THE KOREAN WAVE AS A LOCALIZING PROCESS:
NATION AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN CULTURAL PRODUCTION

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation research examines the Korean Wave phenomenon as a social practice of globalization, in which state actors have promoted the transnational expansion of Korean popular culture through creating trans-local hybridization in popular content and intra-regional connections in the production system. This research focused on how three agencies – the government, public broadcasting, and the culture industry – have negotiated their relationships in the process of globalization, and how the power dynamics of these three production sectors have been influenced by Korean society's politics, economy, geography, and culture.

The importance of the national media system was identified in the (re)production of the Korean Wave phenomenon by examining how public broadcasting-centered media ecology has control over the development of the popular music culture within Korean society. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS)'s weekly show, *Music Bank*, was the subject of analysis regarding changes in the culture of media production in the phase of globalization. In-depth interviews with media professionals and consumers who became involved in the show production were conducted in order to grasp the patterns that Korean television has generated in the global expansion of local cultural practices.

In conclusion, the Korean Wave has rekindled national forces in spreading local popular content globally in three ways: 1) by deconstructing a binary approach of West vs. non-West, and Global vs. Local in order to understand media cultures and practices; 2) by understanding the rise of East Asian media connections as part of a global culture; and 3) by decolonizing non-US/UK state actors to perceive their actions, which hinges on the ongoing centrality of nation-states in the global media sphere.

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the best use of language in English.

Finally, I would like to mention my family in South Korea. My father, Sangmin Kim, who devoted his life to teaching, awakened in me the value of being a great teacher. My mother, Jonghee Kang, is the reason I have grown up as a diligent person. My sister, Juyeon Kim, my brother, Heechan Kim, and my sister-in-law, Eunha Lim, have shared the family responsibilities; this has allowed me to focus on my academic career. My beloved niece, Soyoung Kim, who has sent me smiles and greetings every Friday night, is the impetus for completing this dissertation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

For nearly the past three decades, globalization has been a main source of contestation in media and communication studies, raising multilayered questions about cultural dynamics beyond borders. While these discussions have gone in many directions, most have intersected with analyses of the power of American culture. One of the main arguments sees the cultural impact of globalization as the domination of American media culture over other societies (Berger P. L., 2002; Pieterse, 2015). Another strand of literature underlines the dialectic relation between global (US) and local (non-US) cultures, focusing on how local cultures have responded to the American media industry (Robertson, 1995; Pieterse, 2015). This US-centered critique of globalization in the cultural sphere underestimates the importance of local-to-local and intra-regional connections that have created various cultural phenomena. To enrich scholarly discussions on all of these complicated cultural transactions, media scholars must pay more attention to the context of a particular site, which generates multidimensional cultural dynamics within and beyond borders, in the configuration of globalization. By doing so, researchers can relinquish the long-standing binary of global and local in globalization scholarship and can better embrace a wide array of cultural transactions.

From this standpoint, the Korean Wave phenomenon is an increasingly significant object of analysis. By the early 1990s, the term "the Korean Wave" was employed to name the increasing popularity of Korean television dramas in China, Taiwan, and South Asian countries. Since then, Korean popular culture—television dramas, reality shows,

popular music, online gaming, and animations—have circulated in various societies of the world. With the exportation of cultural content, Korea has constructed its image as one of the central sites in Asian cultural production.

As the transnational expansion of Korean pop culture has moved beyond the Asian region since the late-2000s, US/UK academics have given particular attention to this phenomenon. Numerous studies were recently conducted to explore the global expansion of Korean popular culture in historical, political, economic, industrial, and socio-cultural contexts (Hong Y. E., 2014; Kim Y. , 2013; Kuwahara, 2014; Lee & Nornes, 2015; Marinescu, 2014; Lie, 2015). Despite the explosion of academic attention to the phenomenon, there remains a cultural and geographical gap between these academic climates and their understanding of the Korean Wave. In my perspective, a lack of interaction with East Asian peers discourages US-based researchers of global communication studies from observing the trans-local dimensions of this phenomenon, as well as the transnational impact of cross-industrial integration that has occurred in the particular region (Iwabuchi, 2013). With the ongoing expansion of the Korean Wave throughout Asia, moving beyond the discussion of global-local cultural dynamics is an important task for developing the nature and framework of research concerning this phenomenon.

A point of critique in the Korean Wave scholarship within Asian academics is the paucity of empirical research on the site of production (Otmazgin & Ari, 2012). Many Asian scholars in media studies have examined how audiences living outside of the Korean peninsula have formed an emotional attachment to Korean popular culture (Hong S.-K. , 2013; Jin & Yoon, 2014; Ju & Lee, 2015). This emphasis seeks to demonstrate

the importance of studying the Korean Wave by focusing on the fever for and spread of Korean popular culture. In this regard, both domestic and international media have engaged in the aggravation of this research trend by illuminating international fan activities, such as flash mobs for bringing Korean pop concerts to their cities or YouTube reaction videos of the latest Korean pop songs. In addition, scholarly emphases on social media in the expansion of the Korean Wave beyond Asian societies substantiates the contention that media technology has revolutionized the circulation and consumption of local culture and has enabled people to construct cultural identities detached from their physical location. Although these studies have provided insightful analyses of supra-spatial flows of Korean popular culture, I would point out that these approaches do not fully grasp what actually happens in the stages of production. If we consider Havens' (2006) assertion that the audience does not have "direct" decision-making power in international trade (p. 3), we need to examine how the nation-centered structure and agency of media production are involved in the reproduction of the Korean Wave phenomenon.

I position myself within the field of global media studies, where the spread of local culture is not only based upon outsiders "poaching" for a different taste of culture in the mediated world (Jenkins, 2006), but is also a response by insiders to cross-border media connectivity through "deterritorialization" of their own cultures and traditions (Appadurai, 1996). This view formed during 2001-2004, when I was a television writer at the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) in South Korea. It was when the popularity of the network's drama, *Winter Sonata,* swept over Japanese society. The project that I worked on at that time, a special series of documentaries called *China*, strengthened my

perspective for two reasons. First, this series was an initial effort on the part of the company to produce television programs that targeted audiences beyond the Asian region. Second, KBS adopted the notion of *Asian Values* in reconstructing the history of civilizational exchanges. These experiences enabled me to recognize transformations in Korean media production, as influenced by globalization. In addition, by observing the way in which KBS restructured its production process, I recognized the significance of contextualizing the impact of the global media system over public television within the local society.

In this dissertation, I define the Korean Wave as a state-driven, public broadcasting-mediated and culture industry-executed phenomenon and attempt to explain how this cultural phenomenon has been reproduced through the overarching collaboration of these three entities—state, public broadcasting, and culture industry—at certain levels. To do so, I explore the link between these three sectors by focusing on the trajectory of globalization discourse in Korea, which began as the modernization of popular culture under the direct influence of American and Japanese media in the post-Korean War period, and moved into the transnational flow of Korean cultural content in the global capitalist system and post-digitized era. Building upon Appadurai's (1996) model of *disjunctive flows,* in which "the relationships among flows of persons, technologies, finance, information, and ideology" (p. 47) shape the dynamics of the global cultural system, this dissertation unveils how the locality of culture shapes the relationship of these five flows, which generate particular events and cultural forms in local society. Geertz's notion of the local "as a dynamic site of experience, struggle, and meaning" (as cited in Kraidy & Murphy, 2008, p. 337) helps me to move beyond the long-standing

binary of local-global interactions in global media studies. Certainly, the local needs to be understood as "the space where global forces become recognizable in form and practice as they are enmeshed in local human subjectivity and social agency" (Kraidy & Murphy, 2008, p. 339). From this perspective, global media flows in a particular site can be empirically studied by examining social agents who generate situated and contextual connections beyond borders (Kraidy & Murphy, 2008). With Kraidy and Murphy's (2008) interpretation of Geertz's notion of the local, this dissertation posits the local as a power rather than as a subordinate in the global media industry. In this view, I focus on how the locality of production culture, which is constructed by the relationship between the state, public broadcasting and the culture industry, generates the disjunctive contours of media flows and connections in a global context.

The Korean Wave case, however, complicates understandings of the local due to its intersectionality with the national. If scholars of the Korean Wave adopt Appadurai's (1996) articulation of locality that shapes a boundary of social and cultural experiences, they should consider the terminological and ontological blurring between the local and the national in Korean society. Borrowing from Darling-Wolf's (2015) illustration that "the global/national/local are mutually constituted in contemporary media" (p. 17), this research attempts to see the Korean media system as a local site in responding to and generating global practices and cultures. Hence, through an analysis of the above-mentioned three parties' collaborative connections, I claim that the nation, as an imagined interest group (Anderson, 1983/2006), still holds the key to maintaining locality in cultural production and to directing the cultural dynamics of globalization (Waisbord & Morris, 2001; Curran & Park, De-westernizing media studies, 2000). In this approach,

this Korean Wave case study shows how the nation engages in determining the level and range of hybridization in the cultural sphere in a political economic perspective, and public media are politicized to draw consent from the national public about the materialization of national/local culture.

Examining intellectual works from Korean, East Asian, and US/UK academics, this dissertation attempts to develop cross-border and cross-cultural intersections of Korean Wave scholarship. Taking Chen's (2010) critique seriously that "knowledge production is one of the major sites in which imperialism operates and exercises its power" (p. 211), this study attempts to transcend the US/UK-centric structures of knowledge production and provides a different approach to understand local, regional, and global conflicts. By doing so, this work contributes to advancing the alternative production of knowledge in global communication studies (Iwabuchi, 2013, p. 44). Furthermore, positioning "the idea of Asia as an imaginary anchoring point" (Chen, 2010, p. 212) allows me to propose the historical and social transactions of East Asia as an important case of globalization and to produce this work as part of decolonization movements in global media scholarship. In this point, I assert that the Korean Wave phenomenon is not a local happening, but rather a localizing process, which: 1) springs from the overarching political, economic, media, and cultural needs of nation-states; 2) deconstructs the myth of the US market and rearticulates the importance of intra-regional cultural connectivity in the globalization of the Korean Wave; and 3) proposes a different type of knowledge production concerning the cultural dynamics of globalization.

Why the Korean Wave Now?

It is almost two decades since Korean television content—TV dramas, music

auditions, and reality shows—has gained popularity throughout East Asian societies. Numerous Korean scholars have argued that the transnational consumption of Korean television programs began with a new governmental agenda (Jin, 2011; Ryoo, 2008; Shim D. , 2008).   One of the representative historical events was when the former President Young-Sam Kim first announced at the second APEC Conference in 1994 that he would promote policies for enhancing national competitiveness in the global market (Song Y. , 1994). Sooner or later, the term "cultural industries" was employed in the mass media, and the Ministry of Culture and Sports introduced the Cultural Industry Bureau for the integration of policy-making functions in support of audio and video industries (Shim S. , 2005, p. 210). As such, Kim's declaration inspired Korean-broadcasting companies to put forth a multilateral effort to increase the exportation of media content to neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, Asian media scholars pointed out that the emergence of the Korean Wave has relevance to the economic crisis that East and South Asian societies faced in 1996 and 1997 (Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008).[1] Due to this financial crisis, television networks in Asian countries became more interested in Korean media products. For them, Korean media products of good quality at a low price were some of the best alternatives to American and Japanese ones. From a political standpoint, Jin (2011) explained why Chinese and Taiwanese media audiences chose Korean media products over American and Japanese ones during that period. Prominently, they experienced less resistance in consuming Korean programming, based on similar cultural backgrounds (Jin, 2011, p.

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[1] Due to the significant decrease of exportation from 24.7% in 1995 to 0.6% in 1996, Thailand was forced to have a rescue package of $ 17.2 billion from the IMF in August 1997. Thailand's financial crisis negatively impacted Indonesia's and Korea's economies. Other East and South Asian societies also struggled with financial crisis in that year (Jin, 2011, p. 32-33).

111): some Asian audiences rarely found any relevance between their reality and the American media culture. At the same time, they had "negative experiences of Japanese colonialism, and they were highly sensitive to the penetration of a Japanese cultural invasion" (Jin, 2011, p. 112). Since then, many East Asian satellite channels broadcast Korean dramas daily, and regional viewers have become familiar with the narrative structure and characters of Korean television programs (Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008, p. 2). With this mundane consumption of Korean television dramas, Asian audiences could construct Korea's image as an emerging center for media production in the region, and this national image has helped continue the regional flow of Korean popular content (Huang, 2011; Kim Y. , 2008).

By the late 2000s, the Korean pop music industry opened a new phase of the Korean Wave, creating a different direction for the spread of Korean popular content. Some of the biggest Korean pop groups—2NE1, Big Bang, Super Junior, and TVXQ— have increasingly held solo concerts in Latin America, North America, and Europe and have even put their Korean music albums on the international music charts, including Billboard and iTunes.[2] Understanding the Korean pop boom as a continuum of the Korean Wave, I claim that the transnational popularity of Korean pop groups across and beyond Asia is based on the three characteristics of Korean pop music: hybridity, spreadability, and omnipresence.

First, in terms of hybridity, many scholars have pointed out that the global spread of Korean pop music has been achieved through a mixture of foreign and national popular culture (Hong S.-K. , 2013; Jin & Ryoo, 2012; Lee J. S., 2006; Ryoo, 2009; Shim

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[2] *Billboard.com* has published the Korean pop chart since September 2011, and the chart of the Top 100 albums on iTunes has often included Korean music albums.

D. , 2006). John Seabrook (2012) of the *New Yorker* asserted that much of Korean pop

culture is mixed with Asian-flavored, synchronized dance performances, and non-Asian

sound elements, including "hip-hop verses, Euro-pop choruses, rapping, and dubstep

breaks" (p. 88). Jin and Ryoo (2012) claimed that the rapid increase of English verses in

lyrics of Korean pop music creates a new hyrbid pop culture beyond either the dominance

of American culture or the oppression of local culture (p. 114). The Korean music critic,

Kang (2011) focused more on the creative employment of lyrics, which leads to the

global spread of Korean pop music. In his perspective, Korean lyricists choose rhyming

schemes and onomatopoeia to make similar sounds with percussion instruments. By

using lyrics as one element of music sounds rather than a tool for delivering messages,

non-Asian listeners can consume Korean pop music with less difficulty (Kang M. , 2011).

As such, hybridity, referring to the blend of foreign beats and rhythms with Korean

musical sentiment, the mixture of English and Korean verses in lyrics of Korean pop, and

the re-interpretation of Korean linguistic sounds in a global context has induced both

Asian and non-Asian consumers to enjoy Korean music with less "cultural discount"

(Hoskins & Mirus, 1988, p. 500).

Second, the spreadability of Korean pop music videos has facilitated its rapid

expansion throughout the world. The Korean pop music industry strategically employs

music videos in order to spread Korean pop to various communities simultaneously.

Some examples—PSY's "Gangnam Style" and Girls' Generation's "I Got a Boy"—

demonstrate the contribution of music videos to the worldwide circulation of Korean

pop.[3] Attentive to the notion of spreadability, referring to "the potential—both

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[3] PSY created a huge sensation in 2012, and Girls' Generation received the top award for Video of the Year

technological and cultural—for audiences to share content for their own purposes"
(Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013, p. 3), Jin and Yoon's (2014) empirical study shows how
the rapid spread of music videos has changed the nature of cultural consumption.
Western fans of Korean pop have considered the consumption of popular culture not as
"the possession of materials," but as "participatory processes," which include "searching,
accessing, enjoying, and reworking" (p. 8). This transformation of media consumption is
deeply relevant to the spreadability of new media technology (Jin & Yoon, 2014). .
According to Cedarbough Saeji of the Center for Korean Studies at UCLA, the quality of
Korean pop videos is as good as that of American pop videos; moreover, the cleaner and
less sexualized visual images and the witty and friendly attitudes of Korean artists in
music videos attract international audiences (as cited in Yi, 2011, para 23-24). More
prominently, the arrival of social networking services invigorates the circulation of
Korean pop music videos and strengthens the visibility of Korean popular content. In
this standpoint, Korean pop music videos are the key content in appealing to international
fans (Cho & Russell, 2012), and YouTube gives international fans access to Korean pop
music and mediate it to other people (Jung & Li, 2014).

Third, the omnipresence of Korean pop idols is another driving force of the
Korean pop boom. Korean pop stars are proactive in interacting with international fans,
regardless of geographical distance and time gaps. Korean pop artists routinely use social
networking services, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to promote their albums
internationally (Yoon L. , 2010). It seems certain that social media has helped Korean
pop artists build solid and emotional connections with their fans outside of Korean

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at the 2013 YouTube Music Awards.

society. In an interview with the *NY Daily News*, Virgine Cote, who had come from Quebec, Canada for the SM Town Live in New York City, stated that Korean pop stars care about their fans more than Canadian celebrities do. Tiffany Hwang of Girls' Generations admitted that her fans are the most precious people in her life (Yi, 2011). In addition, as Korean pop music agencies, with the financial support from government-affiliated institutes, have held various concerts in the Middle East, Latin America, Europe, and the United States, top artists have had more opportunities to establish intimacy with hard-to-access fans. At an interview with the *New Yorker*, Jon Toth, a US fan of Korean girl group, Girls' Generation, described his experience at a Korean pop live concert by saying that "they take the love the fans feel for them, and they return it to the fans," and "when you see them onstage, it's like they've come to see you" (Seabrook, 2012, p. 89).

Not surprisingly, the Korean pop boom has made various changes in Korean television production. In terms of the influence of the Korean pop boom in the production and circulation of television, it is important to understand the distinctive relation between the television and music industries in Korean society. The weekly music program is one example to show the long-standing interaction between the two industries. Three major terrestrial broadcasters—KBS, MBC, and SBS—have long produced weekly live shows in which artists can promote their new albums and songs in the market. Hence, Korean music companies have fiercely competed against one another in order to make appearances on these programs. Recently, that competition has been intensified as these programs control the specific songs that will be sold to international audiences, and how they will be presented in an era of multi-media convergence (Willoughby, 2006).

In this structure, KBS, the public-run broadcasting network, has maintained its distinctive power over the Korean pop music industry. KBS' weekly live show, *Music Bank* is regularly broadcast in 114 countries via its satellite channel, KBS World in 2014 (Park J. , 2014; Kim H.-S. , 2012). Furthermore, KBS uploads video clips of the show to YouTube for audiences who miss the live broadcast. Observing the influence of television that media convergence and digitalization have brought over the cultural market, I claim that *Music Bank* plays a prominent role in boosting the Korean pop music industry in two ways. First, the programs' weekly charts motivate viewers to purchase albums at appointed record shops or to visit music download websites in Korea. Each live program determines and announces the weekly rankings of hit songs, according to its own method of selection. Thus, Korean pop fans purchase or download Korean pop albums in large quantities to make their stars the program winners. Second, the live music show encourages international fans to visit South Korea in order to meet Korean idols at live studios in Seoul. Even though the program is broadcast live, directors often pre-record the performance of popular idol groups in the morning of the broadcast. In order to tape the sound effects, music companies, in association with the television industry, recruit fans to act as audience members. Therefore, many East Asian fans make trips to Korea to participate in filming Korean pop artists' performances. Through these various activities, international fans maintain their loyalties to Korean pop.

With the growth of *Music Bank*'s brand power, both Korean television directors and singers recognize that weekly music programs contribute to reproducing the Korean pop boom, both domestically and internationally. The Korean pop industry, experiencing a direct connection between appearances on TV shows and sales of music albums, has

attempted to strengthen its partnership with television networks. In particular, the three major music companies—S.M. Entertainment, YG Entertainment, and JYP Entertainment —that introduced the idol-making system in the late 1990s have worked closely with television producers and directors in the weekly show production (Willoughby, 2006; Kim H.-S. , 2012). Due to this tied relationship, of course, the Korean pop boom considerably affects the Korean television industry. Under the Korean pop boom, one of the fundamental changes is that major networks have created various opportunities for the exportation of music-related products and services to other countries: 1) Music programs introduced runaway productions to make profits, and 2) reality television and television dramas seek to cast Korean pop idols to attract their international fans.

Korean television and music industries have attempted to rearticulate the value of intra-East Asian connections in cultural production and circulation. Two decades ago, Korean music agencies and idol groups initially created the Korean pop boom in the East Asian region. After gaining huge success in the regional market, top Korean idol stars and music producers set their sights on the American pop music market in the mid-2000s. Thus, Rain, Se7en, and BoA, who are categorized as the second generation of the Korean dance music industry and representative pop artists of the three major music companies, moved to the United States and began promoting their music there. These regional pop stars wanted to prove their "world-class" musical ability to the Korean public by succeeding in the US market. Their decisions reflect how deeply American values and ideologies are embedded in the entire society (Kang M. , 2012, p. 315). However, time spent in the US caused these Korean pop idols to lose their position in the Asian market, and cultural differences made it difficult for them to reach nationwide recognition in the

US market. A series of situations in the overseas market encouraged the Korean music industry to deconstruct its subordination to American culture in some ways and to recognize the value of neighboring markets. In addition, PSY's "Gangnam Style," which had created a global sensation through online media, brought about fundamental changes in Korean music companies' marketing strategy. Put concretely, Korean musicians preferred to connect with international audiences via the Internet and mobile media instead of their own migration to the United States. By doing so, Korean music agencies focused more on the Chinese and Japanese markets.

This perception has also been found in Korean television production. In the last three years, collaborations among Korean, Chinese, and Japanese media groups have been noticeably invigorated. Hunan TV, one of the major entertainment broadcasters in China, purchased various Korean television program formats and has gained huge commercial success in Mainland China (Chung, 2013). MBC's music contest program, *I Am a Singer*, reached a viewer rating of 2.38% in China, which surpassed the popularity of *Voice of China* (Chung, 2013). Beon Yeom, a director of Hunan TV's content strategy team, mentioned in an interview with MBC that the success of this music contest program helped Hunan TV return as a leader in the Chinese television market (Chung, 2013). In 2012, China Central Television (CCTV) also joined collaborative production with Korean television companies by making a documentary series with KBS about the Korean pop boom in commemoration of Korea-China Friendship (Choi J.-Y. , 2012) . Japan is another important partner in the transnational flow of Korean television programs. In the early 2010s, KBS and Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) agreed to launch a coproduction committee to cooperate in the production of television programs

(Korean Broadcasting System, 2013). Fuji TV, one of Japan's nationwide channels, also actively introduced Korean media content to Japan, which has often raised heated social debates on the omnipresence of Korean popular content on Japanese television (CNN, 2011). Cable television channels such as WOWOW and TBS broadcast Korean pop music videos and live concert tours; in addition, a satellite channel, KNTV, was established to broadcast exclusively Korean television content for Japanese audiences in the 2000s.

The claim that I have made here is that, unlike the initial stage of the Korean Wave, the development of intra-regional connections in the 2010s reflects a paradigm shift in the East Asian media industry. Korean practitioners asserted East Asia's potential as a global cultural sphere and articulated the importance of collaborations with China and Japan in order to be a leader in the global market. Certainly, their claim is greatly developed from an economic standpoint, and I focus on its decolonizing dimension in constructing the East Asian discourse on globalization. Transcending scholarship that assumes American dominance in global culture industries, this dissertation thus takes an alternative position in exploring the structure of global media production. By investigating the production practices of the Korean television music program, *Music Bank*, I explore the process through which Korean broadcasting institutions have established their own domains within the global media industry through the construction of collaborative networks with the government and the music industry. Through a critical discourse analysis of the *Korean Wave* and interviews with media professionals who have been engaged in the production of KBS' weekly program, *Music Bank*, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions:

RQ1: How and why has the Korean state become a contested site of producing a global cultural phenomenon? What is the implication of the Korean Wave in local, regional, and global contexts?

RQ2: What are the relationships between the government, media, and culture industries in Korea? How are their relationships linked to the Korean Wave?

RQ3: In what ways is cultural hybridization processed in East Asia? Which position does Korea occupy in this process?

As Korean society experienced a process of compressed modernization and economic growth over a short period of time, partly due to the strong export drive initiated by its government, Korean businesses are dominated by a top-down authoritative decision-making system based on a highly hierarchical structure (Kang M. , 2012). The subordination of music companies to television institutions has long influenced the production and consumption of Korean pop music. However, in the early 2000s, major music agencies developed the quality of their content through hybridization with foreign cultures and succeeded in capitalizing on opportunities in the global market. The process that the Korean pop music industry uses to respond to the global market influences the Korean television industry. If we consider the Korean pop boom as part of the Korean Wave, an investigation of the production sectors helps us understand: 1) the complexity of the Korean Wave's emergence; 2) the interaction of transnational popular culture flows and media convergence; 3) the development between East Asian connections in the media industries; and 4) national forces in the globalization of local culture.

The Chapter Outline

The title of this dissertation, *the Korean Wave as a Localizing Process: Nation as a Global Actor in Cultural Production*, reflects the idea that Korean state actors—the government, public broadcasting, and culture industry—have developed a collaborative system to enhance the transnational consumption of popular content. Through a case study of a live music television program, *Music Bank*, this dissertation examines how: 1) the global capitalist system has forced the Korean government to commoditize its national culture; 2) the Korean broadcasting and pop music industries have executed this governmental agenda; and 3) the Korean Wave, the transnational popularity of Korean popular culture, invigorated intra-regional connections in East Asia.

This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter one outlines the cultural phenomenon that this research investigates, which is the Korean Wave, the global spread of Korean popular culture. Two primary research topics are also introduced: 1) what is a global culture? 2) What is the role of nation-states in the emergence of global culture? Chapter two includes the literature review pertaining to the first research question concerning the cultural dimension of globalization. This chapter reviews the theoretical arguments developed within the international communication field. I point out the strengths and limitations of cultural imperialism and the need to understand the de-centralized pattern of global cultural production and consumption through the overarching concepts of cultural hybridity and cultural regionalization. Chapter three comprises the literature review on the second research question regarding the ongoing importance of the national media system in the global media industry. This chapter provides a lens through which readers can comprehend the transformation of public

broadcasting. After discussing the philosophical foundation of public broadcasting in general, this chapter clarifies the reformulated notion of public broadcasting in an age of globalization, which leads to the amalgamation of national and public interests. Chapter four explores the methodology used in this dissertation. Chapter five contains my arguments about how globalizing forces have caused the Korean government to strategize the Korean Wave phenomenon as a national project. This chapter provides an empirical study of how governmental strategies have increased exports of Korean popular content in the global market. Chapter six builds a historical trajectory that explains how the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) has taken a role in mediating the governmental agenda for the national audience. Chapter seven conveys how the Korean television and popular music industries have constructed a unique partnership throughout several decades. Chapter eight examines how the live music show, *Music Bank,* has been employed as a site for negotiating power structures between the television and music industries at the national level, and for creating a hybrid culture that appeals to international audiences. The last chapter discusses my conclusions drawn from my findings in the previous chapters.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

This chapter outlines a range of issues concerning the cultural dynamics of globalization. Building upon the work of Arjun Appadurai (1996), this dissertation makes the claim that the production and dissemination of local culture are a reflection of the globalization discourse, which is intertwined with forms of politics, economy, geography, culture, and technology in a particular site. Given that global systems bring both a desire for and resistance to global flows in local societies, it is significant to examine the disjunctive and situated relationship among "ethnoscapes, technoscapes, and financescapes," referring to the ongoing impact of locality on the globalization process (Appadurai, 1996, p. 35).

Accordingly, many researchers have proposed various patterns of de-Westernization of globalized media culture (Curran & Park, 2000). Innovative scholars of East Asian media studies have debated the reactions of local culture to globalization in various aspects. The main research topics include: the growth of the Chinese media industry (Curtin, 2007; Curtin & Shah, 2010; Lee C.-C. , 2010), the global circulation of Japanese popular culture (Iwabuchi, 2002; Otmazgin, 2013); the emergence of the Korean Wave phenomenon (Isar, 2013; Ryoo, 2009; Shim D. , 2006); and media flows among East Asian nations (Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008; Huat, 2010; Chan, 2010; Otmazgin & Ben-Ari, 2013). They have viewed the enhancement of media production capacity within the region either as a symptom of "the relative decline of the supremacy of American media culture" (Iwabuchi, 2010, p. 199), or as "the growth of a shared regional

popular culture with a distinctive constellation of stars, genres, and stylistic conventions"
(Huat, 2010, p. 221).

In response to growing discussions over intra-regional connections, Iwabuchi
(2010) raised an important question about what has discouraged audiences from critically
recognizing "the promotion of the uneven globalization process" within the region (p.
197). He argued that local scholars should pay attention to the ways in which global
forces promote the inequality between inter-Asian media networks and threaten cultural
democratization in the region. In this light, Huat (2010) argued that intra-regional
cultural connections are "the long process of a pan-East Asian collective identity
formation, building on the different levels of community among consumers" (p. 236).
Following Iwabuchi's (2010) and Huat's (2010) view, I explore what invigorates the
interdependence of the East Asian media industries. The relationship between the
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese television networks has considerably influenced regional
audiences to deconstruct the Western-centered perception of global culture. At the same
time, their partnership has possibly marginalized other Asian societies from the
mainstream in the regional cultural production and distribution.

If one adopts Garnham's (1990) definition of culture industries as "institutions
which employ the characteristic modes of production and organization of industrial
corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and
services" (pp. 155-156), empirical study is useful in understanding the shift of
institutional and cultural power in society. In South Korea, television has been the main
medium responsible for creating and sustaining the dominance of American popular
culture for a long time. However, since the late 1990s, the Korean Wave has increased

its transnational flows of cultural content and has enhanced regional connections for cultural production and consumption. This study, taking a theoretical approach of cultural hybridity and cultural regionalization, explores the appropriations of foreign culture and symptoms of a hegemonic shift in the structure of cultural production. The analysis will focus on ways in which media flows have shaped and strengthened industrial and cultural connections between East Asian countries, and what determines this shape of transnational media culture and practice.

<div align="center">Cultural Globalization: Conflict, Imperialism, and Hybridity</div>

Social theorists have argued that globalization has substantially transformed societies worldwide. Although the concept of globalization initially appeared in the early 20th century, when Marx (1867/1990) recognized the integration of nations in the process of modernization, the term itself has most frequently been employed since the 1960s and 1970s (Held & McGrew, 2003; Kellner, 2002; Waters, 1995). With an increase of political and economic interdependence between societies during this time period, US business schools began studying how transnational conglomerates could raise their competitiveness, enlarge their trade, and wield power in the global market (Jones, 2010; Kellner, 2002; Pieterse, 2015). The conception of globalization has been mainly developed within the frame of Westernization (Hobson, 2012). Viewed through this lens, advocates hail globalization as the diffusion of Western civilization over non-Western societies, including capitalism, democracy, and technology (Friedman, 1994; Fukuyama, 1992; Hardt & Negri, 2000), while critics express concerns about the dominance of Western political and economic power in other areas (Frank, 1998; Galtung, 1971; Wallerstein, 1974). Understanding the responses of non-Western societies, "either as a

past victim of Western neo-imperial globalization or as a passive beneficiary of Western largesse" (Hobson, 2012, p. 26), however, does not seem to embrace the multidirectional process of the phenomenon.

Although many scholars have focused on the economic and political dimensions of globalization, the phenomenon definitely encompasses cultural areas (Tomlinson, 1999; Pieterse, 2015). Pieterse (2015) focused on the fact that globalization involves an encounter of different cultures through personal exchanges and cultural flows. In this point, the collective consciousness regarding growing global interconnectedness raises a question about how to understand the notion of cultural difference. In this regard, Pieterse (2015) discussed that one culture interacts with others in three ways: cultural conflict, cultural standardization, and cultural hybridization.

Much work has employed the intensification of global interconnectedness as an underlying assumption that the reduction of cultural differences between societies has generated various conflicts for retaining a local society's cultural indigenousness (Berger P. L., 2002; Pieterse, 2015). Galtung (1971) early on argued that culture clashes arise because each civilization establishes its own way of viewing the world. However, the discourse of civilization differences has attenuated in contemporary society because this perspective is not applicable in discussing the increase of transnational and multinational practices in the global cultural sphere (Pieterse, 2015).

Cultural standardization is a main topic in the political economy tradition. Scholars who have focused on power relations that construct symmetrical cultural flows and production structures between core and periphery nations (Fejes, 1981; Mattelart, 1979; Schiller, 1976; Tomlinson, 2002; Tunstall, 1977) have criticized cultural

homogenization and standardization under the domination of Western culture. Two main

theories have evolved to explain these patterns. On one hand, Straubhaar (1991) pointed

out that cultural dependence occurs as a result of unequal relations between societies in

the political realm, and the economy creates cultural inequalities between them. He

argued that theorists of cultural dependence tend to see political and economic structures

as a determining factor for the globalization of culture. In other words, changes in

political and economic dimensions influence the ways in which people conduct their lives

and communicate with others. On the other hand, Schiller (1976) proposed the concept

of cultural imperialism to see how power inequality and cultural flows bring about

cultural standardization in the international community. He presumed that the global

consumption of American cultural products brings about the diffusion of Western values

and ideologies. For instance, global brands, such as Starbucks, McDonald's, and Coca-

Cola, cause international homogenization within the cultural sphere. In this view,

Tomlinson (1999) pointed out that the consumer culture of American capitalism changes

an individual's way of life "from styles of dress and eating habits to architectural and

musical form" (p. 89).

　　　　Understanding global flows of popular culture as one-way processes from core to

periphery countries (Herman & McChesney, 1997; Schiller, 1976), however, has met

with objections by some scholars. Berger (2002) argued that cultural imperialism

exaggerates the influence of Western cultures upon local cultures. In his view, local

people who consume American popular culture are still "embedded in their traditional

culture" (p. 7). Although the local audience may have changed their thoughts and

behaviors while enjoying American cultural products, it is difficult to clarify what

actually brought about these changes in their minds (Berger P. L., 2002).

Another point of critique is the underestimation of the reaction of local culture to the inflow of global culture (Appadurai, 1996; Darling-Wolf, 2015; Hong S.-K. , 2013; Iwabuchi, 2002). These scholars have argued that the global network system enables diverse actors to show their capacity in cultural production, and as a result, the hegemonic dominance of core societies over other periphery societies has lessened (Omae, 1992; Robertson, 1992; Sinclair, 1997). Later on, a group of cultural theorists attempted to discuss the complicated and multi-directional processes of globalization by focusing on the reactions of local cultures. Sociologists who tend to view globalization as a macrosociological phenomenon created "a mythology about globalization" (Ferguson, 1992, as cited in Robertson, 1995, p. 25). In his perspective, Giddens' (1990) "action-reaction relationship" between global and local cultures oversimplifies the complicated and multidimensional dynamics of the local culture in the process of globalization (as cited in Robertson, 1995, p. 27). Instead, Robertson (1995) defined globalization as "the linking of localities" (p. 35) and claimed that locality involves the imagination of specificity, and in this sense, a nation needs to be understood as "a major agency for the production of diversity" in the global society (p. 41). Appadurai (1996) also demonstrated the cultural role of nation-states in the intensification of globalization. The nation-state promotes cultural difference to the public by creating various kinds of international events and grants people "the fantasy of self-display on some sort of global or cosmopolitan stage" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 39). In his view, nations try to construct and share their own cultural meanings in the adaptation of foreign cultures. For Sinclair (1997), the government affirms group identity and protects people from the inexorable

attraction of foreign cultural products because cultural distinctions among societies need to be retained to enhance international cultural practices and trade (p. 33). Thus, a main concern of national governments is whether they can control the importation of foreign cultural goods and services. At the same time, these governments, seeing the symbolic power of American popular culture over the world, focus on strategizing popular culture as "expressive of the nation" (Sinclair, 1997, p. 40).

However, the intensification of globalization blurs boundaries of national, local, and global cultures, and the amalgamation among them needs further exploration regarding the transnational cultural flows and identity construction (Darling-Wolf, 2015, p. 4). Some cultural scholars have proposed the need to examine the cultural dynamics in global society beyond the binary thinking between cultural homogenization and cultural globalization (Appadurai, 1996; Darling-Wolf, 2015; Kraidy M. M., 2005). In this approach, the concept of cultural hybridity has been employed to see cultural globalization as a mixing process of global and local cultures (Bhabha, 1994/2004; García Canclini, 1995; Kraidy M. M., 2005; Pieterse, 2015). Kraidy (2005) noted hybridity as "the fusion of two hitherto relatively distinct forms, styles, or identities across national and cultural boundaries" (p. 5). Appadurai (1996) argued that cultural hybridity is the theoretical backbone to explore how cultural products are detached from national culture; these products are combined with the standardized elements of global culture (Adorno, 2002); moreover, this mixture of national and global cultures has brought about the decline of Western cultural domination (Bhabha, 1994/2004).

In the strand of cultural hybridity scholarship, the relationship between hegemony and hybridity is an important subject. Kraidy (2002) claimed that the power relation

between the two cultures considerably shapes transnational cultural dynamics in a global context. For him, hybridity, as practices of hegemony, displays how the local appropriation of global cultural products and styles can be understood as a reflection of the power dynamics (Kraidy M. M., 2002). Kraidy (2005) added that the myths of cultural homogenization and American dominance in global culture could be critically examined with increased cultural hybridization in popular culture. In terms of the proliferation of hybrid culture, Bhanha (2004) emphasized that precolonial societies obtain their own cultural differences and uniqueness through a mixture of Western and traditional cultural elements. His argument helps us view the hybrid cultures of local communities in their own ways of resistance and creation. Furthermore, García-Canclini (1995) focused on how cultural hybridization intersects with the modernization of a local culture. He argued that Latin American societies "institutionalized cultural mixture as a sure way to effect the slow decay of precolonial cultures and integrate them in the dominant society" (as cited in Kraidy, 2005, p. 53). In his view, the state appropriates cultural hybridity by eliminating the indigenousness of a local culture, as well as by strengthening the national dimension of the culture by borrowing some ingredients from the hybrid culture.

The innovation of communication technology has recently increased the employment of the cultural hybridity thesis in studying transnational cultural production (Pieterse, 2015). Communication technologies have invited marginalized groups to participate in the production and consumption of global cultures. Local cultures learn from global standards and mix them with their own elements, thereby obtaining global awareness of new cultural styles (Condry, 2006), or suggesting alternative cultural

products in the global market (Pieterse, 2015). As García-Canclini (1995) argued,

cultural production and consumption are not possibly independent of the marketplace.

Thus, a local culture that deconstructs its traditions dissolves into hybridity, and embraces

modernity, thus enriching the landscape of the global culture industry. At the same time,

he emphasized the revitalization of the traditional culture, which can be established by

the modern and global economy. Therefore, understanding how the local society

tactically responds to new opportunities has become an important task in global

communication studies (García-Canclini, 1995).

Why Do Regional Connections Matter?

The concept of supranational regionalism was developed to understand how and

why nations have made regional connections as a part of globalization. Schulz,

Soderbaum, & Ojendal (2001) noted that supranational regionalism explicates the

development of the regional production and circulation system in two ways: regional

cooperation and regional integration (as cited in Fioramonti, 2014, p. 5). Langenhove

(2013) differentiated the goals between the two types of supranational regionalism.

Regional cooperation is meant to proliferate collaborative activities among national

organizations in the region, while regional integration aims to create a supranational

authority in a specific field (Langenhove, 2013). Either way, economic interdependence

among societies has intensified regionalization in the global capitalist system (Hettne,

2005). Fioramonti (2014) pointed out that "neoliberal globalization has been a

fundamental driving force behind the explosion of regionalism as a global phenomenon"

(p. 11). In other words, the economic interdependence of regional societies is the main

cause of the growth of regionalism and regional cooperation. His argument was

developed based on Nye's (1965) definition of a supranational region as "a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence" (p. 7).

However, economic forces are not the only reason for increasing mutual interdependency in a region. Langenhove (2013), who defined a region as a socially constructed group rather than a geographically attached one, argued that political and cultural practices considerably determine the range and level of mapping regional societies. Put differently, the supranational regionalization[4] of the culture industry is a token of the strengthened political and cultural integration of societies in the region (Fioramonti, 2014). Hoffman (1965), however, emphasized the maintenance of national sovereignty in making a decision, and ultimately, in determining the range and level of regionalization. In Hoffman's (1965) perspective, the regionalization of societies is, despite the growth of their mutual interdependence, controlled by the nation-state (as cited in Fioramonti, 2014, p. 10).

East Asia is a reflection of cultural regionalization, which has been invigorated by the mutual interdependence of neighboring societies in various aspects, including politics, economy, and national security (Choi J. , 2010; Hettne, 2005; Jin & Lee, 2012). Jin and Lee (2012) understood cultural regionalization in East Asia as "a bottom-up, market- and society-induced process" (p. 28). Hettne (2005) also noted that this region displays the importance of social values and traditions in the creation of mutual interdependence. The notion of *Asian values* helps us understand the perceptual connection between East Asian communities. Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, argued that *Asian*

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[4] Fioramonti (2014) defined the supranational regional production and circulation system as "a meso-level between the state and the international system" (p. 5).

values, based upon a hierarchical view of society and Confucianism, are constructed by and shared with people in the region (as cited in Barr, 2002, p. 5).   However, Hyun (2007), focusing on the involvement of Western values in the construction of Asian cultural identity, claimed that *Asian Values* is a mutual constitution of traditional/Asian and modern/Western elements (p. 13). According to Barr (2002), this *Asian values* mythology has inspired East Asian societies to promote their traditional cultures in order to produce alternative global products (p. 12).

Recently, Asian scholars have discussed the cultural dynamics of pan-East Asian societies in conjunction with the construction of an East Asian identity (Choi J. , 2010; Fung, 2007; Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008; Iwabuchi, 2010; Otmazgin, 2013). Specifically, the emergence of the East Asian collaborative production and circulation systems has advanced the discussion of cultural interaction at the regional level. In light of scholarly works, it seems certain that this region has constructed a "geocultural sphere of proximity and intimacy beyond the nation-state's boundary with identifiable logics and patterns of cultural production, circulation, and reproduction" (Choi J. , 2010, p. 116). However, it is also important to understand that the history of colonialism in the region has created tensions and conflicts among societies of the region (Choi J. , 2010). Therefore, the discursive and industrial dynamics between "the desire for pan-Asianness and the contemporary assertion of national cultural meaning" (Iwabuchi, Muecke, & Thomas, 2004, p. 5) are an ongoing subject of the region that needs further investigation.

The Korean Wave: An Imagination of National Culture

The Korean Wave has become a substantial topic in Korean and East Asian media studies, creating fierce debates over nationalism and Asianism. Numerous media

scholars have mainly viewed it as an outcome of the government-driven development of

media production (Huang, 2011; Iwabuchi, 2010; Ryoo, 2008; Shim D. , 2006). Ryoo

(2008) identified the nation as "a discourse-producing agent" in the development of a

national culture industry (p. 876). Taking Appadurai's (1996) idea of *mediascape*, he

argued that the discourse practices of globalization have brought about economic and

cultural transformations in the Korean media industry. As he noted, when the direct

distribution of Hollywood films intensified their domination in the Korean film market in

the late 1980s, the Korean government strongly supported domestic film companies to

develop high-quality Korean commercial films (Ryoo, 2008, p. 884). Because of the

government's policies, Korea has gained a reputation in international film festivals, and

has accomplished exportation enlargement in Asia. At the same time, the Korean film

industry reached over 59% of the national market share at the box office in the early

2000s (Seo J. , 2005, p. 139). Shim (2006) also weighed in on governmental actions in

the rise of the Korean media industry. According to Shim (2006), the Korean

government invested a considerable amount of money in the investigation of how leading

countries in the global television market – the US, Japan, and Hong Kong – have utilized

their media industries for the enhancement of the national economy. He used the

example of the Presidential Advisory Board, in which the president recommended

"promot[ing] media production as the national strategic industry" (p. 32). As a result, the

Kim Administration introduced media policies for the vertical integration of media

conglomerates to increase the exportation of cultural products during the mid-1990s

(Shim D. , 2006, p. 32). Shim critically pointed out that the support of the Korean

government aggravated the dominance of *chaebol* [5] in the domestic media industry.

However, this governmental policy presents "the conventional Korean developmental

regimen of an export-oriented economy" (Shim D. , 2006, p. 32). Therefore, these big

business groups recognized an increase in the exports of media products as their

responsibilities in exchange for business favors (Groves, 1997, p. 61). Both Shim (2006)

and Ryoo (2009) argued that the top-down production system was an important driving

force in the transnational flow of Korean media products.

Meanwhile, there are scholars who have attempted to comprehend the early stages

of the Korean Wave phenomenon within the framework of the relative superiority of

Korean popular culture (Lee K. , 2008, p. 182). They employed cultural essentialism and

cultural nationalism to address the Korean Wave as a reflection of the development of the

domestic culture industry (Lee K. , 2008). They argued that Korean popular culture has

achieved a relatively high quality of production value in the television industry, and as a

result, has attracted younger generations of Asian professionals who live in modernized

and urbanized circumstances (Iwabuchi, 2004, p. 17). This strand of Korean Wave

scholarship focused on the unexpected emergence of the cultural phenomenon in the late

1990s. These scholars argued that, at that time, the consumption of Korean television

dramas was transnationally expanded to East Asian societies without governmental

support because cultural interchange between East Asian countries had not yet

proliferated. In addition, scholars argued that Korean society did not improve its

governmental support system for cultural production in those days. Choi (2014) pointed

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[5] Chaebol are family-owned big business groups in Korea, including Samsung and Hyundai (Shim, 2006, p. 32).

out that, whereas the government attempted to employ a discourse of globalization to the culture industry, governmental plans did not lead to tangible practices at the given time.

Audience researchers focused on exploring the contribution of regional audiences in the rise of the Korean Wave phenomenon (Kim Y. , 2008; Hyun, 2007; Ju, 2010; Mōri, 2008; Lin & Tong, 2008). Hyun (2007) investigated how Asian audiences identify Asian modernity through their consumption of Korean television dramas. He maintained that cultural regionalization brought about the rapid development of inter-Asian media flows. Following Straubhaar's (1991) concept of cultural proximity, he argued that regional audiences share "the ideas of Asian distinctiveness as a region system" in the consumption of Korean media content (Hyun, 2007, p. 12). He concluded, "The shared experience of Asian modernity operates favorably for [the] regional circulation of popular culture" (p. 21).   Ju (2010) also focused on the interaction between Asian identity construction and Korean media consumption. In her view, watching Korean drama helps Japanese audiences reimagine their belonging to the East Asian community. Japan, a long-standing cultural exporter in the region, has identified itself as a mediator between the West and Asian countries (Iwabuchi, 2002). Given that Japan's self-identification is based on a separation from both the West and Asia (Iwabuchi, 2002), the Japanese audience's imagination of its "Asianness" increased "local-to-local cultural communications" (Ju, 2010, p. 5).   The huge success of the Korean drama, *Winter Sonata* in Japan, however, encouraged regional scholars to pay attention to the role of audience in the extension of the Korean Wave to Japanese society (Hanaki, Singhai, Han, Kim, & Chitnis, 2007; Mōri, 2008; Hirata, 2008). Based on interviews with a Japanese audience, Mōri (2008) argued that active fans of *Winter Sonata,* who consistently

consume the program-related products and events, made this phenomenon visible throughout the whole society. In a broader sense, she also mentioned that watching Korean drama caused the Japanese audience to change their image of Korea (Mōri, 2008, p. 137). Hirata's (2008) research explored how Korean pop culture increased people's interactions across borders. The number of Japanese tourists who traveled to Korea jumped by 35.5% in 2004, compared to the previous year (Hirata, 2008, p. 143). She argued that the popularity of Korean dramas encouraged female audiences to move transnationally. Japanese fans of the drama toured the shooting locations, directly experiencing "the physical reality" in Korea, and dramatically changing their approach to the political and cultural conflicts between the two nations (Hirata, 2008, p. 155). Although these female fans were subject to criticism in Japanese society, the growth of this active audience contributed to developing colonial discourse in both societies (Hirata, 2008).

The global spread of the Korean pop boom in the early 2010s challenged a body of research on the Korean Wave phenomenon in the Asian region with respect to the employment of cultural proximity and cultural discount. Hong (2013) pointed out that these theoretical frameworks are not applicable in explaining the consumption of Korean pop music in the US, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. She pointed out that Korean pop fans in these areas are willing to consume Korean pop music and artists due to their relatively healthy, less sexual, and affectionate sounds and images (Hong S.-K. , 2013). Korean pop fandom in the US and Europe has shown that a niche market in the idol business is still available, targeting white middle-class families (Hong S.-K. , 2013). For her, the expansion of Korean pop culture beyond the Asian region should be

understood in connection with the patterns of the fans' consumption. Most Korean pop fans in Western societies are "omnivores" who have enjoyed other foreign cultures, including Japanese animation and Chinese films (p. 35). This finding shows that these fans want to differentiate themselves from others through the consumption of popular culture. Thus, she believes this cultural phenomenon should be examined as a new way of constructing identity in the age of digital culture rather than the rise of Korean popular culture in the global market (Hong S.-K. , 2013).

The musicological scholarship has also focused on the development of Korean pop music in the framework of cultural hybridity. However, different perspectives have been employed to interpret power dynamics in the mixture of Korean and foreign pop elements. Jamie Shinhee Lee (2004) emphasized local subjectivity in the adoption of global music trends because Korean music artists employ pop music as a way to construct their hybrid identities and cultures. In this frame, the mingling of Korean and English in lyrics is meant to resist against the ruling values and ideologies in society (Lee J. S., 2004, p. 430). For example, she focused on the capacity of Korean companies to adapt to Japanese culture strategically. She argued that, unlike Korean *enka* singers in the 1980s, the linguistic and physical "crossing" (Lee J. S., 2006, p. 235) of Korean idol groups should not be interpreted as a continuing colonial relationship between the two societies. She framed the collaboration between the Korean and Japanese music industries as "the renegotiation of positions of ex-colonizer and colonizee" (Lee J. S., 2004, p. 248). In her argument, Korean pop idols do not struggle with a "victim mentality" or "linguistic and cultural hegemony" (Lee J. S., 2006, p. 249). Rather the mixture of Japanese and Korean music elements aims to "create something Asian and not a replica of the West" for the

audiences in both nations (Lee J. S., 2006, p. 247). However, Howard (2002) focused more on the contribution of foreign music styles and structures to the transnational popularity of Korean pop music. He argued that the similarity between Korean pop from the 1990s to the 2000s and British pop in the 1960s brought about nostalgia and intimacy for audiences living in non-Asian areas. In Howard's (2002) perspective, the Korean pop boom is not the globalization of local (Korean) pop culture, but the localization of global pop culture. Shin (2005), however, criticized this asymmetrical approach to the interaction between local and global cultures. Taking the notion of popular Asianism to understand the nature of intra-regional cultural circulation in East Asia, he claimed that this theoretical framework enables researchers to view Asia "not as a single unit but as a union of multiple members" (Shin, 2005, p. 17). Shin (2005) argued that the Korean pop industry not only adopts the global trends of pop music, but also creates dynamics in the intra-regional cultural circulation of the adopted global music.

By expanding the discussion of Korean pop music in the perspective of cultural hybridity and cultural regionalization, this study examines the rise of East Asian connections in television production. Again, viewing globalization as cultural homogenization or cultural heterogenization overlooks the local dynamics in accepting other cultures and fails to explain the complexity in the cultural dimension of globalization. Considering the pace and scope of mixing and its relation to structural transformations, the cultural dynamics in East Asian countries are an important consideration when interpreting local cultures as a new form of global culture (Appadurai, 1996; Pieterse, 2015). Furthermore, indigenous localization is the key to understanding complicated aspects of globalization (Tomlinson, 2002) because local cultures have been

significantly modified when they adopt global cultures (Robertson, 1995). Local cultures

consistently create their new forms in order to survive through the specific work of

capitalism. This kind of localization often proceeds by virtue of cultural hybridization

between the imported forms and traditional ones, leading to the revitalization of

indigenous cultural forms (Berger P. L., 2002; Iwabuchi, 2010).

This dissertation argues that the dynamics of the national and regional cultures in

the East Asian region should be considered as an important counteraction against

globalization. Of course, it does not mean that these cultures have taken a leading

position that core countries have held in cultural production during the past several

decades. However, cultural hybridization has allowed room for East Asian societies to

destabilize the long-term boundaries of center and periphery. The production and

circulation of hybrid cultures provides East Asian societies with an opportunity to

construct and share Asian identity from a global perspective. The proliferation of hybrid

cultures and the transnationalization of cultural production for the global market have

brought about conflicts regarding the origin of national popular culture (Martín-Barbero

J. , 1991/2006). In the process of dealing with these tensions, the mass media have

adopted a "*political* role to incorporate the public into the nation" (Martín-Barbero J. ,

1991/2006, p. 627). The mass media politicize the regional mixture of popular cultures

and contribute to strengthening the importance of the locality in the national discourse of

globalization. The nation's localization strategies also help the rise of regional markets

(Robertson, 1995). This case study attempts to understand the interplay and overlap of

cultural, economic, and political forces in the construction of inter-Asian connections by

exploring changes in Korean television production. The declining value of locality as an

assumption of globalization should be reconsidered because "the intimate links between

temporal and spatial dimensions of human life" (Robertson, 1995, p. 26) are still

influential in the production and consumption of popular culture.

CHAPTER 3

GLOBAL MEDIA AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING

This chapter contains scholarly discussions over how the rise of the global system has changed the landscape of the local television industry in the aspects of production, distribution, and consumption. The first part of this chapter aims to comprehend different theoretical views—critical political economy vs. critical cultural studies—concerning the influence of the global media system upon local television industries and cultures (Havens, 2006). Afterwards, this chapter portrays previous empirical studies of the East Asian television industry, focusing on the power dynamics and interactions between policymakers, television producers, distributors, buyers, and viewers. Based on both classical and contemporary studies of global television, I claim the significance of examining Korean public television as a global actor that creates, negotiates, and mediates transnational connections in global television cultures and practices.

Over the decades, one of the dominant claims concerning global television is the influence of the American television system and culture over other societies. Numerous political-economists have argued the asymmetric relations between the core and the periphery in structures and practices of the global television industry (Barker, 1997; Herman & McChesney, 1997; Tunstall, 1977). In this view, the impact of US-based multinational media corporations over local societies can be addressed in two ways: 1) multinational media corporations influence the ownership and control of local media institutions; and 2) the consumption of American media products change the patterns of culture within a local society (Fejes, 1981). Media scholars have criticized the political-

economic structure of the global television marketplace as follows: core countries exclusively maintain their power over the allocation of human and capital resources; moreover, they impose their values on developing societies, and even erode the indigenousness of local television cultures (Schiller, 1976; Tunstall, 1977).

By the early 1990s, some scholars, however, raised questions about the presumption that the global power of American television has resulted in the standardization and homogenization of television systems and cultures around the world (Martín-Barbero J. , 1991/2006; Straubhaar J. , 2002/2006). Straubhaar (2002/2006) criticized the simplicity of these political-economic analyses that offer obscure explanations about various reactions of local television to media globalization. Instead, he paid more attention to the role of local media in mediating global forces and local experiences. For him, local television is deeply engaged in reproducing local cultures, not only in terms of expanding viewers' perceptions of reality across time and space within society, but also in terms of reasserting local identities by offering audiences multilayered cultural experiences (Straubhaar J. , 2002/2006). Such critical cultural approaches to global television have encouraged media scholars to examine the dynamics driven by local television in the process of media globalization. Numerous field-driven research studies on the interaction between global and local television have advocated the view that local television has maintained its social position by filtering out undesirable parts of American television culture (Kraidy M. M., 2010), thus modifying imported programs in the local context (García-Canclini, 2001), and making connections within the region (Iwabuchi, 2010).

The complexity of media globalization in local societies has been widely

recognized in the perspective of the reception of global television. However, the paucity

of research on how local agents participate in the production and circulation of global

television has led to the marginalization of dynamics and interactions within and across

local television industries in global media studies.   Havens' (2006) work indicated that a

traditional, dichotomous critique on the forces shaping media flows, either America's

structural dominance (Herman & McChesney, 1997), or cultural proximity among local

communities (Straubhaar J. , 2002/2006), always provides partial knowledge of global

media practices and flows.

From another perspective, paying attention to the methodological dimension of

the term "flow" helps enrich our knowledge on television (Moran, 2009). The notion of

flow, referring to "a displacement" (Moran, 2009, p. 13), emphasizes a spatial dimension

of media globalization. In this perspective, television scholars have identified the de-

Westernized pattern of television flows and the local specificity in television cultures and

practices, focusing more on the level and range of interactions among local television

industries (Chalaby, 2009; Elasmar, 2003; Havens, 2006; Straubhaar J. D., 2007).

Examining television flow thus allows us to see why satellite television can bring about a

new phase of broadcasting (Griffiths, 2003), and how distribution refers to a connection

between television production and consumption (Wright, 2006). This recent academic

tendency indicates that media scholars put more emphases on the transnational aspect of

television production, and international audiences' participatory culture (Havens, 2006;

Jenkins, 2006; Lotz, 2014; Moran, 2009; Spigel & Olsson, 2004).

Taking Appadurai's (1996) disjunctive and irregular flow perspective, this

dissertation attempts to develop theoretical and empirical-bound discussions of global

television production. To do so, this chapter provides a historical context of what media

industry scholarship has discussed the globalization of the television industry in the

aspect of public broadcasting, production culture, media convergence, and audience

fragmentation. From Hay's (2004) geographical idea that television always produces for

"the particular site" (p. 976), I also reviewed various empirical studies of East Asian

television culture and practice. These scholarly discussions of the television industry

help develop my claim that the national media system forces Korean media practitioners

to establish relationships with regional partners in television production.

<center>The Global Perspective on Public Broadcasting</center>

The main concern of globalization in the television industry is attributed to the

expansion of the American-centered commercial television paradigm to various societies.

For over nearly a century, the American television industry has developed the

commercial model of production and dissemination "responding to market conditions

rather than an organ of the state or public institutions" (Hilmes, 2007, p. 7). In this

commercialized media system, American society has built up its own notion of public

interest that can be achieved through the operation of the market (Collins & Murroni,

1996). A traditional belief that "free and public expression is the best way to arrive at the

truth" (McCauley, Peterson, Artz, & Halleck, 2003, p. 22) is shared by the American

audience. Because consumers choose television programs by their own free will,

American broadcasters who attract audiences are considered "those who best obtain the

public interest" (McCauley et al., 2003, p. 22).

Some media scholars, however, have pointed out that this perspective is too

optimistic because the commercial mechanism only helps a few network owners

maximize their revenue instead of fulfilling the public interest (Tracey, 1998; McCauley et al., 2003). Indeed, commercial television networks pursue the production and distribution of standardized, easy-to-digest content that "encourages viewers to make their own way through an ever-changing array of human cultures" (McCauley et al., 2003, p. 17). In addition, the audience tends to watch entertainment programs because commercial television always provides them with an escape from their social responsibilities (Gitlin, 1979/1994). According to Hoffmann-Riem's (1992) study, audiences who get used to watching commercial television are less engaged with the media coverage of political issues. In this light, media commercialization possibly damages political cultures in democratic societies (Herman & McChesney, 1997).

The commercialization of television programs has brought about an intensive discussion over the need of public broadcasting. The philosophical foundation of the public broadcasting model is to promote the public interest by guaranteeing opportunities to speak to all residents, regardless of characteristics such as their gender, class, and race (Ouellette, 2002). In order to reach the mission of public broadcasting, there are two preconditions: 1) All citizens should be able to access media content produced by public broadcasting; and 2) Clear standards of media content, including impartiality, ideology balance, and the development of refined tastes, are required (McCauley et al., 2003). In this sense, Herman and McChesney (1997) and Tracey (1998) claimed that the federally supported or donation-based funding system should be maintained in order to produce content dealing with public affairs such as education, religion, culture, and children's programming, which can be consumed by the national audience.

In order to meet this requirement, public broadcasters provide programs that cover

a nationwide range of cultural tastes and interests (Park N. , 2007). Park (2007) noted that, due to this coverage, public service television is often considered as the national medium. Given that identity construction is influenced by communities that possess a unified and unchanging memory concerning its past (Morley, 1992), the narrative of television programs contributes to uniting members of a society (Ouellette, 2002; Tracey, 1998). With the rise of the commercial broadcasting system and online media, Hoynes (2007) emphasized the significance of public broadcasting by reconfiguring the notion of the public interest.

Tracy's (1998) claim that restructuring public broadcasting is a national issue can be applicable to understanding the counteraction of the government to the global media system. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a distinct example to show how media globalization brings about changes in public broadcasting. In its initial stage, the British Government did not adopt the U.S. commercial model of broadcasting because they were concerned about the negative influence of commercialized programs in the construction of public opinions (Curran & Seaton, 2010; McCauley et al., 2003). Instead, they chose the federally supported and donation-based funding system to protect the broadcaster's independence in content production and distribution. Noncommercial networks, funded by federally generated and donated money, encourage independent producers to make programs dealing with public affairs such as education, religion, and children's programs (Herman & McChesney, 1997). However, the fact that public broadcasting depends on federal funding has provoked a new debate over the political independence of public broadcasting companies (Hall, 1974). In addition, the media's diminishing role in the field of political communication has been of concern in many

societies (Hall, 1974; Tremblay, 2016).

Certainly, the future of public broadcasting is an ongoing issue in the intensification of media globalization and convergence. Tracey (1998) provided a pessimistic perspective on the maintenance of public broadcasting by saying that the idea of public media was initially proposed due to the limited number of television channels and radio waves, which is no longer the case. Flew (2011), however, considered media convergence and the global system as a unique opportunity for the reinvention of public networks. He claimed that new media platforms require public broadcasting to play its part in the employment of limited resources more effectively and in the decrease of production costs. Hence, public service broadcasters view media globalization as a driving force in restructuring their production and distribution systems in convergence with the Internet and social media, and they reconfigure social responsibilities in the global spread of the commercial television paradigm (Flew T. , 2011).

Going beyond Hollywood Studios

Scholars in production studies have focused on behind-the-screen cultures and practices of media production (Mayer, Banks, & Caldwell, 2009). An important critique on the field of production studies is the domination of the American-centered paradigm because most case studies have been conducted to examine English-spoken production sites (Caldwell J. T., 2008; Mayer, 2011; Mayer, Banks, & Caldwell, 2009; Newcomb & Alley, 1983). This exclusive focus on Hollywood studios has created an ongoing marginalization of non-US/UK television production in media industry scholarship, which has resulted in its lack of understanding about the dynamics of Asian production sites. In recent years, however, as media convergence and digitalization have

complicated the interaction of media producers and consumers across borders, television

scholars are required to provide in-depth knowledge of the emerging centers within the

global television industry (Curtin, 2007; Kraidy M. , 2010; Yoshimoto, Tsai, & Choi,

2010). Hence, understanding the de-Westernized patterns and local-centered dynamics of

media production has become one of the most significant matters in media industry

studies.

Media scholars who view "production as a culture" (Mayer, Banks, & Caldwell,

2009, p. 2) have devoted their attention to hierarchies in the structure of media production.

Following the strand of critical cultural studies, they have become interested in "the

complex structure in dominance" (Hall, 1980/1993, p. 92) in the production and

consumption of television messages. Hence, various interplays among media producers,

media products, and financing resources have been examined in the framework that

"culture constitutes and reflects the relationships of power" (Mayer, Banks, & Caldwell,

2009, p. 2). This analysis of power dynamics in the production process, including media

actors – directors, writers, editors, celebrities, casting agents, and production associates –

and media organizations, helps us better understand "behind-the-scenes" as a cultural text

that the television industry produces (Mayer, Banks, & Caldwell, 2009, p. 2).

These scholars' assertion that media professionals are located between "the

creators of popular culture" and "functionaries in the service of capitalism" (Mayer,

Banks, & Caldwell, 2009, p. 2) sheds light on the difference between television and other

forms of production. Caldwell's (2008) ethnographic research raised an important

question about the growing restrictions on creativity in television production. His

critique that the institutional power structures threaten the authorship of television

directors and writers shows that the enduring difference between television and other types of production is rooted in the concept of creativity (Caldwell J. T., 2008, p. 199). Mayer (2011) delved into the labor value of media actors "below the line" who employ their manual skills under the guidance of producers in television production (p. 4). She argued that the market logic has devalued producers' agency (Mayer, 2011, p. 3). These case studies portray the landscape of the television industry, in which the material conditions of the new television economy have blurred the "boundaries between subjectivities and commodities" (Mayer, 2011, p. 3). Based on the study of American television production, focusing on media actors' professional experience, Mayer (2011) developed two collective identities of television producers: "extraordinary individuals, possessing creative capabilities" and "ordinary members of the professional class" (p. 7). As she pointed out, seeing media producers as members of the closed group who share professional goals helps us better understand the power of media producers over the contents and technologies, as well as their powerlessness "in the negotiated realms of capital investments and distribution, policy making and regulation" (Mayer, 2011, p. 7).

From this standpoint, scholars in production studies are requested to see how the global capitalist system and neoliberal media policies have intensified cross-industrial and trans-border connections in television production. The mutual dependence between the television and telecommunications industries and the construction of international networks among media professionals has complicated the contours of media production. First, rapid changes in the field of production require television scholars to include musicians, video gamers, fashion designers, and graphic designers as the subjects of analysis. Second, the development of the transnational production system allows them to

see the flow of media products, finances, people, and ideologies as part of the production

(Appadurai, 1996). As such, I argue that scholars in Asian media production studies

should go beyond US/UK-centered analyses, recognizing the localizing process of

creative production in conjunction with the convergence culture, audience fragmentation,

and transnational aspect of the television medium.

<div align="center">Media Convergence and Audience Fragmentation</div>

Media convergence has been a hot-button topic in the discussion of global

television because the serialized consumption of media content across multiple platforms

has changed not only the ways and implications of watching television, but also the

definition of television (Jenkins, 2006; Lotz, 2014; Spigel & Olsson, 2004; Thompson &

Mittell, 2013). In response to these fundamental changes, media scholars have expanded

the study of television to digital, online, and social media. In this light, many have

discussed how digitalization has affected the dominance of the terrestrial network in the

television industry; how convergence has blurred boundaries between television and

other media; and how these new media environments have reconstructed the relationship

between television and audiences (Chalaby, 2009; Lotz, 2014; Jenkins, 2006).

Early on, Budd, Craig and Steinman (1999) employed the term *convergence* in

the description of the economic restructuring of media industries. They argued that the

television network, with the support of the government's deregulation, reforms its

organizations in order to improve profits. In other words, numerous governments were

only interested in stabilizing and protecting the domestic television industry and culture

in the past; however, they realized the need to stay competitive in the global television

market (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002). With the strong support of the government,

major television companies have attempted to converge from program production to distribution to the audience "with global mega-corporations increasing their control over all aspects of television" (Budd, Craig, & Steinman, 1999, p. 28). These big players consolidate their positions as leading media companies by merging other media companies, including film production, book and magazine publishing companies, music agencies, and the new media corporations. A single corporation's ownership of a variety of industries definitely creates a synergistic effect because the popularity of the products made by one branch can also attract consumers in other branches (Budd, Craig, & Steinman, 1999; Jenkins, 2006).

As many societies transitioned from analogue to digital television services during the late 2000s, television has been understood as "a non-site-specific, hybrid cultural and technological form that spreads across multiple platforms" (Bennett & Strange, 2011, p. 2). The transformation of television as digital media caused the serialized consumption of media content across media platforms (Jenkins, 2006, p. 3) and the reconstruction of relationships between television and other media (Bennett & Strange, 2011). Along with these changes, television scholars have focused on how blurring the boundaries between platforms, such as mobile phones, iPads, and online streaming services—YouTube, Hulu, Netflix, and Amazon Prime—impact television cultures and practices. Bennett and Strange (2011) argued that the digital switchover not only brings us technological benefits, such as interactivity, omnipresence, and a high quality of television content, but also economic and cultural transformations, including the reconfiguration of modernity and the restructuring of the global media industry (p. 3). These shifts are followed by the conceptual transition of television from "the social collective experience" to "a

fragmenting experience" (Bennett & Strange, 2011, p. 4).

Digital television and media convergence have led audiences to become a controversial topic in television scholarship (Spigel & Olsson, 2004). Previously, television as a "mass medium" constructed the audience's national identity by providing them with the collective experience of national and international events (Fiske, 1987; Gitlin, 1979/1994; Newcomb & Hirsch, 1994). However, Jenkins (2006) claimed that media technologies have allowed each person to find the meaning of media texts in his/her own way. He delved into the interaction between media convergence and audiences, examining how audiences have been empowered in an era of media convergence and globalization. In his view, media flows across borders are invigorated by "the migratory behavior of media audiences who will go almost anywhere in search of the kinds of entertainment experiences" (Jenkins, 2006, p. 2). García-Canclini (2001) also paid attention to the transformation of the public's identity construction in the transnationalized social system. He pointed out that modern people are accustomed to defining their identities based on "the private realm of commodity consumption and the mass media rather than the rules of democracy or collective participation in public spaces" (p. 15). In their view, the consumption of global cultures possibly deconstructs an individual identity bound to national or ethnic communities. In other words, changes of media surroundings such as "technologies of production, in the design of objects, and extensive and intensive communication among societies" destabilize traditional ways of watching television and constructing identities (García-Canclini, 2001, p. 16).

More importantly, the audience recognizes that their collective consumption allows them to exercise their influence in television production. Jenkins' (2006) claim

that media fandom's participatory culture is a new type of cultural production and social structure (p. 246) raised a significant question of how the empowerment of the audience reshapes hierarchies in the television industry. With regard to this matter, Turner and Tay (2009) argued that audience fragmentation has caused the rise of subscription-based television channels and online media services. The collective audience who watched television in the living room now prefers to consume television programs in a private setting (Turner & Tay, 2009, p. 2). This fragmenting consumption of media content has privatized television production and circulation. As a result, major television networks that should produce programs for a large and diverse domestic audience have faced the loss of viewers and advertisers (Spigel & Olsson, 2004, p. 2). Similarly, public/state-driven networks must find their own ways to maintain their presence in society by finding new types of viewers in the rapidly changing market.

<div align="center">The East Asian Feature of Production</div>

Korean Wave scholarship has discussed the theoretical implications of East Asian connections within the field of media globalization (Choi J. , 2010; Huat, 2010; Iwabuchi, 2013). The intersection of cultural commodification and regionalization has been a contested issue in the cultural sphere of the East Asian region. Nevertheless, it is misleading to see the intra-regional popularity of Korean television programs and pop music as resistance against the global domination of American media content because Asian audiences still enjoy Hollywood movies, American pop, and TV shows. The complexity of media consumption in East Asian societies indicates that the binary approach to global and local culture does not help clarify the implications of the Korean Wave phenomenon.

Iwabuchi (2010, 2013) accentuated the significance and urgency of examining the distinctive aspects of East Asian media connections because digital media environments have allowed Asian youth to consume regional media content in their own ways, and even advanced intra-regional collaborations in the production stage (Iwabuchi, 2013). In this light, Cho (2011) argued that the rise of Korean media culture should be understood in the context of the ongoing regionalization of media culture, as shown in the case of the Hong Kong and Japanese media cultures. His claim that the Korean Wave as a cultural iteration reflects on the "historicity as well as the multiplicity of East Asian pop culture" (Cho Y. , 2011, p. 388) is important in understanding why the Korean Wave can be the object of study in the East Asian process of cultural globalization.

Deregulation and marketization have considerably changed the East Asian broadcasting systems (Turner, 2011). One distinct example is the development of co-productions and collaborations in the media industries. Otmazgin and Ari (2012) elucidated the dynamics and patterns of these intra-regional interactions, focusing on how the cultural economy focuses on "region-wide appropriation of cultural formulas and styles" (p. 1). On the contrary, Iwabuchi (2010) argued that East Asian connections in creative production reflect the decline of Euro-American media cultural power in the region and further offer the decentralization of power in global media production. Whereas the controversy over the power dynamics between local and global cultures is ongoing, what is obvious is that the East Asian media connections have expanded to other industries and have strengthened the interdependence of East Asian societies with one another.

Meanwhile, many critiques have also been directed toward the uneven media

traffic that the three East Asian countries—China, Japan, and Korea—have dominated in the regional television market (Huang, 2011; Huat, 2010; Iwabuchi, Muecke, & Thomas, 2004; Iwabuchi, 2010). Put differently, the one-way media flow from the center to the periphery within the East Asian region has complicated the dynamics in the process of cultural globalization (Iwabuchi, 2010). From the production perspective, Iwabuchi, Muecke, and Thomas (2004) expressed that a state actor who constructs new cultural imaginaries about Asianness has reigned in the regional market. However, Huang (2011) argued that the "universal tastes" of hybrid culture are the key to conquering the local market (p. 4).

The intra-regional relationships in East Asia complicate Korean society's cross-industrial connections. During the early 1990s, as governmental discussions on globalization spread to Korean society as a whole, policies and regulations were created in order to enhance the qualitative growth of television programs. With the support of media policy, Korean television networks have actively attempted to explore overseas markets. In addition, mergers and integration between media companies were made in order to reduce risks and maximize the efficiency of channel marketing and content distribution (Gambaro, 2005, p. 6). Television companies merged with other media companies, including film production companies, book and magazine publishing companies, and music agencies in order to become global mega-corporations. Having a variety of industries creates a synergistic effect because the popularity of products made by one branch can also attract consumers to other branches. After the huge success of the Korean drama *Winter Sonata* in the Asian market, the Korean media industry made higher profits by selling a variety of media-related merchandise such as books, pop music

albums, and tour packages in order to raise higher profits (Hirata, 2008).

Much work has dealt with the regional circulation and consumption of Korean popular music and television content, such as dramas and reality shows; however, media scholars have overlooked the intersection between the industries. Thus, this project attempts to examine how Korean production sectors have expanded their regional markets. Studying the Korean Wave phenomenon in a production context can provide a number of insights into cultural globalization.

First, this case study offers a framework in a new phase of globalization. This dissertation addresses how and why the Korean television industry was active in exporting its products to the Asian market during the past decades. The large scale and solid profit structure of the domestic market discouraged Japan's transnational promotion of cultural products, despite its huge popularity (Iwabuchi, 2002). However, Korean pop music companies and artists expanded to overseas market due to limited domestic market prospects; the domestic music market is relatively small, and profits had decreased due to the high-handedness of big distribution corporations. Second, an interpretive analysis of weekly music programs provides an in-depth understanding of the relationship between Korean pop music and the television medium. Because weekly live shows have long been a window into Korean pop music culture, this dissertation provides an account of how local practitioners have mediated global culture to revitalize Korea's national culture and identities. Third, observing the behind-the-screen operations of television companies and music agencies allows us to explore the process through which producers position themselves as one of the centers in the global culture industry by targeting Asian audiences.

This study observes how Korean television has influenced the construction of a national popular culture, and now seeks to hold the public media's sovereignty in the face of stiff competition with other commercial networks, cable and satellite channels, and Internet media. Korean television media have a close relationship with the production and circulation of Korean pop music because the three major networks have their own weekly music programs; most Korean music agencies have been willing to promote their new albums on these live music programs for several decades. However, the censor system of the networks has regulated the degree of sexual explicitness in the lyrics of Korean pop songs and artists' clothes. In addition, KBS' satellite channels and official YouTube channel have helped Korean artists construct transnational fandom communities and get into the music market in neighboring countries.

From this standpoint, I investigate how the Korean television industry has become involved in the (re)production of the Korean pop boom. In particular, this dissertation examines how the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), the largest broadcasting company, has promoted the transnational flow of Korean popular culture and has developed intra-regional media connections. Viewed in this light, the Korean Wave has provided a valuable glimpse into the political, economic, geographic, and cultural intervention of the Korean media system in generating the global cultural phenomenon. Put differently, the ongoing power of the national media system is the key to understand the de-Westernized pattern of cultural dynamics (Flew & Waisbord, 2015, p. 632).

Most prominently, this dissertation poses a trans-local approach to rearticulating the traditional implications of television as a technology, national medium, cultural form, institution, and industry. By looking at the production process of KBS' weekly program,

Music Bank, I claim that the show's global branding power was constructed by the local

gravity of cultural production and the global expandability of media connections. If one

considers the Korean Wave as an alternative global phenomenon, it is important to

understand the production actor's contextual and situated sphere as local, national,

regional, and global (Kraidy & Murphy, 2008). Put differently, Korea's shifted position

in its interaction with the US/UK, East Asia—China and Japan—and other Asian

societies in the cultural sphere has complicated the contours of the Korean Wave

phenomenon. Therefore, "a transnational sphere of influence" that Korean cultural and

media actors have created can be better discussed by moving beyond "the local-global

dyad" (Kraidy & Murphy, 2008, p. 347). Thus, I focus on how the nature and direction

of the Korean Wave has reflected geographical and cultural homologies between East

Asian societies beyond the binary thinking of global and local cultures (Fung, 2007).

CHAPTER 4

METHODS AND DATA

This dissertation employs qualitative methods to explore the shifting process of

Korean cultural production in global, historical, and cultural contexts. Numerous media

scholars have employed qualitative research methods to investigate the multiple

dimensions of a social event, including "the texture and weave of everyday life, the

understandings, experiences, and imaginings of our research participants, the ways that

social processes, institutions, discourses or relationships work, and the significance of the

meanings that they generate" (Mason, 2002, p. 1). This methodological approach enables

these scholars to contextualize the daily lives of people by examine the way of expressing

themselves (Mason, 2002; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).

In particular, the advantages of qualitative methods and sources are highlighted in

the examination of cultures (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Mason,

2002). Lindlof and Taylor (2002) identified cultures as "economies" in which texts

comprise the medium for changing relationships among producers, performers, and

consumers (p. 58). Accordingly, in calling upon "the term *cultural economy*" (Lindlof &

Taylor, 2002, p. 58), they incorporated the conventional meanings of text and commodity.

In Lindlof and Taylor's (2002) view, qualitative researchers investigate the relationships

between an object's official worth in a financial or cultural economy and its unofficial

possibility for creating meanings within the local systems of value and belief.

Following the tradition of this methodological approach, I examined what local

practitioners have felt and experienced in the globalization of media industries. Implicit

in this investigation is a contextualization that the unusual pattern of local media production can be seen as the making of trans-local and/or intra-regional connections. Kraidy and Murphy's (2008) suggestion that Geertz' notion of the local is applicable to analyzing the meaning of change in local cultures within a global context provided the foundation for this empirical research. Building on Geertz' discussion of cultural overlaps among local societies, scholars of global communication studies have room to delve into "the particularities of the local in its broader structural and comparative context" (Kraidy & Murphy, 2008, p. 341). Furthermore, the ways in which media are involved in the double-sided characterization of globalization – fragmentation and integration – (Kraidy & Murphy, 2008, p. 343), which has invigorated the complexity of the phenomenon, encouraged me to adopt trans-local and intra-regional approaches in examining the East Asian process of cultural globalization.

Taking into account the contributions of qualitative and trans-local methodologies to global media studies, this dissertation has mainly employed two qualitative methods: critical discourse analysis and in-depth interviews. First, critical discourse analysis was employed to obtain situational and contextual information for understanding the complex chain of media texts, media discourse, and institutional discourse regarding the Korean Wave during the last decade (Fairclough, 2003). In addition, in-depth interviewing was chosen to gather an insider view regarding the constitution of the Korean pop boom in the Korean broadcasting and pop music industries. In-depth interviewing also provided below-the-line knowledge regarding the interaction between global and local media production players in an East Asian context.

Critical Discourse Analysis: Discourse, Power, and Hegemony

This dissertation centered on exploring the national forces in the global spread of local culture. Foucault (1980) argued that the analysis of new social practices should focus on "the relations of force, strategic development, and tactics" (p. 114). Early on, in order to examine how "the relations of power" shape social discourse, Foucault (1980) proposed the notion of the *apparatus,* which consists of strategies and relations of forces (p. 115). In his view, the *apparatus,* supporting and supported by types of knowledge, is reflected in the dynamics of power and is linked to the construction of knowledge (Foucault, 1980, pp. 194-196). This approach views the relations of knowledge, power, and the body as the main topics to study social representations in historical and global contexts. Foucault (1980) focused on the interaction between power and knowledge, linking the two together not because of the authority of the connection based on the truth, but because of the power to make the linkage the truth. In Foucault's view, Hall (1997) argued that, because our knowledge is constructed by technologies and strategies in specific situations, historical contexts, and institutional settings, an examination of a social phenomenon should consider the ways in which a combination of power and discourse produce the phenomenon under the given circumstances (p. 49).

Building on Foucault's (1980) notion of power and discourse, Fairclough (2003) proposed critical discourse analysis to examine the relations among the constituent elements of systems, which range from human languages to cultural practices. Halliday (1973) also perceived that the constituent elements of systems shape the relations between the use of language and the social structure (p. 65). Hence, through textual and discourse analysis, researchers can provide us with information about how cultural forms

are produced and projected in a society (Halliday, 1973; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006).

Fairclough (1992) extended the notion of discourse, traditionally referring to mainly

spoken or written language use, to other types of linguistic activity, such as visual images

and nonverbal communication. He argued that viewing language use as a social practice

implies that language is a socially and historically "situated mode of action that is within

a dialectical relationship with other facets of the social" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 54).

Fairclough (1992) indicated the shifting relationships of media discursive orders with

social discursive orders. From this perspective, he developed discourse analysis as taking

place on three levels: text, discourse practice, and social practice (p. 73). Therefore, he

emphasized the need to analyze a mediated process of texts (script, image, and the

original soundtrack), program production and consumption, as well as social and cultural

systems. Fairclough (1992) concluded that all of the discursive types, which are

employed in media production, constitute the order of discourse of a social institution. In

media studies, Taylor (1984) stressed the usefulness of discourse analysis as the starting

point for analyzing the ideology and power that are embedded in media texts. By

understanding discourse as "a mode of political and ideological practice" (Fairclough,

1992, p. 67), critical discourse analysis contributes considerably to studying the

globalization in which media discourses constitute, normalize, and reproduce social and

cultural ideologies in a society.

This dissertation adopts Foucault's (1980) argument that analyzing the forms of

practice and institutional regulation helps us understand the relations of power and

agency in knowledge production within a particular context. By analyzing the discursive

formation of the selected texts and practices via the critical discourse analysis approach

(Foucault, 1980) and "the discursive practices of a community – its normal ways of using language – in terms of networks" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 55), I examine how globalization as discourse has brought about a series of changes in cultural production in Korea.

In addition, an analysis of the linguistic regulations in media texts will help provide an understanding of the social, systemic and practical relations and interactions between media texts and social ideology (Hall, 1980/1993). In order to examine stories about the Korean pop boom, as well as the rise of inter-Asian connections in the production and consumption of media content, this study collected and analyzed documents and video clips relating to KBS' live music program, *Music Bank*. Analyzing the key terms, visual images, and symbols making up the "forms and conventions" of live television music programs allows us to develop a better understanding of how the cultural environment in which a television program is viewed helps audiences construct and circulate social and cultural discourse. As Foucault (1972) argued, particular ideologies have been (re)produced within a social system. The discursive nature of power and social change implies the fact that discourse is constitutive, in both conventional and innovative ways (Foucault, 1972, p. 55). The body of material examined in this project will include episodes of the live weekly Korean television show, *Music Bank*, from 2002 to 2013, focusing on the first episode of every month, as well as the special edition of the *Music Bank* world tour concert, which traveled to nine countries: Japan, China, Chile, France, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Vietnam, and Turkey. All episodes of the program were obtained from the KBS Official Website and TVBOGO, the US-based Korean media website. In an analysis of *Music Bank*, I looked for main themes in the shows and closely analyzed the program's selection of Korean pop songs, the sequencing of music

artists' stages, music charts, and special events. In addition, I also paid attention to changes in the ranking systems. Given that changes in the ranking system and the list of artists have considerably influenced the Korean pop music industry, including album sales, online downloads, and mobile voting, the live program's ranking system reflects the power shift between the television and music industries. The ways in which the audience participates in the program also reflect the global consumption of the program. Based on primary sources, I examined how the ranking system and program narratives include the participation of international viewers, and how they reflect changes in the media environment and transnational consumption of Korean pop music.

The program's episodes from January 2002 to December 2013 were first collected and scrutinized closely to identify the directors, writers, and artists who had participated in the production of the program. I then contacted the relevant television stations and music companies to reach the identified professionals and scheduled interviews with them. Once a small pool of initial informants were identified and contacted, they were asked to introduce other informants through their social networks.

<div align="center">In-Depth Interviewing</div>

Conducting interviews is one of the most common methods chosen by qualitative researchers to understand a cultural phenomenon (Fontana & Frey, 1994; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Qualitative researchers believe that the (re)construction of people's knowledge and experiences helps people understand the phenomenon (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001). Thus, interviews aim to gather the opinions of the interviewees regarding the subject that a researcher studies, and help "to retrieve their experiences from the past, to gain expert insight or information, to obtain descriptions of events that

are normally unavailable for observation, and to create a record of discourse that can subsequently be analyzed" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 4).

Interviews are useful to obtain knowledge through topic-centered, narrative, and biographic conversations between the interviewer and the interviewee. Moreover, conversations helped me more deeply understand relatively recent phenomena (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Mason, 2002). Collaborative interactions between the interviewee and the interviewer are crucial for gathering high-quality data (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Mason, 2002). Mason (2002) argued that social interactions should not be considered as a bias because all respondents would understand and interpret questionnaires in their own way. In this sense, qualitative research focuses on investigating the context or situation involved in an interview. Denzin (1978), however, clarified the difference between an interview and a conversation by noting that "topics are selected not by talkers but by respondents and the interviewer control over the respondent" (p. 171). In this regard, the researcher needs the ability to elicit conversations about respondents' experiences and thoughts about the research topic and to produce ideas and questions guiding the interview (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 172). As Lindlof and Taylor (2002) stated, through in-depth interviews, researchers obtain information about events, processes, and objects in a given community.

The interview method has been adopted in numerous research projects in local cultural contexts. Because the process of globalization is too complicated and multi-directional to be explained within a binary theoretical framework of core and peripheral countries (Tomlinson, 1999), some regional scholars have attempted to explore local audiences' experiences and responses to the global expansion of U.S. cultural products.

Siji (1988) argued that local people do not passively or identically consume Western cultural products. Rather, they prefer to watch local programs or interpret the Western texts from their own perspective (Parameswaran, 1999). Media scholars have insisted that local artists, producers, and even media institutions promote their own cultural products to attract local audiences in order to compete against Western-based transnational conglomerates (Iwabuchi, 2002; Shim D. , 2006). However, globalization scholars who focus on Western/non-Western relationships have often underestimated the emergence of competitive producers and active consumers in local areas (Darling-Wolf & Mendelson, 2008; Iwabuchi, 2002). Globalization research needs to employ in-depth interviews to obtain situational and contextual information from non-Western countries to understand the complexity of the production and consumption of local cultures.

I visited Korea from May 26 to August 4 in 2014. During the visit, I interviewed twenty respondents, including television producers, journalists, music producers, and Korean pop fans in various places including the lobby and office of the KBS' headquarters building, coffee shops, and restaurants in Seoul. Interviewees were chosen from a variety of production sectors in the media and music industries. These informants acknowledged the Korean television production system or experienced the production of the television music program, *Music Bank*, directly or indirectly. After obtaining approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB), snowball sampling was employed to contact interview members of the target group. The interview took the form of interactive, open-ended questions and answers. I elicited conversations about the respondents' experiences and thoughts (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 172). It is a common tactic for a researcher to have informal conversations with interviewees in qualitative research (Fontana & Frey,

1994). The maintenance of a "stance of formal neutrality" is mandatory because interviewees can be pushed in the direction of the interview one way rather than other (Fairclough, 1992, p. 22).

All recruited informants were asked to take part in a one-on-one, audiotaped interview using an open-ended interview guide. After listening to the objective of the research, all participants were asked to complete the consent forms in order to participate and agree to be recorded. Many of them asked me to use a pseudonym in the presentations and publication of this research. Thus, I used a pseudonym in the following chapters. Each interview took from 30 minutes to 1 hour 30 minutes. During the interviews, each informant was first asked to describe his or her experiences regarding the music program production.

The main topic of the in-depth interviews dealt with how the Korean pop boom has influenced the relationship between the Korean television and music industries, and how the increasing popularity of Korean pop music and celebrities has led to the development of partnerships between East Asian television industries. Keeping the socio-cultural roles of KBS' music program in mind, I further asked about changes in the television industry in the process of globalization. How did KBS contribute to holding cultural specificity, despite the dominance of imported television programs in the 1980s and 1990s? What kinds of strategies do Korean television companies utilize in order to survive in the rapidly changing domestic media market? How did Korean television construct globalization in the last decade? How did KBS employ the term *Asian Values* in the network's production strategy during the last decade?

The relationship between television and music industries in Korea was another

important subject in this study. Thus, I moved on to the power dynamics between the two industries. What kinds of programs have been involved in the growth of Korean pop music during the past decade? What is the engine for globalizing Korean pop music? In what ways do television music programs relate to the Korean pop music industry? How does the introduction of the Internet and mobile service influence the status of the music program? How has KBS applied the notion of the public interest to the production of media content? How do these linkages reinforce the role of public broadcasting with the broader concerns of the global cultural phenomenon?

The last part of the interview was about weekly music program production. Interviewees talked about the roles they played and tasks they performed, the narrative and visual strategies they used, any conflicts they faced, and their experiences and thoughts on the transnational interaction of East Asian television industries. After I completed the interviews, I analyzed the data in several stages. First, all interview content was recorded and transcribed into texts in Korean. I read the texts repeatedly and observed the key terms that the interviewees often used. The key terms were transcribed into a new document and were presented as an English translation. These documents were read again to ensure the consistency of key themes.

<div align="center">Examining the Korean Sample</div>

Understanding the intersection of the Korean pop boom, television media, and East-Asian connections first necessitates historicizing the mediation process between social change and media discourse. This study employs critical discourse analysis in order to understand the relationship among the government, broadcasting and the culture industry during the past decade. The body of primary sources includes the government's

export promotion policy, annual reports on the media industry, and national and international news reports on the Korean Wave phenomenon. I downloaded government annual reports from the government and news releases from the official websites of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Korean Broadcasting Commission, and the Korea Creative Content Agency. I then visited the National Assembly Library to gain stenographic records of the inspection of state administration, to download Korean scholarly journal articles and graduate theses, and to read doctoral dissertations from Korean universities. I also employed the news search engine, *Kinds,* which is provided by the Korea Press Foundation, to collect news reports on the global popularity of Korean cultural content and cultural policy. The search engine, *LexisNexis*, was also used to gather international reports on the Korean Wave.

Qualitative interviewing with practitioners in the music and television industries aimed to gather information from individuals who had been directly involved in the production of Korean popular content (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). Gathering the points-of-view and opinions of the interviewees regarding the subject that the researcher is studying is the ultimate goal of in-depth interviews (Fontana & Frey, 1994). Qualitative researchers believe that the (re)construction of people's knowledge, experiences, and interactions help them understand social reality (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001).

Fontana and Frey (1994) noted that how the researcher presents herself is important in the process of interviewing because "after one's presentational self is 'cast' it leaves a profound impression on the interviewees" (p. 367). In addition, researchers must establish trust with interviewees for the success of the study (Fontana & Frey, 1994).

Therefore, I presented myself as a doctoral student studying media and communications in a US institution. However, before informants were asked to decide to participate in the study, I informed them of my professional career as a television writer and critic in order to foster an additional level of trust.

Close rapport with respondents is important for researchers to obtain more and higher quality information. However, as Fontana and Frey (1994) noted, rapport might cause the researcher to be a "spokesperson" for the group studied (p. 367). The knowledge that I achieved while working as a media professional helped me understand the social context of media globalization in Korean society; at the same time, my experience studying US media culture and production systems helped me ground my study within a broader theoretical context.

<center>Triangulation: Method and Data</center>

One of the main concerns in qualitative research is how to increase the validity of the research findings. Thus, a variety of procedures were employed to reduce the possibility of misinterpretations (Fontana & Frey, 1994). In this sense, triangulation, referring to "a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation," is important in raising the value of the research findings (Stake, 1994, p. 97). Denzin (1978) proposed four different types of triangulation: 1) a variety of data sources can be used for a study; 2) several researchers participate in a study; 3) multiple theoretical frameworks are used to interpret a single set of data; and 4) multiple methods are combined to explore a single phenomenon. Patton (1990) pointed out some misconceptions of triangulating data, investigators, theories, methods, and environments among researchers. The consistency of findings across

various approaches is not the only one way of validating research (Patton, 1990). Guion, Diehl, and Mcdonald (2011) also stated that "inconsistencies should not be seen as weakening the evidence, but should be viewed as an opportunity to uncover deeper meaning in the data" (p. 1). Their discussions allowed me to focus on both consistencies and inconsistencies across multiple data sources and data collection methods.

In this dissertation, I employed two types of triangulation: methodological and data triangulation. I first used methodological triangulation, which contains the employment of multiple methods, including discourse analysis and in-depth interviewing. The use of multiple methods in the exploration of a single problem allowed me to demonstrate a mediating process between text, media discourse, and social ideology in different ways (Fairclough, 2003). Using diverse methods in observing the phenomenon heightens the validity of the research. Therefore, this case study used a combination of critical discourse analysis and in-depth interviewing to explore the collaborative connections among the government, public broadcasting, and the music industry in the phase of globalization. These combined methods helped me discuss the transnational expansion of local culture from multidimensional and multifaceted perspectives.

I also used interviewing to validate changes in the program texts during the past decade. Methodological triangulation helped me understand how media texts reflect negotiations between the television and music industries. In this pursuit, I focused on exploring the following topics: First, changes in the ranking system and the order and given time of artist performances can be identified through an analysis of the episodes. This textual analysis helps us understand which music companies and idol groups have become the winners of the program under the specific ranking system, and which are

given much longer performing time. Second, camera operations are the subject in which

the performance directors of music companies have increasingly become involved within

the production of the music program. Third, the issue of who performed at concerts in

China and Japan is related to concert ticket and media content sales. The ranking system

and the appearance of music artists are also important subjects of continuing negotiations

between television networks and music companies.

Data triangulation involves using different sources of information for in-depth

interviews (Guion, Diehl, & Mcdonald, 2011). These sources are the stakeholders of

Music Bank. After identifying the stakeholder groups, such as television producers,

journalists, the music company's staff, and Korean pop fans who became involved in the

program production, in-depth interviews were conducted with each of these groups in

order to gain insight into their perspectives on the environment of program production.

The relationship between the television and music industries and the negotiations in the

program production were explored through various perspectives of different stakeholder

groups. As Guion, Diehl, and Mcdonald (2011) argued, "During the analysis stage,

feedback from the stakeholder groups would be compared to determine areas of

agreement as well as areas of divergence" (p. 1). This type of triangulation, where the

researchers use different sources, is necessary because I investigated how different

stakeholder groups negotiate one another's interests in television production. In particular,

an analysis of inconsistencies in the data, according to the stakeholder groups, is

important in finding the power dynamics in the television and music industries in the

(re)production of the Korean pop boom, including the ranking system, the order and time

of artists' performance in the program, the broadcasting review regulations, and the artists' appearances on the other television programs.

CHAPTER 5

RETHINKING THE KOREAN WAVE

This chapter provides the political-economic context of how governmental actions have been involved in the (re)production of the Korean Wave during the past two decades. Understanding that the political intervention of the Korean government is one of the most prominent impetuses for the country's economic development (Jin, 2011, p. 26), it is pivotal to see a strong connection between governmental action for the globalization of the national economy and the transnational expansion of Korean popular culture. For instance, the former President Young-Sam Kim's declaration in 1994 sparked media attention toward globalization in the effort to strengthen the country's economy. During this particular time, the global capitalistic system and neoliberalism fundamentally transformed the country's governmental policies, industrial relations, and organizational cultures. As a part of this, the Kim Administration devised schemes to promote the exportation of cultural products to the Asian market, executing a variety of governmental-funded projects in the media industry. The government-driven neoliberal economic policies fundamentally transformed the economic system and allowed conglomerates to benefit from "privileged loans and lower taxation" for the enhancement of exportation (Jin, 2011, p. 18).

This government-initiated economy resulted in the ongoing increase of exporting media products and services to the regional market and constructed Korea's national image as an emerging center of cultural production in the Asian region. Given that the global media system has increasingly highlighted the transnational circulation of Korean popular culture, the Korean Wave, referring to the national discourse of Korean cultural

power, has often been used as a euphemism for globalization within Korean society. With the terminological amalgamation of these two imaginations, Korean media have shaped the Korean Wave as a national project. As such, cultural transactions across borders have become a policy issue of national salience in the intensification of globalization.

The presumption that the Korean Wave is composed of and reflects governmental cultural policies allows media scholars to study major shifts in the characteristics and direction of the phenomenon in the mid-2000s (Choi Y.-h. , 2014; Lee D.-Y. , 2014; Jin, 2014). Many have asserted that the first Korean Wave was an unexpected occurrence, and that external market conditions—e.g., financial crises throughout Asian society and the need to find relatively cheap media content—enhanced the exportation of Korean popular products to neighboring countries (Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008). Unlike the early phase of the phenomenon, a number of scholars pointed out that the Korean pop boom, the second phase of the Korean Wave, was created by internal market conditions and political actions that allowed a few favored conglomerates to maintain privilege and monopolies (Choi Y.-h. , 2014; Jin, 2014).

Furthermore, the main body of analyses on the second phase of the Korean Wave gives weight to the international audience's active reception of Korean pop culture in association with the development of the online network system (Hong S.-K. , 2013; Jung & Li, 2014; Kim J. , 2012). Hong (2013) noted that some European fans of Korean popular culture choose Korean media products over American ones, even though they believe that the quality of American media culture is higher. In her argument, it is significant to understand the Korean Wave as a new cultural practice in the digitized era

and to examine what causes these sub-cultural practices outside of the country, moving

beyond an analysis of media texts in Korean Wave scholarship (Hong S.-K. , 2013).

From the production perspective, however, I claim that the Korean Wave should be

understood as a localizing process, which is influenced by ongoing interplays between

the nation-centered and top-down social system and global market logic. In this view, it

is significant to understand the historical and social contexts of the Korean Wave,

focusing on how governmental policies have constructed a hierarchical and

interdependent system between the media and pop music industry, and how this cross-

industrial relationship has shaped the local specificity in the transnational flow of Korean

popular culture and the development of cross-border connections in cultural production.

Hence, in order to understand how the Korean nation has constructed a new cultural

geography in the global media industry, this chapter deals with several questions: What is

the historical process through which the Korean government has promoted the global

expansion of Korean popular content? How does the Korean Wave phenomenon relate to

Korean society's political, socio-economic, geographical, and cultural conditions? How

can the Korean Wave be understood as a global culture? An interpretive analysis of

Korea's cultural policy and the exportation of Korean cultural products in the historical

context will elucidate the phases of the Korean Wave phenomenon as a localizing process

of a national culture.

Whereas previous research has highlighted how the Korean government has

promoted the second phase of the phenomenon by setting globalization as a national

agenda, this chapter expands the argument by focusing more on how the media and pop

music industries have initiatively employed governmental forces in creating their

overseas markets. Analyzing the exportation of cultural content and industrial conditions

helps us acknowledge how and why Korean production actors have sought to construct

intra-regional production connections with neighboring countries in the past years.

Viewing the Korean Wave as Korea's ongoing activities under the force of the global

economic system rather than either an outcome of digital communication advancement or

the emergence of transnational audiences, this chapter provides some insights into

understanding the state actor's power in mapping transnational cultural flows and in

decentralizing global cultural production and consumption.

<div align="center">Globalization as the National Agenda</div>

The economic condition of Asian countries and the proliferation of intra-regional

cultural flows created export opportunities for Korean popular culture in the late 1990s.

At that time, television dramas created the Korean Wave by gaining popularity in China

and South Asia. It was a time when Chinese and South Asian television companies were

looking for something to replace American and Japanese media content due to the pan-

Asian financial crisis. Many scholars understood that the Korean television dramas, *A

Star in My Heart* and *What is Love* promoted early attention to Korean popular culture in

China in the late 1990s (Lee & Jung, 2005; Lee K. , 2008). Later on, this cultural

sensation was expanded to Japan and the Middle East: The TV drama, *Winter Sonata*

exercised a decisive influence in the expansion of the Korean Wave to Japan in 2003, and

the TV drama, *Jewel in the Palace,* had an audience of three billion by this time, with

broadcasts in 89 countries (Lee K.-d. , 2013). However, since the mid-2000s, Korean

pop music, mainly idol group electronic dancing music, has become the main Korean

cultural content in the global cultural market (Lee D.-Y. , 2014). The unprecedented

circulation of PSY's music video, "Gangnam Style," hitting 4.7 billion YouTube views, was a symbolic event showing the global impact of Korean pop (Caramanica, 2015).

Numerous scholars who viewed the Korean pop boom as a continuum of the Korean Wave called it either the new Korean Wave (Choi Y.-h. , 2014), the post-Korean Wave (Lee D.-Y. , 2014, p. 29), or the Korean Wave 2.0 (Jin, 2014). In spite of similarities in the transnational popularity of these two cultural items, some distinct characteristics of the Korean pop boom should be mentioned compared to the first stage of the Korean Wave. First, the transnational popularity of these two Korean cultural products occurred in different technological contexts. According to the Jeju Peace Institute (2011), while Asian television companies had been in control of circulating Korean dramas, the online media have enabled the spread of Korean pop music on a global scale (as cited in Jeon & Song, 2012, p. 36). Second, the Korean pop boom has increased the level of regional connections in the production process (Shin H. , 2012). Korean music agencies established a transnational, collaborative, production system in other societies during the late-2000s. Third, participatory culture, which was constructed by international consumers, invigorated the global spread of Korean pop music. Unlike Asian television drama audiences, international Korean pop fans are relatively active mediators who not only consume Korean popular culture, but also participate in reprocessing and spreading the content (Jin & Yoon, 2014).

Previous research, highlighting the growth of the global media system, collaborative production, and participatory fan culture, has framed the transnational popularity of Korean pop music as either a spontaneous or self-motivated event (Jeon & Song, 2012, p. 36). However, this body of research is subject to criticism by media

scholars in political-economic traditions. Young-hwa Choi (2014) recently pointed out

the possibility of political pressures on the Korean Wave scholarship because the Korean

government funded much of the research on the topic. Her assertion that the Korean

government's involvement is a significant factor in transitioning from the first to the next

stage of the Korean Wave is supported by an allocation of the Lee Myung-Bak

Administration's budget, the enactment of laws and ordinances, and the development of

an administrative support system (Choi Y.-h. , 2014, p. 3). In Choi's (2014) perspective,

it is significant to acknowledge the government's way of publicizing its cultural policies

and financial support, in that Lee's regime financially supported the body of research in

order to show how governmental involvement has extended the Korean Wave from the

television industry to the popular music industry (p. 3).

Korean journalism is another sector that has exhorted the government to improve

the transnational consumption of national culture. The tendency to report the Korean

Wave in the frame of capitalism and pragmatism contributes to constructing a national

mythology of the Korean Wave (Choi & Ryu, 2012; Lee D.-Y. , 2014; Yoon T. , 2002).

Lee (2014) pointed out that the proliferation of news articles focusing on the Asian

fandom of Korean popular culture created the construction of cultural nationalism in

Korean society during the early 2000s (p. 28). This tendency of journalism benefited

some intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences, who wrote about the bright side

of the Korean Wave and conducted government-funded research projects (Lee D.-Y. ,

2014, p. 28). The Korean Wave discourse, which was intertwined with cultural

nationalism in the early phase of the phenomenon, reflects how Korea's social structure,

maintaining hierarchical relationships among the government, academic institutions, and

news organizations, has considerable influence in shaping the ideas and minds of the public with respect to the popularity of Korean pop artists and the continuation of the Korean Wave in the global market (Choi Y.-h. , 2014). Not surprisingly, it is likely that the Korean public imagines the Korean Wave as an organic and natural event due to the influence of government-driven and socially trusted group discourse.

Some scholars in critical cultural studies have used the notion of cultural formation to explicate the relation between governmental actions and the reproduction of the Korean Wave (Choi Y.-h. , 2014; Lee D.-Y. , 2014).[6] Lee (2014) claimed that the Korean Wave advanced to the next level with the cooperation of political, economic, and cultural institutions. By understanding the phenomenon as an active, transformative, and national response to globalizing forces, he criticized the nature and direction of cultural policies that the Korean government has executed in order to push its cultural products overseas rather than to grow the domestic market (Lee D.-Y. , 2014). In this view, although these political economic forces have led the Korean culture industry to improve the quality of its products in some ways, scholarly criticism should be given to governmental projects legitimizing the politicization of popular culture.

Another point of these critiques, mainly made by Asian cultural scholars, is the close relationship between the government and leading conglomerates (Jin, 2011;

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[6] The term *cultural formation* is an adoption of the Marxist concept of *social formation* to the cultural sphere. Williams (1977) highlighted the conditions of the existence of the mode of production in (re)producing a cultural phenomenon. Marxists have argued two issues on the mode of production: First, the ultimate goal of production is to reproduce the conditions of production. Second, the process of production is to retain the productive forces in determinate relations of production. Althusser (1971) argued that the reproduction of the conditions of production depends upon the *social formation* that reproduces the productive forces and the relations of production. His view of *social formation* highlights the hierarchy of social institutions (Althusser, 1971). Later on, Williams (1977), adopting the concept of *social formation* in the exploration of cultural production, focused on how the relations of political, economic, and cultural institutions shape a society's culture (p. 117). He demonstrated that governmental forces influence the practices of cultural institutions.

Kavoori, 2013; Yin & Liew, 2006). They have focused on how Korean media companies have developed global marketing strategies with the government's support. Yin & Liew (2006) pointed out that the main bodies of social power—the Korean government and major television networks—constructed and shared this imagination to maintain their own hegemonies. Kavoori (2013), referring to the amalgamation of global capitalism and national hegemonies that caused the legitimation of government-sponsored cultural events, argued that the government-media relationship was employed as a discursive basis for "state mobilization over national identity and regional nationalism" in Korean society (p. 216).

Apparently, the Korean government has regarded the transnational popularity of Korean cultural content as an opportunity "to sell a dynamic image of the nation through soft power" (Kim Y. , 2013, p. 3). In pursuit of such soft power, the former five administrations, from Young-Sam Kim to Myung-Bak Lee proactively introduced a variety of cultural policies to enhance the export of popular culture. In the following sections, by examining the governmental plans and responsive actions of the popular cultural industry in the past two decades, I provide a policy-grounded explanation concerning the exportation of Korean popular content. What I focus on here is how the transnational flow of Korean popular culture is considerably shaped by the relationships between the government and cultural industries. By doing so, I claim that the national system is a kernel of mapping cultural transactions in a global context, and the Korean case reflects cross-industrial and trans-border amalgamation in the East Asian process of globalization.

The Political Discourse of Globalization

Since the mid-1990s, globalizing forces have changed the landscape of the international community in many ways: First, the global economic system has integrated markets and capital. Second, communication technologies have enabled people to recognize the interconnectedness of societies. Third, media groups have increased cultural flows beyond borders. In these changing environments, local governments have been forced to establish their own strategies in order to survive the global competition. During the given time, four different administrations have run Korean society. The former Korean presidents, from Young-Sam Kim to Myung-Bak Lee, have thus applied the concept of globalization in the construction of national cultural policies. Table 1 is a summary of the major policies that the four regimes have introduced to support the globalization of the culture industry.

Table 1

List of the Korean Government Administrations

Presidency	Incumbency	Major Policy Issues in the Culture Industry
Kim, Young-Sam	1993-1998	▪ Entry to The World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Kim, Dae-Jung	1998-2003	▪ Arm's Length Principle in making cultural policies ▪ Establishing the Korean Culture and Content Agency
Roh, Moo-Hyun	2003-2008	▪ Creating the hub of Asian cultural exchange ▪ Cultural manpower training policy ▪ Developing the infrastructure of cultural production
Lee, Myung-Bak	2008-2013	▪ Establishing National Brand Committee ▪ Renaming the Korea Content Agency ▪ Establishing Additional Cultural Centers Abroad

Note: Adapted from "The formation of the new Korean Wave and the socio-cultural formation in South Korea" by Y.-h. Choi, 2014, p. 52-82.

The Kim Young-Sam Administration (1993 to 1998) was the first government to declare the phenomenon of globalization as a national agenda. Under the three objectives of his administration—democratization, neoliberalism, and globalization—Kim proclaimed 1995 as the first year for the promotion of globalization (Ji J. , 2011, p. 141). As part of an effort to do so, Kim's administration became a member of multiple international organizations, including the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Additionally, the Kim Administration executed a 5-year economic development plan to meet economic advancement and globalization. With the establishment of the Ministry of Culture and Sports in 1993, Kim's regime focused more on the enhancement of the culture industry. In that year, the Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology took note of the fact the Hollywood film, *Jurassic Park*, had an overseas revenue equivalent to the sales of 1.5 million Hyundai automobiles (Shim D. , 2008). Thus, the Board advised President Kim to develop the film industry as a national strategic industry in 1994 (Shim D. , 2008, p. 17). Accordingly, Kim's Administration enacted the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1995 and gave tax benefits to film production companies. This new law enabled major conglomerates, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo, to enter the motion picture industry (Shim D. , 2008, p. 17). Government-backed production companies led to the development of the domestic film industry in the short term. Table 2 shows the remarkable rise of film exportation at the end of the 1990s. The Korean Film Council annual report shows that the total amount of Korean film exportation had increased from 492,000 dollars in 1997 to 3,073,750 dollars in 1998.

Table 2

Korean Film Exports

Year	Amount Exported	Growth Rate	Year	Amount Exported	Growth Rate
1995	208,679	-	2005	75,994,680	30.39%
1996	404,000	48%	2006	24,514,728	-67.74%
1997	492,000	22%	2007	24,396,215	-0.48%
1998	3,073,750	525%	2008	21,036,540	-13.77%
1999	5,969,219	94%	2009	14,122,143	-32.87%
2000	7,053,745	18%	2010	13,582,850	-3.82%
2001	11,249,573	59%	2011	15,828,662	16.53%
2002	14,952,089	33%	2012	20,174,950	27.46%
2003	30,979,000	107%	2013	37,071,445	83.7%
2004	58,284,600	88%	2014	26,380,475	-28.8%

Note: Adapted from "2005 Korean Film Industry," by M. Kim and D. Do, 2006, p. 6, "Annual Accounts of the Korean Film Industry in 2014," by Korean Film Council, 2015, p. 46, and "The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave," by D. Shim, 2008, p. 22.

Shim (2008) pointed out that governmental support did not lead to the structural development of the film industry, and therefore, this increase in sales was temporary. Domestic media conglomerates recognized film production as an unprofitable business. As a result, many of them withdrew their business from the film industry: The SK Group reduced its scale of cultural business in 1998; Daewoo withdrew from the film industry in 1999; and the Samsung Entertainment Group exited the entertainment business in 1999 (Shim D. , 2008, p. 19). These ensuing closings indicated that the government-driven restructuring of the film industry did not put cultural policies into practice.

During the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration (1998-2003), the globalization process of the Korean culture industry was slowing down. The 1997 foreign exchange crisis that the nation encountered had aftereffects on every aspect of society. After receiving bailout money from the International Monetary Fund, the Kim Administration aimed to restructure the national economy under the adoption of neoliberalism. From this perspective, a variety of publicly funded projects were

introduced to increase the exportation of cultural products. One representative example

was the establishment of the Korea Culture and Content Agency (currently named the

Korea Creative Content Agency) in 2001. This government-affiliated institute

established a support system in order to develop the cultural industry. The government

spent ninety million dollars for the institute (Shim D. , 2008, p. 28). According to the

annual report of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2003), it was the first time that the

government employed 1% of the national budget in 2000 (p. 15). In addition, the

Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2001) reported that the Kim Administration published

an annual long-term vision of the Korean cultural policy under the slogan of the Arm's

Length Principle, referring to support without any interference (as cited in Choi, Y-h,

2014, p. 56). In this sense, Lee (2007) argued that, during Kim's leadership, the

government did not weigh in on the Korean Wave in national cultural policymaking.

The trend of global economics moved from a manufacturing-based economy to an

information-based economy in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration (2003-2008) (Lee B. ,

2007). As Internet technology led to the rise of the knowledge-based industry, popular

culture became the national asset to promote the country's national brand in the

international community. In this setting, Roh's regime fostered Kwangju as a hub of

Asian culture in order to enhance cultural exchanges in the East Asian region (Choi Y.-h. ,

2014). Choi (2014) argued that, during the latter years, the Ryo Moo-Hyun

Administration considered cultural products as the engine of global economic growth.

The belief that the quantity and quality of cultural content showed national

competitiveness in the global market was pervasive. Therefore, the project "C-Korea

2010" was conducted to obtain the national goal of becoming one of the top five exporters in the global culture industry by 2010 (Choi Y.-h. , 2014).

In the early 2000s, the Rho Administration prescribed new cultural policy guidelines for cultural exchanges in Korean Wave marketing and the export enlargement of cultural products. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism established graduate schools in cooperation with local universities and helped provide experts with training courses for cultural production (Lee K. , 2008, p. 179). Rho paid attention to developing the production environment by supporting media creators. Similarly, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism subsidized 473 million won (approximately 0.44 million dollars) to independent directors and cable channel providers for their participation in international media markets and hosted international media events (Shim D. , 2008, p. 28).

During the Lee Myung-Bak Administration (2008-2013), the notion of popular culture was transformed into a commodity, and market logic was applied intensively to the promotion of the culture industry (Lee H.-K. , 2013). President Lee clarified his perspective of understanding culture as a business in his inaugural speech by saying, "Culture should be understood as an industrial product. We need to strengthen the industrial basis through raising our competitiveness in the global culture industry" (Lee M.-b. , 2008, para. 9). According to the 2008 operational plan report, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism aimed to establish "the nation with strong soft power and creative culture," and the government prioritized its spending on the development of cultural productions rather than the enhancement of cultural diversity or cultural welfare (Park Y. , 2012, pp. 317-318).

In addition, the Lee Administration employed the global popularity of Korean pop music as a tool to improve the country's national brand in the global market (Choi Y.-h. , 2014; Lee H.-K. , 2013). Lee (2013) argued that the global expansion of Korean popular culture, including pop music and television dramas, motivated the Lee Myung-Bak government to set the reproduction of the Korean Wave as "a global project" (Lee H.-K. , 2013, p. 191). Thus, the government-affiliated organizations completely supported Korean pop groups' performances in Europe (Lee H.-K. , 2013).[7] However, some Korean media scholars criticized the politicization and instrumentation of popular culture. Noh pointed out that the success of these events glorified the government's cultural policies (as cited in Choi Y.-h. , 2014, p. 71). Won and Kim discussed that the cultural policy of the Lee Administration was established within the frame of nationalism, and Korean music agencies joined the bandwagon by packaging Korean pop stars as pillars of the national industry (as cited in Choi Y.-h. , 2014, p. 71).

<div align="center">Three Phases of the Korean Wave</div>

During the last two decades, governmental power has driven the transnational flow of Korean popular content and has accelerated the globalization of the culture industry. Through an analysis of trade statistics and white papers, and policy reports, published by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Korean Creative Content Agency, and Korea Communications Commission, this chapter argues that the exportation of Korean cultural products went through three phases between 1995 and 2014. Each phase has its own characteristics as

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[7] In June 2011, SM Town Live World Tour was held in Paris with the support of the Visit Korea Year Committee, the Korean Cultural Center in Paris the Paris branch of Korea Tourism Organization (Lee H.-K. , 2013, p. 194).

follows: During the 1990s and 2000s, television dramas initiated the exportation of

Korean popular culture to China and South Asian countries. In the late-2000s, Korean

pop groups began leading the popularity of Korean media culture in Japan, Europe, and

Latin America, as well as the United States. By the early 2010s, reality shows became a

mainstay in policy reports and white papers concerning the Korean Wave phenomenon.

By looking at governmental documents and actual export records, this section addresses

how phases of the Korean Wave can be discussed in a way that the government has

begun an effort on a national level to accomplish export enlargement, and such efforts

have paved the way for diversifying cultural items.

The Transnational Consumption of Korean TV Dramas

For the past two decades, the television industry was most affected by the

government's declaration of globalization. In particular, three nationwide television

networks—KBS, MBC, and SBS—recognized the importance of entering into global

markets in order to retain their status in the changing media circumstances. In the late

1990s, these companies had benefited from the pan-Asian crisis, and they later engaged

in promotional activities. After Hong Kong's Asia Television Ltd. (ATV) purchased the

television drama, *What Is It All About* in the beginning of the 1990s, Asian television

companies have consistently shown interest in Korean television dramas (Han & Kim,

2001).   As a result, during the last two decades, the Korean television industry has

shown remarkable growth in exporting its media products and services. Figure 1 shows

the pattern of imports and exports of television programs over the past two decades. The

exportation of Korean TV programs in volume has been increasing during the past two

decades. The total amount of Korean television content exports increased from 5.5

million dollars in 1995 to 336 million dollars in 2014, and the excess of exports over

imports in the last decade has increased.

Figure 1. Annual Exports and Imports of Television Programs. Adapted from "A Study on the Overseas Market of Korean TV Dramas," by J. Park, 2014, p. 12; "2012 Content industry statistics," by Korea Creative Content Agency, 2013, p. 48; "2015 broadcasting industry white paper," by Korean Creative Content Agency, 2016, p. 125.

Figure 1 reflects that the transnational consumption of Korean popular culture is

an ongoing rather than a passing or temporary phenomenon. Moreover, a marked

increase in profits has helped construct Korea's image as a producer rather than as a

consumer in the global television market.

Figure 2. Exports per Content Providers. Exports per Content Providers. Adapted from "2015 broadcasting industry white paper," by Korean Creative Content Agency, 2016, p. 126.

Table 3

Countries for the Export of TV Programs

	Country	2012 ('000)	2013 ('000)	2014 ('000)	Portion (%)	Annual Growth Rate (%)
	Japan	112,088	138,687	79,017	31.1	-16.0
	China	11,000	26,139	56,944	22.4	127.5
	Hong Kong	2,162	8,886	52,694	20.7	393.7
	Singapore	3,108	1,935	3,883	1.5	11.8
Asia	Taiwan	14,588	21,778	15,643	6.2	3.6
	Malaysia	5,577	1,703	1,328	0.7	-51.2
	Thai	4,129	8,379	14,693	5.8	88.6
	The Middle East	2,996	836	619	0.2	-54.6
	ETC	8,748	17,413	18,158	7.1	44.1
	The United States	12,565	9,351	9,232	3.6	-14.3
America	Canada	-	15	-	-	-
	Latin America	247	343	338	0.1	17.0
	France	66	304	643	0.3	211.9
	Britain	143	95	148	0.1	1.8
	Germany	-	18	3	-	-
	Italy	91	155	75	-	-9.2
Europe	Spain	119	29	24	-	-55.2
	Hungary	1,353	-	-	-	-100.0
	Russia	55	94	25	-	-32.6
	Netherlands	1	-	-	-	-100.0
	ETC	1,726	1,155	768	0.3	-33.3
Oceania	Oceania	5	222	78	-	295.5
Africa	Africa	15	66	34	-	50.3
ETC	ETC	197	1,870	1,939	0.8	213.7
		179,719	239, 473	256,276	100.0	18.5

Note: Adapted from "2015 broadcasting industry white paper," by Korean Creative Content Agency, 2016, p. 136.

According to the amount of exports per providers, terrestrial networks reaches 79.6% of the total exports, which reflects the ongoing dominance of major broadcasting networks – KBS, MBC, and SBS—have led the transnational expansion of Korean media content (Korea Creative Content Agency, 2016, p. 126). In 2014, the portion of broadcast television providers in the total amount of exportation has slightly increased from 77.1% to 79.6% (KOCCA, 2016, p. 126). This result confirms that the three main

terrestrial networks have considerably shaped the direction of the Korean Wave in spite

of the proliferation of media platforms and providers in the 2010s. In other words, the

centrality of the three major networks in television program production and circulation

needs to be mainly considered to see how the Korean state has continued the exportation

of popular content and has constructed its national image as one of the centers in the

global media industry.

Another important point is that since the mid-2000s, Korean television companies

have exported their products to various countries beyond Asia, focusing on emerging

markets including the United States, the Middle East, and Latin America (Nye & Kim,

2013). The Korean drama, *Winter Sonata*, was broadcast via the Kurdistan Satellite

Channel throughout Iraq in 2005, which was first time when Korean popular culture

expanded its soft power to the Middle East in a political perspective (Nye & Kim, 2013, p.

34). Nye and Kim (2013) argued that the inflow of Korean television dramas to the Arab

world was led by the Korean government under the political agenda of constructing a

positive image "towards the 3,200 South Korean soldiers stationed in Northern Iraq" (p.

34). In addition, the government financially supported Egypt Radio Television Union to

broadcast *Winter Sonata* with Arab subtitles (Nye & Kim, 2013). These examples

indicate that the Korean government has been deeply involved in the expansion of

Korean television dramas beyond the Asian media market and in the improvement of its

national image in global societies. Nevertheless, table 3 indicates that Japan and China

are still the major importers of Korean media products. Japan formed the largest part of

Korea's TV content exports, reaching 79 million dollars (31.1 %), and China has spent

about 57 million dollars (22.4 %) purchasing Korean television programs. The latest

figures show that, although Korean television companies have observed growth potential in markets beyond the Asian region, the current exports of Korean TV programs heavily depend upon the East Asian market.

According to annual reports of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, television dramas were Korea's primary television exports in the early 2010s. The latest figures suggest that Korean television dramas captured approximately 89.9% of the total exports. Korean television dramas, dealing with Asian sentiments such as family values, respect toward elders, and pure and genuine love, attracted East Asian audiences (Shim D. , 2008). Shim (2008) contended that viewers in developing countries watch Korean television dramas rather than Japanese and American ones because "the former retains traditional values while having achieved the technical sophistication comparable to that of the latter" (p. 27). Korean television dramas have helped audiences construct Korea's national image as a role model in the development of culture and economy (Choe, 2001).

Table 4

Program Genres for the Export of TV Programs

Year Genre	2010 ('000)	2011 ('000)	2012 '000)	Ratio (%)	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Average Growth Rate (%)
Drama	117,344.7	154,616.0	161,500.8	89.9	4.5	17.3
Documentary	3,200.4	1,450.3	8,144.0	4.5	461.5	59.3
Animation	229.0	117.2	44.0	0.0	-62.5	-56.2
Entertainment	4,996.3	10,399.9	7,731.2	4.3	-25.7	24.4
Music	268.5	889.6	1,260.3	0.7	41.7	116.2
Infotainment	271.1	594.2	134.0	0.1	-77.4	-29.7
Education	18.0	10.2	141.0	0.1	1,282.4	179.9
News	-	-	590.0	0.3	-	-
Sports	-	43.6	21.2	0.0	-51.4	-
ETC	746.7	819.7	152.0	0.1	-81.5	-54.9
Total	127,074.7	168, 941.7	179,718.5	100.0	6.4	18.9

Note: Adapted from "2013 video broadcasting industry white paper," 2013, p. 81-82.

Another important point in Table 4 is that music shows are one of the fastest-growing programs in Korea's TV exports. This result reflects the notion that the transnational popularity of Korean pop music was another driving force in the revitalization of the television industry in the early 2010s. The Korean Wave indicates how the television and music industries are intertwined with each other in Korean society. Similar to Korean television content, which provided Asian audiences with an opportunity to consume Korean pop music in the late 1990s, the Korean pop boom in the 2010s has encouraged Korean television producers to create music-related programs appealing to international audiences. The export of television music programs illustrates that the Korean pop music industry has made a huge sensation in the global market within the last few years.

Korean Pop Boom beyond Borders

The exportation of Korean pop music in volume has been dramatically increased the extent to which revenues have soared 135.5% year to year from 2005 to 2011 due to increases in overseas performances and album sales (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 2013, pp. 54-55). In particular, as Figure 3 shows, there was a sharp rise in the exportation of Korean pop music during the Lee Administration; the total amount of Korean pop music exports increased from 31 million dollars in 2009 to 235 million dollars in 2012 (Korea Creative Content Agency, 2013).

Figure 3. Imports and Exports of Popular Music in Korea. Adapted from "2013 music industry white paper," by Korea Creative Content Agency, 2014, p. 148, "2012 music industry white paper," Korea Creative Content Agency, 2014, p. 148, "2012 content industry white paper," by Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2013, p. 252.

Moreover, Korean pop artists have held their concerts in cities outside of Asia, such as New York City, Mexico City, São Paulo, London, and Paris. In spite of the global visibility of the Korean pop boom, Dong-yeon Lee (2014) argued that the notion of Korean pop is still constructed based on its locality (p. 30). Unlike the global image of American and British pop music, Korean pop music styles, as well as their planning, production and circulation systems are closely related with their geo-cultural specificity (Lee D.-Y. , 2014). In Lee's view, although the term Korean pop boom refers to the global popularity of Korean pop music, the implication of the Korean pop boom is based on the indigenousness of local cultures (Lee D.-Y. , 2014). He also pointed out that the Korean pop boom was created in a situation in which Korean music agencies entered into the global market due to financial crisis in the domestic industry. This means that the domestic crisis motivated Korean musicians and producers to overcome cultural, racial, and geographical barriers and to decolonize discussions on the production system and quality of sounds (Lee D.-Y. , 2014).

Table 5

Countries for the Export of Korean Pop Music

Year Countries	2010 ('000)	2011 ('000)	2012 ('000)	Ratio (%)	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Average Growth Rate (%)
China	3,627	6,836	8,806	3.7	28.8	55.8
Japan	67,267	157,938	189,512	80.6	20	67.8
South Asia	11,321	25,691	31,146	13.2	21.2	65.9
North America	432	587	857	0.4	46	40.8
Europe	396	4,632	4,231	1.8	-8.7	226.9
ETC	219	429	545	0.2	27	57.8
Total	83,262	196,113	235,097	100.0	19.9	68.0

Note: Adapted from "2013 music industry white paper," by Korea Creative Content Agency, 2014, p. 149.

If one adopts Lee's (2014) argument on the backgrounds of Korean music agencies' overseas expansion, it is necessary to investigate the structure of the Korean pop music industry during the early 2000s. At that time, domestic music companies experienced the digitalization of music content. Innovative changes in music production and circulation resulted in a remarkable decrease of album sales in the domestic market. In addition, television networks abolished existing music programs. Korean music agencies have employed three different tactics to break out of this management crisis. First, some major companies have attempted to enter into markets abroad in cooperation with local music companies in the market. As table 5 shows, exports of Korean popular music have been dramatically increasing since 2009. This occurred because some idol groups such as TVXQ, Girls' Generation, KARA, 2PM, and BIGBANG have been nationally recognized in Japanese society, which has the second largest popular music market. Table 5 shows that, although Korean pop fandom has been constructed globally and Korean agencies have held their Korean pop concerts all over the world, the main market is the neighboring countries, including Japan, China, and South Asia.

The tactic that major music agencies used was to expand their business boundaries from just music production to total-packaging management in the domestic market. In spite of the rise of Korean music agencies in the transnational market, telecommunication conglomerates still dominate the infrastructure of music production and distribution in Korean society. In order to survive the stiff market competition, major music companies attempted to merge with other film or television production companies.

Due to their market power based on the Korean pop boom, music agencies successfully entered into the television and film industry in the late 2000s. In these changing circumstances, idol group members from the major music agencies could have taken main roles in TV dramas and reality-based variety shows in prime-time, in spite of their lack of acting careers.[8] The expansion of music production to media production paved the way for the establishment of strong partnerships between Korean broadcasting companies and music agencies.

Furthermore, a couple of major music agencies including S.M. Entertainment, YG Entertainment, and JYP Entertainment, and corporate aggregates such as the Korean Entertainment Producer's Association and Korea Copyright Commission began the Korea Music Power (KMP) project in May 2009, which aims to correct the market structure and to increase the rights and interests of music agencies (Korea Creative Content Agency, 2010, p. 17). The companies participating in this project worked together to weather the recession of the recording industry and developed a new profit model, and announced major promotions in the works, including the revision of the

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[8] Lee Yeon-hee, an actress of SME, appeared on MBC's drama "East of Eden" in 2008; Kang In, a member of the male idol group, Super Junior, appeared in the film "Romance Manga"; and Yoon A, a member of Girls' Generation, played a main role in KBS' drama "You Are My Destiny" (Korea Creative Content Agency, 2010, p. 29).

copyright system, the introduction of music awards and reputable music charts, and the improvement of the music content distribution structure (KOCCA, 2010, p. 17-18).   This KMP project reflects how the major music agencies, which are leading the global popularity of Korean pop idol groups, began confronting the ruling powers of the leading telecommunication conglomerates in the domestic music industry. What to consider here is that the KMP project team constructed a mutual aid system that was related to a government body. The music agencies contended that they were willing to participate in the Korean Music Awards, launched by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2009, if winners were selected by using an unbiased judgment standard (KOCCA, 2010, p. 18). Yoo In-chon, the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, announced that the government would make an appropriation of 1,275 hundred million won (approximately 127,500,000 dollars) through the enrichment of the domestic popular music market, the construction of the music industry infrastructure, and the reinforcement of a foundation for industrial growth (KOCCA, 2010, p. 18).

The Korean pop boom was indebted to the changing media circumstances, the transnational circulation of Korean television dramas and the stagnation in the domestic popular music market. However, the exportation of Korean pop music and world live tours has been limited to idol groups of the three major agencies (Lee H.-W. , 2014, p. 5). According to the Korean Creative Content Agency, 56.3% of the total amount of exports in the music industry has been made by ten listed music agencies. It is relatively a high number, compared to other chief items of export in the culture industry, such as broadcasting (36.1%), games (31%), and character (17.7%) industries:

Figure 4. A Share of Listed Companies of Total Exports. Adapted from "Statistics briefing," by Lee, H.-W., 2014, p. 7.

This statistic indicates that the listed companies, mostly idol music agencies

including SM, YG, and JYP, have led the transnational popularity of Korean pop music.

The domination of these major music agencies in exportation has possibly caused the

Korean government to focus on supporting global projects, including world tours and

complex cultural spaces, which have mostly been proposed by the listed major idol music

production companies. Governmental support for the Korean pop music industry has

increasingly weighed on the industrial success of popular music content rather than the

enhancement of musical quality or diversity for the domestic audience. As a result, the

polarization of wealth between idol music and independent music labels has deepened.

Dae-chul Shin, a veteran musician posted his critique on Facebook regarding the current

streaming system of popular music, claiming that the government actually instigated a

"rich-get-richer and the poor-get-poorer situation" in the domestic music market (Lee S.-

H. , 2014). In other words, the dominance of the idol agencies has resulted in the

exclusion of small and medium-sized music companies and local independent musicians

(KOCCA, 2010, p. 18).

Another problem is that Korean music producers tend to focus on monotonous genres, such as electronic and hip-hop for idol groups; as a result, opportunities for musicians in other music genres have been in decline in the market. These veteran musicians have been increasing and enduring most of the economic hardship because Korean performance culture is underdeveloped, and royalties for music downloading and streaming services have not reach their intended recipients.

The Format Trade of Reality Television Shows

Watching entertainment programs requires the audience to have an in-depth understanding of the given society and culture. Thus, Korean companies have been relatively negative to exporting those kinds of programs to other countries. However, in the early 2000s, a few Korean shows—*X-Man* (2001), *Match Made in Heaven* (2004) and *Family Outing* (2008)—were popular among Chinese and South-Northeast Asian fans of Korean media content. The growth of these Asian audiences has made both Chinese and Korean media companies aware of the potential of reality shows in regional markets.

Recently, entertainment shows have introduced another stage of the Korean Wave in East Asia. During the early 2010s, media attention toward the exportation of popular culture in Korean society has moved from the global popularity of Korean idol groups to the growing collaboration between Korean and Chinese media companies. After a huge sensation of the Chinese remake of the Korean music show, *I Am a Singer* in China in 2011, Chinese television networks proactively purchased the television format of Korean reality shows. The Korean news media have increasingly highlighted the format trade of Korean entertainment shows (KOCCA, 2015). This format trade has developed the co-production system between the two countries. Both media industries have preferred

collaborative productions of entertainment programs to importing completed television content.

The exportation of the Korean television format is still in the initial stage. The television format is defined as the basis of a new program that enables television directors to make another season of the program (Moran, 2004). In the late 1980s, the Formats Recognition and Protection Association (FRAPA) introduced a license fee system in trading television formats; thus, a television format as "the set of invariable elements in a programme" (Moran, 2004, p. 5) was commoditized and transnationally exchanged. It was the early 2000s when the Korean television industry participated in the format trade. At that time, Korean broadcasting companies were limited to importing the format of American and Japanese reality shows. SBS, one of the major networks, initially localized the Japanese show, *Solomon's Choice* and *Super Viking* (KOCCA, 2011). KBS' game show, *1 vs. 100* and MBC's *Dancing with the Stars* are examples of such major Korean television networks that have adopted American reality shows (Yang S. , 2013).

The list of imported reality show formats indicates Korea's dependence on Western and Japanese television shows. Only three reality show formats were originally produced by neither Western nor Japanese television companies: MBC's subsidiary cable channel, Every1, localized the Turkish reality show, *Perfect Bride* in 2008; QTV adopted the Colombian game show, *Moment of Truth* in 2009; and tvN remade the Korean version of the Australian dating show, *Love Switch* in 2010. In particular, the influence of Japanese reality shows was fundamental in television production during the 2000s. In the case of the major terrestrial television networks, 70% of the imported shows had originated from Japanese production companies.

Table 6

A List of Imported Reality Show Formats

TV Networks	The Title of the Original Show	Country	Year
KBS	1 vs. 100	Netherlands	2007
	Minute to Win It	U.S.	2011
MBC	Strictly Come Dancing	England	2011
	Nep League	Japan	2008
	Brain Survivor	Japan	2002
	Quiz! Hegsagon	Japan	2007
	The Wall of Brain	Japan	2007
SBS	Viking: The Ultimate Obstacle Course	Japan	2006
	Tochi's Cooking Show	Japan	2003
	Solomon's Choice	Japan	2002
MBC Everyone	Strictly Come Dancing	England	2011
	My Man, Kann	Germany	2011
	Perfect Bride	Turkey	2009
	Love Switch	Australia	2011
	Pop Star to Opera Star	England	2010
	Yes or No	Netherlands	2006
	Triangle	Netherlands	2010
tvN	British Got Talent	England	2010
	Benidorm Bastards	Belgium	2010
	A Quiet Library	Japan	2010
	America's Next Top Model	U.S.	2010
	Project Runaway	U.S.	2009
	Top Gear	England	2011
	Nada m s que la Verdad	Columbia	2009
QTV	Wife Swap	England	2003
	Love Taxi	England	2009
	London Hearts	Japan	2009

Note: Adapted from "A study on the Korean broadcasting program format industry in 2011," by Korea Creative Content Agency, 2011, p. 9.

Table 7

A List of Korean Reality Show Formats Exported to Other Countries

Year	TV Networks	Show	Country
2003	KBS	The Golden Bel Challenge	Vietnam
2010	MBC	We've Got Married	Turkey
2012	tvN	Super Diva	China
	KBS	Immortal Song: Singing the Legend	China
		2Days and 1Night	China
	MBC	I Am a Singer	China
		Daddy, Where Are You Going?	China
		Real Men	China
		We've Got Married	China
		Wonderful Partner	Turkey
2013	SBS	Audition Miracle	China
		K-pop Star	China
	m.net	Superstar K	China
	JTBC	Hidden Singer	China
		Great In-Laws	China
	tvN	Super Diva	Argentina Mexico Columbia
		The Genius	Netherlands
2014	tvN	Grand Father over Flowers	China

Note: Adapted from "What is a television program format? Based on copyright law," by Kim J.-K., 2014[9]

The commodification of the TV format in the global television market led the Korean government to view the reality show format as a new driving force behind the continuation of the Korean Wave. In this sense, the Korea Creative Content Agency has actively supported reality show production companies in exporting TV formats to other

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[9] Retrieved from http://blog.naver.com/hpros/220190081598

societies since 2009 (KOCCA, 2012). In April 2012, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and

Tourism held an event to promote Korean reality show formats at MIPTV (Korea

Creative Content Agency, 2012). The governmental support expanded media discussions

of the Korean Wave, from dramas and pop music to reality shows.

According to the report of the Korean Creative Content Agency, China is the

main importer of Korean reality show formats. The trend began when KBS exported the

format of the quiz show, *Golden Bell Challenge*, to CCTV in 2003 (Korea Creative

Content Agency USA, 2015, p. 4). Since then, ten of fourteen Korean reality shows were

localized in China. MBC led this new movement by developing a close partnership with

Hunan Satellite TV. With the increase of the television program format trade between

Korea and China, media coverage of the Korean Wave focused on intraregional

collaboration between Korean and Chinese television networks. News media have

highlighted cross-border collaborations as the new phase of the Korean Wave.

The remarkable growth in the exportation of reality show formats was made for

two reasons. First, the Chinese government's restrictions on the importation of foreign

media content caused the Korean television industry to focus on exporting the format of

reality shows to local Chinese companies. By localizing the show format, Chinese

companies could appeal not only to Chinese fans of Korean media content, but also to

their national audience. The first notable success in the format trade of Korean reality

shows to other countries was a music contest program, *I Am a Singer*, which was

originally created by MBC in Korea and was later adopted by Hunan satellite TV in

China. This reality show was a smash hit in both societies.   The unprecedented success

of the remake of Korean reality shows encouraged the Chinese provincial satellite

television to seek another reality show format from the Korean television network. Such prime-time shows—*Daddy, Where Are You Going*? and *K-pop Star*—were localized in China. The Chinese versions of these shows broke viewer rating records of the Korean programs previously imported to China.[10]

It seems certain that the success of Korean reality show formats in China has advanced to the next stage, cross-border production between the two nations. SBS, one of the major television networks first co-produced the Chinese version of the prime time entertainment series, *Running Man* with Zhejiang Satellite TV station in 2014. The real-variety show, *Hurry Up, Brother*—the Chinese version of *Running Man*—has drawn a number of viewers; an episode of the variety show drew a 4.2 percent viewership, making it the most-watched show that day (Streamside, 2015). The format trade of Korean reality shows allowed the Korean culture industry to maintain regional power. At the same time, increasing collaborations of Korean media production sectors with Chinese media groups have increased creative migration (Curtin, 2007), which raised another question on how to deal with tensions between the intra-regional mapping in cultural production and the protection of national cultural sovereignty (Keum, 2015). This criticism has emerged when Chinese media production companies have poured money into the employment of Korean top celebrities, producers, and writers (Keum, 2015). Their creative migrations were a direct hit in the Korean media industry, which further have questioned how to maintain nation-bound subjectivity in the rise of intra-regional media collaborations.

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[10] The Chinese version of the show, Daddy, Where Are You Going? Reached an average viewer rating of about 5% and was chosen as one of the hot issues on Sina Weibo, a Chinese microblogging website (Jung, Eun, & Lee, 2015, p. 30).

Conclusion

This chapter argues that a boundary of the Korean Wave is constructed by the dynamics of national ideologies and the industry's reactions. Examining how to construct the social discourse of the cultural phenomenon allows me to capture the ongoing power of state actors over cultural globalization. My focus on nation-states in shaping transnational flows of popular culture is relevant to Kavoori's (2013) argument that the commitment of the Korean government to globalization of the culture industry indicated "the intimacy of global capitalism with national hegemonies" (p. 217). In his view, the Korean Wave as "national assertion on a global stage and as the oft-stated soft power equation to the spread of media hardware (especially LG and Samsung)" (Kavoori, 2013, p. 216) shows how the Korean government, through the politicization of economic effect of cultural exports, rebuilt its national image. By understanding governmental involvement in the construction of the Korean Wave discourse, this chapter analyzed how cultural policies, which were implemented by former regimes (1993-2013), reflected neoliberal market philosophy, created hybridization and intra-regionalization in the Korean culture industry, and brought about the commoditization of popular culture.

Apparently, the historical and political-economic context of the Korean Wave proved that neoliberal market philosophy deeply influenced this postcolonial society. During the given time, the former presidents introduced a variety of cultural policies to promote cultural production, such as the introduction of cultural policies, the allocation of research grants, the construction of media agendas, and sponsorship for international events. Therefore, many researchers have examined the ways in which these political activities helped increase the exportation of cultural content and empowered nation

branding in the international market (Huang, 2011; Kavoori, 2013). In addition, Korean scholarly and journalistic discussions of the economic effect of the Korean Wave were employed to legitimize the ongoing political intervention to the reproduction of the Korean Wave (Lee D.-Y. , 2014). Thus, scholars in critical cultural studies have consistently criticized the politicized imagination of the Korean Wave in Korean society (Choi Y.-h. , 2014).

This chapter furthers the discussion of the Korean Wave, with a focus on the relationship between the political body and production actors. Through an analysis of industrial reports and journal articles about cultural policies and exportation, I argue that the process of the Korean Wave falls into three stages. So far, many researchers believe that the phenomenon has two phases: While the transnational flow of Korean popular content in the early 1990s occurred along with social changes in East and South Asia, the Korean government initiated the phenomenon as a national business in the last decade. Choi's (2014) study claimed that Korean politicians and governmental officials placed the development of Korean popular content at the center of cultural industry policymaking and introduced a variety of state-sponsored events, seminars, and policies in order to increase the exports of cultural products during the 2000s. It is obvious that governmental forces have been deeply involved in the globalization of the Korean culture industry.

I view production actors as another key to understanding the complexity and unpredictability in the flow of Korean popular culture. In this sense, I claim that classification in the transnational flow of Korean popular culture needs to be made by the relationships between producing and consuming societies because the Korean culture

industry, through adopting changes in the market conditions, has made the Korean Wave an ongoing hybridizing process. Based on this definition, it is important to acknowledge that the main items have been changed, according to the level of hybridization in the process of transnational production: Television dramas, popular music, and reality shows. In the first stage of the Korean Wave, Korean television dramas helped Asian audiences imagine Asian ways of modern lifestyles and societies. By the early 2000s, Korean pop music advanced the Korean Wave into the next phase through which Korean pop singers entered neighboring markets in partnerships with local agencies. The adaptation of Japanese pop music culture was one of the main reasons that Korean pop stars—BoA and TVXQ—could succeed in the Japanese entertainment industry.

The Korean Wave has transitioned from the second to the third stage as the Korean television industry has developed an intra-regional collaborative system in order to maintain its status as a local leader in the global market. This third stage allows me to argue that it is too simplistic to see governmental forces as the main reason for the continuity of the Korean Wave. Recent studies show that format sales have been remarkably growing in the global television market, and media convergence has increased the importance of securing license agreements with local-based networks (Jung, Eun, & Lee, 2015). By the early 2010s, however, the intra-regional popularity of Korean reality shows made Korean television networks realize the benefits of coproducing television programs with Chinese television networks, in that revenue from coproduction is much larger than what they could earn from selling television formats. Interestingly, the legislation that the Chinese government has executed to protect the national media culture has promoted the development of collaborative connections between the two

countries. Likewise, although political sectors have become considerably involved in the transnational production, circulation, and consumption of media products, there is still room for media actors to shape the landscape of the media industry. The phases of the Korean Wave thus require scholars to further investigate the complexity between "the economics of political life" and "the politics of economic life" in East Asian connections (Kavoori, 2013, p. 217).

CHAPTER 6

THE SHIFTING PARADIGM OF KOREAN PUBLIC TELEVISION:

FROM NATIONAL PROPAGANDA TO AN EAST ASIAN HUB

In the previous chapter, I articulated the Korean Wave as a process of

hybridization in cultural production within the sphere of governmental forces and global

market logic. For the past two decades, a variety of cultural policies and national projects

were introduced to facilitate the exportation of Korean popular culture; as a result,

production actors have developed television dramas, popular music, and reality shows as

main national items for the global cultural market. Many thus have argued that the

Korean Wave is a cultural formation that the Korean government has elaborated in order

to boost the national economy and to maintain its ruling ideologies. The claim that I

made in the previous chapter is, however, that we should consider the role of production

actors in setting the direction of the phenomenon. In this light, I classify the Korean

Wave into three stages, according to the extent of the connectivity between sending and

receiving sectors. These phases of the phenomenon show how Korean cultural actors

have developed inter-East Asian connections through making a shift in the discourse of

globalization from Americanization to Asianization.

In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the Korean media system shapes the

modernization and globalization of popular culture. Since the early 1990s, Korean

networks have increasingly exported television content, including dramas and reality

shows to China, Japan, and South Asian countries. In my view, the Korean Wave

illuminates the continuing power of the national system over media cultures and practices

in the era of globalization. In particular, the way in which the Korean Broadcasting

System (KBS), the largest and the most influential broadcasting network in Korean

society, has been involved in the reproduction of the Korean Wave, shows the

infrastructural benefits that the Korean media system provides to the company.

In my perspective, KBS, with the production and circulation of television

programs and the launching of new media channels, has played a leading role in the

development of the Korean Wave. After diplomatic ties with China in 1992, the public

network first exported its television animation, *Long Long Time Ago*, to China (Lee &

Jung, 2005, p. 82). In 2003, KBS' drama, *Winter Sonata*, which aired for Japanese

viewers through the NHK channel, contributed to changing Korea's national image in

Japanese society. Recently, in search of new markets, KBS expanded its subsidiary and

collaborative channels, including satellite TV, radio, and YouTube channels, and

produced music programming, such as K-pop festivals and contests. By doing so, the

public network strengthened the role of content distribution in a way to survive in the

marketplace.

From a philosophical standpoint, however, these moves can be seen as KBS

taking controversial steps to pursue profits. As Tracey (1998) pointed out, the key

difference between public and commercial television is derived from the purpose of

program production.   In other words, while producers in commercial networks "make

programs to acquire money," producers in public television "acquire money to make

programs" (Tracey, 1998, p. 18). His argument clarifies the long-standing mission of

KBS in which directors should produce programs for the public good. In this light, KBS

could establish its financing system that the entire nation pays with a license fee. This

funding model was introduced in a shared belief that KBS must be less pressured in production, compared to commercial networks, in order to provide more diverse programming to the public. However, the rise of capitalism and the influence of the global media system brought a change in the norms of public broadcasting concerning program production and circulation. In this chapter, thus, I investigate that change based on the following questions: In what ways did KBS change its ownership, organization, and culture of production over the decades? What was the role of KBS in promoting the exportation of Korean popular content? Why did KBS proactively develop East Asian media connections?

By examining the involvement of public broadcasting in the transnational spread of Korean popular culture, I explicate the dialectic interaction among the global media system, public broadcasting, and the transnational flow of Korean popular culture. What the KBS case study illustrates is that, through an analysis of the television institution in a larger perspective, we can discuss how the global media system has changed the structure of local media industries, and how these changes have increased the transnational flows of local culture. Previous media scholars have had enthusiastic discussions on local responses to global forces. Some have argued that global organizations and actors created a variety of cultural phenomena throughout the international community (Schiller, 1976; Tunstall, 1977), while others have asserted that local actors, such as national governments, national media institutions, national producers, and national audiences, have also participated in the creation of transnational media flows and cultural interactions (Appadurai, 1996; Straubhaar J. D., 1991).

This chapter enriches the strand of critiques on media globalization by moving

beyond the global-local approaches. What I bring here is that the national media system, particularly the national process of facilitating a public broadcasting model, shapes the organization of the media trade to ensure that the prevailing interests in media production are associated with those of the governmental body. Understanding KBS as a central space in leading to the modernization of national culture, I analyze the historical and social contexts in which Korean television has constructed the discourse of globalization, and KBS has strategically utilized the Korean Wave for the reconfiguration of public broadcasting. Through a critical discourse analysis of public broadcasting in Korean society and in-depth interviews with members of KBS, I claim that the power of public broadcasting considerably operates in the globalization of the Korean television industry, and the Korean Wave manifests this fact in the Asian market. By studying KBS in this aspect, this chapter addresses the notion that globalizing forces invigorate the development of inter-East Asian connections in the television industry through the collaboration system between state/public-driven networks, generating tensions about blurring cultural traditions at the same time.

<div align="center">Public Broadcasting in Korean Society</div>

Despite the global dominance of the private broadcasting system, the Korean public still considers broadcasting as a public good (Kim J. , 2005; Paek, Kang, & Lee, 2009). This social perception springs from the long-standing structure of the Korean broadcasting industry. Until the introduction of cable channels in 1995 and satellite channels in 2002, Korean society maintained monopolistic power of four terrestrial broadcasting networks over the domestic media market, and three of the four terrestrial television channels—KBS, MBC, and EBS—entirely or partially operated in the format

of public service broadcasting (Kim H. , 2003, p. 37).

As was proposed by Yang (2004), two ideas clearly explain the structure of the Korean broadcasting industry: "country isolationism and media isolationism" (p. 8). Based on this notion, we can say that the Korean terrestrial networks—KBS, MBC, SBS, and EBS—were not very interested in working with either foreign actors or other media providers. Put differently, they had a scant interest in increasing their profit margin, from either syndication or marketing programs abroad. Instead, the networks concentrated their focus on raising program ratings and increasing advertising revenue in the domestic market for several decades. Due to this distinctive industrial structure, the Korean audience has tended to value public television and, at the same time, to perceive commercial networks negatively (Kim H. , 2003).

Not surprisingly, this public-centered ecology of broadcasting has allowed KBS to retain an unchallenged position in the industry for over nearly half a century. KBS, which was originally named Seoul Television Broadcasting Station, was established by modeling the BBC for its philosophical foundation, ownership, and organization (Paek, Kang, & Lee, 2009, p. 1). The 44th Amendment of the Broadcasting Act indicated that the company has obligations for public broadcasting in the following manner: 1) the realization of the public interest and the independence of broadcasting; 2) a high quality of broadcasting service; 3) the development of television production, broadcasting service, and technology; and 4) the growth of a national culture and the construction of an ethnic identity (Korean Broadcasting System, 2013, p. 42). Such legislative statements display the objectives that public networks should pursue. Likewise, high responsibilities imposed on KBS by the Broadcasting Act have inspired in-house producers and directors

to provide differentiated programming and services to the Korean public, compared to commercial networks.

A number of media scholars have discussed the significance of public broadcasting's independence from external forces to meet the mission of public broadcasting (Syvertsen, 1992; Tracey, 1998). The belief that public broadcasting should have privileges in the financing system so as to protect the institution from market forces was widely accepted in Korean society and, thus, KBS adopted the BBC and NHK's license fee system. The Korean National Assembly granted funding privileges to the public network by establishing Article 64 of the Broadcasting Act (Ministry of Government Legislation, 2015). Concerning the registration of television sets and payment of TV license fees, that law stated that individuals, who possess a television receiver, whether or not watching KBS' TV channels, should pay a television broadcast license fee. This funding model allows KBS to raise money and to carry out the principles of public broadcasting. Of course, this institutional privilege made all members of public broadcasting companies recognize their mission for returning the value of the licensing fee to the public (Syvertsen, 1992). KBS' producers tend to comprehend their obligations concerning the production of high-quality media content (Cho H.-J. , 2014; Paek, Kang, & Lee, 2009). As a result, KBS developed its own goals in production as follows: Focusing more on diverse issues of Korean society, improving the esthetic standard of television programs in the aspect of program planning, acting, script writing, editing, lighting, and general production values, and preserving national cultural values and enriching democratic discussions (Paek, Kang, & Lee, 2009, p. 5).

A review and assessment of operations are a follow-up issue of the TV license fee

system. Public media scholars have agreed that, due to the given privileges, the

performance of public broadcasting must be critically assessed by external organizations

because the license fee system does not guarantee the quality improvement of television

programming (Syvertsen, 1992; Tracey, 1998). The public, who pays license fees and

constructs solidarity with public broadcasting, deserves constructive criticism and

continuing interest and participation in the operation of the network (Cho H.-J. , 2014).

In this perspective, KBS' performances are reviewed in three ways: Whereas a

government agency, the Korean Broadcasting Commission (KBC), investigates how KBS

performs its social obligations, an internal committee, the Board of Governors, observes

the independence and integrity of the company as a public broadcaster (Paek, Kang, &

Lee, 2009). Finally, with respect to taking "the rights and responsibilities of citizenship,"

the civic society monitors the network's corporate operation (Tracey, 1998, p. 13).

One of the main criticisms about KBS has been the consistent, invisible, political

pressures in the process of program production (Cho H.-J. , 2014). The government-

biased news reporting and the appearance of family members of the ruling party in prime-

time shows have often made KBS an object of public criticism. More seriously, the

structural dependence of the company on the government has often created crisis in

performing its duties of public broadcasting. Given that its license and authority

ultimately derive from the Korean government, it is almost impossible for news reporters

and chief editors of the company to investigate the ruling party and present the

government with a critical eye.

The independence of KBS from ideological forces is a long-standing and complex

issue. Kim (2003) pointed out that Korean society opened up the era of mass media

during the military regime, which actively utilized media as a vehicle of promoting

governmental policies and modernism, and this condition considerably outlined the

nature and limitations of the mass media (p. 139). Accordingly, after its establishment as

a government-affiliated broadcasting network in 1961, KBS concentrated on producing

propaganda programs in the early phases of its development (Cho H.-J. , 2014; Lim J. ,

2011). At that time, a number of television programs, including soap operas and

documentaries, helped national viewers construct solidarity with other members of

society by conveying governmental agendas. A key example was the television drama, *A*

Cinema Based on a True Story, broadcast from 1964 to 1985. Dong-Hyun Kim, head of

the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, who wrote the script of the drama series,

promoted governmental policies to viewers of the series (Lim J. , 2011). The first human

interest documentary, *Human's Victory* (1968), also dealt with heroic stories of people

who devoted themselves to state and local communities (Lim J. , 2011). By describing

poverty and hardships as personal matters rather than as national or social problems, this

documentary induced the national audience to neglect issues of social welfare and

individual lives (Lim J. , 2011). As such, government-led campaigns—the New

Community Movement and the Revitalizing Reforms Constitution—were considerably

hailed in the narrative of television programs (Lim J. , 2011).

Many things have changed since the Korean government approved the rebirth of

KBS as a public broadcasting entity in 1973. Although KBS became, in point of law,

independent of the government, the fact of the matter was embroiled in controversy.

Some media scholars criticized that the Jung-Hee Park regime had introduced the public

broadcasting system in order to increase the power of KBS over the society without

losing governmental influence over the media institution (Cho H.-J. , 2014; Jung S. , 1991; Lim J. , 2011). According to Moon (1971), the public corporatization of KBS confirms that the independence of broadcasting is hardly guaranteed in consideration of Korea's socio-political structure and the birth of public broadcasting was merely cosmetic in Korean society (as cited in Cho H.-J. , 2014, p. 111).   However, one point to mention here is that KBS' transformation from a government-affiliated institution to a public broadcasting entity allowed the public to monitor the close relationship between KBS and politicians. The origins of KBS have made the Korean audience concerned about the company's political, financial, and creative independence; therefore, media scholars and civic groups have requested the independence of KBS from the government in an earnest manner.

In the middle of the 2000s, new media environments—globalization, digitalization, and media convergence—brought rapid and far-reaching changes in the Korean television industry. The legitimacy of public broadcasting has been weakened by an expansion of the number of media channels during the past three decades: The introduction of cable and satellite television channels has eroded the foundation of public broadcasting during the 1980s and 1990s, and the growth of broadband services has accelerated the collapse of public broadcasting in the 2000s (Shim S. , 2005). As media technology has encroached on the terrestrial network-centered market, KBS has faced a fundamental question on the legitimacy and necessity of the public media system.

To be sure, the idea of public media derives not only from the paucity of media channels, but also from the belief that a democratic state must have a sphere of open communication. It is one thing to explain why, in spite of such unfavorable conditions,

KBS maintains its symbolic position in Korean society. According to a recent survey, which was conducted by the Survey Committee of Concentration in Public Opinion (2016), 17.5% of respondents chose KBS as the most powerful media in the construction of public opinion. The survey also reported that the network took first place consecutively, along with the results of its first survey in 2013. As the Korean public still sees the value of public media in the post-public broadcasting era, KBS has reconfigured its mission in tune with the new media circumstances.

The Commercialization of Public Broadcasting

Over the decades, KBS has maintained its social position as a "public trustee" (Park N. , 2007, p. 12). The network constructed a corporate image through which a variety of programs have covered social issues of economic crisis, corrupt politicians and juvenile delinquency. However, KBS recently executed structural reform and received stiff social criticism on its commercialized performance, referring to its efforts and funding in new media services. Such criticism was mainly targeted at its KBS 2TV channel. Unlike KBS 1TV, this second television channel operates for gain. Thus, the pattern of programming and services for KBS 2TV derives fundamentally from commercial decisions that deviate from KBS' philosophical foundation.

The operational differentiation between the two channels needs to be discussed in a historical context. The launching of KBS 2TV in 1980 is a distinct example of the hierarchical relationship between the government and KBS. Right after seizing power in a military coup in 1979, former President Doo-Hwan Chun (1980-1988) introduced his media unification policy (Cho H.-J. , 2014). President Chun took control of the media industry through the integration and reduction of media corporations. As a part of this,

he commanded KBS to take over the five private broadcasting companies, including

Dongyang, Donga, Cheonil, Seohae, and Korean FM. Through mergers and acquisitions

of those media groups, KBS started its operation of the KBS 2TV channel. In 1987, KBS

announced its dual program policy in the operation of the two television channels: The

KBS 1TV channel concentrated its energy on making educational and social programs,

while the KBS 2TV channel focused on producing entertainment shows (as cited in Cho,

H.-J., 2014, p. 143). The difference between the two channels in financing program costs

affects the genres and narratives of the programs, and as a result, sparked fierce debates

over the notion of public broadcasting.

Several researchers have claimed that the financial dependence of KBS 2TV on

advertising income has decreased sociocultural and educational programming (Kang H.-

c. , 2003; Jeong, 2004; Park N. , 2007). Kazuma (2002) noted that, due to the

overdependence of advertising revenue, the longevity of programming for the KBS 2TV

channel was much more influenced by viewership. Television directors were forced to

participate in stiff competition for high ratings (Park N. , 2007, p. 16). This second

channel thus attempted to expand its audiences with its prime-time entertainment

programming. The portion of entertainment shows had remarkably increased. According

to the Korean Broadcasting Commissions, 64.7% of the total programs were

entertainment shows on KBS 2TV during prime-time (as cited in Kazuma, 2002, p. 94).

As a result, few could find any difference between KBS 2TV and other commercial-

based television channels in terms of programming (Kazuma, 2002).

The blurring in the production structure of KBS 1TV and KBS 2TV is another

point of critique about the commercialization of public broadcasting. KBS had long

developed a job-rotation system that allowed in-house television directors to make

programs for both channels. This crossing of production sectors over the two television

channels possibly complicates the mission of the company. Although each channel has

its own objectives in program production, directors might not clearly differentiate

between the two goals. In this context, some Korean media scholars have consistently

raised questions about advertisements on the KBS 2TV channel. These scholars argued

that, in order to help KBS implement its obligations, the portion of license fees in KBS'

annual budget should be increased (Kim H. , 2003; Kim M. , 1999; Lim H. , 2009). In

terms of the commercialization of public broadcasting, raising the TV license fee is an

ongoing and hot button issue within Korean society. KBS has requested the need to raise

its TV license fee in order to carry out its mission successfully. What complicates this

issue is that governmental officials and politicians, who can approve a modification of the

Broadcasting Act, may possibly use their power to negotiate with KBS regarding news

coverage of political issues.

KBS World: Media Convergence and Digitalization

Apparently, public broadcasting channels in many societies, more or less are

faced with a crisis in executing the traditional mission of public broadcasting in the era of

media digitalization and convergence. Whereas Betzel and Ward (2004) pointed out that

many European societies have lost social power of public broadcasting in this new media

environment, Flew's (2011) study revealed that the Australian public broadcasting

company has shaped a new role of public broadcasting by employing digital media

technologies in the enhancement of media citizenship and multiculturalism within society.

These case studies allow us to acknowledge that public broadcasting providers have

responded to technological changes in the post-network era differently.

If one adopts Tracey's (1998) assertion that public broadcasting is somehow "an idea rather than a technology" (p. 16), the way that each society develops its own actions to maintain the public broadcasting model is an important subject of analysis in global media studies. In Korean society, the government has been deeply involved in developing a new public broadcasting business model. This political sector helped KBS consider new media environments as an opportunity to refine the network's obligations (Park N. , 2007, p. 14). In particular, the company established subsidiaries, including KBS cable channels, KBS Internet broadcasting, and KBS SKY satellite television. With the increase of subsidiary channels and the enlargement of the boundaries of media services, KBS transformed the role of its main channels—KBS 1TV and 2TV—from that of broadcasters to content providers. The proliferation of subsidiary channels led to the ubiquity of KBS' media products across borders. These changes furthered the need to redefine the concept of public television. KBS 2TV's prime-time entertainment programming and the launch of new media services were criticized by media scholars and journalists in various seminars and conferences. KBS responded to these concerned voices over the mission of public broadcasting, highlighting what it can offer to members of society through media digitalization and convergence.

Recently, KBS has often employed the term *globalization* to rearticulate the notion of public interest. The company's emphasis on the public interest within a global context is, at the very least, an expected step. In a society where the political body takes the initiative in the construction of social discourse, the norms of public interest can be considerably politicized. By the mid-1990s, the political use of globalization, like other

aspects of Korean society, made a huge impact on the television industry. The state

deregulated the television industry through the adaptation of neoliberal policy. With the

establishment of GATT (General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade),[11] Korea participated

in international negotiations for free trade in media services. The rise of multinational

media conglomerates helped the national audience to reconfigure the television industry

as a global business, as well as it forced national broadcasters to enhance their

competitiveness in the international market (Budd, Craig, & Steinman, 1999).

In response to the expansion of the commercial model of US television, the

Korean state has introduced various regulations to protect the domestic market. Such

regulations restrict the amount of imported programs and guarantee terrestrial television

networks a certain percentage of in-house program production (Shim S. , 2005, p. 211).

These governmental actions have been systemic and effective. As a result, Korean

television companies have been able to survive against competition from imported

television programs.

During the economic crisis, the Korean government identified broadcasting as an

industrial foundation and developed media policy to promote the exportation of television

content. After the IMF crisis in 1997, the Korean government focused more on

developing the media industry as the primary force of the national economy (Shim S. ,

2005, p. 209). The journalistic discourse of broadcasting in an industrial perspective was

developed in order to justify governmental involvement for the development of culture

industries. Since then, media policies have been developed to support the exportation of

television programs. The annual plan of the Korean Communications Commission

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[11] The deregulation of trading media content was led by the United States in the 1980s (Shim S. , 2005, p. 207).

elucidated that the reproduction of the Korean Wave is one of the main performance

goals of the agency. Detailed action plans included increasing financial support and

developing the infrastructure of television production and broadcasting platforms. This

government policy direction has influenced the Korean broadcasting industry.

<div align="center">Public Broadcasting and the Korean Wave</div>

The Korean government itself has taken a leadership role in developing media

strategies for commercial ends by introducing new regulation that major networks should

broadcast television programs that were produced by independent production companies

programs at given hours (Ryoo, 2009). This regulation aims to strengthen the

competitiveness of television programs before the open-door policy. As governmental

discussion on globalization has spread to the television industry, there have been

considerable changes in public broadcasting companies. The discourse of globalization

that KBS constructed reflects its political subordination to the current government.

Based on in-depth interviews with employees of the company, I acknowledge that KBS

has actively executed various plans for globalization in response to the governmental

policies during the past decade. In an interview on June 24, 2014, informant H, a

television producer, explained that KBS implemented various projects for the Korean

Wave, which was influenced by the inextricable relationship between the government and

the company. He said:

> When the former president [of KBS], In-Kyu Kim started in his new post, it was
> said that KBS as the best broadcasting company [in society] should keep step with
> the Myung-Bak Lee Administration. The Korean Wave was set for the mission of
> the company in the early 2000s, and was put on the back burner. It was stipulated
> as one of the management targets in 2003. (Informant H)

Many researchers believed that a bond of sympathy developed between the

government and KBS because the ruling party could be possibly involved in the selection of the president of KBS. The board of directors that elects the chairperson of the public network is composed of eleven members: seven members are recommended by the ruling party, whereas four members are proposed by the opposition party. The ruling party can get its preferred candidate selected owing to its superiority in numbers. This current system has been consistently criticized by media scholars and the civic society because a chairperson chosen in such a manner is hardly against the government in the operation of the public network (Cho H.-J. , 2014). In addition, due to the vertically integrated structure of the company, the chairperson's opinions and directions are considerably reflected in the network's programming.

This structural connection implies how globalization has become KBS' primary concern for the past two decades. KBS has vigorously executed governmental plans in a shared belief that KBS' duty is to further national interests. In an interview on July 3, 2014, informant M, who has been working in the Division of Entertainment Program Production, said that numerous members of KBS recognize their contributions to constructing a national image. He added:

> This is not just the objective of KBS. It is also one of the government's ambitions. The content industry is important due to halo effects. In the past, we thought that a ballpoint pen with an English brand name is always better than others are. These days, many people would like to learn Korean language. Except for China and Japan, [the Korean Wave] is still considered a culture of resistance in many societies. In those societies, [fans of Korean popular culture] are not sons and daughters of upper-class families. […] However, these teenagers will be the driving force of the society at some point. You can see how the Korean Wave has changed the image of Korea in Japanese society. The image of [Korean men] was changed from a jackass who plays pachinko to a handsome boy [in Japan]. It is an important business because of its long-term effects; thus, we should keep doing the business, even though we lose money. (Informant M)

The company launched its international satellite channels in 2003. This satellite channel, KBS World, reaches Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and America. In addition, the company has radio satellite channels that offer eleven different language services to listeners worldwide. So far, KBS runs three television and seven radio channels domestically, as well as satellite channels, KBS World TV and radio, internationally. The development of online and mobile media forms enhances the transnational distribution and consumption of media content produced by KBS. Satellite channels gained an international reputation when their programs became popularized in Asian countries during the past decade. These satellite-broadcasting channels have considerably expanded the field of business; moreover, they have changed the quality of program content and have reshaped the obligations of public broadcasting. These changes indicate that satellite broadcasting has considerably helped the expansion of KBS in the international market.

KBS concentrated on the development of multichannel platforms (Tak, 2004, p. 70). KBS' subsidiary channels have functioned as a window for exposing KBS' entertainment programming to international audiences (Lotz, 2014). In particular, the public network employed Taiwan as a test market in order to obtain knowledge on how East Asian audiences respond to their programming. Likewise, KBS could retain its social and industrial status with active responses to changing media circumstances. Adopting the commercial television model through media convergence has reconfigured KBS' public interest in connection with globalization; additionally, it has enabled KBS to reclaim its own socio-cultural legitimacy by being transformed into transnational media.

Tak (2004) explicated the ways in which KBS has developed its global marketing

strategies. Above all, the company enhanced its efficacy, creativity, and independence through the restructuring of the corporation. Since its establishment in 2004, the Global Center has managed various international projects, including global marketing, promotion, international and satellite broadcasting, and has developed partnerships with foreign broadcasting companies (Tak, 2004, p. 70). The main business of the global marketing team at the Global Center has been to develop the company's brand image and market property (Tak, 2004). These various actions indicate that the company embraced globalization of the broadcasting industry and attempted to retain its power in society.

Moreover, KBS established the Global Center for the Korean Wave in the early 2010s to develop products and services targeted at international fans of Korean popular culture On July 9, 2014, I met with informant P, a television director, who stressed the collaborative nature of the Global Center. He said:

> The Global Center for the Korean Wave became a presidential body two years ago. The planning team had twelve officials who were recruited from different departments, including administrators, announcers, journalists, and directors. I managed to publish the magazine, *K-Wave*, which was distributed to 137 countries. The division also held the K-pop World Festival, which invited Koran pop fans from various countries to perform K-pop dances on stage and many academic seminars, including PSY research. […] The Center was established because KBS is a public broadcasting provider and the largest broadcasting company [in Korea]. [The company has a responsibility] to introduce the *Korean Wave* to other societies. (Informant P)

What the Global Center has shown is that KBS restructured the production system in order to increase its revenue from the international market. In this new setting, television directors and writers began considering both international, as well as domestic audiences in the pre-production stage. KBS television dramas and reality shows have thus attracted audiences in various Asian countries. KBS' success abroad has been

employed to promote the role of public broadcasting to the domestic audience. The company has framed the transnational popularity of Korean media content as the nation's cultural empowerment and has justified the foundation of public broadcasting. Of course, this atmosphere has influenced company employees' attitudes toward work. In the interview, informant H stated that employees tend to identify KBS as the leader of the Korean television industry, which is deemed a positive factor for the Korean Wave phenomenon. He explained:

> Members of KBS share a strong belief that they should lead everything. […] There is definitely a cynical point-of-view about the atmosphere. However, they are motivated to achieve something. The entertainment industry views television media as a catalyst or mediator to boom up the *Korean Wave* phenomenon. The members of KBS take their role more seriously than the other broadcasting companies. They think that they [KBS] should do it. (Informant H)

A wide range of research supports the transnationalization and marketization of public broadcasting in Korean society. KBS took more responsibility than other television networks for managing its status in the global media (Tak, 2004, p. 63). According to Tak (2004), in this process, the corporate image of KBS is closely related to the nation's image, identity, and competitiveness in the international community, and KBS has taken responsibility for constructing Korea's positive image (p. 63). Major Korean television networks should cooperate with one another in order to survive the global competition (Heo, 2005, p. 94). His argument indicates that members of the society give priority to national interests. In this sense, major networks develop their coalitions for the international market over the competition in good faith in the domestic market. In the process, public television paradoxically strengthens its function as a national medium.

Furthermore, with the transnational fame of the drama, *Winter Sonata*, KBS recognized that vertical integration is the key to maximizing returns. Therefore, during the 2000s, KBS actively penetrated the regional media market by selling a variety of media-related merchandise, such as books, albums, and travel packages. Similarly, as Korean pop music was increasingly consumed by international fans, three major networks held a number of events, including live concerts and fan meetings in Europe, Latin America, and the United States. By appearing in those festivals and events, Korean music agencies could maintain amicable relations with television networks. Likewise, the Korean Wave considerably contributed to creating media giants in the Korean broadcasting industry. Then, these media conglomerates aimed to obtain higher profits, which is the nature of a capitalistic society (Tetzlaff, 1991). The Korean public media corporations, transforming regional fans of Korean popular culture into regular consumers of their products and services (Shim D. , 2006), have developed their power in both domestic and global media industries.

<p style="text-align:center;">*The Korean Pop Boom Changed TV Production*</p>

KBS has constructed its image as the national medium in which various programs, such as television dramas and entertainment shows, are deeply involved in modernization and social unification. Lim's (2011) study showed that the core values of KBS' prime-time dramas deal with family stories reflecting modernization. Put differently, these dramas have contributed to sharing the image of a modernized family, nation, and ethnic group throughout society during the post-war period and have become a site for enhancing an understanding between social strata (Lim J. , 2011, p. 134). Similarly, long-lived entertainment shows, such as *National Song Contest* and *Open Concert*, which

allow the national audience to consume popular music, have helped form a cultural consensus among generations. An executive producer claimed at an interview that the main objective of show production in the company was, for a long time, to enhance intergenerational communications among members of society. He said:

> We [directors] often talk about public accountability in program production because television license fees appropriate 40% of production costs. KBS 1TV channel, as a national medium, produces music programs, such as *Open Concert, 7080*, and the *Scent of Korean Traditional Music*, and KBS 2TV channel puts an emphasis on producing content for younger generations. The objective of producing [KBS entertainment] programs is generational integration by sharing the latest [Korean] culture. The target audience of *Gayo Stage* is the 60s and 70s, *7080* for the 40s and 50s, *Open Concert* for the 20s and 30s, and *Music Bank* for teenagers. […] While watching *Music Bank*, mother generations understand youth culture and younger generations learn about popular music of the past. During a relatively long time, we [KBS] secure space for generational integration. (Informant M)

The capitalist system, however, has made production actors of KBS change their objectives of media production. In-house directors, regardless of their specialties, are pressured to produce popular programs, beating other stations' programs. One of the changes in the network was to develop a mutual-assistance structure in program production. Because the network's annual revenue hangs on the success of prime-time dramas and entertainment shows, many late-night and morning talk shows often invite leading actors of prime-time dramas and shows. Some have argued that the top-down structure of Korean television networks contribute to invigorating collaborative production across departments. In an interview on June 13, 2014, a television director stated that higher-ranking producers mainly instigate collaborations across departments. Informant C said:

> Chief producers closely consult with each other for promoting dramas and

entertainment shows. If I were in charge of directing the comedy show, *Gag Concert,* in a show production team, I might call a colleague [who joined the company with me at the same time]. However, interaction with directors in the different departments is minimal. Thus, in general, the chief producer makes arrangements [with other chief producers to make the deal]. (Informant C)

The Korean pop boom that emerged in the early 2000s accelerated the integration between television drama and music show production. This occurred when several Korean pop music groups made huge sensations throughout Asia. In an interview on June 13, 2014, a planning producer of television dramas at an outsourcing company talked about the current power of Korean pop stars in television drama production. She explained that their market power in East Asian countries, including China and Japan, forces television directors and writers to cast them in television dramas and sitcoms, regardless of their acting skills. She added:

> We do not plan a new drama for idol members. However, we cannot help casting idols if we create a male character in his 20s. Many idol music agencies support their idol members to complete acting programs. We prefer them because casting idols definitely helps international sales of the dramas. Particularly, [this strategy] works in Japan, which is still the biggest business partner. […] Casting is a very important factor in being on the air. Major broadcasting networks prefer idols over unknown, but competent actors. (Informant D)

Despite the fact that KBS 2TV is a public broadcasting channel, it also requires in-house producers and directors to find external financial sources in order to produce blockbuster dramas. Drama directors who must attract investments are forced to cast Korean pop stars for prime-time dramas and entertainment shows. Although casting actors have always been the right of drama directors, they do not have a wide range of choices these days. The two interviewees provided a couple of examples that show the involvement of Korean pop stars in liaising for investors:

The drama, *Inspiring Generation* (KBS, 2014)*,* was a ten-million-dollar project. This kind of big-budget drama could be produced only when we cast a *Korean-Wave* leading star like Hyun-Jung Kim. The project went off well because Kim liked to do it. Japanese companies invested the project. (Informant C)

Investments of foreign capital are flowing into [the Korean broadcasting industry]. Mostly it came from Japan. […] Japanese advertising agencies and distribution companies like Hakuhodo, which have a close connection with Japanese broadcasting networks, invest money in producing Korean television dramas. In the decision-making process, Japanese advertising and distribution companies are interested in casting rather than the story. If a Korean outsourcing production company succeeded in casting Geun-Seok Jang, Japanese investors would participate in the drama production even before seeing a synopsis of the drama. […] In the case of a ten-million-dollar project, half of the total budget will be spent in casting actors. (Informant D)

The recent concern of television drama or show directors involves the different reactions of domestic and international audiences about casting idols for the main characters of their programs. Interestingly, many Korean pop stars have a low profile in Korean society, which contradicts their international popularity. This gap creates troubles for television directors in program production and distribution. Informant M, an executive producer, argued that show directors of the network invite top idol group members to popular programs in spite of their relatively weak competitiveness in the domestic market. He said:

The appearance of idol members does not guarantee the success of the entertainment programs. There is no connection between high ratings and the appearance of members of TVXQ, Girls' Generations, and Big Bang. The show becomes successful when [the narrative of the show] arouses sympathy from the audience. […] The reason why the director casts idol members is to sell their programs to overseas markets. In addition, the guarantee for idols is cheaper than that for top actors. [..] We do have a partnership with [music companies], but it is not that helpful to increase the company's profits. (Informant M)

Casting Korean pop idols, however, has often resulted in the fatal failure of

prime-time dramas and entertainment shows—*Mary Stayed Out All Night* (2010), *Poseidon* (2012), *Marry Him If You Dare* (2013), and *Prime Minister and I* (2013)—in the domestic market. What is worse, such failures could possibly provoke criticism of the public broadcasting company's ignorance of the domestic audience. The inflow of foreign capital has considerably influenced the landscape of public broadcasting production; as a result, it has become difficult for drama directors to produce television dramas based on the extent to which the program quality satisfies the domestic audience's expectations.

<div align="center">The Politics of East Asian Public Broadcasting</div>

Experiencing the transnational consumption of Korean popular culture, major broadcasting networks increasingly contextualized themselves within the global media system. In the process, those leading domestic broadcasting companies have shifted their interests from the American and European markets to Asian ones. Many have argued that the rise of inter-Asian cultural connections is made on the basis of a similar trajectory in the amalgamation of globalization and modernity in the industry (Jung S. K., 2009). Keane (2004) contended that East Asian television industries have vigorously adopted technologies, formats, and cultures from one another for decades. He employed Braithwaite and Drahos' (2000) notion of modeling in the description of a close interconnectedness of media infrastructure in the region (Keane, 2004, p. 14). For East Asian countries, *modeling* refers to symbolic interpretation and reproduction rather than mimicry and imitation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000, pp. 539-543). If one focuses on the negative aspect of modeling, such as plagiarizing or know-how stealing, he or she might not acknowledge how East Asian media companies have developed their co-production

systems and have enhanced their power in the global television market within a short

period (Keane, 2004, p. 14). The East Asian media industry thus presents a different

context of cultural adaptation and recreation between local societies.

It was the mid-2000s when the Korean broadcasting industry actively interacted

with other East Asian television networks. Until then, major Korean networks were not

interested in the construction of a mutual-interdependent system within an Asian regional

bloc (Yang E.-K. , 2004; Jin & Lee, 2012).[12] However, during the past decade, industrial

changes—the growth of cable and total TV programming channels—have threatened the

dominance of terrestrial television networks in the domestic market. Due to this crisis,

major television networks have sought to export television programs to neighboring

markets. Accordingly, they put an emphasis on the connectedness of East Asian cultural

markets. Regardless of political and social tensions, they have executed some

collaborative projects with their neighboring partners. Informant E, a radio director,

talked about increasing collaborations with Chinese media companies:

> The department of global business launched a radio program targeting Chinese
> audiences. The director of the program cast Chinese members of EXO. This
> program is a broadcast on the cable television channel, MBC Music, and is
> available for download in China. (Informant E)

Like other networks, KBS has actively elaborated on the construction of the East-

Asian media community. In this process, KBS was requested to redefine the concept of

public interest by providing a twofold direction of international universality and national

specificity in the operation of the company (Kim, Lee, & Yang, 2008, pp. 71-72). These

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[12] Yang (2004) explained the characteristic of the Korean television industry as state unit-ism and media unit-ism. Media unit-ism refers to the Korean television industry's active launching relations with other kinds of media industries, while State unit-ism means that the television industry depends entirely on the domestic advertising market (Yang, 2004, p. 31).

moves could be understood as an attempt to reconstruct the foundation of public broadcasting in the framework of media globalization. Under these two goals, KBS invested intensively in producing high-quality documentaries in the beginning of the 2000s. Such documentaries emphasized the importance of the past in the process of finding a way to the future (Kim, Lee, & Yang, 2008).

Since then, KBS has shown its consistent interest in the development of intra-regional connections. That action reflected the regime's efforts to make media products become one of the state's strategic commodities. Commonly, at the beginning of the New Year, KBS announced special documentaries as the network's primary projects. Much investment was made to produce several documentaries about the Asian-centered history of civilization—*Mongolian Route*, *China*, *Noodle Road*, and *Ancient Tea Route*—during that period. The network attempted to achieve this purpose by targeting the regional market, where Korean television dramas had created the Korean Wave in the mid-1990s. These special documentaries hailed the way in which KBS developed intra-regional connections that promoted dynamic interactions of their cultures. These bigger budget programs in some ways were intended to construct public discussions on the benefits of Asian connections in globalized societies.

Furthermore, KBS has gone on to develop partnerships with public networks in neighboring countries, China Central Television (CCTV) and the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK). KBS has maintained a channel of communication with these neighboring public networks concerning co-production, copyright, and content cooperation (Korean Broadcasting System, 2002, pp. 18-19). The issue I consider here is not how the East-Asian public media alliance was constructed, which too often

highlighted the growth of the pan-East Asian market in the global media industry, but how these intra-regional connections harmonized the conflicts of interest among societies. There is, of course, much to be associated with the historical tensions between Korea and China, and Korea and Japan. Informant M, an executive producer, said that regional connections in television production have distinct limits in reality, due to the clash of opinions. He added:

> Media connections can only be made when [Korean cultural products] have commercial value within the [Japanese] society. […] NHK earned about 3.5 million dollars with the huge hit of the television drama, *Winter Sonata*, in Japanese society, whereas KBS made two or three hundred thousand dollars. [The Japanese Broadcasting Network] imported Korean dramas to earn money; however, the *Korean Wave* dramatically decreased the extent to which the major Korean cultural business district, Shin-Okubo, was almost dead. As [the Korean Broadcasting Company] became outspoken in their demand, the Japanese one increasingly rejected the deal.

> [The Chinese government] is not delighted to see the expansion of minority cultures. If the popularity of Korean culture exceeds the government-approved level, regulations will be made to control the phenomenon. Do you think that it is possible for EXO to make a profit in their concert tour in China as much as TVXQ did in their concert event in Japan? I do not think that they [China] are willing to accept the establishment of the co-production system. There is a branch office of CCTV at the building of KBS, while KBS does not have its branch office at CCTV's headquarters. This is a direct example that reflects the difference of status [between them]. (Informant M)

The main point of his critiques is that, whatever directions KBS develops its intra-regional collaborative connections with NHK and CCTV, KBS cannot take a leadership position. In his perspective, East Asian media connections indicate that the dynamics of the transnational media system are influenced by domestic, economic and industrial conditions, including the size of the domestic media market. In spite of the domestic market-driven and unequal structure, these neighboring countries increasingly collaborate

to produce media products for different reasons. The Japanese media industry needs to

revitalize its domestic economy through the adoption of foreign culture, while the

Chinese broadcasting networks attempt to initiate their own advanced production culture.

Although there are reasons why these East Asian public broadcasting providers maintain

their relationships, informant H, a television director, has a negative opinion concerning

the future of these intra-regional connections. He claimed that the lack of mutual

interests and the differences in industrial structures discourage Korean television

producers and directors from coproducing content with neighboring actors. He added:

> There is a high negative perception of collaborations [at KBS]. Previous
> experiences cause them [directors] to think that, if they co-work with people who
> are deficient in production skills, they will have unsatisfactory results. There is
> certainly an atmosphere in which [KBS] is willing to collaborate with
> [neighboring broadcasting networks] in terms of cultural exchange. However, it
> does not mean that they expect to produce a high quality of programs through the
> collaboration. There are cultural differences. We [Korean media production
> culture] have changed so quickly. (Informant H)

While this stiff criticism is originating from within the production department,

KBS has increasingly carried forward collaborative production with neighboring public

broadcasting companies. In early 2015, KBS announced its annual plan to coproduce a

historic documentary series, *Imjin War*, with CCTV (KBS, 2014). Both agreed to share

the production costs, to be on simulcast in both countries, and to co-promote the program

in the global television market. Despite the uncertainty of the Chinese government's

open-door policy and the unwillingness of internal production actors, KBS consistently

collaborates with the leading Chinese broadcasting company. At the same time, the

company does not neglect to enhance its relationship with NHK in program production.

This government-supported company increasingly co-produced media programs with

Korea and China (Jin & Lee, 2012). These actions reflect KBS' enthusiasm and plans to develop pan-East Asian connections and to centralize the region in the globalization of the media industry.

Until the 1980s, many Asian societies maintained their integral system of state/public broadcasters, leading to the development of a national economy, cultural modernization, and the construction of a social identity (Kim Y. , 2008). Thus, these countries maintained a high percentage of domestic production, and they were reluctant to mutually exchange media content with other countries (Varis, 1984; Waterman & Rogers, 1994; Yang E.-K. , 2004). For example, Singapore has activated foreign capital inducement; however, it employed an exceptional clause in its domestic satellite broadcasting industry. Japan strictly limited foreign capital inflows to terrestrial broadcasting companies, along with and drama and animation productions. Moreover, Korea had imposed strict controls on imported television programs (Lee & Jung, 2005, p. 84). These actions were definitely designed to protect these respective countries' domestic industries, and a variety of media policies were introduced to meet the governments' objectives to reduce the influence of American media products in their domestic markets (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 87).

Recently, this state-centered structure of broadcasting has been influenced by media globalization. I approach the rise of intra-regional connections in television production with Hettne's (2005) assertion that Asian countries, due to their mutual dependence, developed supranational collaboration systems. The rise of intra-regional connections in the regional media industry can be discussed in two ways: De-westernization (Curran & Park, De-westernizing media studies, 2000) and de-

essentialization (Moran & Keane, 2004). The former focuses on the core value of national media systems, while the latter pays attention to the internationalization and interdependence of media systems within the region (Moran & Keane, 2004, p. 12).

Let me intersect the two different approaches in order to explicate why the interdependence of East Asian media systems ultimately highlights the ongoing power of the national media system. Yang (2004) claimed that an emphasis on the connectedness of Asian societies was made to protect the domestic television industry, and this rhetorical and practical focus on regionalization should be understood as a strategic response of East Asian societies to media globalization. The Asian-Pacific Broadcasting Union annual conference, which was held in November 1994, was a case to show how Asian countries coped with the global media system. At the event, Asian television producers shared the need to create more attractive content for domestic audiences in order to resist the invasion of American media products. Since then, Asian media actors have considered television programs as a transnational commodity, and their changed perceptions have led to a paradigm shift from nationalism to transnationalism in Asian media cultures and practices (Yang E.-K. , 2004). In this light, the construction of East Asian collaborative production systems should be understood as local actors' recognition of geographic values (Choi J. , 2010).

In terms of the development of intra-regional connections, what to consider is that KBS has maintained its power in determining the range and level of collaborative productions. When the former journalist, Yeon-Joo Jung became president of the company in 2003, KBS paid much attention to build up its brand power in the global broadcasting industry (Tak, 2004, p. 77). In terms of this goal, the company attempted to

collaborate with globally known state/public channels—the BBC, NHK, and CCTV—in television production and this globalization strategy was somewhat effective in enhancing the brand awareness of KBS in the international community (Tak, 2004, p. 75). While working with these public media companies, KBS increasingly produced programs about common topics, such as the coexistence of human civilizations, cultural diversity, and natural disasters. Furthermore, KBS has proactively assisted in constructing media infrastructures in developing countries (Tak, 2004). Establishing its business target as transnational media, KBS has shared technological knowledge with broadcasting companies in developing regions of the Asian community (Tak, 2004). For example, in the development of relationships with South and Central Asian media companies, KBS has expanded its range of intra-regional interactions beyond East Asia and has constructed its image as a leading broadcaster in the Asian market.

Tak's (2004) article shows how KBS has become a central site of Asian media production by creating collaborative connections within and beyond the East Asian region and has taken a pivotal role in the globalization of Korean media cultures and practices. The political, economic, cultural, and geographical interdependence of the East Asian media industries is an important consideration in understanding the process through which KBS has promoted the Korean Wave by establishing systemic and institutional connections with Chinese and Japanese media actors. However, in my view, it is more important to see that KBS' globalization strategies and actions confirm the significance of the national media system and policy in shaping the contours of trans-local and intra-regional media transactions.

Conclusion

Building upon Tracey's (1998) argument that the fate of public broadcasting is considerably influenced by contemporary ideologies (p. xv), this chapter examines the context that technological, industrial, and economic transformations reshape the philosophical and socio-cultural terms about public broadcasting in Korean society in order to foresee the future of public broadcasting. As Tracey (1998) noted, the term "customer" that BBC executives have recently employed in their public speeches displays its deviation from the original idea for founding the corporation. In other words, we should identify "the shakiness of the very idea of a 'public good' and 'public interest'" as the most substantial problem that public broadcasting has faced in the era of globalization and digitalization (Tracey, 1998, p. xv).

Similarly, the argument that I have made in this chapter delineates how the global popularity of Korean popular culture has invigorated the transformation of KBS from national to transnational media. The transnational production system that KBS has developed during the past decade helps us clarify how the public broadcasting provider in local society has put itself onto the global stage. As Appadurai (1996) argued, the dynamics of cultural flows are considerably shaped by a society's structural and historical contexts. From his perspective, it is necessary to comprehend what caused the national broadcasting channel to have dramatically increased its cultural transactions across East Asian societies. Jung (2009) argued that the rapid growth of the Chinese economy sparked off the discussion of the East Asian cultural community,[13] and brought the paradigm shift from the US/Europe to Asia in the world economy. The three nations—

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[13] East Asia is a geographic notion that centers on China, Japan, and South Korea, and additionally includes North Korea and Far East Russia (Jung, 2009).

China, Korea, and Japan—represent 21.49% of the world's economic output, forming an independent economic bloc such as the European Union, with increased intra-regional transactions in the aspects of technologies, finances, and cultural products (Jung S. K., 2009, p. 235). These political economic integrations among the three countries have invoked state/public broadcasting providers to construct a collaborative system in order to foster intra-regional cultural flows.

Nevertheless, understanding the East Asian connection as a mutually beneficial decision in the political economic context is too simplistic to explain the reason why local actors embrace neighboring media cultures and systems. In this view, many studies have asserted that Confucianism, which has long influenced the lives and perspectives of people in the region, led to the construction of the East Asian cultural community (Heo, 2005; Iwabuchi, 2010). In addition, the increase of intra-regional collaborative media productions has created "conceptual spaces for East Asia" (Jin & Lee, 2012, p. 37). In this standpoint, the Korean Wave can be understood as an example of the construction of the regional cultural community and space rather than as one-way cultural flows from Korea to other East Asian countries (Yang E.-K. , 2004). This body of scholarship has largely taken Straubhaar's (1991) idea of cultural proximity, asserting that audiences tend to consume media products produced in the region. However, Yang (2004) argued that the concept of cultural proximity, in spite of its clarity and usefulness, does not fully explain the complexity of East Asian media industries. She noted that the concept of cultural proximity helps scholars identify cultural similarities in examining the regionalization of the culture industry. However, the shared awareness of East Asian cultural similarities has been constructed among regional audiences, given that more

people can afford to consume popular cultures, thus leading to a similar level of modernization rather than similarity of East Asian cultures or values (Yang E.-K. , 2004). This means that East Asian modernization has helped audiences construct the comfort and familiarity of East Asian culture and has resulted in the mutual-assistance system in solving political, economic, and cultural issues (Yang E.-K. , 2004).

East Asian media studies have always paid attention to the cultural context that Asian modernity was constructed through intra-regional cultural traffic of popular culture (Iwabuchi, Muecke, & Thomas, 2004, pp. 1-2). Choi (2010) persuasively proposed that the integration of media culture created an "East Asian Cultural Sphere (EACS) as a contemporary embodiment of cultural regionalization in East Asia" (Choi J. , 2010, p. 110). For him, cultural regionalization refers to "a tendency to construct geocultural spheres of proximity and intimacy beyond the nation-state's boundary with identifiable logics and patterns of cultural production, circulation, and reproduction that are simultaneously autonomous from and interconnected with the forces of cultural globalization" (Choi J. , 2010, p. 116). In a historical context, East Asian countries– China, Korea, and Japan–have identified their interdependence in the interplay of political, military, economic, and cultural situations. Economic interdependence strengthened the connection between these East Asian societies. Similar to other sectors, the media industries of societies have developed regional connections. This means that intra-regional media connections, which are made by the interconnectedness of East Asian societies in the aspects of "historical roots, institutional momentums, and aesthetic norms" (Choi J. , 2010, p. 116), are powerful, consistent, and systematic.

This chapter, however, asserts that we should not underestimate the fact that East

Asian media connections have been promoted by a national logic of globalization rather than by a mutual understanding of regional interdependence. In Korean society, the Roh Administration first suggested East Asian Economic Cooperation in 2000, by saying that this strategic community would guide the country's future in the rapidly changing global society (Jung S. K., 2009). The Mu-Hyun Roh regime recognized the importance of regional prosperity in the development of a national economy and the role of culture in constructing the virtuous circulation of peace and prosperity in the East Asian region (Jung S. K., 2009). Based upon the governmental analysis of international relations, the Korean media industry, compared to the other two actors, has shown a relatively high initiative in the creation of intra-regional connections in production and circulation. The exportation of media products to these neighboring markets has resulted in not only national economic activation, but also the enhancement of a national image. In both considerations, neighboring countries were desirable partners: China has grown faster and has realized greater profits than any other country, and Japan has prevailed as one of the biggest players in the world's media market. These complex factors were involved in the globalization of the Korean television industry: In spite of the huge sensation of the Korean Wave in South Asian countries, Korean companies focused more on developing intra-regional connections and localizing their products and services in China and Japan.

In this chapter, I considered KBS as the key to understanding the rise of the East Asian broadcasting network. During the past decade, KBS has remarkably transformed its vision, as well as its organizational structure in response to changes in the domestic and international media markets. KBS' actions show why we still need to understand broadcasting as a "national phenomenon," and to investigate the broadcasting industry at

the national level. This approach provides us with greater insights into comprehending globalization. KBS has enhanced its marketability in order to adopt governmental media policies. The governmental discourse of globalization inspired KBS to reconfigure its concept of the public interest. By interpreting the reproduction of the Korean Wave as an obligation of public media, KBS has nationalized the concept of public interest within a global context. This new concept of public interest has crystallized into the construction of intra-regional connections, which has promoted a large increase in the number of its exports and has formed its national image as a global cultural leader.

CHAPTER 7

TELEVISING HYBRID MUSIC CULTURE:

THE INTERSECTION OF KOREAN TELEVISION AND POPULAR MUSIC

In the previous chapter, I argued that KBS has retained its central position in the construction and circulation of hegemonic national discourses in Korean society for over half a century. However, the global media system has shaken the power of the public network by which the influx of foreign media content into the Korean paid television industry has offered Korean audiences a variety of cultural content for consumption. In addition, online-based media channels have helped underrepresented groups make themselves heard throughout society. Such changes have forced KBS to reconfigure its role in public broadcasting. One way that KBS has chosen to overcome a crisis is to become proactive in selling content to neighboring countries, thereby making it a hub of East Asian cultural production. That transformation has allowed us to see the complicated and multi-layered adoption of globalization in the Korean media industry.

In this chapter, I turn into examining the intersection of the Korean television and music industries in the development of Korean popular culture. During recent years, the Korean pop boom—the transnational circulation of Korean music culture—has provided researchers with room to investigate the peculiar relationship between Korean television and music industries at the national, regional, and global levels. I argue that the Korean pop boom has brought about significant changes, not only in the popular music industry, but also in the television industry within Korean society.

Unlike the Korean Wave initially made by external factors, such as the pan-Asian financial crisis and the disinterest of regional competitors, the second and third phases of the phenomenon were driven by internal needs through which Korean culture industries invigorated hybridization in the East Asian cultural sphere. For me, this Korean case captures some features of cultural hybridity in the East Asian process of cultural globalization. Seeing cultural hybridity as the key to understanding the global popularity of Korean pop, this chapter explores how the relationship of the two cultural actors—the television and the music industry—has been negotiated, and how such changes have continuously influenced the nature and direction of the phenomenon. Bear in mind, I investigate the following questions: How has the television industry constructed a relationship with the Korean pop music industry? What has influenced the modernization and globalization of Korean pop music? How has the transnational circulation of Korean pop music invigorated intra-regional television production and consumption in East Asia? In order to answer these questions, I analyze the distinctive collaboration between broadcasting and popular music production in Korea.

Previous scholars have asserted that the globalization of local popular culture is indebted to two factors: 1) the hybridization of American pop and Korean melodies; and 2) the active employment of online media channels, such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and iTunes. Some have argued that the global popularity of Korean pop music is based upon its active adoption of foreign musical elements, including American, European, and Japanese pop music (Hong S.-K. , 2013; Lee J. S., 2006; Shim D. , 2006; Jung E.-Y. , 2006). Others have noted that new media environments allow international audiences to enjoy local music without time or spatial restrictions (Hong S.-K. , 2013; Jung & Li,

2014; Song & Jang, 2013). In my perspective, however, the collaborative system between the television and popular music industries is another driving force for this cultural phenomenon (Shin, 2005; Howard, 2006). I specifically focus on the role of broadcasting companies in the transnational consumption of local music beyond borders. In this sense, I examine the historical, economic and cultural contexts in which Korean television and popular music industries have constructed their unique partnership throughout several decades. Based on in-depth interviews with media practitioners and an analysis of institutional documents, I maintain that the power of public broadcasting still operates in the globalization of the television industry, and that Korea's transnational cultural power manifests this fact. By examining the Korean television and music industries in this light, I claim that the nationalized structure of cross-industrial connections have contributed to developing intra-regional connections in East Asia.

<center>Korean Pop Music Needs To Be Televised</center>

By the early 2000s, Korean society experienced drastic changes in its political and economic environments, including the introduction of direct presidential elections and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development membership. In spite of improvements in their living conditions, Korean people have rarely advanced in their way of enjoying cultural life. This gap between economic and cultural standards can be noted from their heavy dependence on television in consuming popular culture. Several interviewees contended that the three major terrestrial networks–KBS, MBC, and SBS– have taken a pivotal role in cultural production and consumption throughout Korean society. At an interview on July 24, 2014, informant T, a news writer who has covered popular music at a nationwide newspaper, criticized the excessive domination of

television over the Korean public's daily lives. He said:

> Television is the most powerful medium in the field of Korean popular culture. Everyone says, "I enjoy popular culture because I watch television." Television has long seized power in the culture industry and still executes plans to hold its dominance. [This is possible because] watching television is the only way for the Korean public to consume popular culture. Television is just a way of enjoying popular culture. However, [Koreans] consume music, films, and books only through watching television programs. The consumption of popular culture is below the level of advanced countries. Since the 1990s, [Koreans] have been able to afford the enjoyment of cultural life. However, television is still the main vehicle for them to spend spare time. (Informant T)

Koreans' high level of dependence on television in cultural consumption has induced the Korean television industry to execute its power over the popular music industry. What is interesting about Informant T's argument is that the audience has contributed to constructing and maintaining the hierarchical relationship between the two industries. In other words, the pop music industry is subject to being under the control of the television industry in order to attract consumers. At an interview on July 4, 2014, informant N, who has worked in entertainment management and record production for twenty years, pointed out that the Korean public's passivity in cultural consumption has led to the construction of the deformational structure in the two industries. He said:

> [Koreans] used to go to concerts with invitation tickets. Americans believe that they should pay for concerts because musicians make them happy. The artists will make them happy again only when they pay for the concerts this time. Koreans are not in that mindset. The common assumption in our society is that it is not worth paying for the concert. [Koreans] think that performers should thank the audience because they came to see their performances. (Informant N)

He claimed the underdevelopment of show business and the weakening autonomy of the pop music industry in Korean society as a result of the domestic audience's consumption of musical performance via television. In his view, the proliferation of the

idol music business has further aggravated the poor condition of the performing culture industry because music agencies that focus on producing boy bands and girl groups do not make bold investments to develop sound or lighting techniques for tour concerts. Instead, these companies exert every effort to increase profits by selling celebrity-related commodities, such as T-shirts, luminous sticks, and bags.

Until the growth of cable television and Internet media channels, a few media corporations, through vertical integration in television production and distribution, virtually monopolized the path to make emerging stars within society. This star-making system has allowed the production practitioners of major terrestrial networks to wield absolute power over popular music agencies for decades. Because of this unequal relationship, Korean idol music agencies must build up tight cooperation with television directors and writers rather than enrich the quality and volume of their music events. Informant N recalled:

> We, managers [of idol groups], only receive 30% of the total sales due to the retail margin. However, we keep producing albums with an expectation of making a big star at some point. For example, Crayon Pop, [a four-member girl group], entered stardom when releasing the group's third album. They hang in there. The public becomes accustomed to idol groups by seeing them [in the media] repeatedly. The management company spent a couple hundred thousand dollars in uploading videos of the group [Crayon Pop] that constructed their images as cute, bizarre, or ugly girls. During the 1990s, when a broadcasting company intentionally played a song three to four times per day, the song was sure to become a hit. Any song can be popular if the media help the song become familiar [with the public].

> Radio programs wielded great influence on album sales. Radio listeners bought albums. [After a broadcast on a radio program], I received orders for one hundred thousand copies of an album in one day. At that time, radio was more powerful than television. […] In the late 1990s, dance music swept over the Korean music industry. [Dance singers] mainly appeared on television programs, particularly entertainment shows. Because the audience easily became bored with visual

images, TV directors require singers to bring [something new] in a shorter period. It took at least six months to promote one song in the old days. In the late 2000s, their promotion cycles were shortened. (Informant N)

Music agencies have shared a firm belief about the effect of broadcasting on the success of their new music albums. As informant N mentioned, while radio was a centered medium for circulating popular songs among national audiences in the past, television takes the symbolic function for introducing selected and popular music artists to audiences in the present. That is more than the simple transition from radio to television in the context of technological improvements. A cultural context should be also considered that Korean pop agencies concentrated on producing idol dancing music in the early 1990s; boy bands and girl groups gained popularity, setting a new trend in the music market. Due to such music trends, visual elements, including dance performances and stage costumes, have become a signature of Korean pop music. Hence, Korean dancing music groups have regarded their appearances on television as the determining factor for the success of their professional careers; accordingly, they have made various efforts to solidify their ties with media producers.

From the other side, television networks also want to secure cooperative relationships with leading music companies. For television directors, securing potential cast members is the key to producing competitive television shows. However, it has become more difficult to cast the musicians they want for the following reasons: The proliferation of media channels has allowed music agencies to find alternative ways of promoting their albums, and some superstars who have created the Korean pop boom in various societies are hardly available to appear on television shows due to their worldwide tour schedules and other promotional activities in foreign countries. In order

to bring them on their shows, Korean television directors must maintain good relationships with leading music agencies that handle these big stars. At an interview on July 18, 2014, informant Q, a chief producer, admitted that relationship. He said:

> It is true that we established lasting and fruitful partnerships with music agencies. […] Music agencies view television as an effective promotion channel, and we employ them as the cradle for rising stars. (Informant Q)

As informant Q explained, there is a mutual interest between the two production sectors. At the surface level, Korean pop artists should promote their new albums, and television networks need celebrities who can attract audiences. Furthermore, informant Q's comments reveal the complexity in their relationship. Music agencies have an implicit contract with television networks: not only top stars, but also emerging entertainers of the agencies appear on television shows. Such a coupling allows music agencies to retain their power in the music market. When interviewing informant E, a radio director, on June 16, 2014, I identified why the two sectors agreed to make such a tacit contract. She added:

> It is a deal. [If top idol groups of a company appear on my show], I should cast emerging singers of the company, as well. Directors of [television and radio] develop this relationship with managers of music agencies. The top idols also make an appearance on the shows when they have friendly relationships with show hosts. (Informant E)

The intra-regional reputation of Korean pop stars cemented the relationship between the two industries. Major television networks, based on their long-standing dominance over music companies, have attempted to share the profits of the Korean pop boom. In recent years, however, leading music agencies have begun to strategize their global marketability in negotiation with television companies. It seems obvious that the Korean pop boom has reformulated their relationships and further has influenced the

process of cultural globalization within the society. If we see the new Korean Wave as an ongoing reflection of power dynamics between the broadcasting and pop music industries, it is significant to understand the ways in which Korean broadcasting companies have influenced the modernization and globalization of Korean pop music.

From Exclusion to Inclusion: The Myth of Western Culture

Many scholars in musicology have discussed that, in the Korean context, television is a barometer of political pressure upon the liberty of cultural expression (Cha, 2012; Seojung, 2012; Shin, 2005). During the 1970s and 1980s, the Park Jung-Hee regime censored popular music in order to protect the national culture from the influence of foreign cultures. At that time, one of the government's biggest concerns was the indiscriminate acceptance of American or British pop music, which could possibly threaten the indigenous nature of domestic pop music culture (Kang N. , 2000; Lee K. , 2008; Seojung, 2012). As a result, all popular albums and songs required governmental regulatory approval (Shin, 2005, p. 20). Along with the government's censorship policy, KBS reviewed all released songs concerning whether the popular music included messages and performances at a socially acceptable level. The in-house reviewing committee pressured music companies to follow the standards of the broadcasting company. Musicians were limited in their creative freedom in order to meet the largest media company's guidelines of musical expression, such as the lyrics, costumes, and performances.

Despite various control plans, Korean young people were possibly influenced by the inflow of foreign pop music (Keith, 2002; Jung, 2006). One representative example was the *tong kita* boom. When *tong kita* music, a mixture of the Korean word, *tong* (box)

and the English term, guitar, gained huge popularity among college students, the government cracked down on *tong kita* musicians. These musicians learned about the American folk song movement by watching imported American media content or by listening to American pop albums (Hwang O. , 2006, p. 37). Some singers who were mesmerized by American folk songs translated these songs into Korean. Hee-Eun Yang, a female singer, included "Seven Daffodils" in her debut album, originally sung by Brothers Four and The Shaw Brothers (Hwang O. , 2006, p. 37). Young Korean people who consumed these American pop songs often gathered in music spaces like the Green Frog Hall in Seoul to enjoy the performances of *tong kita* musicians (Kim C. N., 1986, p. 181). Many *tong kita* musicians, however, suspended their activities when the government conducted "the pop music ethical movement" (Shin, 2005, p. 20). In June 1975, the Korean Culture and Arts Ethics Commission took popular songs into reconsideration and announced new review guidelines and forbidden songs. The standards and details of re-deliberation conveyed the core value of the Yushin regime's cultural policies: popular music should not 1) threaten national security or consensus; 2) indiscriminately accept or imitate foreign culture; 3) deliver messages of self-torture, grief, and defeat; and 4) include suggestive and decadent expressions (Kim C. N., 2003).

The other historical event during this time was that musicians who smoked marijuana were taken in custody. From December 1975 to January 1976, prosecutors arrested about thirty folk musicians, such as Hyung-Joo Yoon, Jang-Hee Lee, and Joong-Hyun Shin. These incidents, involving top musicians and symbols of youth culture, greatly shocked the entire society. President Park told the public that the judge in charge should inflict the severest possible penalty upon the defendants. Accordingly, the

Ministry of Culture and Information made a list of fifty-four celebrities who had smoked marijuana and requested networks to take sanctions against them (Yoon Y. , 2010). A considerable number of musicians were sent to prison or were banned from musical activities. As a consequence, the Korean popular culture industry entered the dark ages.

It was terrestrial television that has mainly excluded foreign pop culture from Korean pop music production. The Korean broadcasting industry operated the censorship system, in which all popular songs had to obtain *expost facto* approval from the Korea Broadcasting Reviewing Committee (KBRC). Under the Park Jung-Hee regime, television companies particularly kept pace with governmental action by strictly monitoring the popular music industry (Shin, 2005, p. 20). This was a deliberate effort to control the infusion of American, British, and Japanese cultural traits into Korean popular music. KBRC banned 787 Korean songs and 659 imported popular songs from March 1965 to September 1981; the reasons for banning these songs varied, including concerns that they contained "'Japanese styles,' negative influences of 'defeatism,' and 'machoism,' as well as dangers to 'national security'" (Maliangkay, 2006, p. 51). This reviewing process definitely discouraged Korean musicians from expressing their personal identities in lyrics and performances (Howard, 2006, p. 84) and resulted in the disappearance of creative music works during that period (Shin, 2005).

In the early 1990s, after the demise of the military regime, the Korean pop music industry turned its attention to new music trends, including dance music, hip hop, and ballads, rather than proceeding to the heritage of folk and rock and roll music (Lee S. , 2014). In Lee's (2014) view, this radical change was made on account of consumers; repeated and devastated experiences made young Korean audiences become familiar with

their cultural icons being replaced with new stars. Hence, the Korean television and music industries dramatically moved to the next stage with the appearance of Seo Tai Ji and Boys in 1992. The Seo Tai Ji and Boys case illustrates that the modernization of Korean popular music was achieved by deconstructing traditional Korean pop music and adopting American pop trends (Howard, 2002; Jung E.-Y. , 2006; Shim D. , 2006). Because of its innovative and broadly hybrid character, this boy band received mixed reviews from music critics and producers. At the interview, informant N, a manager of music artists, vividly remembered the extent to which the boy group's music, performance, and fashion styles affected the entire Korean pop music industry. He said:

> No one could define his music. Music producers asked each other, "Is this music?" Singer managers did not know how to evaluate his music, either. Nobody knows what to say about his music. [At that time, producers followed a common rule that] all songs should have quadruple rhythms and melodies with an introduction, development, turn, and conclusion. (Informant N)

An increasing number of scholars have studied the context of how Seo Tai Ji could create a different style of music during that period. Howard (2002) claimed that the Korean boy band employed "conventional sampling techniques and synthesized accompaniments to rap texts" (Howard, 2002, p. 86), which were derived from the youth music of Tokyo and Los Angeles. In a larger context, the rise of dance music was relevant to the demand of Korean youths (Jung E.-Y. , 2006). Kim (2003) demonstrated that the Korean pop industry paid attention to teenagers as a new segment during the 1980s for two reasons: first, with parents' financial support, teenagers could spend money by purchasing various cultural products. Second, they considered popular culture as a shelter where they could forget about the stiff competition for entering college in reality (Kim C. N., 2003). That atmosphere had

strengthened by the 1990s, such that 90% of Korean pop music is currently consumed by teenagers (Kim C. N., 2003). Therefore, youth who were accustomed to consuming American media products were fascinated by Seo Tai Ji and Boys' albums, the adaptation of American pop, and the localization of "global lexicons" (Jung E.-Y. , 2006, p. 109).

An additional complication needs to be mentioned in order to understand the hybridization of Korean pop music in the early 1990s. As far as Korean popular culture is concerned, Japan has been one of the most important sources. Japanese pop music has influenced Korean pop music production and consumption behavior. In the late 1980s, Japanese pop was widespread throughout East Asia, and thus, Korean music agencies attempted to imitate the music style. In the interview, informant N explained how the increase of international students and traders between the two countries led to the inroad of Japanese pop albums and music videos to Korean society. Informant N's argument indicates the impact of Japan in the modernization of Korean pop music. He pointed out that this neighboring country was a main source of Asian sentiment, more advanced and with various music styles in Korean pop music production. He said:

> Singer managers often visited Japan in order to purchase music albums that were ranked on the Oricon Chart, including Miyajaki Hayao's animation films, the videotapes of recording live concerts of Japanese jazz, rock, and metal groups, as well as those of American pop artists like Queen. The CEO of the music company let emerging Korean pop artists watch these videos. […] Yazawa [14] was considered as a kind of god [among Korean musicians]. I actually imitated his live performances, such as stage setting. Some Japanese students duplicated and sold Japanese music albums on the street around Ewha Woman's University. At that time, Japanese music had very much developed the extent to which musicians created some innovative rhythms. (Informant N)

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[14] Eikichi Yazawa is one of the most influential musicians in the Japanese music industry.

During the late 1980s, restrictions on foreign travel were relaxed, and many

Korean American musicians moved to Korea in order to seek more career opportunities

(Shin, 2005). Howard (2002) pointed out that the children of these immigrants brought

with them American popular culture to the Korean popular music industry (p. 88).

Korean musicians also moved to the United States in order to learn about American pop

trends. The increasing connectivity among the Korean, US, and Japanese music

industries through the transnational flow of people, cultural products, and services

created remarkable changes in the Korean pop music industry. Informant L, a music

critic, argued that the different responses of local musicians to global music determine

the global visibility of local music. He added:

> I think that localizing is a distinct difference between Korean and Japanese pop.
> Japanese musicians try to localize [American music]. The localized music is,
> however, limited in its appeal to the global market. Of course, Korean musicians
> localize American music, as well. However, they made a huge effort to create a
> similar level of production to trendy American pop. SMP might be a different
> form of music, which considers dance performances in music production. But the
> sounds of SMP music are a representation of American and British pop trends
> rather than something Korean. No matter how hard they tried in the past, there
> was a distinctive gap [between American and Korean pop]. These days, Korean
> musicians study music in the United States and England and computers simplify
> the process of producing music. However, it is interesting that, in spite of
> meeting the global standard of pop music, Korean pop still has its traditional
> sentiment. It can't be helped. […] It seems that they strike the right balance.
> (Informant L)

Although Korean music agencies have developed their music styles through a

mixture of American and European trendy music, they are still interested in retaining

something Asian or Korean. Some interviewees have contended that Korean music

producers are very proud of their contributions to creating the Korean pop boom beyond

the Asian region. They do not rank themselves lower than Western musicians any longer. That self-confidence in the quality of Korean pop music was spurred by the worldwide sensation of PSY's "Gangnam Style." His performances in the United States and European countries encouraged Korean musicians to target their albums toward international audiences without eliminating their local character. Informant O, a Korean composer, said that the development of audio equipment has enabled local pop musicians to produce something staking up against the latest global music. He said:

> The quality of K-pop music was dramatically developed. In these days, it is truly difficult to reach the Korean market levels. The sound quality of Korean composers' demo is just incredible. During the last fourteen years, everything has completely changed. Musical equipment, such as MIDI devices, [multi-track digital audio] interface and sampler, were very expensive in the past. However, technological advancement has enabled young musicians to record their songs [at a low cost]. […] Now, there is no difference between [American and Korean musicians in music production]. There are many prodigiously talented Korean musicians who [can produce globally selling music]. A person who sits in a corner of the SM office scored a number-one hit on the electronic music chart [in the United States]. Except for lyrics, we do not localize music. (Informant O)

Certainly, the Korean pop boom constructs and reflects changes in the musical activity, production, and consumption in the Korean popular music industry. In order to better understand the rise of Korean pop, we should investigate the historical context that Korean leading agencies have focused on in producing dancing music. Building upon Adorno's (2002) definition of popular music as a commodity, in the following section, I focus on how Korean dancing music "orients itself according to the demands of the market" (p. 395). It portrays what created the demand in the market, and how the Korean music industry has responded to these claims in two ways: 1) by creating a hybrid form of popular music through the development of a trans-local music production system between the US, Europe, and Korea; and 2) by

strengthening cross-industrial connections between broadcasting and pop music, which generates regional interdependence in the East Asian culture industry.

The Age of the Idol Music Empire

By the early 1990s, Seo Tai Ji and Boys considerably changed the landscape of the Korean pop industry in which some music producers who were inspired by Seo Tai Ji's success introduced the idol star-making system. Shin (2005) noted that Korean music agencies redefined their business as entertainment or total management companies (p. 23). In this vision, major labels invested in producing idol groups, and as a result, two idol music agencies—SM and YG—led to the domestic market. As these two companies were listed on the stock market in the mid-2000s, music producers and composers of the companies tried to develop their own music production systems for stable management.

Since then, what SM and YG have concentrated on is the active adoption of the latest American pop music trends. This strategy helps these Asia-based local companies expand their sphere of influence to the global market. They have standardized beats and rhythms of hit songs that draw identical reactions in their consumers. Music agencies manipulate consumers' listening experiences into a system of response mechanisms, and then industrialize this system's mass production and distribution (Adorno, 2002). The industrialization of popular music illuminates that "the most successful hits, types, and 'ratios' between elements were imitated, and the process culminated in the crystallization of standards" (Adorno, 2002, p. 443). The industrial requirement of a cultural product's imitation and reproduction became stronger because listeners with the false belief that their consumption was an act of the will did not recognize the standardization of popular music (Adorno, 2002). Then, idol agencies started aggressively marketing their idol

groups in order to capitalize on the international markets. The following analysis on the production and marketing strategy of Korean idol agencies helps us understand how cultural hybridity relates to the creation of the Korean pop boom.

<div align="center">*Watching Music in the Living Room*</div>

SM, the largest music label, initially introduced the star-making system in the Korean pop music industry. Soo-Man Lee, the former folk musician and television host, established the company in 1995. Since its foundation, SM has developed a training system for prospective idol stars. Right after Seo Taiji and Boys' disbandment, the company launched a male idol group, H.O.T. This group made their debut with their first album, *We Hate All Kinds of Violence* in 1996 and became the most popular idols among Korean teenagers. Since then, SM has concentrated its energy on producing dancing groups, including S.E.S., Shinhwa, TVXQ, Super Junior, Girls' Generation, SHINee, F(X), EXO, and Red Velvet.

Hyo-Jin Hwang, a music critic, identified SM's music in his article for the online magazine, *IZE*, by mentioning the following characteristics: 1) the lyrics are socially critical; 2) Songs have the thumping beat of rock music; 3) The choreography is intricate; and 4) The members of the group synchronize their gestures (Hwang H. , 2013). SM first showed its unique music style in H.O.T.'s album in the late 1990s and considerably developed it in TVXQ's second album, "Rising Sun" in 2005 (Kang M. , 2010b). During the last two decades, the music producers of SM have elevated their brand value. In a media interview, Young-Jin Yoo, an executive music director of the company, said that SM created a peculiar music genre by combining traditional Korean melodies with American and European pop beats. Thus, the company has increasingly purchased well-

arranged beats, rhythms, and even melodies from other composers in Europe and the

United States (Lee K. , 2013).

SM has developed its music sounds through the hybridization of Korean and

foreign pop music. The company has promoted its music characteristics in the market

through a mixture of music sounds with heavy beats and highly stylized dances. SM

music is a representative example to show how Korean pop music agencies have created

hybrid music genres through mixing traditional and western music elements. In an

interview with Young-Jin Yoo, who has worked as an executive producer of the agency

for the past fifteen years, he reflected why SM has specialized its music brand by

including Korean traditional music sounds. He added:

> My wife majored in Korean classical music in college. Thus, I asked her to recommend the beats and rhythms of Samulnori.[15] While listening to the traditional music, I thought that those rhythms and beats ccould be transformed as melodies. The introduction of Bonamana (Super Junior's song) was created in that way. (as cited in Kang, 2010b, para 8)

In addition, SM tried to find ways to keep abreast of global music trends. The

company organized a team to contact American and European composers, and invited

them to Seoul to collaborate with Korean composers and artists (Lee K. , 2013). Hence,

in the past years, a considerable number of internationally renowned music producers

participated in making SM's music albums. A Denmark music company, Deekay Music,

composed TVXQ's Japanese single, "Super Star"; in another example, Teddy Riley, who

produced Michael Jackson's *Dangerous*, worked with SM in order to create "The Boys,"

the title song of Girls' Generation's third album. Informant O, who had worked with the

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[15] Samulnori is a group of musicians who perform Korean classical music, dance, acrobatics, and rituals. This performance is generally given to celebrate good harvests in the fall.

music agency for more than ten years, stated that SM had purchased the foreign tracks to

ensure the improvement of their performance and to reduce risk in the global market. He

said:

> Foreign composers commonly resell their songs to Korean music agencies. They
> have some unpopular songs. Of course, they sell new songs, too. Even though
> these songs are not new, the quality of the songs is high, which reduces risk in the
> market. (Informant O)

More importantly, as Korean pop music has gained its reputation among

international listeners, SM strengthened its position within the global music industry and

brought American and European composers and choreographers to the company's head

office. SM opened music studios in its newly constructed building and invited composers

from various countries for collaborations. For publicity purposes, SM invites journalists

to see what is going on behind the scenes for making its hybrid music. Lee (2013), a

reporter of *JoongAng Ilbo,* published what she experienced in the company:

> On August 28, 2013, on the third floor of SM Cheongdam Studio in Seoul, Hanna
> Cho, a staff of Artists and the Repertoire team did a presentation in English for
> Korean, Swedish, and Australian composers. […] At studio 5, Australian female
> composer, Hailey and a Korean singer and composer, Max (Seo-ho Song), and
> Sung-Chan Ahn worked together to develop their song. […] Sung-Soo Lee, a
> director of the SM producing division said, "This collaboration system definitely
> creates a different song from what Hailey makes by herself in Australia. Whether
> for good or for ill, something different makes the song competitive in the global
> market." (as cited in Lee K. , 2013, para. 6-8)

Lee's (2013) report hailed that, in search of new styles of songs from European

and American music creators, the company holds fast to its principle that in-house music

producers participate in finalizing the arrangement of all elements. She pointed out that

this finalizing process is instrumental in gratifying Asian consumers who are accustomed

to local pop music, and sets the company's musical products apart from American and

European ones in the Asian market. What we should focus on here is that SM has developed its own musical style in order to captivate regular consumers of the company's music. A composer explained that there are fundamental rules for in-house music production. He said:

> The company has shared a solid rule with composers in the structuring of a song. Through this production system, the company strictly maintains its own styles in melodies and sounds. If one writes a song without considering the company's musical style, the song will not be chosen.

> SM pays careful attention to the lyrics. When making a title song of a new album, the company does not ask one or two lyricists. SM asks at least one hundred lyricists to write their own version. In the case of songs composed by foreign musicians, the agency asks more than one hundred lyricists. (Informant O)

As informant O mentioned, SM has painstakingly developed its own standardized system in order to maintain the quality level of the music. During their visit, American and European composers create a song for a specific idol group in the company. This customized production system shows how the Korean leading music company has localized standard global music styles through its own process of cultural hybridization.

The formation dance is another important point of hybridization that SM has developed. The overall structure and flow of SM's music is designed to highlight the dance formations of the idol groups on stage, from the beginning to the end (Kang M., 2010a; Kang M., 2010b). Kang (2010a; 2010b) wrote that Yoo, the executive producer of the company, who had worked as a back-up dancer for television music shows, greatly influenced the direction in which SM's dance music was developed:

> I have composed 200 songs and released 180 of them. I always created rhythms first… Because dance music is created for dance performances, it should be dramatic. Some songs might not be attractive when listening to the music because it was made in consideration of the stage performance. (Kang, 2010a, para. 9)

In the early stages, the company simply imitated American pop stars'
performances through watching their music videos or concert live DVDs (Informant N,
2014). Since 2010, however, SM directly contacted American and Japanese dancers in
order to purchase their choreography. Tony Testa, a Creative Director and
Choreographer who worked with Michael Jackson, Britney Spears, and Kylie Minogue,
choreographed the title songs of SM male idol groups, such as SHINee's "Sherlock,"
TVXQ's "Catch Me," and EXO's "Wolf." Nick Bass, who choreographed for Justin
Timberlake, Beyoncé, and Christina Aguilera, created dance performances for Super
Junior's "Sorry Sorry," SHINee's "*Ring Ding Dong,*" and EXO's "*Growl.*"

Although the company has increasingly worked with American choreographers,
in-house Korean creative directors often revise the choreographies that foreign directors
had originally created. Sang-hoon Hwang and Jae-won Shim, the former members of the
idol group, Black Beat, have taken the role of rearranging all dance formations and
moves, down to the very last step. What they focus on is refining the dance movements
in order to make all members of the idol groups stand out on the stage. A column of an
online cultural magazine, *IZE*, analyzed how their corrections are fundamental to
maximizing the idol group members' fascination and to maintaining the characteristic of
SM music and performance (Hwang H. , 2013). Shim said at a media interview that idol
group members have the strong belief that these Korean directors, who were former
members of idol dancing groups, are well-qualified to catch the strengths and weaknesses
of all artists in the company (Hwang H. , 2013).

Because SM has a particular focus on dance music performances, it is not
surprising that the company has heavily collaborated with all of the television channels.

SM's pop groups proactively cooperate with the directors and writers of the major television networks as well as the cable channels, without exposing their preference for specific channels. However, the Korean pop boom has provided the leading music company with room for negotiating with broadcasting production actors.

One of the company's widely known media strategies is that if an artist of a company appears on a music show, he or she must perform at the end of the show.   The company sees that defending the finale of television programs reflects the reigning power of the company and artists in the industry. Hee-Jun Moon, the leader of H.O.T., mentioned it on the talk show, *Magic Eye*, on September 16, 2014 (Kim & Ryu, 2014). He shared an anecdote with the audience from his days under an exclusive contract with SME in the early 2000s:

> One day, g.o.d.[16] and I competed against each other in order to have the finale on a music program. The director of the program asked me, "Can you make a concession of the finale for g.o.d?" I must have been severely scolded by Soo-Man Lee, if I were dispossessed of the ending stage. It was an emergency. I talked to the director over the phone for two and a half hours and finally came on the stage as the final guest. [17]

As Moon's case shows, having a finale on television programs has often caused conflicts between music agencies. On this basis, television production has become the site to reflect on the power dynamics of the television and music industries. The Korean pop boom during recent years has complicated problems, in that many boy bands and girl groups of SM—TVXQ, Girls' Generation, Super Junior, EXO, F(x), and SHINEE—have fostered the transnational popularity of Korean pop music. The company could make a

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[16] It is a five-member boy band. The name of the group is an acronym for Groove over Dose, and the group was nicknamed as "the Nation's Idol" in the early 2000s.

display of power in negotiating with television producers to determine the order of

performances. Informant A, who has covered the television industry for several years,

explained how SM has recently become empowered in the process of television

production. She said:

> It is no longer reasonable to say that television networks dominate music agencies.
> Major music agencies often compete for the final stage of media music events.
> SM would cancel the appearance of the company's idol groups in the events if
> any group of the company did not have the final stage. (Informant A)

Another important example that presents the tight relationship between SM and

major television networks is a filmed TV broadcast of the SM Town Live World Tour.

The SM Town Live concert series is a music festival that the music company has held in

various cities around the world. SM has held its brand tours across Asia, Europe, and

America, and some of the events have been broadcast on major television networks.

Televising these musical events helps construct its corporate image as a leading brand of

the Korean pop boom. Actually, after the airplay of the Paris concert in 2011 and the

Tokyo concert in 2012 on MBC, the Korean public increasingly recognized the

international fans of SM idol groups. Through the use of television as its method, SM

constructed the company's image as a global music agency rather than as an idol factory.

As the leading brand, SM adheres to its long-standing principle in the

maintenance of neutrality when working with the three major television networks and

cable television channels. For the company, it is significant to secure channels of

communication as much as possible because SM, after getting itself listed on the

KOSDAQ market,[18] has expanded its business to tour, theater, and media productions.

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[18] Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) is a trading board of the Korea Exchange

The president of the company has developed real vision to the business and the

brand with an in-depth understanding of the ongoing power of broadcasting over

reproducing the transnational popularity of Korean pop music. On March 1, 2015, Lee

said in an interview with *Joongang Ilbo* that televisions and smartphones are the devices

that people use in the living room (Jung & Min, 2015). His claim that the audience's

needs are created in the living room shows the direction of the music company in the

future. In Lee's argument, SM has put steps toward the integration of video and music

productions, and the vision of the company has invigorated the intersection between

television and popular music in Korean society.

<div align="center">*Othering Self on the Global Stage*</div>

After Seo Tai Ji and Boys sent shockwaves throughout Korean society two

decades ago, the dancing music genre has become important to the bottom line of the

mainstream music industry. Record labels seem to be casting about with unparalleled

zeal for a new generation of idol pop stars. Hyun-Seok Yang, the former member of Seo

Tai Ji and Boys, however, established a music agency that concentrated on producing

hip-hop musicians, such as Jinusean and 1TYM, and R&B vocalists, including Wheesung,

Gummi, and Big Mama (YG Entertainment, n.d.b). Due to that, YG is considered the

music production company that first brought black music into the Korean mainstream.

In the mid-2000s, YG turned its direction to the idol business as SM's idols, BoA

and TVXQ, swept over the domestic market. However, the distinct difference is found

between SM and YG music styles. While SM has developed idols' abilities to perform

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(KRX) in Korea. KOSDAQ was first established by the Korea Financial Investment Association in 1996,
which is an independent stock market from the Korean Stock Exchange. KOSDAQ is a benchmarking of
NASDOQ.

dance moves and sing live at a relatively high level, YG has promoted the group members' musical abilities. For example, the company's representative boy group, Big Bang, made a huge sensation throughout Korean society with "Lie," the title song of its first mini album, *Always* in August 2007. G-Dragon, the leader of Big Bang, took the role of main producer and composer of the group's album. Journalists and critics spotlighted him as an "idol musician" who established an idol member's independence and subjectivity in the standardized music production system. Moreover, the group received the Song of the Year award at the M.net KM Music Festival and the grand prize at the Seoul Music Awards (YG Entertainment, n.d.a).

When launching a female idol group, 2NE1 in 2009, YG used a similar strategy in the development of the group's public image. 2NE1 has released songs with heavy electronic sounds, "Go Away," "Fire," and "I Am the Best." The song lyrics helped members of the group construct an independent female image. For instance, CL, the leader of 2NE1, released her first solo album in 2013, which included the song "The Baddest Female." In the song, she identified herself as a bad girl. Her warrior image in the music video also differentiated the group from other Korean female singers, including SM's Girls' Generations, F(X), and Red Velvet, who emphasize their feminine, cute, and sexual images. Certainly, YG's distinction strategies helped construct the image of 2NE1 as a female group who is as great.

In the early 2010s, the company diversified its portfolio by making a contract with veteran singers, such as PSY and Epik High. These musicians were popular in the domestic market for a long time, but were having a hard time due to nationwide scandals. PSY had to serve in the Korean army twice after it was revealed that he had been given

preferential treatment in the army. Tablo, the leader of a hip-hop group, Epik High,

suffered from doubts raised by Internet users about his academic background as a

Stanford alumnus. In spite of exceptional careers and musical talents, these veteran

musicians struggled to find music labels because those scandals detracted from their

reputations in the domestic market. At that moment, YG made contact with them by

highly appreciating their musicality and experience.

Sung-duk Seo (2014), a music columnist, analyzed the characteristics of YG's

music styles in his article of an online popular culture magazine, *IZE*. In his view, YG

does not aim to simply adapt American pop to the local market, but to compete with

American pop stars in the global market. The image of YG as a global music brand is

constructed based on its similarity to the current American pop trend. The following

paragraph is an excerpt of the article:

> G-Dragon and Taeyang's new single, "Good Boy" (2014), is a conclusion that
> YG has drawn in the process of pursuing the authentic style of hip-hop music.
> The song, "Good Boy," is faithful to following the current trend of American hip-
> hop. The company did not seem to modify the version that was originally
> composed by The Fliptones. YG no longer considers the musical taste of the
> local audience in the production stage. Except for the Korean lyrics, nothing is
> bound up with the local characters of G-Dragon and Taeyang in the song. (Seo
> S. , 2014, para 3)

As Seo (2014) pointed out, the audience might not be able to find any difference

between the music video of GD and TY and that of Christ Brown and Justin Bieber. If

one scrutinizes the music video of "Good Boy," however, he or she might recognize

something unfamiliar. Colin Tilley, who produced the music video of "Good Boy,"

unlike his previous works, highlight the small bodies of the YG musicians, and their

different looks symbolize Asian music, differentiating itself from American and

European pop culture (Seo S. , 2014). Put differently, the embodiment of Asianness is the focal point for understanding the global strategy of YG: The alienation of K-pop from mainstream pop culture and the decolonization of local music.

This strategic approach needs to be examined in the context of the untouchable success of PSY's "Gangnam Style." PSY was the first Korean musician who was ranked as the second in the Billboard weekly single chart and No. 1 on the iTunes Music Video Chart. PSY appeared on various American TV shows, including *Live! With Kelly and Michael* and *American Idol Season 12*, and performed on various events with Madonna, MC Hammer, and Snoop Dogg. His musical activities in the United States inspired other young musicians in the company. Informant L, a music critic, argued that the high quality and peculiarity of Korean pop music sounds enable the local music agency to accomplish global reputations. He added:

> If you eliminate the name of PSY on his single album, "Hang Over," you would never have thought that the song is Korean pop. K-pop sounds were very developed. You cannot say that the form of the song ["Hang Over"] is unfashionable. G-Dragon's "Crooked" is also great. When American musicians asked Asian singers to feature their albums in the old days, most of them were a kind of a bonus track to appeal to Asian listeners. Last year, G-Dragon and CL were invited to collaborate with Skrillex, who is a world-renowned dubstep producer. It was one of the main tracks on his new album. A tycoon of the electronic music scene is willing to work with Korean idols without hesitation. This case shows that [American musicians] agree that the quality of Korean pop is similar to theirs. (Informant L)

Another important consideration is that YG has employed mysticism marketing by establishing an exclusive relationship with few media channels. As a result, idol groups of the company—Bing Bang and 2NE1—made an exclusive appearance on two weekly music programs, Mnet's *M! Countdown* and SBS's *Hit Song*. Hyun-Suk Yang, the president of YG, has often raised the question of the effectiveness of weekly music

programs in the market. In his perspective, the proliferation of media channels has put an

end to the dominance of terrestrial networks over the entertainment industry. In the new

media environments, online media provide music companies and artists with alternative

opportunities to promote their new albums without depending on traditional media. In

compliance with the company, Big Bang and 2NE1 have not appeared on KBS' *Music*

Bank and MBC's *Music Core* since 2012.

Instead, the company has strengthened media cooperation with the specific

channels by launching reality audition programs for the next generation of upcoming

Korean pop stars. A distinct example is the reality singing contest show*, K-Pop Star.*

SBS began producing this prime-time show in 2011. Founders of the major music

agencies, Hyun Suk Yang (YG) and Jin-Young Park (JYP), and BoA, a female dancing

singer of SM, took charge of being the judges on the program until the second season of

the program. YG has employed this program as an opportunity to make a contract with

rising singers and rappers, and as a result, the agency made a debut of new artists,

including a female R&B solo artist, Lee Hi, and an acoustic duo, Akdong Musician.

In addition, the cable channel, Mnet, also collaborated with YG on the reality

show production. The two companies created two reality survival series—*Win* and *Mix*

& Match—which aimed to select the final members of YG's new male idol group,

Winner and IKON. These reality shows followed a process in which all trainees of the

company competed against one another to become a member of the two idol groups. YG

introduced the method of selection that the viewers of the shows voted for the best

candidate on the website of the program.

As the cases have shown, YG established its own media planning through

developing a strategic partnership with the specific channels. The top idol groups, who exclusively appeared on the music programs of the specific broadcasting channels, received preferential treatment, including pre-recording, stage setting, and running time for their performance. In addition, the reality shows, made by the broadcasting companies, provided the rising stars of YG with the opportunity to be exposed to the public before their official debut. By collaborating with some specific broadcasting channels exclusively, YG could maintain its power in the process of media production.

Centering East Asia in Music Production

Until the late-1990s, the Korean popular music companies did not show their interests in the market abroad because the domestic market was large enough to continue their business; two or three singers and bands sold two or three millions copies of their albums every year (Korea Creative Content Agency, 2008). However, the record industry had dramatically declined in the early 2000s, along with the digitization of music production and circulation (KOCCA, 2008). After the popular music market reached a definite point in 2001 by selling a million copies of three albums, the total number of albums released in 2006 was only 1,662,000 copies (KOCCA, 2008, pp. 19-20). The restructuring of the music production and distribution system brought about the closure of wholesalers and retailers, a long-term depression in the domestic music market, and the rampancy of illegal reproductions (KOCCA, 2008).

In addition, through the amalgamation of music production and record companies, telecommunication conglomerates have come to dominate the digital music industry (KOCCA, 2008). Mobile services, including ringtones and ring back tones became a major market for music agencies. In this process, a structural imbalance in distributing

profits has been constructed. Flat-rate pricing forms allow consumers to download songs

at giveaway prices. This price destruction has jeopardized musicians and singers in a

way that they fell so low as to become subcontractors of the major digital music websites.

Contested conflicts over profit distribution modes continue among musicians,

productions, and online music websites (KOCCA, 2008, p. 17). Informant F, a music

director of television programs, asserted that this new industrial structure has discouraged

musicians from creating music of high standards. He added:

> A couple of music distribution companies, creating a symbiosis with telecommunication conglomerates, formed a monopolistic structure and practiced usury [targeting small music productions and musicians]. Music agencies and artists obtained investment for producing albums under exclusive contracts with the distribution companies. Right after making albums profitable, the distribution companies collected loans. […] Thus, distribution dealers, not musicians, earn money. […] If a consumer uses a streaming service to listen to a song, a composer of the song earns about 0.000025 cents. This is completely unreasonable. (Informant F)

Music companies, which needed to plot a survival strategy from the decline of the

domestic market, expanded their businesses to the neighboring markets. In the early

2000s, Korean television dramas made a huge sensation in Asian societies and helped

Korean dancing groups enter into the Chinese and Taiwanese markets. As a result, the

five-member boy band *H.O.T.* attracted Chinese youth through holding their concert tours,

and other Korean dancing groups, including Clone and NRG, also became intra-regional

stars. In spite of the transnational consumption of Korean pop music in South Asia and

China, Japan was still Korea's only untouchable market in the region.

Under significant progress in Korea-Japan relations after co-hosting the 2002

FIFA World Cup, SM, the largest Korean music agency, actively localized Korean idol

groups in the Japanese market. The company, by trial and error, achieved remarkable

results with the female singer, BoA. The company reached a collaborative agreement with AVEX, one of the largest music companies in Japan. These two companies promoted BoA as a cosmopolitan celebrity who speaks three languages, including English, Japanese, and Korean, and the elimination of her Koreanness in the mass media helped her gain commercial success (Kwak, 2010). Since the late-2000s, BoA's label mate TVXQ made another chart success in Japan. Similar to other Japanese musicians, this boy band performed in all local areas of the society in order to promote new albums. These activities invoked Japanese audiences to view TVXQ as part of Japanese music history. As a result, the male idol group has become the number one international artist in the Oricon Single Chart by selling over four million copies (Gil, 2014). In addition, TVXQ has rewritten the history of Korean pop music in Japan by gathering two million audiences for their Japanese concert tours during the past three years. The huge success of TVXQ inspired other Korean music agencies to adopt SM's local promotions; other major music agencies—YG, JYP, FNC—strategized their representative male groups, such as Big Bang, 2PM, and CNBLUE, to weigh in on performing in the Japanese music market. Their annual sales had heavily increased. Informant O added:

> I have gained many royalties in Japan. The total amount is much more than I expected. TVXQ are very popular [in the Japanese market]. Although my song was not the title song [of TVXQ's Japanese albums], I earned a fortune from the market. (Informant O)

The malaise in the Korean pop industry was its excessive dependence on Japanese society. Because they did not improve their domestic market power, Korean music businesspeople could hardly control the intervention of external factors, such as the worsening of international relationships. In 2012, the former president, Lee's visit to Dokdo Island and his request for Emperor Akihito's apology to Korean independence

patriots had triggered new diplomatic tensions between Korea and Japan, and as a result,

cultural exchanges rapidly cooled between the two nations. The Japanese media did not

cast Korean celebrities on television programs, and the disappearance of Korean idols on

television shows decreased album and concert ticket sales in the past years (Lee J. , 2015).

The political tensions with the Japanese government caused a freeze in the wholesale pop

music markets, which did plenty of financial damage to Korean music companies.

Informant N, a manager of Korean pop singers, said:

> There is no demand for Korean pop in Japan. Few products that Japanese companies imported last year have been on the market. [Korean entertainment companies] are more interested in the Chinese market now. In the beginning of this year, major Chinese companies purchased a lot of television content. [Managers and producers] substantially consider the Asian market. A K-pop idol performs in a small theater in Japan for two months. After making fans, the group goes to China. (Informant N)

Korean music agencies were apprehensive of the high rate of dependence on

exports to Japan and paid more attention to capitalizing on another big market: China.

Although Chinese youth have long been fascinated with Korean pop music, Korean

music agencies have not shown an enthusiastic attitude toward capitalizing on the

Chinese market for a long time. The whole context has changed with respect to how

Korean agencies look at the Chinese market, as Chinese society has rapidly developed as

a socialist market economy during the past decade. The restructuring of the cultural

market system caused state-owned Chinese enterprises to seek competitiveness in the

market (Chan, 2010, p. 201). Thus, they rushed to collaborate with Korean entertainment

companies. In addition, Chinese fans of Korean pop idols who were influenced by

Korean fan culture made an effort to purchase original albums by visiting Korean music

stores or by ordering them online. The increasing collective awareness of the

infringement of copyright among loyal consumers in the Chinese market helped Korean music companies expand their business to China. However, the Chinese government has actively controlled the inflow of Korean popular content through the modification of cultural policies. Informant M, an executive producer, also pointed out the uncertainty of the Chinese market condition, which remains a major obstacle in the development of collaborative networks between the two industries:

> The Chinese do not think that it is desirable to allow the growth of a minority's culture. Thus, they just stop when the importation of Korean popular products exceeds a certain limit. Here is a huge question. Can EXO's China tour generate the same amount in revenue as TVXQ's Japan tour? The answer of this question will determine SM's future. (Informant M)

EXO, the male idol group of SM, separating into two subgroups that performed music in Korean and Mandarin, conquered both markets with their first album, *XOXO* in 2013. This group could gain huge popularity in their targeted markets by including members of Chinese descent. Jung (2011) claimed that Korean boy groups often contain foreign members in order to enter into neighboring markets (p. 166). She employed the term *chogujeok* (transnationality) to describe their "culturally mixed and versatile features" (Jung S. , 2011, p. 170). These groups still maintain their national specificity as a Korean boy band, but embrace their "multinational cultural figuration" (Jung S. , 2011, p. 163). However, this global marketing strategy brought about conflicts between idol members and companies, and/or audiences. For example, EXO encountered a crisis when three of the four Chinese-descent members filed a lawsuit against the company so as to terminate their contracts. As the group gained huge popularity throughout Mainland China, many Chinese agencies showered these Chinese-descent members of EXO with great offers (Jeon W. , 2015). However, SME could not protect these foreign members

from contact of Chinese entertainment agencies because they provide definite advantages for those who want to work in their homeland. In spite of these very real obstacles, Korean music agencies had to expand their overseas activities in order to stay in business. The company has recently confirmed the continuation of its regionalizing strategy by announcing EXO's concerts in the Tokyo Dome and Kyocera Dome in Japan.

It is important to see that the Korean music companies' move is in-line with governmental action. In 2014, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced a plan to launch the Korean Foundation for Asian Cultural Exchange in order to make Korea a hub of the East Asian culture industry. The slogan of the organization, "Asia Major, Global Minor," indicates the importance of East Asian cultural markets for Korea's national economy. However, Shin (2005) criticized the government's employment of the Korean Wave as part of its initiative to increase intra-regional cultural traffic rather than to develop cultural connections (Shin, 2005, p. 27).

Local TV Makes the Global Pop Star

The Korean pop boom, which originated from the first Korean Wave in aspects of "its mediational route, geographic scope, and generational specificity" (Choi & Maliangkay, 2014, p. 2), replaced the term, the *Korean Wave,* in a description of the transnational popularity of Korean popular culture (Lee D.-Y. , 2014, pp. 27-8). The Korean pop boom inspired television networks to produce idol star-related media content targeted at international consumers. In particular, electronic music is the main genre that has led to the transnational consumption of Korean pop. The dynamic and complicated formation dances, trendy fashion styles, and good-looking members of the idol groups pulled the market value of Korean pop music into the global market. Hong (2013) argued

that the international audience consumes not only the trendy music, but also the physicality and sexuality of the members of Korean pop boy and girl groups.

Korean pop groups weigh in on their performances on television in order to appeal to mass audiences. These audiences' preferences enable television to retain its power over Korean music agencies and to develop a close partnership between the two cultural players in television production. Ju (2014) asserted that, similar to Hollywood, the Korean entertainment industry utilized the star-marketing system in order to promote media content in the regional market. Media content buyers consider top stars as "a common barometer in the decision-making process" (Ju, 2014, p. 36); thus, Korean idol dance groups who have a number of Asian fans have become an important "promotional tool" for the Korean television industry to pursue the regional market (Ju, 2014, p. 36). Major television networks have increasingly cast young celebrities in prime-time entertainment programs, whereas cable television channels, in partnerships with major music agencies, have produced reality shows that follow the everyday lives of idol group members, such as *EXO's Show Time* (2013), SHINee's *Hello Baby* (2010), and *One Sweat Day* (2013).

Korean broadcasting networks are considerably involved in the growth of Korean idol music. Television directors and writers cast members of Korean pop groups not only for music shows and reality programs, but also for television dramas and films. The omnipresence of boy bands and girl groups in media outlets has helped idol music agencies conquer the domestic popular music market. Small music companies, inspired by the huge success of leading idol music agencies, have rushed to create their own boy and girl groups. The predominance of electronic dance music has drastically dampened

other genres of music, such as jazz, rock, ballad, and folk. Informant T complained about

the commercial supremacy of the major idol music agencies because the companies have

created the homogenization of pop music culture in Korean society through the

standardization of music production. Even worse, the overflows of this systemized music

impede the promotion of healthy music ecology. He said:

> [We do not listen to music] based on the quality of sounds. It is more important to
> see how hard musicians work to create songs. I do not think that people feel
> touched by listening to [idol] music. Singer-songwriters, such as Min-Ki Kim and
> Dae-Soo Han, do not sing well. However, their songs and performances made a
> strong impression because their sincerity for the music was reflected in their
> works. It is meaningless to discuss the quality of music made by [idol] factories.
>
> The collaboration with foreign composers is just about money. It seems the same
> as a poet who writes to sell a poem. I would not call it music. A song camp could
> be an effective way to create a hit song. However, when answering a question
> about why you create a song, you probably say that you made it and hit the big
> time. You do not make it in order to be a great hit. Again, it is useful for
> economic prosperity, but nothing meaningful in the development of music culture.
> (Informant T)

It is important to see how television has amplified the global marketability of

Korean pop music. The interdependence of the television and music industries has

reinforced the dominance of idol music culture in society. Although many scholars have

viewed online media—YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter—as the crucial tool in the

creation of the Korean pop boom by making the connection between local musicians and

their international fans, the Korean case indicates that television, which is considered as

the national medium, even employs its power over the construction of the global cultural

phenomenon. Informant R, a television writer, explained the ongoing influence of

television programs in the global market:

Social media like YouTube is fundamental [in the Korean pop boom] because Korean singers can interact with international fans through the online networks. However, these international fans mainly enjoy Korean pop by watching broadcasting content. Thus, [music companies] cannot ignore [television appearances]. *Show! Champion* has been on the air for three years. I guess that few [Koreans] know the program, whereas many Korean pop fans outside of the country watch the program. [We feel responsible for] introducing Korean pop groups to them by preparing good stages. [Because of our program], some idol groups that are not well known in Korea become popular in other places. Whereas the Korean audience considers which agency produced a group, the international consumer evaluates the group only by their performances on stage. Thus, when [television directors and writers] meet a talented new group, they pay more attention to how to prepare their sets. WASSUP is an example. I heard that this female group gained popularity in Brazil and is planning to perform there. (Informant R)

In her argument, a variety of music programs that Korean broadcasting channels produce are one of the significant sources that keep international fans of Korean pop updated on the recent music trends in Korea. As many have argued, foreign fans actively express their affection toward Korean pop stars through the circulation and consumption of Korean cultural products. The growth of Korean pop fandom beyond domestic borders and their on- and offline cultural movements have highlighted the potential of Korean popular culture in the global market and have transformed an understanding of local culture. Shifting the discussion of global culture toward East Asia has inspired Asian cultural actors to advance engagement on a regional scale.

However, what to consider here is that international fans are limited in poaching products under the guidance of local music and broadcasting companies. In other words, their subjectivity in cultural consumption is entangled with the autonomy that television producers have maintained in media production. From a production perspective, small music agencies that cannot afford to promote their idol groups on a large scale depend

more upon appearances on television shows. Leading companies also need to collaborate with broadcasting networks in order to maintain their prestigious positions in the global market. The local specificity of cultural production has enabled the growth of Korean pop music beyond domestic borders. To be sure, the emergence of active audiences has blurred the boundaries of local and global cultures, and has contributed to the expansion of Korean popular culture. However, an analysis of how the hierarchical relationship between the television and music industry sustains the Korean pop boom as a global process of local culture helps us view the phenomenon not as a passing fad, but as an ongoing phenomenon. This approach, at the same time, calls for media intellectuals to criticize the ecology of Korean pop music, which has become devastated by the commercialization and industrialization of music production.

Conclusion

Idol dancing groups, which mainly create the transnational popularity of Korean pop music, are a dominant subject in discussing the growing capacity of Korean cultural production. In many case studies, cultural hybridity was employed as the key concept for comprehending the appeal of Korean dance music to international audiences (Jung E.-Y. , 2006; Lee J. S., 2004; Shim D. , 2006). These case studies show that the Korean idol industry has developed into a hybrid of American rap and Asian-styled melodies.

To unearth the existing knowledge on the production of global culture, and to further understand the Korean pop boom in a global context, it is important to identify who determines the scope and level of mixing two cultures in the discussion of hybridization. According to Kraidy's (2005) articulation, hybridity is an outcome of negotiating different powers. In this perspective, the decisions that Korean music

agencies have made in the acceptance of American pop trends show their growing power in the process of creating new hybrid songs. Hence, the adoption of global trends in the Korean music industry can be considered as a local actor's strategic decision rather than as a cultural obsession.

This chapter examined the leading two music agencies that have consistently produced hybrid idol music and led the global popularity of Korean pop music. Although both companies have devised different branding strategies, they similarly value Korean sentiment in their music or images. SM and YG seem to understand that a mix of the familiar and the exotic is the key to success in the global market. In this perspective, SM established its own style, with the purpose of showing artists' performances, and it actively collaborated with top American and European producers. Korean music producers and composers who are affiliated with the agency have subjectively recreated Western-styled trendy music with an understanding of Korean music culture.

These two major music agencies have employed a different strategy in the production of their cultural content. While SM has focused on localizing global music by spicing it with local sentiments, YG has attempted to globalize local music by illuminating it with local character. Either way, the global spread of Korean pop is considerably indebted to American and European musicians and performers. However, the East Asian music industries identify the intra-regional popularity of Korean music as the construction of East Asianism rather than the action or counteraction of the global dominance of American pop. This perception is not surprising. For a long time, the global music industry has considered the East Asian region as the place of consumption, and thus, has excluded East Asian pop music from the World Music Waves, which refers

to the globally overarching popularity of local music (Shin, 2005, p. 11). Due to the marginalization of East Asian pop in global music production, musicians and audiences in the region have employed East Asianism to understand the regional popularity of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese pop. Hence, Asian audiences feel that the Korean pop industry has created an East Asian process of globalization in the cultural sphere (Shin, 2005).

The Korean pop boom is not simply a manifestation of the rise of East Asian connections in popular music production; it also reflects the involvement of the national media system in the globalization of Korean popular culture. As I discussed earlier, KBS has long played as a mediator between the government and the music industry in terms of modernization and globalization. The public media, for decades, have transformed their role from that of a censor to supporter in music production, keeping in step with the government's policy. In my understanding, this mediating process has strengthened the subjectivity of pop music production and has constructed a boundary of national culture in cultural hybridization. If one views the Korean pop boom as cultural formation, which is formulated by three entities—the government, public broadcasting, and the popular music industry—it can be said that the globalization of Korean popular culture is grounded in the national media system. In this way, the media narrative of the phenomenon, which is often empowered by locating Korea in a regional context, can be possibly the politicized imagination of globalization. However, it is important to see what the dynamics among the three entities have brought to popular music production. Korean cultural actors, based on "a renewed understanding of the self" (Chen, 2010, p. 254), have led to the revitalization of East Asia in the global cultural sphere.

CHAPTER 8

INTRA-REGIONAL CONNECTIONS:

MUSIC BANK AND EAST-ASIAN CENTERED GLOBALIZATION

The previous chapter analyzed the modernization trajectory of Korean pop music during the past half century. The hybridization of foreign and traditional musical elements was one of the hot issues in the development of the Korean pop music industry. Until the late 1980s, the integration of American and Japanese pop music in Korean pop music production was strictly forbidden by the government (Kim C. N., 2012; Shin, 2005). The review system of television networks was another force that discouraged Korean musicians from following foreign music trends. A primary concern of the review board was to protect the national culture by filtering out rebellious ideas and expressions. Thus, all singers and musicians who wanted to perform their songs on television had to observe the standards that the review board provided.

By the early 1990s, however, the global media system diminished the exclusive power of the review system of television networks over pop music production in two aspects. First, young people who were accustomed to listening to American and British pop songs increasingly expected Korean musicians to adopt the styles and elements of American music (Jung E.-Y. , 2006; Shin, 2005). Accordingly, idol-dancing groups who performed hybrid music performances dramatically changed the pop music industry by ruling the mainstream genre of popular music. Second, the new media ecology offered Korean music agencies alternative promotional channels (Ono & Kwon, 2013). Indeed, online media effectively conveyed Korean pop music to audiences, regardless of time and

place. Under these new circumstances, the hierarchical relationship between major

television networks and music agencies was profoundly shaken.

A major shift in the relation of the two cultural sectors—broadcasting and popular

music—impacted the production of weekly music shows. These changes were well

portrayed in a television drama, *The Producers*, broadcast on KBS in 2015. This

program, as a mixture of television drama and reality show, depicted how KBS show

directors became less powerful in casting top idols for their music shows compared to the

past. A main character of this hybrid drama is a television director of KBS' weekly

music show, *Music Bank*. In one scene, she conducts psychological warfare with an

inappropriately dressed female singer (Park & Pyo, 2015). After kicking production

associates out of the dressing room, she strikes a polite attitude to soothe the top celebrity

(Park & Pyo, 2015). This funny scene in the drama reflects an aspect of reality in current

television production. Put simply, the television industry no longer reigns over the music

industry. Given that Korean popular culture has been transnationally consumed, globally

renowned entertainers have privileges in media production. Whereas the hierarchy

between the two industries was shaken, mutual benefits have increased. Therefore, these

two sectors were forced to develop a collaborative partnership in order to continue the

exportation of Korean popular content.

This chapter unravels the ways in which the strategic partnership between KBS

and major popular music agencies–the combination of KBS' infrastructure and idol

groups' transnational marketability–has been involved in the (re)production of the

Korean Wave. An investigation into this agreement illuminates the national context of

the continuing dominance of Korean popular culture within the pan-Asian region. I

chose KBS' live music program *Music Bank* as the subject of analysis. Since the first broadcast in December 1998, the show has retained its distinctive domain in the history of Korean popular music. In the process of researching and writing, I watched 45 episodes of *Music Bank* by employing systemic sampling from 2001 to 2014. In addition, I interviewed twenty television and music professionals, journalists, and fans who, directly or indirectly, became involved in the program's production. Broad literature from multiple disciplines, overarching politics, and popular culture and music were also included to place this case study within historical and social contexts.

The questions of how, and under what conditions, KBS' weekly music program, *Music Bank,* has become a site to mediate Korean pop idols and Asian audiences were also developed to discuss the changing role of public broadcasting in the popular music industry. *Music Bank* is a representative text to see how public media is still important in the global spread of the national culture. The television program indicates that national sovereignty navigates the range and direction of the production and the circulation of television content. During the time that I analyzed this program, it had actively adopted new media platforms in the production process and had allowed the transnational interaction of national producers and international audiences in various ways.

By examining the cooperation of the public network and the popular music industry in television production, I argue that Korean weekly live music programs still dominate the Korean popular music sphere by creating the interdependence of television and music productions. In addition, the convergence among terrestrial, satellite, and online media channels increases the influence of television content over international consumers. It is necessary to understand *Music Bank* as the catalyst for creating the

power dynamic between the Korean television and music industries, the transnational

productions and distributions of public broadcasting, and the interactivity of audiences in

television production. This chapter helps us understand how the Korean media and music

industries have developed the transnational production system in the East Asian region.

The local specificity in the industrial structure enriches the complexity of transnational

cultural flows, creating a paradigm shift in the Korean media industry in mapping cultural

geography during the last decade.

<div align="center">Weekly Live Music Shows in the New Media System</div>

One of the reasons why terrestrial networks broadcast weekly music programs is

that the Korean way of constructing the relationship between the media and entertainment

industries helps both sectors survive in the global market. This strategy also applies to

cable television channels seeking opportunities to compete with the terrestrial networks

in the domestic market. Thus, five weekly music shows—three shows on terrestrial

networks and two programs on cable television channels—are broadcasting in Korea:

Music Bank (KBS), *Show! Music Core* (MBC), *SBS' Popular Song* (SBS), *Show!*

Champion (MBC Music) and *M! Countdown* (Mnet).

It seems that these music programs capture some features of cultural globalization

in their locale. The three major terrestrial television networks—KBS, MBC, and SBS—

have produced these kinds of live music programs for nearly a decade, while cable

television has recently joined the production of music shows. Five weekly music shows

broadcast from Wednesday to Sunday; only one live show is broadcast in a day in order

to secure performance staff. These weekly music programs provide the space for music

companies and artists to show their new songs and performances to a national audience.

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Thus, music artists who release new albums typically appear on the shows for three to five consecutive weeks. The following account indicates what brought about the proliferation of weekly music programs in the Korean television industry. Informant R, a television writer, said:

> Koreans love music. […] Music audition programs are always full of contestants. Where did all of the people come from? Koreans like singing a song. They are the consumers of music-related products. In these circumstances, it is reasonable that every broadcasting company produces at least one [weekly] live music show. (Informant R)

She noted that Korean peculiarities are a driving force that propels music-related content in the television industry. As she pointed out, the consistent demand of the domestic audience encourages television networks to produce weekly live music shows. Her assertion, however, contradicts the fact that weekly music programs are consistently losing their audiences to other programs in the timeslot. An executive television director confirmed the decline of audience ratings of live music shows. He said:

> When I directed *Music Bank* in 1999, the average viewership was around 13%. When an episode of the program was lower than 10% of the audience rating, the boss chewed me out. In these days, the average viewership [of the program] is only 2-3%. When broadcasting *Gayo Top10* [in the 1980s and 1990s], audiences could see both Seo Tai Ji and Boys and Joo, Hyun-Mi in the same episode of the program. Older generations could recognize idol groups until the male idol group, ShinHwa, actively appeared on the program [in the early 2000s]. Nowadays, only teenagers watch the program. (Informant M)

Informant M pointed out that the target audience of live shows has been segmented according to age and life stage these days, which challenges terrestrial networks to continue producing the shows. Low ratings have been followed by a reduction in advertising. Another problem with the current weekly music programs is that they lack a competitive edge. After the cable channels launched their own shows in

the mid-2000s, viewers watched the five weekly music shows that had similar castings and depended on a tired format in the same week. The music program genre became exhausted and lost popularity due to over-saturation in the market.

It is interesting that networks have not yet considered the abolition of these programs in spite of low ratings and poor returns. Some informants have noted that cross-industrial connections continue the production of these music programs. Informant H, who is working on program planning at KBS, said that the network acknowledges the production value of music programs in a global context, as these programs have become the most popular content among international viewers. Therefore, the company does not consider the abolition of these shows due to low ratings or the decline of ad sales.

As far as the pop music industry is concerned, singers have been the most zealous supporters for weekly music programs (Kim H.-S. , 2012). In particular, idol-dancing groups, who are eager to earn their reputation, put a premium on showing their performances on music shows. As a consequence, weekly television music programs have established specific conventions and codes of popular music culture in Korean society. Informant E, a radio director, argued that the ongoing power of television over the pop music industry has developed the routinized promotion process of Korean pop groups. She said:

> First, [an idol group] publishes a new album on online streaming sites during a specific time. Then, weekly live music programs including *M! Countdown*, *Music Bank*, *Music Core*, and *Hit Songs* are on the main schedule for the first week of the new album promotion. [Idol groups] consider that performing on the four live shows is to pay their respects to [directors of] the major television networks. This is a kind of rule in the industry. [Idol groups] put a bigger emphasis on the programs, which gives them the chance to appear on other entertainment shows. (Informant E)

Informant E detailed the mandatory process that K-pop idol groups could expect in the promotion of their new albums. Many Korean pop fans regard weekly music shows as the site for album promotions. Hence, the first and final performances of idol groups on weekly shows are commonly considered the beginning and end of their album promotions. These unspoken rules have become legitimate, and most Korean singers must develop their promotion plans in their discussions with television directors and writers. This partnership is particularly important because it has local consequences to which the global media system has yielded.

Another factor contributing to the longevity of weekly music programs, regardless of their low ratings and lack of commercial value, is the loyalty of the target audience toward K-pop idol groups. Television shows penetrate mass audiences beyond borders, and the range of this penetration inspires K-pop fans to concentrate on the performance of their stars on the weekly shows and to participate in spreading the video clips of the program via online channels. This type of media consumption is clearly seen in various online forums and social network services. The great passion and desire to make their stars become successful in the market have caused more and more Korean pop fans to pay attention to these television music programs.

Meanwhile, emphasizing Korean pop groups' appearance on television to enhance their singing careers has a connection with the underdevelopment of the concert tour business and the collapse of the recording industry. Due to this poor industrial structure, many Korean music agencies struggle with running their businesses, if they depend on profits from performing concerts and selling music only. Instead, most Korean pop idol groups increase their earnings by appearing on television variety shows and dramas,

corporate and college events, and commercials. What to consider here is that the revenue

for these activities is eventually determined by the level of popularity that the singers

have achieved in the market within a short period. Television is still the most effective

medium to produce top celebrities. That is why Korean pop groups are eager to appear

on prime-time music programs, which allow them to either maintain or improve their

degree of their recognition. Informant B added:

> Their appearances on the show give the public an impression that the singer has begun promoting a new album. […] Only after appearing on the programs, they might be able to appear on popular entertainment programs [that are produced by television networks]. (Informant B)

As I observed earlier, Korean pop stars can appear on prime-time entertainment

shows only after performing on weekly music shows. This same rule applies to both

superstars and newcomers; however, these two groups feel that regulation differently.

For top singers, every network employs weekly live shows as bargaining chips to prod

singers to appear on other entertainment programs that the network produces. Another

distinct manifestation of the weekly music program is in the selection of rising stars.

Informant Q, a television producer, noted that many show directors consider weekly

music shows as training grounds. Television directors feel responsibility for nurturing

future pop stars and providing them with regular opportunities to meet with audiences.

Informant Q also mentioned that these aspiring entertainers audition for other television

directors and writers while performing their songs on the live music programs.

The television network's personnel policy is another driving force for maintaining

the weekly music programs. The Broadcast Act demands that Korean-broadcasting

networks produce a certain percentage of programming within their in-house production

system. The production parts of Korean television networks have long developed a

rotation system in their personnel policies. Under this policy, a show director who made a music program last year is supposed to produce a reality show this year. This rotation system, which was introduced to give in-house directors a variety of different opportunities in making television shows, requires them to maintain good relationships with celebrities. For television directors, personal connections with the managers of top Korean pop groups are one of the biggest assets to continue their professional careers. Informant A, a journalist who has covered the television industry for several years, noted that this rotation system has heavily influenced the construction of peculiar relationships between the television and pop music industries in Korea. She said:

> The program has a premium in the division of variety show production in the broadcasting company. Television directors enjoy privileges to produce live shows according to the rotation system. It is strategic management in order to help produce other entertainment programs. TV directors develop a relationship with the managers of idol groups while producing live music shows. This directing career helps them cast idol members for the other programs that they will direct. (Informant A)

For the last decade, the importance of personal relations has become more strengthened in show production due to the structural expansion of the broadcasting industry. In Korean society, the three major television networks—KBS, MBC, and SBS—and the CJ media group have operated a number of subsidiary media channels including cable, satellite, and radio. Indeed, these additional channels are not competitive in the media market. Thus, the television directors of these subsidiary corporations often need the support of the head office to make their own content. In other words, the complexity in making strategic partnerships between television networks and music companies has been generated by media ownership and convergence. Informant A claimed that the frequent appearance of top Korean pop groups in various entertainment

shows in cable and satellite channels are an outcome of transmedia negotiations. She

added:

> Aspiring idol groups first appear on the programs in the subsidiary channels of major television networks, and then perform in the weekly live music shows. Idol groups of SM and JYP even appear on programs of the KBS World television channel. […] Major television networks maintain live music programs in order to maintain their initiative in the negotiation with music agencies. (Informant A)

Informant B, who has directed a variety of music-related shows in a cable

television channel, admitted the connection between production actors of the main

television and subsidiary channels. When having a difficult time casting celebrities, he

calls to ask in-house directors of the main television channel. However, he views that

this intra-corporation connection reflects hierarchical symbolic power in television

production. He added:

> The interaction between the main company and its subsidiaries certainly exists. It is pretty much a one-way [communication from the main company to its subsidiaries], though. Rather, the collaboration between divisions of production in the main company is more often made. It takes almost ten years to construct the mechanism [system] that, if one appears on the weekly music program, television directors guarantee the singer's appearances on entertainment shows. (Informant B)

His remark is useful because it helps explain why the Korean media system is so

instrumental in constructing the culture of media production. Over the decades, the in-

house production system has strengthened the authority of the terrestrial networks over

other media channels and, television producers and directors, as regular staff of the main

media channels, hold secure power over the production and distribution of media content.

Thus, singers should follow the logic of major networks in the process of television

production. This means that they might have to appear on low-rating shows in a

subsidiary channel of a terrestrial network. The structure of a hierarchy in the Korean

media industry determines the nature and direction of television content in some ways.

Another point to be mentioned is how the convergence of broadcast, online, and

mobile communications affects television show production. As Internet environments

and smartphones enable the multiple use of television content, major networks have

opened their YouTube official channels in order to provide video clips of an episode right

after a program broadcast (Kim H.-S. , 2012). Thus, audiences who missed the live

broadcast can watch clips at their own convenience. The segmented clips even allow

them to enjoy the content selectively. These new media environments have inspired

Korean music agencies to calculate the effect of the weekly music shows from various

angles (Kim H.-S. , 2012). In this setting, audience ratings are no longer the main

consideration for music companies and singers in appearing on the shows. Rather,

Korean music agencies put a much larger value on the weekly music programs,

understanding the ongoing power of the live content in the changed media environments.

The growth of international Korean pop fans has caused Korean music agencies

and idol groups to increasingly depend upon weekly live shows. These audiences

actively participate in the spread of Korean pop content by translating the subtitles of the

television programs and by uploading these video clips on various streaming websites.

The enthusiastic and dynamic reactions of international viewers to these weekly music

programs have reinforced their subordination to the television industry in Korea. As a

result, many Korean idol groups first perform new songs on television right after

releasing their digital sounds and albums to the market. With this new marketing strategy

of pop music agencies, the Korean television industry derives benefit in two ways:

networks maintain attention from the domestic and international audiences to their music programs, and at the same time, solidify their collaborative partnerships with music agencies.

As numerous scholars have noted, Korean idol groups attract their fans with choreographed dance moves, trendy fashion styles, and various expressions. Informant I, a news writer, also mentioned that the fascination of Korean pop fans with video clips of live music shows is based on the dance performances of Korean idol groups. Thus, Korean pop artists maximize the presence of their performances by appearing on "live" shows. She said:

> Many people appreciate the clips on YouTube channels that television networks upload after a music program broadcast. The footage of the shows is different from that of music video. Music videos often include dramatic stories in order to describe the lyrics of the song. However, television programs focus on the performances of idol groups that fans ultimately want to see. That is why fans of idol groups are looking forward to watching a "comeback stage" of their stars on the weekly music programs. (Informant I)

Online journalism, which always inspires real-time news items, contributes to continuing the power of television music programs over the pop music market. While watching live music programs, news writers of online news outlets publish reports of top musicians' new songs and performances. Major portals quickly post the online news reports on the main pages of the entertainment section. This online news ecosystem allows the Korean public to kindle an interest in idol groups' new albums without watching the television shows. More importantly, users of major portal sites stay informed about the current charts of weekly music programs, even if they have no interest in it. Likewise, the omnipresence of news information heightens the symbolic value of television entertainment programs and maintains the power of television in the

structure of music production.

Regardless of the ongoing value of live music shows in the media and music industries, the low ratings of live music shows are a significant issue for television networks. Most Korean television networks depend on advertising to pay for the cost of the production, and the Korean Broadcast Advertising Corporation (KOBACO) exclusively determines the cost of time slots based on the average ratings of the targeted programs. Hence, losing audiences is a warning sign that television networks might have to elaborate on the format of the program. Some informants (M and H) pointed out that different types of viewership do not feed into the audience measurement in the current system, which prevents producers from grasping the market value of weekly music programs.

In this industrial structure, it is obvious that commercial-based television networks feel more pressure in producing low-rating programs. Compared to other weekly shows, KBS' *Music Bank* has more flexibility to broadcast various music genres, which meets the mission of public broadcasting. The following section presents the ways in which *Music Bank* has influenced the music market and has constructed the cultural sphere for domestic and international K-pop fans in its own forms. I also address why the program has often raised social criticism about the direction of public-run television in the era of globalization.

Music Bank: Public Broadcasting and Local Popular Culture

KBS' long-standing philosophical foundation is to grow cultural diversity and to enhance intergenerational communication within society (Cho H.-J. , 2014). The mission of public broadcasting has fully influenced the development of the production system. In

this light, informant M argued that members of the company have shared their responsibilities for producing different types of music shows compared to commercial networks, and have pursued an enhanced understanding between generations through enjoying television programs. This enterprise objective characterized the company's own live music programs. As a result, one weekly music program, *Gayo Top 10,* was created in 1981. The program announced a weekly music chart and awarded a prize to the winner of the week. Informant M claimed that the cultural power of the program originated from the national condition of the industrial infrastructure. He said:

> The chart [*of Gayo Top 10*] was kind of a right answer. At that time, the audience did not have any credible source to obtain information [about the music industry]. Thus, they just accepted the weekly ranking of *Gayo Top 10* without any criticism. It can be said that broadcasting companies authorized the ranking of songs to singers. However, [at that time], the results could be unfair to them in some ways. There was no quantitative analysis model to evaluate the popularity of songs. Accurate figures on album sales were not available. (Informant M)

As he stated, the weekly ranking of the program had symbolized the power of the television media over the pop music industry. During the given time, the Korean pop music industry did not have reputable music charts like the Billboard chart in the United States or the Oricon chart in Japan. Thus, the weekly chart of *Gayo Top 10* was considered a yardstick for measuring the popularity of music artists and songs in Korean society. From this connection, it is important to note that the impact of television music shows over musicians and audiences came from the company's exclusion of information concerning the trends of the pop music industry. In addition, by making a direct and exclusive connection between music artists and the public in the show, KBS maintained its symbolic power as a cultural disseminator within society.

In 1998, KBS launched a new weekly music program, *Music Bank*, replacing

Gayo Top 10. For the show, television directors introduced a "hot request" format, instead of the chart format. It seems that this new format was an outcome of changing communication environments. As Internet technology has enabled television directors to interact with their audiences at a different level, various methods were introduced to increase viewers' participation in program production. The hosts of *Music Bank* gave a brief introduction in terms of how to submit a request on the website of the program during the show's airtime; then, the television directors invited singers whom viewers requested on the show's official website.

By the early 2000s, the *Music Bank* production team made multi-prolonged efforts to develop genre diversity in the show. Within this context, rock bands, rappers, and dance musicians often performed on the show. This style of directing contributed to strengthening the corporate image of KBS as a public broadcasting channel. However, its commitment to the enhancement of cultural diversity did not last long when *Music Bank* went back to the chart format in 2008. Under the chart format, television directors had less power to invite various musicians instead of top singers whose songs were on the latest charts. This move was not compatible with the aim of public broadcasting.

Under the renewed program format, boy bands and girl groups that led the transnational popularity of Korean pop music throughout the Asian market occupied most of the guest list of *Music Bank*. Then, *Music Bank* generated intense debates over the role of public broadcasting in cultural practice. Informant L, a music critic, said:

> The Korean government and broadcasting companies view popular music in an industry perspective. This music genre [idol dance music] is popular [in the market], so they should actively support them. [Broadcasting companies] produce programs dealing with Korean pop, and [the government] promotes the pop music industry. However, they are not interested in what really happens in the field of popular music. […] KBS, which is considerably supported by the government,

has the power to introduce a variety of pop music [to the public]. It is all about the company's will. […] For example, *Music Bank* could include a chart for independent musicians. (Informant I)

The effort that KBS has made for the ecology of popular music culture is not entirely satisfactory. However, the *Music Bank* case has more complicated aspects. Informant H, a television director, explained the dilemma that the public television network has faced concerning weekly music show production. He said:

The household audience rating matters [for the company]. Commonly speaking, older adults are the target audience of the major terrestrial television networks. If we broadcast a music program during prime-time, the viewership might be around 4-5%. If the program broadcasts during the daytime, it still has 3-4 % of the household audience rating. *Music Bank* has some limitations in attracting an audience. That is why we chose to televise *Music Bank* on Friday nights. We tried to find the best time slot for the program, except for prime-time. The schedule cannot be changed because other television companies have weekly live music programs. (Informant H)

It is not by accident that KBS schedules *Music Bank* on Friday night. Above all, the target audience of KBS' broadcasting channels is not interested in watching weekly music shows, whereas the television network has to maintain the show due to its value in entertainment show production. In addition, KBS has to consider the availability of pop stars appearing on the show due to the proliferation of weekly music shows in the Korean television industry. By broadcasting *Music Bank* in the earliest time of a week compared to two other shows–*Music Core* and *Music Trends*–KBS has reached out to compete with other commercial networks, as well as to exert its authority over the music industry.

The Power and Controversy of the Chart System

Major Korean television networks regularly broadcast five weekly music shows, and each show has its own ranking calculation method in 2015. These programs

celebrate their own winners every week after announcing their own charts. Table 10 indicates the current ranking selection methods of the major music shows. The categories that all of the major shows consider in the decisions of the weekly ranking charts are digital single sales, album sales, and the results of audience surveys. Details of the ranking selection methods are as follows:

	Music Trend (SBS)	Music Bank (KBS)
■ Digital Single	55	65
■ Album Sales	5	5
■ Broadcasting Score	0	20
■ Audience Survey	5	10
■ Music Video Views	35	0

■ Digital Single   ■ Album Sales   ■ Broadcasting Score   ■ Audience Survey   ■ Music Video Views

Figure 5. The Rank Selection Methods of the Weekly Music Chart Shows. Adapted from "Music Bank," KBS,[19] and "Music Trend," SBS.[20]

The distinctive manifestation of the ranking system is the active participation of the audience in determining the weekly chart. The target audience of the programs, mostly the fans of music artists, expects their stars to be presented with trophies from the show. Therefore, K-pop idol fandom analyzes the calculation method of each program and makes an effort to gain high marks through collective activities, including purchasing albums and digital sounds, taking online surveys, watching music videos, and sending text messages during the live broadcasts.

Under this mechanism, *Music Bank* has constructed its distinctive feature

[19] Retrieved from http://www.kbs.co.kr/2tv/enter/musicbank/
[20] Retrieved from http://program.sbs.co.kr/builder/programMainList.do?pgm_id=00000010182

compared to the other program in two ways. First, the show considers the number of appearances on other television shows in their decision of its weekly rankings. Unlike *Music Trends* (SBS), the directors of *Music Bank* consider neither music video views on YouTube nor the number of live voters. In other words, while the show directors of the other commercial broadcasting networks make profits through the inclusion of live voting in their calculation methods, public-broadcasting employees do not pursue their source of income in connection with the ranking system. Instead, they strategically include the section of broadcasting appearances in the ranking methods, given that this category makes it easier for the other show directors of the company to cast musical celebrities for various entertainment shows of the company. Hence, the introduction of broadcasting scores reflects how KBS employs the market power of the weekly music show to sharpen the competitiveness of its other entertainment programs. This public broadcasting company has to spend a relatively low budget in the payment of performance fees in show production; however, this policy operates to the company's disadvantage in industrial competition. KBS has focused more on casting top singers for other programs than on appropriating the expense of weekly live show productions.

Another feature of *Music Bank* is that weekly album sales have a certain percentage in rank selection methods compared to other programs. This has considerably influenced the marketing and business strategy of Korean idol music agencies. For example, many idol group agencies organize consecutive autograph sessions with fans to increase album sales. They choose attendees based on the serial number of the album. Thus, Korean pop fans who long to meet their stars in person should purchase several albums in order to increase their chances of receiving an invitation. These fan activities

show how Korean idol agencies value obtaining higher scores on the *Music Bank* chart.

Korean pop groups are eager to reach the top of the weekly charts of shows in order to maintain their popularity in the market. Therefore, Korean pop stars often encourage their fans to view music videos on YouTube and to download music from specific streaming websites via social networking services. Informant I said:

> If one group appears on the weekly shows and takes first place on the chart of a program, the news media refer to the group as "top-ranked singers." In these days, idol groups are going all out to get high marks in the category of the number of views on music video and text messaging voting. [After shows broadcast], I often receive many news items, [written by music agencies]. […] Older people consider that a number one position is good. [A winner of a weekly music program] makes the group introduce itself [to the older people] in an effective way. (Informant I)

It seems certain that the experience of winning the weekly show contributes to heightening the market value of idol groups. Due to the heavy dependence of idol groups on their guarantees for commercials and music events in the domestic market, music agencies are sensitive to the number of trophies on music programs that idol groups collect during the promotion of their new albums. Conquering weekly shows definitely helps them obtain a higher reputation within society.

Then, what allows *Music Bank* to maintain its prestigious status in the popular music industry? Informant L, a music critic, argued that television music programs excessively influence the industry due to the lack of a nationally acclaimed music chart. He added:

> We do not have any [representative] music chart. When [hearing news that] a singer topped a chart, we do not know which chart it is. It could be either the Melon chart[21] or the *Music Bank* chart. It is fuzzy. Of course, each music program

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[21] Melon is a digital music platform that has the largest number of subscribers. Real time charts reflect the music trend in Korean society.

has its own criteria in making a weekly chart, such as album sales and the number of appearances on other television programs. [TV directors] read into the meaning of hit songs in their own minds. Because of this, the winner of the *Music Bank* chart is not credited as much as that of the Billboard Chart or Oricon Chart. [...] When one group receives an award from either KBS or SBS, [the public] considers it [as an achievement] in a league of their own. (Informant L)

The interdependence of television music programs and music production companies has created hot debates on the fairness and credibility of their ranking systems. Television directors have retained the exclusive power to determine which type of methods to employ in calculating the weekly ranking of their programs. The ranking system presents a structural inequality in which KBS has been involved within the pop music industry. A certain issue is that, in maintaining its chart format for the last seven years, few veteran and independent musicians have been able to appear on *Music Bank*. The predominance of idol-dancing groups on the show has generated a great deal of criticism. What to consider, however, is that although show directors know the main points of these critiques, they still maintain the chart format. Their decision implies that the *Music Bank* chart is a politicized point with Korean pop fans, who continue to wield their market power in the show's production.

K-pop idol fandom considers *Music Bank* as one of the most representative and powerful chart providers. One reason that this belief was developed is the range of its broadcast. *Music Bank* currently reaches out to over one hundred countries via international broadcasting. Thus, Korean pop groups and their fan communities cannot help but pay attention to the *Music Bank* chart. In addition, whereas the other commercial networks have changed their program format and methods for the weekly chart, *Music Bank* has maintained its own methods and narratives. Interestingly, this

conservative production style has contributed to improving audience confidence in the chart. Informant G, a television director, considers the consistency of the evaluation items as the reason for the program's high reputation among the audience members. He said:

> *Music Bank* has long maintained its way of determining weekly rankings, while other television networks have often changed their evaluation system [of weekly music programs]. The maintenance of the calculation method made [the *Music Bank* chart] gain public confidence. (Informant G)

In the early 2010s, Korean-broadcasting companies adopted different points-of-view about introducing the chart format in show productions. Unlike KBS, the other terrestrial broadcasting networks – MBC and SBS - abolished the chart on weekly music programs by saying that the ranking system increased fierce competition among idol fans and even discouraged the audience from enjoying a variety of pop music on television shows (Kim H. , 2012). However, this maneuver was temporary, and shortly thereafter the two terrestrial channels reintroduced weekly chart formats in 2013. Their decision shows that the ranking system was a core value of weekly music programs. The target audience of the program watched these kinds of shows not only to enjoy the various music genres and performances, but also to see their stars become the winners of the weekly chart.

The increasing power of the weekly music programs in the international music market and the debate over the fairness and credibility of the ranking system often generated a clash among the television networks and music agencies. This conflict between the two sectors, of course, had been deepening, along with an increase of idol groups' popularity in the market. On March 4, 2011, Big Bang, one of the most popular male idol groups, did not appear on *Music Bank,* even though the group's new song,

"Tonight," was ranked at the top of the weekly chart. Many news reporters wrote that the boy group declined to perform on the show due to a conflict with the production team (Lee H. , 2011). YG and KBS had a heated discussion about how many songs the group would perform on the show. While Big Bang wanted to sing two songs like other popular groups, KBS maintained the formal position that candidates for winning the chart could only sing one song. Although Big Bang boycotted the program, KBS presented the group with a trophy and bouquet on the show. It seems that *Music Bank* maintained its public confidence by announcing the ranking, regardless of the guest's appearance on the program.

Since then, YG's idol groups and musicians have rarely appeared on *Music Bank*. PSY was a representative case. In 2012, PSY's worldwide hit number, "Gangnam Style," topped the program's chart ten times consecutively. When PSY released his 6th album on July 18, 2012, in the market, the title song of the album, "Gangnam Style," immediately conquered the charts of online streaming and downloading websites in Korea. However, he did not win the program until August 17, 2012. This happened because the ranking system of the program included the number of appearances on other KBS programs and album sales. News reports criticized the controversy of the chart system, citing that "Gangnam Style," in spite of its domestic and international popularity, had not won the program (Lee E. , 2012). Later on, although PSY did not perform on *Music Bank*, "Gangnam Style" won the weekly chart ten times, which is the longest record on the chart (Lim Y. , 2012). His success was possible because KBS news programs had covered the global sensation of "Gangnam Style," and his music video clips, inserted into the news items, were counted as his appearances on KBS programs.

Tensions between KBS and a major music agency created a wide diversity of opinions on the shaken hierarchy between KBS and music companies. Informant E (2014) argued that YG's musicians and idol groups made an exclusive appearance on *M! Countdown* and *SBS Hit Song*. Due to this, these two program producers treated YG's singers differently; the production staff of the programs showed indefatigable zeal in preparing the stage sets, camera walks, and lighting plans for these special guests. The power conflict between the two sectors originated from the proliferation of media channels and the empowerment of idol fans in the entertainment market. Leading music agencies had increasingly employed alternative media channels, such as web portal sites and social network services, for the promotion of their cultural products. New media environments consulted with music agencies to measure their strengths against major broadcasting networks.

<div style="text-align:center">*Production Culture and Globalization*</div>

The increasing number of weekly music programs and the global appeal of Korean pop idols are the main reasons why KBS considered developing collaborative productions with music agencies. For television directors, collaboration meant admitting of the involvement of music agencies in the process of show production. Thus, the blurring of duties between television and music producers had increased. Music producers viewed television music programs as an extension of their album promotions, and television directors were required to work with music agencies concerning the studio setting, directing, and lighting (Kim H.-S. , 2012). Informant G, a television director, emphasized that media production sectors still have power on their side to decide the extent to which music agencies are involved in the show production. He said:

> The new albums of idol groups that are affiliated with the major agencies have their own production concept. [Music agencies] discuss with television directors [concerning how to perform the production concept on the television show]. Staging begins with discussions between television directors and managers of the major music companies. The television director agrees to follow the company's intentions, or add his or her interpretations of the song [in directing the stage]. In the case of *Music Bank*, directors make the decision. (Informant G)

One more thing to consider here is that this collaborative producing system is limited to top Korean pop groups. One example of this kind of privilege is that television directors record top celebrities' stages for the show before a live broadcast. This special treatment helps continue the influence of the top boy bands and girl groups in the market by highlighting their new albums and live performances. Informant I, a journalist, pointed out that the gap between the dancing groups of the major music agencies and the other groups of small and independent companies in the construction of their images has increased due to the different quality of stage management, camera shots, and editing while they perform on the weekly shows. She added:

> [Directors] of KBS tend to mimic the scenes of a music video. The background they choose for their shows is the same as that of the music video. SM often chooses a long take in filming the music videos of EXO and Girls' Generation. *M! Countdown* directed the groups' performances on the show like their music videos. […] The directors care about pre-recording the top idols' stages, but do live cutting for the other idols. (Informant I)

Likewise, market logic is symbolically involved in television production. The public network's weekly music show contributes to strengthening the structure of the popular music industry through allocating media resources and deciding the rules of the market. Hence, the trend in discussing the differences in the directing styles for each television network has become popular during the past years, and the controversy in the characteristics of *Music Bank* has been ongoing among critics, journalists, and audiences.

Interestingly, these different perspectives developed between the production and consumption sectors in describing the quality of directing and the reviewing system of *Music Bank*. Informant Q, a chief producer, explained that the mission of public broadcasting influences the direction of *Music Bank's* production. He added:

> We aim for the standard of music shows. [That is why] we choose the most stable and conservative approach to casting, reviewing, camera walking, and designing studio sets. Whereas other television companies employ more sophisticated and sensational production plans, KBS produces the show within a basic and safe perspective. (Informant Q)

From an inside perspective, *Music Bank* has maintained its standard, unchanged, and routinized production techniques in order to meet the role of public service broadcasters in society. In other words, although young generations mainly watch the show, KBS considers audiences of all ages. As a result, advanced techniques for shooting performances are not attempted in the show, compared to other television music shows. However, a journalist presented a different perspective on the directing style of *Music Bank*. She added:

> I do not understand why directors of KBS show their bureaucracy on the show. Are camera operators of the program public servants, as well? They revealed their mindset as a governmental official in the scenes of the program. There are too many close-up shots in the program. They neglect to seize on the key dance moves of the idol groups. Their full-shots also look very normal. (Informant I)

Informant I considered *Music Bank* to be an uncompetitive show in the aspect of production values. She argued that the low quality of *Music Bank's* production derives from staff members' easygoing attitude, claiming that the television directors and camera operators of KBS are not proactive in updating the latest trends in media production. In her perspective, the *Music Bank* team does not perform their duties for developing a media production culture.

Idol Fandom as a Production Agency

Fandom music publishers devote all of their power to creating fan members who are willing to purchase a variety of musical commodities with "libido energy" (Adorno, 2002, p. 466). As Adorno asserted, an idol fan was one who went his own way, "shutting his eyes and gritting his teeth in order to avoid deviation from what he has decided to acknowledge" (Adorno, 2002, p. 466). Idol fans' hysteria about popular music, however, can create a new aspect of the music industry. Benjamin (1968/2007) claimed that the increase of participants can change the social recognition of participation. In this regard, when fan clubs produce a new activity to reveal their fanaticism, the public does not feel great repugnance for it; rather, the new mode of participation will be accepted as a cultural activity.

The growth of Korean pop fandom is possibly one of the most distinctive and important changes in the Korean pop music industry. Music-related businesses depend greatly on younger generation consumers because they have increased purchasing power in the market. This market mechanism has considerably changed the marketing plans of music companies. Informant A, a journalist of a major newspaper company, pointed out that the growth of the K-pop fan community has enabled music agencies to target specific segments. She added:

> Idol fandom underpins the [popular culture] industry these days. Whereas the public knew much about idol groups in the past, few recognize members of the male group, EXO. […] However, the music agency of [the group] is not concerned about the lack of popularity of EXO to the public. (Informant A)

During the past two decades, Korean idol agencies have developed their business strategies by analyzing the characteristics of Korean pop fans. This segmentation study helped create music-related products and services, and helped appeal to target audiences.

For example, SM employed transmedia storytelling to promote the male idol group, EXO (S.M. Entertainment, 2012). The company described each member of the group as a specific character that has supernatural power in their promotion videos. Their fictional characters were consistently used in the production of music videos and commercials (S.M. Entertainment, 2012). Young female audiences who had grown up enjoying fantasy novels and films, such as *Harry Potter* and *Twilight Zone*, were fascinated with the male group that crossed over between the fictional and real worlds. As a result, within the last three years, this branded group constructed huge fandom around the globe; these fans have not only bought the group's music albums, but have also consumed the group's merchandise. In this light, a composer said that the leading Korean music agency concentrates on creating a brand rather than creating music. He added:

> In fact, it is a kind of business relating to brands. The easiest and fastest way to create a brand in the entertainment industry is to employ dance, music, and celebrity. You can sell whatever you want if you have a brand. Do you know how many clothes EXO has sold? The SM merchandising shop, located in Sinsa-Dong, sells a tremendous amount of clothes and accessories. (Informant O)

It is important to understand that K-pop idol fandom helps music agencies expand their power beyond the music market. These fans tend to consider the achievement of their stars as their own. The growth of Korean pop idol fandom has thus brought about dramatic changes in related industries, including advertising, fashion, and beauty businesses. Informant K, a hair designer, gave us an example of how TVXQ fandom had influenced the haircare services industry in Korea during the mid-2000s. She said:

> Owners of major salons compete against each other in order to obtain sponsorship with top celebrities. […] This sponsorship is helpful to attract customers to the salons. It is well-known that the hair salon, Sun Soo, which is located in Cheongdam Street, [Gang Nam-Gu], always had a mass of customers while the hair salon sponsored members of the male idol group, TVXQ. The fandom

wanted to support the staff of their stars. (Informant K)

Not surprisingly, K-pop idol fandom has gotten involved in broadcasting production. Korean pop fans have grown as one of the main production practitioners in the weekly music program, and their involvement has contributed to shaking the long-standing power hierarchy between the television networks and pop artists. Fans who have constructed their solid bonds to Korean pop artists are always committed to enhancing the public images of their stars (Kim J. O., 2015). For that reason, it matters for Korean pop fans to display strong endorsements of their celebrities to television production workers. They believe that these messages protect their stars from retaliation in the broadcasting production process. Thus, Korean pop fans collectively strategize their activities to put boy bands and girl groups on the tops of the weekly charts. Put simply, the chart system has led to the involvement of Korean pop fandom in television production.

The global media system is often argued to have a complicated fan participatory culture in weekly show production. During the past decade, *Music Bank* has expanded to more than one hundred nations via satellite channels. KBS World channel regularly rebroadcasts *Music Bank*. Online channels, such as the KBS official website and YouTube, also upload the latest episodes quickly. Media convergence has shrunk the time gap in the consumption of music programs. This media environment has increased the power of the weekly chart over Korean pop fandom. Informant M, an executive producer, explains how domestic and international audiences perceive the *Music Bank* chart. He added:

In light of cultural flows, it was very difficult to go beyond the national border. For example, Korean television content was extremely limited to broadcast to

Chinese society. That is why the annual Korea-China music festival, (co-hosted by KBS-CCTV) made a huge sensation when the program aired in the whole Chinese society.

In these days, however, it is too easy to consume popular content transnationally. Many distribution systems, including YouTube channels, help international fans enjoy Korean pop culture. […] For Korean audiences, *Music Bank's* weekly chart is meant to confirm the popularity of idol groups or songs. However, this chart has been authoritative for international audiences. (Informant M)

As the scope of the show has been extended to the global level, the show's weekly chart has become more important to music companies, idol groups, and fans. They consider the number of weeks topping the chart as the standard for evaluating their album promotions. Informant M also contended that the domestic fans of Korean pop idol groups view the weekly chart as an outcome of their fan activities. On the contrary, international fans use weekly rankings as an important source for learning about Korean pop trends. Thus, the domestic fan community feels more responsibility for making their stars the winner of the program because the global recognition of idol groups can be attained by the *Music Bank* chart. Domestic fans who are more engrossed in placing their stars at the top of the chart encourage the participation of international fans to achieve their goals. As such, they translate methods of raising points for the weekly chart into foreign languages and share these instructions with overseas fans through social media.

Fans' participatory culture has further developed collaborations between the television and music sectors in the pre-shooting system. Korean television directors and writers have heavily leaned on fans' active contributions to produce their weekly music programs because Korean pop fans always fill the seats in television studios. Their attendance is fundamental to recording crowd noise when show directors record top idol groups' sets in advance. Both television and music companies prefer this form of

production in order to improve the quality of the groups' performances, stage

management, and video editing.   However, it is not easy for them to recruit audiences for

shooting because the production is often scheduled in the early morning of the

airdate. Music companies save their troubles in the audience recruitment by mobilizing

fans for the set production. Some even pass the night without sleep in the lobby of the

broadcasting station in order to secure front-row seats. Informant J, a Korean pop fan,

explained how to participate in the pre-recording event:

> The corporate website posts notices to inform fans about idol groups' promotion schedules. These notices include the time and place for each event and the method of distributing invitation tickets. Fans should send an official of the company an email to apply for the tickets. […] While the music agency manages the audience for the pre-recording production, KBS is in charge of selecting visitors for the live broadcast. […] The music company rates idol fans who come to a television station according to categories, such as official club membership cards, receipts of purchasing the latest album, and records of download music sounds. Fans who get higher grades can enter into the television studio first. A temporary worker checks out the attendance list. (Informant J)

Similar views were found among interviewees that the role of the Korean pop fan

community has been expanded from consumers to producers in the industries. These idol

fans do not mind providing their voluntary and unpaid labor in the show production by

identifying themselves as the running mates of their stars.   Informant S, a Korean pop

fan, participated in the weekly show production about ten to fifteen times since 2011.

She felt that it has become more difficult to be selected as an attendee for the pre-

production of music programs. She added:

> Fans who had fan club membership cards could get in the studio easily in the past because they did not have to wait in a television station. Nowadays, fans should download ringtone sounds and purchase albums as well as have membership cards. Attendance for the production is on a first-come-first-serve basis; however, fans should spend their time and money to secure their seats.

The duration of pre-recording is about twenty minutes. Fans should wait three hours in the lobby and four or five hours outside of the building before entering the studio. They waste the day [for the production]. (Informant S)

The introduction of this strict screening method relates to the increasing number of foreign attendees. Some international audiences who have been watching *Music Bank* via satellite and Internet broadcasting channels of KBS visit Korea to participate in the weekly music show production. Some Korean travel agencies have even developed Korean pop tour packages, including a visit of the studio production of Korean weekly music shows. Domestic fans have realized changes that international fans have brought about in live show production. The introduction of foreign consumers in local television production, however, has caused various cultural conflicts with local audiences. Informant J said that due to a lack of knowledge about Korean television production, international audiences often disturb shooting proceedings. She added:

I think that the TV studio is the celebrity's workplace. It is the place where the idol group presents a new performance to the public. Thus, I feel that we work together there. [The Korean public] tends to ignore idol groups. However, while listening to fans' chanting on television, the public, whether or not they know the name of the idol group, recognize the popularity of the group. Because of this, fans made efforts to call members' names loudly during the show production. Koreans have enthusiastic and fiery characters. […] Chinese and Japanese fans are not familiar with our fan culture. In the concert tour, Japanese fans were quiet to listen to the songs. They support the artist by seeing their performances. (Informant J)

The interaction between stars and fans has been routinized, by which leading music companies standardize the fan-chanting system in the television production. Music agencies announce the cheer pattern for the title song of the Korean pop groups on the

official website before pre-recording the groups' performances in television studios. Fans who are selected to attend the events should be well acquainted with their duties.

In television studios and live concert halls, K-pop idol fans shout short slogans in parentheses between the lyrics and sing the boldface typed words with their artists. Music companies assign these slogans or words to the fans, who should chant them during the idol groups' live performances. This collaboration makes fans feel like being team members with their stars. These experiences motivate the consistent participation of K-pop fans in the weekly show productions. Informant S added:

> Idol fans are in a pseudo-romantic relationship. [Many fans regard] idol stars as their boyfriends. Fans think that they are one of a kind to their stars. [During the production], *oppa* (a star) said, "Thank you for coming in the cold." A limited number of fans were in the studio, so they felt that they are special to the artists. […] I like shouting and singing along, which makes me feel like sitting in a melting pot of emotions. (Informant S)

Through ethnographic interviews with young Korean middle-class women, Youna Kim (2008) argued that they long for something special in order to get out of their routinized lives. However, these marginalized women cannot afford to go to overseas to travel or to consume high culture (p. 33). Instead, they are addicted to watching television, which enables them to imagine new lifestyles (Kim Y. , 2008). Similarly, Korean boy bands and girl groups in the weekly music programs become a venue for these female fans' achievements through their everyday practices.

The power of collective actions that fans routinely create has become influential; however, the separation between the producer and consumer, and the relationship of the dominant and the subordinate is still maintained in the show's production. Informant S

claimed that the television production staff, who know Korean pop fans' attitudinal and behavioral loyalty toward their stars, feel no compunction in treating the fans rudely and subserviently in the production process. She added:

> [The production team] seems to work without any plans. They do not take care of the time or effort of the fans. The times that they announce for the production are often delayed. They are not punctual at all. […] Members of the broadcasting companies seem to consider that the public has a lower social status than they do. […] They form the fans into ragged lines in order to record the set in the lobby at 4:00 am. Such a schedule is so rude. A security guard of KBS even called a fan a bitch. (Informant S)
>
> Admittedly, *Music Bank* has become the venue for confirming the mutual

dependence and confrontation among media professionals, Korean pop groups, and their fans. However, the politics of the main production sectors are more complicated by the fact that the transnational broadcasting of the program has called international fans into the KBS Hall. On one hand, the increase of foreign attendees in the show production reflects the notion that Korean popular content and celebrities affect these foreign fans' daily lives and translate their mundane practices into the creation of power in broadcasting production. On the other hand, the inflow of international fans to local production led to the encounter of local cultural traditions. These foreign visitors often break implicit regulations that the media, music companies, and domestic fans have long legitimated, and have intensified the subordination of domestic fans in the power relationship of production. Informant J added:

> Bodyguards sensitively respond to fans' behaviors, such as changing seats, making noises, or trying to gain admittance despite not being on the attendance list. The guards often insult fans. They infringed on our human rights by treating us like animals. It was annoying because fans were there to support TVXQ. International fans do not know about this situation well. If a fan makes a mistake, the television production team would disadvantage the whole of the fan community the next time. [For instance], security guards caught some Chinese fans jaywalking in front of a television station. Due to that, the production team

did not allow TVXQ fans to enter into the pre-recording studio. […] The production team knows that there are many other fans willing to come to the show. No payment was given and fans have no human rights. (Informant J)

Numerous fan scholars have argued that the digitized and globalized communication systems have widened and deepened fandom's involvement in cultural production (Jenkins, Ford, & Green, 2013). However, the blurring of media production and consumption can also allow industries to exploit fans' voluntary labor. While highlighting international listeners who have actively searched for and consumed Korean pop music as one of the main producers of the Korean Wave in the past decade, mass media consistently marginalize the contribution of domestic fans. The separation among fans based on their nationalities has been recognized in the television production system.

<center>Globalization of the Korean Music Program</center>

In the early 2010s, the transnational popularity of Korean pop music changed weekly live music programs in several ways. One of the most notable changes is that the three major television networks actively held live concerts in various cities. KBS led to this new production trend by launching a special edition of *Music Bank* in July 2011.

Table 8.

Music Bank World Tour Schedule

Date	City	Country	Venue
July 13, 2011	Tokyo	Japan	Tokyo Dome
February 9, 2012	Paris	France	Bercy Stadium
June 23, 2012	Hong Kong	Hong Kong	AsiaWorld Arena
November 2, 2012	Viña del Mar	Chile	Quinta Vergara
March 9, 2013	Jakarta	Indonesia	Gelora Bung Karno Stadium
September 7, 2013	Istanbul	Turkey	Ulker Sports Arena
June 7, 2014	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	HSBC Arena
October 30, 2014	Mexico City	Mexico	Mexico City Arena
March 28, 2015	Ha Noi	Vietnam	My Dinh National Stadium

Music Bank World Tour concerts were held in nine different cities across Asia, Europe and South America. Since its first event at the Tokyo Dome in Japan, KBS has held the event two or three times per year. The production team has developed, in spite of some variations, a routine process from program planning to its distribution. Each event had performances by six to fifteen Korean singers and idol groups. KBS cut down on production costs by collaborating with local performing agencies and broadcasting networks. After coming back to Seoul, directors of the program combined the footage of the live performances with location scenes. This finished program was first broadcast on KBS 2TV and KBS World channels, as well as it was uploaded on the KBS official website. This production routine illustrates how KBS planned, executed, and expanded its World Tour events.

Intersecting Two Cultures and Two Audiences

The routinized storytelling of the *Music Bank* World Tour program reflects the idea that television directors and writers have standardized the process of overseas program production. Narrative parallels were possibly constructed due to the tight budget of public broadcasting, which pressed the production team to decrease the venue schedule and production staff. A dearth of information about the locations of the performances may have also blocked efforts to attempt a variety of endeavors regarding onstage plans. Furthermore, it is almost impossible for idol groups to make time in their busy tour and album promotion schedules to prepare special performances for broadcast-driven concerts. Due to these realistic limits, similar patterns and themes in the narrative of the programs were found.

In general, the first scenes of the special programs are in the airport lobbies,

where Korean pop stars entered into the presence of fans of the place. Television directors often displayed K-pop fans who carried placards to greet the Korean pop stars at airports to substantiate the popularity of Korean pop beyond boundaries, as well as to justify the transnational production of the weekly music program. The whole view of the concert hall was followed by dolly shots of local spectators in a long queue for the entrance. The next scene focused on the main players of the shows' production—Korean television producers, local event promoters and workers—who installed the equipment and rehearsed the show inside the venue. Subtitles of the scenes informed viewers about the meaning of the events in both societies. For example, the Verci Stadium in Paris was described as a stage for global stars with the subtitles, "the K-pop festival will be held at the place where world stars, such as Madonna, Lady Gaga, and Britney Spears, have performed" (Lim & Lee, 2012a, 1:07). The Arena Ciudad de Mexico in Mexico City was also mentioned as a venue that had been opened with a top Mexican musician, Luis Miguel's concert, followed by performances of top stars, such as Pitbull, New Kids on the Block, Maroon 5, Linkin Park, and Deep Purple (Lim & Lee, 2014b). These rhetorical expressions were a reflection of the *Music Bank* team's interpretation regarding the achievement of Korean pop stars from an Americanized angle. Korean directors, under the assumption that the size of the concert venue represents the loyalty of local fans toward the invited performers in the society, employed the names of top American singers and groups that allow domestic audiences to see how far Korean pop stars have come, and to assess how much progress they have made. Such actions were possible because Americanization as the goal of globalization has been widespread in the entire society (Kang M. , 2012).

The opening set of the main tour concert was either done by singing a local pop song in unison or by performing ethnic dances. One aspect is that all invited Korean artists would sing a signature song of the country, such as "Champs Elysées" in Paris (Lim & Lee, 2012a); "La Bam Ba" in Mexico (Lim & Lee, 2014b); and "Todos Juntos" in Chile (Lim & Lee, 2012c). All songs were meaningful to the local audience, as well as they were known to Koreans. The other aspect is that local professional dancers played traditional performances in order to welcome the Korean pop stars. The Vatavia Dance Team performed the "Ondel-onde Dance" on stage in Indonesia (Lim & Cho, 2013), while Turkish dancers performed both the Horon Dance and Korean pop dance moves (Lim & Song, 2013). These opening performances were much like a cliché. Although the program directors intended to emphasize the unification of the two societies, Korea and the visiting country, many of the invited singers did not fully prepare for the performance.

The *Music Bank* production team enriched the show by staging a variety of special performances. In the initial phase, the program organizers simply asked Korean pop artists either to cover the popular songs of the visiting country or to translate their hit numbers into the language of the community. Thus, in Paris, Hyorin of Sistar and Soo-hyun of U-Kiss covered the song, "Friend, You Give Me a Reason," which was originally sung by a French singer, Elsa, and an American artist, Glenn Medeiros (Lim & Lee, 2012a). As another example, Hyun-bin Park sang his hit song "Shabang Shabang (Dazzling)" in Japanese at the Tokyo Dome (Lim & Kim, 2011). Later on, the production team, which had grown in experience, prepared special stages in consideration of the local culture. In Hong Kong, an event included some original soundtrack numbers

under the theme of "City of Cinema." A female group, F(x) sang the original soundtrack of the film, *Comrades: Almost a Love Story* (Lim & Lee, 2012b). The performance reminded the viewers of the heyday of the Hong Kong film industry in the 1990s. In Chile, Yong-Hwa Jung, the leader of the boy band, CNBLUE, covered Elvis Presley's "Love Me Tender" (Lim & Lee, 2012c). His set followed a short documentary film of the thirty-three trapped Chilean coal miners in 2010. The song became popular for those miners during their sixty-nine days of desperate struggle in a mineshaft. This stage amplified the emotional attachment between crying Chilean fans and singing Korean pop artists. Another interesting example was the female solo artist Ailee's special performance in Mexico. She covered the song, "Donde Voy," of which the lyrics embrace the joys and sorrows of the Mexican illegal immigrants (Lim & Lee, 2014b). The Korean public knows the song as well, because a Korean veteran singer, Soo-Bong Shim translated the song in 1999. These special sets caused the audiences of the two societies to recall their memories of the song. In addition, by planning these special performances, the *Music Bank* production team showed an enthusiastic attitude toward Mexican spectators, as well as thoughtful consideration for Korean viewers.

While visiting the cities, the production team asked some Korean pop groups to introduce them to historical sites and food cultures in the city or to record themselves backstage with camcorders. Directors employed these clips as a bridge between the two sets in the final version of the program. Three idol groups participated in filming clips in Jakarta, Indonesia: INFINITE recorded packing their suitcases in their residence before heading to Indonesia; Sistar, who visited a shopping mall, put on traditional clothes; and 2PM toured the national monument and traditional houses (Lim & Cho, 2013). In the

case of Turkey, the local production company prepared clips that introduced Turkish history, food, and tour sites. These videos gave emphasized the close relationship between Turkey and Korea in a historical context by mentioning the Turkish veterans of the Korean War, the third-place match in the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and Turkish fans of Taekwondo and Korean pop music (Lim & Song, 2013). The Turkish production company dubbed these clips into Turkish, and the KBS team added subtitles to help Korean viewers understand the messages of the clips (Lim & Song, 2013). The KBS staff used little time before and after the concert, although many of the clips looked rushed in order to include exotic scenes in the episode of the World Tour series.

Local cover dance teams were invited to perform on the show. The pop music magazine *Billboard* described the term *cover dance* as "the imitation of K-Pop artist's dance choreography" (Billboard Korea Staff, 2011, para 3). Covering K-pop dance has become a global trend in which K-pop fans enjoy the music. Flash mob dances, led by international fans, have helped the Korean public understand Korean idols' dancing performances as a form of global entertainment. The *Music Bank* team reflected on this latest trend in program production by inviting some K-pop cover dance teams to the concert tour. These fans obtained an opportunity to perform K-pop dances with their stars on the same stage. As an example, the male idol group, Bangtan Boys, met a cover dance team, *Re: On Soul,* at a dance studio in Mexico City (Lim & Lee, 2014b). The two groups, after practicing together, performed Bangtan Boy's hit number, "No More Dreams," in the concert. In Paris, a couple of cover dance teams were chosen to perform at the concert, through which the Music Bank team examined all video files that the amateur dancers had submitted. As a result, the female group, T-ara, performed "Roly

Poly" with a cover dance team at the Paris concert (Lim & Lee, 2012a). These dancing

sets indicate how the production team tried to increase the participation of the

international audience in the event. By mediating Korean pop stars and their fans on the

show, KBS played a central role in the reproduction of the Korean pop boom.

The *Music Bank* team clarified the principle of casting, in which the event aimed

to introduce diverse Korean pop music styles to audiences. Under the basic rule, KBS

arranged the casting members in the mixture of top and rising idol dancing groups,

rhythm and blues vocalists, trot singers, and rock bands. However, the notion that public

broadcasting should contribute to conveying many different cultural voices through

program production was not actually applicable in the selection of performers. Local

event organizers needed to cast idol groups that led to the Korean pop boom with strong

ticket power. Thus, in order to increase ticket sales, KBS had to cooperate with the major

idol agencies—SM and YG—that possessed the top idol groups. However, controversies

that arose in the weekly program production led to a tenuous relationship between KBS

and YG during the past years. Thus, in spite of the popularity of PSY, Big Bang and

2NE1 in Europe and Latin America, none of the music agencies participated in the World

Tour series. This means that KBS should have developed a strong partnership with SM

in order to make the tour a success. Clear signals of the KBS-SM relation in the World

Tour program are as follows: Each concert invited at least one idol group of the company.

The SM idol groups performed at the end in seven places: Girls' Generation in Paris;

Super Junior in Jakarta, Viña del Mar, and Istanbul; TVXQ in Tokyo and Hong Kong; and

SHINee in Rio de Janeiro.

The ongoing success of the tour series made the *Music Bank* team look like one of

the most powerful actors in the transnational circulation of Korean pop music. In addition, the consistency of the events arguably implies the superiority of public broadcasting to private media companies in supranational collaborations. However, it is also important to see that their achievements are substantially dependent upon the popularity of idol dancing groups rather than the quality of show programs.   Therefore, the following section will investigate the behind-the-screen practices of the *Music Bank* World Tour events with a focus on the cultural interactions and power dynamics between production sectors.

Reconfiguring Obligations of Public Broadcasting

Whereas Korean mass media made a great fuss about reporting the Korean pop boom in the early 2010s, the public was somewhat doubtful about the news. It was the normal and sensible response to the story for the following reasons. First, the Korean public has been aware of the global dominance of American pop music for such a long time. The consistent consumption of American media has created the internalization of American cultural superiority in their minds. In addition, many idol groups who created the K-pop boom over the world were not widely popular in Korean society. Due to the relative lack of their singing skills, the Korean public has considered them as media-made stars rather than as talented musicians or singers.

Perhaps television is the medium that has led the national audience to admit the global appeal of Korean pop idols. There are two important airplays of the taped Korean pop concerts in 2011 that became the source for the proliferation of the discussion of the Korean pop boom in society. One was the *SM Town World Tour in Paris* broadcast on MBC, and the other was KBS' *Music Bank World Tour at Tokyo Dome*. The Korean

public has constructed an image of those two places as the center of advanced popular culture. Informant M, an executive producer, contended that the two events made television programs play a distinctive role in navigating the public discourse of the Korean pop boom within society. He added:

> In the early 2010s, the global popularity of Korean pop was initially discussed [in Korean society]. In 2011, the *SM TOWN World Tour in Paris* and the *Music Bank World Tour* made [Koreans] believe the Korean pop boom. In former times, the public just learned about it from news articles. (Informant M)

Informant M (2014) argued that KBS began the tour due to the competition with other commercial broadcasting networks. In the early 2010s, the other two major networks—MBC and SBS—and the music cable TV channel, Mnet, rushed to hold Korean pop music festivals in other cities. During that time, KBS did not have confidence in the marketability of Korean pop music artists. However, all of the tickets of the first concert of the *Music Bank World Tour* at Tokyo Dome in July 2011 were sold out. The huge success of the first event allowed KBS to continue planning these special programs. Informant P, a television director, contended that the ticket power of the Korean pop stars induced local companies to collaborate with the public broadcasting provider. He added:

> It cost about 20 million dollars to hold the *Music Bank World Tour* in Chile. [Local] investors covered all production costs. KBS paid for round-trip airfare and accommodations charges. […] Generally speaking, local production companies sent KBS a proposal for the World Tour concert. For example, a Chilean company sent KBS an email, "We want to bring your concert to Chile. Is it possible? We will prepare the expenses." In the case of Chile, ticket sales started just fourteen days before the event. Nevertheless, twelve thousand tickets sold out rapidly. [K-pop concerts] are a roaring business. (Informant P)

The live recording and broadcast of the Korean pop concerts in multiple cities

invoked television producers of the public broadcasting company to realize the

competitiveness of Korean pop music in the global market. The ongoing success of the

World Tour is also related to the international broadcast of its regular program, *Music*

Bank via the KBS satellite channel. The brand awareness of *Music Bank* helped promote

the World Tour concert among international fans of Korean pop. Understanding the

mutual dependence between the weekly and special programs, the *Music Bank* team

actively reflected on the needs of international fans in the weekly show production.

Informant Q, a chief producer, added:

> After 2011, *Music Bank* has two responsibilities: increasing exportation [of the
> program] and boosting domestic demand. When beginning the program service
> for the international viewers, we provided the title of a song and the name of a
> singer in both languages [English and Korean] during a live broadcast. One week
> later, the show is broadcast on the KBS World Channel across 114 countries with
> English subtitles. Now, we consider international audiences in the program
> production. The KBS World Channel has been running for 11 years, and *Music
> Bank* is the core content of the channel. (Informant Q)

These special editions have distinguished *Music Bank* from other weekly music

programs. Due to the size of the production cost, it is too risky for private broadcast

networks or small-sized music agencies to keep hosting events beyond Asia. However,

KBS continues these events by articulating the invigoration of the Korean Wave as a

mission of public broadcasting. Informant Q said:

> In the process, producers of *Music Bank* developed two objectives of the program
> production. One is to enter into the foreign markets as a cultural commodity, and
> the other is to take a pioneering role for assessing non-Asian markets. There is an
> overflow of Korean popular culture in the Asian market. In order to disseminate
> content, [KBS] should enter into the targeted society and cooperate with local
> television companies. To do so, we made an effort to develop a good relationship
> with [local production teams] in Paris, Hong Kong, Chile, Indonesia, and Istanbul.
> (Informant Q)

KBS saved production costs by collaborating with local media companies. Based on physical and direct interactions, KBS developed strategic partnerships with local television networks in Asia and Latin America. Informant M argued that the World Tour should be understood as an extension of the obligations of public broadcasting. He added:

> It was meaningful because the event promoted cultural exchange between nations. We created a direct connection with Trans TV, [the third largest television network], in Indonesia [while holding the concert in Jakarta]. The production staff of this Indonesian television network participated in recording our concerts, and we let the television network broadcast our live concert [in Indonesia]. In the case of Turkey, we collaborated with the television network, TRT, and gave the company the copyright of a live broadcast. (Informant M)

In fact, these concerts are the outcome of long-standing and hierarchical collaborative partnerships between the Korean broadcasting and music industries. Korean music agencies have been dependent upon television media in the promotion of their artists. When television companies ask music companies to schedule the performances of their idol groups on K-pop events, music agencies hardly refuse such requests from major television networks. Thus, news journalism has critically viewed broadcasting-hosted music festivals as tyranny of the strong (Lee & Yoon, 2011). Lee and Yoon wrote:

> Invited groups including TVXQ, Girls' Generation, BEAST, 2PM, and KARA are all top stars who can attract tens of thousands of audience members for their solo concerts. However, they were forced to perform on the broadcasting-hosted events with one-half or one-third of their revenue per general event.

> The increase of K-pop concerts is more problematic than the issue of appearance fees. Korean pop stars make a profit by holding fan meetings or solo concerts. However, if the audience can see all top Korean celebrities with a one-hundred-dollar ticket, they will not go to solo concerts or fan meetings for one idol group or singer. (Lee & Yoon, 2011, para. 3-4)

As the report pointed out, music companies participated in the events reluctantly. They were concerned that Korean television companies stole customers from the music businesses around the foreign markets (Lee & Yoon, 2011). However, informant M emphasized the positive contributions of the broadcast-driven music events to the music industry. In his perspective, the *Music Bank* concert tours demonstrated the interdependence between KBS and the major music companies in expanding their markets. He added:

> We spent the profit from the Hong Kong concert to cover the deficit of the Chilean one. We did not take the idol groups' market. Rather, we interchanged experiences [with music companies] to pioneer a new market. [The *Music Bank* Tour] was the first large-scale K-pop concert in Istanbul, [Turkey]. Inspired by [the event] in Chile, Super Junior had its solo tour around Latin America. CNBlue also planned its tour in Latin America with the production team that had participated in our program. (Informant M)

Major music companies, such as SM, YG, and JYP, were reluctant to participate in the programs because they had continued their own concert tours under the names of "SM Town World Tour," "YG Family Concert," and "JYP Nation" since the late 2000s. These companies were concerned about ticket sales for their own concerts because Korean pop fandom in various cities is limited (Lee & Yoon, 2011). However, they could not refuse to attend the special events led by KBS because the companies needed to consistently produce new idol groups, who required promotions through weekly programs (Lee & Yoon, 2011). The tensions and agreements between KBS and the major music agencies are ongoing as Korean pop music has become more popular beyond borders, and both KBS and music agencies are constructing specificity in the structure and culture of local production, even though it generates marginalization of local-based independent musicians and domestic audiences.

Conclusion

This chapter examined how the weekly show, *Music Bank,* contributes to spreading Korea's pop music trends beyond domestic borders and reconfiguring the obligation of public broadcasting in the intensification of globalization. KBS has long provided the Korean public with mediated sites for enjoying popular music culture. The company's directors and writers have engaged in the constitution and reflection of Korean pop music culture through continued interaction with pop artists and music producers. The television production team claims that they can control the Korean pop music industry by requesting modifications in the pop artists' performances, including their costumes, lyrics, and dance moves at socially acceptable levels. These regulations provide guidance to music companies in terms of a mixture of traditional and foreign music. The practice of media power over music artists involves announcements of weekly charts on shows, thereby trying to determine the market value of the latest Korean pop songs. In other words, by topping the weekly chart of *Music Bank*, Korean pop artists and idol groups can tighten their grip on the market.

In this chapter, I argue that the cultural power of *Music Bank* is socially constructed in the amalgamation of the Korean television and music industries, and is further expanded to the global domain, in that international and online broadcasting channels rebroadcast the program to more than one hundred countries. In turn, this globalized media system reinforces the domination of *Music Bank* in the Korean pop industry. However, the Korean pop boom has complicated the power relationship between the broadcasting and music industries in show production. The proliferation of weekly music shows and the increase of Korean pop artists' overseas activities have

made it difficult to cast top stars. Due to this changing production environment, music companies attempt to position themselves favorably in negotiations with television networks. Several informants in this research admitted to increasing active involvement of music producers in television production. The global popularity of Koran pop artists has invigorated the development of the strategic production system between industries.

Furthermore, television producers have contended that hosting the *Music Bank World Tour* concert in various cities outside of Korea was a legitimized practice for the promotion of public interest, and not a forced attempt to launch another profitable business. I observe that KBS' reconfiguration of the public interest is bounded by globalization discourse within society, and the logic of the national economy in the global capitalist system leads the public to tolerate the commercialization of public broadcasting programs. This means that KBS has redefined the notion of public interest by making connections with the national interest in the context of globalization and has utilized this remade notion of the public interest in order to vindicate the company's exploration of funding sources from overseas markets.

Meanwhile, the market forces of globalization have reshaped the role of audiences in the broadcasting industry. In particular, Korean pop fans, who are loyal to their celebrities, have provided their voluntary labor to show production teams, such as purchasing music-related products and services at the assigned places and filling audience seats in the television studios for pre-recording footage. Domestic fans have even analyzed ways to obtain higher scores in the category of the weekly charts and have shared manuals with international fans for collective action. Their cultural practices are fundamental resources for program production. The Korean pop fandom experience of

globalization in *Music Bank's* production reflects the importance of location in the

construction of television culture, the transnational expansion of fan cultures.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines the Korean Wave phenomenon as a particular form of globalization, which generates trans-local hybridization in popular culture and establishes intra-regional relationships in media flows. A great deal of global media studies reaffirms the centrality of American culture in global media flows. However, these approaches have been consistently challenged by scholars who bring up the complexity and irregularity in the transaction of media cultures at the local, regional, and global levels. That is, the intricate landscape of the global media industries introduces the presumption that the transnational power and value of non-US cultural products can be underscored in the current setting of the global communication system. Although the logic of global capitalism strengthens the centripetal force of media conglomerates in local societies, media scholars should also identify the potential of local entrepreneurship, which complicates the pattern of cultural production and distribution. Certainly, this different approach is significant for understanding the decentralization of cultural production and the disjunctive contours of media flows and consumption.

In the early 2000s, despite the flood tide of global capitalism and cultural imperialism, Curran and Park (2001) pointed out that three aspects of the national media system allow the power of nation-states to rise above multinational media conglomerates and media exports market: 1) the communication regulations are national; 2) the licensing authority of media channels are reinforced by the government; and 3) nation-states are the basic unit of making differences in cultural traditions, politics, economies, and power structures (p. 9). More prominently, the complexity of social relations in shaping the

media system is national (Curran & Park, 2000). In this dissertation, I extend this national approach to understand the transnational aspect of Korean media production. Hence, this dissertation examines the national media system as a driving force of transnational media cultures and practices in order to enrich media theory by challenging the argument that governmental control has been weakened under the rise of global capitalism.

In addition, Appadurai's (1996) assertion that "the complexity of the current global economy has to do with certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics" provides me with a space to study dynamics in the Korean Wave phenomenon as a cultural dimension of alternative globalizations (p. 33). In his view, the five landscapes—ethnicity, media, technology, finance, and ideology—are deeply involved in the disjunctive aspects of global culture, and these disjunctive relations are the key to understanding the kaleidoscope of global media cultures. These five landscapes, which are created by "perspectival constructs" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 33), as opposed to being "objectively given relations" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 33), imagine, construct, and situate a boundary of individual groups and communities. This local community, which is understood "as relational and contextual rather than as scalar and spatial," contours a boundary of "agency, sociality, and reproducibility" (Appadurai, 1996, p. 178). Therefore, it is imperative to explore who navigates the disjuncture of global media flows. In this standpoint, this dissertation synthesizes how Korean society's history, structure, and geography yield a cultural form of globalization, and sets a new theoretical agenda for global media studies. An examination of the television and pop music industries enriches the scholarly discussion over how local actors yield the

disjunctive aspects of global production and distribution and further engage in shaping the landscapes (Appadurai, 1996, p. 33).

Kraidy and Murphy's (2008) and Darling-Wolf's (2015) focus on local-to-local connections encouraged me to reconsider the imagined conceptions of local vs. global from a different context. In their perspective, media scholars should challenge the long-standing conceptual strand of East-West and West-Rest to better explain the complicated nature of the current cultural exchange. As Darling-Wolf (2015) pointed out, this West/East approach has led to strategic simplicity in the discussion of transnational and transcultural transactions. Media scholars, viewing global dynamics as a trans-local phenomenon, instead, can explain the simultaneousness and complexity of local-to-local connections within and beyond the region. Darling-Wolf's (2015) argument that "the global/national/local are mutually constituted" helps me deal with the intersection of nationality and locality in the (re)production of the Korean Wave phenomenon (p. 3). My response to the rise of trans-local connections in cultural production and distribution, generating cultural hybridization and regionalization, respectfully, is influenced by decolonization movements in knowledge production (Chen, 2010).

An empirical study of the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), which has played a prominent role in the construction and protection of national/local culture among Korean ethnic communities, allows us to see how national/local actors have been proactive in creating hybrid cultural forms and trans-local/intra-regional collaborations in the intensification of globalization. Based on this study, I claim that the mixture of national/local/global cultures and territory-conditioned amalgamation in cultural production reinforces the power of national actors in the transnational production system.

To understand the state's presence in a globalizing process of Korean media culture, I focus on the dynamics of three main bodies—the government, public television, and the pop music industry—which are constitutively involved in the determination of transnational cultural connections. By analyzing the national forces of transnational cultural production, I conclude that the interplays between cultural hybridity (García Canclini, 1995; Bhabha, 1994/2004; Kraidy M. M., 2005) and cultural regionalization demonstrate the rebirth of cultural nationalism within Korean society (Choi J. , 2010; Chua, 2012; Fung, 2007; Otmazgin, 2013).

The Korean Wave case seems to rekindle the long-standing debate over universalism and particularism in the globalization of cultural production (Wallerstein, 1974; Robertson, 1992). Wallerstein (1974) early on stated that nationalism is constructed by the simultaneous achievement of the universal and the particular (pp. 166-67). Robertson (1992) furthered this perspective by arguing that these two counter-posed goals can be mutually reached through "a massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of the universalism" (p. 100). In his view, the experience and expectation of particularity and universality have become institutionalized in contemporary globalization (Robertson, 1992, p. 102). Appadurai applied this twofold process of globalization to the cultural domain by focusing on "the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization" (as cited in Robertson, 1992, p. 103). In Apparurai's view, culture is "a pervasive dimension of human discourse that exploits difference to generate diverse conceptions of group identity" (as cited in Robertson, 1992, p. 13). Appadurai (1996) added that the term *culture* is consistently rearticulated to sustain the difference between

group identity and others. In particular, he claimed the possibility of mobilizing culture in order to meet the interests of local politics and the gravity of ethnicity in "the conscious and imaginative construction and mobilization of differences" in global society (Appadurai, 1996, p. 14).

I challenge this view by arguing that the state still stabilizes its hegemonic power through the articulation of cultural differences in the intensification of globalization. The assertion I have made here is that the similarity of cultural tastes and the dissimilarity of cultural identity are mutually influenced by and concretely imagined by placing a national community into a regional context. Bafu (1993) provided an important explanation of how the state strategizes culture within the location of national specificity. He viewed culture as a discursive and symbolic formation that contains "the territorial integrity of nation and certain 'sacred' cultural contents" (Bafu, 1993, p. 3). In this light, by focusing on how the logic of national politics and economy generates the meaning of national culture, I maintain that the governmental body engages in the construction of cultural nationalism, creates the meaning of a national culture, and in some ways, determines the level and range of cultural hybridization.

East Asia is an excellent case to show how the narrative of cultural nationalism is influenced by anxieties about national unity and national identity (Robinson, 1993, p. 167-168). The history of the region obviously reveals that three nations—China, Japan, and Korea—have formed their own stances concerning cultural values, international relations, and historical events in the consistent recognition of their connections (Robinson, 1993). By the early 2010s, East Asian societies began strategizing the value of their interconnectedness beyond the long-standing history of their neither-close-nor-far

relationships. Some thinkers in media studies have characterized increasing collaborative productions among these nations as the shifting framework of globalization from localization to regionalization (Choi J. , 2010; Otmazgin & Ari, 2012). Their renewed attention to regionality has been characterized by various terms: "regionalizing culture" (Otmazgin, 2013) ; "regional impetus" (Fung, 2007, p. 266) ; and "emergent and unstable entities" (Otmazgin & Ari, 2012, p. 4). In this standpoint, Fung (2007) reconfigured the meaning of "geography, history, cultural proximity, and emotional/esthetic immediacy," thereby challenging the belief that local interests are politically subordinated to the national logic (Fung, 2007, p. 266).

It seems certain that the global nature of capitalism has established regional collaborations among East Asian societies, and cultural actors have begun producing something that attracts audiences in neighboring countries. As a result, the geographically conditioned imagery of the self and subjectivity have become increasingly hot-button matters in the academic world (Chen, 2010). The point to emphasize here is that the increasing awareness of interconnectedness among these societies has always been associated with concerns about maintaining cultural differences from neighbors. As an example, in Korean society, controversy over leaking cultural secrets has been mounting, since Korean television networks have developed collaborative productions with Chinese satellite broadcasting and online media groups. Another example is that protesters took to the streets in Tokyo to complain about the increasing broadcasts of Korean television dramas on Japanese television channels. These cases show the tensions and conflicts that the intra-regional cultural flows have generated within society.

As Curran and Park (2000) early on mentioned, fundamental differences in media

structures, regulations, cultures, and practices have definitely set limits to intra-regional collaborations. This empirical study also supports the notion that unpredictability in the revision of media regulations and the underdevelopment of the media production culture have discouraged the in-house television directors of KBS from cooperating with Chinese partners. Similarly, co-hosting Korea-Japan pop festivals between KBS and NHK is almost impossible due to national differences in the power relationships between the television and pop music industries. In addition, conflicts over political and historical issues, such as Dokdo Island and comfort women, continue to affect Korea-Japan partnerships in the media industry. In this context, the growth of connections between Korea, Japan, and China is a situated and strategic counteraction of national to globalizing forces rather than a continuum of regionalization in cultural geography.

With the interpretive analysis of the Korean Wave, I propose to see globalization as a *nationalized discourse* that imagines the global presence of national cultural actors. This nation-centered phenomenological discourse is constructed by situated and contextual interactions of international relations, political economic structures, and media environments. Furthermore, I regard the Korean Wave discourse as a distinct case in displaying the mutual constitution between national politics and global market forces. The former Korean administrations from the mid-1990s to the early-2010s often mentioned the term *globalization* in the process of introducing cultural policies. Due to the dependence of political power on economic strength, each regime attempted to vindicate its strategic utilization of cultural products for the enhancement of the national economy. Thus, these former administrations commonly linked the discourse of globalization to the future direction of the Korean Wave phenomenon. The discursive

amalgamation between globalization and the Korean Wave, which was constructed by politicians, scholars, and journalists, legitimized the state-driven global process and to strengthening the hegemonic narrative of cultural nationalism within society.

Apparently, the national discourse of the Korean Wave reveals the hierarchical structure of discourse production. The production process of public discourse is as follows: The Korean government mobilized money and regulations to support the exportation of cultural products. Intellectuals and media professionals depicted the transnational consumption of Korean popular content within the narrative of cultural pride and national interest. The public perceived the phenomenon in connection with the discursive construction of reality in the media. This process mirrors cultural nationalism, which is mainly dependent upon the transnational marketability of popular culture, engages in the discussion over the level and range of adopting foreign cultures, and makes intra-regional cultural connections.

The reason I became interested in analyzing the governmental documents, annual reports, and academic journals is because regime changes in Korean society have considerable influence on the construction of globalization and the Korean Wave discourse. Due to a transfer of political power from the Democratic Party (1996-2008) to the Republican Party (2008-2017) in the governmental discourse of globalization, the implicit understanding of the term *culture* changed from *intrinsic values* that differentiate one society from others, to *global commodities* that brand nation-states within the international domain. The objectification of the culture industry reached its pinnacle when the former president Myung-Bak Lee declared the Korean Wave as a national business. Under Korea's top-down discourse production system, Lee's (2008) statement

framed the national audience to form their thoughts and perspectives about the Korean Wave phenomenon. In addition, media coverage of the Korean pop boom during the Lee Administration possibly encouraged the Korean public to believe that cultural commodification was a reasonable solution for globalization. The transnational consumption of Korean pop music beyond the Asian region arguably allowed members of the society to feel the global presence of Korean musicians. My analysis in this dissertation argues that the public's interest in the maintenance of cultural difference is often associated with national pride, which is infused by a constructed emphasis on a one-way flow of Korean popular content to the other two neighboring societies. The government chose the terms to highlight the competitiveness of Korean popular culture in the regional market. This mirrors the notion that imagining a nation as an interest group in the global economic system, in some ways, has the outcome of reshaping cultural geography.

The second critique of this dissertation involves the role of public television in the (re)production of transnational culture. As national control has been weakened in the globalization of the media market, the traditional beliefs that public broadcasting needs to be introduced for the development of democracy, the construction of collective national identity, and the enrichment of diversity within society were shaken (Curran & Park, 2000, p. 8). Alternative media channels—cable television, satellite television, and social media—have extended the public sphere, and neo-liberal markets have forced nation-states to introduce deregulatory media policies (Curran & Park, 2000).

With the rise of a globally networked system, numerous media researchers have questioned the relevance of nation-states for global media cultures and practices. The

presumption that the logic of media capital (Curtin, 2004) and that the growth of global cities (Punathambekar, 2013) invigorate the deterritorialization of media production have been widely embraced by scholars in global media studies. However, some still put an emphasis on "the continuing centrality of nation-states for media processes, and the ongoing significance of the national space in an age of media globalization" (Flew & Waisbord, 2015, p. 626). In their perspective, nation-states as a boundary of media systems retain their presence in the formation of global production. This media systems approach focuses on the ongoing power of national politics in the global media industry. Flew and Waisbord's (2015) claim that nation-states force and institutionalize the amalgamation of media politics, production, and distribution in the moment of media globalization rings true with what has occurred in Korean society.

Evidence of this argument can be offered from societies where public broadcasting has taken a lead in the foundation and development of the media system. This empirical study of how Korean public television has engaged in the reproduction of the Korean Wave enriches the East Asian-centered description of national forces in shaping the future of public broadcasting. The decline of public media institutions is commonly expected everywhere. Nevertheless, given that public television is a concept, and that this idea can be discursively negotiated within the national community, the globalized networking system can now be identified as an opportunity rather than a collision (Tracey, 1998).

The Korean example indicates that the rebirth of public television can be made by rearticulating the role of public broadcasting in the global structure of capitalism. Hall (1974) asserted that the mundane practices of broadcasters are possibly intervened by

"institutions of power"; thus, they tend to adopt the "dominant definition of the situation" (p. 20). In this sense, Hall did not think that biased discussions on television are the product of program directors and writers' political views. On the contrary, Foucault (1978) underscored the subjectivity of these production practitioners in spite of the influence of the government. In his perspective, governmental actions are possibly not only pressures, but also motivations for these practitioners. Caldwell (2008) also pointed out that television producers do not simply create cultural products to propagate the objective of the government. Rather, they develop their own entertainment forms through "self-analysis and self-representation" of social changes (Caldwell J. T., 2008, p. 1). From Foucault's (1978) and Caldwell's (2008) arguments, I could identify that KBS' strategic partnerships with major pop music agencies operate not only as given missions, but also as active endeavors for self-survival in the post-public broadcasting era.

KBS' legitimation of their commercialized actions, based on the reconfiguration of the public interest in a global context, raises a fundamental question about the philosophical foundation of public broadcasting. The media industry has long considered public television as a "universal service" (Ouellette, 2002, p. 4) that offers all members of the society more educational and socially related programs than commercial networks. Media scholars have valued the commitment of public broadcasting to cultural diversity and social equality and have agreed to retain the public service media model. Hence, it is not surprising to understand the marketization of public service organizations and the loss of their traditional purpose as the encroachment of commercial globalization over publicly owned and regulated broadcasting media took place (Curran & Park, 2000, p. 8).

When the public broadcasting model is challenged in the era of digital media

technology, which expands the number of television channels, Tracey (1998) argued that such industrial conditions do not guarantee fulfillment for Enlightenment (p. 259). Another point that Tracey (1998) has emphasized concerning the value of public media is their role in politics. A public site of communication holds "the power to shape our forms of thought, our patterns of behavior, the power to feed the imagination, to give it credence and legitimacy; but most of all the power to create extraordinary wealth" (Tracey, 1998, p. 8). However, public broadcasting had to revisit its goal and philosophical foundation, as governments have forced the television industry to follow market logic. KBS is a case in point, as public broadcasting tried to develop intra-regional expansion of the company's business. The company constructed a corporate image by naming itself as a national channel. Then, the company authorized its attempts to commercialize music-related programs in order to reproduce the Korean Wave phenomenon. This self-reflexivity motivates in-house directors and writers to produce various entertainment programs to increase the exportation of Korean popular music and to develop an intra-regional production system with Chinese and Japanese public broadcasting companies.

KBS has produced music-related programs in order to illuminate the importance of the public service broadcasting channel in a post-public broadcasting era. For example, the *Music Bank World Tour* displays the growth of KBS' brand power in the global cultural market. I identify that, unlike the other two terrestrial networks, KBS has continued producing a spin-off of the original weekly music show, *Music Bank*. The production team held one of the World Tour concerts in Jakarta in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of Korea-Indonesia amity (Lim & Cho, 2013). They also brought some

K-pop artists to Rio de Janeiro in order to celebrate the 2014 Brazil World Cup (Lim &

Lee, 2014). These public broadcast-driven Korean pop events have contributed to

revitalizing the corporate image of the company, both domestically and internationally.

Above all, these events have awakened in the Korean public a sense of KBS' duties as a

national medium. The public, who views Korean popular culture as an engine of the

national economy and Korean pop groups as cultural ambassadors, has supported the

company's special programming.

In addition, the satellite channel of the company provides international fans of

Korean pop with a source for the latest trends. *Music Bank* is simultaneously broadcast

over more than 100 countries, and this fact itself, regardless of actual viewership, makes

the international audience recognize the global power of the local television music

program. The international viewers learn about the Korean music business world and

fandom culture based on the regular consumption of the show. They acknowledge that

the number of singers' topping the weekly charts of television programs considerably

determines the success and failure of Korean pop idol groups. Likewise, the expansion of

public broadcasting has brought about the transnational and collective participation of

international audiences to local television production. For the Korean pop music industry,

public television suggests a powerful channel to reach out to international consumers.

The cultural power that the weekly show has generated thus continues collaborative

partnerships between KBS and pop music companies.

It is also important to recognize a shared belief among members of the public

service television company that they should take a leading role in the reproduction of the

Korean Wave phenomenon. Not surprisingly, a mixture of political intervention,

financial pressure, and communication technologies has substantially threatened the social commitment to the values and goals of public media. In almost every interview that I have had, members of the public broadcasting company expressed that media globalization is an opportunity. They did not seem to be concerned about losing their role in the (re)construction of national discourse. Rather, they tried to reconfigure their strengths in a global context. The production body of the company has strategized Korean pop in order to justify their pursuit of commercial interests through a blend of public and national interests. Hence, KBS has rearticulated its mission of public broadcasting. As part of its mission, the network focuses on what the national public media organization contributes to promoting the exportation of national popular culture.

The third point of this dissertation is to contextualize what constructs hybrid cultures in the Korean culture industries. In the previous chapters, I substantiate the ways in which the logic of cultural nationalism legitimizes the mixture of local and foreign cultures within Korean society.   Above all, the intersectionality and interdependence of Korean television and music industries is the key to understanding the hybrid culture of Korean pop music during the past two decades. As Kraidy (2005) argued, mass media take a pivotal role in legitimating the mixture of local and foreign cultures in several ways: articulating the notion of hybridity and highlighting "globalization's material effects" (p. 148). Within this frame, I claim that KBS has shifted the discursive framework of cultural hybridization over decades. The aim of the deliberative body is to maintain a socially acceptable level of artistic presentation. By the early 1990s, the national media gave the public the implication that foreign pop music possibly contaminates the traditions of local music by banning numerous musicians and albums

because of their adoption of foreign musical tastes and sprits. These days, however, KBS considers trans-local interactions in cultural production as a strategic and beneficial choice to survive in the global market. This historical context indicates how deeply television media constitute and reflect on musical hybridization in Korean society.

Scholarly and institutional analyses of the Korean pop boom often contain the notion that the Korean pop music industry actively entered neighboring markets during the early 2000s because of anxieties about the decline of the domestic market. In addition, Asian references confirm that Korean music agencies were dependent on regional audiences, who routinely consumed Korean television dramas in their initial stages of East Asian business (Mōri, 2008; Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008). Mōri's (2008) empirical study presented how Japanese fans of Korean television dramas expanded their interests to Korean pop music and further introduced Korean popular content to other Japanese audiences. The inverse case occurred in the late 2000s. The popularity of Korean pop stars increased the number of offshore investors and invigorated transnational collaborations in television production. Hence, cross-industrial collaborations within society have become the key to increasing the exportation of their products and services and transnational connections in East Asian culture industries.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that KBS' review policy has been influenced by changes in these industrial structures and market conditions. For decades, production practitioners of KBS have argued that their in-house production system has contributed to protecting the values and traditions of the national culture in the importation of foreign cultures and practices. Their statements are also relevant to Robertson's (1995) assertion that the complexity of media globalization springs from nationalized negotiations

between the diffusion of locality and the adoption of globality in media production.

Although the influence of the review policy in music production has been remarkably

diminished in recent years, this regulation still maintains its social role in the protection

of national cultures and local traditions. In this sense, I argue that KBS still maintains

symbolic power in determining the level and direction of hybridization in Korean pop

music production. The way in which KBS has employed its reviewing process, directing

the modification of lyrics and costumes for appearing on television shows, complicates

the issue of public broadcasting's involvement in the mixture of local cultures in the

production process.

From the music industry perspective, hybridization can be understood as a

localizing process of Korean popular culture. Some leading music agencies have

established partnerships with local companies in the targeted society and have actively

created hybrid forms of music, fashion, and performance. Korean pop groups have made

a huge impact in the Japanese and Chinese music industries by adopting local-based

music performances. The notion of intercontexuality, which is proposed by Appadurai

(1996), offers a new perspective to understand the mixture of Korean and Japanese

culture. Appadurai (1996) argued that the mutual constitution of text and context is an

important consideration in exploring cultural hybridization. In addition, Kraidy (2005),

viewing context as "a constitutive and constituting force" (p. 155), emphasized

situatedness in constructing the structure and discourse of hybridity within society. In his

argument, hybrid forms are not always determined by the power relationships of cultural

actors (Kraidy, 2005). Therefore, the localizing process of Korean pop music should not

be simply viewed either as the subordination of Korean pop to the market logic or as the

power dynamics of inter-regional relations. Instead, it can be interpreted as "the East Asian process of cultural hybridization and "the materializ[ation] of East Asian cultural geography" (Iwabuchi, 2013, p. 45).

In the previous chapters, I articulated two distinct directions of transnational interactions in Korean pop music production: trans-local negotiations with Euro-American creators and intra-regional connections with East Asian partners (Iwabuchi, 2013, pp. 45-46). Above all, the global visibility of Korean popular music is an outcome of increasing collaborative productions between Korean and American/European music groups. American and European composers, musicians, and choreographers who have recognized the marketability of Korean pop music have changed their attitudes toward working with local-based and regional-led music agencies. Another point in the trans-local collaborative production system is its expansion to other industries, including media, tourism, fashion, and merchandise. As an example, internationally acclaimed fashion designers often invite Korean pop idols, such as G-Dragon of Big Bang and Siwon Choi of Super Junior to their events in Europe and the United States, and multinational companies have increasingly invested in Korean media production in order to expose their brand logos in Korean television dramas for Chinese and Japanese audiences. These new, market-driven connections in cultural production indicate that the global popularity of Korean pop culture strives to develop a trans-local production system.

From another direction, the Korean Wave is considered as the continuation of inter-regional cultural fads, which were previously led by Japanese and Hong Kong media. Understanding the localization of Korean popular music, as the East Asian process of cultural globalization, is significant to enrich the comprehension of

complicated cultural interactions between Korea, Japan, and China. In going beyond an essentialist view of national cultural values and traditions, the interchange between East Asian cultural actors needs to be discussed based on "inter-Asian referencing" (Iwabuchi, 2013, p. 46). Put differently, examining the similarities and dissimilarities between Korean Wave and other Asian cultural phenomena is necessary to identify the localization of Korean pop music as an East Asian process of cultural hybridization, as well as an alternative path of cultural globalization (Chen, 2010; Iwabuchi, 2013).

In brief, the Korean Wave phenomenon allows media scholars to elaborate upon the determining force of cultural globalization. Appadurai's (1996) hypothesis, which states that the transnational flows of popular culture are contextual and disjunctive, can be applied in order to see what shapes East Asian forms of cultural phenomena. Certainly, a trajectory of the cultural phenomenon is made by a complicated interaction of national, regional, and global forces. Nevertheless, this critical, political-economic, and qualitative research proposes the need to examine the Korean Wave in a national perspective. Building on Appadurai's definition of globalization as a "localizing process," and Curran and Park (2000) and Flew and Waisbord's (2015) assertion that the media system constructs a national boundary in cultural transactions, I claim that the Korean Wave is to imagine the global presence of a national/local culture, which is somewhat proven by the imaginaries of regional connections.

Understanding the (re)production of the cultural phenomenon is instrumental in expanding the subject of media studies in several ways: The decolonization of Asian actors in global activities, the development of alternative knowledge production concerning global media, and the significance of locality in a global process. I believe

that it is necessary to examine the production of local media in a trans-local and intra-regional perspective in order to unveil the alternative implications of globalization and to overcome US/UK-centric knowledge production in global media studies.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

No.	Interviewees	Position	Date
1	A	Journalist	06.12.2014
2	B	Television director	06.13.2014
3	C	Television director	06.13.2014
4	D	Planning producer of television dramas	06.13.2014
5	E	Radio director	06.16.2014
6	F	Music producer	06.18.2014
7	G	Television director	06.24.2014
8	H	Television director	06.24.2014
9	I	Journalist	06.24.2014
10	J	Korean pop fan	06.27.2014
11	K	Hair designer	06.28.2014
12	L	Music critic	07.02.2014
13	M	Executive producer	07.03.2014
14	N	Manager of pop artists	07.04.2014
15	O	Composer	07.09.2014
16	P	Television director	07.17.2014
17	Q	Chief producer	07.18.2014
18	R	Television writer,	07.18.2014
19	S	Korean pop fan	07.18.2014
20	T	Journalist	07.24.2014

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

The following Interview Questionnaire Guide has been developed to investigate how the Korean pop boom has changed the production environment of Korean television companies. The research will take the form of interactive, open-ended questions and answers.

Background Review

The following questions are designed to gather the information on the interviewee's professional experiences and to confirm the connection between the interviewee's experience and the subject of the study.
1. What are/were your major responsibilities at (present/most recent job)?
2. Discuss/determine skills and level of expertise related to (position title).
3. What are your experiences relating to Korean music or television production?

Changes in the Korean TV Industry

Following is a list of sample questions designed to gather information about how globalization have influenced the Korean television and music industry since the 1990s.
1. How did KBS contribute to holding cultural specificity, despite the importation of foreign television programs in the 1990s?
2. What kind of strategies do Korean television companies utilize in order to survive in the rapidly changing domestic media market?
3. How did Korean television construct globalization in the last decade?
4. How did KBS employ the term Asian Values in the network's production strategy during the last decade?
5. In your experience, have you had any process or task that was being done with television companies in other countries?

Live Music Program Production

Following is a list of questions designed to provide information relating to the growth of the Korean pop boom and its influence on the television production.
1. What kinds of television programs have been involved in the growth of Korean pop music in the 2000s?
2. What kinds of television programs are involved in the emergence of Korean pop boom in East Asia?
3. What is the engine for globalizing Korean pop music?
4. In what ways do television networks relate with the Korean pop music industry?
5. How does the introduction of the Internet and mobile service influence the status of the music program?
6. How has KBS applied the notion of the public interest to the production of media content?

7. How do these linkages reinforce the role of public broadcasting with the broader concerns of the global cultural phenomenon?

The Interaction of East Asian Television Industries

Following is a list of questions designed to gather information relating to the rise of inter-Asian connections in the production, circulation, and consumption of television content.

1. How does the growth of East Asian markets influence the Korean television industry?
2. What are the reasons that the Korean music live programs focus on holding or filming music events transnationally?
3. How does the East Asian audience involve in the process of program production?
4. What are the major advantages and disadvantages that you see in the use of media technology in the expansion of television content in the region?