2011

Cracking Consensus

The Dominican Intervention, Public Opinion and Advocacy Organizations in the 1960s.

Cara Rankin
Adviser Dr. Petra Goedde

The beginning of the Cold War in the 1950s is often depicted as a time of immense animosity, fear, and conformity within American society. The threat of nuclear war and the spread of communism united the American public, government, and media in a bipartisan consensus that focused its energy on stopping the spread of communism at home and abroad at any cost. This Cold War consensus, as historians have called it, would sanction military actions in Korea, Iran, Guatemala and Cuba throughout the 1950s and early 1960s with little or no condemnation. In 1965, the escalation of military actions abroad in Vietnam began to fracture this political consensus amongst some Americans.[1] Intellectuals, students, and liberals began to question actively the justifications behind their government's actions abroad, forming what became known as the 'New Left' and the anti-war movement. This new progressive generation of activists in the 1960s and the Vietnam War are commonly cited as important factors in cracking the Cold War consensus thus initiating a new dialog about the motivations and operations of American government domestically and abroad.[2]

The major reactions to changing times in American society were found within new advocacy groups and movements. Civil rights, Vietnam, Feminism and the Counterculture movements inspired a virtual alphabet soup of organizations that would advocate change within American society. An example of this phenomenon was the new advocacy organizations that were formed in reaction to American foreign policies in Latin America.

For years, the American public had been relatively silent about United States interventionism in Cuba and Latin America. This changed in 1965 when the United States

---

[1] William C. Gibbons, "Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus," in *Foreign Policy and Domestic Consensus The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership*, ed. Richard A. Melanson and Kenneth W. Thompson (Latham MD: University Press of America, 1985), 113-116.
[2] Matthew S. Hirshberg, Perpetuating Patriotic Perceptions: The Cognitive Function of the Cold War (Westport CT: Praeger; 1993), 73.

invaded the Dominican Republic over what the government deemed a communist "take-over" of a populist revolt. Liberal Americans looked suspiciously at the United States' motivations for intervening in an internal civil conflict. The simultaneous development of escalating military actions in Vietnam insured that the issue garnered little reaction or criticism in the mainstream American media despite widespread criticism from the Organization of American States (OAS), the Eastern Bloc, and even Western Europe. In fact, the mainstream media generally accepted the Johnson administration's explanations for military action in Latin America without question, despite the contradiction to stated policy. Due to this, liberal Americans began to reexamine the integrity of their government's foreign policy decisions and their own media sources.

The Dominican occupation was a relatively small event in the commotion of 1960s but it was notable for its influence on the changing perceptions of United States relations with Latin America. As a direct result of minimal media criticism in the wake of the intervention, new left-wing educational research organizations, like the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), were founded to provide a critical alternative review of United States policies in Latin America and educate the public. Through the dissemination of information, NACLA and other organizations functioned as both sources and architects of public opinion, raising public consciousness and inspiring an entire new generation of Leftist thinkers, fracturing the Cold War consensus.

Part 1: Cold War Media Consensus and the Dominican Intervention

In the 1950s the new threat of mutual destruction due to the atomic bomb forced a radical change in international diplomacy as it moved from a predominately professional and secretive negotiating apparatus to a publically scrutinized and manipulative force. Historians like Kenneth Osgood, who classified this phenomenon as the "new diplomacy," typify this change as being

inherently psychological. "Negotiations," Osgood suggests, "now possessed a significant psychological and symbolic dimension for the impact they exerted on international and domestic opinion. No longer were diplomatic conferences merely opportunities for resolving international disputes; they had becoming sounding boards for public opinion and forums for propaganda." [3]In the mid 1950s the new need to rein in domestic opinion with symbolic moves and propaganda would become increasingly influential force in international relations. The Eisenhower administration and later Kissinger were large proponents of this psychological strategy. They felt if the government could control domestic and international opinion it could control the direction of diplomatic negotiations.[4]

While some disagree with the scope or even the existence of a Cold War consensus, the majority of historians tend to agree that there was a concordance between Congress, the White House, and public opinion throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.[5] The breakdown of this consensus in Latin America relations began for many Americans with their reaction to United States intervention in the Dominican Republic.

The dilemma began on April 24 of 1965 when the Triumvirate military dictatorship headed by General Reid Cabral attempted to fire four top generals suspected of subversion. The Dominican people were outraged and took to the streets, while the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and other constitutionalists demanded the return of the constitutionally elected president, Juan Bosch, who had been ousted in a 1963 coup d'état. Rival military leaders split

---

[3] Kenneth Osgood, Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006); 182.
[4] IBID., 183.
[5] Some historians have questioned the existence or extent of consensus in the United States such as Ernest May, Richard E. Neustadt, Thomas R. Hughes, James M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf.. See Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus (NY: St. Martin's Press 1991), 1-28.

from the dictatorship, joining protesters in the occupation of sections of Santo Domingo, kicking off an internal civil revolt as a worried United States government looked on.[6]

On April 30, 1965, with little warning, Johnson's administration issued a sharp reaction, ordering the landing of 400 Marines in Santo Domingo under the premise of protecting the lives of the 1,300 Americans citizens caught in the crossfire. Within one week there were over 23,000 troops on the ground. As time went by, rumors of Communist subversion within the rebel forces supplied Johnson with another reason to keep American troops in the Dominican Republic. The opportunity for a second Cuba and a second communist center in the Caribbean provided the basis for the deployment of Marines to the region for over a year.[7] The Organization of American States and other outside observers including Western European nations were outraged by the break of the Organization of American States Charter. [8]

The landing of Marines in Santo Domingo came as a complete surprise to most Americans and the world. Before April 24th no mainstream newspaper in the United States had a

---

[6] Abraham Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Baltimore MD: John Hopkins Press; 2004). 61-70.

For more information on the intervention itself the author suggests: Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: the United States and the Dominican Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). Piero Glejeses, *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention* (MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1978). Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action, 1965: Intervention or Cooperation?* (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, 1966). Theodore Draper, *The Dominican Revolt: a Case Study in American Policy* (New York: Commentary, 1968). And Fred Goff and Michael Locker, "The Violence of Domination: US Power and the Dominican Republic," in *Latin American Radicalism,* ed. Irving Horowitz, (New York: Random House, 1969).

[7] IBID., 31, 63-113.

[8] The United States had broken Article 15 and 17 of the Charter:
Article 15 "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements."
Article 17: "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."
Organization of American States Charter. *Avalon Project.* Yale, 2008.

correspondent in Santo Domingo. All of the information provided in major news sources like the *New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune* and the *Washington Post* came through wire service for the first week of the revolt.[9] Compounded by the ignorance of Dominican politics and Johnson's inconsistent justifications, (first insisting on American safety and later communist subversion), it was not astounding that large newspapers responded with little criticism or questioning. American public opinion echoed these sentiments. In a Gallup-poll conducted three weeks after the invasion, of the 80% of the people that were aware of the occupation of the Dominican Republic at the time of the poll, 76% of that population agreed with the President's actions to invade. [10]

Brigitte L. Nacos a political scientist at Columbia University focused on the domestic reaction to the Dominican crisis in her book *Press, Presidents and Crises*. Her chapter devoted to the Dominican Crisis provides a methodical look at the level of criticism of the Johnson Administration through all of the articles (excluding editorials) published by the *New York Times*, *the Chicago Tribune*, and *the Washington Post* during the various stages of the intervention in Santo Domingo in 1965.

Nacos argues that of all the articles written on the intervention "supportive sources enjoyed preferred placement in front page headlines and page one stories," while more negative stories were buried and given an insignificant amount of lineage.[11] Of the 7,804 lines of print in *New York Times* articles written in the early stage of the crisis, 46.9% of the lineage devoted to the crisis was positive towards the intervention, 31.4% was neutral, and only 21.7% was devoted

---

[9] Brigitte Lebens Nacos, *The Press, Presidents and Crisis* (NY: Columbia University Press; 1990), 54.
[10] George Gallup, "Dominican Crisis Action Wins Approval of 76%." *The Washington Post* (1965), A2. ProQuest.
[11] Nacos. *The Press, Presidents and Crises,* 62. Lineage is an advertising term that refers to the total number of lines of text in a column and is typically used to calculate cost assessments.

to any sort of criticism.[12] The most liberal of the three papers was the *Post* which saw a 23.3% negative lineage, as compared to the more conservative *Tribune* which as only 17.3%. Despite little evidence of a communist plot, as the crisis lingered and American forces remained in the Dominican Republic, news sources remained predominately neutral or positive about the policy.[13] Nacos concludes that, "…even when Johnson hinted that U.S. forces were needed to prevent a Communist takeover in the Caribbean state, little criticism was voiced as long as American citizens waited to be evacuated and American soldiers got caught in the crossfire of fighting Dominican factions."[14] Though there was some critical reportage it was still never a major element and the level of criticism contained within those lines was mild at best.

Other analysts of press opinion that came before, like H. Schulyer Foster, a former American Opinion Analyst for the United States State Department, tend to agree with this assessment. In his book *Activism Replaces Isolationism,* Foster similarly argues using editorials that "…editorial approval of the role of the Marines in protecting the lives and property of U.S. citizens continued to receive the approval of the overwhelming majority of American

---

[12] IBID., 61.

[13] To clarify what is meant by "little evidence," by June of 1965, Johnson was pushed into releasing evidence of communist "subversion" in order to placate rumors to the contrary. The State Department released the names of 58 communists that were supposedly involved. The reaction within the American public was outrage. As Professor John J. Johnson said at the time "You can find 58 Communists in New York City or San Francisco or anywhere else you want to look." Additionally, a large portion of that list were found to be living outside of the country at the time and had no contact or participation with the rebellion. "Essay: Dominican Republic: The Necessary Risk" *TIME Magazine,* June 11, 1965, 1. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,833690,00.htm (Accessed 03/29/11)

IBID., 68.

Lingering Crisis Coverage: Domestic Sources:

Linage	For	Neutral	Against	Total Lines
New York Times	39.6%	42.9%	17.5%	8,020
Washington Post	38.4	46.4	15.2	5,504
Chicago Tribune	42.3	39.3	18.4	4,569

[14] IBID., 76.

newspapers…most editors advocated OAS action also."[15] The mainstream newspapers simply did not effectively question the justifications of the invasion itself. The press only looked at the details and the way in which Johnson invaded without the authorization of the Organization of American States (OAS) but did not take issue with the actual decision to invade.

Even though the distaste for American policy is not echoed by the columnists themselves, a public dissatisfaction of American foreign policy can be seen in letters to the editor. For example Gordon Levin wrote on May 4, 1965, that "…the landing of the Marines in the Dominican Republic is…the logical result of an American policy which claims the right to use any means necessary to prevent another social revolution…there is no possible word for such a policy but imperialism."[16] Though letters to the editor like this existed, within the vast majority of them there was a tactful sense of understanding from readers. Writers agreed with actions taken to protect U.S. interests but similarly disagreed on the way in which it had been handled. One such letter objected to Johnson's decision on the basis that "it departs from the principle that international law does not permit interference on the ground of an objectionable political ideology".[17] However, the author does not outright condemn the action, simply the way it was conducted without the OAS because "the dangers of the new United States position…may in the long run far outweigh the immediate tactical advantages."[18] Publicly, most Americans criticized the way in which the operation was handled, but not the intervention itself because the majority of Americans still believed that their government would not invade without substantial reasoning.

---

[15] H. Schuyler Foster, *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes 1940-1975*, (Washington D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1983), 273.
[16] N. Gordon Levin Jr., "Latin-American Policy," *New York Times,* May 4, 1965, 42. ProQuest (AAT 101544069).
[17] W. Freidmann, "Legal Implications of the Johnson Doctrine," *New York Times,* May 9, 1965, E13. ProQuest (AAT 97198937).
[18] IBID.

The response of the Christian community in the United States provides a second example of the lack of criticism about the interventions motivations. With strong ties to Protestants and Catholics in Latin America through youth and charity programs, the Christian response to the invasion of the Dominican Republic was almost immediate. Less than two weeks after the Marines landed in Santo Domingo on May 13th a coalition of thirty Catholic and Protestant leaders sent a joint letter President Johnson to convey the concern and disapproval of the United States Christian community. The group, headed by Methodist Reverend Dana Green, directly addressed the Administration's decision to break articles fifteen and seventeen of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter by invading the Dominican Republic. However, the letter did not directly question the administration's justifications for intervention, but instead directly asked that the US "live up to its promises and commitments" by withdrawing troops from Santo Domingo in order to reaffirm the OAS charter in the eyes of Latin America.[19] It had been less than two weeks into the occupation and although this event was clearly making waves in the Christian community, dissenters still failed to publically question the reason for the invasion, instead focusing only the methodology in which it was accomplished.

Not all Americans swallowed the justifications given by their government. In the *New York Times*, one letter questioned American policy: "Johnson has said that the United States would not tolerate a second Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. John Kennedy once said that the United States would accept any government in the world that was democratically elected. Has policy changed?"[20] These dissenting voices started to rise as United States forces lingered in the Dominican Republic. By June, the *Washington Post* was running

---

[19] "Letter to President Johnson May 13, 1965." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.
[20] Stephen Gillers, "Change in Policy?" *New York Times,* May 12, 1965. ProQuest (AAT: 101546142).

advertisements by businesses like the International Latex Corporation, which operated in the Dominican Republic entitled "Answers to Second-Guessers" in response to what they called "a tide of second-guessing about the American intervention in Santo Domingo."[21] Clearly, public opinion towards Johnson's administration was negative enough to warrant the purchase of an entire page of advertisement space by a Dominican based company to quell the "rumors" that there might not truly be a communist take-over.

Another response to the crisis involved the creation of short-termed advocacy groups like the University Committee on Latin American Policy (UCLAP). At the time this group organized activists by "sending out mailings, [running] advertisements in the *New York Times* and in general tried to carry on discussion and correspondence."[22] These advertisements took up entire pages and while they spoke to the public, they were addressed directly towards the Johnson Administration. Gathering support from Latin American specialists from various universities and organizations around the country, over 100 names were signed to these advertisements denouncing Johnson's actions abroad, stating that they could no longer allow him to "misrepresent Latin-American revolutions as simply "pro-communist' or 'anti-communist.'" UCLAP claimed that, "such oversimplification can only undermine the progressive elements now striving for reform." [23]

However, as the crisis waned and elections were held in 1966, so did much of the attention on Latin America. In the wake of the casual disappearance of Latin America in the press, some American activists felt the need to create new groups in order to continue the educational expansion of the New Left movement. Three new groups would be created by this

---

[21]"Display Ad 4 -- No Title," *The Washington Post,* Jun 6, 1965, A.2, ProQuest (AAT 183129862).
[22] "Meeting Minutes-1966 UCM- Latin American Concerns Committee" Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.
[23] "Display Ad 159 -- No Title," *New York Times,* May 23, 1965, E6. ProQuest (AAT (AAT 83129862).

event; the University Christian Movement's Latin American Concerns Committee, the Cornell Committee on United States and Latin American Relations, and most importantly for this paper the North American Congress on Latin America.

Part 2: NACLA and the New Left Ideology

The founding of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) was not the start of the American discussion about Latin American relations. Several small marginalized groups such as the Fair Play Cuba Committee and the *Latin American Times* existed for short periods, but were heavily denounced for ties with communism.[24] This new generation of activists wanted to be sure that whatever NACLA stood for, that it would have a sense of permanency within the activist community. Having already been disillusioned by experiences as a translator during the Dominican Elections of 1966, NACLA founder Fred Goff felt that "at the time…there was no entity that one could go to for independent information about Latin America" and he and others activists hoped NACLA would fill this void.[25] In the eyes of NACLA founders Fred Goff and Michael Locker, working within the established mainstream press seemed inadequate for their goal of accurately representing Latin American issues through well researched analysis. For Goff and other Naclistas (as organization members called themselves) the media's uncritical acceptance and crisis-oriented reporting was disruptive to a formative understanding of Latin American relations. "Flurries of concern" within the US press expressed short bursts of concern in times of crisis but the coverage only lasted as long as the disaster, providing an inconsistent and crisis-oriented report of events in the eyes of activists.[26] This is seen in the wake of the

[24] Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left. (New York: Verso, 1992). 137-160.
[25] Fred Rosen, "US Role In Dominican Republic Spurs NACLA Founding" *NACLA: Report on the Americas.*36;3 (2002), 14.
[26] Fred Goff, "Some Reflections on the Role of the Churches in the Formulation of Foreign Policy" Margaret Flory

Dominican intervention, where there was a sudden dash to understand the politics of the region. As soon as the elections were finalized in 1966, the concern and the urge to understand the politics and importance of the country disappeared as American press looked for the next story, the next crisis. NACLA founders desired an "an independent, unaffiliated, unencumbered base."[27] The structure of the press was therefore inadequate for the role that NACLA founders desired it to play just like other members of the New Left.

Defining exactly what the New Left Movement entailed has been a source of many publications as critics argue over how best to delineate the confines of the New Left movement. Merriam Webster defines the New Left as "a political movement originating especially among students in the 1960s, favoring confrontational tactics, often breaking with older leftist ideologies, and concerned especially with antiwar, antinuclear, feminist, and ecological issues."[28] NACLA and the New Left's desire for an alternative media structure is indicative of the larger ideology that propelled activists towards a counterculture during the 1960s.

In his book *SDS*, Kirkpatrick Sale argued that new "alternative institutions" can be situated within the theoretical foundations of a counterculture that marked "the decline of reformism and the start of revolutionary alternatives."[29] Sale asserts that alternative organizations went beyond just breaking away from the established order of society. Instead new alternative institutions like NACLA or the African Research Group were created with the intent of being "independent of (at least some of) the pressure of the surrounding society; those who founded them were not interested in working through the instruments of the society but apart from them,

---

Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.
"Progress on the Magazine" *NACLA Newsletter.* 1 (1967), 4.
[27] Fred Rosen, "The Movement Gives Birth to NACLA," *NACLA: Report on the America* 36;3 (2002), 17.
[28] "New Left," *Merriam-Webster* 2010, http://mw1.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/new%20left (Accessed 03/27/10).
[29] Kirkpatrick Sale, *SDS* (New York: Random House; 1973), 269.

hoping as far as possible to remain untainted by them, trying by forging new shapes to avoid the built in dangers of the old."[30]

This combative ideology of the youth generation was echoed by the political disillusionment generated by the failed democratic initiatives of the Kennedy administration. Edward Morgan's *The Sixties Experience: Hard Lessons about Modern America* expounds upon Sale's arguments maintaining that New Left activists did originally believe in what he calls "instrumental politics." Morgan argues that they only became disillusioned later, after the "evasion and resistance" from lawmakers forced activists to turn to what he called 'expressive politics' because their "…democratic vision was fundamentally incompatible with the root assumptions of American institutions," forcing them to create their own. [31]

Terry Anderson agrees, explaining in his book *The Movement and the Sixties*, that "most baby boomers think back on the Kennedy years as thousand days of idealism and vigor; an era of Camelot."[32] For the Baby Boomers the era of John F. Kennedy was their first real experience with the political process. There was an idealistic anticipation that this new Democrat would finally change the way in which United States foreign relations operated within the Cold War system. However, promised initiatives fell short of high expectations. In Latin America, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program promised to support containment through social progress and economic development, attempting to reverse negative images of military and dollar diplomacy tactics that had reigned since the Monroe Doctrine of the 1820's. Yet, intervention in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs, and a lack of follow through on crucial parts of the program would disillusion many young advocates. This was especially true as Johnson moved

---

[30] IBID.
[31] Edward P. Morgan, *The Sixties Experience: Hard Lessons about Modern America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 9.
[32] Terry H. Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties* (NY: Oxford University Press; 1995), 84.

farther and farther from the foundational basis of these ideas with his selection of Thomas Mann[33] as the new Director of the Alliance for Progress.[34] The sponsoring of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships and the repeated undermining of democratic "revolution" destabilized the image of United States as a liberator in the public. These failed democratic experiments compounded disillusionment over Vietnam and encouraged the new youth generation to create alternative systems, organizations, and ideals outside of the "Establishment" changing many normal activists in the eyes of Terry Anderson from "liberal Peace Corps-type Democrat[s]...To a raging, maniacal lefty[s]".[35] In this sense, NACLA's loss of faith in the political process was echoed in its desire to separate its new newsletter from the societal infrastructures that might otherwise constrict or condemn the scope of its research or analysis. Goff himself personally viewed the occupation of the Dominican Republic as a capitalist or imperialist response to the possible return of reformist president Juan Bosch, who had been ousted in a 1962 coup by Reid Cabral and the Dominican military.[36] He could never have published such thoughts within a mainstream newspaper.

So the greater question then for Fred Goff and other founders was what role they would want the magazine and the organization to play. What was the point of the research? What was NACLA attempting to accomplish?

Part 3: The Founding of NACLA and its Contributing Groups

The organization's diverse coalition made any discussion of definition complicated. Among the journalists, activists, returned Peace Corps members, and academics there were many

[33] Johnson's new director for the Alliance for Progress was the same Thomas Mann who once stated "I know my Latinos. They understand only two things, a buck in the pocket and a kick in the ass."
[34] For more on the Alliance for Progress and the New Left see Michael Latham, "Modernization as Ideology" (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press; 2000.)
[35] Terry H. Anderson, the Movement and the Sixties, 84.
[36] Fred Goff and Michael Locker ,"The Violence of Domination: US Power and the Dominican Republic," in *Latin American Radicalism* ed. Irving Horowitz. (New York: Random House, 1969).

different opinions, suggestions, political views and egos to reconcile. Drawn together by "a common sense of dismay… [perceiving] the obstructionist role of the United States in Latin America" and the "common sense of inadequacy because of the fewness of those... interested in Latin America" the group had to work collectively to form its own collective identity.[37]

The three main groups that would contribute representatives to the process were the aforementioned groups that had emerged from the Dominican Intervention, the University Christian Movement's Latin American Concerns Committee (UCM-LACC) and the newly formed Cornell's Committee on United States and Latin America Relations (CUSLAR) with the cooperation of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). [38]

The University Christian Movement had come out of an increasingly radical ecumenical student movement that was growing in the 1960s.[39] With strong ties to their Protestant brethren in Latin American through youth and charity programs, UCM's response to the invasion of the Dominican Republic was great. In May of 1965 the UCM held an ad hoc conference on the Dominican Crisis. Transcripts of the conference's testimony unanimously proposed that U.S. actions were based on exaggerated claims of communism and aggressive foreign policy actors.[40] In light of all this negative feedback from first hand testimony and other Latin American protestant students the president and executive board decided to issue a formal statement to the media on May 10th, 1965 condemning the actions of United States government. Unlike the more conservative voices of Christian leaders, the UCM statement laid partial blame on the United

---

[37] Brady Tyson, "NACLA as Coalition," *NACLA Newsletter.* 1 (1967), 4.
[38] Other groups that were involved included Pax Romana, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, as well as individual journalists, academics, and returned Peace Corps members.
[39] In 1966, UCM had just broken away from it former organization the Nation Student Christian Federation in order to peruse more political agenda, but to avoid confusion I will only refer to it as one organization in order to avoid confusion.
[40] "Letter from Communidad Evangelica de Estudiantes" Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

States for the revolt for its prior recognition and support of dictatorships that blocked necessary social changes and charged the United Sates with encouraging communism with its actions.[41]

A subset of UCM the Latin American Concerns Committee (LACC) grew rapidly out of this conference and began to take on a very political role within its own ecumenical organization. Letter writing campaigns and telephone hook-ups were organized by LACC in February of 1966 to encourage American neutrality in the elections process in the Dominican Republic.[42] LACC even helped organize groups to send to assist the Commission for Free Elections in the Dominican Republic. The UCM's focus on politics and re-education would become an increasing part of its LACC program. In 1967, UCM would even publish its own bibliography entitled "Focus-Latin America" encouraging the distribution of academic research on Latin American Foreign Policy taken from various alternative print sources. However LACC did not believe it could accomplish much on its own. A weeklong conference was held by the Latin American Concerns Committee for over 80 leaders from 20 different countries and various states in 1966. The meeting minutes show a discussion about the direction of the LACC which acknowledged that "the central [problem] is not a lack of interest in Latin American concerns. The problem is in the coordination of this concern" [43] LACC resolved that their group should look "for greater coordination of Latin American concerns" outside of their own community. [44]

---

[41] "New York, N.Y., May 13- The Following Statement on the Current Situation in the Dominican Republic was issued May 10" Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library: *"If anything pushed the revolutionary force in Latin American countries into extremist positions, it is the obstacles to desperately needed economic, social and political reforms set up by dictatorships too often supported by the U.S.A. Even if the charged communist participations in the Dominican revolt should prove to have been substantial we wonder whether U.S. action has not rallied more support to its communist aims throughout the hemisphere that would otherwise not have been possible."*

[42] "Letter to Christian Century, Mrs. Theodore Wilde" Feb 19, 1966. Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

[43]" Meeting Minutes - May 1966" Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

[44] IBID.

Cornell's Committee on United States and Latin American Relations (CUSLAR) would be one of these groups. Founded in 1965, in direct reaction to the Dominican Intervention, by disillusioned Peace Corps members, the group of former Cornell students organized the new group focused on Latin America and the "issues of human rights, U.S. foreign policy and resistance struggles in Latin America."[45] Like LACC, a large part of its focus was on educational outreach. Centered at Cornell's campus the group sponsored speakers, film screenings, and participated in grassroots movements to encourage research and direct action in support of Latin American interests.

The final main actor in the movement towards NACLA's creation was the Students for Democratic Society (SDS). Made popular in the 1960's for its ideas on "participatory democracy" and radical role in the anti-war movement, SDS was always geared as an advocate for peace and saw the futility of the invasion in the Dominican Republic and the startling lack of evidence of any communist activity. The organization's main connection to the movement would come through Richard Shaull and Michael Locker, who were both active within the SDS's Radical Education Program (REP). The REP was formed in August of 1966 as "an independent educational, research and publications program…dedicated to the cause of a democratic radicalism and aspiring to the creation of a new left in America"[46] As part of these ideals, SDS realized that more research and information was needed to inform its own members. One of the areas SDS wished to explore was Latin America, but like UCM and CUSLAR, activists were frustrated by the quality and quantity of 'trustworthy sources' about the political, social, and

---

[45] "Advertisement: Committee on U.S.-Latin American Relations (CUSLAR)," *Peace Newsletter* (Syracuse: Syracuse Peace Council, September 1980). 3.
[46] "Radical Reeducation Charter" *SDS* August 1, 1966, as cited within *Headquarters for Destruction: the Behind-the-Scenes Story of the Diabolical North American Congress on Latin America*. Ed. Edgar C. Bundy (Wheaton, IL: Church League of America; 1972), 9.

economic state of the southern hemisphere and its interactions with Unites States corporate businesses and the American government.

As separate groups, all three had found a new common calling after the Dominican intervention to re-educate the American public about their government's intrusive policies abroad. Reconciling various goals and personal ideologies NACLA was formed at a November 1966 meeting at Princeton University. The goals of the organization according to its charter, stated that the organization was formed as a way of confronting the problem of the "widening gap between our lives and interests" and those of the people in Latin America. It emphasized that through "research, publication, and actions" NACLA wished to "examine the Latin American policy of the United States- both government policy and the policy of North American corporations, philanthropic foundations and educational institutions." [47] Statements like this show an increased focus on Latin American interests and, at the center, a new desire to truly understand the way United States policy functioned within the Latin American diplomatic system.

In the wake of NACLA's founding, the Latin American collective was eager to gain membership and circulate information as quickly as possible. Primarily the goals of the organization were the dissemination of factual research on Latin American events and relations with the United States, and the emphasis on "the political use of information." [48]

One of the ways NACLA founders encouraged membership was by appealing to Christian feelings of charity and goodwill. Co-founder Fred Goff wrote an appeal to the Presbyterian Church in which he asked Christians to stand with NACLA and others in questioning and exploring the current state of United States and Latin American relations. Goff

[47] Roth, Paul "Latin American Committee Established" *New Left Notes* 1/45 (1966), 3.
[48] Helen Shapiro, "NACLA Reminiscences: An Oral History" *NACLA: Report on the America* 15 (1981), 47.

announced his acknowledgement of people who "are beginning to realize that the real explanations for…disparity …are to be found here in our own country and that the place to begin tackling these problems is also right here."[49] However, Goff broadcasts his frustration with what he calls "flurries of concern and protest during specific crises and frequent expressions of dismay and we-should-do-something-about-it" because "as far as I can tell there are very few people working on the crucial problem of coverage, interpretation, and analysis of current news about Latin America, especially that news which would be most important to Americans who would do something about our country's relationships with our neighbors." Goff asks for money and action from the religious community or a movement towards a secular and "non-ideological" source for new information. Goff argues that Christians are needed in this struggle because "universities and governmental institutions have not demonstrated great leadership in this field, nor has the labor movement. " Student and peace groups he stresses "are concerned about the problem but lack the organizational and financial resources that might begin to cope with the magnitude of the problems." [50]

The response from church elders was generally favorable. In a letter from the Assistant Area secretary of Commission of Ecumenical Mission and Relations (COEMAR) in the Latin American department, Reverend John Sinclair discussed the reaction of the Presbyterian churches Advisory Council of Inter-American Affairs to the ideas promoted in Goff's essay. The letter agreed that information about official United States involvement in Latin America should get to the public. It also professed a desire for future cooperation between the Latin American Department and NACLA because he was also "convinced that the religious force in North American can have a great influence in this area of concern." However, Sinclair doubted the

[49] Fred Goff, "Some Reflections on the Role of the Churches."
[50] IBID.

need for the creation of a new magazine that would disseminate information, arguing that he was "not sure as to the wisdom of creating a new magazine for this purpose, or whether the more effective tool is 'infiltration' of existing media." [51] The Reverend Dana Green in another memo stated that Sinclair's idea was "meritorious" and deserved to be "explored as an alternative." [52] This is radically different from the perceptions of the founders who felt that "infiltration" as Reverend Sinclair suggested was not a worthwhile endeavor.

Despite this early criticism, within three months NACLA was receiving large grants from the Presbyterian Church, UCM, and the United Methodist Church. The first year, the Presbyterian Church allowed NACLA free use of an office at the Interchurch center in Manhattan. Money for its new newsletter "NACLA: Report on the Americas" was supplied almost exclusively by COEMAR and private grants from the "United Methodist Church, the Division of Youth Ministries of the National Council of Churches, and UCM".[53] Their first annual budget was over 11,000 dollars, which went primarily to salary wages and publication material.[54] Despite the financial support, NACLA acknowledged that most contributors didn't see permanency in the groups' vision.[55] In its first year there were 8 staff members that dedicated themselves to making NACLA "a source of reliable information and analysis on Latin America that could be of use to activists…"focusing on systemic analyses of wealth and power in the Americas rather than on scandals or policy "mistakes."[56]

Part 4: Impact

---

[51] John Sinclair "Memorandum December 8, 1966" Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.
[52] Dana S. Green "Office Memorandum" December 15 1966. Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.
[53]" History," NACLA. 2010. https://nacla.org/history (Accessed 03/28/11).
[54] IBID.
[55] IBID.
[56] IBID.

What then is the significance of this growing Latin American collective in the 1960s and what did it accomplish? The importance of NACLA and other advocacy organizations cannot be measured through policies, protests, or wide range political change, but in the change of public and academic consciousness that occurred after its formation.

As early as 1967 NACLA research articles were being written focused mainly on Latin American politics and their interactions with United States government and business. From the very beginning the newsletter did not attempt to focus on any one area of the Southern Hemisphere too closely. With a variety of writers and readers, the group was mindful of becoming too centered on any one topic, country, or cause.

> Our primary concern was how to make people in the U.S. understand the economic and military institution, the government apparatus, the religious apparatus etc. that perpetuate exploitation in Latin American and the third world. How do you cut through the veil that obscures these relationships? Vietnam was not an exception; the D.R. was not an exception there was a system operating here. We had to reveal it and get people actively involved in trying to change it. We decided that what was needed was factual data.[57]

Though the group wanted to be analytical, Naclistas wanted the facts to speak for themselves, in order to provide a new critical voice for Latin American issues. Topics ranging from the state of Unite States agribusiness, to travel restrictions to Cuba, to the health of Puerto Rico were all included in the first NACLA newsletters. They all appealed to different audiences and readers but centered on demonstrating the truth about what was going on and how they too could become informed. Mike Lockner discusses the group's focus:

> The other thing we wanted to do was demystify research. It doesn't require a million dollar think tank or PhD's business to find out who's doing military research on campus, which corporations are involved in which countries, or which

[57] Shapiro, "NACLA Reminiscences," 46.

> individuals in the Administration have ties to corporate banking…and are perpetuating these interests, consciously or unconsciously.[58]

NACLA did not just serve as resource for Latin American activists but also even served as a research foundation for other New Left groups including the Radical Education Program with SDS and the Viet Report Magazine which published information about the war in Vietnam. NACLA even published its own Research Methodology Guide in 1968 in order to provide the New Left with a standard methodology.[59] Mike Klare of the Viet Report explains NACLA's value: "In my view NACLA really had two purposes: one was Latin America…the other more general one was the political use of information. The movement had to have a research and information capacity if it was going to expand and become more relevant. Consequently, along with demystifying research, NACLA also had a contrary emphasis of developing expertise on the Left"[60]

The information that NACLA disseminated and the way that this information radically changed worldviews of up and coming intellectuals, policymakers, journalists, and advocates was significant in the 1960s and early 1970s. What those leaders did with that information is what creates agency for organizations like NACLA. Activists like Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Ramsey Clark, journalists like Seymour Hersh and policy makers like Democratic Representative Ronald Dellums of California all read and were significantly affected ideologically by the magazine.[61] Noam Chomsky, who regularly cites NACLA in his books on

---

[58] IBID 47.
[59] NACLA decided to publish this Methodology Guide after the experiences during the 1968 Student protests at Columbia. Their research publication "Who Rules Columbia?" had connected the University with military funding and the Vietnam War and inspired a lot of students and activists to do research. However, the group was really mystified that students were so unclear about how to go about the process. This Methodology Guide was therefore a teaching solution designed to build expertise on the New Left.
[60] IBID., 47.
[61] "Readers Respond" *NACLA: Report on the America* 15 (1981); 47. NACLA Reminiscences: An Oral History" *NACLA: Report on the America* 15 (1981); 47. "Dispatches from Latin America: On the Front Line of Against

foreign policy, regards NACLA as "a resource of enormous value," stating that, "the outstanding work of NACLA over many years has opened new ways of understanding the realities of the region and responding to the needs and concerns of its population."[62]

The truest sign of the NACLA's significance in the late 1960s and 1970s was its popularity abroad with foreign dignitaries and leaders. After reading NACLA's 1973 book *New Chile,* President Salvadore Allende of Chile was so impressed that after a pivotal speech given to the United Nations he said to reporters "If you want to understand what's happening in Chile today, just read *New Chile* by NACLA."[63]

Information is a weapon and to be sure many thought NACLA's information was dangerous to the image of the United States. The Church League of America, a far right-wing Christian fundamentalist organization based in Wheaton, Illinois, attacked NACLA in the early 1970's for its pro-liberation status. Focused on exposing communism within the United States during the Nixon administration, the group was fundamentally convinced that the National Council of Churches was secretly a communist front and from there grew their intense aversion to NACLA's agency in United States policies.[64] In 1972 the Church League of America published an 88 page "exposé" entitled *Headquarters for Destruction: the Behind-the-Scenes Story of the Diabolical North American Congress on Latin America* which was meant to undermine the organization's influence with Christian conservatives. The article personally attacks NACLA staff members and sought to undermine the organizations ideological motivations using insinuation, carefully selected quotations, and an overall commentary on how

---

Neoliberalism: Synopsis and Reviews." Powell Books, 2011. http://www.powells.com/biblio/1-9780896087682-4 (Accessed 03/38/2011).

[62]"NACLA, "Media Kit" 2010. https://nacla.org/files/NACLAmediakit.pdf. (Accessed 03/28/2011).

[63] Less than a month later He was ousted in a coup orchestrated by the Nixon Administration.

[64] Edgar C. Bundy, ed., Church League of America. "Headquarters for Destruction: the behind-the-scenes story of the diabolical North American Congress on Latin America" (Wheaton, IL: Church League of America; 1972), 19-20.

the " 'research' organization...is paving the way for Communism in the Western Hemisphere, in those nations to the South!"[65] The article incorrectly characterizes NACLA as an offshoot of SDS and marks them as communist for their use of Prompt Press, a publishing company used by the Communist Party of the United States. However, the magnitude of this pamphlet comes in the right-wing's admission that though NACLA is not a huge organization, its impact far exceeds its publication numbers. "It is not a matter of how many copies are distributed, but who gets them and to what use they are put...We …say with certainty that NACLA is a dangerous organization."[66]

Other authors have argued similarly about small intellectual think-tanks that began to emerge in the 1970s. Inderjeet Parmar's *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, researched two small organizations in England and their influence on foreign policy, ultimately concluding that " despite their relative public obscurity and lack of self-advertising in the mass media, [they] have placed key roles in…their respective national establishments…providing leading forums for experts and policymakers from several walks of institutional life, including the press… to discuss and to conduct detailed study and investigation." which assists 'in the making of foreign policy and...the mobilization of elite, attentive and, on occasion, mass public opinion." [67]

Part of the value of NALCA articles was their constant use as forum for experts, who took great interest in the written pieces that linked to American corporatism, imperialism, and other issues of Latin American concern. Factual research was stressed in every paper, and the organization's Research Methodology guide specifically focused on the education of New Left activists. For the

---

[65] IBID., 5.
[66] IBID., 6.
[67] Inderjeet Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 215.

group, teaching and cultivating proficiency in research were the most important goals, which is why speeches, conferences, and film screenings made up the majority of NACLA's sponsored events. Unlike most other groups that were forged in the 1960s, NACLA's strong research foundation gave it purpose and a base within the growing Latin American collective of advocacy groups. The group still exists today and with a circulation of "over 30,000 readers, is the most widely read English-language magazine on Latin America and the Caribbean." [68] The group even has kept to its founding goal of exposing media bias with its newest project Media Accuracy on Latin America (MALA) which seeks provide an analytical commentary and expose media inaccuracies within the North American press.

In a personal interview with the journal *New Enlightenment* in 1997, the famous leftist activist and historian Howard Zinn was asked how he was able to free himself from the constraints of "the usual blinders and come to an understanding of what's really going on" in the world. Zinn simply replied *"*I went to the library! When people ask me, after I've talked about the perfidy of the mass media, where to get information, I say: go to the library, read books… look for alternative publications that have information you can't get elsewhere. You want information on Latin America. There is NACLA."[69] Information and education is what drives activism and eventually can change consciousness within a society.

Conclusions

The Dominican occupation was a relatively small event in the commotion of 1960s but it was notable for its influence on the changing perceptions of United States relations with Latin America. During the intervention, American government response to revolution was to occupy

[68] NACLA, "Media Kit" 2010. https://nacla.org/files/NACLAmediakit.pdf. (Accessed 03/28/2011).
[69] Zinn, Howard, interview by Michelle Mairesse, transcript, 1997, *New Enlightenment.* http://www.hermes-press.com/zinnintv.htm

first and decipher the particulars later. Unlike other conflicts in the region in which the United States had intervened, there was a perceived lack of a true communist threat in the Dominican Republic. While many Americans still believed that just the threat of communism was a necessary justification for intervention many liberal Americans questioned the preemptive intrusion into the civil matters of a foreign state on such little evidence. The self-serving actions on behalf of American interest frustrated leftists. Without the Dominican intervention, many activists might never have felt the same inspiration to react. The knowledge and ideas spread by NACLA would help make the 1973 coup in Chile a national discussion, which would in turn inspire the emergence of more liberal advocacy think-tanks like the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA).

The Dominican activists' reaction is somewhat remarkable and distinct for its time. In the 1960s when most other activists were trying to influence the political agenda through non-violent protest methods, NACLA used consciousness, research, and media as its weapons of choice. Part of this was due to necessity; so much of the political attention was focused on Vietnam and the Soviet Union, that Latin American relations were consistently overlooked and undermined by fears of a second Cuba. As it happens NACLA was one of the few dissenting groups to survive the 1960s and 1970s. NACLA's permanency in American society beyond the 1960s, where most other New Left organizations faltered, shows its strong readership and ability to adapt with the changing political landscape. Today, NACLA provides strong factual data that is used by academic and journalists alike. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Seymour Hersh even claimed dependence upon the groups' magazine in a crisis because it was often "ahead in analyzing and interpreting political trends in Latin America and in Washington."[70] The question that emerges

[70] "Dispatches from Latin America: On the Front Line of Against Neoliberalism: Synopsis and Reviews," Powell

from this research is what NACLA's success tells us about advocacy organizations and the legacy of the New Left.

Other dissenting and political organizations faded with changing political ideologies and world events but NACLA's research and role had a factual authority that kept it relevant in the 1970s and 1980s. Its research about the Third World was unique because it incorporated people and organizations from a variety of ideological, political, social backgrounds and its ideas weren't just focused on one country, or one concept like – the idea of capitalism or humanitarian causes. NACLA brought people together to discuss a singular focus in a factual setting.

NACLA's role as an educational research organization inspired an entire new generation of Leftist thinkers in the United States from a variety of backgrounds. Its basis in facts and research and its vast foundation of members allow it to remain inside the changing environment of the Cold War and beyond. It was knowledge and access to information that made NACLA a permanent fixture in alternative liberal politics of today.

Books, 2011. http://www.powells.com/biblio/1-9780896087682-4 (accessed 03/38/2011).

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

ProQuest Historical Periodical Archives for the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *Chicago Tribune*:

"Display Ad 4 -- No Title," *The Washington Post.* June 6, 1965, A2. ProQuest (AAT 183143182).

Freidmann, W.. "Legal Implications of the Johnson Doctrine." *New York Times.* May 9, 1965. E13. ProQuest (ATT 97198937).

Gallup, George. "Dominican Crisis Action Wins Approval of 76%.**"** *The Washington Post* (1965), A2. ProQuest (AAT 165612292).

Gillers, Stephen. "Change in Policy?" *New York Times*. May 12, 1965. ProQuest (AAT: 101546142).

Levin Jr., N. Gordon. **"**Latin-American Policy." *New York Times.* May 4, 1965, 42. ProQuest (AAT 101544069).

Opinion Archives- NACLA Digital Archive

Rosen, Fred. "The Movement Gives Birth to NACLA." *NACLA: Report on the Americas.* 36; 3 (2002), 17.

Rosen, Fred. "US Role In Dominican Republic Spurs NACLA Founding." *NACLA: Report on the Americas.*36; 3 (2002), 14.

"Progress on the Magazine." *NACLA Newsletter.* 1; 2 (1967), 4.

"Readers Respond." *NACLA: Report on the America.* 15 (1981), 47.

Shapiro, Helen."NACLA Reminiscences: An Oral History." *NACLA: Report on the America.*15 (1981), 47.

Tyson, Brady. "NACLA as Coalition." *NACLA Newsletter.* 1; 2 (March 1967), 4.

Margaret Flory Papers. Special Collections-Yale Divinity School Library.

Goff, Fred "Some Reflections on the Role of the Churches in the Formulation of Foreign Policy." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

Green, Dana S. "Office Memorandum, December 15 1966." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

"Letter to Christian Century, Mrs. Theodore Wilde, Feb. 19, 1966." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

"Letter from Communidad Evangelica de Estudiantes." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

"Meeting Minutes-May 1966." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

"New York, N.Y., May 13- The Following Statement on the Current Situation in the Dominican Republic was issued May 10." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

Sinclair, John. "Memorandum, December 8, 1966." Margaret Flory Papers, Record Group No. 86, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School Library.

Miscellaneous:

Advertisement: Committee on U.S.-Latin American Relations (CUSLAR)" *Peace Newsletter.* Syracuse: Syracuse Peace Council, September 1980.

Bundy, Edgar C.. *Headquarters for Destruction: the Behind-the-Scenes Story of the Diabolical North American Congress on Latin America*. Wheaton, IL: Church League of America; 1972.

"Essay: Dominican Republic: The Necessary Risk." *TIME Magazine.* June 11, 1965, 1. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,833690,00.htm (Accessed 03/29/11)

Organization of American States Charter. *Avalon Project.* Yale, 2008.

Roth, Paul. "Latin American Committee Established." *New Left Notes.* 1/45 (1966).

Zinn, Howard, interview by Michelle Mairesse. transcript. 1997. *New Enlightenment.* http://www.hermes-press.com/zinnintv.htm. Accessed 03/28/11.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Terry H., *The Movement and the Sixties,* New York: Oxford University Press; 1995.

Bacciocco Jr., Edward J.. *The New Left in America: Reform to Revolution 1956 to 1970.* Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974.

Castañeda, Jorge G..”Latin America and the End of the Cold War.” *World Policy Journal* 7; 3 (1990), 469-492. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209157. Accessed 03/28/11.

Diggins, John Patrick. *The Rise and Fall of the American Left.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992.

Draper, Theodore. *The Dominican Revolt; a Case Study in American Policy*. New York: Commentary, 1968.

“Dispatches from Latin America: On the Front Line of Against Neoliberalism: Synopsis and Reviews.” *Powell Books*, 2011. http://www.powells.com/biblio/1-9780896087682-4. Accessed 03/38/2011.

Foster H. Schuyler. *Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes, 1940-1975*. Washington D.C.: Foxhall Press, 1983.

Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, *Dominican Action, 1965: Intervention or Cooperation?* (Washington D.C: Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, 1966).

Gibbons, William C.. “Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus.” in *Foreign Policy and Domestic Consensus: The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership*. Ed. Richard A. Melanson and Kenneth W. Thompson. Latham MD: University Press of America, 1985.

Glejeses, Piero. *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention*. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Goff, Fred and Michael Locker “The Violence of Domination: US Power and the Dominican Republic” in *Latin American Radicalism.* Ed. Irving Horowitz. New York: Random House, 1969

Gosse,Van. *Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left.* New York: Verso, 1992.

Harbutt, Fraser, J.. *The Cold War Era.* Oxford UK: Blackwell Press, 2002.

Hirshberg, Matthew S. *Patriotic Perceptions: The Cognitive Function of the Cold War.* Westport CT: Praeger, 1993.

Holden, Robert H.. “The Real Diplomacy of Violence: United States Military Power in Central America, 1950-1990.”*The International History Review.*15; 2 (May, 1993), 283-322. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106667 Accessed 03/28/11.

Holsti, Ole R.. *Making American Foreign Policy.* New York: Routledge, 2006.

Holsti, Ole R.. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Kamman, William. "U.S.-Latin American Relations."*Organization of American Historians Magazine of History.*7; 2 (Fall, 1992), 21-25. JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/25162871 Accessed 03/28/11.

Latham, Michael . *Modernization as Ideology*. Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Lowenthal, Abraham. *The Dominican Intervention.* Baltimore MD: John Hopkins Press, 2004.

Maddox, Robert James. *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Melanson, Richard A.. *Reconstructing Consensus*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Morgan, Edward P. *The Sixties Experience: Hard Lessons about Modern America.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

Muñoz, Herlado. "The Dominant Themes in the Study of Latin America's Foreign Relations." *World Affairs* 150; 2 (1987), 129-146. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672133. Accessed 03/28/11.

NACLA, "Media Kit" *NACLA: Report on the Americas*. 2010. https://nacla.org/files/NACLAmediakit.pdf. Accessed 03/28/2011.

Nacos, Brigitte Lebens. *The Press, Presidents and Crises.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

The New Left: Legacy and Continuity. Ed. Dimitrios Roussopoulos. Montreal/New York: Black Rose Books, 2007.

Osgood, Kenneth. "The Illusory Spirit of Geneva: Propaganda and the New Diplomacy." *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad.* KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006.

Osgood, Kenneth and Andrew K. Frank. *Selling War in a Media Age: The Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century.* Florida: University Press of Florida, 2010.

Palmer, Bruce. *Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989.

Parmar, Inderjeet. *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Randall, Stephen J.. "Review: The Tragedy of American Diplomacy Revisited: U.S. Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean."*Latin American Research Review* 38; 2 (2003), 167-179. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555424 Accessed 03/28/11.

Sale, Kirkpatrick. *SDS.* New York: Random House; 1973, 269.

Slater, Jerome. *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Sobel, Richard. *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Tulchin, Joseph S.. "The United States and Latin America in the 1960s"*Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.* 30, 1 (1988), 1-36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/165788. Accessed 03/28/11.

Unger, Irwin. *A History of the American New Left, 1959-1972*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1974.

Wiarda, Howard J.. "Consensus Found, Consensus Lost: Disjunctures in US Policy toward Latin America at the Turn of the Century."*Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs.* 39;1, (1997),13-31. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/166493. Accessed 03/28/11.