lorded over by Sendero or regarded as Emergency Zones by the Peruvian government.[510]

Figure 5.1: *Sendero's Geographic Expansion During Expansion During the War*[511]

[507] Dietz (1990, 141)
[508] Degregori et al. (2012, 113)
[509] DESCO (1989, 352)
[510] Goritti (1999, 138)
[511] Kent, Robert B. (1993) "Geographical Dimension of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru," *The Geographical Review* 83(4), 441-454



Because the Peruvian military apparatus had easily eradicated the MIR[512] in 1965, it initially expected to do the same with Sendero.[513] But their counterinsurgency tactics were outdated and mostly ineffective;[514] and they were far from unified.[515] The police

[512] Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, Revolutionary Left Movement
[513] Sanchez Nieto (2011, 526)
[514] According to Gustavo Gorriti (1999, 52), "The military could only conceive of guerrillas in terms of a classic Castro-style movement" and was looking for "strangers wearing olive drab uniforms…" *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*, University of North Carolina Press
[515] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 10)

were also ill-prepared, under-trained, and meagerly equipped.[516] Furthermore, "organizational problems"[517] among Peru's three police forces, the Guardia Civil (GC), Guardia Republicana (GR), and the Policía Investigaciones del Perú (PIP) made initial coordinated efforts against Sendero impossible. It has been elsewhere argued the 'relationship' between the military and police was also particularly problematic.[518] Consequently, Sendero's core leadership remained elusive through much of the 1980s.

Inability to curb Sendero's wanton brutality greatly eroded the Peruvian government's legitimacy both at home and abroad, and devastated the economy. There were claims the conflict cost more than half of the country's Gross National Product. [519] In Lima alone more than 100,000 civilians were displaced as a result of the violence.[520] After the CVR's final count was tallied, the conflict claimed between 61,007 and 77,552[521] civilian lives, with Sendero as the "principal perpetrator of crimes and human rights violations, responsible for 54% of the deaths."[522] The conflict also had an exceptionally strong impression on Peru's electoral process, courtesy of Sendero's widespread and terribly brutal intimidation campaign.[523]

By 1990, the insurgency had lost ground as both the civilian population and many of its own militants began to see the protracted conflict as a threat to the country's long-

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[516] Gorriti (1999, 40)
[517] Soifer and Vieira (forthcoming, 114), Gorriti (1999, 62)
[518] Gorriti (1999, 62), Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 10), Soifer and Vieira (forthcoming, 114)
[519] In *The Shining Path of Peru* (1992, 301) David Scott Palmer claimed the war cost "more than $24 billion in direct and indirect property damages (over half of Peru's Gross National Product)."
[520] Degregori et al. (2012, 25)
[521] This is the estimate given in the conclusions of the Truth Commission: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (*Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, CVR)*
[522] CVR conclusions
[523] Soifer and Vieira's (forthcoming, 125) analysis of the 1989 municipal elections demonstrated that "25 percent of districts in an additional 30 provinces, including fi ve in Huánuco, four each in Arequipa and Junín, and three each in Ancash, Puno, and Lima. Thus missing returns affected at least some share of elections in nearly one-third of the provinces in the country, impacting 410 districts. Widespread spoilage affected 203 districts in 61 provinces. Finally, low turnout was found in an additional 103 districts spread across 43 provinces."

term survival.[524] The police had also started to slowly match Sendero at the operational level,[525] though there still appeared no immediate end in sight.[526] According to Degregori, 1992 "was possibly the worst year in Peruvian contemporary history."[527] Sendero went on a rampage, laid waste to the countryside in the Ayacucho and other Andean provinces, and left in its wake a trail of murdered and maimed Peruvians that numbered in the thousands.[528] The government's response was far from measured and decidedly undemocratic.

Fearing Peru would not recover from the chaotic spiral, President Alberto Fujimori—with full support of the military—disbanded congress and seized power from the judiciary and regional governments.[529] Then, in what Gustavo Gorriti called a "masterful stroke planned and executed by a small police unit,"[530] Guzmán was captured on September 12, 1992 "without a single shot being fired."[531] He was convicted and sent to prison for life less than two weeks after his capture, courtesy of a legal process that has been lambasted by some as "draconian" and illegitimate.[532]

5.4 Before the Shining Path

Sendero developed when the western South American country of Peru was going through an era of sociopolitical uncertainty. Control of the government had resembled a veritable game of hot potato. Manuel Carlos Prado y Ugarteche, who had been elected in 1956 via democratic elections, was unseated in a 1962 coup d'état that led to the installment of a

[524] Yaworsky (2009, 661); del Pino, 'Family, Culture, and ''Revolution''
[525] Gorriti (1999, xvi)
[526] Dietz (1990, 127); CVR 2003a
[527] Degregori (2012, 25)
[528] ibid
[529] ibid (26)
[530] Gorriti (1999, xvi)
[531] Degregori (2012, 27)
[532] ibid

military regime helmed by General Ricardo Pío Pérez Godoy. He was promptly ousted by another coup less than a year later, which led to a similarly short-lived reign by his successor, General Nicolás Eduardo Lindley López. In 1963, Fernando Belaúnde Terry took the reins after he prevailed at the ballot box. Then General Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado unseated him five years later. In 1975, General Francisco Morales-Bermúdez Cerruti unseated Velasco in yet another coup.

Unlike most military regimes in Latin America during the era under scrutiny here, the Velasco and Morales administrations were neither particularly oppressive nor plagued by instability. They actually tried to generate political participation—though largely without political parties—and instituted a whole host of (mostly failed) pro-poor reforms. These started with Belaúnde, who launched countrywide reform campaigns, "particularly in public education and rural development initiatives."[533] Velasco's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-75) followed Belaúnde's lead with its own reforms.

The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, "best known for its sweeping agrarian reform initiative, a program that accomplished a massive redistribution of land inside Peru,"[534] gained momentum in the early 1970s. Representatives from the regime's educational arm, the National System of Support for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS), had "traveled throughout Peru, visiting communities and towns to inform Peruvians about the military government's reforms…"[535] At first, SINAMOS found attentive ears amongst many campesinos across Ayacucho but it slowly fell out of favor when it failed to follow through with most of its promises. On the whole, these programs

[533] Palmer (1992, KL 310-311)
[534] Heilman (2010, 149)
[535] ibid (150)

had varied results and mixed reviews—especially in Ayacucho. Velasco's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces intended to build a loyal "social democracy of full participation"[536] through continued land reforms and anti-clientalism labor policies but actually ended up alienating much of the population it sought to court.

Peru's demographics had also undergone some significant shifts. Peasant land seizures in Piura (1972, 1973, 1978-79), Andahuaylas (1974), and to a lesser extent in Cajamarca (1973-74) and Cuzco (1977),[537] had been successful insofar as some peasants were able to get and hold land.[538] "Agrarian pressure and dislocation"[539] led to migration that caused massive shifts in population densities away from the highlands and into more urban centers.[540] Add to this unprecedented growth in university enrollment. For example, between 1959 and the early 1970s, the University of San Cristóbal of Huamanga (UNSCH) had grown from "just 550 students and 40 faculties … to approximately 4,500 students and 200 teachers…"[541] The wave of young people that descended on Peru's college campuses roughly coincided with a massive influx of Maoism thanks to a Latin American regional press campaign organized by the Chinese Communist Party (PCCh[542]). At this time, political and ideological tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its neighbor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), had been mounting over differing interpretations of Marxism, which

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[536] ibid (149)
[537] Taylor (1983)
[538] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 46)
[539] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 5); Matos Mar, José. (2004) *Desborde popular y crisis del Estado (veinte años después)*. Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú; Calderón Cockburn, Julio. 2016 [2005]. *La ciudad ilegal. Lima en el siglo XX.* Lima: Punto Cardinal
[540] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 5); Matos (2004)
[541] Palmer (2017, 429)
[542] According to Navarro (155), the acronym, PCCh, was used primarily by Peruvian Communists.

ultimately led to the Sino-Soviet split (1960-89).[543] The Partido Comunista Peruano (Peruvian Communsit Party, PCP) was one among many that were inundated with stories of the Sino-Soviet split that were decidedly pro-Chinese in nature.[544]

There were pro-Moscow/pro-Chinese camps within the PCP.[545] There were also moderates on both sides of this divide that were hopeful of the government's reforms. Before this particular series of splits within the PCP led to Sendero's birth in 1970, the fracturing of left-leaning Peruvian political parties was hardly a new phenomenon. Only a few years earlier a faction of the Marxist-influenced Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP or APRA) had splintered off and formed the ill-fated MIR discussed in the next chapter.

Social movements, while dating as far back as the 1920s, had increased from 364 strikes in 1968 to 779 in 1975.[546] A smorgasbord of social movements led by anti-government discontents from the teacher's union (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Education, SUTEP), various other labor unions,[547] and a variety of "socially oriented representatives of the Catholic Church"[548] had popped up all over Peru and led the reform charge. By the 1970s, these movements had collectively "shook the country"[549] and put the military regime on its heels. By the mid-1970s, massive mobilizations in places like Apurímac had started to grab national headlines.[550] While nation-wide, some of the

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[543] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming)
[544] According to Navarro, (155), "the PCCh organized this effort as part of a publicity campaign in celebration of its tenth anniversary."
[545] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming)
[546] Tovar (24) in Hunefeldt, Christine (2004) *A Brief History of Peru*, University of California Press
[547] Stokes (1995, 33)
[548] Stokes (1995, 39)
[549] DeGregori (2012, 21)
[550] Berg (1992, KL 2271-2272) in *The Shining Path of Peru*

largest and most intense protests were in Ayacucho.[551] There, SUTEP was engaged in a full-scale anti-government campaign spearheaded by students and workers.

Add to this "the onset of Peru's worst economic crisis since the War of the Pacific."[552] By 1977, real wages had fallen more than 35% and underemployment and unemployment ballooned to 39% and 9.4%, respectively. [553] "Economic issues were of course included in the strikers' list of demands…"[554] but there were also calls for the "extension of the franchise to the illiterate…" [555] Consecutive strikes lasted anywhere between 80-118 days, "the longest in Peru's labor history."[556] The state responded first with crackdowns by the military and police, which resulted in many arrests.[557] Though these suppressions were largely bloodless, "the threat of military reprisal was strong."[558] The state also seized a number of "ex-haciendas"[559] and "converted [them] into state-organized agricultural cooperatives… in an effort to block radical, grass-roots expropriation of the haciendas."[560]

To avoid further violence, Morales later withdrew the CG from most of Ayacucho.[561] He also knew the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces' days in power were numbered and announced elections for a Constituent Assembly to be held in June 1978. The Peruvian left won those elections handily. Even Hugo Blanco, an erstwhile revolutionary and peasant hero, who had returned from exile earlier that year,

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[551] JPRS 82202 No. 2601, Latin American Report (1982, 51)
[552] Taylor (1983, 3)
[553] ibid
[554] ibid (4)
[555] Degregori (2012, 75)
[556] Wilson (2010, 728)
[557] Berg (1992, KL 2277-2279) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[558] ibid (KL 2275)
[559] ibid (KL 2277-2279)
[560] ibid
[561] Heilman (2010, 173)

collected in excess of 250,000 votes.[562] However, Sendero had no involvement to speak of in these movements. As these economic crises and social movements were spreading like wildfire across Peru, Guzmán's Sendero rather started as a slow burn.

5.5 Forging the Path: Triggering Support with Interpretive Discourse

"*Being communists, we fear nothing*."[563]

5.5.1 Interpretive Discourse

It is important to reiterate here that in my framework, proto-insurgent discourses are informed by theories, myths, ideologies, etc., but simply constitute a lens through which events are presented to an audience. Interpretive discourse is thus a tool by which an extreme narrator can attempt to gain support in order to foment political violence. Sendero's activities constitute an exemplarily illustration of this.

I should start by noting the broader unoriginality of the narrative used to plant Sendero's seed.[564] Guzmán plucked the lion's share of his discourse straight from the pages of Peru's premier 20th-century Marxist intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui La Chira's, *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (*Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, 1927) and Mao's *Little Red Book*. Guzmán had cut his political teeth in the PCP, which was founded by Mariátegui in 1928. His initial association with the party roughly coincided with the aforementioned influx of pro-Chinese (read Maoist) ideology. He was particular smitten with Maoism partially because the Castro/Guevara-inspired foco movements of the day had been quickly (and brutally) eradicated. But also because the stories coming out of China at the time cast the Cultural

[562] Taylor (1983, 6)
[563] Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, Central Committee Communist Party of Peru (1991)
[564] Vasquez (1993, 204), Palmer (1992, KL 304-06) in *The Shining Path of Peru*

Revolution in a decidedly positive light—at least from a revolutionary point of view. Moreover, Mariátegui's *Seven Essays* shared some of Maoism's critical tenets; particularly that the peasantry occupied a central role. Guzmán maintained that had he been alive, Mariátegui would have been a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist.[565]

Though the PCP was inundated with stories of the Sino-Soviet split that were pro-Chinese in nature,[566] not all within the party were as enamored with Maoism as Guzmán. On the one hand, there were the pro-Moscow and pro-Belaúnde factions who held out hope the democratically elected president's intended reforms would make Peru more economically fruitful and less socially divided. On the other were the Maoist-influenced Red Faction, Guzmán among them, who dismissed the government's top down plans in favor of more aggressive means of reform from below.[567] When this dispute came to a head in 1964, Guzmán was among those that fled to Ayacucho to form Bandera Roja (PCP-BR), which gained some momentum in the ensuing years.

The PCP-BR "helped set up a municipal federation of community organizations and a People's Defense Front, which took the lead in the massive movement in defense of free education."[568] It also established considerable influence at UNSCH, thanks in large part to Guzmán, who had taken a faculty position there two years prior. UNSCH was a public university intended to provide higher education in Ayacucho and was the only university in the whole department. The magnitude of Guzmán's influence during his first few years in Ayacucho should not be overstated however. Sure, he had shunned both Soviet and post-Mao communism and outwardly denounced Peru's other Marxist

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[565] Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, Central Committee Communist Party of Peru (1988). Mariátegui died in 1930, only two years after he founded the PCP.
[566] PCP leaders Jorge del Prado Chávez and Raul Acosta even visited Beijing in 1960.
[567] Navarro (2010, 156)
[568] Degregori (1992, KL 1278-79) in *The Shining Path of Peru*

parties.[569] Yet he and the rest of the pro-Maoist PCP-BR were largely ostracized. This was one of the reasons the PCP-BR and the People's Defense Front were established in Ayacucho in the first place—some 350 miles from the party's headquarters in Lima.

Guzmán however played only a peripheral role in both organizations. He was merely in charge of propaganda and "the production of the [PCP-BR's] newspaper which bore the same name."[570] As already discussed, he was skeptical of the Castro/Guevara foco movements of the day—many inspired by the not-so-distant Cuban Revolution[571]—which had failed to initiate revolution in various rural departments around Peru.[572] But by 1965, Guzmán had not yet entirely embraced violence as *the* strategy nor had a fully developed narrative of his own—though he was moderately certain some mixture of Mariátegui and Maoism would constitute the fundamental undergirding.

To illustrate the minimal extent of Guzmán's influence during the 1960s, both the People's Defense Front and the PCP-BR continued on unencumbered when he ran off to China. He traveled there on at least two separate occasions during the 1960s[573] where he witnessed the Cultural Revolution at its height. Upon observing revolutionary Maoism first-hand, Guzmán was further convinced a similar strategy was necessary to replace the current regime back home with a peasant-run government. He "found the Chinese Cultural Revolution's more radical forces, led by Mao and then Madame Mao, to be more compatible with his extreme Marxist views."[574]

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[569] Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton (KL 4707-4711) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[570] Lewis Taylor (1983, 8)
[571] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 40) argued the ELN and the MIR started off with a strategy of non-violence but both eventually morphed into guerilla movements.
[572] Hugo Blanco led a string of unsuccessful land seizures before he was jailed in 1963. The MIR was decimated by the Peruvian military after only a few months. The ELN led a two-year campaign before it broke apart in 1965.
[573] McClintock (1998, 65)
[574] Palmer (2017, 432)

While abroad, Guzmán underwent significant instruction in the Chinese revolutionary style. His schooling lasted many months and incorporated both academic and military components.[575] He learned about the "history of the Chinese revolution, the works of Mao, how to organize peasants, and how to establish and maintain party cohesion."[576] He was also taught how to use weapons and explosives. He returned from his Far East wanderlust in 1967 fully converted[577] and convinced of the inexorability of his 'unique' mission.

While on hiatus, the sociopolitical environment in Peru had not improved. Belaúnde had been ousted by Velasco and a newly proposed public schooling fee was encountering hostility from poorer families and students across the country. Likewise, the PCP-BR and the People's Defense Front were making some of their own waves in Ayacucho. In response to Velasco's policy, "street mobilizations and school occupations involving thousands of the urban poor (Ayacucho) and campesinos (Huanta)"[578] were starting to spread. The Associations of Parents of Family (APAFA) and the National Federation of Educators of Peru (FENEP) were among the larger, national associations while the People's Defense Front led the charge in Ayacucho.[579] Mobilizations there turned violent on June 20, 1969. Shots were fired and the police arrested teachers, students, as well as a handful of leaders from the PCP-BR and the People's Defense Front, some 35 in all.[580] Guzmán was among the jailed. In the wake of the violence, the PCP condemned the PCP-BR and lambasted them as blind, desperate, notoriety-seeking

[575] Navarro (2010, 158-159)
[576] ibid
[577] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 9)
[578] Taylor (1991, 680)
[579] Degregori (2012, 52)
[580] ibid (61)

opportunists.[581] For their efforts, Guzmán and many of the remaining PCP-BR members were fully banished from the ranks of the party.

Having served his sentence, Guzmán was convinced all the telltale signs for fomenting revolution in the Chinese-style existed in Peru. It is important to note here that because the 1969 'peaceful' approach had landed him in prison, Guzmán learned a great deal about how *not* to run a movement. That year marked the critical juncture whereby Guzmán eschewed peaceful social movements in favor of a more radical (violent) approach. However, his revolutionary battle cry was far too radical for even the PCP-BR—who he claimed were committed more to rhetoric than action—and in 1970, he abandoned the movement with a small cohort of supporters in tow.[582] That same year, he penned a magazine article entitled, "By the shining path of Comrade José Carlos Mariátegui" and Sendero Luminoso was officially born.[583]

5.5.2 Recruitment

Guzmán maintained Sendero traced its ideological roots to Mariátegui and Maoism, both of which shared a penchant for peasant-based mobilization. Interestingly enough however, it was not the peasants—Peru's oppressed and highly impoverished Indian communities—on which he first focused his recruiting efforts. He first marketed his revolución to a much smaller community that he knew well and with whom he was already well established—the UNSCH. There began Sendero's recruiting efforts during incubation.

Guzmán, who presided over the UNSCH's Philosophy Department and was the

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[581] ibid (67)

[582] Many of the original members of Sendero had also traveled to China with Guzmán during the mid-1960s.

[583] The Gang of Four was a political faction composed of Mao Zedong's wife Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.

university's personnel director[584] used his position to recruit students and faculty. He was charismatic, well spoken, and a natural at tapping into emotion and enthusiasm.[585] He cultivated "an image of genius and omnipresence among his followers, who often appear[ed] to be as enamored of the man and his image as of the goals and objectives of the organization."[586] He was also a natural salesman and starry-eyed university students were easy pickings. According to José Luis Rénique and Adrián Lerner, Guzmán built himself up as the "infallible creator of the theory of the people's war in Peru—the so-called *Pensamiento Gonzalo* ("Gonzalo Thought")."[587] He also maintained violent revolution was both necessary and inevitable.[588] "His way of neutralizing caution and lingering doubt was to convince his followers that they stood on the threshold of a grand historic quest."[589] According to the CVR,[590] by 1970 Guzmán had seduced 51 followers into the Sendero fold. By 1974, the core cadre was comprised mainly of UNSCH students, faculty, and local schoolteachers.[591]

As noted, Guzmán did not initially target peasants for recruiting—a distinct departure from Maoism-proper. In point of fact, like most guerilla movements in Latin

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[584] Starn, Orin (1995, 404) "Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27(2), 399-421
[585] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 7)
[586] McCormick (1990, 7)
[587] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 8); Poole, Deborah A. (1994) "Peasant Culture and Political Violence in the Peruvian Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the State." *In Unruly Order. Violence, Power, and Cultural Identity in the High Provinces of Southern Peru*, edited by Deborah A. Poole, 247-281, Westview Press
[588] Navarro (2010, 154)
[589] Gorriti (1999, 23)
[590] CVR 2003, vol. 2, chap. 1, 23
[591] According to party documents analyzed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR, Chapter 1, p. 1), Guzmán had somewhere around 51 followers in 1970 and approximately 520 by 1979. According to Wickham-Crowley (1992, 218), Sendero "politically controlled" most of the "indigenous" student and faculty organizations at UNSCH by 1970, which had exhibited an "over 2,000%" (221) growth in enrollment; or approximately 15,000 students by 1972 (221). According to McClintock (1998, 74-74), Sendero's core cadre numbered less than 100.

America, Sendero did not adopt a "hard-line Maoist strategy."[592] Rather Gonzalo Thought had landed somewhere far from pure Maoism and incorporated both Mariátegui and Guzmán's own ideas. He had always thought the "peasantry, especially the poor peasants, [would constitute Sendero's] main participants, as fighters and commanders"[593] because while Maoism situated the peasantry as the central driver of revolution, Mariátegui, his intellectual mentor, so too "believed that the highland peasantry had the potential to lift the country from economic ruin…"[594] Guzmán figured the long history of campesinos oppression, courtesy of big landowners and Velasco's newly integrated reforms, made Gonzalo Thought[595]—which emphasized peasants as the main driving force of revolution—strikingly apropos. Yet between 1970-74, he primarily courted impressionable college students and faculty largely because he was highly educated, "came from the 'decent' strata of the province,"[596] and had little prior connection with the peasant communities he envisioned as the base for his insurgency. But 1974 marked a distinct shift in Sendero's recruitment strategy away from the university and towards the countryside.[597]

"As one born on the coast and educated in the cosmopolitan southern Peru city of Arequipa, Professor Guzmán was very much affected by the very different reality he found in the much poorer rural indigenous sierra of Ayacucho…"[598] More pragmatically however, he sought to exploit Peru's Indian communities for material supplies and for

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[592] La Serna (2012, 138)
[593] Guzmán (1988)
[594] La Serna (2012, 139)
[595] Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, Central Committee Communist Party of Peru (1988); CVR (2003)
[596] de la Cadena, Mansol "From Race to Class: Insurgent Intellectuals de provincia in Peru, 1910-1970," in *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru*, 1980-1995, Duke University Press, Stern, Steve J. (1998, 54)
[597] Degregori (2012)
[598] Palmer (2017, 434)

expanding Sendero's ranks as per the first and second 'phases' outlined in "Development of the People's War" (1974). This internal document outlined two initial tactics: 1) the "Development and Infiltration"[599] of the rural areas,[600] and 2) the establishment of "people's self-defense groups"[601] and "training cadres."[602] The key question however, was *how* to go about enticing peasants to get on board.[603]

Recall from Chapter 3, efforts to mobilize civilians take a long time to develop and refine and sometimes requires years to implement.[604] This was never truer than amongst Peru's poor peasant communities, which harbored a wider array of differing capacities, incentives, and motivations than among those Guzmán had seduced at UNSCH. Add to this the social movement milieu of the day,[605] which had been quickly gaining momentum and it is easy to understand that "winning the support of the rural poor"[606] presented somewhat of a conundrum for Sendero. Given this backdrop however, Guzmán was not easily deterred and instead launched a multi-pronged, long-term, and exceptionally shrewd strategy that was designed to supplant Sendero's student-based recruitment with one that was peasant-centered. Senderistas courted peasants and tapped into political and nonpolitical mechanisms; exploited economic grievances, kinship ties, preexisting rivalries between peasant communities;[607] and even peer pressure. Discourse was varied throughout incubation to fit the particular dynamics of each community in

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[599] González, Raúl (1986) "Para entender Sendero Luminoso" *Qehacer*, 42, 28-33
[600] ibid
[601] ibid
[602] ibid
[603] Gorriti (1999, 24)
[604] Weinstein (2007, 52)
[605] Degregori (2012, 75)
[606] La Serna (2012, 138)
[607] For further reading on this, see Miguel Abram La Serna's, *The Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency*, University of North Carolina Press, 2012

order to advance recruitment.[608]

Senderistas first sought to mobilize peasants by appealing to grievances held towards wealthy landowners and by feeding into their disappointment with SINAMOS' lackluster results. Recruiters marketed Sendero as the remedy for both. They applied this economic grievance-exploitation tactic and found attentive ears amongst many peasant Indian communities in Ayacucho's countryside.[609] The CVR later confirmed "many campesinos … allied with [Sendero] to win revenge against the wealthier and more powerful members of their communities, people like mayors, governors, and justices of the peace..."[610] Still, the warm reception Sendero found in the town of Chuschi is particularly noteworthy.[611] A closer look at Sendero's recruitment activities in this small rural town[612] situated in the Rio Pampa Valley is especially instructive for how the movement's discourse varied *contextually* during incubation.[613]

As it was, the haciendas that lorded over much of Peru's rural areas elsewhere had not developed in Chuschi.[614] Residents there had not experienced the same oppression from wealthy landowners, as had other peasant communities around Ayacucho. This fact rendered Sendero's economic grievance-exploitation approach largely inapplicable.[615] Nonetheless, Senderistas figured out other ways to build inroads with these peasant

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[608] Smith (1081-1084) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[609] Heilman (2010)
[610] ibid (150)
[611] For an exceptionally well-done and remarkably more detailed accountancy of Sendero's activities in Chuschi, see Miguel Abram La Serna's, *The Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency*, University of North Carolina Press, 2012
[612] "The Rio Pampas valley that had a total population in 1975 of about 6,500 inhabitants…" (Isbell 1992, KL 1736-37)
[613] Guzmán later chose Chuschi for Sendero's ILA, (Initiation of the Armed Struggle), La Serna (2012, 136)
[614] Isbell (1992, KL 1739) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[615] While Berg, McClintock, and Scott claimed a desire for "economic justice" (Berg, 116) was useful for helping explaining the warm welcome Sendero found in place like Andahuaylas, scholars like Poole and Rénique, and Popkin have since argued "there is no need for dramatic subsistence crises before peasants in 'feudal' or subsistence areas will support revolutionaries (Popkin, *The Rational Peasant*, 3, 28)."

communities.[616] To demonstrate, Sendero's incubation activities in Chuschi[617] and other similarly arranged communities across Ayacucho unfolded as follows.

Peru's peasant Indian youth and left-leaning teachers would constitute Sendero's largest and most receptive recruitment pools.[618] Like it had done at the university, Sendero concentrated its civilian recruiting efforts on the youth, with "the average age of the vast majority […ranging] between twenty and thirty."[619] Senderistas found that youths living in Chuschi, some as young as eleven,[620] were particularly captivated by Sendero's ideological battle cry. As "children of the deceived, [these youths were] looking for truth"[621] and Sendero happily obliged with its own accessible version.[622] Actually, the tactic that courted students so successfully from UNSCH and that Senderistas knew best—recruitment and indoctrination through education—also proved to be an exceptionally effective way to court many of Peru's rural youth. Schoolteachers-turned-Senderistas (many culled from the ranks of SUTEP) took up residence and established *escuela popular* (popular schools),[623] wherein students were slowly programmed with "the writings of Mao, Lenin, Marx, and Mariátegui."[624] Though most Senderista-teachers were not native to the districts where they were stationed,[625]

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[616] In *The Shining Path of Peru* (1992), Billie Jean Isbell noted that Sendero may have chosen "Chuschi for its initial military operations precisely because of this absence of haciendas, which allowed SL to experiment with peasant communities that had strong communal structures, autonomy over their resources, and whose experiences with capitalistic market penetrations were minimal (KL 1741-43)."
[617] La Serna (2012, 145)
[618] Degregori (2012, 92)
[619] Chávez (2011, 272)
[620] La Serna (2012, 145)
[621] Degregori (1992, KL 1420-21) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[622] ibid (KL, 1441)
[623] La Serna (2012, 146)
[624] ibid
[625] ibid (145)

some spoke or learned to speak the local Quechua language.[626] Likewise, some schoolteacher-turned-Senderista militants "married into the communities and preached politics."[627] Learning the local language and marrying into communities gave Sendero at-large a particularly pivotal edge over other previous would-be insurgents that had attempted the same approach.[628] Many pupils were thus eager to spread the message to family and friends.[629]

Sendero also fostered a noteworthy association[630] with SUTEP from behind the scenes. Throughout the 1970s, SUTEP controlled a number of institutions that oversaw teacher-training curricula[631] where attendees received "lessons in Marxism, dialectical materialism, historic materialism, the history of Peru according to the Marxist interpretation..."[632] This is an important point largely because schoolteachers occupied a particularly fascinating niche in Peruvian society that made them especially susceptible to Sendero's discourse.[633] According to Alan Angell, "schoolteachers were a constant source of troublesome opposition to the military government from 1968 to 1980…"[634] The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces and SUTEP had been at odds since the latter came on the scene in 1972. Velasco had "denied SUTEP official legal recognition until 1978 and even tried to cripple SUTEP by creating a rival, pro-

[626] According to Wickham-Crowley (1992), the majority of Sendero's members at this time hailed from or near Ayacucho.
[627] McClintock (1984, 51)
[628] See Chapter (MIR)
[629] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 253); La Serna (2012, 146)
[630] Prior to his appointment to the University of Huamanga in 1962, Guzmán had headed the La Cantuta School, one of SUTEP's most important teacher-prep educational institutions.
[631] "No central record was kept of union membership, but 100,000 teachers were thought to have been members in the mid 1970s, representing some 70% of the teaching profession" (Wilson 2007, 728).
[632] JPRS Report 82202 No. 2601 (1982, 51)
[633] Wilson (2007, 721) referred to schoolteachers as "quintessential hybrids."
[634] Angell, Alan (1982, 2) "Classroom Maoists: The Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers under Military Government," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 1(2), 1-20

government teachers' union."[635] While Sendero's violence-fueled aspirations were far too extreme for SUTEP at-large, most "radical teachers had read (or at least heard of) Mariategui's *Seven Essays* and took part in local popular movements against *gamonalismo*…"[636] In fact, many of the participants in the 1969 protests,[637] who went on to form SUTEP three years later, had been former students of Guzmán at UNSCH.[638] This combination of exposure to Marxism, the willingness to participate in popular movements, and a penchant for organizing helped usher some schoolteachers towards political militancy.

Sendero's cadre however utilized strict screening processes to attract the right recruits. "Membership could only be acquired after passing a multi-level process in which the candidates moved slowly from one hierarchy level to the other."[639] Applicants had to be vouched for by "already proven members of the organization"[640] before they were meticulously vetted through extensive background investigations. This approach had one of two results. Those who found Sendero attractive tended to be highly committed.[641] Others were repulsed and many communities, including those in Huanta, did not welcome Sendero's advances with open arms.[642]

Despite successes with youth, some among the older and more politically conservative generation were far less amenable to Sendero's discourse because they still

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[635] Heilman (2010, 174)
[636] A term used in Peru and Bolivia that denoted the 'bosses' or landowners who had oppressed peasant communities.
[637] In 1969, schoolteachers gathered in Huanta and protested the government's plan to impose a fee on public school students. The protest quickly turned into a "student-parent massacre [of] mostly peasants" (Crenshaw 2007, 260).
[638] Crenshaw (2007, 260)
[639] Chávez (2011, 267)
[640] Taylor (1983, 14) emphasis in original
[641] The fervency of Sendero's members has elsewhere been discussed in explicit detail. See for example, Degregori, *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 24(4) December–January 1990–1991, 10–16, Heilman (2010), La Serna (2012)
[642] Heilman (2010); La Serna (2012)

held out hope for the government's reforms.[643] Recall, Peru's military regimes were notably less oppressive than others in the region at the time. More importantly, Velasco's reforms were intended to shift power away from the "notoriously abusive local notables and into the hands of the more impoverished, more indigenous [peasant] majority."[644] Yet tensions flared within many communities between the older generation that largely supported the military government's interventions and the younger generation that eschewed it.[645] In the end, Sendero never managed to cull any significant number from older generations. Many who refused Sendero's recruiting efforts during incubation were later maimed or murdered by Senderistas during the 1980s.[646]

In sum, much of the literature has cast students, schoolteachers, and the younger generation of peasants as Sendero's primary recruiting focus. These are accurate depictions. Yet depending on the specific community at hand, Guzmán and his Senderistas used discourse that tapped into political and nonpolitical, economic grievances, kinship, and peer pressure to recruit from these segments of the population. While this strategy helped Senderistas find traction in communities like Chuschi, older and decidedly more conservative generations in these rural communities mostly shunned Sendero's advances. Despite setbacks among this segment, Sendero amassed a following that numbered more than 500 by 1979.[647] The number of active militants recruited into the insurgency over the ensuing ten years more than quadrupled that number, with thousands more supporters.[648]

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[643] Heilman (2010, 154)
[644] ibid (153)
[645] See Heilman (2010) for a detailed and exceptionally well-executed discussion of the shortcomings of Velasco's reforms.
[646] Heilman (2010, 160-161)
[647] CVR 2003, vol. 2, chap. 1, 23
[648] ibid

5.6 Solving (Organizational) Puzzles: Cohesion and Training

As Sendero's ranks slowly grew throughout the 1970s, Guzmán and his Senderistas had three organizational puzzles to address. They needed some sort of orderly internal structure to sort and manage the numbers. As violent revolution was the intended goal, a program for combat training had to be developed. And because Senderistas were going to be expected to risk their lives for the people's war, plans to deter defection and desertion, and inculcate cohesiveness among the ranks needed to be devised. These three internal organizational building processes were not mutually exclusive but were rather complexly interrelated and intertwined with each other, as well as other incubation processes. I shall illustrate this further.

While recruiters did cast a wide net and the organization grew in size as a result, Sendero's strict vetting practices and meager material resource endowment[649] meant recruitment practices reaped would-be combatants largely motivated by the organization's discourse. Recall from Chapter 3, the influence of resource endowments on the membership profiles of insurgent organizations has been well trodden in the literature.[650] In short, when proto-insurgent and rebel leaders have little to offer in the way of financial or material benefits, they tend to attract what Jeremy Weinstein called: highly committed activists.[651] My theory claimed that combatants incentivized to join an insurgency because they were seduced by the organization's discourse are less likely to defect, desert, or side-switch when subjected to intense internal cohesion-building practices. This is turn influences the types of structure proto-insurgents can implement.

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[649] One of the amazing things about Sendero's survival and success is that it did so operating on a shoestring. This is discussed in detail later in this chapter.
[650] See Weinstein (2007), for example
[651] Weinstein (2007, 139)

Sendero is an excellent study in the way recruitment and cohesion and control processes compliment and enable each other.

Thanks to Guzmán's time in China, the fiercely hierarchical organizational structure that Sendero built during incubation looked "much like other Leninist-Maoist movements, along rigid, close-knit, and secretive lines."[652] To illustrate, after recruitment, between 5-10[653] proto-Senderistas were sorted into a 'cell' and shipped off to a nearby camp where a single cadre[654] oversaw an extensive training regimen that lasted months. Much like the training Guzmán had undergone in China a decade earlier, proto-Senderistas were subjected to two concurrent modes of 'instruction.' To build combat proficiency, they were trained "in the use of firearms, explosives, the practicalities of rural guerrilla warfare..."[655] This mode also incorporated physical fitness and self-defense techniques.[656] After an assessment period, cadre assigned each proto-Senderista a distinct occupational specialty within their cell. Some were designated as explosives or weapons specialists, ideologues,[657] or medical experts.[658]

A complimentary mode integrated strict daily internal group cohesion-building exercises where proto-Senderistas "were subjected to a process of intense ideological indoctrination."[659] They engaged in a great deal of ritual bonding through marching, singing, and chanting[660] the virtues of their leaders. They were also taught to expect and

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[652] Dietz (1990, 134)
[653] ibid
[654] ibid
[655] Taylor (1983, 15)
[656] Taylor (1983 14)
[657] Taylor (1983 14)
[658] ibid
[659] Chávez (2011, 267)
[660] "Sendero en Canto Grande!," *Caretas*, July 30, 1991, cover, 34-39

to "endure excruciating physical torture,"[661] should they be captured—and to be prepared to die, if necessary. This produced what Degregori called: "increasingly well-organized cadres steeped in ideology."[662]

The insurgency's organic cohesiveness was remarkably strong as a result, and Sendero had few issues with desertion or defection.[663] By 1979, there was a network of militant cells and pro-Sendero villages bolstered by strong familial ties all across the Ayacucho countryside—the movement had started to resemble a formidable revolutionary insurgency.

5.6.1 Solving (Organizational) Puzzles: Resource Management

Curiously, most scholarly treatments have left out details of Sendero's financial and resource portfolio and its management. Jeremy Weinstein was one of the few who addressed this gap, though he mostly focused on the organization's involvement in narcotics after 1987.[664] This leaves roughly 17 years of Sendero's resources and finances mostly unattended. Examining Sendero's resource management vis-à-vis my theoretical framework is particularly informative because Sendero successfully incubated despite doing so on a shoestring.[665] This has elsewhere been described as one of the more puzzling aspects of the insurgency.[666]

To begin, the lack of foreign patronage meant resources and funding were culled domestically. While Guzmán did seek to base Sendero among the peasantry and to "use

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[661] La Serna (2012, 143)
[662] Degregori (KL 1289-90) in The Shining Path of Peru
[663] ibid (KL 1296)
[664] According to Dietz (2007) and Weinstein (2007), Sendero did not begin making money from narcotics until 1987.
[665] Sendero entered the narcotics business in 1987 (The Shining Path of Peru, KL 884
[666] Smith, Michael L. (KL 884) in, *The Shining Path of Peru*; Weinstein (2007, 117)

the resources it could generate through popular participation,"[667] its network of sympathetic villages did not fill the organization's resource and financial coffers primarily because most had hardly a surplus to offer.[668] Resource shortfalls were thus common. Indeed, throughout the entire incubation process Sendero's resources were meager at best.[669] The organization was often so strapped for supplies, Senderistas utilized old rusty weapons and stolen mining explosives.[670] While Guzmán eventually managed to build a small but highly committed network of "sacred families"[671] primarily in Ayacucho,[672] most supplies like food, clothing, and weapons were limited.[673] Relative scarcity however is insufficient for explaining Sendero's success.[674] Despite depravation, the organization still grew steadily in size throughout incubation.[675] It even extended its reach beyond Ayacucho,[676] and still managed to maintain sufficient resources and financing. This was largely due to the finance committee.

Sendero needed to procure at least enough resources to keep up with growth and for sustainment once conflict began.[677] Though it never succeeded in generating a steady or consistent resource stream during incubation,[678] the quantity of resources and money

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[667] Weinstein (2007, 117)
[668] According to Weinstein (2007, 117), "There were few opportunities […] for immediate material gain [and Sendero…] began with limited economic resources and did little to improve its economic position."
[669] According to Chávez (2011, 273), *Sendero* "possessed a thin financial ceiling that covered its expenses scarcely and that was composed of different sources that had to be made accessible time and again [and] only a very small circle of party leaders had intimate knowledge of the party finances."
[670] Koc-Menard, Sergio (2007, 189) "Fragmented Sovereignty: Why Sendero Luminoso Consolidated in Some Regions of Peru but Not in Others," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30(2), 173-206
[671] Orin Starn, "Maoism in the Andes. The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 2 (Cambridge, Mass. 1995), 399–421
[672] Deborah Ann Poole/Gerado Rénique, *Peru: Time of Fear* (London 1992), 43
[673] CVR (2003c, 15–16)
[674] Koc-Menard (2007, 192)
[675] CVR (2003, Chapter 1, p. 1)
[676] For more on Sendero's financing in various departments around Peru after conflict onset, see Koc-Menard, Sergio (2007) "Fragmented Sovereignty: Why Sendero Luminoso Consolidated in Some Regions of Peru but Not in Others," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30(2), 173-206
[677] Chávez (2013, 265)
[678] ibid (277)

collected turned out to be largely inconsequential because its finance committee kept a tight lid on the organization's resource coffer and meticulously managed what was scrounged. Despite paltry material and financial resources and no foreign patron(s) to lean on, Sendero still managed to not only get itself off the ground, but also develop into an extraordinarily formidable insurgency by 1980. This happened because: 1) available resources, though limited, were efficiently tapped through a variety of outlets, 2) Guzmán developed a finance committee,[679] which fiercely guarded the organizations' portfolio, and 3) management and distribution was meticulously controlled from the top down.

Though it often struggled to make ends meet,[680] Sendero's finance committee was the sole proprietor of the organization's resources.[681] The consequence of this arrangement was three-fold. First, squandering of scarce resources by mid-level commanders was largely avoided because the finance committee authorized the distribution of provisions to the applicable cells that Guzmán and the committee alone deemed absolutely necessary. Second, foot soldiers and mid-level commanders had little knowledge of the organization's full resource coffer and were therefore be unable to divulge its status in the event of capture.[682] Third, because Guzmán and his closet cadre, vis-à-vis the finance committee, exclusively managed resources, subordinates became solely reliant on the central leadership's decision-making, which further entrenched Guzmán's claim as the organization's supreme leader.[683] The downside was that because "Guzmán tried to monopolize this kind of knowledge in order to protect and enforce his

[679] Later known as the Department of Finance
[680] Michael L. Smith (1992, 29) "Taking the High Ground. Shining Path and the Andes": David Scott Palmer (ed.), *The Shining Path of Peru* London
[681] Chávez (2013, 282)
[682] According to documents procured by Chávez (2013), lower level commanders and foot soldiers had almost no idea about the size or extent of Sendero's resources or finances. Sala Penal Nacional, Exp. 560-03, Acta de la Duodécima Sesión (17/11/2005)
[683] Worsnop (forthcoming, 12)

claim to power,"[684] the finance committee was caught unwittingly and ill-prepared to manage Sendero's resource portfolio in the wake of his 1992 capture.

As it turned out, training camps and cells were meagerly outfitted and were rarely supplied with similar endowments.[685] But it did not matter because Senderistas knew very little about the extent of the organization's coffers.[686] How Sendero was able to pull this off with little backlash from foot soldiers and mid-level commanders is empirically fascinating and especially instructive on how a success in one incubation process impacts other incubation process outcomes—as delineated in my theoretical framework.

Guzmán was able to keep the majority of his Senderistas in the dark about the movement's coffer and portfolio because he populated the insurgency with highly committed activists. Strict vetting processes saw to that. Recall this type of militant is always far more cooperative when faced with relinquishing control of the organization's resources to the central leadership[687] than are adventure seekers or opportunists.[688] Moreover, mid-level commanders were not able to compare notes on their respective resource endowments because cells were spread out across the countryside and hence largely segregated from each other. Thus, Sendero's resource control effectiveness during incubation, and during the first half of the conflict, was a correlate of decisions made with regard to structural make-up settled upon during incubation.

It should be noted that according to Sergio Koc-Menard, by the late 1980s Sendero had become more geographically dispersed across Peru and the finance committee encountered some issues maintaining control over resources and distribution.

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[684] Chávez (2013, 273)
[685] ibid (281); Koc-Menard (2007, 200)
[686] Sala Penal Nacional, Exp. 560-03, Acta de la Duodécima Sesión (17/11/2005)
[687] Chávez (2011, 274)
[688] Weinstein (2007)

For example, "funds collected in the Huallaga did not benefit the rebel units operating in Ayacucho and Puno."[689] In reply to his claim, I argue this happened as a result of a shift in the kinds of recruits Sendero ended up attracting in response to involvement in the coca leaf industry after 1986.[690] Beginning in 1987, Sendero, or at least those operating in the Upper Huallaga Valley,[691] became entangled in all aspects of the drug-trafficking supply chain.[692] Weinstein has elsewhere argued the Upper Huallaga Valley front suffered from command and control problems after getting involved in narcotics trafficking because the funding it generated attracted less-committed opportunists.[693] Before 1987, most Senderistas had been sufficiently affiliated, were highly committed activists, and thus required little direct oversight to keep them in line with top-down directives. As such, Sendero had adopted a complex organizational structure that incorporated both multidivisional and unitary forms.[694] That is, fronts were dispersed geographically but still fell mostly under Guzmán's direct purview.

Recall from my theoretical framework that multidivisional setups are not a problem for organizations with members that exhibit strong commitment to the organization's cause. This had been the case before 1987. But with the advent of funding generated from the coca leaf industry, and the fact the insurgency was heavily engaged in full-on, large-scale combat with Peruvian military[695] and police forces, the organization was not able to alter its cohesion-building process to effectively indoctrinate the

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[689] Koc-Menard (2007, 183) (CVR 2003b, 292; U.S. Embassy in Lima [US Emb.] 1988a, par. 7
[690] Koc-Menard (2007, 186)
[691] Weinstein (2007, 15)
[692] Chávez (2013, 275)
[693] Weinstein (2007, 15)
[694] Johnston (2008, 113)
[695] According to Koc-Menard (2007, 184) and US Embassy 1984, par. 4; (1987b, par. 26), the Peruvian military did not become fully and actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations against Sendero until 1984.

opportunists that started to flood the ranks of the front in the Upper Huallaga Valley. This is an especially telling example of how the sequencing of the organization building processes *before* combat is critical.

Sendero's resource endowment also had some other notable organizational implications. For example, resource shortages, with regard to armaments in particular, meant it would be foolhardy to expect to match the far-better equipped Peruvian military, head-on. As such, during incubation Senderistas trained small unit tactics like raids and ambushes using rifles, bird guns, lances, and even arrows and machetes.[696] As previously noted, Sendero utilized these types of smaller combat actions, especially the use of explosives, with exceptional precision during wartime.

5.7 Avoiding Detection

Another critical feature of the theoretical framework proffered in this dissertation was that proto-insurgents insurgents who go to great lengths during incubation to avoid government detection are more likely to have time to undergo the rest of the incubation processes. In review, secrecy during incubation is important for two main reasons. First, proto-insurgents—who can expect to be weaker than the state-backed forces they will challenge—are at their weakest during incubation and should therefore take time to build themselves up into an organization that is actually capable of waging armed conflict. Second, building an organization that can take on this task is difficult enough without the added complication of fighting government forces at the same time.

"The image of the Sendero Luminoso as an alien infection that *suddenly* attacked Peruvian society with its dogmatic violence still looms large in the country's collective

[696] Chávez (2013, 279)

memory."[697] It was a remarkable feat that Guzmán was able to plant and nurture his revolutionary seed without triggering the state apparatus during a decade that was defined by the largest number of social movements in the country's political history.[698] Yet it was not by accident that the state did not see, or at least chose to ignore,[699] the development of the insurgency until it was too late.

Sendero avoided government detection for at least the first seven years of incubation. And even though there may have been some suspicion that "subversive activities"[700] were occurring somewhere in the "jungle,"[701] local police and State Security never managed to catch the proto-insurgency in the act. This was because concerted efforts were made in four distinct areas listed here and discussed in turn below.

First, Guzmán originally started his insurgency-building efforts in a place that was of little interest to the government—the university system. To maintain anonymity, they fled to the countryside as soon as the government started to take notice that college and university campuses were becoming a breeding ground for radicalization. Second, though Ayacucho was not particularly unique when compared to many of Peru's provinces, Guzmán and his Senderistas leveraged both the physical and social geography of the region to their advantage. Third, Senderistas were steeped in ideology and consequently adhered to and respected the organizations command and control structure and maintained strict operational security during incubation. Fourth, the failed movements of the 1960s as well as the social movements of the 1970s served as instructive cautionary

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[697] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 3) emphasis added
[698] Degregori (2012, 74)
[699] Gorriti (1999, 45-50) claimed the police had intelligence as early as 1977 that Sendero was making preparations for war. Though they ultimately decided they were not a threat.
[700] Gorriti (1999, 49)
[701] ibid (46)

tales for Guzmán. The proto-insurgency thus maintained distance from highly visible groups and organizations that were making waves or grabbing headlines and had no notable presence in the social movements[702] that swept Peru during the 1970s.

5.7.1 UNSCH was the Perfect Breeding Ground, at First

As previously noted, Guzmán had taken faculty and administrative positions at UNSCH in 1962, which was one among many institutions of higher learning that had sprung up throughout Peru during mid-century. During the time under scrutiny here, Peru's largely disaffected peasant youth were exhibiting ever-increasing aspirations for education[703] while at the same time the Revolutionary Governments of the Armed Forces neither cared nor had the desire to funnel the money to support it.[704] Indeed, the growing aspiration amongst the younger population for better-funded, higher-quality education was not held in similar regard by the Peruvian government.

Funding is a good indicator that the Revolutionary Governments of the Armed Forces did not see higher education as a priority during Sendero's incubation.[705] Spending on education during the 1970s, which hovered around 20% of the national budget,[706] was mostly funneled to primary and secondary schools. Comparatively, public university expenditures as a percent of the national budget came in at a paltry 3.4%[707] in 1970 and declined steadily every year thereafter, even as students continued to

[702] Degregori (2012, 74)
[703] "The percentage of the population from six to twenty-three years of age who were enrolled as students rose from 40.6 percent in 1960 to 73.8 percent in 1980. At the same time, Peru's ranking for student enrollment within Latin America went from fourteenth place in 1960 to fourth place in 1980, surpassed only by Panama, Argentina, and Cuba (Degregori 2012, 96)."
[704] Degregori (2012, 97)
[705] see Bernales (1981), Lynch (1990), INEI (1989, vol.1)
[706] Degregori (2012, 94)
[707] INEI (1989, vol.1)

increasingly flood college and university campuses.[708] There was an inverse relationship between university enrollment and public university expenditures throughout the 1970s.[709]

Guzmán took advantage of the upswing in university enrollment coupled with state apathy and had veritable free-reign at UNSCH for approximately four years. He recruited, held meetings, and largely saw UNSCH as a petri dish where he tested the triggering-value of his revolutionary discourse relatively unencumbered. This "honeymoon"[710] period did not last however and Guzmán's insurgency building efforts at the university, unwittingly sponsored by the state, largely came to an end in 1974.

Guzmán's Sendero was one among many "in the alphabet soup" [711] of left-leaning radical groups on Peru's campuses during this era. But by 1974 the state had started to take notice of the radicalism that was slowly brewing.[712] According to Enrique Bernales, Peru's military government began to see higher education in general, and the social sciences in particular, as "an ideological apparatus more than as disciplines of scientific rigor"[713] responsible for the "radicalization of vast sectors of the population…"[714] Moreover, "this radicalism co-existed with … a patronage-oriented use of resources by university authorities and students' representatives."[715] The perceived squandering of state funds and preferential hiring processes[716] coupled with a notable upswing in the rebellious trend, fueled by both Pro-Moscow and Pro-Chinese inspired faculty, ultimately

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[708] Lynch (1990), INEI (1989, vol.1); Dargent and Chávez (forthcoming, 2)
[709] Degregori (2012, 97, 98)
[710] ibid (95)
[711] Starn et al. (2005, 320)
[712] Dargent and Chávez (forthcoming, 3)
[713] Bernales B., Enrique (1981, 110) *Parlamento, estado y sociedad*, Desco
[714] Degregori (2012, 95)
[715] Dargent and Chávez (forthcoming, 8)
[716] ibid

forced the state's hand. Velasco cut funds to institutions that "portrayed the state as an enemy."[717] Likewise, a number of reform campaigns were launched in an effort to rein in the radical ideology that was spreading across campuses.[718] As the state began targeting higher education, Guzmán realized Sendero's unimpeded window at UNSCH was closing and thus traded the college campus for the countryside.

5.7.2 Ayacucho was the Perfect Breeding Ground, Sort of

There is some consensus that Ayacucho was a uniquely favorable site for insurgency to develop because it was off the beaten path.[719] The contextual interplay between Ayacucho's "society, politics, geography, and ecology"[720] is often heralded as the reason the insurgency was able to grow so successfully there. Yet the ways Sendero actually parlayed these into advantages is of particular importance here.

Recall physical geography defined by "rough terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power should favor insurgency and civil war."[721] And as it turned out, Ayacucho largely had these favorable characteristics during Sendero's formative years[722]—high, rugged mountains; lush, thick jungles; and rural and geographical isolation.[723] Yet in terms of physical geography, certainly there were lots of places similar to Ayacucho. "The Andes comprise about a third of Peru's territory"[724] and extend from Piura Province in the north all the way through Arequipa in the south. Ayacucho's thick jungles and forests were also not exclusive to the region and vegetation was far richer in northern Peru where rainfall was more abundant. Thus rough physical

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[717] ibid (6)
[718] ibid
[719] Smith (1992, KL 893) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[720] ibid
[721] Fearon and Laitin (2001, 8)
[722] Fearon and Laitin (2001)
[723] Palmer; Smith (1992) in *The Shining Path of Peru*
[724] Smith (1992, KL 895) in *The Shining Path of Peru*

geography was hardly a characteristic unique to Ayacucho and cannot alone explain Sendero's ability to form in secret there. Let us briefly survey three other insurgencies to illustrate this further.

The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, 1962-65) had a considerable presence in La Mar Province, Ayacucho. The MIR (1965) had basecamps in both Junín and Cuzco, which border Ayacucho. Hugo Blanco's 1960 Quechua peasant uprising was likewise in Cuzco. However, favorable geography did not benefit these insurgencies. All were tracked down and eradicated in short order by the army in the decade before Sendero. Thus a closer look at how the proto-insurgency actually engineered physical geography into an advantage is particularly instructive for demonstrating the interconnectedness of each incubation process and how particular environments necessitate calculated and varied approaches.

After Guzmán left UNSCH in 1974, Sendero withdrew ever further into the periphery and established encampments and sanctuaries in Ayacucho's forests and highlands.[725] Like the ELN, MIR, and Blanco, these sites well hidden amongst the dense vegetative and mountainous landscape. Yet Sendero fundamentally differed from these previous insurgencies in at least two crucial respects.

First, proto-Senderistas were "locally recruited and trained"[726] and encampments were strategically positioned around the countryside whereby members were largely segregated from each other.[727] According the Weinstein, "the compartmentalized system of organization meant that, for most recruits … connections to the rest of the organization

[725] *The Shining Path of Peru* (KL, 1284)
[726] Weinstein (2007, 90)
[727] Dietz (1990, 134)

were quite attenuated."[728] This made it almost "impossible for a traitor to inform on large numbers of members…"[729] and minimized the likelihood of infiltration.[730] Second, the exact locations of these sites were highly guarded by the central leadership. Thus while Sendero leveraged the remoteness of Ayacucho's most outer reaches to stay hidden from the authorities, the particular arrangement and locations themselves were shrouded in secrecy from most of its own members and supporters.

As for social geography, there is also relative agreement that Ayacucho was uniquely poor, isolated, and mostly ignored by the Peruvian government.[731] Though poverty was rampant in Ayacucho's rural areas, SINAMOS' advances had started to bear some fruit. Indeed, Ayacucho's status as an isolated backwater had begun to slowly disappear right around the time Guzmán and his Senderistas were making their way into the rural districts. While Velasco's agrarian and economic reforms campaigns on the whole are often (accurately) understood as lackluster disappointments, the state's presence had increased noticeably in previously neglected rural communities as a result of efforts to penetrate the countryside.[732]

On the one hand, there was a notable expansion in the provision of basic services,[733] an improved roadway system,[734] and greater police presence.[735] Unlike

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[728] Weinstein (2007, 90)
[729] Dietz (1990, 134)
[730] ibid
[731] Collier, David (1976) *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru*, Johns Hopkins University Press
[732] Some have argued the massive and unrestrained growth in peasant migration across the entire country, courtesy of the regime-funded improved roadway system, and the economic hardships it caused ultimately led to Velasco's ouster.
[733] *The Shining Path of Peru* (Kindle Locations 484-486)
[734] As part of its comprehensive "reform" campaign, the Velasco regime began rather extensive countrywide roadway and highway improvements in 1968, which was helmed by the army (Collier 1976, 97). While there was a marked increase in the number of roads across the whole of Ayacucho, according to Weinstein (2007, 248), there were still no "paved roads to most of the high Andean communities."

military regimes elsewhere in this era, Peru's regimes rather showed marked interest in cultivating political support, mainly amongst settlements.[736] "This strategy manifested itself through the National Office for the Development of Pueblos Jóvenes (ONDEPJOV), which was formed in 1968"[737] and was responsible for coordinating "social policies for residents of pueblos jóvenes and to mobilize support for the regime among them."[738]

On the other hand, there was still ever-growing distrust among the civilian population for the fleeting military regime and the state did little to thwart this discontent—and even exacerbated it to some extent. To demonstrate, by 1978-79, as the transition to democracy loomed large, leftist anti-state organizations like the Peruvian General Confederation of Workers (CGTP) had continued to sponsor consecutive large-scale protests and strikes.[739] The State Security took advantage of ever-improving access to the hinterlands to gather intelligence on such 'subversives.'[740] The military regime also threatened violence against groups or persons caught or suspected of inciting 'disturbances.'[741] Sendero played off this growing fissure.

As to be expected, some word did get back to authorities that "politicized"[742] groups had been seen conducting "marksmanship with light weapons"[743] in the jungle. When questioned, proto-Senderistas simply claimed they were hunting for wild

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[735] According to Starn (1995), Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming), though there was increased police presence, they were often corrupt, meagerly armed, and poorly trained.
[736] Collier (1976, 103)
[737] López (2014, 141)
[738] ibid
[739] Gorriti (1999, 1)
[740] ibid (3)
[741] Gorriti (1999, 2)
[742] ibid (46)
[743] ibid

animals.[744] But by this time, State Security division chief, Commander Modesto Canchaya[745] had started looking more deeply into rumors that a group called Sendero and its chieftain Guzmán had been making secret preparations for an insurgency.[746] At one point, Modesto even put together a task force charged with corroborating these claims. They looked for Guzmán at "the home of his father-in-law, … at the Lima campus of the Enrique Guzmán y Valle (La Cantuta) University; and a sister's home."[747] He was eventually found and escorted to State Security headquarters for questioning.[748] When asked if he was involved in subversive activities, with a cool demeanor and in a calm voice Guzmán replied: "You know very well that I'm not involved in these things…"[749] He was released two days later on January 11, 1979; just 16 months before Sendero launched its campaign. How could this have happened? The proto-insurgency was not small by any stretch at this point. Indeed, a well-oiled training and cohesion-building machine had already churned out close to 500 hardcore militants with many more still somewhere in the assembly line. There were at least as many civilian sympathizers living in a number of pro-Sendero villages as well as a network of bases and encampments scattered across the countryside.

To begin, Gustavo Gorriti has elsewhere substantiated that Guzmán and his Senderistas enjoyed a strong base of support during incubation that they used as cover from the state apparatus—the worth of which became evident during this January 1979 run-in with State Security. For example, in response to protests from a number of local

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[744] ibid
[745] ibid (3)
[746] ibid
[747] ibid
[748] ibid
[749] Interview with noncommissioned officer *Pablo Aguirre*, January 29, 1987, courtesy of Goritti (1999, 263)

"influential people,"[750] Modesto was forced to release Guzmán due to lack of corroborating evidence. So what Sendero's support network lacked in ability to provide material and financial resources, it made up for in loyalty, which was perhaps more valuable.

Ayacucho was hence not particularly unique per se but rather, the ability to stay hidden during incubation was more a correlate of contextual, concerted efforts Sendero made to avoid the ever-expanding reach of the state. This leads us to the next tactic Sendero used to stay hidden—operational security.

5.7.3 Loose Lips Sink Ships

Much of Sendero's recruitment, training, and internal cohesion building practices have heretofore been discussed. There are a few points worth restating here, as they are pertinent to Sendero's capacity to avoid detection during incubation.

As noted, much of the 1970s was focused on internal organization building. "Sendero had become a classic example of a party built from the top down and from its ideology out"[751] but the specific internal dynamics and mechanisms of control for keeping its members from divulging secrets remains largely absent from previous studies. I fill this gap here by explaining how Sendero utilized a hat trick of ideology, fear tactics, and isolation to keep its members and supporters from leaking information.

During incubation, the proto-insurgency developed a "system of order"[752] that was unrivaled by any previous movements in Peru. Young people[753] willingly bought

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[750] Gorriti (1999, 5)
[751] *The Shining Path of Peru* (KL, 1296-1297)
[752] del Pino (1998, 161) in *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru*, 1980-1995, Duke University Press
[753] Chávez de Paz (1989, 8)

into its violent dogma[754] and were attracted to the orderliness Sendero offered.[755] They were meticulously vetted, sorted into small segregated cells, and baptized via lengthy indoctrination processes that were designed to snuff out individuality and inculcate loyalty through ideological reprogramming.[756] These extensive internal cohesion-building exercises socialized members into a coherent group[757] and fostered extreme loyalty.[758]

As a second line of defense, there was a policy of zero-tolerance for those who shirked the rules,[759] wished to leave the organization, or divulged the goings-on or locations of Sendero's encampments. Indeed, "in joining the ranks [of Sendero], one was effectively sealing the fates of one's closest family and friends, whose guilty-by-association would lead them down the same tortuous path."[760]

The recruitment and indoctrination practices applied to proto-Senderistas, coupled with the highly compartmentalized nature of the cells meant Sendero expressed "ideological rigidity and organic cohesiveness"[761] right from the start. When combined with its strict control mechanisms, Senderistas were extremely loyal to the organization.

5.7.4 Cautionary Tales and Cutting Ties

By the time Guzmán embarked on his initial insurgency building efforts in 1970, he had previously been a part of some ill-fated anti-state social movement experiments.[762] Recall his involvement in the 1969 protests ultimately landed him in jail for several months.[763]

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[754] Sendero did not start using coercive means of recruitment until after 1980.
[755] del Pino (1998, 161)
[756] Degregori (2012, 114)
[757] Sanin and Wood (2014, 213)
[758] Degregori (2012, 114)
[759] "Rules were enforced with iron-handed discipline: there were no second chances, with offenses punishable by either exile or summary execution" (*The Shining Path of Peru*, KL 1296-1297)
[760] La Serna (2012, 143)
[761] *The Shining Path of Peru* (KL 1294)
[762] Gorriti (1990)
[763] Degregori (2012, 61)

He was also not the first to think of challenging the state with violence. As it happened, a whole host of political[764] and guerilla movements[765] had emerged in 1960s-70s Peru, including the three aforementioned groups, which had been all quickly trounced by the Peruvian armed forces.

According to Degregori, the protests and social movements of the 1970s had "greater impact than any others in contemporary Peruvian history."[766] Large associations and unions comprised of teachers, workers, and peasants ever-increasingly pushed the state for reform, which eventually responded by deploying military and police forces. Though teacher and worker stoppages in 1977 and 1978 were largely nonviolent, other peaceful protests devolved into riots wherein civilians and police clashed. There was hostage taking,[767] violent skirmishes, arrests,[768] and even deaths.[769]

Despite the growth of these movements, "Sendero would have had little to contribute … because it no longer was prepared for this sort of struggle."[770] Guzmán was neither interested in making the same mistakes as he had in 1969 nor was he as impatient as his countrymen and women who had leapt headfirst into the social movement foray. [771] In point of fact, Sendero was wholly disinterested in supporting these movements or in playing even a marginal role.[772] Add to this the loyalty Sendero had fostered amongst the local population and we can begin to understand how Sendero stayed out of the limelight.

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[764] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 40) argued the ELN and the MIR started off with a strategy of non-violence but both eventually morphed into guerilla movements.
[765] Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)
[766] Degregori (2012, 74)
[767] *The Shining Path of Peru* (KL 3649)
[768] ibid (KL 2298-2300)
[769] ibid (KL 2298-2300). The Pamplona invasion in Lima in 1971 was among the earlier movements that turned violent (Collier, 1976, 104).
[770] Degregori (2012, 74)
[771] According to Degregori (2012, 74), during the first years of incubation, "Guzmán and his miserable followers" remained mostly isolated, hidden on the UNSCH campus.
[772] ibid

To summarize, throughout incubation, "the handful of communists clustered in Sendero managed to elaborate an absolutely coherent doctrine and an exceptional organization"[773] and did so largely unnoticed by the Peruvian government. Though framing Sendero's successful avoidance of government detection as a correlate of Ayacucho's particular dynamics is, on the surface, understandable, I argued Ayacucho's 'uniqueness' as a favorable site for insurgency is often overstated in the literature. Here I argued Sendero's ability to avoid government detection had less to do with Ayacucho per se, but rather because specific choices were made during incubation that helped the organization leverage the surrounding contextual milieu to its strategic advantage. The proto-insurgency: 1) started in one place not on the government's radar—the university system and learned from, and avoided the pitfalls of previous and current movements, 2) parlayed Ayacucho's physical and social geography into strategic advantages, 3) maintained strict operational security thanks to a combination of recruitment, indoctrination, and control mechanisms, and 4) avoided getting caught up in the social movement melee by cutting external ties with most organizations. In the end, the government did not simply 'miss' the growth of the insurgency during the 1970s. Rather Sendero took certain measures to protect themselves from being found out before they were ready to challenge the state.

5.8 Chapter Conclusions

To date, Sendero was Peru's only prolonged insurgency. Some accounts claim Guzmán came along in precisely the right place at precisely the right time. However, this chapter argued Sendero's wartime success was not a function of fortuitous luck, happenstance, or incidental good timing but rather as a direct cause of the type and extent of the

[773] ibid

movement's prewar preparation. Guzmán successfully fomented political violence not because Peruvian's at-large were especially amenable to calls for violence—despite the fact mid-century Peru was a particularly tumultuous place—but because he and his Senderistas took considerable time and care in prewar preparation.

To summarize and conclude, this chapter demonstrated that incubation is the key to solving the puzzle of Sendero's wartime survival capacity. The proto-insurgency slowly and deliberately worked its way through the incubation processes outlined in Chapter 3. That is, Sendero did not transform into a formidable insurgency over night but rather did so over the course of a decade. Peru's most formidable insurgency encountered many problems during incubation, including ones with recruitment, financing and resources, as well as with avoiding government detection. But it was neither deterred nor hasty in its preparation. It bided time, prepared slowly, and thus amassed the necessary skills and operational capacity to challenge the government. And when conflict eventually erupted, Sendero was sufficiently prepared for the wartime challenges it faced.

CHAPTER 6—COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MIR AND THE FMLN

6.1 Introduction

This chapter's comparative analysis of the MIR[774] insurgency in Peru and the FMLN[775] insurgency in El Salvador provides further insight into the usefulness and limitations of the theory of incubation for explaining wartime survival capacity. Upon initial inspection, these cases do not conform to the theory of this dissertation; the MIR is coded with a nearly five-year incubation period but was defeated in approximately five months and the FMLN is coded with no incubation period yet persisted for as long as the Sendero insurgency. I provide evidence in this chapter that both insurgencies underwent the incubation processes outlined in Chapter 3, but produced a quality of organizational outcome that was very different.

To illustrate, the MIR incubated in a relatively straightforward way, though squandered its time and botched many of the preparation processes. That is, the MIR is a good example of how not to incubate. Though its founder and helmsman, Luis Felipe de La Puente Uceda was partially successful with his recruitment efforts and created a stir early on among college students and select members from the political party from which he hailed, he did not successfully establish rapport with those for which he alleged to speak (the poor peasantry), and was too blinded by hubris to admit it. Safe havens and camps initially cloaked organization-building activities from the government's prying eyes, but de la Puente had a hard time keeping his Castro-inspired insurgency a secret. He condemned the Peruvian government often and publicly—at times describing his plans for revolution in explicit detail over the radio and in print. Though MIR guerrillas took

[774] Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement)
[775] Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front)

part in a good deal of combat training, the organization as a whole exhibited very little in-group cohesion. Member loyalty was so weak in fact; one entire element of the insurgency deserted before the first combat operation. A lack of in-group cohesion even led to, what turned out to be, one exceptionally detrimental defection. In the end, the MIR failed to create a salient interpretive discourse, foster loyalty through in-group cohesion, and avoid government detection. There failures outweighed the successes and much like Che's Bolivian insurgency, the MIR's fate was sealed long before conflict ever began.

The FMLN's incubation is a far more complex picture. It is especially well known among conflict scholars and Latin Americanists that the FMLN insurgency was a coalition of five individual groups, which sought rapprochement and eventually united in late-1979.[776] Like the collection of distinct clans that comprised Al-Shabaab (discussed in Chapter 2) united and stay united, that the five individual member-groups of the FMLN were able to accomplish this is a remarkable but puzzling organizational phenomenon. While the FMLN at-large did not incubate per se, the groups of which it was eventually comprised incubated *individually* before rapprochement.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I first set the stage with a brief overview of the conflicts for both of these cases, followed by a discussion of the sociopolitical context before and in which they incubated. I next discuss how each triggered support using interpretive discourse. While each of the FMLN member-groups had varied successes, I show how the MIR struggled, mostly due to an ineffective approach.

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[776] See for example, Elisabeth Jean Wood's book, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*, Cambridge University Press, and Jeff Goodwin's, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements*, *1945-1991*, (*Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics),* Cambridge University Press

I continue with discussions of the remaining incubation processes: cohesion building, control, training, resource management, building sanctuaries, and avoiding government detection. I show how the MIR did little to modify its methods though it faced considerable setbacks along the way—in some instances even exacerbated mistakes when it doubled-down on the same failed methods. By comparison, some member-groups of the FMLN solved particular problems during incubation better than others. Where one rallied civilian support effectively, another was better at training foot soldiers in guerrilla warfare. Disaggregating the FMLN's coalition in this way demonstrates even a case that appears to have an alternative explanation—when the coalition instead of individual member-groups is the unit of analysis—the theory of incubation proposed here can still travel with some applicable explanatory power. By examining the different ways the MIR and the FMLN member-groups underwent these processes and the variance in successes they had in each, it becomes clear how the former set itself up for failure while the latter established the building blocks that would constitute the foundation for a formidable and long-lasting insurgency.

Before my concluding remarks, I briefly explain how the FMLN became an organization and spent nearly a year consolidating leadership and resource control before combat operations were launched. Popular accounts claim the confluence of income inequality,[777] a legacy of a "wealthy, tightly knit, and hence politically powerful landowning"[778] oligarchy, and the "highly unequal distribution of land,"[779] coupled with a state that was "militarized yet infrastructurally weak,"[780] were factors that contributed

[777] Goodwin (1991, 150); Wood (2003)
[778] Goodwin (1991, 152); Wood (2003)
[779] Wood (2003, 22)
[780] Goodwin (1991, 143)

to the formation of the FMLN insurgency. I do not dispute these claims as these factors were not only present in El Salvador but in other Latin American countries plagued by insurgents, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, and to some extent in Bolivia and Peru.[781] But these are not necessary and sufficient conditions for a quality insurgency. Indeed, Elisabeth Jean Wood claimed a number of armed, though failed uprisings had occurred in El Salvador prior to the FMLN.[782] Thus there are still some unanswered questions about *how* the FMLN in particular was able to engineer a successful rebellion where others had failed. I argue the FMLN did so mainly because of extensive prewar preparation. This was a difficult process but is as remarkable as it is instructive for demonstrating this dissertation's theory in practice. In the end, the member-groups produced an organization that was greater than the sum of their individual parts.

6.2 Sources of Evidence

Unlike the MIR, the history of the FMLN's insurgency (1980-92) has been well documented in meticulous detail.[783] The Truth Commission for El Salvador[784] for example, detailed hundreds of wartime atrocities perpetrated by the FMLN alone. There are also a handful of valuable treatments on some member-group's pre-war activities.[785] Although extant literature is vast, specific studies about the emergence, development, organizational structure, and internal dynamics of the individual groups prior to rapprochement remain largely disaggregated. This chapter amasses this evidence and

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[781] Castañeda, Jorge G. (1997) *Companero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara,* Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group; McCormick, Gordon H. (Winter 1997/1998) "Che Guevara: The Legacy of a Revolutionary Man" *World Policy Journal* (14)4, 1-19; Wickham-Crowley, Timothy (2014) "Two "Waves" of Guerrilla-Movement Organizing in Latin America, 1956–1990 " *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 56(1), 215–242

[782] Wood (2003, 21)

[783] ibid

[784] The *Commission on the Truth for El Salvador* publicized the results of a detailed investigation of serious acts of violence that occurred in the civil war (1980-992).

[785] See again, Wood (2003)

paints a detailed picture of their respective incubation periods.

Such accounts of the MIR were far harder to come by. The MIR's rise and fall took place more than half a century ago and the short-lived nature of the insurgency meant piecing together and cross-referencing various Spanish-language accounts. My account of the MIR's prewar activities helps to shed more light on the lesser-known details of a failed insurgency that has almost altogether been forgotten in the annals of history.

The lion's share of the evidence tapped for both cases in this chapter came from extant literature, historical and journalistic sources, and elite-level biographies, both in English and Spanish. These sources are supplemented by an extensive array of declassified documents penned by a number of government entities. Despite the absence of first-hand fieldwork on my part, the mixture of primary and secondary sources used to research the incubation periods of the MIR and the FMLN offered a variety of opposing viewpoints that helped paint a useful comparative perspective. While my overall concluding interpretations largely coincide with conventional wisdom, my framework further illuminates how antecedent behaviors are critical for explaining insurgent longevity.

6.3 War

De la Puente's "typical Castro-style"[786] foco did not announce itself through violence until five years after it initially formed—though it happened without his consent and was largely anticipated by the Peruvian government. The MIR's Junín-based front, La unidad

[786] Castañeda (1997, 331). Fidel Castro's July Twenty-Sixth Movement is the archetypal example of the 'foco' theory of revolution in practice. Focalism (*foquismo*) was inspired by Castro and Che Guevara's successful insurgency in Cuba and was first theorized by Régis Debray, a French intellectual.

guerrillera Túpac Amaru (Tupac Amaru) led by Guillermo Lobatón Milla raided a mine on June 9, 1965, where they procured explosives.[787] Two days later, they invaded the town of Andamarca,[788] ransacked the police station and tried (but failed) to overtake Hacienda Alegría,[789] one of the largest estates in the Junín region. Despite failing to do so, Lobatón thought he had led the MIR into a "highly publicized and successful armed action."[790] Tupac Amaru later ambushed a group of GC troops,[791] killing nine[792] and capturing twelve in the process.[793] This got the Belaúnde administration's attention and reinforcements from the GC and the Investigative Police of Peru (La Policía de Investigaciones del Perú, or PIP) were sent to Junín to restore order.[794] In a near unanimous tally, the Congreso de la República supported the death penalty for those responsible for the killings and on July 2, Belaúnde put the army in charge of all counter-guerrilla operations—with de la Puente as the main target.[795]

Over the next four months, a series of face-to-face skirmishes with various units of the Peruvian armed forces broke out between Lobatón's Tupac Amaru guerrillas and de la Puente's Mesa Pelada-based front (Pachacútec).[796] Tupac Amaru even attempted a daring, though ill-fated invasion of a Peruvian Army Ranger barracks.[797] Though determined, the MIR was largely outmatched in these confrontations and by the beginning of October 1965 the remnants of the insurgency were in full retreat. On

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[787] Lust (10) 50 años guerrilla peruana: 9 junio 1965 – 9 de junio 2015
[788] Concepción Province
[789] Lust (10) 50 años guerrilla peruana: 9 junio 1965 – 9 de junio 2015
[790] CIA memo, July 28, 1965
[791] Peruvian Republican Guard (Guardia Republicana del Perú)
[792] CIA memo, July 28, 1965
[793] Lust (10) 50 años guerrilla peruana: 9 junio 1965 – 9 de junio 2015
[794] ibid
[795] ibid
[796] ibid
[797] ibid

October 23, 1965, the army overran Pachacútec at Mesa Pelada[798] and de la Puente was killed in the battle.[799] After his death, Lobatón attempted to carry on the quickly dissolving insurgency alone, but three days before Christmas; the army bested Tupac Amaru and he fled into the countryside outside of Lima. After a local priest disclosed his whereabouts, Lobatón was tracked down and killed by Peruvian Army Rangers less than two weeks later.[800]

The MIR had troubles right from incubation's outset. De la Puente had neither managed to create a loyal following nor had he developed the control mechanisms to oversee those that were less committed. He was also unable (or unwilling) to keep his organization and its plans a secret. For example, only months before the start of combat operations he met with a Lima newspaper reporter and outright divulged the MIR's plans to initiate a revolution. He even posed for a picture all gussied up in a guerrilla "costume"[801] that was later published in the paper. The premature attacks by Lobatón and his guerrillas were a testament to the insurgency's meager cohesion and control, as was the defection of 32-year-old Cuzco University student Albino Guzmán who, after he abandoned the movement, provided the military with directions to a number of MIR basecamps.[802] He even led the army to several of the MIR's hidden weapons caches.[803]

By comparison, the FMLN campaign was far more successful and has elsewhere been described as "one of the most successful armed opposition groups turned political

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[798] ibid
[799] According to Jan Lust in *La lucha revolucionaria: Perú, 1958-1967* (2013), de La Puente was killed while he allegedly tried to surrender. According to "Universidad, política y revolución entre la Argentina y el Perú: una reconstrucción de trayectorias militantes a través de un testimonio oral (1960-1973)," written by Anabela Ghilini and Nayla Pis Diez (2016), Lobatón achieved some 'celebrity' status after his death.
[800] Lust (12) 50 años guerrilla peruana: 9 junio 1965 – 9 de junio 2015
[801] ibid
[802] CIA memo, July 28, 1965
[803] ibid

party in the world."[804] But before the January 16, 1992 peace agreement was signed,[805] the FMLN and the Salvadorian government clashed in a deadly conflict that lasted 12 years. More than 75,000 people were killed[806] and "both sides committed human rights violations."[807] While the FMLN was particularly effective at wielding violence, according to the Truth Commission for El Salvador,[808] "the vast majority (more than 85 percent) of the serious acts of violence analyzed by the commission were carried out by state agents or those acting under the direction of state agents against alleged supporters of opposition organizations."[809] Directing violence in such a concerted way says as much about the FMLN's ability to control and direct its members as it does about its military capacity.

That the FMLN was able to survive for 12 years is extraordinarily impressive when considering the sheer size and backing of its foe. "From 10,000 soldiers in 1979, US officials helped expand the Salvadoran army to 56,000 in 1987."[810] They provided arms and various US agencies also trained more than 2,000 Salvadorian army officers in counterinsurgency and military intelligence.[811] By 1991, the US had funneled over $1billion in military aid to help the government fight the FMLN insurgency.[812] Even

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[804] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 89)
[805] Allison and Alvarez (2012); Wood (2003)
[806] Truth Commission for El Salvador (1993)
[807] Courtney, Jocelyn (2010, 523) "The Civil War That Was Fought by Children: Understanding the Role of Child Combatants in El Salvador's Civil War, 1980–1992," *The Journal of Military History* 74, 523-556
[808] Truth Commission for El Salvador (1993)
[809] Wood (2003, 8)
[810] Courtney (2010, 530); Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter (1997, 149) *Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy,* University of Pittsburgh Press
[811] US Department of Defense, Congressional Presentation Document: Security Assistance Fiscal Year 1979, Washington, D.C., 1978; Howard Blutstein, ed., Area Handbook on El Salvador, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971, 191-212
[812] "El Salvador: Military Assistance Has Helped Counter but Not Overcome the Insurgency," *Report to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, US Senate*, United States General Accounting Office, April 23, 1991, p. 2

before 1980, US military assistant to El Salvador totaled $16.7 million (1950-79).[813] Regardless, the Salvadorian military was unable to defeat the FMLN and the FMLN likewise lacked the capacity to defeat the state.[814] "Despite subsequent strategic and tactical innovations on the part of both the Salvadoran military and the FMLN, the military stalemate continued until the end of the civil war."[815] As the following demonstrates, neither the MIR's failure nor the FMLN's success came about as a result of fortuitous luck or happenstance.

6.4 Background

Throughout the 20th-century, alliances among political, economic, and military elites exerted control in both Peru and El Salvador, largely at the expense of poorer populations. In Peru "midcentury agrarian reforms did much to transform land-tenure patterns, but they did little to improve peasants' socioeconomic and political plight."[816] As early as the 1940s, some in more left-leaning political organizations had already started to argue more "extreme measures"[817] might be the only way "to bring about meaningful systemic change."[818]

Control of the Peruvian government changed hands often and under dubious conditions throughout the 20th-century. "Between 1930 and 1968, elections were held and the country's president was inaugurated under constitutional auspices five times…"[819] while coup d'état's, authoritarian governments, and military juntas were mixed in

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[813] US Department of Defense, Congressional Presentation Document: Security Assistance Fiscal Year 1979, Washington, D.C., 1978; Howard Blutstein, ed., Area Handbook on El Salvador, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971, 191-212
[814] Goodwin (1991, 181)
[815] Wood (2003, 89)
[816] La Serna, Miguel (2012, 137) *The Corner of the Living*: *Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency*, University of North Carolina Press
[817] ibid
[818] ibid (138)
[819] McClintock (1990, 309) in *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 2nd Edition

between. The democratic elections were often tainted due limited franchise as the country's pro-nationalist, anti-imperialist, Marxist-influenced political party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), was barred from fielding presidential candidates throughout most of this era.[820]

Politics were equally troublesome in El Salvador. "The period immediately preceding the emergence of insurgency in El Salvador (that is, roughly 20 years from 1955 to 1975) was … a period of intense demographic growth, improved literacy, the growth of higher education, economic development and even a certain political openness…"[821] In the 1960s president Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera Carballo passed sweeping reforms partially in response to pressure from the Kennedy Administration, "which made US aid conditional on the Salvadorian government holding more competitive elections, among other measures."[822] The most notable of Rivera's reforms were loosened labor laws, which allowed workers to unionize, and a rural minimum wage law.[823] He also "encouraged the organization of agrarian cooperatives"[824] and "free expression [for] various organized social sectors—namely, workers and employees, the educational sector and the Catholic Church."[825] This prompted a massive explosion in anti-state unions and social movements,[826] which caught the military regime off-guard and prompted less-than-tolerant responses.[827]

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[820] La Serna, Miguel (2012); Degregori (2012)
[821] Grenier (2004, 314)
[822] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 666)
[823] ibid
[824] ibid
[825] ibid
[826] The Union of Democratic Nationalists (UDN, 1962), the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR, 1965), and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC, 1961) burst onto the scene and managed to capture a modicum of political power in the National Assembly in the proceeding elections.
[827] Goodwin (1991, 143) *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements*, 1945-1991, *Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics*

Despite these reforms, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the Salvadorian government was "consistently exclusionary, anti-reformist, and more or less indiscriminately repressive of their political opponents (moderates and reformists as well as revolutionaries)."[828] Although according to Tommie Sue Montgomery,[829] unlike Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza DeBayle in Nicaragua, neither Rivera's predecessors nor his successors provided "the population with a single figure … whom everyone love[d] to hate."[830] The problem was rather one of politics and economics, "a far more amorphous enemy."[831] To illustrate, campesinos harbored grievances over property rights,[832] land use,[833] and wages[834] courtesy of long-standing hacienda system presided over by landowning oligarchs[835] largely bolstered by the elite-engineered policies. Elsewhere, those who labored in the country's vast network of coffee and textile mills were likewise unhappy over poor working conditions and meager pay.[836] Most were "desperately poor"[837] and by the time the FMLN came on the scene in 1980, El Salvador exhibited one of the highest measures of income inequality in the region.[838]

"Attempts during the 1960s and 1970s to redress a variety of social and political grievances through elections and peaceful organizing were greeted by the authoritarian regimes … with blatant fraud and violent repression."[839] A trio of military-run regimes in

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[828] ibid
[829] Montgomery, Tommie Sue (1983) "The Church in the Salvadoran Revolution." *Latin American Perspectives* 10 (1), 62–87
[830] ibid (115)
[831] ibid
[832] Wood, (2003, 50)
[833] ibid (31)
[834] ibid (87)
[835] Goodwin (1991, 152)
[836] Wood (2003, 84)
[837] ibid
[838] Goodwin (1991, 150)
[839] ibid (157)

the 1960s, followed by a brief and bizarre[840] conflict with Honduras in 1969, was followed by tainted elections in 1972 and 1977.[841] According to Jeff Goodwin,[842] long legacies of electoral fraud, a "powerful Salvadoran oligarchy," [843] and "a 'protection racket' for elite interests"[844] stemmed back to the 1930s. Throughout much of the 20th-century the yoke of "sustained long-term regimes in which their militaries ruled the polity collectively, in a de facto alliance with their national, highly conservative upper classes"[845] burdened the country. By the early 1970s however, "institutionalized military rule in El Salvador was coming under increasing electoral threat."[846]

Much to the chagrin of the military regime, José Napoleón Duarte, the president of the National Opposition Union (UNO), which was an alliance of Christian and Social Democrats and communists,[847] made a strong run for the presidency. Fearing Duarte would indeed capture the presidency, "the army prohibited the announcement of further election returns and declared that the military candidate was the victor."[848] Duarte did not go quietly however; he staged an ill-planned and impulsive coup d'état, was captured, "tortured, and forced into exile."[849] While the military regime had won that round, its actions drew further dissatisfaction from Salvadorians.[850]

Prior to the emergence of the two insurgencies under scrutiny here, many rebellious movements had already arisen in both countries and violence often followed.

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[840] *La guerra del fútbol* (Football War) was a four day conflict between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969.
[841] Eusebi Fortuny i Capafons (2007, 40)
[842] Goodwin (1991, 157)
[843] ibid
[844] ibid
[845] Wickham-Crowley (2014, 232)
[846] Goodwin (1991, 157)
[847] ibid
[848] ibid
[849] ibid
[850] Wood (2000, 47)

In addition to parenting the MIR, the APRA also heavily influenced other regional movements like Costa Rica's PLN[851] and Bolivia's MNR.[852] El Salvador too had its share of revolutionary moments. "The first attempt at imitating the Cuban revolutionaries took place early in the 1960s, with the sudden appearance of politico-military organizations such as the FUAR[853] and the MRAM."[854] The former was a "Gaitanismo"[855] inspired movement while the latter was a student-run movement stimulated by the 1944 revolt against dictator, Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.[856] Both were short-lived and were only two amongst a veritable milieu of radical leftist movements that formed in El Salvador during this era.[857]

The APRA, out of which the MIR was spawned, was disenchanted with its government and was at first committed to aggressive, though non-violent political activism to push reform. The party and its leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, often paid the price, having himself been jailed or exiled on multiple occasions while the party was banished from politics and summarily reinstated just as frequently.[858] Likewise, "the persistence of 'old-style' closed polities in the early 1970s, which tended to push more of the populace into the wing of the armed opposition … persisted in El Salvador…"[859]

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[851] Partido Liberación Nacional
[852] Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
[853] Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria (United Revolutionary Action Front)
[854] Grenier (2004, 318) April and May Revolutionary Movement
[855] Inspired by the "the populist political movement led by Colombian politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan." Green, W. John (1996, 283) "Vibrations of the Collective": The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast, 1944-1948," Hispanic American Historical Review 76(2); Hobsbawm, Eric (1963) "The Anatomy of Violence," *New Society*
[856] Grenier (2004, 328)
[857] Anderson, Thomas P. (1971) *Matanza; El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932*, University of Nebraska Press; Paige, Jeffrey M. (1997) *Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press
[858] Cozart, Dan (2014) "The Rise of APRA in Peru: Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre and Inter-American Intellectual Connections, 1918–1935," *Latin Americanist* 58(1), 77-88
[859] Wickham-Crowley (2014, 232)

Some Salvadorians were hopeful reform would still come about through democratic means, though the individual member-groups of the FMLN were far less optimistic.

As was customary for most revolutionary movements across mid-century Latin America, the member-groups that ultimately unified behind the FMLN banner were all hitherto descendants of the same, decidedly communist-influenced political party, the Partido Comunista Salvadoreño's (Communist Party of El Salvador, or PCS).[860] The PCS, which was not initially sold on the idea of violence, eventually came around and formed an armed wing known as the FAL[861] in 1980. The FPL,[862] led by the erstwhile PCS general secretary Salvador Cayetano Carpio, was the largest of the FMLN coalition and became a stand-alone movement after it untethered itself from the PCS in 1970.[863] Two years hence, Christian middle-class communist-influenced college students broke off from the FPL and formed the ERP.[864] Three years later, the FARN[865] formed after the ERP was torn asunder in the wake of the murder of one of its most prominent members, Roque Dalton. In the same year the PRTC[866] formed what would be the FMLN's fifth coalition member and was comprised of ERP separatists and earlier members of the then-defunct Resistencia Nacional (National Resistance, RN) who had not already been swept up into the FARN.[867]

With this backdrop in place, I begin below with the discussion of the incubation processes of the MIR and the FMLN. Like that of Sendero examined in the previous

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[860] Goodwin (1991, 167)
[861] Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (Armed Forces of the Liberation)
[862] Popular Forces of Liberation–Farabundo Martí
[863] Eusebi Fortuny i Capafons (2007, 43)
[864] Wood (2003, 102-103), Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army)
[865] The FARN (Las Fuerzas Armadas de la Resistencia Nacional, Forces of National Resistance) was the military apparatus of the Resistencia Nacional (National Resistance, RN), which folded in 1975.
[866] Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (Revolutionary Party of the Workers of Central America)
[867] Goodwin (1991, 164)

chapter, the first few years of incubation for both proto-insurgencies discussed here were largely dominated by triggering support with interpretive discourse. Each started with a similar baseline that was defined by social upheavals and movements, political and economic uncertainty, and growing distrust of those in power. Despite similar conditions however, the MIR was not able to successfully engineer any modicum of support comparable to that garnered by the FMLN member-groups.

6.5 Forging Paths: Triggering Support with Interpretive Discourse

6.5.1 Interpretive Discourse

"For the Proletarian Cause…"[868]

The "institutional mimesis"[869] of communism across Latin America and its influential nature on revolutionary aspirants has been heretofore well documented and needs little further elaboration here.[870] Suffice it to say, beginning in the 1920s, communism in various forms and amalgams had begun spreading across the region, inspiring numerous left-leaning political parties and social movements. Castro's success in 1959 helped propagate the diffusion of revolutionary political culture across the region[871] and many aspiring revolutionaries looking for a political violence-fomenting discourse followed his lead in some form or another.[872] Yet it is important not to aggrandize communism as the Latin American revolutionary ideology par excellence because communism alone rarely constituted a magic bullet. For example, de la Puente developed the MIR's interpretive

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[868] "Nidia Diaz, interviewed by Carmen Guzman in El Salvador…, 14 January 1997. Transcript translated by David E. Spencer." Phillips (1997, 13)
[869] Wickham-Crowley (2014, 217)
[870] ibid
[871] See Wickham-Crowley (1992) on the "waves" of guerrilla movement organizing in Latin America.
[872] Wickham-Crowley (2014, 231) "in El Salvador, the historical variations in armed and other political resistance activities from the 1930s up to the late 1970s have been meticulously explored by Paul Almeida and obviously have their own dynamic, utterly decoupled from Cuba 1959 effects."

discourse by mixing elements from Marxism and Castro/Guevara foco revolutionary theory with his own aprismo-inspired views.[873]

He had joined the APRA in the late 1940s while in his early 20s and was forged from the same mold as the APRA's erstwhile leader and founder. The MIR was a borne out of what de la Puente called the APRA's "betrayal."[874] He was a fervent political activist, student-leader, and committed leftist. Even among those who were drawn to this radical, left-leaning party, he was considered particularly zealous.[875] In the absence of Haya, the party leader, he rallied what he considered the party's 'true' base and launched an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to unseat Major General Manuel Arturo Odría Amoretti, who helmed the Peruvian military government from 1950-56.[876] For his efforts, de la Puente was jailed and then later deported in 1953 and the APRA was again banned from participating in national politics.[877] While still sheltered under the APRA's political umbrella, de la Puente and a small coterie of followers became evermore removed from, and increasingly at odds with, party moderates.[878] But at the APRA's 4th Convention, he made one last ditched effort to redirect the party back to its ideological roots. He argued the "concessions of the so-called 'coexistence' … would end up changing the very nature

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[873] According to Jaymie Patricia Heilman (2006, 492, 493) "We Will No Longer Be Servile: Aprismo in 1930s Ayacucho," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38(3), 491-518, Aprismo was coined by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and was inspired by "the sudden end of Augusto B. Leguı´a's eleven-year presidency in 1930. Responding to widespread anti-Leguı´a sentiment and economic desperation triggered by global depression and financial crisis, the largely unknown army colonel, Luis M. Sa´nchez Cerro, led a military rebellion against Leguı´a in August 1930, triggering a national revolt that forced him from power."

[874] Sánchez, Luis Alberto (1979, 114) *Notes for a Biography of APRA (A Long Civil War)*, Lima: Editions Mosca Azul Editores; Rénique, José Luis (2004) "From the 'APRA betrayal' to the 'heroic gesture': Luis de la Puente Uceda and the MIR Guerrilla," *International Studies of Latin America* 15(1), 89-114

[875] Rénique, José Luis (2004) "From the 'APRA betrayal' to the 'heroic gesture': Luis de la Puente Uceda and the MIR Guerrilla," *International Studies of Latin America* 15(1), 89-114

[876] This coup attempt failed despite moderate support from the Peruvian Armed Forces.

[877] "The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives," published in the *Monthly Review*, November 1965 (vol.17, No. 6), p. 12-28, and in Chile in the Spanish version of the same magazine. Written by Luis de la Puente Uceda in July 1964.

[878] At this time the MIR was known as the *APRA Rebelde.*

of the party."[879] His pleas fell on deaf ears however and he was infamously cast as a subversive and a provocateur of the aprismo left (a role, which he emphatically embraced).[880] More than 100 members, those who opposed the party's support of then-president Manuel Carlos Prado y Ugarteche were expelled—among them were de la Puente and one of his closest friends and devotees, Gonzalo Fernández Gasca.[881] In an interview conducted shortly after the ouster, de la Puente lambasted the party as "miserables"[882] and claimed: "We are *Apristas* now more than ever."[883]

He made his way to Mexico where he met and fostered a friendship with Fidel Castro—who had been likewise recently banished from his home country of Cuba. There in the company of Castro and Che Guevara, de la Puente embraced "guerrilla warfare as party policy"[884] and started to plan his own insurgency. Subsequent trips to Cuba in 1960[885] where he reunited with Castro and to China in 1963[886] where he met Mao Tse-tung, helped further shape de la Puente's revolutionary discourse. Yet the relative lateness in the incubation process that these trips occurred—the first almost a year after he had begun actively recruiting and the second less than two years before the start of combat operations—speaks volumes to how ill-conceived and perfunctory the MIR's

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[879] Rénique, José Luis (2004) "From the 'APRA betrayal' to the 'heroic gesture': Luis de la Puente Uceda and the MIR Guerrilla," *International Studies of Latin America* 15(1), 89-114

[880] "The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives," published in the *Monthly Review*, November 1965 (vol.17, No. 6), p. 12-28, and in Chile in the Spanish version of the same magazine. Written by Luis de la Puente Uceda in July 1964.

[881] MJ Orbegoso, MJ "Luis de la Puente Uceda: Rebelde con Causa", en MJO-Entrevistas, Lima, 1989, 46-53

[882] ibid

[883] ibid

[884] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 40)

[885] Pelaez, Vicky (2001) "Memorias de un guerrillero en Nueva York: Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco rompe el silencio de 36 anos y habla sobre la guerrilla de los anos 60 en Peru," *El Diario La Prensa*; New York, N.Y., 05 Feb 2001, 12

[886] Rénique, José Luis. De la traición aprista al gesto heroico - Luis de la Puente y la guerrilla del MIR in Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe. Vol. 5, Nº 1. University of Tel Aviv. Jan–Jun 2004.

discourse really was. The one indisputable truth, at least from de la Puente's perspective, was that "the determining factor of victory was the guerrilla struggle."[887] He thought he needed little else to foment revolution and was self-assured the MIR's "military capabilities would be enough to start a process similar to the Cuban one."[888] Though specifics on how to actually go about doing it were sorely lacking.[889]

In El Salvador, a curious union between communism and Christianity proved exceptionally valuable for triggering young aspiring revolutionaries.[890] In the few years prior to the FMLN, Latin American Catholic culture at-large had undergone a profound reformist transformation.[891] At the same time communism gained ever-more influence across the region, particularly among students on college and university campuses who were seeking out alternative methods to endorse political change. Many left-leaning (read, communism-inspired) "activists had been in contact with the Latin American Catholic Left through the training programs organized by the Christian Democratic Party in Santiago, Chile."[892]

Some argued this union happened because communism and Christianity share limited though critical philosophical tenets that resonated amongst young Salvadorian wannabe dissidents. "As the Marxist sociologist Lucien Goldmann (1955) observed in his book on Pascal, both Marxism and Christianity reject pure individualism (liberal/rationalist, hedonistic, or empiricist). For both theories, the supreme values are

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[887] Bermúdez and L. Castelli (1967) "Thirty Years of Che," Gall "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign." *The Reporter* 36 (26 January 1967): 36-38
[888] de la Puente, "Response to the questionnaire presented by the journal *Caretas,* " in *OLPU* , pp. 101-07
[889] ibid
[890] Lowy and Pompan (1993, 28)
[891] ibid
[892] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 667-668)

transindividual: God (for religion) and the human community (for socialism)."[893] What resulted was a Christian-Communist hybrid cobbled together by most of the FMLN's individual member groups and was used as the basis for interpretive discourse.[894]

As it turned out, Catholicism proved to be just the right catalyst for recruiters from the FMLN's member-groups to introduce communist-inspired "models of hope"[895] to disillusioned Salvadorian students. For example, Edgar Alejandro Rivas Mira, who was a young Christian activist and brilliant intellectual that had studied chemistry on scholarship at Tübingen University in West Germany,[896] embraced Trotskyism and eschewed the Soviet (read Marxist-Leninist) brand of communist ideology. While abroad, he participated in on-campus anti-Vietnam protests sponsored by radical West German student movements. The European New Left (or simply New Left) had spread in the UK, US, and Western Bloc countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s and Rivas Mira was swept up in this wave. He traveled to "Czechoslovakia and then Cuba, where he received training in urban guerrilla techniques and made connections with some Latin American guerrilla leaders, in particular with Venezuelan and Guatemalan activists."[897] Combining some of the tenets he picked up in his travels abroad, Rivas Mira stitched together a Christian/New Left mash-up, which he marketed to his Christian friends back home in El Salvador after his undergraduate work concluded. The ERP's "more militaristic or 'maximalist'"[898] point of view would carry over into the war and helped them gain the reputation for having "less good relations with civilians."[899]

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[893] Lowy and Pompan (1993, 31)
[894] Wood (2003, 102); Goodwin (1991, 168)
[895] Lowy and Pompan (1993, 30)
[896] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 670)
[897] ibid
[898] Wood (2003, 86)
[899] ibid

The FPL was founded on a communist-inspired discourse that rejected the "Salvadorian electoral process, as well as the foco theory advocated by Che Guevara [and unlike the short-term approach promoted by the ERP], advocated a prolonged popular strategy (*guerra popular prolonganda*) that was modeled in part after the Vietnamese-experience."[900] They supported the use of violence but only sparingly and even then claimed it should be aimed only at the state apparatus.[901]

As previously noted, the PCS was the oldest organization and the only legitimate political party amongst the FMLN's five member-groups. Largely committed to a political (read nonviolent) approach, at least on the surface, among the five member-groups of the FMLN, the PCS held out hope the longest that violent conflict with the government could be avoided.[902] Its discourse was that of Soviet-style communism. "It was faithful to the guidelines of 'pacific coexistence' advocated by the Soviet Union, until 1961"[903] when they made a sudden radical shift. That year, "communist intellectuals and leaders of social movements formed the United Front of Revolutionary Action (FUAR), a militant organization that constituted the [PCS'] first attempt to carry out armed struggle in El Salvador since *La Mantnza* of 1932."[904] Leaders of the FUAR disdained what they perceived to be "the start of a new "colonization" under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, which purportedly aimed at transforming El Salvador into a 'second Puerto Rico' or a new US colony in Central America."[905] Despite having

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[900] McClintock (1998, 49-50)
[901] Allison, Michael E. and Alberto Martín Alvarez (2012, 92) "Unity and Disunity in the FMLN," *Latin American Politics and Society* 54(4), 89-118, (Carpio, cited in Montgomery 1982, 120)
[902] According to Allison (2012, 114), "the source of this information is a telegram sent by U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Dean Hinton to the Department of State discussing his conversation with Fidel Chávez Mena, minister of foreign affairs and high-ranking member of the Christian Democratic Party."
[903] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 94)
[904] Guman (115)
[905] ibid

been stimulated by the Castro's success, there is little evidence that FUAR received any substantive support from Cuba[906] and thus demobilized in 1963, having never launched a single successful military operation.[907]

In light of its failed revolutionary attempt, the PCS returned to its roots and continued to lure activists mostly committed to political, nonviolent approaches. However, not everyone within the party was in agreement on the best strategy for pushing radical political reform. The PCS was largely split between the policy advocates and those intent on violence. This nonviolence/violence fissure continued through much of the incubation period.

As its name would suggest, the PRTC was decidedly socialist in its political discourse[908] and sought to maintain a "revolutionary socialist orientation"[909] even after they joined the FMLN. Some of its original members had been "municipal and departmental elected officials."[910] "Unlike the other groups, the PRTC maintained more of a regional revolutionary outlook that would involve all of Central America, rather than El Salvador specifically."[911]

Among the five member-groups, the RN/FARN, led by José Eduardo Sancho Castañeda (aka, Fermán Cienfuegos),[912] was considered the least ideological.[913] "Curiously, Eduardo Sancho began as a pacifist opponent of the war between El Salvador

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[906] Cuban Subversion in Latin America, CIA, No. 1586/64 (1964)
[907] Chávez (2013, 45)
[908] Béjar, Rafael Guido (1996, 59-60) "La izquierda en crisis," in *Partido y actores políticos en transición*, ed. Béjar and Stefan Roggenbuck, San Salvador: Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 53–78
[909] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 113)
[910] ibid (104)
[911] ibid (94)
[912] "Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)," *DNSA collection: El Salvador 1990-1994*
[913] ibid

and Honduras in the 1960s."[914] Subsequent contact during the 1970s with "Guatemala's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), which had camps in Santa Ana, El Salvador, and along the border,"[915] prompted his slow but inevitable radical transformation. The Cuban-Communist revolutionary model likewise influenced the RN/FARN's discourse thanks to several trips made by Eduardo Sancho to the island during the 1970s.[916]

In sum, de la Puente developed his hunger for revolution as a result of party politics, an idolization of Castro's success in Cuba, and frequent trips abroad where he became enamored with a 'romanticized' view of revolution. From his position of privilege, he was convinced the idea of revolution alone was enough of a foundation upon which an insurgency could be built. The particulars of which however were sorely lacking and this became blatantly apparent when he tried his hand at recruitment. Comparatively, the FMLN member-groups largely developed their discourse in response to the real situation on the ground. Leaders from each group were intimately familiar with certain segments of society; Christian groups, labor unions, college and university students. This proximity to the population gave them a considerable edge over de la Puente when it came to recruitment, as I next demonstrate.

6.5.2 Recruitment

Over their first few years of incubation, the MIR and each of the FMLN's member groups worked diligently but with varied success to plant and grow their movements from the ground up. As for the MIR, de la Puente returned from Mexico to Peru in 1957 with Ricardo Napurí, an experienced guerrilla (and Che's personal emissary) in tow. He

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[914] Brown, Timothy C. (1999, 114) "José Eduardo Sancho Castañeda, Comandante Fermán Cienfuegos," in *When the AK-47s Fall Silent: Revolutionaries, Guerrillas, and the Dangers of Peace*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University
[915] ibid
[916] ibid

immediately began actively recruiting local Cuzco students and from among the APRA,[917] "who—according to de la Puente—would respond to the call of the MIR in light of the evident betrayal of the leadership."[918]

According to "La Revolución Peruana: Concepciones y perspectivas," written by de la Puente in July 1964, the MIR "emerged into national political life on October 12, 1959."[919] While the organization grew quickly, the MIR was neither very discerning with their recruiting efforts nor particularly inclined to turn down any prospective members.[920] Moreover, not everyone was on board with an agenda marked by violence.[921] While de la Puente found initial recruiting success among students and APRA youths, he was far less prosperous when peddling revolution to the local, predominately-peasant population. He was tall, light-skinned, highly educated, and hailed from coastal aristocracy. Despite the fact he neither looked the part nor spoke the local Quechua dialect, de La Puente and his followers still attempted to build inroads with the locals. At one point, de la Puente put one of the MIR's few locally-recruited guerrillas, a 32-year-old Cuzco University student named Albino Guzmán, in charge of fostering inroads with the local peasant population.[922] But results were lackluster at best.

The MIR's ineptitude in attracting peasants can be largely hung on de la Puente's fundamental misunderstanding of their interests or apathy (or both), and the failure to structure the recruitment discourse to match the audience. It is also known that local

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[917] According to multiple CIA-penned intelligence documents, the MIR's ranks quickly grew to around 1,000 members.
[918] Renique (2004)
[919] "The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives," published in the *Monthly Review*, November 1965 (vol.17, No. 6), p. 12-28, and in Chile in the Spanish version of the same magazine. Written by Luis de la Puente Uceda in July 1964.
[920] De La Pedraja, René (2013) *Wars of Latin America, 1948–1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas*, McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers
[921] Gall, Norman (1967) "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign," *The Reporter* 36 (26 January 1967): 36-38
[922] ibid

"peasants who served as porters for the guerrillas later complained that de la Puente [had] reneged on promises to pay ten times the going rate for delivery of food and weapons."[923] This likely helped further undermine the MIR's recruitment efforts. Furthermore, disagreement between de la Puente and Guzmán would later play an important role in the MIR's undoing. Time and again Guzmán blamed the MIR's failure to court civilians on de la Puente, claiming the MIR's chieftain actually cared little about peasant interests.[924] Ultimately, Guzmán became fed up with de la Puente and on the eve of the MIR's revolution in 1965, he fled Mesa Pelada and into the arms of local police. He divulged a great deal of the MIR's plans and even personally "guided army patrols into the guerrilla zone."[925]

Evidence suggests[926] the MIR's Piura-based foco that was helmed by Gonzalo Fernández also had little success fostering civilian support mostly because peasant smallholders still dominated the region.[927] However, the fruits their efforts were never tested because by the time Peruvian military forces had moved into their area of operation, most of the guerrillas had already deserted and fled over the northern border into Ecuador.[928] The desertion of the Piura-based foco was especially telling of the MIR's feeble state of internal cohesion.

Of the MIR's three 'zones of influence,' Lobatón's Junín-based front received the most civilian backing—though their successes in doing so likely had more to do with land invasion failures in that region than Lobatón's recruiting savvy.[929] As it was, "the

[923] ibid
[924] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 116)
[925] Gall (1967)
[926] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 116)
[927] Gall (1967)
[928] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 114)
[929] ibid (116)

Campa Indians … had been in constant conflict with white settlers in this century (perhaps before as well) over the usurpation of their old tribal lands."[930] Attempts to reclaim these lands were mostly unsuccessful, and "major *Hacendados* still exercised economic and political control of the region."[931] Here was one situation where the MIR's discourse actually matched the target audience. Lobatón, who was well spoken and ambitious, recognized the opportunity and marketed the MIR as the remedy for righting the Campa Indian's ills.[932] "They quickly joined the guerrillas when the MIR foco offered them support in their quest to reclaim those lands."[933] However, their allegiance was tenuous at best and once violence inevitably broke out between the MIR and the state, many Campa Indians deserted and helped the army track and kill guerrillas in and around Junín.[934]

But where de la Puente and the MIR failed, another rebellious organizer he knew well,[935] Hugo Blanco Galdós, prospered. In order to highlight the importance of the contextual importance of interpretive discourse, it is particularly instructive to briefly unpack some of the particulars of Blanco's success in recruiting peasants from the same areas where the MIR failed.

The source of Blanco's legendary status among Peruvian's today can be traced back to his 1958-63 agrarian reform campaign in the Cuzco region of Peru,[936] which has been deemed elsewhere as "the most important peasant movement of that period in Peru,

[930] ibid (136)
[931] ibid (128)
[932] Pelaez (2001)
[933] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 136)
[934] ibid (116)
[935] Gall (1967)
[936] Hobsbawm (1969)

and probably in the whole of South America."[937] Blanco, who became a Trotskyite after spending time in Argentina,[938] advocated revolution and organized a network of militant sindicatos in Cuzco's foothills comprised mostly of "peasants armed with shotguns, pistols, and old rifles."[939]

Blanco and de la Puente had first met in 1960 when their respective revolutionary wanderlusts had crossed paths in Cuba.[940] The two were remarkably similar. Both dreamt of mobilizing peasants to foment political change. And both thought violence was the inexorable way to do so.[941] Yet Blanco had three critical advantages against which de la Puente did not contend: 1) he hailed from Cuzco, 2) he spoke fluent Quechua, and 3) he had actually worked as a laborer on a local coffee plantation.[942] Blanco's 'advantages' played out in a few ways. First, though he was indeed a guerrilla organizer in the truest sense, in contrast to de la Puente, peasants saw Blanco as one of their own, someone who was intimately familiar with their economic and political grievances—not as an outsider who sought to parlay their troubles into his own revolution. Sure, violence was a fundamental tactic of Blanco's but he called his supporters "self-defense committees"[943] as opposed to guerrillas, even though they were armed and trained in guerrilla warfare tactics. While most of the haciendos appropriated for his 'community' were done so under cover of darkness and at gunpoint,[944] Blanco framed violence simply as a means to

[937] ibid (31) Blanco studied agronomy at a university in Argentina.
[938] Gall (1967)
[939] ibid
[940] Rénique (2004)
[941] Interview with Hugo Blanco (2010, 653)
[942] Ward, Alan Ramón (2011) "An Interview with Hugo Blanco Galdos," *Interventions*, 13(4), 651-663; Rénique (2004)
[943] Interview with Hugo Blanco (2010, 656)
[944] ibid (657)

an end rather than as an end itself.[945] This discourse proved to be an effective triggering mechanism amongst Cuzco's peasants. He successfully rallied close to 2,000 to his cause and established a fully autonomous peasant-run community and trade union.[946] In what Blanco considered the "highlight of his career,"[947] he was even elected Secretary General of the Provincial Federation of Peasants of La Convención and Lares in 1962.[948]

While the Peruvian government had taken notice to his highly visible and remarkably successful organizing, a 1962 mid-December skirmish between Blanco's movement and authorities, which left two policemen dead,[949] prompted the regime to act.[950] Blanco was accused of subversion and a warrant for his arrest was issued.[951] He did manage to elude capture for some time with the help of his peasant network but was eventually run down in 1963 and sentenced to 25 years in prison.[952]

In the end, like the privileged Cuzco students that formed the MIR's backbone, de la Puente, a Sorbonne-trained lawyer,[953] and his lieutenants had little to show for their recruitment efforts. [954] The population largely rejected the MIR's advances and even referred to the proto-insurgency's chieftain as a Gringo.[955] It is important to note here that before Blanco's capture, de la Puente initially considered forming an alliance.[956] However, he was wary about sharing control of his revolutionary brainchild, especially

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[945] de la Peña (1998)
[946] Ward (2011)
[947] Rénique (2004)
[948] See Hobsbawm, Eric (1969) "A Case of Neo-Feudalism: La Convención, Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1(1), 31-50
[949] Rénique (2004)
[950] Hugo Blanco, "Generalities on the mode of action of the militant of the city that attends the field and some notes", Quarter Marshal Gamarra, June 1963, in *Peruvian Revolution,* organ of the FIR, July 2, 1963, 7-11
[951] Rénique (2004)
[952] Gall (1967)
[953] ibid
[954] ibid
[955] ibid
[956] de la Peña (1998)

with a Trotskyite,[957] and ultimately decided against the union.[958] He might have learned from Blanco's approach to recruitment but hubris ultimately undercut his efforts.[959] The MIR thus fundamentally misjudged the plight of the peasants with whom they sought allegiance and purported to represent [960] and did little to modify its discourse to suit their target audience.

During incubation, the FMLN's five individual member-groups all fostered notable, but varied support amongst Christian (read Catholic) communities. Most took advantage of the growth of liberation theology in these communities to introduce various communist-inspired revolutionary exposés. All wooed university students to some degree. All drew female recruits in large numbers. And most had roots that traced back to the PCS.

The three institutions: the university, the church, and the PCS, had much in common in 1960s-70s El Salvador. "All three organizations were undergoing at the time a profound identity crisis played out as a political tug-of-war between generations, the youngest being impatient to use the institution as a political vehicle for radical changes in society at large"[961] against the state. Much like on many college and university campuses across the whole region during this era, El Salvadorian institutions of higher learning teemed with revolutionary hopefuls.[962] "The teacher's association strikes of 1968 and 1969 created an environment of struggle motivating many students at the National

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[957] de la Peña (1998, 459)
[958] "The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives," published in the *Monthly Review*, November 1965 (vol.17, No. 6), p. 12-28, and in Chile in the Spanish version of the same magazine. Written by Luis de la Puente Uceda in July 1964; Gall "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign." *The Reporter* 36 (26 January 1967): 36-38
[959] Interview with Hugo Blanco (2010, 652)
[960] Gall (1967)
[961] Grenier, Yvon (2004, 319) "The rise and fall of revolutionary passions in El Salvador: Some lessons for the study of radical political movements," *Journal of Human Rights* 3(3), 313-329
[962] Goodwin (1991, 148)

University of El Salvador to participate in activities to right social wrongs."[963] As a result, student-run proto-guerrilla cells had started to pop up all over college campuses in El Salvador during the early 1970s. Most of the FMLN member-groups were initially comprised of "students and urban professionals."[964] Among many of the central leaders in the FMLN,"[965] Sánchez Cerin (FPL) and Schafik Jorge Handal (PCS) had been professors at Universidad de El Salvador (University of El Salvador or UES). Melida Anaya Montes,[966] the founder of the National Association of Salvadoran Teachers (ANDES) and later, second in command of the FPL, [967] also taught at UES.

Elsewhere, "church-sponsored cooperatives spread rapidly, starting in 1963,"[968] followed by a variety of labor sector organizations[969] that were allied with student and peasant organizations. Huge strikes took place in San Salvador, Santa Ana, and Zacatecoluca, some involving more than 35,000 participants.[970] Add to this "rapid development, especially in the postwar period, of agroexporting economies dominated by small landowning (and processing) classes or 'oligarchies,'"[971] the influx of liberation theology within the Catholic Church,[972] and the spread of communist revolutionary discourse among university students and faculty,[973] and the result was a veritable deluge of anti-government sentiment that swept across the country. Even though the state was

[963] Phillips (1997, 7)
[964] Wood (2003, 127)
[965] Grenier (2004, 321)
[966] According to Grenier (2004, 322) Anaya was later assassinated by Salvador Cayetano, the FPL's commander, in 1983),
[967] Grenier (2004, 322)
[968] Almeida (2003, 360)
[969] ibid (362)
[970] ibid (365)
[971] Goodwin (1991, 146)
[972] ibid (148)
[973] ibid

"fiscally and infrastructurally"[974] weak, meaning it did not "effectively penetrate or control all of the national territory that they claimed to rule (especially 'peripheral' border and/or mountainous regions),"[975] El Salvador was nonetheless mired in a "tradition of political authoritarianism."[976] This was an extraordinarily valuable space in which to recruit but the FMLN member-groups still had to figure out how to match the discourse to suit their target audiences.

The largest of the FMLN's would-be coalition, the FPL, which was helmed by the PCS' erstwhile general secretary Salvador Cayetano Carpio, had at least two different approaches to recruitment during incubation. The first focused on "Christian base communities."[977] This was a smart strategy early on because priests in places like San Salvador "explicitly denounced [government] injustices from the pulpit …"[978] and "parishioners increasingly identified with 'Jesús Rebelde' (Rebel Jesus)."[979] Between 1970-1974, FPL recruiters leveraged this growing anti-government sentiment to build considerable inroads with the church. While many priests largely supported the FPL's agenda at first, the pilfering of parishioners into more "political work"[980] eventually caused tensions between the two.[981] So in 1974, the FPL shifted away from churches and towards grass roots, civilian-centered approaches that focused on building alliances among campesinos communities[982] in the mountains of San Francisco Javier.[983] From

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[974] ibid
[975] ibid
[976] ibid
[977] Allison (2012, 92)
[978] Wood (2003, 91)
[979] ibid (92)
[980] ibid
[981] According to Wood (2003, 92), priests were also nervous about being outwardly associated with the FPL.
[982] Wood (2003, 92); Pearce (1986, chapter 4); Harnecker (1993, 109-110)
[983] Wood (2003, 112)

then on, the FPL worked to mobilize peasants and workers by encouraging them "to participate in local organizations called *poder popular local* (local popular power)."[984] These social networks built by the FPL during incubation would later provide "food and health care…"[985] to FMLN guerrillas during the insurgency.

Another smaller organization that was closely aligned with the FPL, the BPR[986] had taken a similar approach before it was absorbed into the FPL in the mid 1970s.[987] The BPR had successfully wooed many from the Farmworkers' Union (UTC) and the Christian Peasant Federation (FECCAS). These two groups merged in 1976 to form the Farmworkers' Federation (FTC) and the BPR had already forged a pathway to more than 12,000 potentially-amendable people, of which the FPL took full advantage.[988]

After poet Roque Dalton was executed by some of his own ERP compatriots in 1975,[989] the precursor to the FARN immerged, the National Resistance (RN) and was similarly committed to a long-term, civilian-based approach and thus recruited from peasant populations "in hopes of provoking mass insurrection."[990] But unlike the FPL, the RN/FARN leaned less on diplomacy and more heavily on a recruiting strategy that directly advocated guerrilla warfare.[991]

The ERP in particular tapped college campuses with exceptional results. Rivas Mira's "*foquista* strategy […which emphasized] spectacular military action as a prelude

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[984] ibid (126)
[985] ibid
[986] Bloque Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Block)
[987] Wood (2003, 93)
[988] Kincaid (1987, 485); Wood (2003, 93)
[989] According to Goodwin (1991, 164) Dalton "was charged with being a "Soviet-Cuban and CIA double agent" by the ERP's military staff."
[990] Allison (2012, 92)
[991] ibid

to insurrection in the short term—rather than long-term political mobilization..."[992] was particularly attractive to college and university student-run organizations. Among the most smitten was the Comandos Organizadores del Pueblo (People's Organizing Commandos, COP), who "since 1970-71, had been attempting to create an armed organization..."[993] The ERP wooed most of the COP into the fold but so too drew members from multiple organizations, such as the Juventud Estudiantil Católica (Catholic Student Youth, JEC), the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, PDC), the Acción Católica Universitaria Salvadoreña (Salvadorean Catholic University Action, ACUS), and the Movimiento Estudiantil Social Cristiano (Social Christian Student Movement, MESC). The ERP also became a destination for members from the PCS who were disillusioned by "the party's ambiguous and ambivalent stance on armed struggle and electoral politics."[994]

Of the five, the PRTC exhibited some of the best combat training but some of the worst recruitment success, which helps to explain why the organization later chose to join the FMLN, and likely why they were met with open arms. As its moniker suggested, the Marxist-Leninist PRTC, led and co-founded by Roberto Roca and Maria Marta Valladares,[995] focused on triggering worker's unions to foment class-based struggle. "Roca believed in a pan-Central American socialist revolution, not limited to El Salvador."[996] But despite such lofty plans, the PRTC remained geographically confined to the capital city of San Salvador and boasted less than 500 members[997] by the time it

[992] McClintock (1998, 50)
[993] Alvarez and Orero (673)
[994] "Catholic Action, the Second Vatican Council, and the Emergence of the New Left in El Salvador (1950–1975)," Joaquín M. Chávez The Americas, Volume 70, Number 3, January (2014, 486)
[995] Maria Marta Valladares' *nom de guerre* was Nidia Diaz. She was an erstwhile member of the ERP.
[996] Phillips (1997, 4)
[997] Gilberto Osorio, Former PRTC Chief of Operations, telephone interview by author, 28 January 1997

merged with the other member-groups to form the FMLN.

Nidia Diaz (Valladares), the PRTC's cofounder, was one among many Salvadorian women that were drawn to revolutionary organizing at the time.[998] As it turned out, the FMLN drew quite a large number of Salvadorian women.[999] There was a particularly large segment among El Salvador's female population that were especially active as community activists and organizers[1000] at this time, and many embraced more violent means beginning in the 1970s.[1001]

In sum, de la Puente was so enamored with the 'idea' of revolution that he failed to develop a discourse that actually triggered support for the endeavor. He developed a reputation for reneging on his deals with peasants, which likely exacerbated his problems with recruitment. The most important stage of the MIR's incubation, triggering support with interpretive discourse, was mostly a failure. But they were not deterred and continued on despite meager backing.

Comparatively, the member-groups of the FMLN had cast a wide recruitment net that included churches, workers unions, peasants, college students, and community activists of all genders and stripes. The discourse was modified when necessary and each group slowly grew as a result. However, the wide assortment of members gleaned from various segments of society created some particularly difficult puzzles to solve with regard to cohesion and control.

6.6 Solving (Organizational) Puzzles: Cohesion, Control, and Training

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[998] see for example, Carranza, Mirna (2009) "Salvadorian Women's Diaspora: Ana Rivera's Story," *Canadian Woman Studies* 27(1), 140-144

[999] Carranza, Mirna E. and Ana Rivera (2008) "Salvadorian Women's Diaspora: Ana Rivera's Story," *Canadian Woman Studies* 27(1), 140-145

[1000] Carranza and Rivera (2008, 144)

[1001] For more on women in the FMLN, see for example, Carranza, Mirna E. and Ana Rivera (2008) "Salvadorian Women's Diaspora: Ana Rivera's Story," *Canadian Woman Studies* 27(1), 140-145.

Just as the APRA was conceived by Haya to realize his own agenda, the MIR was de la Puente's brainchild and he alone intended to wield it as such.[1002] Not unlike the political party from which it spawned, de la Puente was met with considerable pushback and the MIR was plagued by internal dissension and infighting right from the outset. For example, his vision of the MIR as a guerrilla insurgency was at odds with those, including Napurí (Che's emissary) who thought they should instead concentrate on building a workers/socialist movement.[1003] Moreover, despite being one of de la Puente's oldest friends, Fernández was skeptical the Peruvian peasantry had the stomach for a revolutionary strategy driven by violence.[1004] Add to this Lobatón's ambitious nature; he thought he was better suited than de la Puente to be the MIR's helmsman.[1005] There were even rifts among those that advocated violence. Taking a step back however, and for the purpose of demonstrating the lack of loyalty, in-group cohesion, and control exhibited by the MIR, a brief discussion of the volatile relationship between de la Puente and Lobatón is particularly instructive here.

The two had met a few years earlier in Cuba whilst the latter was the right hand of Héctor Béjar, the future founder of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). All three had made the trip to Cuba to be trained in the Castro revolutionary style.[1006] Lobatón was so anxious to initiate revolution that he gave up his role in the ELN for a position in the MIR because he thought de la Puente was likely to resort to violence sooner than Béjar.[1007] However, there was not enough room in the MIR for both egos.[1008] Hence

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[1002] Rénique (2004)
[1003] Rénique (2004)
[1004] Gall "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign." *The Reporter* 36 (26 January 1967): 36-38
[1005] Rénique (2004); Pelaez (2001)
[1006] Rénique (2004)
[1007] Rénique (2004)

began a dangerous game of one-upmanship where Lobatón insisted the MIR was ready to initiate violence while de la Puente maintained he would be the only one to decide when the MIR was ready to do so.[1009] This back-and-forth continued and escalated over the next two years.

In response to Lobatón's posturing, and in what was (obviously) a foolhardy effort to reassert his claim to MIR's helm, de la Puente went public on April 11, 1965 when a declaration he had written was published in the *Obrero y Campesino* bulletin of the Partido Revolucionario Obrero y Campesino (PROC).[1010] It read:

> *The guerrilla Pachacútec, commanded by Luis de la Puente Uceda, general secretary of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), is ready to avenge the spilled peasant blood by the servants of the gamonales and the bourgeoisie. The Pachacútec guerrilla is ready to defeat those who dare to reach their strengths. The guerrilla Pachacútec is the armed arm of the peasants to defend their rights, to avenge their massacred brothers, to demand that the land be delivered free of charge who are their true owners, without payment and without any obligation. The guerrilla Pachacútec is a revolutionary torch to enlighten all the exploited in Peru and to ignite the longing for the integral liberation of our people.*

This was immediately followed by a May 2, 1965 interview with a Lima-based newspaper wherein he reaffirmed his claim as the leader of a soon-to-be successful revolution.[1011] Even de la Puente's wife later agreed her husband's public declarations were rather impulsive and irresponsible.[1012]

Not to be outdone however, Lobatón decided his Tupac Amaru guerrillas would initiate and spearhead the MIR insurgency on their own and did so a month later without

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[1008] Pelaez, Vicky (2001)
[1009] Lust (6) 50 años guerrilla peruana: 9 junio 1965 – 9 de junio 2015
[1010] Lust (4)
[1011] Lust (4)
[1012] Lust (4)

de la Puente's consent.[1013] In a 2001 interview[1014] then 80-year-old Fernández, the erstwhile leader of the MIR's Piura front, remarked that the two seemed to be competing to see who could make more headlines.[1015]

As for its structural organization, de la Puente had originally envisioned six guerrilla fronts but due to lack of support he managed to only get three of them off the ground.[1016] Those he did cobble together were spread out along disconnected fronts far from the MIR's headquarters at Mesa Pelada. Communication among them was difficult to say nothing of the problems associated operational oversight.[1017] The MIR finally settled on three areas of operation: Lobatón took command of guerrillas in the central highlands department of Junín.[1018] Fernández, de la Puente's long-time friend was charged with operations in the northern region of Piura.[1019] The MIR's headquarters was established near Cuzco outside Mesa Pelada.[1020] The three fronts remained divided on their leader's impetus and his claim to power.[1021]

The individual member-groups of the FMLN also suffered from lack of internal cohesion early on—none more so than the ERP—which was itself the product of an erstwhile guerrilla movement (El Grupo) that had been likewise plagued by political infighting and factionalism. "The ERP's internal dynamics were initially marked by the group's inability to remain a unified entity, which was manifest in the rifts that took place

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[1013] Pelaez (2001); Lust (4)
[1014] Pelaez (2001)
[1015] Gall "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign." *The Reporter* 36 (26 January 1967): 36-38
[1016] Lust (1) 50 años guerrilla peruana: 9 junio 1965 – 9 de junio 2015
[1017] Gall "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign." *The Reporter* 36 (26 January 1967): 36-38
[1018] Pelaez, Vicky (2001) "Memorias de un guerrillero en Nueva York: Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco rompe el silencio de 36 anos y habla sobre la guerrilla de los anos 60 en Peru," *El Diario La Prensa*; New York, N.Y., 05 Feb 2001, 12
[1019] Pelaez, Vicky (2001)
[1020] Pelaez (2001)
[1021] Rénique (2004)

from 1973 to 1976."[1022] This happened because by the end of 1972, the ERP was a loose coalition of PCS dissidents, members from the COP, other revolutionary aspirants from UES, and some left over from the ERP's then-defunct parent organization, El Grupo. The problems with internal cohesion within the ERP primarily stemmed from differences of opinion on strategy between the core leadership and those in the student-based COP. The latter, which was a small group of middle and upper-middleclass UES college students, agreed to work with the ERP[1023] because Rivas Mira claimed they would have an equal share of the ERP's leadership. Rivas Mira had proposed a full integration of the COP into the ERP as well as a core leadership position for Joaquín Villalobos, the COP's helmsman.[1024]

As might be expected, the loosely affiliated, patchwork nature of the organization made oversight a logistical nightmare for its leaders. "From March 1972 onwards, when both groups began a more formal rapprochement, the ERP remained firm on the creation of an armed group as its main goal, while COP members considered it essential to organize the masses at the same time."[1025] The ERP tried to solve this organizational conundrum by allowing each group to create its own separate 'cell,' with Rivas Mira as the group's overall leader.[1026] But they were still largely divided on whether or not the organization would undergo full militarization in preparation for a "popular prolonged

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[1022] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 664)
[1023] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 674) via Interview with Ana Sonia Medina, San Salvador, January 31, 2011. According to Álvarez and Orero (2014, 674) the COP agreed to join "on the condition that they remain an independent structure: 'The people at the ERP told us they were going to support us, give us solidarity, and we set as a condition that we were not going to become a part of them…"
[1024] According to the January 31, 2011 interview with Ana Sonia Medina, Joaquín Villalobos was nominated for this role after he won an internal COP vote.
[1025] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 675)
[1026] Rivas Mira also shared command with Eduardo Sancho and Lil Milagro Ramírez. According to Álvarez and Orero (2014, 678), "Each entity had been organizing its own support groups from the start—a structure of collaborators in charge of providing timely logistics, intelligence and support—with varying levels of success."

war"[1027] or shift attention to a non-violent political approach. Those that advocated for the latter were at continually at odds with those that advocated the former. Yet, successes recruiting new militants by the latter outpaced that of the former, and a resistance strategy that hinged on violence prevailed. [1028]

At the same time, the PCS was bleeding members, particularly those from its youth organization, the Unión de Jóvenes Patriotas (Union of Young Patriots, UJP). Most were disillusioned with the party's insistence on an electoral strategy and thus left to seek out other organizations that advocated more aggressive means. "Some of them joined the party's former secretary-general, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, in the creation of the FPL,"[1029] while others migrated to the ERP. Solving these cohesion and control problems among all the member-groups would take up much of the time during the FMLN's rapprochement in 1979.

As for the MIR, de la Puente moved forward with combat training despite lack of cohesion and control. It might be argued that he was slowly losing control of his proto-insurgency but this would imply he possessed some measure of power to begin with.

6.6.1 Combat Training

By the middle of the 1950s, de la Puente was agitated by his unceremonious ouster from the APRA but emboldened by the prospect of his own movement.[1030] Recall, he had already begun initial planning for such a venture a few years earlier while on forced hiatus to Mexico. So in July of 1959, he and some from his growing cohort of

[1027] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 680)
[1028] According to Álvarez and Orero (2014)
[1029] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 677)
[1030] The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives," published in the *Monthly Review*, November 1965 (vol.17, No. 6), p. 12-28, and in Chile in the Spanish version of the same magazine. Written by Luis de la Puente Uceda in July 1964

revolutionary hopefuls traveled to Cuba where they reunited with Castro and Che—who were at that time only six months removed from their successful Cuban takeover—to undergo further political and ideological education as well as training in guerrilla warfare.[1031]

The small island roughly 100 miles from the Florida coast had become the revolutionary epicenter in the region. Would-be guerrillas from countries like Bolivia, Argentina, El Salvador, as well as Peru poured into Cuba in waves. According to declassified CIA documents, between 1960-62 more than 1,500 revolutionary journeymen (and journeywomen) from all across Latin America made the trek there to be trained in the art of guerrilla warfare.[1032] Some of the largest contingents came from Peru.[1033]

De la Puente and a small contingent of his MIR comrades spent nearly a year in Cuba where they were schooled in "underground organization techniques, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, terrorism, [and] espionage and psychological warfare."[1034] He and his disciples also underwent extensive political 'inspiration' in addition to attending numerous political rallies sponsored by the new Cuban regime. Other Peruvian dissidents like Blanco, Lobatón, and Béjar attended many of the same rallies to learn from the experiences of the Cuban revolution. By 1963, at least 150 MIR foot soldiers had received training in Cuba.[1035] It should be noted that when it came to combat training, their Cuban hosts carefully segregated their revolutionary pupils into separate training

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[1031] Rénique (2004); Pelaez (2001)
[1032] CIA memos, May 1, 1963; June 16, 1965; July 28, 1965; August 6, 1965; September 13, 1965; October 27, 1965
[1033] CIA memos, May 1, 1963; June 16, 1965
[1034] CIA document, February 19th, 1963
[1035] CIA document, February 19th, 1963

cells.[1036] De la Puente and his MIR found themselves under the tutelage of Che—with Napurí acting as mediator.[1037] A second group led by Béjar was trained separately.[1038] These two groups, along with a third contingent of around 80 Peruvian scholars[1039] were continually at odds with one another on how to best initiate change in Peru. This was around the time Lobatón allied with de la Puente.[1040]

The FMLN's military capacity during the conflict is often heralded as one of the insurgency's greatest strengths. In what has risen to the forefront as standard operating procedure for the proto-insurgents examined in this dissertation, combat training for the individual member groups of the FMLN resembled a process in which leaders developed a core cadre schooled in guerrilla-warfare style techniques that then passed along this knowledge to the rest of the organization. This accurately characterizes the ERP, FPL, and the FARN as well as precursor groups like El Grupo and the COP.

Between 1969 and 1973, many of those who eventually comprised the central leadership of these organizations underwent lengthy training in Havana in the art of guerrilla warfare.[1041] There is some evidence to suggest would-be "Salvadoran guerrillas' training in Cuba was the heaviest of all the regional insurgencies since 1960"[1042] but the

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[1036] Rénique (2004)
[1037] According to Rénique (2004), interestingly, Che not only had a preference for the ELN's strategy but continually butted heads with de La Puente during his time in Cuba.
[1038] Héctor Béjar (1973) *The Guerrillas of 1965: Balance and Perspectives*, Lima: PEISA, 17-18
[1039] Rénique (2004)
[1040] Rénique (2004)
[1041] According to Alberto Martín Álvarez and Eudald Cortina Orero (2014) *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 46, Roque Dalton, Domingo Mira, Lemus Arévalo, Francisco Jovel, Leonel Lemus Arévalo all received extensive training, courtesy of the Castro regime, and all eventually occupied important leadership positions both within their individual member groups and later in the FMLN.
[1042] *Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts*. José Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer Review by: Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley Source: *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 76, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 369-370

magnitude of this claim has been elsewhere contested.[1043] That at least *some* of the FMLN's proto-guerrillas did receive some modicum of combat training in Cuba[1044] during incubation has been corroborated.[1045] For example, Francisco Jovel (PRTC), and Joaquín Villalobos and Rivas Mira (ERP)[1046] indeed visited Cuba. The leader of the FARN, Comandante Fermán and many of his comrades also received training there.[1047] But ultimately, "throughout the 1970s, Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas was limited and consisted mainly of intelligence and counterintelligence strategies as well as urban conspiracy tactics."[1048]

Of the five, the FPL was especially apt at training members and developed an intensive and consolidated guerrilla warfare training pipeline.[1049] Its helmsman, Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial") was convinced the best approach was one that would concentrate on attrition, or the slow but steady wearing-down of the Salvadorian military over time.[1050] As such, the FPL's training regime was designed not to match the Salvadorian military's firepower[1051] but rather to maximize the effectiveness of the foot soldiers and weaponry they had. As such, members were trained using long-range weapons like mortars and grenade launchers to help avoid direct, face-to-face skirmishes

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[1043] In the review of the work cited in footnote 89, Wickham-Crowley (369) wrote this claim was likely more revisionist than one rooted in source material.
[1044] Andrea Oñate (2011) The Red Affair: FMLN–Cuban relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 1981–92, Cold War History, 11:2, 133-154; Wood, Elisabeth Jean. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (p. 122) Cambridge University Press
[1045] Wood (2003, 122)
[1046] https://www.ft.com/content/f55ce2a0-67b3-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5
[1047] Brown (1999, 114)
[1048] Oñate (2011, 141)
[1049] Dictadures, revolucions i assaigs democratitzadors: el Salvador 1960-2004 44
[1050] An Interview with Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial") Author(s): ADOLFO GILLY and Salvador Cayetano Carpio Source: Contemporary Marxism, No. 3, Revolution and Intervention in Central America (Summer 1981, 12), pp. 9-14
[1051] ibid

with the much larger and comparatively better-equipped Salvadorian military.[1052] Other training in stand-off-style methods included the employment of mines and bombs.[1053]

The ERP pushed recruits through a battery of guerrilla warfare education comprised of both 'classroom' and practical, hands-on training. Recruits studied "conspirative methodology and the techniques of an urban guerrilla,"[1054] including "compartmentalization (cellular organizations), and clandestine operations."[1055] They were taught how to disassemble and reassemble weapons, engage targets with a rifle from various firing positions, and subjected to daily physical fitness exercises like "running, walking and climbing hills [all] while being supervised and evaluated"[1056] by senior cadre. Much of the training was held under cover of darkness so as not to arouse suspicion.[1057]

As noted, some of the PRTC's leadership, like Comandante Fermán, in addition to a number of its lower level members received training in Cuba but also in countries like Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and even East Germany.[1058] They also benefited from the help of a "retired Salvadoran army colonel who gave them weapons training."[1059] Combat training conducted in Cuba and Vietnam lasted anywhere from four months to a year and largely focused on military and guerrilla warfare tactics.[1060] "PRTC members were selected for foreign training based upon their experience within the PRTC

[1052] ibid
[1053] ibid
[1054] Phillips (1997, 10)
[1055] ibid
[1056] ibid
[1057] Autobiography of ERP commander Juan Ramón Medrano (Raudales and Medrano 1994: 74–5), in Wood, Elisabeth Jean *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)* (160). Cambridge University Press
[1058] "Political, Military, and Professional Training of PRTC Members Outside of El Salvador," CIA document (March, 1990)
[1059] Brown (1999, 116)
[1060] "Political, Military, and Professional Training of PRTC Members Outside of El Salvador," CIA document (March, 1990, 2)

and the dedication they exhibited to the revolutionary process."[1061] Those that underwent training in Europe were mostly taught about intelligence and counterintelligence.[1062] The foreign connections forged by the PRTC during incubation proved to be exceptionally valuable for the FMLN after the war erupted. Many FMLN foot soldiers were funneled through the PRTC's training pipelines during the 1980s.[1063]

The PCS, which was still committed to a strategy of nonviolence (at least outwardly), formed the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (Armed Forces of the Liberation or FAL) as a covert unit that would act on the party's behalf, militarily. Training largely resembled that of the FPL.[1064]

In sum, of all the incubation processes discussed so far, combat training was one where the MIR excelled. Training lasted a whole year for some. This is not surprising as de la Puente spent considerable time abroad training in guerrilla warfare and was thereafter convinced violence was the unequivocal answer to all of Peru's problems. However, combat training alone was proven insufficient for long-term survival. Indeed, violence without cohesion and control is not enough to sustain an insurgency, as evidenced by the MIR's swift demise.

As for the FMLN, one of the more compelling aspects was that many foot soldiers were trained in one group and then often ended up moving to another group during incubation. For example, members trained in the ERP frequently jumped ship to either the PRTC or the FPL (or both) and brought with them the combat tactics learned during

[1061] ibid
[1062] ibid
[1063] ibid
[1064] ibid

their time in former organizations.[1065] This inter-group trading of tactics also benefited the FARN.[1066] Thus evolved a situation in which these groups ended up 'sharing' tactics amongst and between each other during incubation. This created a notable measure of unity in military tactics once these groups ultimately merged to form the FMLN.

6.7 Solving (Organizational) Puzzles: Resource Management

Much has been made of the vast amount of material resources and money Cuba allegedly funneled to insurgents all across Latin America during mid-century and the critical role it played in bolstering these movements.[1067] While there is *some* documented evidence to corroborate claims that Castro both provided the MIR Czech weapons and additional money to purchase firearms, [1068] and the FMLN a "small contribution"[1069] to help finance the organization's first offensive,[1070] the magnitude of Cuba's patronage has been contested elsewhere.[1071] This is not surprising as Castro largely "lacked a monetary surplus to bestow on any cause…"[1072]

There is corroborated evidence to support the claim that Castro had at least promised de la Puente and the MIR (upon their return to Peru in 1960), "propaganda support, … propaganda materials for the movement, training aids to expand guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and … funds and specialized demolition

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[1065] Montgomery (1982, 122); Wood (2003)
[1066] Montgomery (1982, 122)
[1067] See for example, Bracamonte, Jose Angel Moroni, and David E. Spencer (1995) Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprints for Future Conflicts, Praeger
[1068] CIA document, February 19th, 1963
[1069] Oñate (2011, 144)
[1070] "Cuban and Sandinista Aid to Salvadoran Rebels," *United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research*, May 23, 1985, DNSA collection: El Salvador 1980-1994
[1071] See for example, Timothy Wickham-Crowley's somewhat scathing review of Bracamonte and Spencer (1995), *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 1 May 1996, 76(2), 369-370
[1072] Oñate (2011, 144)

equipment."[1073] However, despite these promises there is little proven evidence that the MIR actually received any substantial short or long-term material or financial support.[1074]

Domestically, from his headquarters at Mesa Pelada, de la Puente's oversight of the MIR's insurgent fronts was meager, at best. This extends to resource control as well. According to Wickham-Crowley,[1075] the MIR's fronts procured most of their resources, with varying degrees of success, by paying peasants. Here again, Lobatón's Tupac Amaru stationed in Junín had the most success and consequently the deepest coffer among the MIR's three fronts.[1076] De la Puente never established any central resource control mechanisms probably because his Pachacútec guerillas were having enough trouble procuring resources for themselves, and rendering payment for the ones they did acquire.[1077] Lobatón, and Fernández were thus left to fend for themselves[1078] while the Pachacútec guerillas at Mesa Pelada were the poorest of the bunch.[1079] "To cope with the need of weapons and money, de la Puente explained that the MIR had always planned on capturing its arms from police and army units"[1080] *after* the start of combat operations. This ill-conceived, shortsighted, and last minute plan to make up for the Pachacútec's resource shortfalls never materialized as they were routed rather quickly by the army.

Cuban assistance to the FMLN member-groups during the 1970s was likewise "limited."[1081] When compared to the actual resources the member-groups had on hand during incubation, the claim that all were limited is further substantiated. To illustrate,

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[1073] CIA document, February 19th, 1963
[1074] There are claims that Castro paid de la Puente $70,000 but these sources are unsubstantiated elsewhere.
[1075] Wickham-Crowley (1990, 1992, 55)
[1076] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 55)
[1077] Gall (1967)
[1078] ibid
[1079] Wickham-Crowley (1992, 116)
[1080] De La Pedraja, René (2013, 159-160) *Wars of Latin America, 1948–1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas*, McFarland and Company, Inc.
[1081] Oñate (2011, 141)

before unification in 1979, the FMLN member-groups had a few substantive networks but not a consistent stream of funds or resources.[1082] Of the five, the PCS was the most financially viable during incubation thanks to party donations, as was customary since its inception in the 1930s. Elsewhere the FPL exploited relationships with the Catholic Church and used local collection boxes to withdraw funds, with no intention of repayment.[1083] The RN/FARN likewise utilized strong-armed tactics to raise funds early on.[1084] For example, in 1978, they captured "several foreign businessmen in succession,"[1085] who were staying in San Salvador, and ransomed them for "substantial amounts of money."[1086] Of the five, the ERP was the least financially secure. Splits in 1975 and 1976, which led to the creation of the RN/FARN and the PRTC respectively, left the ERP with little resources and largely disconnected from the previously established social networks from which they were culled.[1087] The disconnected and decentralized nature of the FMLN's resources and management would be resolved later during rapprochement. The MIR however, never set up any centralized resource management process and thus failed to solve this problem.

6.8 Bases, Camps, and Sanctuaries; and Avoiding Detection

I have heretofore discussed in some explicit detail the mistakes made by the MIR in avoiding government detection. Recall Lobatón and de la Puente were neither bashful about publicizing their rocky relationship nor in divulging the MIR's plans to the media. There are a few further missteps that should be noted here. For example, in early 1964

[1082] Wood (2003, 120)
[1083] Waller, Michael J. (1987, 6) "Financing Terrorism in El Salvador: The Secret Support Network for the FMLN," *Council for Inter-American Security, El Salvador Human Rights Special Project*, US Department of State, June 4, 1987
[1084] de la Peña (1998, 455)
[1085] Armstrong, Robert and Janet Shenk (1982, 104) *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution*, South End Press
[1086] de la Peña (1998, 455)
[1087] Álvarez and Orero (2014, 687)

not long after Blanco had been run down and arrested, de la Puente actually took a meeting with Belaúnde's Minister of Government,[1088] Fernando Schwalb López Aldana and denounced the state's destruction of Blanco's movement.[1089] He warned the Minister that if the Belaúnde regime continued on its present course, "the conditions for the armed struggle in the country were maturing"[1090] and a "gigantic and historic"[1091] political insurrection would result. This ill-advised meeting was soon followed by a parade of MIR slogans around Mesa Pelada that called for insurrection.[1092] In February that same year, de la Puente made a public appearance in Lima's main plaza and "gave an inflammatory and subversive speech [that] urged people to rise up in arms."[1093] Convinced he had done enough to foment revolution, he confined himself to the MIR's headquarters at Mesa Pelada and began final preparations for his revolution.[1094]

The FMLN member-groups and Sendero incubated at the same time, albeit about 2,000 miles apart. The political landscape in both countries was very similar at this time. Government had changed hands as a result of coups—Peru in 1975 and El Salvador in 1979. Worker's union strikes, teacher's union protests, and peasant mobilizations abounded. Where the two countries differed substantively was in government response. Though the Peruvian government responded[1095] in some cases with arrests and crackdowns—some of which broke out into violent clashes between the military, police,

[1088] Peru's Minister of Government (or Prime Minister) is subordinate to the President.
[1089] Rénique (2004, 99)
[1090] de la Puente, "Response to the questionnaire presented by the journal *Caretas*," in *OLPU*
[1091] ibid
[1092] Rénique (2004, 99); de la Puente, "Response to the questionnaire presented by the journal *Caretas*," in *OLPU*
[1093] De La Pedraja, René (2013, 159); "Decision by MIR to begin preparations for revolution," 11 February 1964, CIA, Freedom of Information Act (henceforth CIA FOIA); CIA Report on Latin America, 1 April 1964, National Security Files, Latin America, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas
[1094] "Decision by MIR to begin preparations for revolution," 11 February 1964, CIA, Freedom of Information Act (henceforth CIA FOIA); CIA Report on Latin America, 1 April 1964, National Security Files, Latin America, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas
[1095] Rénique and Lerner (forthcoming, 10)

and civilians—it was far more tolerant and significantly tamer when compared to the responses of the Salvadorian government.[1096] "In fact, virtually any type of peaceful political organizing and protest—particularly labor and peasant organizing, strikes, and land occupations—was liable to be attacked violently by the armed forces… (or by allied "death squads") regardless of whether it was undertaken by revolutionaries or by reformists, including groups supported by the Catholic Church."[1097]

Recall from Chapter 3, proto-insurgents stay hidden in response to volatile environments, such as there was in both Peru and El Salvador, in several ways. They can do as Sendero did; remember Guzmán and his Senderistas were not pulled into the fray but remained on the periphery where they continued to build their organization. Sure, Sendero was subtly involved behind the scenes but for the most part, stayed largely disconnected.[1098] This helped them maintain a certain measure of anonymity from the state. In contrast, the FMLN's member-groups responded far differently and used the volatile sociopolitical landscape to help mask more overt organization building.[1099] During the late 1970s, the Salvadorian government used a paramilitary force called the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN) to attack activists and union organizers.[1100] This had two distinct impacts on the FMLN's incubation activities, and detection avoidance in particular.

ORDEN's violent repression first pushed Salvadorians into the arms of the growing guerilla movements.[1101] This helped with recruitment of resources, financing,

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[1096] Goodwin (1991, 143)
[1097] ibid (159)
[1098] Degregori (2012)
[1099] See Byman (2008) for a similar argument.
[1100] Goodwin (1991, 160)
[1101] Wood (2000, 47); For further reading on the impact of government repression, see: Lustick, Ian 'Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control', World Politics 31/3 (April

and overall support. Civilian response to political upheaval, social movements, and government repression on insurgent recruitment has been studied elsewhere at length.[1102] Second, it helped hide the member-group's incubation activities amongst the social movement milieu. Recall, when proto-insurgents maintain close proximity to social movements or large-scale political protests, security, police, and intelligence services are sometimes unable to distinguish political activists from those fomenting revolution.[1103] The FPL and ERP in particular maintained close proximately to Catholic activists[1104] and to some degree, worker-peasant alliances.[1105] This helped disguise their incubation activities because they were but a few among many. To illustrate the effectiveness of 'hiding in plain sight,' the member-groups did not start to show up in government-produced intelligence documents as 'organizations of interest' until 1979.[1106] By then it was too late.

As for sanctuaries, the remote and rugged nature of the terrain in Peru initially made the activities of the MIR difficult for the Peruvian intelligence community to monitor. Recall that it also made intra-organization communication and central oversight among the three zones of influence exceptionally challenging.[1107] The extensive network of rudimentary footpaths that snaked across the rugged terrain was confusing for anyone not native to the region, like de la Puente, and made navigation between and

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1979), 325–44; Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority*, Univ. of Texas Press 1980); Stathis, Kalyvas *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge UP 2006

[1102] See Kuran, Timur (1991) "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44 (1), 7–48; Lichbach, Mark (1995) *The Rebel's Dilemma*, University of Michigan Press

[1103] Byman (2007, 193)

[1104] Wood (2003, 86)

[1105] ibid

[1106] US National Security Archives, El Salvador's National Archives: Palacio Nacional, Centro Histórico, Avenida Cuscatlán San Salvador, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Archive

[1107] Gall (1967)

communication among the MIR's basecamps an extraordinarily difficult task.[1108] In response, de la Puente tried to enlist the help of the locals to act as guides and couriers for resources and weapons but recall he failed to follow through on most of his promises of payment. Many couriers disenchanted by the MIR's treatment, were happy to give information about the location of the MIR's bases to the Peruvian military once combat operations began.[1109]

According to Jeff Goodwin, the mountainous landscape in El Salvador's northern departments was particularly well suited for guerrilla organizing and the FMLN member groups took full advantage.[1110] However, recall terrain is only useful when locations are kept secret, and the FMLN managed secrecy very effectively.

Due to the government's reputation for violent oppression, the mountains acted as a refuge for some of the FMLN member groups but so too for civilians.[1111] The FPL in particular attracted many fleeing civilians.[1112] According to Elisabeth Jean Wood, the FPL and the ERP had sanctuaries in the "mountains north of San Francisco Javier; the ERP was the sole group in the Las Marías area."[1113] In addition to valuable knowledge of the landscape, the campesinos that eventually began filling their ranks took to guerrilla training quickly and brought to the member groups a certain kind of grittiness and determination that had been hitherto absent. There is considerable corroborated evidence that by the end of the conflict, more than "95% of FMLN combatants were campesinos,

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[1108] ibid
[1109] Wickham-Crowley (1992)
[1110] Goodwin (1991, 49); One of Goodwin's arguments for why the FMLN succeeded was because the government of El Salvador was "fiscally and infrastructurally weak [and did] not effectively penetrate or control all of the national territory that they claim[ed] to rule (especially "peripheral" border and/or mountainous regions)…(148)."
[1111] Wood (2003, 94)
[1112] ibid
[1113] ibid (112)

as were 80% of the midlevel commanders."[1114]

Thanks to government heavy-handedness and the ability of the member-groups to tap salient discourse, locations of camps and sanctuaries were kept in strict secrecy. The MIR however, failed miserably in this process.

6.9 Consolidating the FMLN

By the time the five member-groups of the FMLN began formal rapprochement in 1979, there were some very real problems that needed attendance. First, earlier splits within the PCS, the PRTC, and the ERP came about over whether "the rifle ordered the party or the party ordered the rifle,"[1115] and by the time the five member-groups decided to form an alliance, this fissure was the FMLN's most significant cohesion-building obstacle during incubation. Second, the 'financial portfolio' of the FMLN was a hodge-podge of social networks, PCS-supplied resources, compulsory church 'donations,' and criminal enterprises, which did not look at all like a well-oiled resource-mobilization and control establishment.[1116] Indeed, there was no central oversight. The FMLN solved these problems as efficiently as could be expected under the circumstances.

As for cohesion and control, the October 1979 military coup that ousted President Carlos Humberto Romero highlighted divisions among the member-groups and thus the necessity for a comprehensive cohesion building and command and control strategy.[1117] To illustrate, after the coup, both the ERP and FPL claimed combat operations should

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[1114] Wood (2003, 112); Byrne (1996, 35)
[1115] Phillips (11)
[1116] Goodwin (1991, 57)
[1117] According to Goodwin (1991, 196), Keogh, Dermot (1985) "The United States and the Coup d'Etat in El Salvador, 15 October 1979: A Case Study in American Foreign Policy Perceptions and Decision-Making." Pp. 21–69 in *Central America: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, edited by Dermot Keogh, Cork University Press, is the best account of the "coup and its aftermath."

start straightaway.[1118] Curiously, the FARN took a decidedly "more optimistic view of the potential for change"[1119] and wanted to wait. The PCS was still slightly skeptical that violence was absolutely necessary and called for the establishment of the Coordinadora Político-Militar (Political-Military Committee, or CPM) through which the burgeoning organization's member-groups could hopefully come to some semblance of decision-making consensus.[1120] Though neither the ERP nor the PRTC joined the committee, this was the first crucial step in consolidating the FMLN's individual member-groups into one integrated and cohesive organization.[1121] This occurred a year and a half before the start of full-scale combat operations.

In an effort to incorporate the ERP and the PRTC, a second committee, the Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada (Unified Revolutionary Directorate, or DRU) was established five months later at a "meeting in Havana."[1122] By this point the PCS had eventually warmed up to the idea of using violence and established the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion (Armed Forces of Liberation, or FAL) as the party's official military component.[1123] It took another few months before all the member-groups came around to the idea of majority rule and decisions via consensus but by the end of that year, all five were on board and the FMLN was officially formed.[1124] The establishment of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (Revolutionary Democratic Front, or FDR) also came out of the Havana meeting.[1125] The FDR was to be the FMLN's overt political mouthpiece and

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[1118] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 94)
[1119] Byrne, Hugh (1996, 54) *El Salvador's Civil War*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
[1120] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 94)
[1121] ibid
[1122] ibid
[1123] ibid
[1124] Montgomery, Tommie Sue (1982, 131-132) *Revolution in El Salvador*, Westview Press
[1125] "El Salvador: The Insurgent Alliance," Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, August 15, 1984

was so throughout the entire conflict.[1126] While there is evidence to suggest some held onto their member-group lineage even after 1980,[1127] some, like the FPL, altogether dissolved their particular identities into the FMLN."[1128]

The FMLN's 'financial portfolio' would also come under the direction of the DRU,[1129] which was tasked[1130] with the consolidation and allocation of the various funds and material resources to the member-groups. The FMLN's five commandants, Salvador Cayetano Carpio (FPL), Joaquín Villalobos Hueso (ERP), Comandante Fermán (FARN), Schafik Jorge Handal (PCS),[1131] and Roca (PRCT) collectively helmed the DRU and made operational, financial and resource distribution decisions.[1132] This method of centralized control established during incubation would last through much of the ensuing conflict.[1133]

In sum, of all the incubation processes, cohesion and control for the FMLN member-groups was likely the most difficult. It has been elsewhere argued that the

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[1126] ibid
[1127] According to Wood (2003) the ERP was one such group.
[1128] Este artículo es copia fiel del publicado en la revista Nueva Sociedad No. 234, julio-agosto de 2011 149
[1129] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 94)
[1130] The DRU executive body was designed to administer a whole host of top-down command and control directives (Allison and Alvarez 2012, 94).
[1131] At the behest of the newly established executive body, between June 2 and July 22, 1980, the PCS general secretary, Schafik Jorge Handal, went on a global fund-raising campaign. He visited the "USSR, Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ethiopia to procure arms and seek support for the movement." The Vietnamese government promised to contribute "60 tons of arms." The German Democratic Republic (GDR) promised "1.9 tons of supplies." The Czech Communist Party claimed there were "some Czech arms circulating in the world market [that would] be provided so that these arms [would] not be traced back to Czechoslovakia as the donor country." "The Bulgarians agree[d] to supply German-origin weapons and other supplies, again in an apparent effort to conceal their sources." The Hungarian "Communist Party General Secretary Janos Kadar [offered] radios and other supplies." Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam supplied ""several thousand weapons," including: 150 Thompson sub- machineguns with 300 cartridge clips, 1,500 M-l rifles, 1,000 M-14 rifles, and ammunition for these weapons. In addition, the Ethiopians agree to supply all necessary spare parts for these arms." The Soviets allegedly offered to facilitate the transport of these supplies to El Salvador via Cuba ("Communist Interference in El Salvador," *US Department of State Special Report No. 80*, January 23, 1981, p. 4-6)
[1132] El Salvador: The Insurgent Alliance," Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, August 15, 1984
[1133] ibid

insurgency suffered from internal divisiveness at least until 1983.[1134] Such arguments claim that while "the groups had achieved structural integrity,"[1135] internal cohesiveness took another two years to establish. Yet, despite such claims, that fact remains the DRU was able to sufficiently hold the organization together and the FMLN did eventually coalesce.[1136]

6.10 Chapter Conclusions

These cases were chosen for further in-depth investigation as a way to test whether or not the theory outlined in Chapter 3 could sufficiently travel. The MIR was defeated in short order despite an incubation period that lasted longer than the mean. It squandered its time and failed to build an organization with real staying power. It had a hard time figuring out how to market itself, members were disloyal and left largely unattended by the central leadership, and the insurgency lacked any meaningful resource control mechanisms. Its two dueling figureheads were also not particularly concerned with keeping their incubating proto-insurgency a secret. This foolhardy approach offset most of what the organization did successfully during incubation and the insurgency was thus easily defeated once conflict began.

As for the FMLN, it was never militarily defeated and eventually became a legal political party in 1992 after an exceptionally violent and protracted conflict. Evidence presented in this chapter showed all five of the individual member-groups underwent the incubation processes separately and when combined, formed an organization that was greater than the sum of their individual parts. This is a particularly interesting finding because many insurgencies have been comprised of coalitions of smaller revolutionary

[1134] See Allison and Alvarez (2012) for a complete discussion on this.
[1135] Allison and Alvarez (2012, 95)
[1136] Béjar (1996, 64)

movements. Thus, disaggregating a case into individual units of analysis can help explain the staying power of similarly organized insurgencies elsewhere. This is an example of a further nuance missed by our current coding rules, which highlights the limits of conducting large-N analysis in isolation from small-N case studies.

CHAPTER 7—CONCLUSIONS

Through a novel coding methodology, LNA, and case study narratives, I have provided strong evidence that insurgent war duration is causally linked to the length of time spent in incubation. Rather than considering prewar and wartime in isolation from each other, this work advances the claim that factors in the former meaningfully influence the latter. In searching for the causes of protracted insurgent wars, this dissertation has concentrated on the significance of the prewar time period. To that end, this chapter has three objectives: 1) to recap the major findings of this dissertation, 2) to discuss how these findings offer new approaches to studying insurgents, and 3) to examine the practical policy implications of this dissertation and how politicians, police, and security professionals might develop more robust responses to future threats of insurgency.

7.1 Major Findings Recap

It matters how insurgents spend their time before conflict. It matters for how strong they will become. It matters for how long combat will last. It matters because the ways insurgents behave before conflict fundamentally determines whether they are prematurely caught by the state before they are ready, or if they develop into full-blown insurgents capable of protracting conflict for years, or even decades. The problem is that only a few select scholars have taken the prewar time period seriously. This dissertation has made the case for a major amendment to the study of insurgency by showing how this segment of time significantly impacts the way insurgent conflicts unfold, and how long they last.

Most current theories have pointed to wartime institutions, wartime alliances, sources of funding during conflict, ethnic or social divisions created by conflict, the death and destruction civilians endure living amidst conflict, and many other factors

endogenous to wartime to explain the puzzle of protracted insurgent war. It is sensible and logical to study insurgent war by paying strict attention to wartime. While studies along this line of thinking have generated very useful theories and supporting empirical data on the causes of insurgency, rebellion, and civil war, they tell us little to nothing about *what* actually made insurgents capable of dragging out political violence within these contexts—and equally as important—why insurgency failed in similar contexts. I claimed these approaches tell only half, or likely only part of the whole story.

I argued the proto-insurgent who prepped for war developed the capacity to protract war. The notion that drove this dissertation's theory was actually rather simple: it is always better to be prepared. The theory motivated by this notion was detailed, straightforward, and modestly intuitive. Rather than consider prewar and wartime in isolation from each other, I advanced the argument that factors in the former meaningfully influence the latter. In searching for the causes of protracted insurgent wars, I concentrated on the significance of the prewar time period. Before now, we neither had a theory that fully conceptualized proto-insurgent behavior nor empirical methods to test hypotheses about this behavior. The theory and empirical evidence presented in this dissertation constitutes a first attempt at filling these gaps.

I first laid out the theoretical framework that set aside the motivation(s) driving the aspiring insurgent's decision to actually go through with violent action that rather focused on the more practical, less sensational side of things—solving organizational puzzles. The theory claimed insurgents who survived wartime the longest did so not because they flew by the seat of their pants or because they developed movements in ad hoc ways after conflict erupted but rather, they were able to survive conflict long-term in

the face of remarkable odds because were prepared to manage the hardships associated with wartime, *beforehand*. The theory of incubation outlined in this dissertation claimed proto-insurgents who avoided the incumbent's boot heel long-term did so because they addressed a series of problems during the prewar time period, during incubation.

The theory detailed that proto-insurgents who survive conflict the longest, incubate to devise ways to accomplish the following tasks: a) attract recruits and material resources, b) foster cohesion and establish control mechanisms, c) train members, d) establish secret bases or camps, e) manage resources, and f) avoid premature detection. These processes overlap and take place at multiple levels along the way. Some take longer to undertake than others. Some are more difficult to do than others. But when they devise ways to solve all of these problems during incubation, insurgents survive wartime longer because they are the very same organizational problems they encounter during wartime. I argued the duration of incubation was a good proxy for the quality of incubation. Incubation thus affords proto-insurgents the time to sufficiently prepare for war.

As this dissertation demonstrated, prewar preparation alone is an arduous process prone to failure. Organization-building opportunities can be squandered or overlooked. But the ability of the proto-insurgent to undergo incubation to build movements with any modicum of efficiency hinges on their capacity to stay hidden from the state's prying eyes long enough to do so. This is easier said than done, as the state's reach is long, even when they have comparatively feeble security, intelligence, and police forces.

The addition of wartime violence complicates matters further. The inherent dangers of trying to accomplish these tasks while fighting state-backed armed forces

and/or police at the same time compounds the difficulties of organization building. I argued incubation is the best moment for proto-insurgents to pursue organization building because they are at their weakest. Avoiding government detection during incubation should be a priority, lest the proto-insurgent be forced to engage state-backed armed forces before they are adequately prepared to do so.

In light of this summary of the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, the remainder of this chapter has three objectives: 1) to recap the major empirical findings of this dissertation; 2) to discuss how these findings offer new approaches to studying insurgents; and 3) to examine the practical policy implications of this dissertation and how politicians, police, and security professionals might develop more robust responses to future threats of insurgency.

7.1 Major Empirical Findings Recap

Through a novel coding methodology, large-N quantitative analysis, and case study narratives, I have provided evidence that insurgent war duration is linked to the length of time spent in incubation. In broad terms, the findings here lend substantial support to this theoretical contention as demonstrated by the results of the large-N analysis presented in Chapter 4. I developed and tested several hypotheses regarding conflict duration and found lengthier incubation periods reduce the probability of failure. That is, the longer a proto-insurgency incubates, the less likely conflict will end in any given year.

To compliment and further enhance the quantitative findings, I demonstrated that this is mostly consistent with the practical behaviors exhibited by real-world state challengers on the ground. I did so by examining three cases in depth, Sendero Luminoso, the FMLN, and the MIR. While the results from the quantitative analysis

illuminated broad, generalized patterns in the data, these case studies provided micro-level details of what proto-insurgents actually did during incubation that either helped facilitate their long-term survival or set them up for failure.

On the one hand, I showed lengthy and *quality* prewar preparation helped Sendero and the FMLN produce protracted conflicts. Both insurgencies spent approximately 10 years incubating. During this time they figured out ways to successfully attract recruits and material resources, foster cohesion and establish control mechanisms, train members, establish secret bases or camps, and manage resources, all while avoiding premature detection by the state. Here incubation duration was a good proxy for the quality of incubation.

On the other hand, while the MIR incubated for approximately five years, the movement's prewar preparation was severely deficient and was therefore defeated rather swiftly. This case suggests that a key variable is indeed the *quality* of incubation, not just its duration.

7.2 Supporting and Improving Theory

This dissertation provides new insights into several areas of scholarly research. First, we need to expand our analytical toolkit to include the prewar time period when studying insurgent war. Most studies have taken the prewar time period for granted, or overlooked it altogether. Such an overly conflict-centric view ignores the substantial variation in proto-insurgent behavior and how it powerfully conditions wartime behavior. Further research and data collection is clearly needed. We need to expand and round out our datasets to include incubation for all insurgencies so that we can continue to test hypotheses about the relationship between incubation and conflict.

Second, while it is true proto-insurgent leaders have a variety of problems to solve once they decide they are going to use violence to challenge the sovereign's claim to rule within a relatively defined territory, it is likely that preparation for conflict is only one of the things they do during incubation. Some may also take measures to prepare for transformation into a legitimate political party. There is emerging scholarship on this topic, though again, most studies have largely focused on post-war political party transformation.[1137]

We might theorize the threat of war by a proto-insurgent vis-à-vis *overt* conflict preparation constitutes a bargaining chip used to sway the government into considering a settlement rather than taking on the inherent costs of fighting.[1138] The significance of such a bargaining chip for proto-insurgents to barter for a seat at the political table could have some meaningful implications in a comparative analysis of regime type. A future study on this topic might be interested in examining how incubation influences group trajectories—whether they become viable threats (or not) and if they become political parties (or not).

7.3 Implications for Policy

What remains to be considered is the implications of this research for real-world policy discussions. Unfortunately we are unlikely to see a world devoid of insurgency any time soon. As I write, US and coalition forces are ramping up operations in Somalia in

[1137] See for example, Sharry Zaks' forthcoming dissertation; Rufyikiri, Gervais (2017) "The Post-wartime Trajectory of CNDD-FDD Party in Burundi: A Facade Transformation of Rebel Movement to Political Party," *Civil Wars* 19(2), 220-248; Gaudin, Andres (2017) "Disarmed Colombian Rebels Enter Politics, Keep 'FARC' in Party Name," *South American Political and Economic Affairs* 26(36); Ishiyama, John and Anna Batta, Anna (2011) "Swords into Plowshares: The Organizational Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44(4), 369-379

[1138] Bargaining has been explored elsewhere at length. See for example, Fearon, James D. (1995) "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49(3), 379-414

response to the ever-growing threat from Al-Shabaab.[1139] The Taliban continues to fester and grow in Afghanistan as the current US commander on the ground continues to reaffirm his commitment to the same futile and shopworn strategy of his predecessors.[1140] His successor likewise shows little inclination that he intends to alter this approach in the future.[1141] Elsewhere various insurgencies in Myanmar are still waging war after more than half a century and Boko Haram in Nigeria continues to spread violence to neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.

The findings in this dissertation have little to offer by way of policy recommendations for ongoing conflicts. However, police, intelligence, and security agencies in western (read democratic) countries continue to assert that the more difficult and perhaps most important factor with regard to insurgent war is devising strategies for finding them *before* they become full-blown insurgencies.[1142] This dissertation has quite a lot to contribute to this topic.

In one respect, I claimed incubation is the best time for proto-insurgent to come up with plans to build organizations that will make them harder to defeat. Yet, there is always the risk the state might find and attack them before they are ready to launch because tasks like recruitment increase the odds of getting caught. Longer incubation might lead to more strength but also greater chance of getting found out and derailed by the state before they are sufficiently prepared.

[1139] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/world/africa/american-soldier-killed-somalia-.html
[1140] https://www.npr.org/2018/01/29/581674735/following-attacks-in-afghanistan-trump-rejects-idea-of-negotiating-with-the-tali
[1141] https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-u-s-commander-in-afghanistan-emerges-from-elite-units-1526981458
[1142] For example, see the *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (2009, 2) US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State

I have provided a detailed discussion of how proto-insurgents spend their time incubation. While much of the time incubation is undertaken in secrecy, paying careful attention not to arouse suspicion, proto-insurgents cannot completely divorce themselves from their surroundings. They often probe the civilian population for recruits, funding, and material resources. They spend time building base camps and sanctuaries. Recruits undergo training wherein they fire weapons and engage in combat-related exercises. Because insurgents tend to be less durable when they spend less time performing these tasks, one policy recommendation for states would be to increase their surveillance capacities so that proto-insurgents are forced to incubate for shorter periods of time. Many of the more overt incubation activities, like recruiting and combat training provide opportunities for state security, police, and intelligence agencies to find proto-insurgents *before* they become a credible threat, especially when they linger in incubation for longer periods of time. These means states should concentrate on recognizing the warning signs and signals that proto-insurgents tend to give off during incubation.

7.4 Conclusion

Before now, a few scholars like Janet I. Lewis and Paul Staniland have turned our attention backwards to insurgents before conflict and highlighted the important role their antecedent behaviors played later on during conflict. This dissertation attempted to board this (slowly) growing scholarly bandwagon by introducing theory and evidence that proto-insurgent capacity to endure conflict long-term was a direct cause of both length and quality of prewar preparation.

Unlike the myriad counterinsurgency manuals and guides that military, police, and intelligence agencies have produced; there is no universal how-to handbook for the

proto-insurgent. Sure, many communism-inspired insurgents have undergone preparation in similar ways but the results are mixed. While it is true ideology, or appeals to ethnicity, gender, and political and economic grievances can help, they are only valuable if they are framed and marketed in ways that help the proto-insurgent build organizations. I argued the axis of variation along ideology, or any other system of ideas or ideals, is theoretically irrelevant because what really matters is whether or not the proto-insurgent leverages them in order to devise ways to solve more practical organizational puzzles.

While the incubation processes outlined here does not likely establish an exhaustive list, I claimed they are among the most important culprits for protracting conflict. So in a way, this dissertation does represent a first attempt to build a how-to handbook for the proto-insurgent. This is an important step because we cannot expect to curtail the ever-growing prevalence of protracted insurgencies in our world until we begin to understand the common behaviors amongst those that did.

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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 4

A.1 Robustness Tests (Table A.1)

Incubation was found to be statistically significance (at p<.05 level) and in the expected direction given the outcome. Lengthier incubation periods decrease the likelihood of exiting to a loss and increase the likelihood of exiting to a win, and have no statistically significant effect on exiting to a draw.

Table A.1: *Outcome*

	win	**draw**	**loss**
incubation	.0168621* (.0060688)	-.0005602 (.0006699)	-.0001125* (.000451)
terrain	.0053985* (.0022848)	-.00011633* (.0004556)	-.0004628 (.0002517)
statecap	-17.39248* (7.121361)	.05723047 (.6538487)	.5703942 (.9836934)
percapita	-.0031398* (.001358)	-.0003603* (.0001389)	.0000516 (.000351)
ethfrac	-36.39164* (14.26141)	-1.373578 (1.294356)	-3.43806 (1.922736)
loot	-40.57237** (4.56636)	3.348148 (1.938955)	.2675471 (1.42335)
drugs	8.588933** (2.789184)	-.2038587 (.8129297)	1.250348 (1.248965)
gems	56.37103** (10.27058)	-.3790257* (1.946088)	1.175265 (1.661891)
patron	-26.59006** (6.91234)	-.121379 (1.213614)	.0996776 (2.869413)
support	-17.45031** (5.929614)	.3838951 (1.027534)	-.7141463 (1.85654)
sanctuary	.0000807 (.2320254)	-2.005421* (.9932667)	-.2824931 (1.682768)
regimetype	.2036495 (.1711415)	-.0355821 (.0471883)	.1391469 (.1122198)
incubation • terrain	-3.17e-06** (1.08e-06)	1.65e-07 (1.88e-07)	1.67e-07 (8.57e-08)
cons	34.90817** (11.33608)	1.378799 (2.026251)	.8632084 (1.712539)
observations	144	374	207
Pseudo r^2	.6791	.3670	.1787

*p<0.05 **p<0.01

A.2 Predicted Probabilities

A.2.1 Terrain

When the ruggedness of terrain is low (at the 10th percentile, 1230), with all other covariates at their means, incubation has a significant and sharply negative effect on the probability of a conflict ending in a given year when compared to the mean level of terrain ruggedness. In addition, the likelihood of a conflict being resolved is much higher when terrain ruggedness is at the 10th percentile. With accommodating terrain, the likelihood of an insurgency with 0 days of incubation ending in any given year is as high as 40%, almost four times more likely than on average terrain.

Figure A.1: *Terrain at the 10th percentile*



A.2.2 Terrain at the 75th percentile (terrain=5699)

At high levels of terrain ruggedness (i.e., 75th and 90th percentiles), incubation is an insignificant predictor of an insurgency ending. The predicted outcomes across different levels of terrain ruggedness indicate that incubation has a significant effect when terrain

is less rugged. Thus, in the interaction between terrain and incubation, it is terrain that conditions the relationship between incubation and exit.

Figure A.2: *Terrain at the 75th percentile (terrain=5699)*



Figure A.3: *Terrain at the 90th percentile (terrain=7002)*



A.3 State Capacity

When the incumbent helms a state with at least a nominal level of capacity, the relationship between incubation and exit is significant and much more strongly negative than when state capacity does not meet a minimal threshold, though it should be noted incubation is significant in both scenarios. The probability of a conflict ending in a given year is also much higher when state capacity is at least moderately robust. Higher-capacity states have a better chance of ending insurgencies and the length of incubation is more important to insurgent survival than when conflict take place in low-capacity states.

Figure A.4: *Robust State Capacity*



Figure A.5: *Weak State Capacity*



A.3.1 Robust state capacity; terrain at 25th percentile (2436)

For higher-capacity states with easily traversed terrain, incubation is even more important than when terrain is of average ruggedness. When state capacity is at least moderately strong and terrain is very rugged, incubation is almost entirely insignificant, only affecting the probability of conflict resolution at a very high level of incubation, which may be a statistical artifact, since it is necessarily based on outlier cases.

Figure A.6: *Robust state capacity; terrain at 25th percentile (2436)*



Figure A.7: *Robust state capacity; terrain at 75th percentile (5699)*



A.3.2 Weak state capacity, terrain at 25th percentile (2436) terrain at 75th percentile (5699)

When state capacity is low, a similar dynamic plays out vis-à-vis terrain in which accommodating terrain sees incubation with a significant role in determining outcomes; while in scenarios involving highly rugged terrain, incubation is insignificant. When terrain is held at the mean, insurgencies are much more likely to be ended in cases where state capacity is robust than in cases where it is weak, whether terrain is high or low in ruggedness.

Figures A.8, A.9





A.4 GDP

Whether at the 25th percentile (267.711) or at the 75th percentile (1751.85) of GDP per capita, the expected probability of a conflict ending in a given year is significantly and negatively affected by incubation in an almost identical fashion, in keeping with the statistical finding that GDP is insignificant when controlling for proto-insurgent incubation. Incubation matters a great deal, and to approximately the same extent and with the same predicted outcomes, no matter if the state is wealthy or impoverished.

Figures A.10, A.11





APPENDIX B

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