

**THE ROLE OF SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS
IN POLARIZED SOCIETIES**

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ABSTRACT

In modern times, there is an increasing tendency to use “us versus them” rhetoric in the political realm. Motivated reasoning literature offers a solution as to how group conflict contributes to out-group bias. People may develop negative feelings towards out-groups in order to reduce cognitive dissonance and feel better about their judgments. Nevertheless, this is not the situation for everyone. My research aims to understand how peoples’ predisposed tendencies may affect the level of their out-group bias. Drawing from the distinction between shame (a negative sense of identity) and guilt (a response to a specific behavior) in psychology, I hypothesized that self-conscious emotions would moderate the relationship between information about in-group transgressions and out-group bias. To test this, I conducted a survey experiment with three different groups: Men/Women, White/Black people, and Democrats/Republicans. Participants were randomly assigned to watch videos depicting misbehavior from their respective group. Results showed that the proneness to self-conscious emotions did moderate the relationship to some extent, although the connection between shame and guilt proneness was more complex than anticipated. Criticizing one’s in-group generally caused people to experience cognitive dissonance and reinforced out-group bias, particularly among those who were highly prone to both shame and guilt. The three-way interaction between treatment, shame proneness, and guilt proneness varied across and within the different identity categories, suggesting that there is no single theory that can entirely explain the degree of out-group bias.

To all of us who never stop believing,
“Hope dies last!”

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Your worst battle is between what you know and what you feel”

– Unknown

This quote summarizes thousands of pages knowledge into twelve words. One of the ultimate internal conflicts that humankind experience in life is the relentless confrontation between the knowledge and emotions. On one hand, our rational brain tries to make sense of the right or wrong in a logical way. On the other hand, our emotions influence us in different directions from time to time. This tug-of-war is the prime characteristic that makes us human, and it can be attributed to the difficulties in decision-making and the inner battle we face.

Another vital component of our existence is the desire that we want to feel accepted and worthy. As we navigate through life, our self-esteem becomes intertwined with the perceptions of others. It emphasize the importance of maintaining a positive image of us and the group(s) we belong in our personal lives, in our professional lives, and in every part of our social interactions. Why? Because we feel that we are good, hence we should be in the “good side” as a group too. If we receive negative criticism towards us or our group, it becomes challenging. Some of us take it as a motivation to make amends, and others consider it as a source of tension and conflict.

So, what happens when these two concepts (the internal tug-of-war and desire for positive image) meet? People are exposed to plethora of information throughout their lives and process them within their reasoning. Some of this knowledge include negative elements about their in-group where “they” committed a wrongdoing towards others. This criticism, on average, leads to a discrepancy between

what we know (our group perpetrated a misconduct) and what feel (our group should be good), which leads to negative feelings towards the out-group as a defense mechanism to protect self-esteem. This scenario is true for some people, while it may not hold true for others who receive the critique in a more positive light through self-reflection. So, in this dissertation, I ask: How can we explain the variance in out-group bias within group conflict context?

I postulate that Social Emotions may explain the discrepancy across people via their rich and complex structure by driving and regulating people's beliefs and behaviors. A dominant approach on conceptualizing Self-Conscious Emotions in psychology literature indicates that shame is a person's negative perception of self, whereas guilt is the result of a reaction towards a particular behavior. Moreover, peoples' proneness to these emotions is a stimulus for them to experience shame and guilt. Hence I argue that exposure to an in-group transgression should increase people's out-group bias (*Hypothesis 1*), and that this effect can be moderated by shame or guilt proneness (*Hypothesis 2*). Moreover, peoples' identity attachment and their relative status in the society (as perpetrator or victim of the transgression) may intensify/diminish these negative feelings (*Hypothesis 3*).

In order to understand how proneness to feelings of shame or guilt impacts the connection between negative information and out-group bias, I conducted three survey experiments in the United States with participants belonging to dyadic identity categories, namely Gender identity (Men/Women), Race identity (White people/Black people), and Party identity (Democrats/Republicans). In my analysis, I found that the negative information about the in-group (a) generated cognitive dissonance for all identity groups, (b) increased the out-group bias among Black people, and empathic concerns for both men and women. Additionally, I uncovered that (c) the link between shame and guilt proneness is arguably more intricate than what has been previously suggested in existing literature. In fact, a three-way interaction exists, where shame proneness and guilt proneness intertwine to influence women, White people, and partially Democrats

reactions to a negative information about the in-group. Lastly, the analysis on identity attachment revealed that (d) the treatment amplified guilt-prone Black people's out-group bias and reduced their empathic concerns as their identity attachment increased.

In the following part, I review the information processing literature by paying particular attention to cognitive dissonance topic, then in-group favoritism/out-group bias, and the relationship between these two concepts. I then deepen the review by providing a review of the self-conscious emotions. Here, I mainly focus on how shame and guilt are relevant to the link between information processing and peoples' negative feelings towards the out-group. Then I base the core theoretical argument of the dissertation, which theorizes the moderating role of self-conscious emotions to explain differences in out-group bias. I then explain the research design and main findings of the survey experiments. Lastly, I discuss the overall inferences obtained from all three inquiries.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Information Processing

People are continuously exposed to information, known in the literature as “information overload” (Eppler & Mengis, 2008; Roetzel, 2019). Especially in the digital era, it’s challenging to handle and address all of the received information with our limited abilities for information processing (Szegőfi & Heintz, 2022); hence human minds developed several methods to organize them. Psychology literature address this issue by investigating how people classify important or redundant information for them (e.g., attribution theory, consistency theories, etc.). During the information evaluation or selection stage, humans often do cognitive errors by administering the information illogically or irrational.

In regard to politics, motivated reasoning is one of the most well-known concepts to understand these biases (Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Taber & Lodge, 2016). Motivated Reasoning is the tendency to come up with arguments that supports individuals’ favorite conclusions over the ones that they do not want to believe in. Kunda (1990) acknowledges that “there is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480). One of the key elements of the theory is that people are driven by making accurate political claims (Accuracy-orientation), moreover they want these judgements to be consistent with their pre-existing political attitudes (Goal or directional-orientation) (Groenendyk, 2018).

Kiil (2022) reviews the motivated political reasoning literature by demonstrating three main contesting sets of theories as to why people employ this phenomenon (Kiil, 2022). Paraphrasing his work, Taber and Lodge’s “John Q. Public model” (JQP) suggests that the biases are impulsive, affectively-driven, and difficult to overcome with due to their innate nature in our memory (Taber & Lodge, 2016). The Bayesian explanation further argues that “bias” terminology is not suitable because they already stem from approaching political information with a strong former belief that aligns with peoples’ attitudes (Druckman & McGrath, 2019). Lastly, the emotion regulation model asserts that biased motivated political reasoning is not due to incorporating past experiences or beliefs, but rather achieving desired emotions through amplifying positive affective states and diminish negative affective states (Thibodeau et al., 2015; Westen et al., 2006).

The third model (emotion regulation) is the primary driver of this dissertation in terms of information processing. It resonates with several studies that suggests political reasoning is driven by the need for avoid psychological distress, also known as cognitive dissonance (Bisgaard, 2019; Groenendyk, 2018; Kuklinski et al., 2000). Hence, I switch my attention to what cognitive dissonance is and how it relates to the out-group bias.

2.1.1 Cognitive Dissonance

Rational Choice theorists are convinced about the stability of peoples’ attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. They commonly claim that these characteristics explain people’s actions, behavior, and choices (Aldrich, 1993; Blais, 2000; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). On the other hand, social psychologists advocate the other way around: Actions, behavior, and choices fabricate people’s attitudes, beliefs, and preferences (Acharya et al., 2018; Bandura, 1999; Festinger, 1957;

McGregor, 2013; Mullainathan & Washington, 2009). This particular relationship paves the way for several different theories to account for the connection.

The Cognitive Dissonance Theory mainly aims to clarify the circumstances when people have a discrepancy between their attitudes and behaviors (Festinger, 1957). The dissonance indicates the negative association with the unwanted belief that does not correspond with the person's attitude. In these moments, dissonance generates a psychological discomfort and people are motivated to reduce this distress. They often proceed with selective consideration about the received information. Therefore, the core theoretical claim of the theory is that "the idea that if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent" (Festinger, 1962, p. 93).

A classic example of the concept is the idea that people smoke even though they know that smoking is harmful. According to the literature, there are at least three direct coping mechanisms¹ to reduce this inconsistency (Cottam et al., 2015). Direct coping mechanisms involve (a) changing the thought or attitude, (b) changing the behavior, (c) adding a new thought to rationalize the inconsistency, (d) trivializing the inconsistency, so on and so forth. Table 2.1 indicates an example for how people often reduce their cognitive dissonance from the perspective of a smoker.

The theory highlights an important aspect of how people process information and alter their stances. Peoples' motivation to restore the balance in minds impacts the fundamentals of information processing in several means. First, It paves the way for people to develop "selective perception" by making them to pursue non-existing consistent information (selective exposure), to focus on the existing consistent information (selective attention), and to render vague information into a consistent one (selective interpretation) (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

¹The coping mechanisms are not limited to the ones mentioned in this research. Other sources in literature indicate several additional ways as well.

Acquired info	Coping mechanism	Response to reduce cognitive inconsistency
Smoking is harmful	Changing the thought or attitude	The medical evidence sounds a bit exaggerated
	Changing the behavior	It is indeed harmful, and I don't smoke anymore
	Adding a new thought to rationalize the inconsistency	Yes, it is harmful, but I also have a healthy lifestyle
	Trivializing the inconsistency	We all are going to die anyways

Table 2.1. Peoples' coping mechanism with cognitive dissonance

Additionally, the theory does not assume that people cannot live with the contradiction, they simply favor not to have the dissonance. This preference also depends on the intensity level of the opposing contexts.

In the process of the anxiety due to inconsistent information, people can bring their cognitive relief back in several ways. They often decrease their dissonance through changing their thought or attitude, because it's easier than changing their behavior. In addition to the direct coping mechanisms (as in the smoker example above), people also employ indirect mechanisms for their internal consonance. For example, research reveal that core social identities (i.e., religion) are not totally liberated from politics, and as such, politics can influence the reported religious beliefs and behaviors of partisans (e.g., praying, participating services, or believing God) for their personal solace (Margolis, 2016). Furthermore, these partisans hold a more positive assessment when their party is in control of the presidency. Thus, the role of political information on inter-group interactions should be further investigated.

2.2 Out-group Bias / In-group Favoritism

In-group favoritism or out-group bias are well-documented phenomena in the existing literature. Even though scholars sometimes use these two concepts interchangeably, it should be noted that the defining factor lies in the target population. While in-group favoritism indicate that people display preferential treatment to their own group's members compared to others; out-group bias is the act of unfairly singling out the members of other groups. Regardless of the distinctive nature, people can display both behavior in several instances, such as biased evaluations of out-group members, uneven distribution of resources, approaching conflicted issues etc. (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979)

Researchers, especially psychologists, examined the phenomenon on the issues around the group conflict and prejudice towards the out-group. Most of these studies looked at the question from the angle of social psychology by indicating that cultural group formation paved the way for this bias to turn into a trait among people. In this line of research, two theoretical families are the most prominent ones to account for in-group favoritism. While Realistic conflict theory suggests that dispute over scarce resources invokes the inter-group competition and on some occasions inter-group conflict (Campbell, 1965); Social identity theory postulates a psychological stance by putting categorically distinct social identities as the fundamental element of in-group favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

On the political side of the discussion, the importance of out-group bias in current events is enormous. In the last couple of decades, most of the political arguments, if not all of them, have turned into group-centric assessments. Having been surrounded by fierce debates on several hot-button issues, people have felt that coexisting peacefully with people loyal to the other side can't be possible in many cases such as in Turkey, Poland, the United States, etc. (Carothers &

O’Donohue, 2019). In these group-centric evaluations, political tribalism has an instrumental influence on peoples’ political evaluations, rather than being simple policy preferences (Fowler, 2020).

In parallel to the raising attention on societal divisions, research on political polarization has boomed. While the majority of the literature focused on policy-based/ideological divisions to understand the phenomenon, Iyengar and colleagues proposed an alternative sign of the polarization among masses: “To the extent that party-identification represents a meaningful group affiliation, the more appropriate test of polarization is affective, not ideological, identity” (Iyengar et al., 2012, p. 2). By placing the Social identity theory in the center of the concept, today we define affective polarization as the growing trend of favoring the in-group while disliking and distrusting those from out-groups (Iyengar et al., 2019).

This dissertation seeks to answer what explains the variance in out-group bias, and a crucial issue must be clarified before stating my argument in the next section. It should be noted that out-group bias is what researchers measure at the individual level, and the aggregate of out-group bias observed in peoples’ behavior gives us a society-level concept —the affective polarization. Because inter-group conflict displays itself in almost every area of our lives, affective polarization is the inspiring part of the research question, nonetheless the out-group bias still ultimately lies in the heart of the analysis.

Considering the partisanship as a social identity, scholars showed the influence of in-group favoritism/out-group bias on economic behavior (McConnell et al., 2018); hiring decisions (Gift & Gift, 2015); online dating or choosing partners (Huber & Malhotra, 2017; Iyengar et al., 2018; Klar et al., 2018); anti-democratic support or provision for political violence (Mernyk et al., 2022; Voelkel et al., 2023); residential preferences (Mummolo & Nall, 2017), so on and so forth. In these interactions, people exchange countless information. Therefore, it is vital

to look at the relationship between people's out-group bias and how they process information in their connections.

2.3 Relationship Between Cognitive Dissonance & Out-group Bias

People are exposed to plethora of information in a single day. During this information bombardment, some of them are consistent with what they already believe and some of them are not. Festinger (1962)'s theoretical claim of Cognitive Dissonance Theory tells us that people reconcile the inconsistency in various manners. Regarding politics, there are multiple instances of how people decrease their cognitive dissonance. As a choice, people modify their political and social preferences over time; hence they can feel better about their actions being aligned with their preferences.

One occasion is the voting behavior. It's not a surprise that people may change their partisan affiliation. American voters may choose a preferred candidate to support and then alter their positions according to the politician's policy view (Lenz, 2012). Furthermore, regarding to reducing the cognitive dissonance, Cottam and her colleagues acknowledges that if a person's affective connection to a politician from another party is stronger than his or her in-party attachment, then the person may change his/her party choice. Otherwise, (a) the person will likely adhere to vote for their previous choice; or (b) the dominance of political socialization may influence the person's evaluation as seeing the circumstances an irregularity (Cottam et al., 2015, p. 52).

While this experience may look like an individual phenomenon, it can be translated to group level as well. The inconsistent message may be regarding the identity people ascertain with; hence it may generate a potential inter-group competition. Theories of motivated reasoning (e.g., Cognitive dissonance) posit one solution to how group conflict shapes peoples' out-group bias: Individuals develop negative feelings toward out-groups to reduce the cognitive dissonance,

therefore they feel better about their judgments. As a human being, people are inclined to feel more comfortable and even secure around people who share same values or opinions. It is common to endeavor both having coherent information and protecting the in-group's positive image. In doing so, this process of "othering" can manifest itself in various forms such as stereotyping, prejudice, and even discrimination in order to justify one's own attitudes or preferences. Thus, inter-group conflict has an important influence on forming out-group bias.

An example of modified political attitudes is group-based prejudices. Especially in violent acts, these group-based prejudices interestingly may run both ways among oppressors and victims. On one hand, oppressor who committed violence against a victim group develops further hostile attitudes to reduce their cognitive dissonance, and these attitudes could persevere generations (Acharya et al., 2018). On the other hand, even if we don't know that it's related to decreasing cognitive dissonance, experiencing violence has an impact on victim group's attitudes towards the oppressor group based on the threat perception and social-identity choice (Shayo & Zussman, 2011; Voors et al., 2012).

This practice has a crucial consequence on peoples' overall social framework. One possible explanation for how people tend to reduce cognitive dissonance via discriminating against the out-group is: Tribalism². When people base their behavior on their group loyalty, group affiliation is a significant predictor of in-group favoritism and out-group bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1979); and vilification of the out-group can assist diminishing cognitive dissonance and keeping the positive in-group image (Cooper & Mackie, 1983). One example to this "blind group affiliation" is party identification. It is safe to say that already highly politicized issues are often seen through individuals' partisan lens. In addition, these tribal behaviors can also be observed in non-political instances. Druckman and colleagues show that those who show greater levels of affective polarization are

²Oxford Dictionaries —Tribalism: "The state or fact of being organized in a tribe or tribes". Online source (Last accessed April 1st, 2024):[click here](#)

likely to politicize the matters or actors purportedly apolitical in their nature (i.e., response to Covid-19). Hence, partisanship-based hostility forms individuals' opinions or attitudes on a political matter through affective polarization (Druckman et al., 2021).

On the other hand, when we turn the page to racial politics, the issue gets even more complicated. Existing research mostly concentrated on White peoples' attitudes, yet there is still a degree of divergency in their opinion. Growing awareness of the systemic racism and discrimination among some White people manifested itself in a variety of ways such as protests, civil rights activism, and change in public opinion. Moreover, the heterogeneity in Black peoples' political behavior is far more overlooked in the literature. For example, interestingly, Jefferson (2023) observes that Black Americans often espoused policy positions that are conflicting their own interests. He argues that a plurality of the community supported punitive social policies which brought negative consequences for the in-group (e.g. a ban on wearing sagging pants in municipality level, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994)(Jefferson, 2023).

Lastly, gender as a social identity has also been unnoticed in the literature. Most of the debate circles around women's political engagement (Verba et al., 1997), stereotypes and candidate perception (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993), agreeability in political discussions (Sweet-Cushman et al., 2023), discrimination against women in labor (Charles & Grusky, 2005), or voting behavior (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). The existing literature often portrayed that men are more informed, interested, and engaged in politics than women; yet both gender's political behavior towards each other in the context of group-conflict may also have prominent consequences in politics. Bomm and Scheepers (2023) argue that peoples' reaction to sexually assaulted women varies based on their gender, the degree of attachment to it, and the threat perception to their social identity. They found that men who have higher attachment to male identity are less convinced by sexually assaulted women, often over blame them, and assess them

more negatively; relative to women (Bomm & Scheepers, 2023). Given the fact that the society still resembles a patriarchal structure to certain extent, whether men/women form their political behavior through group loyalty to protect in-group's self-esteem is an interesting enquiry.

Overall, people are often motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance by bringing their cognitions, attitudes, or behaviors in line with their identities. While the claim makes sense at a first glance, it also generalizes the motivation for how group conflict forms the out-group bias. The heterogeneity among and within these groups should be further explored. As Jefferson (2023) indicates, supporting punitive policies towards in-group “challenges expectations of in-group favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and highlights the limits of group-based solidarity [cf. Dawson (1994); Miller et al. (1981)], especially as it is marshaled on behalf of more stigmatized group members” (Jefferson, 2023, p. 1448). Second, whether everyone employs the process of achieving the consistency in the same way is disputed. While individuals' political behavior overlap in some ways, it also fluctuates in others. Since emotions are the focal point of current identity centered polarized politics, whether our emotions perform different functions across individuals also paves the way for additional investigation.

2.4 Emotions in Polarized Societies

In daily life, people are exposed to many sorts of information that may trigger cognitive dissonance, ultimately leading to increased out-group bias. These occasions can vary from a conversation with friends to following the news, from watching a video on social media to a partisan discussion with relatives over dinner. For example, Settle, in her book “Frenemies”, found that Facebook “Newsfeed” heightens the psychological and affective polarization among its users, regardless of the content being political or apolitical (Settle, 2018). Moreover, Arceneaux and Johnson in “Changing minds or changing channels?” observe that cable news

consumer Americans are already polarized, and their exposure to the news that contests their beliefs further contribute to their polarized opinions (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013).

Events that threaten one’s group identity can be caused by numerous actions: Group conflict (elections, wars, class inequality, etc.), past wrongdoings (racism, land-stealing, genocides, etc.), technology (social media). A significant element in this dynamic is emotions that can account for the development of negative feelings towards out-groups. Emotions highlight a connection between a social phenomenon and the psychology literature. Hence, the research on emotions can help explaining how our individual-level emotions aggregate to the sharp societal divisions seen in daily life and politics.

Given the importance of identity in political behavior, researchers investigated the origins, underlying principles, and consequences of affective polarization through the lens of emotions [e.g., Webster & Abramowitz (2017): Fear, anger, and distrust; Lu & Lee (2019): Anger and fear; McLaughlin et al. (2020): Enthusiasm and anxiety; Marcus et al. (2019): The role of fear and anger in support for the far right]. Especially partisanship and populism research, has mostly focused on anger (increases out-group bias and polarization) and anxiety (reduces out-group bias and polarization) emotions. While the political psychology literature frequently revolves around circumstance-caused or other-caused emotions, a vital segment of emotions’ role in out-group bias has been understudied —Self-conscious emotions (SCE).

2.4.1 Why Self-conscious Emotions?

SCE are mainly composed of shame, guilt, and pride; as well as encompassing other sets of emotions such as hubris, embarrassment, empathy, regret, envy, and

jealousy³. They are the most understudied group of emotions in political science. Unlike “basic emotions” [anger, fear, disgust, sadness, happiness, and surprise - Izard (1971)] that shows biological and universal characteristics; descriptions of the internal experiences are indeed necessary for researchers to study SCE (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Yet, even though they have a rich and complex structure, less attention has been paid to the role of shame and pride (Kazlauskaitė & Salmela, 2022; Salmela & Von Scheve, 2017; Salmela & von Scheve, 2018). In this regard, it is important to bring SCE into studying political behavior studies for two reasons: Their central features and linkage to identity.

First, from emergence to its functionality, SCE have a diverse working mechanism resulting in a different impact on individuals’ political behavior. In order to highlight these variations, researchers argue five central distinctive characteristics (Tracy & Robins, 2004):

1. *Self-awareness*: While basic emotions can contain self-evaluation process, SCE must have them. They help individuals to form an identity through social, collective, and relational self-representation.
2. *Development*: While basic emotions typically develop in first 9 months after birth, majority of SCE emerge later in the childhood (e.g. shame, guilt, pride by the end of age 3) based on the cognizance of morality.
3. *Complex social goals*: While basic emotions customarily assist the “survival” and “reproductivity” goals; SCE promote accomplishment and preservation of social goals such as status or hierarchy or deterring the negative effects of group rejection.

³There is no concrete agreement on the extent of SCEs; yet shame, guilt, and pride are widely acknowledged as the flag bearers. While some scholars refer all of the mentioned ones in their research, others utilize some particular sets of those.

4. *Non-universal expressions*⁴: Unlike basic emotions, SCE do not often have automatic responses via direct facial expressions; yet they do have evident indications through the combination of body positions, head movements, and facial expressions.
5. *Cognitive complexity*: While basic emotions often involve simple appraisals that intimidate the survival goals, SCE require more complex appraisal of broader norms via high cognitive functional assessment.

Second, SCE demonstrate an interesting pathway from social norms to the identity formation, hence their role in the behavioral outcome is peculiar. One aspect of SCE’s framework is the “morality” aspect that sometimes scholars use “moral emotions” to describe them (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). As Haidt defines, moral emotions “are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (Haidt, 2003, p.276). As being part of a key tool in individuals’ moral gadget, they have an impact in the relationship between “moral standards” and “moral behavior”. When people reflects upon the self, SCE stipulate an immediate sentence and feedback regarding both anticipated and actual behavior (either a penalty or encouragement) by functioning as a moral barometer (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). They provide the motivational force to understand when to do right and avoid doing wrong (Kroll & Egan, 2004). However, what is good and bad can be a relative phenomenon across several dimensions such as culture, position in society, age, etc. rather than universal. Unlike other basic emotions’ functioning in the outcome, different moralities result in different “identities” and different behavior⁵.

Overall, SCEs are critically instrumental in both driving and regulating people’s beliefs, behaviors, and thoughts (Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tracy et al.,

⁴However, Beall and Tracy acknowledge that “pride and shame expressions are both likely to be universal and innate behavioral responses to success or failure” (Beall & Tracy, 2020).

⁵Clearly, other elements—phenotype, experiences, relationships etc.—play a part in the identity formation, but the point here is a direct causal mechanism SCE take part in.

2007) and their linkage to “identity” aspect is cardinal (for instance, shame is ascribed to the individual’s negative sense of identity). For these aforementioned reasons, SCE⁶ could help us understand why some people do and some people do not reduce cognitive dissonance by harmonizing the behavior with their identities (for example, why some people resolve cognitive dissonance by accepting blame through guilt).

2.4.2 Shame vs. Guilt

In social interactions, individuals’ self-representation is crucial within and across their identities (Tracy et al., 2007), and SCE help them to maintain their status, confirm their roles, and avoid rejection (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Psychological distress in response to emotion-eliciting events may result in ‘self-regulation’ as a defense mechanism. According to Tracy and Robins’ model, emotion-eliciting stages play a role in determining specific emotions felt and serve as an “emotion regulation” scheme through cognitive reappraisal to prevent negative emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

The model indicates that cognition is necessary for individuals to react to an event, rather than just activating a survival response, otherwise individuals may experience basic emotions if they do not use cognition. Then, four cognitive stages distinguish an individual’s experience of an event from basic/no emotions to SCE (see Figure 2.1, taken from Tracy & Robins (2007, p.10) to illustrates the steps)

⁶To clarify, I use “social dimension” of the SCE rather than policy-based beliefs, since they are ultimately caused by social expectations that people internalize. Since stronger arguments can sway peoples’ opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007) and most people have fairly weak policy attitudes (Arceneaux, 2012), policy-based beliefs are unlikely to be the key factor to trigger SCE and the main driver of out-group bias.




Figure 2.1. Process model of self-conscious emotions.

1. *Do I activate Self-representation?* Individuals can regulate their thoughts by focusing on their external environment rather than their own identity, thus having no emotions (and avoid SCE).
2. *Does my identity really matter?* Individuals may use their assessment of stimulation as a regulatory strategy for their identity goals by disregarding negative feedback and embracing self-serving perceptions of their own abilities.
3. *Does this event align with my goals for my identity and my aspirations?* Individuals may adjust their self-representation based on the emotion-eliciting event's congruency with their identity goals.
4. *Did something about me cause this event to occur?* Individuals may attribute the cause of the event to an external source rather than themselves (self-serving attributional bias), hence they feel better about their self-representation.

After these four steps, lastly, “internal locus attribution”, takes people to look for the source of the problem: Is it a persistent behavior beyond my control? Or is it a reflection of my identity? Research has presented that individuals who criticize poor performance on the ability (an internal, stable, uncontrollable aspect) are likely to feel ashamed, while people who blame poor performance on effort (an internal, unstable, controllable aspect) are likely to feel guilty (Brown & Weiner, 1984; Tracy & Robins, 2006). While guilt and shame are mostly used interchangeably in daily life conversations and both have a negative connotation, the outcomes for these emotions are complicated.

In contemporary literature, the most dominant rationale to distinguish shame and guilt is “the focus on self vs. behavior” approach. It was put forward by Lewis in the role of shame and guilt in neurosis (Lewis, 1971) and detailed by Tracy and Robins’ appraisal-based model of SCE (Tracy & Robins, 2004). The approach operationalized the difference between guilt and shame as; while guilt is the result of a reaction to a specific behavior (*I have done something bad*), shame is ascribed to the actor’s negative sense of identity (*I am someone bad*). In both situations, the emotions are inter-correlated and not mutually exclusive (Tangney, 1994); and the psychological discomfort occurs due to conflicting beliefs, thoughts, values, etc.

Guilt can function as a cue for activating the control mechanism by sending a signal for behavioral need to change. Individual approaches to the emotionally problematic situation in a more optimistic way include ascribing the source of the problem to “behavior” or “belief”. Eventually, the behavioral change can lead to positive outcomes such as reducing prejudice or increasing the prosocial behavior. Conversely, the mechanism for shame does not allow a stress-free checkout in moments of emotional distress. While changing your behavior is a relatively more possible option, changing who you are is something unlikely in the short-term. Once shame is induced, it signals a personality trait as “feeling like a bad person” which makes the behavioral change improbable. At that moment,

shame is considered a risky outcome that might lead to self-hatred, aggression, violence, addiction, depression, or bullying by ascribing the source of the problem to the “person” or “identity”.

The literature across several fields also focused on the dispositional tendencies that peoples’ proneness (either guilt or shame) is an elicitor that makes them experience these emotions. Shame or guilt prone individuals tend to anticipate respective emotions in response to both the potential behavioral outcomes and actual failures or transgressions (Tangney & Fischer, 1995), yet the variance in the outcome is noteworthy. Lutwak and her colleagues argues that as these difference in cognitive styles result in dissimilar forms of affective responding (proneness); “shame may motivate a range of defensive strategies that are maladaptive and destructive”, whereas “guilt feelings may foster other oriented empathy that points the way toward redemption and strengthening interpersonal relationships” (Lutwak et al., 1998, p.1028). Additionally, guilt is related to an information-oriented style (people who intentionally search, reflect, and utilize self-relevant information in their decision-making) whereas shame is attributed to diffuse-avoidant style (people who are often defensive, avoid confronting their difficulties, and depend on external cues controlling personal endeavors) in terms of the identity related cognitive processes (Berzonsky, 1994; Lutwak et al., 1998).

CHAPTER 3

ARGUMENT

3.1 Can Shame vs. Guilt Debate Help to Explain Differences in Out-group Bias?

Humans tend to keep harmony in their thoughts and their behaviors, hence facing cognitive dissonance is problematic. One of the occasions that may generate cognitive dissonance is facing negative information about one's in-group. Once a person is reminded that his/her in-group involved in a transgression that gave harm to the out-group, the situation may become complicated (e.g., a man is reminded about domestic violence towards women; a White person is reminded about the detrimental effects of segregation era towards Black people; a Democrat or Republican is reminded about a corruption scandal of the party he/she supports). Then, what do people do in these situations?

First, according to Social Identity Theory, an essential factor responsible for group biases is the aspiration for enhancing self-esteem (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), and perceiving our own groups in a positive light helps us to achieve this self-worth in group level (Brewer, 1979). So, a person would like to feel that he or she is a good person, hence his or her in-group should also have a positive image. Second, this positive image of the in-group should be sustainable, so any derogation that may jeopardize the in-group's favorability can be seen as a threat. Third, the person should also circumvent from any unwanted feelings (such as guilt or shame) while grappling with the disagreeing thoughts. Therefore, people may employ some sort of defense mechanisms to re-establish the consistency via adjusting their beliefs or pursuing further verification to fortify their current perspectives.

One explanation to this defense mechanism can be found in the concept of in-group favoritism. People likely to demonstrate in-group favoritism in times of their group is endangered or they have concerns about their self-image is under threat. What is more interesting is the fact that people who denigrated their out-groups as a response to the threat to their in-group experienced higher self-esteem (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), and more reinstated self-worth (Branscombe et al., 1993). In essence, our emotional state is influenced by the perceived image of our group. We feel good or bad depending on how our in-group is appreciated relative to others.

In the light of these notions, this dissertation aims to enhance the literature by examining whether the protection of perceived group image functions in a uniform way for individuals. Thereby, I build my argument on the Intuitionist Model of Political Reasoning by acknowledging the individual differences in motivated reasoning among other political attitude formation models [refer to Arceneaux & Vander Wielen (2017) for details]. My theoretical model further investigates whether people reduce their cognitive dissonance (due to their in-group being involved in a transgression towards out-group) is a universal phenomenon. While the motivated reasoning suggests that they do; there are reasons to believe that this might not be a universal phenomenon (Kiil, 2022), because groups differ in their dominance, groups differ in how ascriptive or descriptive they are, group identities differ across time and across individuals. Therefore, we need to look at this phenomenon from different identity angles to see whether or not these findings are robust across different group types.

I conducted the studies in the United States and my intellectual motivation in this research derives from imagining some of the most important politically relevant groups that represent important cleavages in American politics: Gender, Race, Party identities. There are significant differences in how men and women, White people and Black people, Democrats and Republicans behave politically. Hence, I chose these three categories with their dichotomous sub-categories in

order to keep the parsimony. In relation to the influence of emotions, I look at how people’s predisposed tendencies (traits) as a moderator, as opposed to the emotion (states) itself, because it allows me to make inferences about emotional states without having to measure them directly.




Figure 3.1. Visual representation of the argument

The literature often suggests that peoples’ anger, fear, or anxiety accounts for people’s diverse opinions in which results in sharp cleavages in the society. While this concept may be true to some extent, I argue that when people are reminded about their in-group’s transgression, the situation creates a cognitive dissonance in their mind, and one way to bring the consistency is shifting the blame towards the out-group. This aggression can be explained in terms of increased out-group bias as a response to the attack on the in-group image (H1). However, I further argue that the behavior is not universal, peoples’ predispositions moderate their out-group bias. More specifically, while shame-prone individuals may show higher out-group bias as a defense mechanism to restore the self-esteem; guilt-prone individuals are likely to adopt empathic concerns towards the out-group to reduce prejudice and increase prosocial behavior (H2). Lastly, considering the identity categories in this research, two other factors may have an impact on peoples’ divergent political behavior to reestablish the self-worth in a group

sense. First, peoples' identity attachment vary, and this can result in differing levels of out-group bias. Second, the identity itself may have a 'victim' or 'offender' component due to historical or contemporary politics. Therefore, there are likely to be distinctions between how either of these identity types evaluate a transgression done by or towards themselves (H3) (Please see Figure 3.1 for the visual representation of the argument.

3.1.1 Hypotheses

Individuals are in constant interactions either with each other or with the tools of communication such as newspapers, social media, etc. As motivated reasoning literature indicates, it is important to understand whether the received information creates a cognitive dissonance that eventually steers out-group bias in peoples' minds. I argue that when people hear about transgressions that are caused by their in-groups, their bias towards the out-group elevates.¹ What one can initially expect is that the direct effect of the treatment (information) should be positive on average. I hypothesize that;

[H1] *In-group transgression treatment will increase out-group bias*

And the following equation shows the empirical model for Hypothesis 1:

$$y = b_0 + b_1 * x + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{Out-group bias} = b_0 + b_1 * \text{Treatment};$$

Hypothesis 1 predicts that $b_1 > 0$

The question then becomes whether every individual responds the same way by bringing their cognitions, attitudes, or behaviors in line with their identities.

¹Some would argue that acquiring knowledge of an in-group transgression would reduce affective polarization, either by reducing positive feelings for the in-group or by increasing positive feelings for the out-group. While this argument is valid, I investigate the impact of SCE on motivated reasoning and dissonance avoidance in this project that is based on individuals' counterargument to the information in polarized matters. Regardless of whether the effect goes one way or another, I believe it is interesting to investigate whether it is moderated by predispositional tendencies.

The “guilt vs. shame” debate in psychology literature offers an insight to investigate the variance in out-group bias. On one hand, shame is attributed to the negative consciousness of identity. People with high shame proneness often exhibit maladaptive defense strategies to protect the self-esteem. On the other hand, guilt is recognized as a response to a certain behavior. People with high guilt proneness are more likely to display pro-social and empathetic conduct towards the out-group. Therefore, I expect that the treatment interacts with out-group bias in different levels based on peoples’ dispositional tendencies. I hypothesize that;

[H2] *The in-group transgression treatment will increase out-group bias more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals*

And, the following equation shows the empirical model for Hypothesis 2:

$$y = b_0 + b_1 * X + b_2 * SP + b_3 * X * SP + b_4 * GP + b_5 * X * GP + b_6 * SP * GP + b_7 * X * SP * GP + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Out-group bias} = & b_0 + b_1 * \text{Treatment} + b_2 * \text{Shame Proneness} \\ & + b_3 * \text{Treatment} * \text{Shame Proneness} + b_4 * \text{Guilt Proneness} \\ & + b_5 * \text{Treatment} * \text{Guilt Proneness} + b_6 * \text{Shame Proneness} * \text{Guilt Proneness} \\ & + b_7 * \text{Treatment} * \text{Shame Proneness} * \text{Guilt Proneness} + \text{Pre-treatment Controls} \end{aligned}$$

In light of this knowledge, to demonstrate my theoretical approach, I argue that proneness to SCE moderates the relationship between the level of out-group bias and information about in-group’s past wrongdoing. Moreover, I take the interaction between shame proneness and guilt proneness into account because shame and guilt emotions often co-occur [e.g., Tangney et al. (1996) finds $r=0.40$ to 0.50 in the Test of Self-Conscious Affect—TOSCA questionnaire] and people who display predispositions to shame also tend to show guilt proneness tendencies, and vice versa (Wolf et al., 2010). Hereafter, in the analysis section, I will use “two-way interaction” terminology for the relationship between shame

prone to shame and guilt (b₆ in the equation); and “three-way interaction” jargon to demonstrate all-together connection between shame proneness, guilt proneness, and the respective treatment (b₇ in the equation).

Up until this point, I have utilized the term “in-group” to identify the respective identity group. It should be clarified what “identity” also refers to in terms of its “degree of attachment” and “victimhood”. First, in this research I acknowledge the identity in a social psychological approach by following the “Michigan School” of political behavior and more recent scholars following a similar line of research. A social identity denotes an individual’s sense of attachment to a specific group where he/she takes part in the same identity category that has an impact on “what people feel, think and do” (Klandermans, 2014; Mason & Wronski, 2018). Here, the interaction between these social identities such as race, gender, religion etc. and the partisan identity is important because it paints an overall picture of the cumulative relationship of these categories rather than classification of each social identity as its own. The question remains as to what extent the bond differs across individuals.

Campbell and his colleagues described group identification phenomenon as a “psychological reality” in which “there is room for a great deal of variation in the degree of psychological membership that characterizes the relationship” (Campbell et al., 1960, p.306; Mason & Wronski, 2018, p.258). The American Voter sheds lights into to the modern identity politics by explaining the degree of attachment a person can hold for a social group where the individuals differ in their political thinking and behavior. Their model suggests that three different interactions define the variation in “groupness strength”: (1) the extent individual relates to the group, (2) the extent the group relates to the political world, (3) the extent the individual relates to the political world. They anticipated that “in most (social) groups formed along occupational, ethnic, or religious lines membership is more likely to determine attitudes than are attitudes

to determine membership” as a major factor in varying levels of identification (Campbell et al., 1960, p.323).

Second, along with the degree of attachment, I focus on differences between how “victim” and ”offender” identities approach a transgression that is done by their own in-group. Fohring argues that the discussion of victimhood is “a deeply personal yet also cultural phenomenon” (Fohring, 2018, p.147). Identification of a victimhood paves ways for people to deliver both positive (towards the victim group) and negative (towards the offender group) judgements, hence it creates consequences for both groups in the public eye. So, how do people who belong to one of these groups react to their in-groups’ transgressions toward the other one?

I utilize three identity categories with their dichotomous sub-categories in this research. In each of these identity categories, the common knowledge indicates the following;

1. *Gender ID*: Men are in the offender, women are in the victim group
2. *Racial ID*: White people are in the offender, Black people are in the victim group
3. *Party ID*: There is not an evident offender/victim relationship. (Yet, both sides tend to see themselves the victim of other party’s policies/agenda)

The literature overall indicates that there may be gender differences in SCE where women tend to have higher scores on both shame and guilt measurements (Brody & Hall, 2008; Tangney, 1994; Tracy et al., 2007). Else-Quest and her colleagues show that the stereotyping of women being more emotional than men is partially true that the gender differences in SCE are accurate for shame and guilt, but not for both authentic and hubristic pride (Else-Quest et al., 2012). On the race/ethnicity side of the debate, the literature provides several different answers. Differences between shame and guilt emotions were greater among

White people's samples than non-White ones in gender stereotypes (Else-Quest et al., 2012) and purely racial stereotypes (Peacock et al., 2006); Asian Americans scored greater levels of shame-proneness, compared to guilt-proneness than White Americans (Szeto-Wong, 1997), and Black people experience higher recurrent shame due to the negative stereotyping of African Americans in both institutional and interpersonal levels (Harris-Perry, 2011).

To evaluate individuals' proneness to the SCEs, I use TOSCA-3S questionnaire (see research design and appendix). The measure does not make any reference to politics per se, it only explains how individuals feel about a mistake or transgression they made as a person. However, as individuals' self-esteem is connected to in-group (inter-group discrimination) either as an independent or dependent variable (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the treatment takes effect on the "group to individual" or "group to group" level. Even though most of the research indicates that women show higher degrees of shame and guilt proneness than men, the results for ethnicity are rather conflicting; what I expect here is that when the issue is a sensitive topic (i.e., domestic abuse in gender identity and discrimination in racial identity compared to a corruption scandal in the political party they feel close to), shame/guilt proneness would less likely trigger these emotions for those in the victim identities. The result will be that responsibility attribution will occur and the members of these groups will likely reject the blame overall and perceive it as if attributed by their out-group.

As Women and African Americans² are in the most often victimized groups who fight for the recognition of their collective victimization (Fohring, 2018), I expect asymmetrical results in these categories relative to those in the Party identity ones. Additionally, as Michigan School scholars argue, people who hold strong partisan attachments to their in-groups also tend to categorize themselves as a "victim" so much so that I expect a tendency of rejecting the blame of the transgression in both Party identity categories. Therefore, I hypothesize that;

²along with LGBTQ people, Refugees and Immigrants

[H3] *Those in “offender” groups will give stronger reactions to the treatment than those in the “victim” groups*

- Shame-prone Men in the treatment group will likely have higher scores of out-group bias than shame-prone women.
- Shame-prone White people in the treatment group will likely have higher scores of out-group bias than shame-prone Black people.
- Both shame-prone Democrats and Republicans in the treatment group (those who hold weak party attachments) will likely have similar scores of out-group bias.

3.1.2 Why Gender, Race, and Party Identities?

The United States is a melting pot. There are several social groups that constitute many different identity categories, and naturally, these social groups also comprise fault lines in their interactions. It is fundamentally important for scholars to understand and address these fault lines in the ever-evolving social landscape. These social divisions are frequently rooted in the historical reasons; however, they are further intensified by institutional failures, economic inequalities, and absence of mutual understanding. They can be seen in variety of issues such as race, gender, religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, so on and so forth; and these divisions can generate tension and conflicts that may menace the fabric of American society.

In this research, I reflected on a simple question to keep the parsimony: What are the most relevant social groups in the US that constitute fault lines in their interactions? Contemporary American political landscape funnels down to a handful matters. Majority of the debates revolve around the issues of gender identity, race identity, and partisan identity. In each of these dimensions, there is a historically ascertained socio-cultural division that has become politicized,

hence crafted the society to split into political cleavages. This problematic situation can also be observed in voters who hold an “implicit identity” in their partisan behavior (Theodoridis, 2017). According to the Cleavage theory, these different political interests and preferences among and across groups determine shapes important traditions such as the party system or peoples’ collective voting behavior patterns (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). However, among these three types of identities chosen for the dissertation, there are also qualitative differences in terms of inter-group conflict.

First, while examining the multifaceted nature of inter-group conflict, it is vital to diagnose that the conflict is not uniform in the social dimension, hence the competition may appear differently in distinctive social contexts. For example, while race is a highly salient identity category in American political landscape, the ethnicity is viewed as a broader notion via the ancestry of residents. Moreover, the various dimensions of an identity category may intersect with other categories by making the situation even more complex in terms of political competition between groups. This intricacy emphasizes the importance and need for addressing the question more comprehensively.

Second, I focused on the ascriptive vs descriptive characteristics. Ascriptive identities are those defined by the outsiders by imprinting specific values or its ‘groupness’ (Van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016), while descriptive ones are those how a person describes the self. In theory, descriptive identities (e.g., party) are more malleable to some extent compared to ascriptive ones (e.g., gender or race). However, even in that, how one would describe it has more or fewer social constraints on people’s ability to self-describe and on the degree to which social description happens.

Overall, I aim to investigate the most politically salient identity categories that create political fault lines in their relationships. In doing so, I focus on gender, race, and party identities because their binary sub-categories such as Men/Women, White people/Black people, and Democrats/Republicans construct

the best comparison in political competition within the in-group/out-group logic. It is important to understand the relationship within and across these identity categories because it may shed light on how peoples' political behavior may vary diagonally under the influence of their emotional dispositions. Hence scholars or policy makers can benefit from understanding the complex dynamics of the inter-group conflict in polarized societies.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research¹ investigated the variance in out-group bias that individuals exhibit in their political behavior by considering the role of predisposed tendencies (Moderator) in people’s political decisions (Dependent variable) through daily life interactions (Independent variable). More specifically, the research pursued to show how people’s predispositions (traits), as opposed to the emotions (states) itself may explain the variance in affective polarization across individuals.

To answer how proneness to shame/guilt shape the relationship between group conflict and out-group bias, I designed a 3-sample survey experiment (please see Figure 4.1 for overall structure, further details are explained in the “survey measures” section). The studies took place online using MTurk (through Cloud Research) and conducted on a sample of U.S. adults. Scholars point out several advantages of using MTurk data, including the inexpensiveness, diversity of the sample that allows targeting subgroup studies, high level of flexibility that provides room for cross-cultural research, and the high quality data through the built-in incentive structure (Goodman & Paolacci, 2017).

Survey Measures

To test my hypotheses, I conducted three separate experiments in which I recruited roughly an equal number of participants in the dyadic sub-identity categories (please see Analysis plan below for the detailed sample sizes for each category). The procedure is the same in each of these experiments. Partici-

¹The original IRB approval (protocol no: 27265) was obtained on August 18th, 2020. The amendments were approved on December 1st, 2022 under submission no: 27265-0006




Figure 4.1. The overview for each experiment

pants first completed the same consent form (must be over 18 years of age and wish to participate in the study) and demographics section (party identity, race, gender, closeness to these mentioned identities, ideology, education, income, and religiosity).

Proneness: After the demographics section, all participants answered the questions that measure their shame and guilt proneness in group identity level as in social psychology approach. The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 Short Version (TOSCA-3S) is composed of 11 scenarios with 3 questions each to measure Shame-proneness, Guilt-proneness, and Externalization [Tangney et al. (2000); see Appendix]. The reason behind choosing this measurement is to evaluate the proneness levels through daily-life scenarios by self-reporting.²

Researchers indicate that a scenario-based examination provides a couple of advantages. First, participants do need verbal skills to express their feelings through abstract terms as 'ashamed' or 'guilty' in which the difference is blurry in daily conversations (Rüsch et al., 2007). Second, the questionnaire is not concentrated on cognitive evaluations, alternatively it is more focused on the descriptive accounts of the experiences (Makogon & Enikolopov, 2013); so, it targets the assessment of moral standards rather than individual moral emotions (Tangney, 1996). Third, scenarios help people not to deny their shame or guilt feelings for maintaining their social desirability (Rüsch et al., 2007).

On the other hand, scholars also criticize the scale's low discriminant validity due to not providing a significant distinction between shame and guilt-proneness. Researchers indicate that the test is not sufficient to differentiate trait measures of shame proneness and guilt proneness (especially in high levels of SP and GP) among women with borderline personality disorder in clinical trials (Rüsch et al., 2007). Moreover, the questionnaire overlooks at the negative side of guilt such as no room for existence of confess, repair, amend, or apologize (Bybee & Quiles,

²Externalization proneness is not composed in this analysis. The data will be utilized in another project.

1998) and positive side of shame such as inducing amending action or withdrawal from the situation (Schmader & Lickel, 2006); hence differentiation of these emotions in terms of their presence or functioning demonstrates limited evidence (Luyten et al., 2002; Makogon & Enikolopov, 2013).

Overall, keeping the advantages and disadvantages of the TOSCA scale in mind, the questionnaire encompasses scenarios one can experience in daily life. As the participants read each scenario, they try to imagine themselves in that situation, and then provide how they would have reacted to the respective event. I measured their replies in a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not likely (1)” to “very likely (5)” manner. An example of how a particular question from the survey looks like below:³

You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock you realize you stood him up. You would think:

	1	2	3	4	5
- I'm inconsiderate (shame)	o	o	o	o	o
- I should make it up to him as soon as possible (guilt)	o	o	o	o	o
- My boss distracted me just before lunch (externalization)	o	o	o	o	o

Treatment: The treatment was conducted by priming individuals via acknowledging their respective identities' transgressions through videos⁴. The videos contain information similar to the news broadcasted in traditional media that people can easily encounter with in daily life. Even though the news consumption through television is in decline, according to PEW research, the US adults who often get news from TV is still 31% in 2022.⁵ Additionally, as social media platforms promotes information dissemination (Stieglitz & Dang-

³The name of the emotions were not shown to the participants in the experiment.

⁴The videos were acquired from the internet. I edited (cut unnecessary information, shortened to achieve a minute and a half length, etc.) them using “I-movie” application. All videos are between 1 minute 20 seconds and 1 minute 30 seconds in length.

⁵Online source: [Pew Research](#) [Last accessed on July 1, 2023].

Xuan, 2013), the platforms also drive individuals' attention to specific issues that makes them to go in search of further information in traditional media (Ren et al., 2022). Hence, it is safe to assume that the treatment videos are somewhat organic to what people may face in their daily life (to access to the videos, please see Table 4.1).

In order to keep the parsimony in each research, dyadic sub-categories were chosen within the different identity categories. Based on their selection in the demographics section respective to their identities, participants were assigned to watch a video by using block randomization [please see Suresh (2011) for further information] in order to balance the sample sizes across treatment (those who watched the transgression theme) and control groups (those who watched the birds video) of the same sub-identity (e.g. women in treatment group vs control group). For each identity, the overarching theme regarding the wrongdoing is as follows:

- Control group participants across all categories watched the same video that explains the Frigate (Pirate) Birds of Costa Rica.
- Domestic violence for gender identity
 - Men watched a video that explains domestic abuse towards women
 - Women watched a video that explains domestic abuse towards men
- Discrimination for racial identity
 - White people watched a video that explains the difficulties Black people experienced during Jim Crow laws
 - Black people watched a video that explains how White people felt rejected due to a school trip that only included Black students
- Corruption scandal for party identity
 - Democrats watched a video that explains how Senator Sandoval (D-Illinois) pleaded guilty to two felony charges.

- Republicans watched a video that explains how Representative Cunningham (R-California) confesses he pleaded guilty for corruption charges.

Group	Category	Sub-category	Video
Treatment	Gender	Women	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-40iBdtPwmQ
		Men	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvecqzEXwYM
	Race	Whites	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVwYLPUXGyc
		Blacks	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGu3H7sPmko
	Party	Democrats	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VARP_oy1B2M
Republicans		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfAdu6t1THE	
Control	All	All	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rc4mFUyMYE

Table 4.1. Treatment videos for each category

One may fairly argue that the treatments are not balanced across different identity and sub-identity categories. Domestic violence is viewed in different ways by men and women, the scale of discrimination towards Black people in Jim Crow era is unquestionably not equal to White people’s rejection feeling in a school trip, and these two overarching themes are more sensitive topics relative to the corruption scandals in the party people identify with. While the criticism is valid due to the nature of the videos, my initial purpose was whether the videos may activate self-conscious emotions in viewers, in an organic way as they run into these sorts of criticism in their daily lives. So, the target here is more about how or what these groups are often reminded about their transgressions (for example, institutional racism for White people or affirmative action for Black people), rather than the equal intensity of the wrongdoings across groups.

Cognitive Dissonance: A challenging part of assessing cognitive dissonance is that it is not measured directly (Harmon-Jones, 2019). In this research, I relied on participants’ self-report. After the treatment, each person responded a question indicating how much the information provided in the video contradict

with their belief or behavior, ranging on scale of not at all (1) to very much (5). I use the data to compare across and within identity groups regarding the variance in their out-group bias.

Out-group Bias: Finally, the participants answered the out-group bias questions respective to their identity categories. The affective polarization levels were measured by looking at several factors.

For the gender and racial identities, the experiment contains 2 identical matrix type questions with four (empathy related) and five (threat perception) sets of sub questions. First, I utilized Stephan and his colleagues’ Racial Attitudes Questionnaire/Realistic Threats section (Stephan et al., 2002). I modified the questions for both identity categories as they would fit to the respective category and end up with 5 questions total from the questionnaire (see Table 4.2).

The battery identifies whether individuals consider that their out-group (1) holds too many positions of power and responsibility (2) discriminates against themselves in hiring decisions (3) specifically benefits from money spent on healthcare, childcare, and educational programs (4) is being treated leniently by public service agencies such as tax, court, electricity, etc., and (5) have more economic and political power than they deserve. Five-point Likert scale composes answers from strongly disagree to strongly agree where higher values represent greater animosity towards the “other side”.

Questions:
1. ... (out-group)... hold too many positions of power and responsibility, hence dominate American politics more than they should
2. When ...(out-group)... are in positions of authority, they discriminate against ...(us)... in hiring decisions.
3. Too much money is spent on healthcare, childcare, and educational programs that benefit specifically ... (out-group)....
4. Public service agencies (tax, court, electricity, etc.) is more lenient on ...(out-group)... than on ...(us)...
5. ...(out-group)... have more economic and political power than they deserve in this country.

Table 4.2. The attitude battery for gender and race ID experiments

Additionally, since the lack of empathy is correlated to shame-proneness, I modified Sirin et al. (2021)’s 4-item Group Empathy Index (GEI) as an alterna-

tive measure of the out-group bias by looking at the perspective of individuals and empathic concern scores (see Table 4.3). It composes from almost never to almost always where higher values represent greater empathy towards the “other side”.

Questions:
1. How often would you say you try to better understand ...(out-group)... by imagining how things look from their perspective?
2. Before criticizing ...(out-group)..., how often do you try to imagine how you would feel if you were in their place?
3. How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for ...(out-group)... who are less fortunate than you?
4. When you see ...(out-group)... being taken advantage of due to their gender, how often do you feel protective toward them?

Table 4.3. The empathy battery for gender and race ID experiments

This battery was composed of four-questions that examined whether people believe that they (1) try to better understand out-group by imagining how things look from their perspective (2) attempt putting themselves in their shoes before criticizing (3) tend to have tender feelings for those who are less fortunate, and (4) often feel protective toward them when they see they are being taken advantage of due to their gender. The responses are in a 5-point Likert scale, varying from almost never to almost always that higher scores show higher empathic concerns towards the out-group.

In my analysis for these two identity categories, I used the threat perception scale as my primary out-group bias indicator, and the empathy battery as an alternative measure.

For the party identity, I utilized the feeling thermometer, social-distance measures (e.g., gauging how comfortable people are having close friends or neighbors, the use of the word “we” when thinking of the related to the assigned identity etc.) and trust rating as in Druckman and Levendusky’s study that are composed of 9 questions total (Druckman & Levendusky, 2019). The survey includes same 5-item scales to measure affective polarization respective to the participants’ party identities by varying in the content (e.g., extremely uncomfortable to extremely comfortable, extremely upset to extremely pleased, etc.). The responses

indicate that higher values represent greater animosity towards the “other side” with respect to the assigned identities. In the analysis, I treated all of them as part of the out-group bias measures.

Control Variables: The demographics section was used as the control variables of the research. While participants’ age (interval/ratio) is a co-variate; their party choice, race, and gender (nominal), ideology, education, income, and religiosity (ordinal, likert scale) are the independent control variables. Here, two issues has to be clarified.

First, the importance of the control variables in this research hinges upon the moderators. As it was indicated in Hypothesis 3, the literature touches upon the impact of gender and race on Self-Conscious Emotions. Additionally, it is likely that people’s experiences through life choices, the culture and they grow up, the families they were born into may have an impact on the variance in their shame-proneness and guilt-proneness. Therefore, I investigate whether the moderator (SCE) co-vary with the demographics. Second, the interaction between the treatments and the control variables are tied to each other. As all of the treatment categories (Gender ID, Racial ID, and Party ID) are also a control variable per se, I take into account the rest of the control variables in each category (e.g. when the treatment is in formation on the racial identity, race variable was excluded from the control variable).

4.1 Concerns and Possible Solutions

It should be noted that several researchers touch on a couple factors that could impact the data quality (Buhrmester et al., 2018). Below, I address these issues by responding through answers from the literature. Concern types:

1. *Inattentive participants:* It is advised that using response validity indicators and screening the data reduce the failing response validity indicators of the participants (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020). Additionally, insufficient

attention is no more a problem among MTurk samples than among other commonly used convenience or high-quality commercial samples (Thomas & Clifford, 2017). To prevent this issue, I embedded a basic attention check question (which colors appear in the American flag?) into the “proneness” battery. If the participants failed twice to provide the correct answer, they were excluded from the rest of the survey. Some questions in each section are composed of reverse wording in which the answers offer different polarities (e.g., differently ordered answers of shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and externalization).

2. *Dishonesty in affirming qualifications*: Since the study targeted ordinary citizens, they were not required to prove any specific qualification or accomplishment to participate.
3. *The non-naivete and familiarity*: Employing rigorous exclusion methods consistently boosts statistical power without introducing problematic side effects (e.g., substantially biasing the post-exclusion sample), and can thus provide a general solution for dealing with problematic respondents across samples (Thomas & Clifford, 2017). Same as in dishonesty problem, ordinary citizens are targeted. Additionally, each of the identity batteries composed different exclusion criteria (e.g., ‘pure’ independents in Party ID survey).
4. *Non-credible inferences*: Researchers can make credible, generalizable experimental inferences with some confidence via using MTurk (Berinsky et al., 2012; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014). MTurk data can be used to advance research programs, particularly if researchers measure and account for a range of political and demographic variables as needed (Levay et al., 2016). Demographics section that includes party identity, race, education, gender, income, and religiosity measures that provided the needed variables.

4.2 Analysis Plan

To estimate the direct treatment effect and the interaction between the out-group bias and the treatment, I needed to have a satisfactory powered design. To do so, I set the power at 0.80 , the p-value at 0.05 , and the effect size d at 0.2 ; hence I needed a sample size of 394 per each sub-identity category for being able to detect a small effect. I recruited roughly around four hundred people per each category in case of a decrease in the sample size due to any incompleteness or any other reasons. After eliminating the incomplete responses and those who failed to pass the attention checks, I have a total sample of 2294 participants (1147 in the treatment groups, 1147 in the control group (see Table 4.4 for detailed breakdown of the recruitment)).

Group	Category	Sub-category	N
Treatment (N=1147)	Gender ID	Men	200
		Women	197
	Race ID	White people	201
		Black people	157
	Party ID	Democrats	202
		Republican	190
Control (N=1147)	Gender ID	Men	199
		Women	195
	Race ID	White people	203
		Black people	158
	Party ID	Democrats	199
		Republican	193

Table 4.4. The number of participants based on identity categories

Hypothesis 1

The first model tested the hypothesis that exposure to the information about in-group's part transgression treatment will increase the out-group bias, where OGB (Out-group bias) is the summated scale measuring the out-group bias. I used 3 differences in means (MD) tests to see the effects of treatment videos on individuals' out-group bias compared to the control group one. So, since I have independent samples, I used two sample t-test in which assume that both samples' variances are equal. The regression model below indicates the general form of the analysis:

$$\text{Out-group bias} = b_0 + b_1 * \text{Treatment} + \text{covariates} + \varepsilon_i$$

While the intercept of the equation gives control group's mean, the coefficient shows the difference in means between the treatment group and the control group.

Hypothesis 2

The second model test the hypothesis that exposure to information about in-group's part transgression treatment increase out-group bias more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals. I use Moderation analysis of the SCE to test the effects of treatment videos (include a different video of in-group transgression for each category: Gender ID, Racial ID, and Party ID) on individuals' out-group bias. To examine whether the treatment effects are moderated by the Self-Conscious Emotions, I look at the interaction of the moderator (shame - S and guilt - G) with the treatment indicator (X), along with a matrix of demographics co-variates.

The three-way interaction among the treatment and moderators is important, because critiques of the TOSCA scale discuss that the questionnaire may be unsatisfactory to display a noteworthy distinction between shame and guilt-

prone to disregard at the negative side of guilt and positive side of shame. The regression model below indicates the general form of the analysis:

$$y = b_0 + b_1 * X + b_2 * SP + b_3 * X * SP + b_4 * GP + b_5 * X * GP + b_6 * SP * GP + b_7 * X * SP * GP + \varepsilon_i$$

And the specific moderator hypotheses for each identity groups are listed below: In the Gender and Racial identity categories, I created summated rating scales of empathy and threat variables as dependent variables.

Gender ID

- DV = empathy; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (The treatment will decrease empathy towards men/women more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)
- DV = threat perception; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (The treatment will increase threat perception towards men/women more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)

Racial ID

- DV = empathy; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (The treatment will decrease empathy towards Whites/Blacks more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)
- DV = threat perception; Moderator = SCE; IV = information (The treatment will increase threat perception towards Whites/Blacks more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)

For party identity, I grouped 8 questions under 5 dependent variables: “thermo” as displaying the feeling thermometer questions, “tribalism” for measuring whether they are truly for their own party or against the other party, “distance” as indicating the related to the social distance measures, “social” as showing their

patience level to the people from other party on social media, and “trust” variable for how much they trust to other side:

Party ID

- DV = Thermo; Moderator = SCE; IV = information (The treatment will increase their animosity feeling towards other side more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)
 - Party = The treatment will increase their animosity feeling towards Democratic Party/Republican Party more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals
 - Elected officials = The treatment will increase their animosity feeling towards Democratic Party’s elected officials/Republican Party’s elected officials more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals
 - Voters = The treatment will increase their animosity feeling towards voters of Democratic Party/Republican Party more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals
- DV = Tribalism; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (The treatment will increase partisanship and tribal attitudes towards Democrats/Republicans more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)
- DV = Distance; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (The treatment will increase discomfort towards Democrats/Republicans more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)
- DV = Social; Moderator = SCE; IV = information (The treatment will decrease patience on social media towards Democrats/Republicans more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)
- DV = Trust; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (The treatment will decrease trust towards Democrats/Republicans more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals)

Lastly, it should be noted that each dependent variable for every identity category is also examined separately as a robustness check.

Hypothesis 3

Here, I used the previous Moderation analysis. In Hypothesis 2, I argued that exposure to information about in-group’s part transgression treatment will increase out-group bias more among shame-prone individuals than guilt-prone individuals. However, whether this varies across individuals may depend on two important factors: peoples’ attachment to their identities and peoples’ collective victimhood sensation in those identities. Then, the results beg for a further analysis to investigate whether these two factors also accompanies the relationship between information and the out-group bias across sub-categories. Thus, I expect that those in “offender” groups will give stronger reactions to the treatment than those in the “victim” groups of the same main category. Overall, this hypothesis can also be considered as the “robustness check” of the previous hypothesis where there is any variance across sub-categories. The regression model below indicates the general form of the analysis like in H2:

$$y = b_0 + b_1 * X + b_2 * SP + b_3 * X * SP + b_4 * GP + b_5 * X * GP + b_6 * SP * GP + b_7 * X * SP * GP + \varepsilon_i$$

The specific moderator hypotheses for each identity are the same as in Hypothesis 2 by comparing across the sub-categories in terms of shame-proneness.

Gender ID

- DVs = empathy and threat perception; Moderator = SCE; IV = information (Shame-prone Men in the treatment group will likely have higher scores of out-group bias than Shame-prone women)

Racial ID

- DVs= empathy and threat perception; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (Shame-prone White people in the treatment group will likely have higher scores of out-group bias than Shame-prone Black people)

Party ID

- DVs= all 5 of them; Moderator = SCE; IV= information (Both Shame-prone Democrats and Republicans in the treatment group (those who hold weak party attachments) will likely have similar scores of out-group bias)

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

5.1 Gender Identity

The experiment took place on January 30th, 2023 through CloudResearch participants in the United States (N=791; Treatment=397, Control=394). The full information about the demographics of the participants are presented in the appendix. After demographics section, the participants completed TOSCA-3 short version questionnaire where their proneness to the SCE were measured. The descriptive of the full sample's proneness scores are as follows: Shame proneness with a mean of 3.07 (SD=0.65, median =3.09), Guilt proneness with a mean of 4.09 (SD=0.53, median=4.18). Figure 5.1 indicates the density plot for how men and women's shame and guilt proneness scores are overall distributed.

Similar to the values often reported in the literature, alpha reliabilities were 0.75 (shame-proneness), 0.77 (guilt-proneness), and 0.79 (externalization proneness) with the standard errors of 0.017, 0.017, and 0.016 , respectively. Pearson correlations between scores were 0.41 for Shame and Guilt proneness (moder-




Figure 5.1. Distribution of men and women's shame & guilt proneness

ate), 0.32 for Shame and Externalization proneness (low), -0.17 for Guilt and Externalization proneness (very low).

5.1.1 H1 - Motivated Reasoning

The first model (H1) creates the baseline that investigates whether the information regarding the in-group's past transgression treatment increases threat perception towards out-group (men/women). I created a summated rating scale for the out-group bias measures and used difference in means (MD) test to see the effect across the treatment and control groups. Since these two groups are independent samples, two-sample t-tests were deployed in two batteries: Attitude and Empathy.

The attitude battery scale that constitutes the overall out-group bias was reliable, $\alpha = 0.89$; $SE = 0.006$. The results for direct effects indicate a slight decline in the warm feelings toward the other group, however it did not produce enough evidence to conclude that the information regarding in-group's past transgression fabricate a change in the average expected out-group score (see Table 5.1).

Next, I investigated the results for both groups' empathic concerns as an alternative (see Table 5.2). The empathy battery scale was reliable, $\alpha = 0.87$; $SE = 0.008$. The results for direct effects indicate that the information regarding in-group's past transgression gave rise the average expected empathic understanding score by 0.185 among men and by 0.152 for women ($SD_{\text{men}} = 0.09$, $SD_{\text{women}} = 0.09$). It appears that, on average, critiquing people's in-group due their transgression may increase individuals' empathy towards the other side. These results indicate an important aspect by considering the treatment videos (domestic abuse topic) and I will touch upon my reasoning later in discussion section.

Finally, I explored whether the treatment elicited a cognitive dissonance as a manipulation check for the direct effects (see Table 5.3). The results disclose that the information about in-group's misconduct towards the out-group increased the

	All	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	-0.026 (0.076)	-0.006 (0.103)	-0.050 (0.091)
Control	2.605*** (0.054)	2.135*** (0.073)	3.084*** (0.065)
Observations	791	399	392
R ²	0.0001	0.00001	0.001
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002
Residual Std. Error	1.073(df = 789)	1.031(df = 397)	0.901(df = 390)
F Statistic	0.118(df = 1; 789)	0.003(df = 1; 397)	0.297(df = 1; 390)
Note :	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.1. Attitude battery results for gender identity

average expected cognitive dissonance score by 0.416 for everyone, 0.267 among men, and 0.567 among women ($SD_{all} = 0.088$, $SD_{men} = 0.119$, $SD_{women} = 0.129$). Experiencing domestic violence is a common phenomenon for both men and women, however women more likely to face with recurrent and severe forms of abuse compared to men (Walby & Towers, 2017). Since men are the offender group, it is safe to assume that higher cognitive dissonance is more likely to be observed among women than among men.

Furthermore, I explored the treatment's separate and together interaction with shame and guilt proneness, on participants' cognitive dissonance level. First, considering the two-way interactions, the regression results show a negative relationship of cognitive dissonance and the interaction of treatment and shame proneness, and a positive relationship of cognitive dissonance and the interaction of treatment and guilt proneness for both men and women. Due to insignificant

	All	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.168** (0.066)	0.185** (0.092)	0.152* (0.092)
Control	3.356*** (0.047)	3.534*** (0.065)	3.174*** (0.065)
Observations	791	399	392
R ²	0.008	0.010	0.007
Adjusted R ²	0.007	0.008	0.004
Residual Std. Error	0.934(df = 789)	0.920(df = 397)	0.911(df = 390)
F Statistic	6.398**(df = 1; 789)	4.022**(df = 1; 397)	2.720*(df = 1; 390)
Note :	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.2. Empathy battery results for gender identity

	All	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.416*** (0.088)	0.267** (0.119)	0.567*** (0.129)
Control	1.556*** (0.063)	1.508*** (0.084)	1.605*** (0.092)
Observations	791	399	392
R ²	0.027	0.013	0.047
Adjusted R ²	0.026	0.010	0.045
Residual Std. Error	1.241(df = 789)	1.190(df = 397)	1.278(df = 390)
F Statistic	22.254***(df = 1; 789)	5.035**(df = 1; 397)	19.328***(df = 1; 390)
Note :	p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.3. Cognitive dissonance results for gender identity

results, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the interplay of proneness to SCE and treatment have an impact on the level of cognitive dissonance for either group.

However, the results for the three-way interactions reveal that, as guilt proneness increases, for both low shame prone men and women, the treatment’s effect on experiencing cognitive dissonance increases; on the contrary, for both high shame prone men and women, the treatment’s effect on experiencing cognitive dissonance decreases (see Figure 5.2). Additionally, the interesting pattern appears when looking at where the cognitive dissonance levels congregate. The treatment’s effect on cognitive dissonance varies by men’s shame proneness levels if they are low guilt prone, whereas it clusters them around same cognitive dissonance level if they are high in guilt proneness. On the other hand, for women, the treatment cluster participants’ degree of cognitive dissonance regardless of their shame or guilt proneness levels.




Figure 5.2. Interaction of treatment, shame-proneness, and guilt-proneness on cognitive dissonance for gender identity

One interpretation can be that if men are high in guilt and shame proneness, they did not feel dissonance to be told that men perpetrate domestic violence towards women, because they somewhat accepted it as a factual information. And for women, with the exception of low and high on both shame and guilt

proneness levels, it seems that women in general experienced cognitive dissonance when told they were abused because they are the victim group and so they are not used to hearing it as an information.

5.1.2 H2 - Motivated Reasoning Across SCE

Expanding on the first hypothesis, here I aimed to ascertain whether the in-group bias transgression treatment would have a more pronounced effect on out-group bias across people's proneness to self-conscious emotions (H2). I conducted a moderation analysis through summated rating scales of proneness scores (shame and guilt) and the out-group bias measures.

Upon examination of the separate two-way interactions between out-group bias and shame proneness or out-group bias and guilt proneness, I could not find enough evidence to conclude that the self-conscious emotions (both shame and guilt proneness) moderated the relationship between the treatment and participants out-group bias in their individual interactions across men and women (see Table 5.4 and Table 5.5). Given the fact that the analysis indicates null results, it is still important that the interaction between treatment and shame proneness partially increases the out-group bias for both groups, especially more so among men than women. On the other hand, the interaction between treatment and guilt proneness weakly reverses the direction of the relationship for men and decreases the out-group bias, but not for women that the treatment shows its impact on increasing the out-group bias in high guilt proneness levels.

	All	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	-0.260 (0.364)	-0.418 (0.508)	-0.234 (0.435)
Shame Proneness	0.209** (0.085)	-0.112 (0.119)	0.264*** (0.100)
Treatment:Shame	0.083 (0.116)	0.138 (0.167)	0.067 (0.133)
Control	1.952*** (0.269)	2.472*** (0.367)	2.230*** (0.329)
Observations	791	399	392
R ²	0.025	0.002	0.052
Adjusted R ²	0.021	-0.005	0.045
Residual Std. Error	1.061(df = 787)	1.032(df = 395)	0.880(df = 388)
F Statistic	6.645***(df = 3; 787)	0.311(df = 3; 395)	7.116***(df = 3; 388)
Note:	***p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.4. Attitude battery vs. shame-proneness for gender identity

Deliberating on the previous results, it should be noted that scholars in the psychology field do not have a uniform opinion on how to effectively measure Self-conscious emotions (both trait and state). Even though research acknowledge that shame and guilt emotions are inter-correlated and not mutually exclusive (Tangney, 1994), theoretical conceptualization of the TOSCA questionnaire has been critiqued in several factors (please see “Survey measures” section), including overlooking at the evaluations for those in varying shame or guilt proneness levels. So, I also investigated the three-way interaction between the treatment, shame proneness, and guilt proneness.

	All	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	-0.006 (0.587)	0.171 (0.730)	-0.963 (0.752)
Guilt Proneness	-0.212** (0.101)	-0.677*** (0.125)	-0.165 (0.134)
Treatment:Guilt	-0.005 (0.142)	-0.034 (0.181)	0.217 (0.178)
Control	3.471*** (0.417)	4.822*** (0.499)	3.781*** (0.569)
Observations	791	399	392
R ²	0.012	0.129	0.005
Adjusted R ²	0.008	0.123	-0.003
Residual Std. Error	1.068(df = 787)	0.964(df = 395)	0.901(df = 388)
F Statistic	3.070**(df = 3; 787)	19.581***(df = 3; 395)	0.671(df = 3; 388)
Note:	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.5. Attitude battery vs. guilt-proneness for gender identity

Based on the regression results, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the interplay between the treatment and both shame and guilt proneness is related to the out-group bias for men. However, for women, there is an interesting pattern that those who are high in shame proneness display increasing out-group bias, only if they have higher guilt proneness (see Table 5.6).

Even though men's regression produced null results, graphing the outcome for both groups reveal another interesting feature of the guilt proneness (see Figure 5.3). For both men and women, as guilt proneness increases, the treatment decreases the out-group bias among low shame prone people. This result suggests that higher guilt proneness is a powerful apparatus in lowering the threat perception towards the out-group among low shame prone people (both men and women), but not for those who are also high in shame proneness (especially

	All	Men	Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	2.770 (2.135)	0.670 (2.616)	5.621* (2.977)
Shame Proneness	0.252 (0.560)	0.295 (0.661)	1.767** (0.820)
Guilt Proneness	-0.425 (0.402)	-0.623 (0.484)	0.644 (0.582)
Treatment:Shame	-0.960 (0.755)	-0.108 (0.937)	-2.247** (1.032)
Treatment:Guilt	-0.764 (0.527)	-0.252 (0.670)	-1.368* (0.709)
Shame:Guilt	0.020 (0.134)	-0.040 (0.164)	-0.330* (0.190)
Treatment:Shame:Guilt	0.260 (0.181)	0.060 (0.234)	0.537** (0.240)
Control	3.305*** (1.636)	4.196** (1.894)	-0.808 (2.464)
Observations	791	399	392
R^2	0.066	0.144	0.083
Adjusted R ²	0.057	0.129	0.066
Residual Std. Error	1.041(df = 783)	0.961(df = 391)	0.870(df = 384)
F Statistic	7.882***(df = 7; 783)	9.385***(df = 7; 391)	4.958***(df = 7; 384)
Note:	***p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.6. Attitude battery, SP, and GP results for gender identity

among women). The key consequence of this interaction is that the separate predictions I mentioned above is not enough to explain the role of self-conscious emotions in the outcome, and the interplay between them paints a better picture.




Figure 5.3. Interaction of treatment, shame-proneness, and guilt-proneness on out-group bias for gender identity

5.1.3 H3 – Victimhood & Identity Attachment

H2 suggests crucial inferences that we obtained the expected results for women but not for men. I pre-registered a third hypothesis in this research that we are more likely to get this pattern of the interplay between shame and guilt proneness for those in “offender social groups” rather than people who are in, as social psychologists name, “victim groups”. The common knowledge of the society denotes that men are in the “offender” group and women are in the “victim group”. So, my expectation was that when the issue is a sensitive topic (i.e., domestic violence), shame or guilt proneness would less likely activate these emotions for people who are in the victim identities. Instead, along with their identity attachment, the responsibility attribution would arise for women, and they would reject the blame overall and recognize the situation as if attributed by men.

The regression results indicated no evidence of the effect of the treatment, however graphing the results helped me to grasp a better picture of the relationship. First, I looked at the interplay between the treatment, identity attachment, and shame proneness (see Figure 5.4). In the attitude battery, even though iden-




Figure 5.4. Shame-proneness' interaction with the identity attachment for gender identity

tivity closeness keeps the out-group bias robust, treatment decreases it for men but increases for women in higher shame proneness levels. For empathy battery, as shame proneness increases, the empathic concern's trend goes down irrespective of the identity attachment for both groups, slightly more so for men than for women.

Then, the interaction between the treatment, guilt proneness and identity closeness bring about interesting results (see Figure 5.5). In the attitude battery, as guilt proneness increases, even though higher identity attachment lays an overall resilience, treatment slightly decreases men's out-group bias whereas it slightly increases women's out-group bias. On the empathy battery side, while for men with high guilt proneness, higher identity attachment lowers the empathy towards women in the control group participants, the treatment makes an impact on their empathic concerns and increases it. Quite the reverse, while for women with high guilt proneness, higher identity attachment increases the empathy




Figure 5.5. Guilt-proneness' interaction with the identity attachment for gender identity

towards men in the control group participants, the treatment makes an impact on their empathic concerns and decreases it.

5.1.4 Discussion

Based on the results, even though both men and women experienced cognitive dissonance due to the in-group critiquing information, I found no evidence that the treatment has direct effect on the out-group bias for either group. However, most likely because of the nature of the information (domestic violence), the treatment increased empathic concerns for both men and women. I also found that both men and women's cognitive dissonance drop in high shame and guilt proneness levels. When the treatment's discrete interaction with shame and guilt proneness is considered, I found no evidence to conclude that the information had an impact on the outcome; however, three-way interaction indicated significant results that treatment increased the out-group bias for women who have high level of shame and high guilt proneness together (slight increase for shame-prone men regardless of their guilt-proneness, but not significant results). Lastly, I

received null results for treatment's interaction with identity attachment and shame/guilt proneness. These outcomes generated four interesting patterns:

(a) Exposure to an information about one's group committing domestic violence to the other group increased both men and women's empathy towards the other side.

(b) As the previous literature denotes, shame and guilt emotions are inter-correlated and not mutually exclusive (Tangney, 1994); however dispositions of these two emotions have a noteworthy and still not fully discovered dynamic when both of them are in elevated intensity as a personality trait;

(c) shame is considered a 'master emotion' (Scheff & Retzinger, 2000) as the least desirable one an individual would want to experience (Izard, 1971) and does not provide a stress-free environment in times of conflict. Even though there is not systematic empirical evidence of the debate, researchers think that shame also can function as an adaptive mechanism when experienced in moderate levels. Additionally, scholars claim that TOSCA scale exceedingly touches on the maladaptive side of the shame (Sabini & Silver, 1997); and delivers partial evidence regarding the adaptive characteristics of it (Luyten et al., 2002). Here, I found that the resilience of an individuals' higher-level shame-proneness does not easily let him/her to lower the out-group bias, if only it is coupled with higher guilt proneness levels;

(d) The role of guilt-proneness may be overlooked in both people's experience of cognitive dissonance, their political behavior, and their empathic concerns towards the out-group, especially pondering the historical and societal factors that makes their sub-identities as an "offender" or "victim" one. Indeed, the literature specifies that the negative side of guilt may surface, regardless of the reason, when there is no possible way to confess, repair, apologize, or make amends for one's wrongdoings (Bybee & Quiles, 1998).

5.2 Race Identity

The survey experiment was conducted between February 9th and February 14th, 2023, employing participants from the United States (N=719; Treatment=358, Control=361) through CloudResearch. Specific demographic information on the participants can be found in the appendix. Upon completion of the demographics section, participants were then administered the TOSCA-3 short version questionnaire in order to measure their proneness to Self-Conscious Emotions.

The overall descriptive data for the entire sample in terms of proneness scores is as follows: Shame proneness with a mean of 2.98(SD=0.72, median=3), Guilt proneness with a mean of 4.08(SD=0.56, median=4.18). A density plot illustrating the distribution of shame and guilt proneness scores among White and Black participants is shown in Figure 5.6.




Figure 5.6. Distribution of White and Black people’s shame and guilt proneness

In alignment with values commonly presented in the literature, the alpha reliabilities for shame-proneness and guilt-proneness were recorded as 0.76 and 0.75, respectively, while externalization proneness registered a reliability of 0.81. These values were obtained with corresponding standard errors of 0.018, 0.019, and 0.015, respectively. Furthermore, the Pearson correlations observed between the proneness scores were 0.36 for Shame and Guilt proneness, indicating a low

correlation; 0.42 for Shame and Externalization proneness, suggesting a moderate correlation; and -0.12 for Guilt and Externalization proneness, indicating a very low correlation.

5.2.1 H1 - Motivated Reasoning

The primary model (H1) was utilized to test the hypothesis that exposure to information regarding the in-group's transgressions would result in an increase in out-group bias. Out-group bias (OGB) was measured using a summated scale. The difference in means (MD) test was employed to analyze the effects of treatment videos on the out-group bias of individuals, in comparison to the control group. Since the samples were independent, I used a two-sample t-test, assuming equal variances in both samples. The results were analyzed in two main categories: Attitude battery and Empathy battery.

The Attitude battery scale, which overall measured the level of out-group bias, was reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.93 and a standard error of 0.016. The direct effect results revealed that among Black participants, the information regarding in-group transgression increased the average expected out-group score by 0.319, while among White participants, it slightly decreased it by -0.031 ($SD_{\text{Black}} = 0.104, SD_{\text{white}} = 0.109$). On average, it appears that Black people do not expect their in-group to be criticized and respond accordingly (see Table 5.7). However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that treatment of in-group transgressions had an effect on the out-group bias of White people.

The direct effect results present a puzzling scenario: While there is a treatment effect for Black people, there is none for White people. This prompts the question as to why the baseline hypothesis did not hold for White people. To address this, I conducted a post-hoc analysis, regressing the interaction of race and treatment on the out-group bias. The data suggests that the difference between the two treatment effects is statistically zero at a p-value of 0.02. Although

	All (1)	Whites (2)	Blacks (3)
Treatment	0.123 (0.098)	-0.031 (0.109)	0.319*** (0.104)
Control	2.603*** (0.069)	1.961*** (0.077)	3.428*** (0.073)
Observations	719	404	315
R ²	0.002	0.0002	0.029
Adjusted R ²	0.001	-0.002	0.026
Residual Std. Error	1.309(df = 717)	1.094(df = 402)	0.920(df = 313)
F Statistic	1.600(df = 1; 717)	0.082(df = 1; 402)	9.452***(df = 1; 313)
Note :	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.7. Attitude battery results for race identity

there were fewer Black individuals in the recruitment pool than anticipated, these differential treatment effects demonstrate the precision of the measures.

Subsequently, the Empathy battery scale, which reflected overall levels of empathetic concern, was reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.87 and a standard error of 0.023. The results indicated that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the treatment had an impact on the empathetic concerns of either group (see Table 5.8).

Finally, as a manipulation check, I investigated whether the treatment regarding in-group transgressions activated cognitive dissonance among participants (see Table 5.9). Regression results revealed that the information regarding in-group transgressions increased the average expected cognitive dissonance score by 0.923 among all participants, 0.809 among White people, and 1.069 among Black people ($SD_{all} = 0.105$, $SD_{white} = 0.147$, $SD_{Black} = 0.148$). Furthermore, dis-

	All	Whites	Blacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.101 (0.078)	0.155 (0.099)	0.033 (0.117)
Control	3.462*** (0.055)	3.686*** (0.070)	3.174*** (0.082)
Observations	719	404	315
R ²	0.002	0.006	0.0003
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.004	-0.003
Residual Std. Error	1.052(df = 717)	0.996(df = 402)	1.037(df = 313)
F Statistic	1.654(df = 1; 717)	2.441(df = 1; 402)	0.080(df = 1; 313)
Note :	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.8. Empathy battery results for race identity

crete and all-together interactions of shame and guilt proneness with treatment demonstrated significant effects on participants' level of cognitive dissonance.

In terms of the separate two-way interactions, an increase in guilt proneness among White people led to higher levels of cognitive dissonance in the treatment group, while those in the control group exhibited lower levels of cognitive dissonance. No statistically significant results were observed for the interactions between White people and shame proneness, Black people and guilt proneness, or Black people and shame proneness.

When the three-way interactions were considered (see Figure 5.7), individuals who were high in guilt proneness, regardless of their shame proneness, had higher levels of cognitive dissonance in response to the treatment. The difference between high guilt prone White people and Black people is that shame proneness moderates the levels of cognitive dissonance in reverse ways. In other

	All	Whites	Blacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.923*** (0.105)	0.809*** (0.147)	1.069*** (0.148)
Control	1.762*** (0.074)	1.764*** (0.103)	1.759*** (0.104)
Observations	719	404	315
R ²	0.097	0.070	0.143
Adjusted R ²	0.096	0.068	0.140
Residual Std. Error	1.406(df = 717)	1.473(df = 402)	1.313(df = 313)
F Statistic	77.423***(df = 1; 717)	30.448***(df = 1; 402)	52.192***(df = 1; 313)
Note :	*p***p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.9. Cognitive dissonance results for race identity

words, while high guilt prone White people clustered around the same level of cognitive dissonance after the treatment, high guilt-prone Black people experienced varying levels of cognitive dissonance (higher levels among those with high levels of shame proneness and lower levels among those with low levels of shame proneness).




Figure 5.7. Interaction of treatment, shame-proneness, and guilt-proneness on cognitive dissonance for race identity

5.2.2 H2 - Motivated Reasoning Across SCE

Based on the previous hypothesis, this analysis aims to investigate the effect of in-group bias transgression treatment on out-group bias among individuals with varying levels of shame and guilt proneness (H2). I conducted a moderation analysis to examine whether the treatment effects were influenced by self-conscious emotions. To do so, I used summated rating scales to measure proneness scores for shame and guilt, as well as the out-group bias.

	All (1)	Whites (2)	Blacks (3)
Treatment	0.797* (0.416)	0.496 (0.497)	0.878** (0.400)
Shame Proneness	0.227** (0.098)	0.437*** (0.115)	0.304*** (0.097)
Treatment:Shame	-0.225* (0.136)	-0.170 (0.158)	-0.192 (0.135)
Control	1.923*** (0.302)	0.618* (0.362)	2.550*** (0.288)
Observations	719	404	315
R ²	0.010	0.049	0.063
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.042	0.054
Residual Std. Error	1.306(df = 715)	1.070(df = 400)	0.906(df = 311)
F Statistic	2.320*(df = 3; 715)	6.819***(df = 3; 400)	7.011***(df = 3; 311)
Note:	***p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.10. Attitude battery vs. shame-proneness for race identity

Upon examining the discrete two-way interactions between out-group bias and shame or guilt proneness, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the interaction of each moderator variable and treatment is correlated with out-group bias for either group (see Table 5.10 and Table 5.11). Although the analysis

	All	Whites	Blacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	1.026 (0.713)	1.116 (0.833)	-0.345 (0.707)
Guilt Proneness	-0.075 (0.123)	-0.202 (0.140)	0.213* (0.125)
Treatment:Guilt	-0.222 (0.173)	-0.275 (0.200)	0.172 (0.174)
Control	2.910*** (0.508)	2.791*** (0.579)	2.566*** (0.513)
Observations	719	404	315
R^2	0.011	0.032	0.068
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.025	0.059
Residual Std. Error	1.305(df = 715)	1.079(df = 400)	0.904(df = 311)
F Statistic	2.655**(df = 3; 715)	4.421***(df = 3; 400)	7.579***(df = 3; 311)
Note:	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.11. Attitude battery vs. guilt-proneness for race identity

yielded null results, it is still noteworthy that the interaction between treatment and shame proneness partially decreases out-group bias, while the separate impact of treatment or shame proneness increases out-group bias for both White and Black people. On the other hand, the interaction between treatment and guilt proneness serves to reverse the direction of the relationship for Black people, but not for White people.

As mentioned in the previous experiment, psychology researchers use a variety of methods to measure self-conscious emotions, none of which perfectly establish a unified theoretical conceptualization. The TOSCA questionnaire has also faced criticism by several scholars for not accounting for individuals with both high and low levels of proneness. Similar to the gender identity experiment, I preregistered

a hypothesis that considers the three-way association between treatment, shame proneness, and guilt proneness.

	All	Whites	Blacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	3.006 (2.560)	8.679*** (3.219)	2.543 (2.369)
Shame Proneness	0.267 (0.703)	1.083 (0.815)	-0.069 (0.714)
Guilt Proneness	-0.188 (0.461)	-0.011 (0.566)	-0.114 (0.432)
Treatment:Shame	-0.804 (0.941)	-2.513** (1.114)	-1.326 (0.940)
Treatment:Guilt	-0.598 (0.629)	-2.109*** (0.782)	-0.383 (0.587)
Shame:Guilt	0.001 (0.166)	-0.132 (0.192)	0.083 (0.169)
Treatment:Shame:Guilt	0.159 (0.225)	0.604** (0.264)	0.270 (0.227)
Control	2.553 (1.910)	0.354 (2.362)	3.100* (1.787)
Observations	719	404	315
R^2	0.024	0.139	0.107
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.123	0.087
Residual Std. Error	1.300(df = 711)	1.023(df = 396)	0.891(df = 307)
F Statistic	2.490**(df = 7; 711)	9.111***(df = 7; 396)	5.259***(df = 7; 307)
Note:	***p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.12. Attitude battery, SP, and GP results for race identity

Upon analyzing the regression results (see Table 5.12), there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the interaction of both moderator variables and treatment is correlated with out-group bias for Black people. However, for White people, an interesting pattern emerges where those with high shame proneness

behave as expected, but only if they also possess high levels of guilt proneness. In other words, as guilt proneness increases, the effect of treatment on out-group bias remains stable for high shame-prone individuals but decreases among those with low levels of shame proneness (see Figure 5.8). Therefore, the study’s initial predictions are more complex than anticipated, and the intersection of guilt proneness and shame proneness may offer a more comprehensive explanation for the outcome, rather than examining these factors in isolation.




Figure 5.8. Interaction of treatment, shame-proneness, and guilt-proneness on on out-group bias for race identity

5.2.3 H3 – Victimhood & Identity Attachment

The data obtained suggests a significant implication that this effect is exclusive to White people and does not extend to Black people. A preregistered hypothesis was put forth for this research, asserting that the pattern of shame proneness and guilt proneness would be more likely to manifest in individuals belonging to “offender social groups” as opposed to those in, what social psychologists call, “victim groups” within the United States.

It is widely known that White people have been categorized as “offenders” while Black people have been classified as “victims” in the society due to historical reasons. The anticipated result is that, in situations that address sensitive topics such as racial discrimination, shame and guilt proneness will not readily evoke these emotions in people’s belonging to victim groups. As a consequence, these individuals (specifically Black people) will likely reject any blame attributed to them and instead perceive it as being imposed by those outside of their social group. Therefore, the previous findings are in alignment with the stated hypothesis and requires further investigation, considering other factors such as individual identity attachment, as well as the offender/victim structure.




Figure 5.9. Shame-proneness’ interaction with the identity attachment for race identity

Here, my initial focus was exploring the interplay between treatment, identity attachment, and shame proneness (see Figure 5.9). Upon assessing attitude and empathy measures, there was insufficient evidence to claim that the treatment exerted any influence on out-group bias for either group. After graphically representing the results, I observed that the findings did not provide substantial

insight for White people; however, for Black people, the treatment seemed to intensify out-group bias at higher levels of shame proneness as identity attachment increased, particularly when compared to the control group. Similarly, the empathy measures failed to provide conclusive evidence of the treatment's impact. Interestingly, for Black people, the treatment resulted in an increase in empathy towards White people at lower levels of shame proneness as identity attachment increased, while a decrease in empathy was observed at higher levels of shame proneness.




Figure 5.10. Guilt-proneness' interaction with the identity attachment for race identity

Subsequently, I turned my attention towards examining the interaction between the treatment, guilt proneness, and identity attachment (see Figure 5.10). For White people, the attitude and empathy measures did not yield significant results that could attribute the treatment's effect on the outcome. However, a graphical representation of the data showed that higher levels of guilt proneness resulted in an increase in empathy, regardless of the strength of identity

attachment for White people in the treatment group. For Black people, both the attitude and empathy measures produced significant results. It was observed that as guilt proneness increased, so did their out-group bias ($b = 0.556, p < 0.01$) towards White people in response to an in-group criticism treatment, in conjunction with a rise in their identity attachment. The empathy measures also supported this trend, with Black people experiencing a gradual decline in empathic concern ($b = -0.589, p < 0.01$) towards their out-group as guilt proneness increased and identity attachment became stronger. This confirms the preregistered hypothesis that the negative experiences that Black people have encountered influence their political behavior through responsibility attribution.

5.2.4 Discussion

The analyses have revealed that individuals from both the White and Black communities experienced cognitive dissonance upon receiving critiques concerning their respective in-groups' past transgressions. Furthermore, I observed that this cognitive dissonance was further heightened among participants who exhibited high levels of shame and guilt proneness. In terms of direct effects, I noticed that the provided information led to a rise in out-group bias among Black people, but not among White people. This finding is particularly noteworthy, as it demonstrates that despite obtaining a smaller sample of Black participants that may have resulted in a less powerful experiment, the research displayed significant results. Additionally, I found that the treatment had no statistically significant impact on the empathic concerns of either group. Further exploration into this matter revealed that the treatment effect varied between the two groups, with the effect on Black people being significantly different from that observed in White people.

Upon receiving these results, I interpret that there may be two underlying reasons for such findings. First, it is possible that social desirability played a role

in influencing White people to downplay any reported out-group bias towards Black people due to the historical and current prevalence of racism in the United States. Indeed, post hoc analysis revealed that White people reported lower levels of out-group bias compared to Black individuals, potentially indicating that they had more room to increase their levels of bias (White people in control group - mean: 1.96, SD: 1.1; Black people in control group mean: 3.43, SD: 0.97). Furthermore, while it should be noted that the political attitudes of White people were found to be more heterogeneous compared to Black people¹, the data also suggests that Black participants may have been subject to a ceiling effect.

Second, it is possible that the results were influenced by the offender/victim identity structure. For instance, individuals from victimized groups may be more inclined to reject any blame when presented with information that suggests they have acted maliciously towards the perpetrator group, as it contradicts their own experiences. On the other hand, individuals from the oppressor group may exhibit more heterogeneous reactions to such information. Moreover, in relation to the elements that created the offender/victim identity structure, the differences may also stem from the nature of the experiments; one (for Whites) is about a really terribly systematic transgression (Jim Crow era) and the other (for Blacks) is about a much more trivial, arguably unsystematic and an individual transgression.

While separate interactions between the treatment and levels of shame and guilt proneness did not produce significant effects, it should be noted that interesting outcomes were produced when considering three-way interactions. Similar to the findings observed in gender identity experiment (though it was among women there), I found that the treatment amplified out-group bias among White people who exhibited high levels of both shame and guilt proneness. I also obtained similar results among Black people; however, these results did not reach

¹I observed a more uniform political attitude of Black people that may be useful to refer to the “Black protectionism” or “Transgression credit”. For further information please see: Abrams et al. (2013); Crawford (2019); Russell-Brown (2006).

statistical significance. After graphing the findings, I observed that the treatment increased out-group bias among Black people who exhibited high levels of guilt proneness, regardless of their shame proneness levels. Lastly, supporting previous hypotheses, the results obtained through the treatment's interaction with identity attachment and guilt proneness indicate that as guilt proneness increases, Black people who hold strong attachment to their identity are more likely to exhibit higher levels of out-group bias towards White people. These findings support three interesting patterns that are similar to those observed in the analysis of gender identity:

(a) validating existing literature, I found that proneness to shame and guilt are often inter-correlated and not mutually exclusive; however, more research is needed to fully understand the underlying dynamics between these emotions, particularly when experienced at higher intensities;

(b) the resilience of high shame-proneness influences people to maintain their out-group bias if only accompanied by high levels of guilt proneness;

(c) there may be a potential underestimation of the role of guilt proneness in both people's cognitive dissonance experience and their political behavior towards out-groups, particularly when considering victim/perpetrator identity constructions.

5.3 Party Identity

The experiment took place on February 14th, 2023 through the participation of CloudResearch members residing in the United States (N=784; Treatment=392, Control=392). All relevant data on the demographics of the participants can be found in the appendix. Following the demographic section, participants completed the TOSCA-3 short version questionnaire, which measured their susceptibility to self-conscious emotions. The results for the entire sample's proneness scores are as follows: Shame, with an average score of 3.03(SD=0.68,

median=3.09); Guilt, with an average score of 4.11(SD=0.58, median=4.18). Figure 5.11 displays Democrats (red line) and Republicans' (black line) overall shame and guilt proneness scores.




Figure 5.11. Distribution of Democrats and Republicans' shame and guilt proneness

In line with the values often expressed in literature, the alpha reliabilities were found to be 0.75 (shame-proneness) and 0.77 (guilt-proneness), and 0.73 (externalization proneness), with standard errors of 0.018, 0.017, and 0.018, respectively. Pearson correlations between the scores were 0.40 for Shame and Guilt (moderate), 0.27 for Shame and Externalization (low), and -0.18 for Guilt and Externalization (very low).

5.3.1 H1 - Motivated Reasoning

The initial model (H1) aimed to explore the hypothesis that exposure to information critiquing the in-group would likely increase out-group bias. I measured out-group bias in various forms, including feeling thermometer scores for both the individual's own party and the opposing party, perceptions of party officials and voters ($\alpha_{DEM}=0.95$; $\alpha_{REP}=0.96$); tribalistic behaviors, such as using "we" instead of "they" and supporting one's own party based on its values rather than against the opposing party's values (alpha = 0.43); measures of social distance, such as having close friends, neighbors, and children who marry individuals from the opposing party (alpha = 0.87); tolerance towards supporters of the opposing

party on social media; and a trust item that assesses whether individuals believe they can rely on a supporter of the opposing party to act in the best interest of the country. I used a difference in means (MD) comparison by conducting a two-sample t-test to determine whether the treatment videos had any effect on the treatment group compared to the control group.

The direct effect results of the analysis indicate that there were no significant differences observed in any of the measures used in the study. Failing to reject the null hypothesis could be attributed to various factors. Initially, it is possible that the treatment videos used in the experiment were not sufficient to elicit any reactive behavior. My objective was to utilize scandals involving politicians from each party to stress the idea of group consciousness rather than focusing on prominent figures such as President Obama or President Trump, which may activate personal opinions. However, it is plausible that the participants maintained an emotional detachment from the individuals in the videos, as they may not have viewed the issue as “their problem.”

Secondly, it is possible that the content of the videos, which centered around corruption scandals critiquing the in-group, was not a strong enough trigger to increase out-group bias. While corruption is a well-known form of dishonest behavior with legal repercussions, it is still practiced by people from time to time. Furthermore, when compared to sensitive topics, such as gender violence or racial discrimination used in previous studies, corruption is somewhat “justified” within societal norms as a personal immoral act rather than a malevolent offense. For example, past voting behaviors display that electorates do not always punish corrupted politicians through their votes (Bhavnani & Condra, 2012; Kurer, 2001); and in the American context, race is an important aspect in understanding heterogeneity in political behavior, for example why Black voters do not always hold Black politicians accountable for scandals (Crawford, 2019).

Although not necessarily endorsed, the personal consequences of corruption may not have been a sufficient stimulus for the participants to externalize blame

onto the opposing party. The research also shows that corruption perception varies within and across societies. For example, the socioeconomically disadvantaged observe corruption more than the wealthy citizens only in highly economically developed countries (Maeda & Ziegfeld, 2015), and partisans do not rely on in/out-party signals to determine their stance on corruptibility (Spencer & Theodoridis, 2020). Therefore, in the absence of considerable evidence of differences between groups, the baseline hypothesis requires further consideration.

	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Treatment	1.717*** (0.089)	2.238*** (0.118)	1.166*** (0.127)
Control	1.393*** (0.063)	1.286*** (0.084)	1.503*** (0.090)
Observations	784	401	383
R ²	0.320	0.474	0.180
Adjusted R ²	0.319	0.473	0.178
Residual Std. Error	1.252(df = 782)	1.182(df = 399)	1.247(df = 381)
F Statistic	368.559***(df = 1; 782)	359.736***(df = 1; 399)	83.699***(df = 1; 381)
Note :	*p**p***p < 0.01		

Table 5.13. Cognitive dissonance results for party identity

Subsequently, I examined whether the treatment induced cognitive dissonance (see Table 5.13). The results of the regression analysis indicate that exposure to information that critiques the in-group increased overall expected scores of cognitive dissonances by 1.717 for all participants, 2.238 among Democrats, and 1.166 among Republicans ($SD_{ALL} = 0.089$, $SD_{DEMS} = 0.118$, $SD_{REPS} = 0.127$). Furthermore, the three-way interaction between the treatment, shame and guilt proneness scores revealed that as Democrats' guilt proneness increases, their level of cognitive dissonance indicates a higher jump, regardless of their shame proneness. In contrast, for Republicans, their level of cognitive dissonance reached a

plateau at a higher guilt proneness level, and the effects of the treatment on their cognitive dissonance were weakened for those with high levels of both guilt and shame proneness.

5.3.2 H2 - Motivated Reasoning Across SCE

Building on the initial model, I conducted a further analysis to determine the role of self-conscious emotions in moderating the relationship between negative information regarding in-group and measures of out-group bias (H2). Here, similar to the first model, I used measures of feeling thermometers, tribalism, social distance, tolerance on social media, and trust. In analyzing the two discreet relationships (treatment vs. shame proneness and treatment vs. guilt proneness), I found no significant evidence to suggest that the interaction had an impact on differentiating between groups, with the exception of Democrats' intolerance towards Republicans on social media (see Figure 5.12). The regression results indicate that for Democrats, shame proneness increases the relationship by 0.384** units. In other words, Democrats in the treatment group acknowledged a higher likelihood of unfollowing/unfriending a Republican friend on social media due to their political posts compared to those in the control group, with an increase in shame proneness. Similarly, based on the interaction between guilt proneness and treatment, it appears that guilt proneness also strengthens the relationship by 0.509 units for Democrats.

As previously mentioned in gender and race identity experiments, there is no unanimous agreement on a flawless method for measuring self-consciousness on both a trait and state level. In accordance with this, the pre-registered hypothesis examined the three-way interaction between treatment, shame proneness, and guilt proneness. The results from the regression provide no evidence to suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected. So, I examined the distribution of




Figure 5.12. Democrats' intolerance on social media towards Republicans based on their shame-proneness and guilt-proneness

the data by graphing it at various levels of shame and guilt proneness. Visuals revealed a noteworthy pattern similar to previous experiments.

In terms of the feeling thermometer battery, it is evident that the treatment has a greater impact on increasing warm feelings towards the in-group for those with higher levels of shame and guilt proneness, whether they are Democrats or Republicans. Conversely, it is unsurprising that the treatment has a decreasing influence on warm feelings towards the out-group for high shame prone Republicans, but not for Democrats, as guilt proneness increases. Similarly, treatment resulted in an increase in tribalism scores for highly shame prone Republicans as their guilt proneness increases, but not for Democrats.

Furthermore, the same trend was found when considering other dependent variables such as resilience towards out-group bias for those with high levels of both shame and guilt proneness, as well as intolerance on social media, predicted social distance scores, and distrust towards the opposition. It is noteworthy that for most dependent variables, the combined interaction of shame and guilt proneness maintains or even strengthens out-group bias.

5.3.3 H3 – Victimhood & Identity Attachment

In previous experiments, I obtained comparable results in relation to gender and racial identity, with women and White individuals exhibiting similar patterns. I further investigated this in part by looking at the role of identity attachment and self-perception of group image, particularly in terms of victimhood, on the overall outcome. In light of this, I hypothesized (H3) that participants from both the Democratic and Republican parties who are prone to shame and hold weak party attachments would display similar levels of out-group bias, as no clear victim-offender relationship exists.




Figure 5.13. The interaction between treatment, identity closeness, and guilt proneness on social distance measures

The results of the regression analysis examining the interaction between treatment, identity closeness, and shame/guilt proneness demonstrated significant effects on measures of social distance and feelings towards the in-group (see Figure 5.13). However, no significant effects were observed for any other dependent variables. Notably, the treatment had a positive impact on Republicans' feelings towards fellow supporters, increasing by 5.891 units, as their shame proneness level increases, provided that they have a strong party attachment. Furthermore,

for Democrats with high party attachment, increased guilt proneness decreased the level of discomfort experienced around individuals from the out-group by 0.398 units. In contrast, for Republicans with high party attachment, the treatment had the opposite effect, leading to an increase of 0.449 units in feelings of uneasiness around the out-group.

5.3.4 Discussion

The analysis of results pertaining to party identity suggests that individuals who affiliate with both the Democratic and Republican parties experienced cognitive dissonance as a result of the treatment, regardless of their shame or guilt proneness levels. Notably, I found no evidence of the treatment having an impact on any of the measures of out-group bias in direct effects. These findings raises the possibility that the treatment may have been insufficient in eliciting an emotional response necessary for political behavior formation, or that the chosen transgression (corruption scandal) did not strongly evoke out-group bias.

Subsequently, I analyzed the separate and three-way interactions between the treatment and self-conscious emotions. The findings only demonstrated that the treatment led to an increase in Democrats' intolerance towards Republicans on social media, especially for those with higher levels of shame and guilt proneness. While the three-way interactions yielded null results, visual representations of the data in majority of dependent variables reflected a similar pattern to the previous two experiments —the treatment amplified out-group bias for both groups, particularly for Republicans with high levels of both shame and guilt proneness.

Lastly, the results from the interaction between the treatment, identity attachment, and shame proneness reveal that the treatment caused a significant increase in devoted Republicans' positive sentiments towards their in-group, particularly for those with higher levels of shame proneness. On the other hand, for those with higher levels of guilt proneness, the treatment decreased Democrats'

discomfort around the out-group as their identity attachment increased; however, the opposite effect was observed for Republicans.

These findings portray a slightly divergent image from the previous two experiments in terms of the moderating effect of self-conscious emotions:

(a) the dynamic relationship between shame and guilt proneness remains valid as they are inter-correlated, but it is also possible that they may elicit different forms of out-group bias individually;

(b) the effectiveness of out-group bias remains robust when shame and guilt proneness are coupled, however further examination is needed to confirm the pattern obtained in the previous experiments;

(c) the significance of guilt proneness may still be underestimated in peoples' political behavior towards the out-group, and it appears that it is a strong predictor of social distance measures in combination with identity attachment.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

I explored the puzzle that while some people can practice a positive self-reflection, others develop negative feelings towards their political opponents to defend their self-esteem. I explored why this is the case through three survey experiments by considering peoples' predispositions of social emotions. I found that the relationship between shame and guilt proneness is more complicated than the literature had predicted.¹ There is actually a three-way interaction so that shame and guilt proneness interact with one another to affect how people respond to information about their in-group transgressing against another group, and particularly a political rival.

Identity	Gender ID		Race ID		Party ID	
Sub-identity	Men	Women	Whites	Blacks	Democrats	Republicans
Cog. Dis	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
Hyp. 1 Mot. Reason.	Mixed Support	Mixed Support	Not supported	Supported	Not supported	Not supported
Hyp. 2 SCE prone	Not supported	Supported	Supported	Not supported	Mixed Support	Not supported
Hyp. 3 ID attachment	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Supported	Not supported	Not supported

Table 6.1. Summary of the findings

I encountered this specific relationship among women in the gender identity and among White people in the race identity experiment (to some extent among

¹Tangney et al. (1995) argues that the maladaptive side of guilt may arise when combined with shame. However, it is ultimately shame that gives rise to the initial display of psychological symptoms. I only presents my findings without assuming the priority of any particular emotion.

Black people as well, however with null results). In the party identity, I also found the similar pattern for both Democrats and Republicans in majority of the dependent variables, however it should be noted that these were obtained through the visualization of the null results. (See Table 6.1 for the full summary of the results).

Additionally, I found that information that mentions the in-group's past transgression made people experience cognitive dissonance in statistically significant levels in all experiments. However, the three-way interaction of the treatment, shame, and guilt proneness on their cognitive dissonance worked differently across groups. While the treatment reduced the cognitive dissonance among high shame and high guilt prone people in the gender identity category, it increased the cognitive dissonance among high shame and high guilt prone people in race and party identity categories.

These results indicate a repetition in specific logics but not in others that it begs the question of why to observe these differences across the selected three identity categories. It is safe to assume that how malleable people's ascriptive characteristics are one of the reasons. For instance, in the United States, phenotypically being White or Black is especially ascriptive that there is not a whole lot of social maneuverability around that in terms of self-description, though people can choose the degree of their identification and how they regulate their lives around that racial identity (Appiah, 2000). Obviously, there are people who fall in the bi-racial categories where the ascription is not as clear as a single identity group. They can assert their self-description easier, however than people are more likely to ascribe the chosen identity to the person (Appiah, 2000).

Similarly, gender identity also falls into the ascriptive identification area (Gutmann, 2009) where 'labelling' as a man or woman in ascriptive sense is a strong one. Even though scholars and a growing numbers of people (especially in the left) objects to the ascriptive interpretation of gender by weakening the identity of trans people (Bussell, 2021), it is difficult to disprove that majority of the

people think of gender, by and large, as an ascriptive identity in the societal level.

In party identity logic, however, it is less likely to make the same arguments in an ascriptive sense and it is more of a descriptive characteristic - with a caveat of clothing, facial hair, symbolism etc. to display which party a person supports. For example, Iyengar and Westwood (2015) compare affective polarization and the willingness to discriminate through the lens of race and partisanship in lab settings. Their main argument is that people are more willing to discriminate based on partisanship than on race. They interpret that this difference occurs because of lacking/having social norms. They argue that there are social norms in the society that acknowledge discrimination based on race is dreadful and it is unwelcomed; however, there are not social norms that discrimination based on partisanship is adverse, on the contrary, hostility towards the other party is even acceptable to some extent. Additionally, they further argue that, whether it is true or not, there is a perception that people choose their political identity, but they do not choose their racial or gender identities (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).

In addition, while the other two treatments focus on group dynamics against each other, the party identity treatment rather centers around individuals and not directly transgressing towards the other side. Even though the politicians in the videos represent the parties people support, it still reflects a cognitive jump from the treatments of individuals to generalizing about out-groups, and without harming the other party as such.

It should also be noted that the self-description varies by context, history, or even by perception of the out-group identity discussion. For instance, it is the fact that there is the history of racism in the United States, but there is not a history of Democrats or Republicans being systematically discriminated (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Hence, it is difficult to capture the perfect portrait of the issue at hand that requires the researchers to acknowledge the limitations of the conducted research.

First, given the acquired results, that is most certainly an implication of this literature that if out-groups critique a person's in-group and they feel ashamed about their misbehavior, that their reaction will be to have more out-group bias. However, the problem is shame and guilt, and anger often co-occur. It is difficult to observe the shame, for instance, because people may have turned that into anger to boost their damaged self-esteem or even pride to feel better. But these mechanisms may have happened somewhere in their mind, maybe even outside of the conscious awareness. Capturing instant reactions in a state sense is requires more advance apparatus to test compared to an external setting like using a survey experiment. It may be beneficial to deepen the investigation through the lens of emotion regulation rather than the cognitive dissonance. Hence, future research should unpack whether is it the case that state shame and state guilt would lead to the same effects as well.

Second, considering the experimental treatment, one (self) critique could be that whether the treatments across groups are matching in the level of intensity they capture. When I designed these studies, my primary objective was to make something as realistic as possible. Given the context of American politics, the independent variable that I am manipulating is being informed that one's group misbehave to the other group (less so for the party identity), and these treatments are more likely what people are going to encounter in the real world. For example, White people are often reminded about the racial segregation time, however there is no equivalent evidence of this unfortunate situation for

Black people, and it is usually the specific instances (e.g., a Black person got a job through affirmative action, etc.) that I relied on the essential component of the experimental design —Mundane realism where researchers investigate the correspondences between the real world and the experimental condition (McDermott, 2002). Even though treatments may be imbalanced in a sense, I tried to copy the discourse that exists in American politics and the results I obtained contradicts with the idea that this imbalance in treatments would bias my findings

in the direction of working among White people and not Black people. Additionally, while it is a totally valid point, it also paves the way for a follow up study that could attempt to select two treatments that are much more similar by only adhering to, I suppose, the affirmative action discussion rather than having a structural mechanism versus an individual event.

Third, a conclusion drawn from the results across identities is that the higher the shame and guilt proneness together, the in-group's past wrongdoing treatment decreased the cognitive dissonance in the gender identity (acknowledging men and women about domestic abuse towards each other), whereas it increased the cognitive dissonance in the race identity (acknowledging White and Black people about discriminating towards each other). While these results indicated an interesting pattern, it should be considered with caution. When considering group-based emotions, finding an overarching theory that explains how shame and guilt proneness shape people's reactions to information about group transgression may be extending the scope with bias. It should be considered that the reliability of the results coming from group-based emotions not only depends on the identity type per se, but probably depends on the sociological history of these groups, the transgression itself, the social context. For example, this study was conducted with

Americans, and it is the case that racial identities exhibit characteristics of both social and political divisions in public opinion on many daily life issues in the United States; however, it may not constitute the main fault lines of social or political cleavages in more racially homogeneous countries.

Overall, I anticipated the challenge the notion that people reduce their cognitive dissonance universally. I found evidence of differing results across and within groups for the interaction of in-group critiquing information, shame proneness, and guilt proneness that out-group bias should be considered distinctively for each identity category at hand. I also uncovered that, as the literature predicts, shame proneness and guilt proneness are inter-correlated and not mutually ex-

clusive, however there should be a better way measuring their impact on political behavior. Therefore, deeper investigation reflecting on why these could be the case is needed, and it excitingly suggests new avenues for further research.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

FULL QUESTIONNAIRE

Consent Form

Q1 How old are you? (Drop-down menu)

- Under 18
- 18
- 19
- ...
- 85
- Over 85

Q2 Self-Conscious Emotions Study Informed Consent

Researcher: Adam Ziegfeld, Political Science Department, Temple University

This study involves research. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of Self-Conscious Emotions in how people form their political opinions. What you should know about a research study:

- You volunteer to be in a research study.
- Whether you take part is up to you.
- You can choose not to take part in the study.
- You can agree to take part now and later change your mind.
- Whatever you decide, it will not be held against you.
- Feel free to ask all the questions you want before and after you decide.
- By agreeing to participate, you are not waiving any of the legal rights that you otherwise would have as a participant in a research study.
- The estimated duration of your study participation is around 10-12 minutes.

The study procedures consist of watching a video and answering questions on a survey. The reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts are encountering information that one might encounter in a newspaper. The benefit you will obtain from the research is knowing that you have contributed to the understanding of Self-Conscious Emotions, along with a \$1.25 dollars payment. The alternative to participating is not to participate. Please contact the research team with questions, concerns, or complaints about the research and any research-related injuries by e-mailing awz@temple.edu This research has been reviewed and approved by the Temple University Institutional Review Board. Please contact them at (215) 707-3390 or e-mail them at: irb@temple.edu for any of the following: questions, concerns, or complaints about the research; questions about your rights; to obtain information; or to offer input.

Confidentiality: Efforts will be made to limit the disclosure of your personal information, including research study records, to people who have a need to review this information. However, the study team cannot promise complete secrecy. For example, although the study team has put in safeguards to protect your information, there is always a potential risk of loss of confidentiality. In particular, the study team will not connect any personal identifying information with the data collected and published results will not include identifying information. There are several organizations that may inspect and copy your information to make sure that the study team is following the rules and regulations regarding research and the protection of human subjects. These organizations include the IRB, Temple University, its affiliates and agents, and Temple University Health System, Inc., its affiliates and agents.

Do you consent to take part in this study?

- Yes, I wish to participate in this study
- No, I do not want to participate in this study

Demographics

Q1 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ... (People who choose Independent or Other will take the follow up question in the Party ID experiment)

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other: (text entry)

Q1.b If you had to choose, do you think of yourself as closer to a ... (People who choose neither will be excluded from the rest of the Party ID experiment)

- Democrat
- Republican
- Neither

Q2 Which of the following do you consider to be your primary racial or ethnic identity? (People who choose Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaska Native, Latino, and Other will be excluded from the rest of the Race ID experiment) - White

- Asian
- Black
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Latino
- Other

Q3 Which of the following best describes your gender? (People who choose None of the categories offered will be excluded from the rest of the Gender ID experiment)

- Man
- Woman
- None of the categories offered

Q4 How close do you feel to the following groups? By “close” we mean people who are most like you in their ideas, interests, and feelings? [items presented in random order]

- American.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Democrats.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Republicans.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Independents.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Whites.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Blacks.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Men.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Women.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close
- Non-binary.....Not at all close / Not close / Somewhat close / Very close

Q5 Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- Extremely liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate / middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Extremely Conservative

Q6 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- Less than high school
- High school graduate
- Some college
- 2 year degree
- 4 year degree
- Professional degree
- Masters or Doctorate

Q7 Information about income is very important to understand. Would you please give your best guess? Please indicate the answer that includes your entire household income in (previous year) before taxes.

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 - \$19,999
- \$20,000 - \$39,999
- \$40,000 - \$ 59,999
- \$60,000 - \$79,999
- \$80,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$149,999
- More than \$150,000

Q8 How important is religion in your life? (whichever religion you practice)

- Not at all
- Slightly
- Moderately
- Mostly
- Extremely

Test of Self-Conscious Affect, Version 3 (TOSCA-3S)¹²

Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. For example:

A. You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside.

- | | not likely | very likely |
|--|------------|-------------|
| a. You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. | 1 | 5 |
| b. You would take the extra time to read the paper. | 1 | 5 |
| c. You would feel disappointed that it's raining. | 1 | 5 |
| d. You would wonder why you woke up so early. | 1 | 5 |

Figure A.1. An example for the questionnaire

In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by circling a number. I circled a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning —so it's not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I circled a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't —it would depend on what I had planned. And I circled a "4" for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.

Please do not skip any items —rate all responses.

¹Originally developed by: Tangney et al. (1989).

²The letters in parentheses indicate the following: E = Externalization, G = Guilt, S = Shame. In the experiment, these letters were not shown to the participants

1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood him up. You would think:
 - a) I'm inconsiderate (S)
 - b) I should make it up to him as soon as possible. (G)
 - c) My boss distracted me just before lunch (E)

2. You break something at work and then hide it. You would think:
 - a) This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it or get someone else to (G)
 - b) I should quit. (S)
 - c) A lot of things aren't made very well these days. (E)

3. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly. You would think:
 - a) I feel incompetent. (S)
 - b) There are never enough hours in the day. (E)
 - c) I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the project. (G)

4. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. You would think:
 - a) The company did not like the co-worker. (E)
 - b) I should be quiet and avoid the co-worker. (S)
 - c) I am unhappy and eager to correct the situation. (G)

5. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. You would think:
 - a) I feel inadequate that I can't even throw a ball. (S)
 - b) My friend needs more practice at catching. (E)
 - c) I should apologize and make sure my friend feels better. (G)

Attention Check: Which colors appear in the American flag?

- a) Red - Yellow - Green
- b) Red - White - Blue
- c) Red - White - Black

- 1st time wrong answer: BE CAREFUL! You read the previous question too quickly. Please re-read the question: Which colors appear in the American flag? This is another reminder that you need to re-read the question carefully.

- 2nd time wrong answer: End of survey.

- Correct answer: Continue to the next question.

6. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. You would think:

- a) The animal shouldn't have been on the road. (E)
- b) I'm terrible. (S)
- c) I feel bad and I hadn't been more alert driving down the road. (G)

7. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did poorly. You would think:

- a) The instructor doesn't like me. (E)
- b) I should have studied harder. (G)
- c) I feel stupid. (S)

8. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there. You would think:

- a) I feel small...like a rat. (S)
- b) Perhaps that friend should have been here to defend himself/herself. (E)
- c) I should apologize and talk about that person's good points. (G)

9. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you, and your boss criticizes you. You would think:

- a) My boss should have been clearer about what was expected of me. (E)
- b) I feel like I want to hide. (S)
- c) I should have recognized the problem and done a better job. (G)
10. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while they are on vacation and the dog runs away. You would think:
- a) I am irresponsible and incompetent. (S)
- b) My friend mustn’t take very good care of their dog or it wouldn’t have run away. (E)
- c) I promise to be more careful next time. (G)
11. You attend your co-worker’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices. You would think:
- a) I should stay late to help clean up the stain after the party. (G)
- b) I wish I were anywhere but at the party. (S)
- c) I wonder why my co-worker chose to serve red wine with the new light carpet. (E)

Scoring (*It was not shown to the participants*):

Category	Score	Recode
Shame proneness	0 – 55	Summated rating scale
Guilt proneness		
Externalization proneness		

Table A.1. Summated rating scale scoring for TOSCA questionnaire

Alternative scoring table for the TOSCA-3S, adapted and modified from:
Tangney et al. (2000)

Group	Category	Score	Result	Recode
Men	Shame-talk	0 – 24	Seldom/Low	1
	Guilt-talk	0 – 38		
	Blaming Others	0 – 21		
	Shame-talk	25 – 32	Average/Medium	2
	Guilt-talk	39 – 45		
	Blaming Others	22 – 28		
	Shame-talk	33 – 55	Often/High	3
	Guilt-talk	46 – 55		
	Blaming Others	29 – 55		
Women	Shame-talk	0 – 26	Seldom/Low	1
	Guilt-talk	0 – 42		
	Blaming Others	0 – 20		
	Shame-talk	27 – 35	Average/Medium	2
	Guilt-talk	43 – 48		
	Blaming Others	21 – 28		
	Shame-talk	36 – 55	Often/High	3
	Guilt-talk	49 – 55		
	Blaming Others	29 – 55		

Table A.2. Alternative scoring table for the TOSCA

Treatment Videos

Please watch the video below and think about your ... (Gender / Racial / Party) identity. Then hit the next button.

Group	Category	Sub-category	Video
Treatment	Gender ID	Women	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4oiBdtPwmQ
		Men	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvecqzEXwYM
	Racial ID	Whites	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVwYLPUXGyc
		Blacks	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGu3H7sPmko
	Party ID	Democrats	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VARP_oY1B2M
		Republicans	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfAdu6t1THE
Control	All groups		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6rc4mFUyMYE

Table A.3. Treatment videos for each identity category

Cognitive Dissonance

Q1. How much does the information provided in the video contradict with your belief or behavior?

- Not at all
- Only a little
- To some extent
- Rather much
- Very much

Polarization Batteries

Gender ID

Note: “..(g)..” represents the gender choice selected in the demographics section; “...(og)..” represents the other gender that was not selected.

Q1a “...(og)...” hold too many positions of power and responsibility, hence dominate American politics more than they should

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1b When “...(og)...” are in positions of authority, they discriminate against “...(g)...” in hiring decisions

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1c Too much money is spent on healthcare, childcare, and educational programs that benefit specifically “...(og)...”.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1d Public service agencies (tax, court, electricity, etc.) is more lenient on “...(og)...” than on “...(g)...”.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1e “...(og)...” have more economic and political power than they deserve in this country.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q2a How often would you say you try to better understand “...(og)...” by imagining how things look from their perspective?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q2b Before criticizing “...(og)...”, how often do you try to imagine how you would feel if you were in their place?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q2c How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for “...(og)...” who are less fortunate than you?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q2d When you see “...(og)...” being taken advantage of due to their gender, how often do you feel protective toward them?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Racial ID

Note: “..(r)..” represents the gender choice selected in the demographics section; “...(or)...” represents the other gender that was not selected.

Q1a “...(or)...” hold too many positions of power and responsibility, hence dominate American politics more than they should

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1b When “...(or)...” are in positions of authority, they discriminate against “...(r)...” in hiring decisions

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1c Too much money is spent on healthcare, childcare, and educational programs that benefit specifically “...(or)...”.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1d Public service agencies (tax, court, electricity, etc.) is more lenient on “...(or)...” than on “...(r)..”.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q1e “...(or)...” have more economic and political power than they deserve in this country.

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree
- Agree
- Strongly agree

Q2a How often would you say you try to better understand “...(or)...” by imagining how things look from their perspective?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q2b Before criticizing “...(or)...”, how often do you try to imagine how you would feel if you were in their place?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q2c How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for “...(or)...” who are less fortunate than you?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Q2d When you see “...(or)...” being taken advantage of due to their gender, how often do you feel protective toward them?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

Party ID

Note: “..(p)..” represents the party choice selected in the demographics section; “...(op)...” represents the other party that was not selected.

Q1 We’d like you to rate how you feel towards towards some groups on a scale of 0 to 100 , which we call a “feeling thermometer”. On this feeling thermometer scale;

- Ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest),
- Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest),
- A rating of 50 degrees means you have no feelings one way or the other.

How would you rate your feeling toward; (Please move the sliders to your desired rating)

- Democratic Party..... 0 / 10 / 20 80 / 90 / 100
- Republican Party..... 0 / 10 / 20 80 / 90 / 100
- Elected Democratic Party Officials..... 0 / 10 / 20 80 / 90 / 100
- Elected Republican Party Officials..... 0 / 10 / 20 80 / 90 / 100
- Voters of Democratic Party..... 0 / 10 / 20 80 / 90 / 100

- Voters of Republican Party..... 0 / 10 / 20 80 / 90 / 100

Q2a When talking about “..(p)..”s, how often do you use “we” instead of “they”?

- Never
- Rarely
- Sometimes
- Mostly
- Always

Q2b Would you say that you are a “..(p)..” because you are for what your party represents, or are you more against what “..(op)..”s represent?

- Definitely for what “..(p)..”s represent
- Somewhat for what “..(p)..”s represent
- Neither for nor against these parties
- Somewhat against what “..(op)..”s represent
- Definitely against what “..(op)..”s represent

Q3a How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are “..(op)..”?

- Extremely comfortable
- Somewhat comfortable
- Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
- Somewhat uncomfortable
- Extremely uncomfortable

Q3b How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are “..(op)..”?

- Extremely comfortable
- Somewhat comfortable
- Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable

- Somewhat uncomfortable
- Extremely uncomfortable

Q3c Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married someone who is a “..(op)..”?

- Extremely happy
- Somewhat happy
- Neither happy nor unhappy
- Somewhat unhappy
- Extremely unhappy

Q4 Would you say that you would unfollow/unfriend a “..(op)..” friend on social media because of his/her politics related posts?

- Definitely will not
- Probably will not
- Might or might not
- Probably will
- Definitely will

Q5 How much of the time do you think you can trust a “..(op)..” to do what is right for the country?

- Almost never
- Once in a while
- Sometimes
- Most of the time
- Almost always

APPENDIX B

PILOT STUDY

In order to see the effectiveness of different treatment videos in the theoretical part, a pilot study was conducted prior to performance of the survey experiment¹ In the pilot study, 516 individuals have taken the survey and 418 of them successfully completed the study through Qualtrics platform.² Since the treatment is the IV in the hypothesis, the pilot study answers a crucial question: “Can different videos induce various levels of self-conscious emotions (especially shame to link it to their identities) in respondents as the way it is planned?”

First, consent form and age were asked to ensure respondents who are above 18 years of age willed to participate. Then, participants answered the demographics questions including nationality, favored political party, racial/ethnic group, education level, gender, income level, and the importance of religion in their lives. Based on the answers they provided in their national/party/racial identities, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the sections rather than answering all three identity group questions. After the randomization, they answered questions about their respective identities in each section. Next, they were shown videos about their in-group’s transgressions that are explained by experts, scholars or the politicians themselves to stimulate a set of negative emotions regarding to their identity.

Later, I used a similar procedure to PANAS-M, developed by Rhodes-Purdy and his colleagues, to capture a respondent’s emotional reaction to the treatment. PANAS-M examines a variety of emotions at once by allowing survey-takers to choose which emotions they feel at the moment, then rate the degree of intensity

¹IRB approval (protocol #27265) was obtained on August 18th, 2020.

²The link to the pilot study can be found here:[Qualtrics Pilot Study Link](#)

(Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021). My altered version of PANAS-M functions in the same way, yet only looks at two types of emotions: the basic negative emotions (anger, disgust, fear, anxiety) and the core self-conscious emotions (embarrassment, pride, shame, guilt). The reason behind this logic is to catch whether the videos trigger respondents to feel the self-conscious emotions over the others.

According to the results, there is no significant distinction across videos in the answers of the participants. Therefore, videos are chosen by the investigator to use in the main experiment.

APPENDIX C
DEMOGRAPHICS & IDENTITY ATTACHMENT
DATA

	Control	Treatment	Overall
	(N=394)	(N=397)	(N=791)
Age			
Mean (SD)	44.0 (12.8)	43.3 (12.1)	43.7 (12.4)
Median [Min, Max]	41.0 [20.0, 79.0]	41.0 [22.0, 79.0]	41.0 [20.0, 79.0]
Gender			
Men	199 (50.5%)	200 (50.4%)	399 (50.4%)
Women	195 (49.5%)	197 (49.6%)	392 (49.6%)
Party			
Democrat	187 (47.5%)	194 (48.9%)	381 (48.2%)
Republican	106 (26.9%)	112 (28.2%)	218 (27.6%)
Independent	93 (23.6%)	80 (20.2%)	173 (21.9%)
Other	8 (2.0%)	11 (2.8%)	19 (2.4%)
Race			
White	316 (80.2%)	324 (81.6%)	640 (80.9%)
Black or African American	49 (12.4%)	39 (9.8%)	88 (11.1%)
American Indian or Alaska Native	2 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)
Asian	18 (4.6%)	23 (5.8%)	41 (5.2%)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Other	9 (2.3%)	11 (2.8%)	20 (2.5%)
Ideology			
Extremely liberal	43 (10.9%)	46 (11.6%)	89 (11.3%)
Liberal	83 (21.1%)	87 (21.9%)	170 (21.5%)
Slightly liberal	63 (16.0%)	52 (13.1%)	115 (14.5%)
Moderate / middle of the road	61 (15.5%)	67 (16.9%)	128 (16.2%)
Slightly conservative	46 (11.7%)	58 (14.6%)	104 (13.1%)
Conservative	63 (16.0%)	65 (16.4%)	128 (16.2%)
Extremely Conservative	35 (8.9%)	22 (5.5%)	57 (7.2%)
Education			
Less than high school	3 (0.8%)	1 (0.3%)	4 (0.5%)
High school graduate	38 (9.6%)	24 (6.0%)	62 (7.8%)
Some college	60 (15.2%)	71 (17.9%)	131 (16.6%)
2 year degree	34 (8.6%)	39 (9.8%)	73 (9.2%)
4 year degree	167 (42.4%)	178 (44.8%)	345 (43.6%)
Professional degree	17 (4.3%)	14 (3.5%)	31 (3.9%)
Masters or Doctorate	75 (19.0%)	70 (17.6%)	145 (18.3%)
Income			
Less than \$10,000	10 (2.5%)	20 (5.0%)	30 (3.8%)
\$10,000 - \$19,999	22 (5.6%)	19 (4.8%)	41 (5.2%)
\$20,000 - \$39,999	63 (16.0%)	70 (17.6%)	133 (16.8%)
#\$40,000 - \$59,999	78 (19.8%)	74 (18.6%)	152 (19.2%)
#\$60,000 - \$79,999	78 (19.8%)	70 (17.6%)	148 (18.7%)
\$80,000 - \$99,999	62 (15.7%)	46 (11.6%)	108 (13.7%)
\$100,000 - \$149,999	53 (13.5%)	61 (15.4%)	114 (14.4%)
More than \$150,000	28 (7.1%)	37 (9.3%)	65 (8.2%)
Religiosity			
Not at all	150 (38.1%)	150 (37.8%)	300 (37.9%)
Slightly	55 (14.0%)	53 (13.4%)	108 (13.7%)
Moderately	55 (14.0%)	56 (14.1%)	111 (14.0%)
Mostly	63 (16.0%)	63 (15.9%)	126 (15.9%)
Extremely	71 (18.0%)	75 (18.9%)	146 (18.5%)

Figure C.1. Demographics for gender identity

	Control	Treatment	Overall
	(N=394)	(N=397)	(N=791)
Closeness to American Identity			
Not at all close	11 (2.8%)	11 (2.8%)	22 (2.8%)
Slightly close	77 (19.5%)	69 (17.4%)	146 (18.5%)
Moderately close	144 (36.5%)	157 (39.5%)	301 (38.1%)
Very close	162 (41.1%)	160 (40.3%)	322 (40.7%)
Closeness to Democrats			
Not at all close	95 (24.1%)	96 (24.2%)	191 (24.1%)
Slightly close	106 (26.9%)	113 (28.5%)	219 (27.7%)
Moderately close	132 (33.5%)	118 (29.7%)	250 (31.6%)
Very close	61 (15.5%)	70 (17.6%)	131 (16.6%)
Closeness to Republicans			
Not at all close	169 (42.9%)	162 (40.8%)	331 (41.8%)
Slightly close	103 (26.1%)	112 (28.2%)	215 (27.2%)
Moderately close	81 (20.6%)	88 (22.2%)	169 (21.4%)
Very close	41 (10.4%)	35 (8.8%)	76 (9.6%)
Closeness to Independents			
Not at all close	42 (10.7%)	45 (11.3%)	87 (11.0%)
Slightly close	164 (41.6%)	156 (39.3%)	320 (40.5%)
Moderately close	136 (34.5%)	153 (38.5%)	289 (36.5%)
Very close	52 (13.2%)	43 (10.8%)	95 (12.0%)
Closeness to White People			
Not at all close	26 (6.6%)	26 (6.5%)	52 (6.6%)
Slightly close	89 (22.6%)	81 (20.4%)	170 (21.5%)
Moderately close	172 (43.7%)	175 (44.1%)	347 (43.9%)
Very close	107 (27.2%)	115 (29.0%)	222 (28.1%)
Closeness to Black people			
Not at all close	63 (16.0%)	64 (16.1%)	127 (16.1%)
Slightly close	138 (35.0%)	156 (39.3%)	294 (37.2%)
Moderately close	143 (36.3%)	130 (32.7%)	273 (34.5%)
Very close	50 (12.7%)	47 (11.8%)	97 (12.3%)
Closeness to Men			
Not at all close	30 (7.6%)	28 (7.1%)	58 (7.3%)
Slightly close	114 (28.9%)	114 (28.7%)	228 (28.8%)
Moderately close	165 (41.9%)	180 (45.3%)	345 (43.6%)
Very close	85 (21.6%)	75 (18.9%)	160 (20.2%)
Closeness to Women			
Not at all close	17 (4.3%)	21 (5.3%)	38 (4.8%)
Slightly close	97 (24.6%)	92 (23.2%)	189 (23.9%)
Moderately close	165 (41.9%)	154 (38.8%)	319 (40.3%)
Very close	115 (29.2%)	130 (32.7%)	245 (31.0%)
Closeness to Non-binary People			
Not at all close	177 (44.9%)	168 (42.3%)	345 (43.6%)
Slightly close	125 (31.7%)	134 (33.8%)	259 (32.7%)
Moderately close	75 (19.0%)	81 (20.4%)	156 (19.7%)
Very close	17 (4.3%)	14 (3.5%)	31 (3.9%)

Figure C.2. Identity attachment scores for gender identity

	Control	Treatment	Overall
	(N=361)	(N=358)	(N=719)
Age			
Mean (SD)	42.1 (12.3)	41.7 (12.7)	41.9 (12.5)
Median [Min, Max]	40.0 [19.0, 85.0]	38.0 [19.0, 78.0]	40.0 [19.0, 85.0]
Gender			
Men	173 (47.9%)	157 (43.9%)	330 (45.9%)
Women	188 (52.1%)	200 (55.9%)	388 (54.0%)
Missing	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.1%)
Party			
Democrat	193 (53.5%)	179 (50.0%)	372 (51.7%)
Republican	93 (25.8%)	83 (23.2%)	176 (24.5%)
Independent	69 (19.1%)	78 (21.8%)	147 (20.4%)
Other	6 (1.7%)	18 (5.0%)	24 (3.3%)
Race			
White	203 (56.2%)	201 (56.1%)	404 (56.2%)
Black or African American	158 (43.8%)	157 (43.9%)	315 (43.8%)
Ideology			
Extremely liberal	31 (8.6%)	35 (9.8%)	66 (9.2%)
Liberal	93 (25.8%)	77 (21.5%)	170 (23.6%)
Slightly liberal	46 (12.7%)	48 (13.4%)	94 (13.1%)
Moderate / middle of the road	65 (18.0%)	74 (20.7%)	139 (19.3%)
Slightly conservative	40 (11.1%)	37 (10.3%)	77 (10.7%)
Conservative	61 (16.9%)	62 (17.3%)	123 (17.1%)
Extremely Conservative	25 (6.9%)	25 (7.0%)	50 (7.0%)
Education			
Less than high school	0 (0%)	3 (0.8%)	3 (0.4%)
High school graduate	43 (11.9%)	33 (9.2%)	76 (10.6%)
Some college	81 (22.4%)	62 (17.3%)	143 (19.9%)
2 year degree	33 (9.1%)	44 (12.3%)	77 (10.7%)
4 year degree	138 (38.2%)	148 (41.3%)	286 (39.8%)
Professional degree	10 (2.8%)	12 (3.4%)	22 (3.1%)
Masters or Doctorate	56 (15.5%)	56 (15.6%)	112 (15.6%)
Income			
Less than \$10,000	12 (3.3%)	25 (7.0%)	37 (5.1%)
\$10,000 - \$19,999	29 (8.0%)	31 (8.7%)	60 (8.3%)
\$20,000 - \$39,999	70 (19.4%)	73 (20.4%)	143 (19.9%)
#\$40,000 - \$59,999	86 (23.8%)	62 (17.3%)	148 (20.6%)
#\$60,000 - \$79,999	58 (16.1%)	59 (16.5%)	117 (16.3%)
\$80,000 - \$99,999	43 (11.9%)	45 (12.6%)	88 (12.2%)
\$100,000 - \$149,999	40 (11.1%)	43 (12.0%)	83 (11.5%)
More than \$150,000	23 (6.4%)	20 (5.6%)	43 (6.0%)
Religiosity			
Not at all	96 (26.6%)	103 (28.8%)	199 (27.7%)
Slightly	51 (14.1%)	49 (13.7%)	100 (13.9%)
Moderately	60 (16.6%)	50 (14.0%)	110 (15.3%)
Mostly	65 (18.0%)	72 (20.1%)	137 (19.1%)
Extremely	89 (24.7%)	84 (23.5%)	173 (24.1%)

Figure C.3. Demographics for race identity

	Control	Treatment	Overall
	(N=361)	(N=358)	(N=719)
Closeness to American Identity			
Not at all close	6 (1.7%)	15 (4.2%)	21 (2.9%)
Slightly close	64 (17.7%)	56 (15.6%)	120 (16.7%)
Moderately close	133 (36.8%)	163 (45.5%)	296 (41.2%)
Very close	158 (43.8%)	124 (34.6%)	282 (39.2%)
Closeness to Democrats			
Not at all close	70 (19.4%)	96 (26.8%)	166 (23.1%)
Slightly close	111 (30.7%)	101 (28.2%)	212 (29.5%)
Moderately close	116 (32.1%)	100 (27.9%)	216 (30.0%)
Very close	64 (17.7%)	61 (17.0%)	125 (17.4%)
Closeness to Republicans			
Not at all close	153 (42.4%)	159 (44.4%)	312 (43.4%)
Slightly close	108 (29.9%)	85 (23.7%)	193 (26.8%)
Moderately close	67 (18.6%)	79 (22.1%)	146 (20.3%)
Very close	33 (9.1%)	35 (9.8%)	68 (9.5%)
Closeness to Independents			
Not at all close	39 (10.8%)	40 (11.2%)	79 (11.0%)
Slightly close	135 (37.4%)	146 (40.8%)	281 (39.1%)
Moderately close	147 (40.7%)	127 (35.5%)	274 (38.1%)
Very close	40 (11.1%)	45 (12.6%)	85 (11.8%)
Closeness to White People			
Not at all close	33 (9.1%)	42 (11.7%)	75 (10.4%)
Slightly close	101 (28.0%)	107 (29.9%)	208 (28.9%)
Moderately close	140 (38.8%)	134 (37.4%)	274 (38.1%)
Very close	87 (24.1%)	75 (20.9%)	162 (22.5%)
Closeness to Black people			
Not at all close	31 (8.6%)	39 (10.9%)	70 (9.7%)
Slightly close	109 (30.2%)	106 (29.6%)	215 (29.9%)
Moderately close	124 (34.3%)	123 (34.4%)	247 (34.4%)
Very close	97 (26.9%)	90 (25.1%)	187 (26.0%)
Closeness to Men			
Not at all close	27 (7.5%)	37 (10.3%)	64 (8.9%)
Slightly close	107 (29.6%)	101 (28.2%)	208 (28.9%)
Moderately close	145 (40.2%)	146 (40.8%)	291 (40.5%)
Very close	82 (22.7%)	74 (20.7%)	156 (21.7%)
Closeness to Women			
Not at all close	16 (4.4%)	24 (6.7%)	40 (5.6%)
Slightly close	78 (21.6%)	75 (20.9%)	153 (21.3%)
Moderately close	151 (41.8%)	155 (43.3%)	306 (42.6%)
Very close	116 (32.1%)	104 (29.1%)	220 (30.6%)
Closeness to Non-binary People			
Not at all close	163 (45.2%)	152 (42.5%)	315 (43.8%)
Slightly close	110 (30.5%)	121 (33.8%)	231 (32.1%)
Moderately close	69 (19.1%)	65 (18.2%)	134 (18.6%)
Very close	19 (5.3%)	20 (5.6%)	39 (5.4%)

Figure C.4. Identity attachment scores for race identity

	Control	Treatment	Overall
	(N=392)	(N=392)	(N=784)
Age			
Mean (SD)	42.4 (12.8)	43.5 (13.1)	42.9 (13.0)
Median [Min, Max]	40.0 [19.0, 79.0]	41.0 [20.0, 85.0]	40.0 [19.0, 85.0]
Gender			
Men	190 (48.5%)	189 (48.2%)	379 (48.3%)
Women	199 (50.8%)	200 (51.0%)	399 (50.9%)
Non-Binary	3 (0.8%)	3 (0.8%)	6 (0.8%)
Party			
Democrat	199 (50.8%)	202 (51.5%)	401 (51.1%)
Republican	193 (49.2%)	190 (48.5%)	383 (48.9%)
Race			
White	310 (79.1%)	305 (77.8%)	615 (78.4%)
Black or African American	17 (4.3%)	16 (4.1%)	33 (4.2%)
American Indian or Alaska Native	3 (0.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (0.4%)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	2 (0.5%)	1 (0.3%)	3 (0.4%)
Latino	26 (6.6%)	24 (6.1%)	50 (6.4%)
Asian	29 (7.4%)	40 (10.2%)	69 (8.8%)
Other	5 (1.3%)	6 (1.5%)	11 (1.4%)
Ideology			
Extremely liberal	41 (10.5%)	40 (10.2%)	81 (10.3%)
Liberal	76 (19.4%)	82 (20.9%)	158 (20.2%)
Slightly liberal	50 (12.8%)	49 (12.5%)	99 (12.6%)
Moderate / middle of the road	53 (13.5%)	50 (12.8%)	103 (13.1%)
Slightly conservative	56 (14.3%)	72 (18.4%)	128 (16.3%)
Conservative	85 (21.7%)	66 (16.8%)	151 (19.3%)
Extremely Conservative	31 (7.9%)	33 (8.4%)	64 (8.2%)
Education			
Less than high school	3 (0.8%)	1 (0.3%)	4 (0.5%)
High school graduate	42 (10.7%)	46 (11.7%)	88 (11.2%)
Some college	70 (17.9%)	76 (19.4%)	146 (18.6%)
2 year degree	35 (8.9%)	36 (9.2%)	71 (9.1%)
4 year degree	155 (39.5%)	163 (41.6%)	318 (40.6%)
Professional degree	18 (4.6%)	13 (3.3%)	31 (4.0%)
Masters or Doctorate	69 (17.6%)	57 (14.5%)	126 (16.1%)
Income			
Less than \$10,000	11 (2.8%)	27 (6.9%)	38 (4.8%)
\$10,000 - \$19,999	24 (6.1%)	23 (5.9%)	47 (6.0%)
\$20,000 - \$39,999	54 (13.8%)	77 (19.6%)	131 (16.7%)
#\$40,000 - \$59,999	74 (18.9%)	69 (17.6%)	143 (18.2%)
#\$60,000 - \$79,999	72 (18.4%)	67 (17.1%)	139 (17.7%)
\$80,000 - \$99,999	59 (15.1%)	46 (11.7%)	105 (13.4%)
\$100,000 - \$149,999	59 (15.1%)	48 (12.2%)	107 (13.6%)
More than \$150,000	39 (9.9%)	35 (8.9%)	74 (9.4%)
Religiosity			
Not at all	136 (34.7%)	141 (36.0%)	277 (35.3%)
Slightly	64 (16.3%)	60 (15.3%)	124 (15.8%)
Moderately	57 (14.5%)	65 (16.6%)	122 (15.6%)
Mostly	70 (17.9%)	67 (17.1%)	137 (17.5%)
Extremely	65 (16.6%)	59 (15.1%)	124 (15.8%)

Figure C.5. Demographics for party identity

	Control	Treatment	Overall
	(N=392)	(N=392)	(N=784)
Closeness to American Identity			
Not at all close	13 (3.3%)	15 (3.8%)	28 (3.6%)
Slightly close	69 (17.6%)	63 (16.1%)	132 (16.8%)
Moderately close	145 (37.0%)	139 (35.5%)	284 (36.2%)
Very close	165 (42.1%)	175 (44.6%)	340 (43.4%)
Closeness to Democrats			
Not at all close	121 (30.9%)	101 (25.8%)	222 (28.3%)
Slightly close	122 (31.1%)	132 (33.7%)	254 (32.4%)
Moderately close	98 (25.0%)	111 (28.3%)	209 (26.7%)
Very close	51 (13.0%)	48 (12.2%)	99 (12.6%)
Closeness to Republicans			
Not at all close	149 (38.0%)	134 (34.2%)	283 (36.1%)
Slightly close	93 (23.7%)	113 (28.8%)	206 (26.3%)
Moderately close	100 (25.5%)	103 (26.3%)	203 (25.9%)
Very close	50 (12.8%)	42 (10.7%)	92 (11.7%)
Closeness to Independents			
Not at all close	70 (17.9%)	36 (9.2%)	106 (13.5%)
Slightly close	151 (38.5%)	171 (43.6%)	322 (41.1%)
Moderately close	134 (34.2%)	145 (37.0%)	279 (35.6%)
Very close	37 (9.4%)	40 (10.2%)	77 (9.8%)
Closeness to White People			
Not at all close	28 (7.1%)	23 (5.9%)	51 (6.5%)
Slightly close	77 (19.6%)	74 (18.9%)	151 (19.3%)
Moderately close	165 (42.1%)	187 (47.7%)	352 (44.9%)
Very close	122 (31.1%)	108 (27.6%)	230 (29.3%)
Closeness to Black people			
Not at all close	70 (17.9%)	72 (18.4%)	142 (18.1%)
Slightly close	160 (40.8%)	150 (38.3%)	310 (39.5%)
Moderately close	117 (29.8%)	138 (35.2%)	255 (32.5%)
Very close	45 (11.5%)	32 (8.2%)	77 (9.8%)
Closeness to Men			
Not at all close	34 (8.7%)	43 (11.0%)	77 (9.8%)
Slightly close	114 (29.1%)	110 (28.1%)	224 (28.6%)
Moderately close	160 (40.8%)	166 (42.3%)	326 (41.6%)
Very close	84 (21.4%)	73 (18.6%)	157 (20.0%)
Closeness to Women			
Not at all close	24 (6.1%)	28 (7.1%)	52 (6.6%)
Slightly close	81 (20.7%)	91 (23.2%)	172 (21.9%)
Moderately close	177 (45.2%)	173 (44.1%)	350 (44.6%)
Very close	110 (28.1%)	100 (25.5%)	210 (26.8%)
Closeness to Non-binary People			
Not at all close	187 (47.7%)	177 (45.2%)	364 (46.4%)
Slightly close	118 (30.1%)	135 (34.4%)	253 (32.3%)
Moderately close	62 (15.8%)	62 (15.8%)	124 (15.8%)
Very close	25 (6.4%)	18 (4.6%)	43 (5.5%)

Figure C.6. Identity attachment scores for party identity