

# IMAGINING NATIONAL CUISINE: FOOD, MEDIA, AND THE NATION

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## ABSTRACT

By reading food television as a cultural text, through which the nation is narrated and envisioned, this dissertation examines the evolution of Korean food television and its articulation of Koreanness in contemporary globalization. Theoretically, I suggest understanding the nation as a discourse or a regime of truth from the Foucauldian perspective. In order to bring Foucault's relativistic notion of truth into play, this dissertation employs Fairclough's three-dimensional approach for critical discourse analysis (CDA). Through this multi-dimensional approach, I aimed to conduct a thick description of Korean food television's discursive practice with regard to national cuisine and the Korean nation.

My historical analysis of food television shows that an increased awareness of cultural others enhances a struggle for nation-ness. By unveiling the "Janus-faced" characteristic of the nation, which is constructed both *against* and *through* differences, this dissertation identifies the inextricable relationship between the nation and globalization, and the hierarchical integration processes inherent in cultural hybridization. Moreover, this research project reveals how the nation-state actively appropriates the banality of food and is involved in the production practices of the television industry in order to produce and disseminate hegemonic discourses on the nation, and to keep nationhood near the surface of everyday life. Through an investigation of the interplay between television texts and social conditions, my dissertation also explicates the socially-constructed and the socially-constitutive nature of media discourse, and enriches the discussion regarding the production cultures of the global television industries.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Food as Deep Play

“Toong! Chak, tada tada...” A rhythmic and drumming sound resonates with a dynamic chopping performance, reminiscent of *Nanta*, a South Korean non-verbal performance. The music of percussion instruments continues and the beat is accelerated to the end. While the beat is reaching a climax, a narrator states, “Taste of Harmony, Bibimbap,” which is in turn followed by an image-like caption “The Taste of Korea.”

The commercial portrays the taste of Korea through a variety of visual and sound effects that features Korean “traditions.” The dynamic sound that underlies the entire commercial consists of the four Korean musical instruments that constitute *samul nori* (a traditional Korean percussion music). It ends with a shout of concentration from masters of a Korean national martial art *taekwondo*. When introducing each ingredient of *bibimbap*, the commercial visually connects it with Korean “traditional” performances through cross-cut editing. For example, the image of egg yolk is cut to the performers of *buchaechum* (a Korean fanning dance) wearing yellow *hanbok* (Korean traditional clothes). In the sequential scene, they are surrounded by a *ganggangsulae* (a Korean circle dance play) team that represents egg whites. Other traditional performances, such as *talchum* (masked dance) and *sajachum* (lion dance), are also used to symbolize the ingredients of bibimbap.

The cross-cut editing between food ingredients and traditional performances not only implies that Korean traditions are inherent in Korean food but also represents

Korean food itself as a tradition. This food-tradition identification is enhanced by the use of a particular color scheme. Though the commercial adds two more colors—orange and green, it materializes the color scheme of *obangsaek*<sup>1</sup> (five cardinal colors) that symbolizes Yin-Yang and the Five Element theory. To fulfill the five colors, the commercial, for instance, includes a scene of soft tofu salad despite the fact that it is irrelevant to bibimbap preparation. Other visual techniques, such as camera angles and virtual lines, emphasize the taste of “harmony” in a nuanced way. When presenting each ingredient or performance, the commercial uses medium and medium-long shots along with low or eye-level camera angles. However, when it describes the moment of “mixing” it provides high or bird’s eye views to illustrate the contour and the beauty of harmony.

Funded by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (henceforth, MFAFF)<sup>2</sup>, this thirty-second commercial for bibimbap was produced in 2010 by a team from the MBC variety show *Muhandojeon* (Infinite Challenge). The commercial was advertised at Times Square in New York City in cooperation with a well-known Korean publicist who previously advertised a full-page ad for bibimbap in the New York Times. Due to the popularity of *Infinite Challenge*, the commercial obtained widespread recognition in South Korea and discourses of Korean cuisine became closer to the surface of everyday life. More interestingly, this media event demonstrates that the Korean media

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<sup>1</sup> *Obangsaek* includes white, black, yellow, blue, and red.

<sup>2</sup> The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) replaced the MFAFF in 2013. The initial form was established as the Ministry of Agriculture in 1948. Since then, it has been reorganized as follows: the Ministry of Agriculture in 1948; the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1973; the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in 1986; the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in 1996; the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in 2008.

have embraced the subject matter of food to envision the nation. Why do the Korean media make use of food to speak about Korea? Why do they emphasize the embodiment of traditions in *hansik* (Korean food)? Why does the Korean government sponsor the production of media texts that feature Korean food? To answer these questions requires us to understand the role of food in marking and sustaining cultural boundaries and social identities.

Because food occupies a seemingly mundane position in our lives, it has been taken for granted by academics who have long considered it to be too coarse and one-dimensional for scholarly attention (Ceccarini, 2010; Sutton, 2010). Indeed, “practices and types of knowledge that have been so internalized are difficult to articulate” (Preston-Werner, 2009). However, food means more than just “what we eat” (Long, 2009); the ways we think about food are intensely reflexive (Bell & Valentine, 1997). People use food to “speak” with each other, to establish rules of behavior, and to reveal “what you are” (Belasco, 2008). The “culinary turn” in scholarship came in the 1970s through anthropologists and sociologists who understood food as an intrinsically multilayered and multidimensional subject (Holtzman, 2006; Long, 2009). They viewed food as “matured enough to serve as a vehicle for examining large and varied problems of theory and research methods” (Mintz & Du Bois, 2002, p. 100). Since then, food has been examined as a system of symbolic value-creation, a system of communication, a structure of society organization, a key component of ritual, a marker of social distinction, a site of memory construction, and a domain of customs, beliefs, and meanings (Barthes, 1979; Holtzman, 2006; Levi-Strauss, 1986; Long, 2009; Mintz, 1985; Munn, 1986; Sutton, 2010).

As the anthropological notion of “deep play” (Geertz, 1973) was introduced, researchers paid specific attention to the role of food in the making and remaking of social identities and cultural boundaries (Mintz & Du Bois, 2002). According to Geertz (1973), deep play is “a simulation of the social matrix, the involved system of crosscutting, overlapping, highly corporate groups—villages, kingroups, irrigation societies, temple congregations, “castes”—in which its devotees live” (p. 436). Through his ethnographic work on the Balinese cockfight, he observes that Balinese social life, which is normally obscured from view, is experienced and realized through the cockfight. He further argues that the moral backbone of the Balinese society—the hierarchy of pride—and its surrounding sentiments are only revealed in the cockfight. Thus, he views the cockfight as a cultural text, through which the Balinese tell themselves about themselves. In other words, the Balinese cockfight, as deep play, is not a mere “reflection of a pre-existing sensibility” but a “positive agent in the creating and maintenance of such a sensibility” (Geertz, 1973, p. 451).

Considering food as deep play, Appadurai (1981) argues that food can signal “rank and rivalry, solidarity and community, identity or exclusion, and intimacy or distance” (p. 494). As such, he defines food as a highly condensed social fact and a part of the semiotic system (Appadurai, 1981). This close relationship between food and identities is to be found in an increasing number of recent sociological, anthropological, ethnographical, and geographical studies (see Belasco, 2008; Bell & Valentine, 1997; Gabaccia, 1998; Kanafani-Zahar, 1997; Korsmeyer, 1999; Lentz, 1999; Leitch, 2008; Wilk, 2008). For example, Belasco (2008) claims that food serves to express personal and

group identities and to cement social bonds. He notes that the Latin-based word “companions” means “the people with whom one shared bread” (Belasco, 2008, p. 15).

The discussion on food as deep play has not been limited to companions, villages, or kingroups. Researchers have extended their discussions to the intertwined relationships between food practices and the nation. To take an example, Preston-Werner (2009) explains that eating *gallo pinto* (rice and beans) evokes a nostalgic image of a certain way of life and corresponding identity in Costa Rica. Tam (2001) observes that Hong Kong people build their national identity through eating *yumcha* (several small courses of dim sum and Chinese tea). Ohnuki-Tierney (1993) also argues that rice, as the staple of Japanese diet, has a special centrality in national identity construction. Examining transformations in Belizean food from colonial times to the present, Wilk (2008) claims that food practices impact the ways Belizean people define themselves and their nation. As these studies demonstrate, food, as an integral element of material worlds (Palmer, 1999), constitutes a critical component of cultural resources (Cwiertka, 2006), which incorporate individuals as national subjects. Especially, the flexibility and the ubiquity of food keep nationhood near the surface of ordinary life and people aware of where they belong and what they believe in (Cwiertka, 2006). In other words, food functions as a “banal flag” of national identity (Billig, 1995, p. 181). This “flagging” may be unconsciously displayed, yet it continuously reminds people of the nationhood in a daily basis.

### Research Project

As the nation-state emerged as the global political norm in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Anderson, 2006), the regulatory and the socializing institutions of

the state deliberately constructed the nation as a vortex in which all social relations would be (re)configured (Pieterse, 2007; Tomlinson, 2003). However, despite its seemingly essential nature, the congruity of nation and state is an outcome of historical process where both political and ethnic elements operate to varying degrees (Smith, 1991).<sup>3</sup> Thus, to sustain the arbitrary hyphen between the nation and state requires a variety of collective practices and cultural representations that “condition the spatiotemporal conceptualization of the community as a polity” (Foster, 1991, p. 239). In other words, the construction of a nation demands a symbolic process of “the naturalization of arbitrariness,” which imbues the nation with “an aura of factuality” (Foster, 1991, p. 237). In this regard, Bhabha (1990) suggests reading the nation as a form of narrative. By the expression of “nation as narration,” he emphasizes the cultural temporality and the indeterminacy of the nation and argues that the nation holds culture at its core to narrate its changing status and to establish its boundaries (Bhabha, 1990).

The understanding of the nation as a transitional cultural polity, which requires a constant process of symbolic naturalization, underlies the overall research agenda of this project. The anthropological notion of food as deep play also paves the way for this dissertation in a significant way. As discussed above, food signals inclusion and exclusion and its ubiquity make people imagine and experience the nation in their everyday life. However, most studies that approach the nation through the subject matter of food have explored the limited dimensions of food practices, such as food consumption and classification. Though food discourses are intertwined with the

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<sup>3</sup> According to Smith (1991), every nation-state contains civic (political) and ethnic (cultural) elements in different forms, and thus, produces a distinctive form of nationhood depending on specific historical and political conditions.

organization of everyday conduct and function as a “biological device” that links individuals to a multitude of governing bodies including the nation-state (Hiroko, 2008, p. 9), the discursive dimension of food has hardly been studied. Likewise, despite the popular media’s crucial role in imagining the nation and mediating food discourses, the conjuncture of food, media, and nation has not gained much attention from media and communication scholars. By reading media’s discourse of national cuisine as the “deep play,” this dissertation aims to explicate this food-media-nation nexus; particularly, it will explore how Korean television has discursively (re)constructed the nation through discourses of food. Here, it is important to problematize the taken-for-granted nature of national cuisine and understand its symbolic roles as an invented tradition.

As Bell and Valentine (1997) put it, “the history of any nation’s diet is the history of the nation itself, with food fashions, fads and fancies mapping episodes of colonialism and migration, trade and exploration, cultural exchange and boundary-marking” (pp. 168-169). In other words, the emergence of national cuisine coincides with the formation of nation-states (Mennell, 1985). National cuisine consists of the four different elements: a limited set of “basic foods,” a distinct manner of preparing food, distinctive flavor principles, and a set of manners (Belasco, 2008)—codes of etiquette and what Barthes (1979) calls protocols. These elements are culturally defined and selected, and reflect the cultural traditions and beliefs of specific nations (Palmer, 1998). Thus, the national cuisine has often been seen as a given characteristic of a people and a country (Tannahill, 1975). For example, Barthes (1982), taking *sukiyaki* as a cultural text to read Japan, views Japanese food as the essence of Japaneseness. Hiroko (2008) also points out that Japanese food has long been recognized as a representation of Japaneseness both inside

and outside of Japan. Indeed, Japan has been strongly identified with rice both domestically and globally (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993).

Despite its seemingly essential nature, national cuisine is a modern construct (Belasco, 2008). Cwiertka (2006) notes that the proliferation of culinary nation-making is a characteristic feature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like nations are imagined, national cuisine is “a feast of imagined commensality” (Bell & Valentine, 1997, p. 169). As other modern traditions conceal their invented-nature, national cuisine also hides its short-lived origins and complex histories of trade links, cultural exchange, and colonialism as well as the history of negotiation between the local and the foreign, between practice and performance, and between high and low (Bell & Valentine, 1997; Cwiertka, 2006). In so doing, national cuisine naturalizes the clear continuity with the past and ethnic cores, provides the illusion of common history, and constructs intra-national sameness. Further, the emphasis on the past and ethnic cores makes what we eat a medium/reservoir for personal recollection and collective memories as well as creates a fear of loss and a sense of nostalgia, which become strong ways of preserving identities (Belasco, 2008).

As Bell and Valentine (1997) write, food articulates the “notions of inclusion and exclusion, of national pride and xenophobia, on our tables and in our lunchboxes” (p. 168). It is the embodiment of such notions in the foods themselves that enables national cuisine to act as a boundary-marker. To put it another way, national cuisine serves two opposed semiotic functions—homogenization and heterogenization of the actors (Appadurai, 1981). Through the study of the creation of Indian national cuisine, Appadurai (1981) argues that cookbooks from the 1960s to 1980s condensed regional and

local culinary diversity to a single dish in order to construct the “taste of India.” Consequently, cultural, religious, and ethnic differences of Indian people were reduced while the unity of them was reinforced. Cwiertka (2006) also points out that in the process of inventing Japanese national cuisine a diversity of local food practices has been replaced by a set of foods, practices, and tastes with which the majority of Japanese people willingly and ardently identifies.

National cuisine also speaks of difference. As Levi-Strauss (1986) observes that the structure of society is organized by binary distinctions such as the raw and the cooked, the fresh and the decayed, national cuisine draws a strong boundary between “we” and “Others.” For instance, Ohnuki-Tierney (1993) demonstrates that the link between rice and Japaneseness, which is expressed throughout national culture but unconsciously experienced in everyday life, functions as a stronger marker of boundaries between Japanese people and Westerners. Such distinctions clearly identify those who adhere to the semiotic system—national cuisine—as belonging to a particular faith and cultural tradition (Palmer, 1998).

Given these symbolic and semantic roles of national cuisine, this dissertation explores how the nation has been (re)constructed through discourses of national cuisine that are mediated by popular media. The underlying assumption is that discourses of national cuisine are reflective of and formative of discourses of the nation. I also see the growth of discourses of national cuisine as symptomatic of the struggle for the nationness. In other words, national cuisine is not a final destination of this project, but a means to discuss how popular media have discursively produced and transformed the cultural boundaries of the nation.

To investigate this inquiry in a practical way, this dissertation assumes 2008 as a turning point from which the Korean food-media-nation nexus began to be articulated in a significantly different way. On February 25, 2008, Myung-Bak Lee, the seventeenth President of South Korea, announced the globalization of *hansik* (Korean food) as a national issue. One month later, the Minister of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MFAFF) declared 2008 the “Year of Korean Food Globalization” (S. Park, 2008, March 18, p. 4). Afterwards, led by governmental agencies and public corporations, such as the MFAFF and the Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation (aT), the Korean Food Foundation was launched in 2010 as an official organization for Korean food globalization. Though the Korean government has endeavored to globalize Korean food since the early 2000s<sup>4</sup>, it was not until 2008 that an integrated system was established to globalize Korean food<sup>5</sup>. The late 2000s and the early 2010s also underwent the explosion of television food shows. Examining the relationship between food TV and food culture in Korea, S. Kim (2015) portrays the 2010s as a golden age of food media. Further, A.

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<sup>4</sup> For example, the Korea Food Tourism Association and the Korea Cooks Association has hosted Seoul International Food Competition since 2000 (K. Lee, 2007, May 3, p. 16). The Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT)—currently, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST)—launched Han-Style project in order to industrialize and globalize Korean language (*hangul*), food (*hansik*), costume (*hanbok*), house (*hanok*), and paper (*hanji*) (Y. Song, 2007, June 13, p. 3). Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)—now, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA), Korea Agro-Fisheries and Food Trade Corporation (aT), and Korea Foodservice Industry Association have jointly sponsored Seoul International Food Industry Expo since 2006 for the purpose of building a cornerstone of Korean food globalization (Y. Jeong, 2007, October 9, p. 18). More detailed information will be provided in Chapter 5.

<sup>5</sup> While the Korean government promoted “Dynamic Korea” as a national brand in 2002, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy attempted to raise a global profile of Korea with the catchphrase “Premium Korea”; the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Han-Style”; the Korea Tourism Organization, “Sparkling Korea.” Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Ministry of Health and Welfare vied for taking the initiative in food industry before 2008 (S. Woo, 2007, September 6).

Kim (2014) suggests a rapid growth of Korean food-focused programs as a characteristic of the major Korean television networks in the 2010s. It is within this context that I set 2008 as a critical moment for the investigation of the food-media-nation conjuncture in Korea.

As described above, the Korean government has intensely promoted Korean food since 2008 in an effort to raise a sense of internal unity and the global profile of Korea. Korean popular media have also produced vast discussions on national cuisine and “Korea” in a relatively short period. Therefore, the case of Korea provides abundant discursive samples for the analysis of the intersection between food, media, and the nation. Through Fairclough’s three-dimensional discourse analysis, full details of which will be given in the next chapter, this dissertation mainly explores the following questions: 1) How has Korean food television evolved since the 1980s? 2) What discourses has Korean food television produced regarding Korean cuisine and the Korean nation? 3) In what contexts have these discourses evolved over time since the 1980s? and 4) How have power relations been exercised, negotiated, and/or challenged by the Korean television industry?

Taking media’s discourse of national cuisine as a cultural text through which the nation is envisioned, this project will elucidate how competing regional, national, and global cultural pressures are articulated in the media’s discourses of national cuisine. As an “instrumental” case study (Stake, 1994, p. 240),<sup>6</sup> it will also illustrate the negotiation

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<sup>6</sup> Stake (1994) distinguishes case studies into three ways: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective case study. In intrinsic case study, the case itself is of prominent interest before a formal study begins. Researchers seek to illustrate the particularity and the uniqueness of the case in detail. The knowledge in this type of case study is “transferred” or constructed through the process of “naturalistic generalization,” in which the reader comes to know some things told, “as if he or she had experienced them” (Stake, 1994, p. 240). On the other hand, instrumental case study aims to

of regional, ethnic, and class differences and the asymmetrical process of hybridization in constructing cultural boundaries of the nation. Further, it will account for the media's role in inventing traditions and (re)imagining the nation. Finally, this dissertation will enrich the discussion about the role of the nation in the era of "contemporary accelerated globalization" (Pieterse, 2009, p. 16).

### Chapter Breakdown

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. As discussed above, Chapter 1 provides a detailed description of the research project and explains why food matters for the discussion of the nation. It also reviews scholarship of food studies, and introduces the anthropological notion of food as deep play and the understanding of national cuisine as invented tradition. This chapter helps readers view food as an intrinsically multilayered subject and grasp the cultural and political contexts of this research.

Chapter 2 illustrates the theoretical and methodological frameworks that underlie the research agenda of my dissertation. First, from the Foucauldian perspective, I suggest reading the nation as a discourse or *a regime of truth*, and highlight the necessity to distinguish the discursive construction of the nation from that of national identity. I then discuss the role of popular media in inventing tradition and imagining the nation. This chapter also focuses on the bilateral and inextricable relationship between the nation and globalization. Through the perspective of critical hybridity, I describe the "janus-faced"

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provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory. Although the particularities and ordinariness of the case are scrutinized in depth, the case is of secondary interest and looked at to illustrate how the concerns of researchers and theorists are manifest in the case. Collective case study refers to the extension of instrumental case study to several cases. It seeks to enhance the understanding of what are sought for in instrumental case study and better refinement of theorizing through comparative studies.

characteristic of the nation, which is constructed both against and through differences. I then explain why critical discourse analysis (CDA) best serves my research project, and how to combine Foucault's relativistic understanding of truth and the CDA's analytical methods. The final section of this chapter demonstrates the strengths of Fairclough's three-dimensional approach, and illustrates the data gathering and analysis processes of my dissertation.

The next two chapters delineate the historical development of Korean food TV, and cultural, political, and economic conditions, in which Korean food TV has been embedded. Based on the understanding of genre as an articulation of different cultural sites, Chapter 3 offers a history of Korean food TV, and elucidates how various material and discursive contexts are articulated in Korean food TV from the 1980s to 2007. The purpose of this chapter is not to list all television food shows in chronological order or to discover specific genre conventions of culinary television; rather, it is to explore the social imperatives involved in the production practices of the Korean television industry.

Through a similar approach, Chapter 4 discusses how food has been addressed by the Korean television industry since 2008. Given the fully-fledged status of Korean food TV, this chapter pays more attention to the social conditions that led to the "explosion" of food TV rather than identify its particular formats that were prevailing post-2008. I argue that the rapid growth of food TV was interlocked with the following internal and external factors: 1) the structural changes in the Korean television industry and the following channel competition, 2) the increase in single-person household and the rise of *sampo* generation, and 3) the growth of gourmet culture and the shift in cultural legitimacy of food. Along with Chapter 3, this chapter aims to situate food TV's discourses about the

Korean nation, which I discuss in Chapter 6, within sociocultural, political, economic, and historical contexts.

Given that discursive practice mediates text and social practice (Fairclough, 1995), Chapter 5 elaborates on the production practices of Korean food TV. By reading television production as a social space where power relations, ideological frameworks, and institutional routines are negotiated, this chapter investigates the interplay between the government, food industry, and television production. Particularly, it critically examines the Korean government's involvement with national cuisine, and its economic and political contexts. It then illustrates how the government's concerted efforts to promote Korean food were articulated in the production practices of food TV.

Chapter 6 stands on the idea that television is a major repository of visual elements, ideas, and discourses that constitute our imagination and reality, and that food TV does not simply tell audiences how to cook but instead ascribes ideological meanings to food and food-related practices. In this chapter, I explore the Korean food TV's discursive construction of the nation by employing both historical analysis and textual analysis. Specifically, I focus on how Korean television has (re)invented Korean cuisine as tradition, and how the insignificant "us" and significant "Others" are negotiated to construct the cultural boundaries of the Korean nation. Finally, Chapter 7 (Conclusion) discusses the formative and reflective role of food discourses in relation to national discourses, and elaborates on how to incorporate food into media and communication studies, and vice versa.

## CHAPTER 2

## THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS

## The Nation as a Discourse

Nation and associated ideas, such as national character, national consciousness, national feeling, nationness, nationalism, and national identity, present researchers with a “slippery slope” to conquer conceptually as they are often used and understood as synonyms (Kong, 1999, p. 569). This conceptual hodgepodge paradoxically indicates the nation’s enormous capacity to orchestrate a sense of belonging and to configure a variety of social relations. Indeed, the nation had been the most successful modern mode of identity construction before identity politics became more complicated in global ecumene (Hannerz, 1989; Tomlinson, 2003). The binding force of the nation has been seen as “natural” by those who have understood the nation as either rooted in kinship ties or as a constant feature of human history (Smith, 1999). Those primordialists and perennialists have claimed that the nation persists as “a pre-eminent constituent of identity and society” (Edensor, 2002, p.1).

However, every nation-state does not originate from blood ties or genetic similarities. Nor is it a transhistorical feature of human being. Rather, it is a modern construct that is imagined as community (Anderson, 2006). It is an *imagined* community because the members of the nation never know “most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). And it is an *imagined community* because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Yet, the comradeship is not

given as “being”; the nation “becomes” imaginable as a consequence of the invention of the printing press, the rise of print media, mass literacy, and mass communication, all of which provide a symbolic place, in which the idea of the nation is disseminated and readers/viewers are explicitly and implicitly addressed as co-nationals (Featherstone, 1996, p. 53). In other words, the nation requires constant symbolic practices to sustain its binding forces and to ensure its relation to the state. In this light, Hall views nations “not only as political constructs, but also as systems of cultural representations, by means of which an imagined community may be interpreted” (as cited in de Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 155). This understanding of the nation as a system of cultural representations allows us to see the nation not as an essence but as a process; not as unified or static but as temporal and indeterminate. However, the cultural temporality and indeterminacy of the nation do not imply that there are no limits or rules to represent the nation at a given moment in a given society. We should note that Hall regards the nation as a *system* of cultural representations. By this expression, he points to a set of rules that governs representational practices, which makes it possible to construct the nation in a particular way and limits the other ways (Hall, 2006). To describe this formative and regulatory force of the system, he coins the term “a regime of representation,” which refers to the whole repertoire of representational practices and rules at any one historical moment (Hall, 1997b).

Hall’s notions of the nation and a regime of representation theoretically underpin this dissertation. And they lead me to read the nation as a discourse in a Foucauldian perspective. Indeed, Hall (1996c; 2006) uses representations and discourses interchangeably. For example, when he examines the formation of the discourse of the

West and the Rest, Hall (2006) writes, “By ‘discourse,’ we mean a particular way of *representing* ‘the West,’ the Rest,’ and the relations between them” (p. 165, emphasis in original).<sup>7</sup> However, the primary purpose of perceiving the nation as a discourse is to add “power” to the investigation of the food-media-nation nexus and to stress the arbitrary relationship between the nation and state, which would be explained through Foucault’s idea of “truth.” In a Foucauldian perspective, a discourse, as a particular way of speaking and thinking a subject, produces knowledge about the subject, and when the knowledge has real effects on social practices and perceptions surrounding the subject it becomes “true” (Foucault, 1980). As he emphasizes *becoming* rather than *being* with regard to truth, Foucault (1980) does not presuppose a clear distinction between the true and the false. He states:

There is a battle ‘for truth’, or at least ‘around truth’—it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’, but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays (Foucault, 1980, p. 132).

As described above, it is the outcome of the struggle between competing discourses that determines the truth status of knowledge. And it is power that decides the result of the contestation. In other words, power produces knowledge and governs what knowledge could/should be accepted as the truth. At the same time, knowledge induces new power relations, creating subject positions in which inequality is inherent. Thus,

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<sup>7</sup> In this case, Hall (2006) describes discourse as a particular way of representation. In the other book, Hall (1997b) says, “a discourse produces, through different practices of *representation* (scholarship, exhibition, literature, painting, etc.), a form of *racialized knowledge of the Other* (Orientalism). . .” (p. 260, emphasis in original). At this point, he presents representation as a way of discursive practice.

Foucault (1980) argues that power and knowledge directly imply each other. His understanding of the relationship between power, discourse, and knowledge provides a theoretical framework for exploring how power is exercised through media's discursive practices. Also, Foucault's idea of a regime of truth, which Hall (2006) expresses as a regime of representations, explains the formative power of discourse and the transitionality of truth. According to him, when a particular discourse is effective in organizing and regulating relations of power and its knowledge is accepted as truth, it is called as a regime of truth (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). He argues that this regime is not merely superstructural but essential to the structure and functioning of the society due to its general politics of truth that is constituted by:

the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1980, p. 131).

Each society has its own regime of truth at a given historical moment. However, it is not fixed; it is changing depending on the political and economic conditions (Foucault, 1980). A regime of truth of the nation is also subject to global modification because the hyphen that connects the nation and state has been weakened by transnational mobilization, deterritorialization, and electronic mass mediation (Appadurai, 1996; Featherstone, 1993; García-Canclini, 1995). Thus, one of the primary purposes of this dissertation is to investigate a transitional social reality inscribed in the shifting regime of truth of "Korea." It is within this context that this project employs textual, institutional, and historical analysis as main research methods.

At this point, it is important to note a conceptual difference between reading the nation as a discourse and understanding national identity as a discursive construct. Examining the discursive construction of national identity in Austria, deCillia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999) write, “national identities are discursively produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed” (p. 153). They argue that national identities become “reality in the realm of convictions and beliefs” (deCillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 153) through reifying and figurative discourses. I agree with the claim that discourse is socially constitutive of knowledge, situations, social roles, and identities (Fairclough, 1995). However, identities are constructed not *by* discourses but *within* discourses. As Hall (1996a) puts it, identities are “points of temporary attachment to the subject positions, which discursive practices construct for us” (p. 6). He defines identities as “the meeting point[s]” between “the ideological discourses” and “the psychological or psychical processes” (Hall, 1995, p. 65). By this definition, he means that identities are not about being but about becoming or positioning (Hall, 1996c); not “who we are” or “where we came from,” but “what we might become” (Hall, 1996a, p. 4). In other words, discourses construct possible subject positions for us, but identities are temporarily constructed when “we tell ourselves about ourselves” in relation to those subject positions (Hall, 1995, p. 66). Stressing the two different dimensions of discursive practice, van Dijk (1993) states:

we distinguish between the enactment, expression or legitimating of dominance in the (production of the) various structures of text and talk, on the one hand, and the functions, consequences, or results of such structures for the (social) minds of recipients, on the other (p. 259).

Therefore, for the thorough study of the discursive construction of national identity, researchers should include the discursive practice of reception to their analysis.

By reading the nation as a discourse, this dissertation explores what (national) subject positions have been produced by media's discourses of national cuisine. However, it does not extend its analysis to the question of how people narrate themselves to construct their national identity.

### The Nation and Popular Media

As discussed above, the nation, as a discourse, is not a “preconceived set of national characteristic” (Edensor, 2002, p. 1). It is not a static entity but a system of incomplete cultural signification (Bhabha, 1990). Accordingly, to ensure its truth status, the nation should consistently be reproduced and reconstructed. In the early stage of nation-state building, the regulatory institutions and statist cultural/political elites played a significant role in producing and disseminating national discourses. Especially, to create “the illusion of primordality and continuity” (Edensor, 2002, p. 5), they invented traditions and selected an idealized past as national history (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Nietzsche, 2009; Smith, 2003). As Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) put it, invented tradition is taken to mean:

...a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual of symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (p. 1).

By this definition, Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) emphasize the role of invented traditions in establishing a sense of communality and the continuity with the past. They argue that selective cultural forms and practices are invented as primeval traditions to construct an ancient national lineage. Despite their invented nature, traditions, through ritualistic and repetitive practices (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), arouse a strong primordial sentiment for *assumed* blood ties, race, language, region, religion, and custom

(Geertz, 1973), through which the nation is made visible and distinct both for its own members and for those from other nations and societies (Palmer, 1998). Yet, all cultural forms and practices are not invented as traditions: some are selected as traditions; some are brought together; and others are neglected or expunged (Edensor, 2002). To explain this selective process, Smith (2003) writes:

...they will only survive and flourish as part of the repertoire of national culture if they can be made continuous with a much longer past that members of the community presume to constitute their 'heritage' (p. 279).

The continuity with a longer past is critical to the invention of tradition because it gives the present a sense of direction and creates a tailored discourse about common history (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), which is always related to the remembrance and memory. As Halbwachs (1980) points out, memory is a collective recollection of past events that are found in and shared between members of any given community. Through this "inter-subjective" interaction (Bell, 2003, p. 65), disparate members of the nation give a shape to an assumed national lineage and identify themselves as co-nationals. However, everything ancient is not considered equally venerable. What is recalled and appropriated for the present purpose is an idealized history. This selective process is relying on the imaginary belief that "the great thing existed and was therefore possible, and so may be possible again," which Nietzsche (2009) calls "monumental history" (Nietzsche, 2009, p. 102). By bringing together "things that are incompatible" and "generaliz[ing] them into compatibility" (Nietzsche, 2009, p. 103), monumental history becomes to constitute national history.

As popular media were considered shallow or unconnected to questions of the nation, traditions and national history used to be produced and reproduced through the

nostalgic celebration of folk culture or the maintenance of high culture (Edensor, 2002). However, as the “cultural guardianship” (Edensor, 2002, p. 17) of official and high culture has been decentered, the power of traditions and national history is now by and large maintained by “their (re)distribution through popular culture” (Edensor, 2002, p. 12). In contemporary society, traditions are continually reinstalled and reinvented by popular media, of which ubiquity facilitates the repetition of rites and symbols of the nation, such as flags, parades, ceremonies, and rallies. In other words, popular media provide “cultural resources” (Barker, 1999, p. 7), “symbolic places” (Featherstone, 1996, p. 53), or “cultural matri[ces]” (Edensor, 2002, p. 17) through which people routinely situate their lives and their sense of themselves (Thompson, 1995). In this respect, McVeigh (2004), focusing on Japanese contexts, argues that the power of popular media resides in their daily use and ubiquitous nature. They reinforce the continuous routinized “flagging” of national belonging in everyday life (Billig, 1995).

Constituting both an important resource and topic for other types of discourse (Fairclough, 1995), popular media produce a variety of signifiers and reminders of the nation that partly organizes everyday spaces, routines, and practices. In particular, those signifiers and reminders are depoliticized and unconsciously “waved” as popular media provide them in the form of commodity. By objectifying the nation and national culture as commodity to be consumed, popular media make invisible power relations inherent in the discursive construction of the nation. They make people constitute themselves as co-nationals through the “fabrication of, and interaction with” commodified national cultures (Foster, 1991, p. 238). The shared mass consumption of the commodity anchors the imagined national communities in daily practice as “large-scale, non-intimate

collectivities unified by the ritualized fantasies of collective expenditure” (Foster, 1991, p. 250). If the nation-state is distinguished from other communities by the “style” in which it is imagined (Anderson, 2006, p. 6), popular media play a crucial role in changing that style.

## The Nation and Globalization

### *The Era of Contemporary Accelerated Globalization*

The debate about globalization and its consequences has been going on from various perspectives, including economic, social, anthropological, psychological, political, and even philosophical. As globalization has become an “enormous recent furor” (Wallerstein, 2000, p. xix), scholars have explored different globalization actors, domains, periodizations, and themes. As Pieterse (2009) puts it, globalization is like a “prism,” through which major issues, such as “inequality, power, development, ecology, culture, gender, [and] identity” are refracted (p. 7). Globalization, however, has become “an infamously ambiguous word” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 39) as it has entailed more controversy than consensus about its definition, scale, causation, chronology, and impact (Pieterse, 2009).

The history of globalization still remains in the area of controversy because its answer is depending upon “how far we are willing to extend the chain of causation” that results in recent social arrangements (Steger, 2009, p. 18). Economists and “hyperglobalists” (Jones, 2010, p. 12), who consider global corporations, world products, and global capitalism as keywords of globalization, have limited the historical scope of globalization to the 1970s (Pieterse, 2009). On the other hand, those who understand globalization as the extension or continuation of Western modernity have stressed the

historical discontinuity in the seventeenth century as a characteristic of globalization (Giddens, 1990).

However, there is a growing sense that globalization is a long-term phenomenon—a much longer process of “social integration” (Jones, 2010, p. 12). For example, Steger (2009), according to the pace of social exchanges and geographical scope, distinguishes a historical period of globalization into four ways: the premodern, the early modern, the modern, and the contemporary period. I agree with the historically deep and geographically wide perspective on globalization (Pieterse, 2009) in that it helps us to avoid the Eurocentric view that attributes the process of globalization to the “journeys of [Western] modernity” (Pieterse, 2009, p. 27). Yet, to highlight the dynamic relationship between the nation and globalization, I will discuss the nation, focusing on the era of “contemporary accelerated globalization,” in which “the volume of materials moved is larger, the speeds with which they are moved are faster, and the diversity of materials moved is greater” (Pieterse, 2009, p. 16, 28).

In South Korea, the 1980s signifies the beginning of this historical period of globalization. Particularly, in the late 1980s, South Korea underwent a rapid shift in ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes, which Appadurai (1996) perceives as the building blocks of globalization. Due to worldwide sports events and international agreements, such as Asian Game in 1986, Trade Liberalization of Foreign Processed Food in 1987, and The Seoul Olympics in 1988, and Liberalization of Overseas Trip in 1989, globalization became prevalent in various social dimensions. In this regard, this project investigates the shifting boundaries of “Korea” articulated by the media’s food discourses since the 1980s. However, it is not to delineate

a genealogy of the nation and globalization. Its goal is to contextualize the food-media-nation nexus after 2008 when the globalization of Korean food became a national issue.

*The Tension between the Nation and Globalization*

As people's daily lives become more and more interwoven with the complex, overlapping, and disjunctive flows of globalization (Appadurai, 1996), group and individual identifications are becoming "nationally deterritorialized, and locally and globally, even virtually, reterritorialized" (Edensor, 2002, p. 28). It appears that the nation loses its cohesive force. Especially, globalists have interpreted globalization in terms of "'undermining,' 'undercutting,' 'outflanking,' or 'marginalization' of the nation-state" (Mann, 1997, p. 473). Proponents of cultural imperialism have also seen the nation-state as a victim of the accelerating encroachment of a homogenized and westernized consumer culture (Tomlinson, 2003).

However, the nation-state is not on the receiving end of globalization but engages in the globalization process as a strategic actor, which "may now be leaner but also more active, and in some areas assume greater responsibility" (Pieterse, 2009, p. 11). For instance, Schiller (1999) notes that Asian countries, such as Japan, China, and the Philippines, consistently reclaim their emigrant populations as members of their ancestral states. Kong (1999) also argues that the Singapore state continually takes strategic actions and policies to inculcate Singaporean transmigrants in China with a sense of national belonging. As such, it is a mistake to ignore the role played by nation-states in binding their populations into another cultural-political order of local identification (Tomlinson, 2003).

The proliferation of identity politics provides a basis for the claim that the nation is withering away. One effect of globalization processes is the growing international connection between people. Tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals have increased the familiarity with others and have changed the world in which we live (Appadurai, 1996). The international connection between people has also increased because of the shift in mediascapes, which offer repertoires of images and narratives to viewers (Appadurai, 1996). Due to electronic and digital technologies and systems, which transcend geographical limitations, people have been able to get unfettered access to distant others. The increasing social networks and organizations as well as the deterritorialization have brought about the rise of new forms of collective identities. And the rise of identity politics around ethnicity, race, or religion has challenged the dominance of the nation as a primary social grouping (Tomlinson, 2003).

However, globalization does not merely increase the familiarity with others; it also develops an awareness of difference. The intensified contact with others makes people recognize discrepancies between themselves and others and draw an imaginary boundary between the “in-group” and the idiosyncratic “out-group.” Featherstone (1996) explains this ambivalence as follows:

The bilateral interactions that occur between nation-states, especially those which involve increasing competition and conflict, can have the effect of unifying the self-image of the nation, as well as the image or national face which is presented to the other. An increase in the regularity and intensity of contact...can intensify the pressures to form a distinctive and coherent identity (p. 56).

As described above, the increased awareness of others enhances the awareness of “ourselves.” In this sense, Bhabha (1990) writes, “the ‘locality’ of national culture is

neither unified nor unitary in relation to itself” (p. 4). Also, the identity politics in proliferating social locations does not refer to the imminent collapse of the nation. Since globalization threatens both the cultural and spatial fixity, it can generate fears of loss and ontological chaos. Those fears and anxieties entail “a discursive and affective focus for reclaiming a sense of situatedness” (Edensor, 2002, p. 28). They also engender “nostalgic attachments to homeland” (Marden, 1997, p. 49) and the desire to return home—regardless of whether the home is real or imaginary (Featherstone, 1996). In addition, the lack of cultural fixity does not render the impoverishment of national culture. The global circulation of images and narratives of nations provide flexible cultural resources, which can be enacted by various groups in different social locations to create new symbolic modes of affiliation and belonging. With the flexible resources, a sense of national belonging can be contained within the nation-state as well as detached from the nation-state (Edensor, 2002). In other words, the physical presence in a territory is not a necessary condition for a feeling of nationhood (Kong, 1999). As Pieterse (1994) puts it, transnational location reinforces a sense of national belonging, often leading to absentee patriotism and long-distance nationalism.

Globalization challenges but does not eliminate the nation. Nor does the proliferation of identity politics make the nation disappear. Globalization “goes above the nation-state” and, at the same time, it “goes below it” (Hall, 1997a, p. 179). Thus, the nation and globalization should not be conceived in dichotomous terms; they are inextricably bound together. Also, all societies do not experience global forces in a uniform way. Different social compositions, histories, surrounding environments, and power resources shape various responses to globalization (Featherstone, 1996). In other

words, the tension between the nation and globalization is “more complex than is usually recognized in the globalization literature” (Waisbord & Morris, 2001, p. ix). As such, it would be a mistake “to overlook focus on one side in favor of exclusive concern with the other” (Cvetkovich & Kellner, 1997, p. 1). It would also be premature to confirm the “death throes” of the nation (Marden, 1997, p. 37) or its “bowing off the stage of history” (Hall, 1997a, p. 177).

### The Janus-Faced Nation and Critical Hybridity

The discursive construction of the nation entails a struggle for homogenization. To form the cultural boundary of “the nation-space” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 4) requires the negation of domestic differences. In order to represent itself as a homogeneous entity, the nation should absorb *intranational* differences, such as class, region, gender, race, and ethnicity (Hall, 1997a). However, the process of imagining the nation is not a mere product of internal factors (Featherstone, 1996). The nation is located in the relational matrix of its significant others. It is mobilized in response to “the unavoidable contacts, interdependencies, and power struggles” (Featherstone, 1996, pp. 55-56) with others. For example, to be English means “to know yourself in relation to the French, to the hot-blooded Mediterraneans, and to the passionate, traumatized Russian soul” (Hall, 1997a, p. 174). In other words, the construction of the nation accompanies with the two discursive strategies: assimilation that aims at the construction of *intranational* sameness; dissimilation that aims at the construction of *international* differences (deCillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999). The notion of hybridity provides a vantage point for elucidating this “Janus-faced” discourse of the nation (Bhabha, 1990, p. 4).

Hybridity is one of the “emblematic notions” of global conditions (Kraidy, 2005, p. 1) formed by interracial mixture, interethnic contact, decolonization, and mass communicational fusions (García-Canclini, 1995). It is concerned with the sociocultural processes in which different and separate structures or practices are mixed to generate new structures, objects, identities, and practices (García-Canclini, 1995; Pieterse, 2009). It refers to “a cross-category” process, which subsumes “cultures, nations, ethnicities, status groups, classes, and genres” (Pieterse, 2009, p. 78). The diversity of cultural mixtures has generated a rich vocabulary, such as syncretism (the mixture of religion), mestizaje (the mixture of race), and creolization (the mixture of language) (Kraidy, 2005). Hybridity is a terminology that encapsulates border crossing of those various categories.

The virtue of hybridity is that it acknowledges the unevenness embodied in the mixture and problematizes the boundary fetishism. As discussed above, the cultural boundary of the nation is constructed both *against* and *through* differences. To make the nation appear a stable and homogeneous entity, the nation-state conceals the history of mixing and disguises internal differences. At the same time, the nation-state appropriates “Others” to build up its distinctiveness: some “Others” are assimilated into the nation; others remain “Others,” in which a hierarchical structure is inherent.<sup>8</sup> Hybridity looks into these “asymmetrical inclusion” and “hierarchical integration” (Pieterse, 2009, p. 32). Although boundaries are historical and cultural constructs, their resulting status of the

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<sup>8</sup> For example, others, in Japan, are perceived in different ways. *Gaijin* is commonly used only in reference to whites, who are assumed to be Westerners, while *gaikojin* refers to Blacks and non-Japanese Asians. The lexicographic difference implies the prevalent ideologies with regard to Japan and “Others,” such as Occidentalism, reversed orientalism, and Japanese exceptionalism (Creighton, 2003).

marginalized and the privileged are naturalized by boundary fetishism. As it entertains border crossing, hybridity problematizes the fixity of and fetishism of boundaries and reveals the history of mixing practices (García-Canclini, 1995; Kraidy, 2005) concealed by “religious, national, imperial, and civilizational chauvinisms” (Pieterse, 2009, p. 88). It also discloses “a variety of historical, economic, and cultural forces whose enmeshments with one another are as manifest at the local, national, and regional levels as they are visible globally” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 6).

At this point, it is important to distinguish critical hybridity from other types of hybridity. Hybridity has been approached in three folds: empirical/descriptive, theoretical/analytical, and normative/critical (Dirlik, 1996; García-Canclini, 1995; Kraidy, 2005; Pieterse, 2009). On a descriptive level, researchers seek to discover components of and existential status of hybridity. Thinking hybridity on an analytical level means examining the depth, scope, direction, and implication of hybridity. A critical approach to hybridity pays more attention to the questions of power and inequality, and gives a critique of boundary fetishism. It investigates prior assumptions about difference, purity, and fixed boundaries; examines how and why the boundaries have become historically and socially significant; and explores what maintains the boundary fetishism in a given society at a given moment (Pieterse, 2009). Both descriptive and analytical approaches are useful to explain different times, patterns, types, and styles of mixing (Pieterse, 2009). However, this dissertation employs critical hybridity to elucidate the asymmetrical process of hybridization, which is inherent not only in the globalization process but also in the construction of the nation. Through the critical approach to hybridity, this dissertation will unmask the “Janus-faced” characteristic of the nation

(Bhabha, 1990, p. 4) and unveil the boundaries on which the nation identifies significant others and insignificant “us.”

### Critical Discourse Analysis as a Methodological Framework

Discourse is a difficult concept, largely because there are so many conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints (Fairclough, 1992, p. 3).

As many academic disciplines utilize the notion of discourse for the understanding of society and human responses (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006), discourse and discourse analysis have become a diverse area of study that entails various approaches (Fairclough, 1992). To enumerate examples, discourse has been approached through linguistic and sociolinguistic analysis, semiotic analysis, speech act theory and pragmatics, conversation analysis, discursive psychology, narrative analysis, critical linguistics and social semiotics, social-cognitive analysis, and cultural-generic analysis (Fairclough, 1992; Jaworski & Coupland, 2006). Though each discipline and approach uses discourse in a different way, there is a growing consensus that discourse is “*beyond language in use*” (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006, p. 3, emphasis in original). Especially, researchers, who take a critical approach to discourse, have viewed discourse as social practice, which is “socially and historically situated” and is in a “dialectical relationship with other facets of the social” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 54). They argue that discourse is “socially shaped, but is also socially shaping—or socially constitutive” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 55).

On the one hand, the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourses; on the other hand, discourses influence social and political reality... Through discourse social actors constitute knowledge, situations, social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations between various interacting social groups. In addition, discursive acts are

socially constitutive in a number of ways (de Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 157).

As quoted above, critical approach to discourse differs from other types of approach in that it does not just describe “discursive practices” (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 12) but attempts to show both the socially constitutive and socially conditioned properties of discourse (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Fairclough, 1992). It is concerned with both discourse as “the instrument of power and control” and discourse as “the instrument of the social construction of the reality” (van Leeuwen, 1993, p. 193). Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical works (1972; 1980) has been quite influential in the development of critical discourse analysis. Fairclough (1992) summarizes Foucault’s significant insights as follows: “the constitutive nature of discourse,” “the primacy of interdiscursivity and intertextuality,” “the discursive nature of power,” “the political nature of discourse,” and “the discursive nature of social change” (pp. 55-56). Understanding the nation as a discourse, this dissertation also embraces Foucault’s insights into the nature of discourse and that of power. Through the analysis of media’s discourse of food and its articulation of the nation, it investigates the relationship of discourse and power, the discursive construction of subjects and knowledge, and the conditions of transformation of the knowledge.

However, critical discourse analysis distances itself from Foucault’s view on discourse in several ways. First, whereas Foucault (1980) is concerned with the politics of the *scientific* statement, critical discourse analysis perceives any “written and spoken ‘discourse’ as a form of social practice” (de Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999, p. 157). I agree with critical discourse scholars’ broad view of discourse and their claim that media discourse constitutes “an important resource and topic for other types of discourse”

(Fairclough, 1995, p. 50). Yet, it does not mean that this dissertation denies a constitutive nature of scientific statements; rather, it attempts to apply Foucault's insights to the analysis of media discourse. Secondly, critical discourse scholars criticize Foucault's neglect of textual analysis. As Fairclough (1992) puts it, Foucault's analysis of discourse does not include "discursive and linguistic analysis of real texts" (p. 56). His focus is upon abstract systems of rules "according to which the true and the false are separated" (Foucault, 1980, p. 132). He is more concerned with such question as:

what *governs* statements, and the way in which they *govern* each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures (Foucault, 1980, p. 112, emphasis in original).

However, text itself is constitutive of social relations, knowledge, and belief, and it is a "sensitive barometer of sociocultural change" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 52). In addition, text or its "generic structure" (the structure of the text) plays a crucial role in mediating the "field structure" (a structure used in the text) and (social) minds of recipients (van Leeuwen, 1993, p. 193). The structure of texts not only facilitates "the formation of specific social representations," but also determines "specific mental processes" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 259). In so doing, it produces subtle forms of dominance and manufactures consensus and legitimacy of the dominance. Thus, researchers should include "actual instances of discourse" to their analysis (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56). In this regard, Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) writes,

Critical scholars explain that individuals are "imprinted" by their culture's power-knowledge relations and researchers must use "texts" as their starting point in order to more accurately investigate social power (p. 281).

Another discrepancy between critical discourse analysis and Foucault's view of discourse is that Foucault is resistant to use the notion of ideology. One reason Foucault

denies ideology is that it is based on “a distinction between *true* statements about the world (science) and *false* statements (ideology)” (Hall, 2006, p. 166, emphasis in original). He argues that discourses themselves are “neither true nor false” (Foucault, 1980, p. 118). For him, a particular discourse or resulting knowledge becomes “true” when it has real effects in practice (Hall, 2006). Due to his relativism, Foucault has been criticized for sidestepping an ideological dimension of discourse (Fairclough, 1992). In opposition to Foucault’s relativistic notion of truth, critical discourse scholars identify their works as ideological analysis. They claim that discourse plays “a prominent role as the preferential site for the explicit, verbal formulation and the persuasive communication of ideological propositions” (van Dijk, 1995, p. 17). Fairclough (1985) views social institutions as “containing diverse ‘ideological-discursive formations’ (IDFs) associated with different groups within the institution” (p. 739), and explains the purpose of discourse analysis as following:

A characteristic of a dominant IDF is the capacity to “naturalize” ideologies, i.e. to win acceptance for them as non-ideological “common sense.” It is argued that the orderliness of interactions depends in part upon such naturalized ideologies. To “denaturalize” them is the objective of a discourse analysis which adopts “critical” goals. I suggest that denaturalization involves showing how social structures determine properties of discourse, and how discourse in turn determines social structures (Fairclough, 1985, p. 739).

The goal of this dissertation does not differ from what Fairclough (1985) suggests. It seeks to explore how particular discourses of the nation have been depoliticized and naturalized and how power has been exercised and challenged through the media’s discursive practices. However, it does not contradict Foucault’s relativistic understanding of truth, either. Though Foucault’s concept of discourse avoids “the problem of truth/falsehood in ideology” (Hall, 2006, p. 167), it does not evade the issue

of ideology itself. Indeed, he clearly defines the issue of truth as “ideological struggles,” stating, “it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation” (Foucault, 1980, p. 132). In other words, Foucault sees truth status as an outcome of ideological struggles, which is linked to “a contestation over power” (Hall, 2006, p. 167). Focusing on the *becoming* nature of truth, Foucault avoids a fixed distinction between ideology and scientific “facts.” He also uses the notion of truth rather than ideology to stress the constitutive nature of discourse. He resists making use of ideology because it “stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc.” (Foucault, 1980, p. 118). He argues that discourse is not merely “superstructural,” though it is produced and transmitted “under the control” of “political and economic apparatuses,” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 132-133).

Understanding the nation as a discourse in a Foucaudian perspective, this project aims to investigate a shift in the regime of truth about “Korea” with a focus on the media’s food discourses. However, Foucault’s discourse analysis is only concerned with the discursive formation of scientific discourse and with the ensemble of rules that govern the true and the false, which eventually limits Foucault’s work. As such, this dissertation pays attention to “concrete instances of [discourse] practice and the textual forms” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 61), as critical discourse scholars suggest. I also consent to the claim that critical discourse analysis should be an ideological critique and examine both the socially constitutive and socially conditioned nature of discourse. Yet, as described above, Foucault’s notion of truth is not contradictory to critical discourse scholars’ understanding of ideology. Rather, it provides a detailed account of how particular discourses come to secure ideological dominance. Thus, it would not be

problematic for this dissertation to utilize both Foucault's concept of truth and the analytical methods developed by critical discourse scholars.

### Research Methods

On a methodological level, critical discourse analysis does not provide a standard set of procedures (Fairclough, 1992). While some scholars entertain the diversity of methods, others seek for "a systematic and focused framework" (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000, p. 450). Yet, most scholars acknowledge the significance of concrete texts in discourse analysis. They view texts as "specific products, or 'sediments' of meaning, which, to varying degrees, will reflect global as well as local discourse practices relevant to their production and reception" (Jaworski & Coupland, 2006, p. 6). In this regard, Fairclough (1992) defines critical discourse analysis as a "textually- (and therefore linguistically-) oriented discourse analysis" (p. 37). However, the focus on texts does not refer to "a reduction of discourse analysis to textual or linguistic analysis" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56). To avoid textual reductionism, Fairclough (1992; 1995) suggests a three-dimensional approach for critical discourse analysis in practice, which includes analysis of texts, analysis of discourse practices, and analysis of social practice. This approach enables researchers to examine the detailed properties of texts and relate them to "social properties of discursive events as instances of social practice" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 8). It also uncovers the ways in which wider sociocultural contexts shape discourse practices and the "generic structure" (van Leeuwen, 1993, p. 193) of texts (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Fairclough, 1995). In other words, it provides a useful tool to investigate a dialectical relationship between texts and society/culture, which is a core concern of critical discourse analysis.

Utilizing the three-dimensional approach, this dissertation aims to explore a regime of truth about the nation with an emphasis on media's food discourses. The main focus is on the food-media-nation nexus articulated since 2008 when Korean food became a significant issue to the Korean government and television industry. Given the inextricable relationship between the nation and globalization, the nexus could be extended to food-media-nation-globalization. To contextualize this conjuncture and the "articulatory processes" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 9), I also investigate a shift in the regime of truth about "Korea" since the 1980s, which signifies "the era of contemporary accelerated globalization" (Pieterse, 2009, p. 16) in Korea. As noted in Chapter 1, this project mainly explores the following questions:

RQ1: How has Korean food television evolved since the 1980s?

RQ2: What discourses has Korean food television produced regarding Korean cuisine and the Korean nation?

RQ3: In what contexts have these discourses evolved over time since the 1980s?

RQ4: How have power relations been exercised, negotiated, and/or challenged by the Korean television industry?

To answer these questions in a practical way, I conducted textual analysis, institutional analysis,<sup>9</sup> and historical analysis. However, each analysis does not precisely correspond to each dimension of discourse. I used the three analyses simultaneously to complement the analysis of text, discourse practice, and social practice. For example, to illustrate the detailed properties of texts, I employed both textual analysis and historical

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<sup>9</sup> According to critical discourse analysis scholars, institutional analysis should be an ideological analysis of social institutions (Fairclough, 1985). In this dissertation, I used this term to refer to my analysis of discourse practice of production.

analysis. For the analysis of media's food discourses produced since 2008, I investigated concrete texts, such as television shows and documentaries that feature Korean food as a main subject. To delineate media's food discourses before 2008, I used secondary resources, including broadcasting white papers, academic works, trade journals, and news articles.

As for the textual analysis, this dissertation examines three television programs, including *Korean's Dining Table*, *The Great Competition for Korean Food*, and *EBS Docuprime*. I selected these programs for an intertextual analysis of the texts, which focuses on "the borderline between text and discourse practice" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 61). Produced by a public broadcasting channel KBS-1 (Korean Broadcasting System-1), *Korean's Dining Table* utilizes documentary genre and takes a humanistic approach to Korean food. On the other hand, *The Great Competition for Korean Food*, a reality-competition program, has aired on a commercial cable network Olive. *EBS Docuprime* was chosen based on the credibility of EBS (Educational Broadcasting System) as an educational broadcaster. Taken together, the analysis of the three television texts will account for different domains and types of television discourse on Korean food. As to *Korean's Dining Table* that has 349 episodes as of December 28, 2017, I examined the first episode of every month. For *The Great Competition for Korean Food*, I watched all three seasons (36 episodes) and selected critical cases for close-reading. And I conducted a detailed analysis of *EBS Docuprime*'s three episodes that feature Korean food as a primary theme—"Speaking of Korean Food" aired from March 12, 2012 to March 14, 2012. In order to deconstruct these texts, I paid particular attention to the following analytical units: subject matter, semantic structure, argumentation, source/archive, lexical

or syntactic style, metaphor, and rhetorical figure (de Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999; Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Hall, 2006; van Dijk, 1993),

For the analysis of television food shows created from the late 1980s to 2008, I looked into a variety of secondary resources, including academic works that have studied the history of Korean broadcasting and television food shows; trade journals, such as *Newspaper and Broadcasting* produced by Korean Press Foundation since 1964; the yearbook of the three major television networks in Korea—MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation), KBS (Korean Broadcasting System), and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System); and newspaper articles that have dealt with television food shows. All research materials, except for newspaper articles, were gathered through the online database from Korea Creative Content Agency, MBC, KBS, SBS, and National Assembly Library.

To understand the power relations that circulate in the discursive practices of food TV, I conducted an institutional analysis, focusing on in-depth interviews. To prevent a risk of assuming a single voice as a “univocality” or “one-to-one correspondence with social ‘facts’ or institutions” (Jenkins, 1994, p. 444), I had interviews with various actors, such as food TV producers, governmental officials, researchers of governmental policy, and professionals in the food industry (see Table 1). Carried out through two research trips to Korea from December 2014 to January 2015 and from May 2016 to July 2016, this institutional analysis accounts for how “the general functioning of an apparatus of truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 132) is articulated in the Korean television’s food discourses, and how sociocultural contexts and texts are mediated by its production practices.

Table 1

*The List of Interviewees*

Name	Date	Length	Position	Affiliation
Cho, Seungheon	5/25/2016	1h 30m	Advertising planner	SM C&C
Ha, Jeongseok	12/16/2014	1h 35m	Senior director	CJ E&M
Heo, Mooran	6/2/2016	1h 20m	Senior director	MBC Everyone
Hwang, Gyoik	5/27/2016	1h 50m	Food critic and columnist	
Hwang, Yonggyun	12/17/2014	1h 15m	Chief producer, Department of Outsourcing Production	KBS
Joo, Hyoungha	12/29/2014	1h 35m	Professor, Graduate School of Korean Studies	The Academy of Korean Studies
Kang, Heon	1/2/2015	1h 30m	Culture critic	
Kim, Donghee	1/6/2015	1h 35m	Secretary general	KFF
Kim, Hyunju	1/5/2015	1h 35m	Associate research fellow, Tourism Policy Division	Korea Culture & Tourism Institute
Kim, Jiseong	12/22/2014	1h 30m	Restaurant owner	
Kim, Shinjae	5/24/2016	1h 05m	Senior deputy director, Food Industry Policy Division	MAFRA
Kim, Taehee	1/5/2015	1h 30m	Professor, Department of Cultural Tourism Industry	Kyung Hee University
Ko, Mingoo	5/25/2016	1h25m	Chief producer, Entertainment Team 1	CJ E&M
Lee, Bokyun	12/26/2014	2h 10m	Department head, Department of New Business Development	LOTTE
Lee, Changwoo	6/2/2016	1h 30m	Production producer, Production Team 3	JTBC
Lee, Junghwa	6/7/2016	1h 40m	Chief producer	CJ E&M
Lee, Jungok	1/2/2015	1h 20m	Producer, Educational Documentary Team	EBS
Lee, Wookjung	12/17/2014	1h 25m	Producer, Documentary Division	KBS
Ok, Keuntae	6/1/2016	1h 40m	Chief producer, Entertainment Production 2	SBS Medianet
Park, Youngho	5/13/2016	1h 15m	Assistant secretary to the President for Oceans and Fisheries	Office of the President Republic of Korea
Seong, Heeseong	5/20/2016	1h 25m	Chief producer, Production Team 3	JTBC
Yoo, Misun	5/18/2016	1h 30m	Senior deputy director, Food Grain Policy Division	MAFRA
Yoon, Sookja	1/6/2015	1h 15m	Chairperson	Institute of Traditional Korean Food

The political and economic contexts that have shaped the food-media-nation nexus are addressed through the examination of governmental policies, international agreements, broadcasting acts, and industrial statistics. I collected those materials through the official website of government agencies, including but not limited to the Ministry of Government Legislation ([www.moleg.go.kr](http://www.moleg.go.kr)), Statistics Korea ([kostat.go.kr](http://kostat.go.kr)),<sup>10</sup> the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs ([www.korea.go.kr](http://www.korea.go.kr)), and the Blue House ([www.president.go.kr](http://www.president.go.kr)). To elucidate the key actors and contexts of “Korean Food Globalization” project initiated in 2008, I looked into newspaper articles on Korean food, Korean food globalization, President Lee’s campaign pledges, and Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement published between the late 2007 and the early 2008.

For all newspaper articles, I primarily used the Korean Integrated Newspaper Database System ([www.bigkinds.or.kr](http://www.bigkinds.or.kr)). As an official news archive of the Korea Press Foundation, the online database BIGKinds covers a wide range of contemporary newspapers. Although it does not offer news search service for three major daily newspapers, including *Chosun Ilbo*, *JoongAng Ilbo*, and *Dong-a Ilbo*, its search results provide sufficient resources for understanding social and news trends in particular objects, figures, and incidents as it involves seven nationwide daily newspapers. Since BIGKinds does not provide newspaper articles published before 1990, I used another database Naver News Library ([newslibrary.naver.com](http://newslibrary.naver.com)) to find the articles about television food shows in the late 1980s. To grasp the understanding of governmental discourse on Korean food, I also examined *The Taste of Korea*, which is an

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<sup>10</sup> Statistics Korea is a central organization for statistics under the Ministry of Strategy and Finance.

organizational newsletter of the Korean Food Foundation (KFF) published twice a month since August 2011.

Bringing together the three types of analysis, this dissertation examines both the micro aspects of discourse and the macro levels of discourse (Fairclough, 1992), which have articulated the food-media-nation nexus in Korea. It sheds light on the discursive themes and strategies that Korean food TV has utilized to produce and legitimate knowledge and beliefs surrounding national cuisine and the nation. Moreover, it elucidates how the nation-state appropriates the banality of food and involves in the production practices of television industry in order to produce and disseminate hegemonic discourse on the nation and to keep nationhood near the surface of everyday life. Based on the investigation of the interplay between television texts and social conditions, this dissertation also explicates socially constructed and socially constitutive nature of media discourse. Further, it enriches the discussion regarding the production culture of global television industries by demonstrating how media practitioners negotiate a variety of external and internal factors for their production practices.

## CHAPTER 3

## THE HISTORY OF KOREAN FOOD TV AND ITS SOCIAL SITUATEDNESS

Genre is not just a form of textual codification but a system of orientation, expectation, and convention. Although it originated with the commercial nature of the Hollywood's production system (McArthur, 1972), it circulates between texts, industry, and audience (Neale, 1980). In other words, genre functions as a semantic site where the different elements of "the circuit of culture" are temporarily articulated (du Gay, Hall, Janes, Mackay, & Negus, 1997, p. 3).

By reading Sony's Walkman as a cultural artifact, du Gay et al. (1997) provide a holistic analytical framework allowing scholars not to fall into reductionism and essentialism. They argue that any mode of cultural circuit—representation, identity, production, consumption, and regulation—is not entirely determined by one particular mode, albeit inseparable from and interconnected to each other. Modifying this model, D'Acci (2004) suggests that media studies scholars examine four cultural sites: 1) cultural artifact, 2) production, 3) consumption, and 4) sociohistorical context. She writes that each site cannot be understood apart from the conditions of other sites. While du Gay et al. (1997) and D'Acci (2004) conceive the cultural circuit differently to some extent, they share the ideas of anti-essentialism and anti-reductionism, which accompany the notion of "articulation." According to du Gay et al. (1997), articulation is "the form of the connection that can make a unity of two or more different or distinct elements, under certain conditions" (p. 3). It is a linkage that is "not necessary, determined, or absolute and essential for all time" (du Gay et al., 2004, p. 3). This concept of articulation and the

models of cultural circuit help to understand the television genre as a linkage among texts, audience, industry, and sociocultural contexts. Also, they are complementary to Fairclough's three dimensional discourse analysis that encompasses texts, discursive practices, and social contexts.

Through this understanding of genre as an articulation of different cultural sites, this chapter elucidates how various material and discursive contexts are articulated in food television from the 1980s to 2007 in Korea. The goal of this chapter is not to list all television food shows in chronological order or discover the specific genre conventions of culinary television. Rather, it is to explore the social imperatives that involved in the production practices of the Korean television industry. More importantly, it is to situate food television's discourses about the nation, which I will discuss in Chapter 6, within sociocultural, political, economic, and historical contexts. For the background information, I will describe below the history of Korean food TV. I will then discuss the sociohistorical circumstances that shaped the conjuncture of food and television.

#### The Development and Transformation of Food Television (1980s-2007)

Since the late twentieth century, media discourses about food have proliferated and our lives have been increasingly engulfed by televised images of food (de Solier, 2005; Ketchum, 2005). Reflecting wider trends of television programming formats, food television has expanded its formats from instructional cooking shows to "all things food" (de Solier, 2005; Ketchum, 2005). Now, food is to be found in a variety of television formats, such as lifestyle shows, travel shows, magazine programs, reality shows, game/survival shows, live variety shows, docu-soaps, and melodramas (de Solier, 2005). Moreover, during the past two decades, several countries have witnessed the growth of

television networks entirely devoted to food (Ketchum, 2005). Examples encompass the Food Network in the United States, China Food TV in China, Lifestyle Food in Australia, and Cuisine+ in France (the latter disappeared in 2015) (de Solier, 2005). Korea is no exception to this global trend. Just as food television has developed globally from simple “cooking instruction” to “restaurant-set competition” shows (Oren, 2013, pp. 20-21), Korean food television has evolved through its interaction with other television genres and historical circumstances. With the development of cable networks in the late 1990s, Korea also observed the emergence of food-dedicated television networks, such as Food TV and Olive TV.

The origin of Korean food television can be traced back to the 1960s when the first commercial broadcaster, TongYang Broadcasting Company (TBC), aired *Today's Cooking* and *Housewife News* (A. Kim, 2014; S. Kim, 2015). The format and content of this early food television were imported from their predecessors on radio, such as *Housewife Time* on KyungSung Broadcasting (JODK), which was founded during the era of Japanese colonization (S. Kim, 2015). As media historian Dana Polan notes, the new medium of television was widely perceived as an intimate tool for the “instruction in the arts of the home” (as cited in Oren, 2013, p. 22). Likewise, early Korean food television developed as an instructional means to promote enlightenment campaigns and modern lifestyles (Y. Joo, 2011; S. Kim, 2015). Yet, this early form of food television did not last long because of two global oil crises in 1973 and 1978. In order to save energy, the Korean government banned broadcasting transmission in the morning except for Sunday, and as a result, morning-time, how-to-cook programs rapidly disappeared from Korean television (A. Kim, 2014).

When the ban was lifted in 1981, the Korean television industry resumed morning broadcasting on May 25<sup>th</sup>. Although there was a controversy over the restarting of morning broadcasting, the desire to “swiftly process flooded information and revitalize stiffened television programming” (Dong-a Ilbo, 1981, April 1, p. 7) outpaced public concern about morning broadcasting as “a waste of electricity” (S. Kang, 1981, August 4, p. 12). To fulfill the desire, television networks filled up morning broadcasting time with news programs and instructional/educational information programs (Dong-a Ilbo, 1981, May, 26). Though morning news programs, such as *News Wide* and *News Show*, retained a sizable male viewership, the main audience for morning broadcasting was housewives (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, July 2). Within this context, two public television networks, Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) and Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), produced female-centered, domestic cooking shows—*Today’s Cooking* and *Home Cooking*. The two instructional cooking shows immediately gained wide popularity, and *Today’s Cooking* ranked number one in the ratings of morning broadcasting in June, 1981 (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, July 2). The following news article effectively portrays the unprecedented popularity of food television among housewives in the early 1980s:

MBC TV’s *Today’s Cooking*, where actress Youngran Kim appears, is explosively popular among homemaker viewers. Food stylist JongIm Lee and Ms Kim offer a lecture on cooking everyday at 9:35am except for Sunday. MBC is swamped with an overwhelming number of calls that requests a repeat of menu and recipe. Ms Kim is also very excited as she receives immediate feedback from viewers and even gets invited to come and eat their dishes (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, June 22, p. 12).

As described above, the goal of *Today’s Cooking* and its competitor *Home Cooking* was like that of their precursors in the 1960s in that they took the same

instructional style to assist the homemaker in the domestic work of nourishing, cooking, and family-care (Oren, 2013) while simultaneously teaching unmarried women the virtue of becoming housewives. Indeed, Youngran Kim, the assistant host of *Today's Cooking*, boastfully stated that she finally had confidence in being a housewife after a yearlong training on the show (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1982, July 7, p. 12).

However, one significant distinction of 1980s Korean food television when compared to its 1960s predecessors is that it features not only food experts but also female celebrities. Although *Today's Cooking* and *Home Cooking* delivered a lecture on cooking in a domestic kitchen-like set, the female celebrities lightened the “lecturing” tone of the show, commented on the taste of dishes, and added elements of talk shows to food television. In this light, Soocheol Kim (2015) views the food television of the 1980s as having a transitional status between hard information shows and soft entertainment shows. While the format of instructional cooking shows continued until the early 1990s, Korean food television’s tendency toward entertainment steadily increased. For example, KBS2, which is more entertainment-oriented than KBS1, started to produce a food/travel show titled *Taste and Flavor Showoff* in 1983 and an evening cooking show *Cooking is Joyful* in 1989. Featuring actress Yookyung Oh as a main host, *Taste and Flavor Showoff* got out of the domestic kitchen, visited famous restaurants, and thus proposed a new format for food television, even though the show was blamed for copying Japanese television programs (S. Kim, 1984, October, 22, p. 3). *Cooking is Joyful* addressed both the homemaker and other family members as its target audience by airing at 6pm (Youm, 2016), and incorporated more entertainment by adopting elements of the talk show style and by featuring a male comedian as its main host (H. Hong, 1989, December 21).

Whilst most researchers read the 1980s as the initial stage of the Korean food television and agree upon the characteristics of early food shows, they show discrepancies in interpreting the later development and the transformation of food television in the 1990s and 2000s. Through the study of Korean food television and its mutual relationship with food culture and globalization, S. Kim (2015) divides the history of Korean food television into five periods: 1) the rise of television food shows (1981-), 2) food talk shows (1981-1993), 3) food variety shows (1993-2001), 4) restaurant reviews (2001-2011), and 5) the golden age of food shows (2012-2015). In her master's thesis on food television and its socio-cultural contexts, A. Kim (2014) suggests a simpler version of periodization as the following: 1) instructional cooking shows (1981-1999), 2) gourmet and well-being (2000-2008), 3) Korean food variety (2009-2014). Focusing on food television on public broadcast network KBS, Youm (2016) argues that Korean food television has evolved from instructional cooking shows (1985-1992)<sup>11</sup> to food travel shows (1993-1997), food talk shows and gourmet programs (1998-2003), restaurant reviews and well-being (2004-2011), and talk/variety shows (2012-2015). Reconstructing these different perspectives on periodization (A. Kim, 2014; S. Kim, 2015; E. Na, 2015; Park & Baek, 2013; Youm, 2016), Table 2 below provides a snap shot of Korean food television's evolution from the 1980s to 2007.

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<sup>11</sup> Like other researchers, Youm (2016) perceives *Home Cooking* and *Today's Cooking* as an initial form of Korean food television. His periodization of the first stage of food television, namely, 1985-1992, results from his misunderstanding of the broadcast date of *Home Cooking*. While he argues that *Home Cooking* began to air in 1985, it started in 1981 and competed with MBC's *Today's Cooking* until both shows were cancelled in 1993. For this reason, viewers often complained about the airing of the two programs at the same time (J. Gu, 1981, September 23).

Table 2

*Dominant Formats and Representative Examples of Food Television until 2007*

Time Period	Dominant Formats of Food Television	Representative Examples
-1981	Instructional cooking shows	<i>Today's Cooking</i> (TBC) <i>Housewife News</i> (TBC)
1981-1993	Instructional cooking shows	<i>Home Cooking</i> (KBS1) <i>Today's Cooking</i> (MBC)
1993-2000	Food talk shows Food travel shows Food variety shows Soft documentary - Restaurant reviews	<i>Lee Hongryeol Show</i> (SBS) <i>6 O'Clock My Hometown</i> (KBS1) <i>Pipi Cooking Room</i> (KBS2) <i>VJ Special Forces</i> (KBS2)
2000-2007	Infotainment – Restaurant reviews & Well-being Food variety shows	<i>Find! Delicious TV</i> (MBC) <i>Vitamin</i> (KBS2) <i>Decision! Taste to Taste</i> (SBS)

As illustrated above, the year 1993 signals the second phase of Korean food television. Because of low ratings, *Home Cooking* and *Today's Cooking* were cancelled that year, while *Cooking is Joyful* had ceased in 1992. While the initial form of food television—instructional cooking show—gradually disappeared from the Korean television scene, food began to settle in various television formats, such as talk shows, variety shows, travel shows, morning shows, and magazine shows. KBS1's *Home Cooking* was replaced by the food travel show *Following the Taste and Road* that took the same format as *Taste and Flavor Showoff*, and the still-running magazine show *6 O'Clock My Hometown* (KBS1) highlighted rural food to appeal to its audience. It is noteworthy that the two programs utilized food to promote local cultures and arouse a feeling of nostalgia. Indeed, *Following the Taste and Road* faced sharp criticism for not being able to go beyond introducing the taste of local food (A. Kim, 2014). Through the campaign, “one item for each local,” *6 O'Clock My Hometown* introduced and invented indigenous food products so as to revive local economies and cultures (I. Yoo, 1991,

December 21, p. 24). In an interview with *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, the chief producer of *6 O'Clock My Hometown* stated, "I'd like to deliver vigorous heartbeat of hometown... In the program, I will convey the news of affluent and beautiful hometown. Specifically, I will facilitate the direct transaction between urban consumers and local farmers and fishermen, who have preserved our empty hometown ever since young people left to urban areas" (I. Yoo, 1991, December 11, p. 24). As this interview demonstrates, Korean television, in the early 1990s, began to see food, especially agro-fishery products, as the core of cultural practices and elements of the local.

Along with travel shows and magazine shows, morning shows, which mainly addressed current affairs and information, allocated one segment to food. For example, SBS's *Morning Wide* featured food-focused segments, such as "Tasty House, Stylish House" and "Lee Hanwoo's Cooking World." Likewise, KBS2 involved "The Delicacy of Head House Family" as part of *Live TV Good Morning*, and MBC created "The Expedition of Cooking on the Spot" to gain more viewership of its morning show *Live TV Morning is Nice*. These food segments provided viewers with information about restaurants, cooking skills, and secret recipes.

While magazine shows, travel shows, and morning shows approached food as information, talk shows and variety shows utilized food as an element of entertainment. Specifically, to create a sense of intimacy, talk show hosts served food to guests or cooked with them in a kitchen setting. Representative examples include *Tonight with Star* in 1994 (SBS), *Lee Hongryeol's Show* in 1996 (SBS), *Noh Youngshim's Opening the World* in 1996 (KBS2), *Between Night and Music* in 1995 (MBC), and *Choi Hwajeong's Delicious Story* in 1998 (MBC). Although these talk shows were not entirely dedicated to

food or cooking, they employed food as a primary device of entertainment and featured food as a “main character” of the show (Dong-a Ilbo, 1994, March 22, p. 21). The following news article illustrates this new trend of food television that began in the mid-1990s:

Food spices up TV programs. Although instructional cooking shows for the housemaker have disappeared, food is increasingly used to flavor the television program that has nothing to do with food. SBS's *Tonight with Star* is very representative. This program, which airs on Monday and Tuesday at 10:55pm, enjoys the advantages of the late-night show and has a regular sketch, in which show host and guest eat a midnight snack” (Dong-a Ilbo, 1994, March 22, p. 21).

This fusion of food and talk expanded the viewership of food television. Not only domestic housewives but also male viewers in their 30s and 40s were addressed as target audiences. Several food talk shows further attempted to reach all family members, including teenagers. For example, *Lee Hongryeol's Show* used food to create “sound humor” from the very beginning, and successfully attracted various age groups (Kang & Yoon, 2002, p. 124).

The mid-1990s also witnessed the emergence of food variety shows. Variety shows, in South Korea, started with the opening of broadcasting stations in 1962, and steadily increased to encompass other television formats, such as talk shows, game shows, comedy shows, and so on (Kang & Yoon, 2002). The term “food variety shows” was coined by journalists, cultural critics, and media practitioners in the mid-1990s to explain and inductively categorize this new usage of food in the television industry (A. Kim, 2014). MBC's signature variety show, *Sunday, on Sunday Night*,<sup>12</sup> created a

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<sup>12</sup> Its former form is *Great March on Sunday Night* that started in March, 1981. The title of the show changed to *Sunday, on Sunday Night* in November, 1988. After changing its title, this show attempted to add more elements of black comedy. It is still on air with the abbreviated title *Ilbam* (KyungHayng Shinmun, 1988, November 21, p. 16).

segment “Yori Cheonha,” in which celebrities competed with each other or against professional chefs. Moreover, three television programs—*Opening the World with Flavor* in 1996 (MBC), *Pipi Cooking Room* in 1998 (KBS2), and *The Best Table* in 1998 (SBS)—employed food as a primary subject and an entertainment device. For example, *The Best Table* utilized various formats, such as competition, lifestyle, and restaurant review, by featuring cooking contests between two amateur teams, celebrities eating out, and Korean culinary expressions. *PipPi Cooking Room* involved the formats of reality shows and talk shows through the on-site filming of shopping, cooking, and delivery. Initially, the two programs were developed as pilots, and scheduled as regular programs afterwards as they were successful in the ratings game. These food variety shows were described as “new generation cooking shows,” and received positive reviews in that they elevated food’s status from “something to eat” to “something to enjoy” (G. Lee, 1998, October 10, p. 14).

In general, talk shows and variety shows are categorized as separate television formats in South Korea (Kang & Yoon, 2002). However, it is hard to make a clear distinction between food talk shows and food variety shows, both of which appeared and enjoyed unprecedented popularity in the mid- and late 1990s. Studying the transformation and development of Korean entertainment shows, Kang and Yoon (2002) point to *Lee Hongryeol’s Show* as an example of a personality talk show. On the other hand, scholars of Korean food television understand it as a kind of variety show. Interestingly, journalists and cultural critics put it under the category of variety talk shows. This classificatory hodgepodge partly results from the multiple purposes and actors of

television genre categorization.<sup>13</sup> More importantly, it is an outcome of the Korean television industry's trend toward genre hybridization in the 1990s, which signifies a period of multi-channel competition (Kang & Yoon, 2002). This tendency also applied to other formats of food television, including instructional cooking shows. The initial form of food television, which focused on the delivery of cooking lessons to domestic housewives, vanished bit by bit as it lost its popularity in the early 1990s. However, it does not mean that the cultural values and practices of the past perished completely.

As Raymond Williams (1977) writes in *Marxism and Literature*, the transition from one epoch to another embodies complex interrelations among the “residual,” the “dominant,” and the “emergent” (p. 122). Distinguishing the residual from the archaic, which is to be observed or to be “revived,” he argues that the residual is still “active in the cultural process” not only “as an element of the past” but also “as an element of the present” (Williams, 1977, p. 122). He further divides the residual into two different types based on their relations to the dominant culture: the one with alternative or even oppositional relations to the dominant culture, and the other having been largely incorporated into the dominant culture (Williams, 1977).

In the mid- and late 1990s, female-centered instructional cooking shows could not survive the predominant production practices that were oriented to genre hybridization and entertainment (Kang & Yoon, 2002). Also, they did not offer alternative or

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<sup>13</sup> Academics often distinguish television genres for critiques and analysis of genre diversity, broadcasters give priority to production routines and conventions, regulatory institutions divide genres to ascertain whether or not each program meets regulations on broadcast scheduling controlled by law, and broadcasting-related industries departmentalize genres to measure ratings and unit cost of advertisement (C. Joo, 2004). To meet their own goals, different actors apply such criteria as content, target audience, format, and function (Park & Baek, 2013).

oppositional meanings and experiences to “the present.” Yet, as the “actively residual” (Williams, 1977, p. 123), they were incorporated into the dominant television culture, by changing their shapes, meanings, and experiences. For example, *Lee Jungsub’s Cooking Show* (KBS2) in 1997 adopted the characteristics of instructional cooking shows, but it featured a male celebrity as main host to fit the new idea that cooking is not exclusively a female activity. Moreover, the conventions of instructional cooking shows were appropriated by the Educational Broadcasting System (EBS) for the purpose of changing its network identity from “television private tutor” to “interesting educational television” (J. Gong, 1994, September 9, p. 21). Indeed, featuring a little girl as its main cook, EBS’s *Little Cook* achieved ratings of about four to eight percent—much higher than the average viewer ratings of EBS programs (J. Gong, 1994, September 9). Also, as described above, the early model of food television was largely incorporated into other television formats, such as comedy shows, talk shows, and variety shows, which characterized television production practices in the mid- and late 1990s (Kang & Yoon, 2002).

In the early 2000s, Korean food television changed by taking soft documentary and infotainment shows as its primary format. Of course, the values and production practices of the 1990s did not completely die out. EBS produced a new recipe show, *The Best Cooking Secret*, in 2000, and other instructional cooking shows, such as *Lee JungSub’s Cooking Show*, moved to the food-committed cable network Channel F that was launched in 2000. Morning shows still involved food-related segments, food travel shows were incorporated into the soft documentary format, and food variety shows also continued. Yet, Korean food television in the early and mid-2000s cannot be fully

illustrated without the soft documentary format that became one of the predominant production practices of the Korean television industry in the 2000s.

Soft documentary is not a prevalent taxonomic category of television genres. In South Korea, the term was developed to describe a series of television programs that employed VJ (video journalist) production system (Oh & Heo, 2010). Unlike other types of documentary, especially *cinéma vérité*, the Korean soft documentary pursued “fast” and “interesting” as its main features, and attempted to combine humanistic, informative, and entertaining approaches (Oh & Heo, 2010, pp. 106-107). The major characteristics of soft documentary involve the following components: humorous and vivid narrations; parallel composition of unrelated subjects; on-site close filming of unique and unusual figures, places, and/or incidents; florid camera work and fast-paced editing; poetic, explanatory, and/or participatory representational styles (J. Kim, 2002; S. Kim, 2004; B. Lee, 2009; Oh & Heo, 2010).

These production practices of soft documentary were chiefly developed by *VJ Special Forces*, which was first aired on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2000 (J. Choi, 2001). In order to enlarge the field of video journalism and avoid the traditional approaches of informative and educational documentary, KBS1 designed a new type of television documentary that made use of the works of video journalists from independent production companies (J. Choi, 2001). In the beginning, *VJ Special Forces* did not address food matters, and paid more attention to the topics that would fit pre-existing journalistic interests (J. Choi, 2001). As it moved to KBS2, which was more actively vying for ratings than KBS1, in October 2000, *VJ Special Forces* began to regularly deal with food items (A. Kim, 2014). This change was an outcome of the production staffs’ awareness that food items had

never failed in the ratings game (Youm, 2016). Although *VJ Special Forces* was not successful in establishing its identity as alternative video journalism, it soon achieved widespread popularity and played the role of “trend-setter” in the Korean television industry (Oh & Heo, 2010, p. 107). Indeed, other broadcasters competitively produced similar soft documentary programs that addressed food items. Table 3 below shows the representative examples of those programs from 2000 to 2007.

Table 3

*Food Television in the Format of Soft Documentary between 2000 and 2007*

Broadcaster	Title of Program	Production Year
KBS	<i>VJ Special Forces</i>	2000
	<i>Infinite Zone Q</i>	2004
MBC	<i>6mm Exploring the World</i>	2003
	<i>Sympathy Unique World</i>	2005
SBS	<i>Master of Living</i>	2005
	<i>Well-being Taste Hunting</i>	2005

As the chief producer of *VJ Special Forces* writes, the program aimed to satisfy viewers’ curiosity and expectation through the close and lively filming of spectacular scenes and fast-paced editing (J. Choi, 2001). These production strategies of soft documentary were shared across broadcasters, and highly influential in creating a new form of food television, namely, *matjib* program (restaurant review programs). While food variety shows and food talk shows in the 1990s used food to enhance entertainment and catalyze conversation, soft documentary focused on providing information on renowned restaurants. Studying the changing forms of restaurant review programs, C. Kim (2012) explains the narrative of *matjib* programs as the following: 1) visiting famous restaurants or finding hidden gems, and showing a long waiting list, 2) identifying specific dishes in the kitchen or on the customers’ table, 3) revealing the secret of special flavors, such as fresh ingredients, unique cooking style, and long history, and 4)

exaggerating customers' reaction through short interviews. Along with the above-mentioned representational practices, this narrative structure, as an effective tool for high audience ratings, continued to the present.

Another predominant format of food television in the early and mid-2000s is infotainment. In South Korea, this hybrid television format started in the early 1990s to strike a balance between commercial interests and public benefits (G. Park, 2004), and, on a more practical level, to circumvent<sup>14</sup> the Enforcement Decree of the Broadcasting Act. Amended in September 1990, it prescribed that television broadcasting must transmit *gyoyang* (the broadcast programs related to culture, henceforth culture programs) for at least 40% of air time; *yeneung* (those related to entertainment), 20%; *bodo* (those related to news reports), 10% (Ministry of Government Legislation, 1990).<sup>15</sup> Although the format suffered social stigma and labels such as “weird entertainment shows,” “education-masked entertainment shows,” and “mutant entertainment shows” (G. Park, 2004), it has continuously grown since the late 1990s, as Figure 1 demonstrates.

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<sup>14</sup> In the spring of 1994, terrestrial broadcasters, such as KBS, MBC, and SBS, announced their new programming schedule. Although they argued that their culture programs would be above 40%, it turned out that they counted infotainment shows as part of culture programming. According to the Korean Broadcasting Commission's analysis, the proportion of culture programs of each network, except for KBS1, was below 40% (Dong-a Ilbo, 1994, May 26, p. 21).

<sup>15</sup> Article 29 of Enforcement Decree of the Broadcasting Act amended in September, 1990 defines news report broadcasts as “the broadcasts related to coverage and commentaries for current events with respect to overall politics, economy, society, culture, etc.”; cultural broadcasts as “broadcasts to inherit and develop unique national culture and to enhance general culture and education of the public”; and entertainment broadcasts as “broadcasts to cultivate national sentiments and make life cheerful” (Ministry of Government Legislation, 1990, September 3).




Figure 1. The Increasing Number of News Articles on Infotainment Shows. Adapted from the search results of news articles on “infotainment” via BIGKinds

The use of food in infotainment shows was activated in two ways. On the one hand, food infotainment shows, like soft documentary, produced a large amount of information about renowned restaurants. Although food infotainment shows incorporated other formats, such as reportage, talk shows, and variety shows, to enhance entertainment and diversify their contents (G. Park, 2004), they remained agents of restaurant advertisements and/or topographers of food service industry at best (S. Kim, 2015). MBC’s *Find! Delicious TV* is a good example of this type of food infotainment show. Aired from 2001 to 2016, *Find! Delicious TV* received high viewer ratings and created a sensation in the Korean television industry, making other broadcasters and media practitioners reevaluate the value of food as television content (A. Kim, 2014). Its production staff described the goal of the show as the following:

Diversified society, the shift in food culture, concomitant development of food service industry! We’d like to make [our show] a guiding program that can elevate food to culture by leading food service culture into the right path and introducing a variety of national cuisines (as cited in A. Kim, 2014, p. 33).

As quoted above, *Find! Delicious TV* attempted to promote food's cultural status and expand the boundary of the Korean food scene. Through the use of different formats for each segment, such as "Legend of Kitchen," "Celebrities' Favorite Restaurants," and "Great Competition of Food, 7 Taste," the program tried to provide useful information on various aspects of culinary culture. However, as the documentary film *The True-Taste Show* argued,<sup>16</sup> *Find! Delicious TV* failed in diversifying food culture or fostering food literacy (S. Kim, 2015). Rather, it only offered restaurant information, standardizing food television and food culture (S. Kim, 2015; O. Lee, 2011, June 3).

Another type of food infotainment approached food through the lens of health and well-being. As the expression "well-being" signifies, this type of program paid more attention to how to live well through eating well. For instance, SBS produced *How to Eat and Live Well* in 2002 and *Hundred-Year-Old Health Special* in 2007; KBS, *Mysteries of the Human Body* in 2002, *Vitamin* in 2003, *Happy Table* in 2004, and *Nobel's Table* in 2006. Although each program utilized different television formats and incorporated elements of entertainment to different degrees, it aimed to combine food and health, based on the traditional notion of *yaksikdongwon*, which suggests that the sources of food are the same as the sources of medicine. A segment "Campaign of Diet Improvement" in *How to Eat and Live Well* suggested what seasonal foods could be a substitute for medicine and of assistance to health improvement. Similarly, *Hundred-Year-Old Health Special* provided the middle- and old-aged audience with food information as part of

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<sup>16</sup> A former television producer of MBC, Jaehwan Kim, produced *The True-Taste Show* in 2011 to reveal the cozy relationship between the food service industry and the media industry. The film provides a detailed explanation of how media manipulate people's reactions to advertise particular restaurants, and how they create a fake reputation for those restaurants in exchange for a bribe. Ironically, this perverted relationship refers to the power of food media in manufacturing food culture.

medical information. By taking the formats of quiz shows and talk shows and featuring both professional and entertainer panelists, KBS's *Vitamin* delivered information on health and well-being from the perspective of entertainment (G. Park, 2004), and achieved constantly high ratings since its first run. Specifically, its segment "Great Table" discussed such issues as quality of life, health, and happiness in terms of food and eating, and made *Vitamin* a representative example of health/food infotainment shows (Y. Kim, 2003, July 8). As their title indicates, other programs, including *Happy Table* and *Nobel's Table*, also attracted audiences by introducing "well-being food" every week.

As discussed above, Korean food television has continuously changed since the early 1980s. By employing various television formats, it has transformed its contents, forms, and audiences. Specifically, the Korean television industry expanded the use of food from educational information to entertainment device, and food became a tool for high viewer ratings. In the following, I will discuss how different socio-historical contexts were articulated in the Korean food television from the early 1980s to 2007, and how Korean television industry embodied those contexts in its production practices.

### The Conditions of Food Television

Exploring the interplay between institutional conditions, socio-political contexts, and broadcasting culture, Kim and Han (2001) classify the history of the Korean television industry into the four following eras: 1) development of broadcasting culture (1962-1969), 2) enjoyment of romantic time (1970-1980), 3) construction of everyday life (1981-1991), and 4) commodification of culture (1992-1999). With a focus on the structural change of the television industry driven by economic, political, and technological circumstances, Kang and Yoon (2002) explain the history of the Korean

television industry through the following five periods: 1) experiment of television (1956-1961), 2) seminal state of television (1961-1969), 3) development of television (1969-1980), 4) monopoly of public television (1980-1991), and 5) competition of multiple channels (1991-2000). These studies provide a meaningful analysis of how Korean television has interacted with various social conditions since its birth. Yet, the historical periodization and the investigation of social contexts should be research-specific. Although previous research is useful to obtain a general understanding of the Korean television industry, it cannot fully explicate internal and external factors that have situated the development and transformation of Korean food television. Specifically, the analysis of food television should involve the shift in both television and food landscapes. With that in mind, I will offer below a snapshot of each era in which Korean food television significantly changed its formats and contents.

#### *The Era of Instructional Cooking Shows (1980s-1993)*

In 1980, the Korean television industry experienced structural upheavals due to political turbulence. When South Korean President Chunghee Park was assassinated on October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1979, Doohwan Chun took advantage of the fragile political situation and ruled South Korea as an unelected coup leader from December 1979 to September 1980. Manipulating rumors of North Korea's infiltration, Chun invoked martial law on May 17<sup>th</sup>, 1980, and suppressed the democratic movement by force of arms, which led to a bloody massacre in Gwangju city. While he was repressing the civil movement, he purged more than 200 journalists and eliminated 172 periodicals (Kang & Yoon, 2002). When he was officially inaugurated as the fifth President of South Korea on September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1980, Chun immediately exercised stricter control over the press and broadcasting. In

November 1980, he rearranged broadcasting industries by merging five broadcasters<sup>17</sup> into the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), and having KBS take over the 65% stocks of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (E. Lim, 2007, November 20).

This forced rearrangement brought about the complete collapse of commercial and private broadcasters and the beginning of a state-controlled broadcasting environment. For example, the commercial network TongYang Broadcasting Company (TBC) was merged into the public network KBS and became KBS2. MBC was also converted into a public broadcaster as KBS became a dominant stockholder of MBC. Although this restructuring was implemented by the new military dictatorship, the Korean Newspapers Association and the Korean Broadcasters Association “voluntarily” adopted a resolution “nurturing and developing wholesome media” on November 14<sup>th</sup>, 1980 (S. Park, 2010, May 18). In the statement, they wrote, “...In the face of new age, our media require self-renovation to adjust to the new situation that undergoes structural transformation... We will contribute to the development of democratic and public media by reorganizing the structure of media that is against public interests of media” (Maeil Business Newspaper, 1980, November 15). A month later, Chun declared the Fundamental Act on the Press that would change the mandatory ratio of culture programs from 30% to 40% (Kang & Yoon, 2002).

Along with the rearrangement of the broadcasting industry, the introduction of color TV largely affected the Korean television scene. The discussion of color broadcasting already began in 1972, and domestic home appliance companies were

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<sup>17</sup> The five broadcasters include TongYang Broadcasting Company (TBC), Dong-a Broadcasting System (DBS), SeoHae Broadcasting Company (SBC), JeonIl Broadcasting, and Korean FM Broadcasting.

making color TV set in the early 1970s (Kang & Yoon, 2002). However, the Park Chunghee administration withheld color broadcasting to prevent social disharmony between classes (J. Im, 2007). In contrast, the new military regime actively promoted the consumption of color TV sets to cheer up and depoliticize people struggling with precarious political conditions. Also, advertisers urged television networks to embark on color broadcasting so as to promote their consumer products. As a result, the luxury tax on color TV sets was lowered in November 1980, and all terrestrial TV channels started color broadcasting in the next month (J. Im, 2007). The proliferation of color TV sets and the opening of color broadcasting triggered “color renovation” in both the television industry and the consumer products industry, and made the Korean television industry pay more attention to the visual aspects of television programs.

Within these contexts, and due to the restart of morning broadcasting, Korean food television started in 1981 as an intrinsic part of culture programming. As mentioned above, the restructuring of the broadcasting industry and the Fundamental Act on the Press constricted entertainment shows and required broadcasters to highlight public interests through the enhanced production of culture programs.<sup>18</sup> Specifically, these cultural policies that emphasized the role of television as a public good were strictly applied to morning broadcasting. Since the purposes of the reopening of morning broadcasting were to provide proper information and to fulfill public demand for culture and education, the Korean government compelled television networks to focus on news,

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<sup>18</sup> Chun’s policies forced television networks to minimize commercial aspects of television. However, color broadcasting allowed media practitioners to produce spectacular show/entertainment programs. As a result, the development of entertainment shows was enhanced, and the competition for viewers between television channels increased during the 1980s (Kang & Yoon, 2002; Lee, 2007). Yet, the morning broadcasting was dedicated to news reports and culture programs.

information, and education in the morning airtime, addressing before-work salarymen, housewives, and preschool children as target audiences (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, May 25). MBC's *Today's Cooking* and KBS1's *Home Cooking* were outcomes of these changes in the Korean television industry. Although South Korea became self-sufficient for its staple food, rice, in 1980 (Y. Joo, 2013), its food service industry was still in a seminal state in the early 1980s (Chong, 2011), and food was conceived as a matter of enlightenment, modernization, and education rather than enjoyment. Moreover, food and cooking were regarded as domestic matters belonging to the female homemaker (A. Kim, 2014), who was the main audience of morning broadcasting (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, July 2). For this reason, television networks approached food as an object of education, and thus took the instructional style to help housewives in managing family-care.

The regular programming of food television and its high popularity also resulted from the advent of color broadcasting. Although TBC produced two instructional cooking shows in the late 1960s, they did not gain much attention because they could not offer “proper” images of food. In this light, one of my interviewees, Gyoik Hwang, who has worked as a food critic and food columnist for more than 25 years, argues that the history of the Korean food television is interlocked with the history of color broadcasting (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27, 2016). He described this parallel relationship as follows:

Food shows in the Korean television industry are intertwined with the development of color television. It's meaningless to see food on monochrome television. I guess color TV started around 1981. Food television, such as *Today's Cooking*, began to be produced within this context. Aired in the morning time or in the afternoon around 4 to 5 pm, in which housewives prepare dinner, food programs gained high popularity

back then. They got the highest ratings...The viewer rating of those programs used to be over 20% (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27, 2016).

Indeed, many Korean researchers view MBC's *Today's Cooking* and KBS1's *Home Cooking*, which were produced in the era of color TV, as the origin of Korean food television (Hong & Park, 2016; E. Na, 2015; Park & Baek, 2013; Youm, 2016).

Likewise, media practitioners see this enhanced visuality as critical to the development of food television. They argue that food is of high value in the television industry because its colorful and splendid images can attract viewers (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016; Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014). Jeongsuk Ha, the director of *Master Chef Korea*, explained the significance of visuality in food television as the following:

Because viewers cannot taste or smell [food], we're trying to visualize details of food as much as possible. Otherwise, they cannot feel it with their eyes and ears. That's why we put a lot of efforts in portraying every detail of food and cooking. I discuss with program participants such things as plate, ingredients, and arrangement of colors. What about this? Does it look much prettier? I give them some suggestions like this. Actually, we are not entirely devoted to food itself. We discuss how to make food look better and how to increase the visuality of food (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

As referenced above, Chun became the fifth President of South Korea through a military coup. In order to secure the legitimacy of his regime, Chun implemented various cultural policies and held a series of cultural events to diminish citizens' political awareness. In 1981, the Presidential Secretariat and KBS organized a huge national festival titled *Gukpung 81* (National Customs 81) at Yeouido Park in Seoul. According to KBS, the purpose of this government-driven festival was to make a space where college students could express their desire for national culture and national studies, and citizens

could share their craving for traditional culture (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, April 28, p. 11). However, the festival was strategically designed by the government to weaken resistance from college students and civil society, which was about to happen during the first commemoration of the Gwangju Democratization Movement. To achieve this goal, Mundo Heo, the Secretary to the President for Political Affairs, developed three themes for the carnival: 1) Gukpung 81 Grand Party, 2) Eight-Province Specialties, and 3) Festival of the Youth (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, April 28, p. 11). By utilizing these three themes, the Chun government attempted to spread statist discourse on tradition and national subjectivity, and appropriate culture for its own political purposes (J. Im, 2007).

Interestingly, the Chun government found food to be critical to arousing a sense of nostalgia and a desire for traditional culture, and thus arranged two food-related events in the name of Eight-Province Specialties. For example, during the five days from May 28<sup>th</sup> to June 1<sup>st</sup>, agro-fishery products and local specialties from eight provinces of South Korea were sold at the temporary marketplace in Yeouido Park. In addition, eight food stalls were set up to create a carnival atmosphere and prompt visitors to enjoy various regional foods (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1981, April 28, p. 11). These food-focused events were a big hit during the festival as demonstrated by the following news article:

Among various event halls of Gukpung 81, it is *Paldomirakjeong* (Food stalls/restaurants from eight provinces) that was most crowded. In the entire afternoon, people, including salary men in Yeouido, formed a hundreds-meter-long line to try great dishes from eight provinces. All foods on menu were immediately sold out. For this reason, one customer, who couldn't enjoy Daegu City's *ddarogukbap* (rice and soup in separate bowls) after thirty-minute waiting, complained, "There's only codfish soup" (Dong-a Ilbo, 1981, May 29, p. 6).

Although the festival was organized for a political purpose, it gained nationwide recognition and impacted multiple dimensions of Korean society.<sup>19</sup> Specifically, Eight-Province Specialties played a significant role in changing the Korean food landscape by reintroducing urbanites to local foods and locally-specific agro-fishery products. As Table 4 indicates, starting in 1970, Korean society experienced rapid urbanization, and population in rural areas significantly decreased. In 1980, the population in city districts marked 57.2% of the total population, and only 30% inhabited rural areas. This shift in populated areas generated people's nostalgia for local foods. Eight-Province Specialties enhanced this social demand, and provided renowned local restaurants with opportunities to move into Seoul (Y. Joo, 2013). Although the Korean food service industry began to address local foods in the 1970s when large numbers of people moved from rural and regional areas to Seoul and its neighboring towns, it was not until the early 1980s that restaurants specializing in particular regional foods appeared in Seoul, and local foods became national (Y. Joo, 2013).

Table 4

*The Demographics from 1970 to 1985 according to Administrative Districts*

District	1970	1975	1980	1985
National	31,435,252	34,678,972	37,406,815	40,419,652
City	12,928,822	16,769,946	21,409,453	26,417,972
Town	2,850,355	3,720,417	4,536,826	4,814,407
Village	15,653,957	14,185,121	11,460,536	9,187,273

*Note.* Adapted from Statistics Korea's "Population Census" from 1970 to 1985.

Within this context, early Korean food television "discovered" local foods to diversify and enrich Korean cuisine (MBC, 1984, p. 146). Along with the royal cuisine of

<sup>19</sup> When it comes to the television industry, Gukpung 81 led to the development of grand-scale television programs. Not only variety shows but also television dramas began to be produced on a large scale to attract attention from the majority of people (Kang & Yoon, 2002; J. Im, 2007).

the late Joseon Dynasty, local foods became the main ingredients of culinary television in the 1980s, and were described as symbolic materials that would express the uniqueness of Korean cuisine. Specifically, as the Korean society increasingly encountered foreigners due to two consecutive international events—the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games—Korean food television made use of local foods to promote the superiority of Korean cuisine both domestically and globally. For example, MBC held “The Contest for Korean Food Cooking” in 1983, and live broadcasted it as a special episode of *Today’s Cooking*. The 1984 MBC yearbook describes the purpose and result of this event as the following:

The first Contest for Korean Food Cooking, which was designed to inform the superiority of Korean food and improve people’s diet by developing and discovering Korean local foods and by introducing foreigners to those local foods in the face of international and pan-national events, such as the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, was very successful in displaying unique Korean foods, which otherwise would have been forgotten (MBC, 1984).

In the mid- and late 1980s, Korean culinary television moved beyond “traditional” or local Korean foods, and incorporated foreign foods into its menu. For instance, *Today’s Cooking*, on its special edition in November 1983, invited a famous French chef and offered the audience an opportunity to learn about foreign foods, such as chicken stew, truffle, and sea bass in puff pastry (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 1983, November 11, p. 12). This new menu composition was not a one-off event, but a lasting trend based on particular social economic circumstances, including but not limited to the social events listed in Table 5.

In Korea, the history of franchised restaurants started in 1977 as Lims Chicken opened its first store in Seoul. Thereafter, the coffee chain Nandarang began in 1979, and

the Lotte Group imported the first foreign fast-food restaurant, Lotteria, in 1979 (Chong, 2011). In the mid-1980s, foreign franchised restaurants rapidly increased due to the 1984 Amendment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act. By alleviating regulations on foreign investment, the Korean government accelerated economic opening, and enabled foreign companies to invest in various types of business (S. Kim, 1984, June 5, p. 2). As a result, a series of American fast-food restaurants, such as Burger King, Wendy's, McDonald's, KFC, Dunkin Donuts, Pizza Hut, and Domino's Pizza, opened Korean branches between 1984 and 1986. This influx of foreign foods, specifically American foods, largely impacted the Korean diet, and speeded up the globalization of the Korean food service industry (Y. Chong, 2011; D. Nam, 1984, February 21, p. 3).

Table 5

*The Social Conditions that Impacted Food Landscapes in the Mid- and Late 1980s*

Year	Social Event
1984	Amendment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act
1984	The rise of foreign franchised restaurants
1986	Three-low era
1986	The era of GDP 5,000
1986	The Seoul Asian Games
1986	The certificate of the Olympic restaurants
1988	The Seoul Olympic Games
1989	The complete liberalization of the overseas trip

The exposure to and consumption of foreign foods were further enhanced during the three-low period, when the Korean society enjoyed an unprecedented economic boom. As the international finance rates, oil prices, and the value of the dollar sharply dropped in 1986, South Korea, whose economy was highly dependent on export and foreign money, was able to enter the era of GDP \$5,000, as demonstrated below in Figure 2. This growth of GDP per capita and the two international sporting events brought about cosmopolitan consumerism in South Korea (Y. Won, 2008). Although it was often

criticized for being excessive or reckless, the consumption of foreign products, including foreign foods, largely expanded in the late 1980s (Y. Lee, 1989, October 10, p. 9; Maeil Kyeongje, 1989, September 22, p. 17).




Figure 2. The GDP Growth per Capita in South Korea from 1980 to 1993. Adapted from “Gross Domestic Product,” by OECD, 2018a.

Familiarity with foreign foods was further heightened as the Korean government completely liberalized overseas travel in 1989. Before 1989, only people over the age of 40 could travel abroad with no restriction. In 1989, the 13<sup>th</sup> President of South Korea, Taewoo Roh, eliminated this age limit on overseas trips (Maeil Kyeongje, 1988, March 12, p. 1). Accordingly, the number of outbound travelers immediately increased in 1989, and travel to European countries, for instance, escalated by 40% compared to the previous year (Maeil Kyeongje, 1989, April 18, p. 5). The growth of overseas travel enabled more Korean people to experience foreign foods, and thus affected Korean culinary culture in a significant way. A food critic and columnist, Gyoik Hwang, explained this close relationship between tourism and food landscape as follows:

Let’s say that you had some local foods while you’re traveling to other countries. When you came back, you would eat the foods that you had during your trip to recollect the pleasure from the travel...The reason why Japanese restaurants are booming in Shinsa Dong or Hongdae, where young people hang out, is that Korean young people have travel experience to Japan. They might have a pleasant time, walking around

backstreets and eating local foods...Japanese restaurant is the best place for them to talk about their pleasant travel experience...Do you know why Thai foods spread all around the world? It's because Thailand is at the center of global tourism...Tourism and tourists' experiences are closely related to the globalization of local foods (G. Hwang, personal communication, 2016, May 27).

Taken together, the above-mentioned social circumstances expanded the consumption of foreign foods in everyday life, particularly among urbanites in Seoul, and this culinary trend changed the menu composition of food television. While foreign foods were addressed only in special episodes in the early 1980s, food television in the mid- and late 1980s actively incorporated foreign dishes into its regular programming. For example, *Today's Cooking* and *Home Cooking* featured the following dishes in their regular episodes in the mid- and late 1980s: meat loaf, New Zealand Barbeque, fried cookie, macaroni jelly salad, beef pickle wrap, and so on (Y. Choi, 1989, January 14, p. 6).

*The Fusion between Food and Various Television Formats (1993-2000)*

The year 1987 marked another turning point in Korean politics. The torture case of Jongchul Park<sup>20</sup> and President Chun's "4/13 Defense of the Constitution" speech<sup>21</sup> enraged civil society, and triggered the June Democratic Movement—a nationwide democracy movement that generated massive protests from June 10 to June 29. The demonstrations forced the military regime to succumb to public pressure and announce

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<sup>20</sup> In January 1987, Jongchul Park, a linguistics student at Seoul National University, died while being tortured by policemen. As this torture case gained wide publicity, it pushed the Korean government to admit its brutal abuse of power. Mr. Park's case changed the Korean political landscape, and galvanized protests against President Chun (Haberma, 1987, January 31).

<sup>21</sup> Since 1985, there had been increasing social demands for a direct presidential election system. On April 13<sup>th</sup>, 1987, President Chun delivered a "Defense of the Constitution" speech, declaring that his successor would be chosen through an indirect election. Along with the torture case of Mr. Park, this speech enraged civil society, and triggered the June Democracy Movement.

direct presidential elections and press freedom. As a result, the Korean television industry was able to have relative autonomy within a more democratic system. For example, in 1989 the Broadcasting Policy Research Committee was launched to conduct extensive research on broadcasting philosophy and policy, and its research results were applied to the 1990 Amendment of Broadcasting Act, which allowed commercial broadcasting after a 10-year hiatus (Kang & Yoon, 2002). A year later, a commercial broadcaster, Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), was established, and the Korean television industry witnessed the revival of a public-and-commercial competing system. This multi-channel competition intensified as 20 cable networks started in March 1995 (see Table 6).

Table 6

*20 Cable Networks Launched in March 1995*

Category	Network	Channel Number
News	Yonhap TV News (YTN)	24
	Maeil Kyeongje TV (MBN)	20
Cinema	CATCH-ONE	31
	Daewoo Cinema Network (DCN)	22
Music	Korea Music Broadcasting (M21)	21
	Music Network (m-net)	27
Entertainment	Hyundai Broadcasting (HBS)	19
	Q Channel	25
Culture	Century TV (CTN)	29
	Korea Sports TV (KSTV)	30
Sports	Doosan Super Network (DSN)	23
	MY TV	44
Education	Dasom Broadcasting (DASOM)	26
	Children TV (CTV)	17
Children	Dong-a Television (DTV)	35
	Green Television (GTV)	35
Woman	Peach Broadcasting TV (PBC TV)	33
	Buddha TV (BTN)	32
Transportation	Transportation/Tourism Television (TTN)	28
Public service	Korea Picture (K-TV)	14

Additionally, in 1991 the Korea Communications Commission compelled a gradual increase of outsourcing to invigorate the production market of the Korean television industry. Based on the recognition that the pre-existing production structure,

which was terrestrial-broadcaster-centered, would hamper the expansion of program supplies, the Korean government has strategically fostered outsourcing production and independent production companies since 1991 (S. Moon, 2011). Due to these structural changes, the Korean television industry entered a period of multi-channel competition in the 1990s (Kang & Yoon, 2002). Accordingly, each network prioritized entertainment to gain more viewers, and the distinction between culture programs and entertainment programs became blurred. It is within this context that variety shows and talk shows became predominant television genres in the 1990s (see Figure 3). For example, while 4.9 regular variety shows were produced annually on average during the 1980s, the average increased to 18.2 in the 1990s. Developed as a hybrid genre of culture and entertainment, talk shows also rapidly increased from 18 programs in the 1980s to 69 programs in the 1990s.




Figure 3. The Increasing Number of Variety Shows and Talk Shows in the 1990s.  
Adapted from the numeric data collected by Kang and Yoon (2002).

The growth of variety shows and talk shows was also related to the collapse of the broadcaster-exclusive entertainer system. Before the 1990s, entertainers and performers belonged to particular broadcasters, such as TBC, MBC, and KBS, and there was a strong

tie between them. For this reason, it was not easy for entertainers, including actors/actresses, comedians, singers, and news anchors, to appear on television programs across different broadcasting stations (J. Im, 2007). This exclusive production system was broken down due to the establishment of SBS, the development of independent production companies, and the growth of entertainment management companies. As such, television networks were able to access expanded resources for their variety shows and talk shows even though they had to compete against each other more fiercely.

While expanding variety shows and talk shows, television producers found food to be appealing to both show guests and audiences. In particular, unlike in the 1980s, they began to use food as a device of entertainment and a catalyst for host-guest communication. For instance, the director of *Tonight with Star*, in his interview with Dong-a Ilbo, stated, "People become friends quite quickly when they eat together. The purpose of this show is to create good vibes by serving celebrities with their favorite foods that fit their image" (Dong-a Ilbo, 1994, March 22, p. 21). The fusion of food and variety/talk shows received favorable reviews from media critics and viewers for its originality as a new television genre (Dong-a Ilbo, 1997, August 6, p. 23). Yet, this new form of food TV cannot be separated from the following inter-related factors: the rise of consumerism, the emergence of the X-Generation, President Kim's information and communication policies, the development of broadcasting technologies, the growth of the food service industry, and the economic depression in 1997.

In 1993, South Korea had its first civilian government. Due to this political democratization, resistant culture, which had characterized the 1980s, lost ground and began to wane in the 1990s (J. Im, 2007). With continuous economic growth from the

late 1980s, commercial culture filled this cultural space (E. Joo, 2010). Specifically, as Korean society entered the era of GDP \$10,000, household consumption expenditures largely increased (see Figure 4), and consumerism became the zeitgeist of the 1990s (E. Joo, 2010). This quantitative expansion led to the qualitative change in consumption practices: standardized consumption was replaced by personalized consumption; and consumption became a cultural index of individual taste (E. Nam, 2007). In other words, Korea entered the age of mature consumer society, in which commodities are defined by what they signify rather than by their use, and people distinguish themselves from others through what they consume (Baudrillard, 1998). Indeed, the Korean Consumer Agency's survey shows that 40% of respondents thought of possessions as a strong indicator of status in the mid-1990s (E. Nam, 2007).




Figure 4. The Shift in Household Consumption Expenditures in South Korea (1990-2016). Adapted from Statistics Korea's "Household Survey Data" from 1990 to 2016.

This qualitative change in consumption practices was further enhanced by the emergence of a new generation, namely X-Generation. As a counterpart of the American expression—Generation X, the term X-Generation was first used in 1993 by the cosmetics company, Amore Pacific, to advertise its men's skin care product, *Twin X*. Although this new generation was interpellated by advertising and marketing industries,

it soon gained wide public attention (see Figure 5), and became a major actor of consumer culture in the 1990s.




Figure 5. The Rapid Growth of News Articles on X-Generation during the Mid-1990s.  
Adapted from the search results of news articles on “Xsedae (X-Generation)” via BIGKinds

Having grown up with political democratization, economic abundance, cultural liberalism, and visual culture, the X-Generation cohort was very active in consuming practices, and used commercial and cultural products as symbols through which they could express their identities (E. Joo, 2010). Because of the X-Generation’s buying power, cultural industries and consumer goods industries reorganized their structures from a mass production system into a customized production system, and began to emphasize “taste” and “individuality” to meet the lifestyle of the X-Generation, as demonstrated by the following news article:

As the new generation emerged as a main agent of consuming, there have been increased demands for X-Generation in cosmetics, clothing, shoemaking, food, electronics, and auto industries...According to industrial reports, the market size for the X-Generation is about 600 to 700 billion KRW, and it will grow by 20% to 25% every year...Although the shoemaking industry used to release new products seasonally, it now launches innovative products biweekly given that the new generation prefers unique products...The auto industry also pays attention to the taste of the new generation...(Maeil Kyeongje, 1994, May 17, p. 21).

The rise of consumerism, the emergence of the X-Generation, and the following shifts in consuming practices were also applied to Korean food culture. During the mid-1990s, the food service industry expanded both quantitatively and qualitatively (Chong, 2011), and the meaning of food changed from “something to eat” to “something to enjoy” (D. Nam, 1999, April 24). For example, due to the proliferation of franchise restaurants, the ratio of restaurants to citizens reached 1:100 in 1995 (Chong, 2011). In addition, the expenditure on eating out and lodging gradually increased until 1997 when the financial crisis gripped much of East Asia (see Figure 6). Given that the 2016 expenditure is 342,136 KRW, it can be said that the eating-out culture was strongly established during the mid-1990s.




Figure 6. The Growth of the Expenditure on Eating-Out and Lodging. Adapted from Statistics Korea’s “Household Survey Data” from 1990 to 2016.

Also, in order to meet consumers’ various demands, the food service industry became more diversified in terms of both food types and food service brands. For instance, the America-focused fast-food market expanded to incorporate Japanese, Hong Kong, Australian, and French brands; and popular items for eating-out encompassed not only pizza and burgers, but also more luxurious foods, such as steak, seafood, and sushi (Chong, 2011). Based on these enlarged culinary resources, people consumed food to

satisfy their sociocultural desires rather than their physical appetites, and used food as an object of conspicuous consumption in the 1990s (Nam E, 2007). Although the expenditure on eating-out decreased after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it quickly rebounded from the depression (see Figure 6), and the public's attention to food continued throughout the 1990s, as demonstrated by the following news articles:

People's interests in food are unbelievable. Healthier foods are quickly sold out in the market, and people do not hesitate to make a long journey to visit renowned restaurants (J. Yoon, 1997, May 7).

Have all the people become gourmets suddenly? Or, has Korea been attacked with a gourmet epidemic? While the cultural industry is suffering from a great depression, a new cultural commodity—food/cooking—is emerging as a hit product across various genres in popular culture (Y. Lee, 1998, December 16).

As I discussed above, television producers used food in an effort to expand variety shows and talk shows. Given that simple repetition neither provides consumers with pleasure nor sustains a particular genre (Cawelti, 1971), the use of food could be understood as a production strategy to make a difference and variation within variety shows and talk shows. However, the meaning of food in the 1990s television industry should not be limited to “interchangeable details” (Adrono & Horkheimer, 1972), which would make the television industry appear to change. Rather, food was an unavoidable subject for television producers because of its changing cultural status and its prevalence in everyday life. As described above, the meaning of food moved beyond calories and nutrients in the mid- and late 1990s, and food became an important resource for cultural practices. Media practitioners *had to* incorporate this new trend into their programs so as to address viewers' current concerns, and in turn, win ratings. My interviewees

acknowledged this relationship between popular trends, ratings, and television production in the following ways:

The only criteria we use is viewer ratings. It's because [food television] is successful in the ratings game...We cannot help look at the results (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

I think food television emerges based on people's increased interest in food...In television industry, the amount of contents is highly dependent on the amount of people's concerns (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

As food changed from something to satisfy hunger to something to enjoy, people got more curious about food. What is this? Where does it come from? This kind of questions...For media practitioners, food is a rich repository of contents, ratings, and competitiveness (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

As quoted above, television producers' production practices are inseparable from popular trends and public concerns. However, this relationship is not limited to the television industry; other media industries, including the publishing, film, and comics, also paid keen attention to food in the mid- and late 1990s (D. Nam, 1999, April 24). For example, Japanese representative food comics, such as *Oishinbo*, *Shota no Sushi*, and *Cooking Papa*, were first introduced in 1996 and 1997; the Korean comics industry began to publish food comics in 1998; and two Korean food films—*The Grand Opening* and *The Great Chef*—were released in 1999. Thus, the emergence of food variety/talk shows should not be understood only within the television industry. Rather, it was an outcome of the ongoing negotiation among audiences' "horizons of expectation" (Neale, 1990), structural changes in the television industry, and relations to other media genres.

Another factor that facilitated the development of food variety shows is the advancement of broadcasting technologies. Specifically, the introduction of small and light cameras had a great impact on Korean television production in the mid-1990s (S.

Lee, 2005). Just as small ENG (Electronic News Gathering) cameras facilitated documentary production in the mid-1980s, 6mm digital cameras enabled television production to come out of the static studio (A. Kim, 2014; Oh & Heo, 2010). Due to their low cost, relatively good picture quality, and easy-to-use interface, 6mm digital cameras were welcomed by television networks because they reduced the production budget and the number of staff members required for outdoor shooting (S. Lee, 2005). It is within this context that the 1990s variety shows had more out-of-studio segments than before, and travel shows became one of the dominant formats of food television in the mid- and late 1990s. Before the mid-1990s, food television only focused on the “cooking” process; it was not able to feature other aspects of food, such as grocery shopping and delivery, because of budgetary and technological constraints. For this reason, food television was limited to the domestic or professional kitchen set, and it could not extend its boundary to other television formats. The development of broadcasting technologies made it easier for television producers to show various dimensions of food practices—preparation, production, and consumption—within one program, utilizing both indoor and outdoor shooting at low cost (A. Kim, 2014). For instance, one of the 1990s food variety shows, *Pipi Cooking Room* (KBS2), was comprised of several segments, including: 1) host-guest talk in the studio, 2) happenings during grocery shopping, 3) guest-chef cooking outside the studio, 4) on-the-road filming of food delivery, and 5) on-site filming of food sharing.

This new form of food television greatly appealed to the X-Generation, who grew up with daily use of technologies such as color TV, computers, and video games, and who were primary consumers of both popular culture and food culture (E. Joo, 2010). Accordingly, food variety shows, along with food talk shows, replaced instructional

cooking shows, and the main audience of food television changed from household wives to young adults. However, the decline of instructional cooking shows cannot be fully understood without the consideration of the Korean government's information and communication policies. From his first year in office, President Kim (1993 to 1998) faced the global force of market opening. The 8<sup>th</sup> Multilateral Trade Negotiations—The Uruguay Round—incorporated previously exempted or not-included areas (i.e., agriculture, textiles, trade in services, intellectual property, and investment policy trade distortions) into the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) trade rules, and led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (D. Seo, 1994). Since the Uruguay Round was supposed to come into effect in 1995, the Kim administration had to acknowledge this new international trade system and find ways to adapt to it. Consequently, South Korea became a member of the WTO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and President Kim declared globalization as his key policy at the Asia-Pacific Cooperation meeting in Sydney in 1994 (Y. Park, 2006, September 17).

As part of these efforts, the Kim administration set up “informatization” as a major national project to reform economic structure and to face globalization (S. Han, 2013). President Kim stated, “The country that excels at information and communication technologies will dominate the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We need concerted efforts of the government and corporations to develop information technologies and information industries” (Maeil Kyeongje, 1996, May 2, p. 2). Due to these efforts, the Ministry of Information and Communication was established in 1994 to administer information and communication policies; a super-highway information network promotion committee, in

1994; and an informatization promotion conference, in 1996 (S. Han, 2013; Kim & Chung, 2012). As a result, the Internet was commercialized in 1994, and a super-highway online service network was built on a national scale in 1997. In addition, online users rapidly increased from 1.8 per 1000 people in 1994 to 231.8 per 1000 people in 1999 (E. Joo, 2010).

This explosive growth of information technologies and industries blurred the rationale for recipe-oriented cooking shows. As information technologies penetrated into people's everyday lives, they were able to search the information about food and cooking without help from broadcasting. Commercial online service providers, such as HiTEL, UniTel, Nownuri, and Chollian, opened food-oriented online sites; users shared their information in online communities; and food companies provided special recipes via online platforms to promote their products (A. Kim, 2014; Yonhap News, 1995, August 19). For instance, a food company Miwon opened its cooking class on HiTEL, offering recipes for special menus and instructions on how to use its products (Yonhap News, 1995, August 19). This trend was reinforced as the 15<sup>th</sup> President, Kim Daejung (1998 to 2003), established "information-oriented society" as a core means to overcome the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In order to boost employment and domestic economy, he prioritized information-oriented economic reform and adopted "Cyber Korea 21" as a national project. As a result, people's information perception level continuously increased (Han, 2013) (see Table 7), and the Internet took over the role of broadcasting in providing how-to-cook information (S. Han, 2013). Along with the enhanced channel competition, this wave of informatization drove the decline of instructional cooking

shows and the development of entertainment-oriented food television in the mid- and late 1990s.

Table 7

*Information Perception Level by Year*

Year	1986	1988	1992	1994	1997
Information Perception Level (%)	26.6	61.1	76.5	86.8	91.3

*Note.* Adapted from “A Study on Korean Information Policies: Developments and Goals” by S. Han, 2013, p. 73.

*The Era of Soft-Documentary and Infotainment Show (2000-2007)*

In the early 2000s, Korean food television took soft-documentary and infotainment as its primary formats, and disseminated a huge amount of information about renowned restaurants and well-being. As discussed earlier, the food soft-documentary was initiated by KBS’s *VJ Special Forces* which premiered in May, 2000. This program and its followers reflected the emergence of a new production subject. In 1996, the Korean television industry adopted 6mm digital cameras and non-linear editing (NLE) equipment, which allowed a one-person production system (Lee & Song, 2010).<sup>22</sup> Due to its cost efficiency, this new system was directly employed by television directors belonging to major television networks. But, more importantly, it created a new profession, called a video journalist (VJ), who could produce broadcasting contents alone (S. Lee, 2005). Until the late 1990s, VJs played second fiddle to producers/directors of

<sup>22</sup> A one-person production system does not mean that all production processes, including pre-production and post-production, are handled by one person. Rather, it refers to the production system that allows one person to play different roles, such as lighting, audio-recording, directing, reporting, and filming, on location (S. Lee, 2005).

major television networks (J. Choi, 2001).<sup>23</sup> However, they became major actors of soft-documentary production in the early 2000s as discussed below.

The proliferation of the soft-documentary was also related to the Korean government's cultural policies on independent production. In order to diversify the production subject and production structure of broadcasting, the Korean government has forced the expansion of independent production since 1991 (S. Moon, 2011). Specifically, in 2000 the ratio of independent production rapidly increased up to 20% due to the Integrated Broadcasting Act, which combined four broadcasting-related regulations—the Broadcasting Act, the Composite Cable Broadcasting Act, the Management of Cable Broadcasting Act, and the Korea Broadcasting System Act. Its goal was to “promote the protection of the rights and interests of the viewers...and to contribute to the development of broadcasting and advancement of public welfare by guaranteeing the freedom and independence of broadcasting...” (Korea Broadcasting Commission, 2000, March 13).

One of the outcomes of this Act was the establishment of the Korean Broadcasting Commission, which would be responsible for “the qualitative improvement of broadcast contents and a fair competition in the broadcasting industry” (Korea Broadcasting Commission, 2000, March 13). As an independent regulatory authority, the Commission exercised not only administrative but also quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial roles in resolving the matters concerning broadcasting plans, operations, and programming, licensing of a broadcasting operator, and fair trade in the distribution of

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<sup>23</sup> The relationship between producers/directors of major television networks and those of independent production companies is more complicated than discussed here. VJs are either working freelance or as employees of independent production companies. See Lee and Song (2010) for a detailed explanation of how the relationship changed from the 1990s to the 2000s.

broadcast programs (Korea Broadcasting Commission, 2000, March 13). As part of efforts to enrich broadcast contents and promote fair competition in the broadcasting industry, the Commission specified the ratio of “externally produced broadcast programs” as follows:

A terrestrial broadcasting business operator shall...program the broadcast programs produced domestically by persons other than the relevant broadcasting business operator (excluding movies, and hereinafter referred to as “externally produced broadcast programs”)...within the limit of 40/100 of the total broadcasting hours every month...A broadcasting business operator engaged in general programming shall...program the externally produced broadcast programs...within the limit of 15/100 of the prime time broadcasting hours every month (Korea Broadcasting Commission, 2000, March 13).

Here, the Commission describes programs produced by independent production companies as “externally produced broadcast programs” so as to distinguish them from programs produced by “the persons specially related to the broadcasting business operator” (Korean Broadcasting Commission, 2000, March 13), which refer to affiliates of major terrestrial networks, such as MBC Everyone, MBC Music, SBS Plus, SBS Sports, and so on. With its enhanced authority, the Commission limited the number of broadcast programs produced by affiliates of broadcasting business operator, and expanded the number of externally produced broadcast programs to 20% in 2000, and 30% in 2001 (S. Moon, 2011). Within this context, the number of independent production companies largely increased in the early and mid-2000s (see Table 8).

Table 8

*The Increase of Independent Production Companies from 1998 to 2008*

Year	Newly founded independent production companies	The rate of increase over the last year	Total
-1998	168	-	168
1999	91	54.20%	259
2000	136	52.50%	395
2001	85	21.50%	480
2002	88	18.30%	568
2003	90	15.80%	658
2004	81	12%	739
2005	100	13.50%	839
2006	89	11%	928
2007	71	7.70%	999
2008	49	4.90%	1,048

*Note.* Adapted from “Report on Present State of Video-Broadcasting Independent Production Companies,” by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2008.

Table 9

*The Scale of Independent Production Companies in 2005*

By capital scale			
Less than 50 M KRW <sup>a</sup>	50 M-100 M KRW	100 M-300 M KRW	More than 300 M KRW
73 (13.9%)	147 (28.1%)	162 (30.9%)	142 (27.1%)
By the number of employees			
Less than 10	10 to 20	20 to 50	More than 50
195 (37.2%)	183 (35.0%)	117 (22.3%)	29 (5.5%)
By the number of production staffs			
Less than 10	10 to 20	20 to 50	More than 50
290 (55.3%)	153 (29.2%)	62 (11.9%)	19 (3.6%)

*Note.* Adapted from “Report on Present State of Video-Broadcasting Independent Production Companies,” by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2005.

<sup>a</sup>The capital size is calculated based on the Korean won (KRW). 1 million KRW equals 914.91 USD as of November 21, 2017.

Despite the quantitative expansion of independent production companies, the qualitative change did not occur in the early 2000s. As Table 9 indicates, most independent production companies were small-scale in terms of both capital size and

employment size. Specifically, it is noteworthy that more than 55% of companies had fewer than 10 production staff. Because of this lack of financial and human resources, independent production companies pursued one-person production system (Lee & Song, 2010), and therefore, their production was limited to particular television genres, such as culture programs and documentaries, which required smaller budgets and fewer production workers compared to large-scale entertainment shows or TV dramas. Indeed, the 2005 “Report of Video-Broadcasting Independent Production Companies” shows that 18.1% of independent production companies produced culture programs; 30.2%, documentaries; and only 7.6%, TV dramas (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 2005). This limited form of outsourcing production was also involved with the changes in advertising revenues and production costs of terrestrial networks.




Figure 7. Total Sales and Advertising Revenues of Terrestrial Networks (2002-2007). Adapted from “A Study on the Independent Production Policy’s Outcome and Result: Focusing on Program Product Market’s Changes,” by S. Moon, 2011, p. 174. The numeric unit for the Y-axis is 100 million KRW.

As Figure 7 demonstrates, advertising revenues of terrestrial networks gradually decreased while total sales were stagnant in the early 2000s. This downturn was partly caused by terrestrial networks’ loss of audience share (S. Moon, 2011). According to the

Korea Cable TV Association (n.d), audience share of terrestrial networks declined from 70.8% in 2002 to 57.9% in 2006, while that of cable networks expanded from 27.8% to 42.1% during the same period. Along with this change, the continuous economic depression after the 1997 Asian financial crisis influenced total production costs of terrestrial networks (see Table 10) (Oh & Heo, 2010). Particularly, internal production costs were largely reduced in the early 2000s whereas outsourcing production costs were heightened to meet the Korea Broadcasting Commission's regulation.

Table 10

*The Production Costs of Terrestrial Networks (2002-2007)*

Year	Total production costs	Internal production costs	Outsourcing production costs <sup>a</sup>
2001	17,341 <sup>b</sup>	14,960 <sup>b</sup>	1,681
2002	10,188	6,899	2,004
2003	8,859	5,323	2,521
2004	8,939	5,583	2,411
2005	8,091	4,806	2,651
2006	9,130	5,602	3,203
2007	9,197	5,235	3,604

*Note.* Adapted from "A Study on the Independent Production Policy's Outcome and Result: Focusing on Program Product Market's Changes," by S. Moon, 2011, p. 174. The numeric unit for the Y-axis is 100 million KRW.

<sup>a</sup>Outsourcing production costs include production costs of "the persons specially related to the broadcasting business operator."

<sup>b</sup>2001 costs include both below-the-line and above-the-line production costs.

Given the limited financial resources, terrestrial networks invested their internal production costs in dramas and entertainment shows, which were more critical to ratings, and outsourced culture programs and documentaries.<sup>24</sup> In so doing, they took advantage of one-person production systems to enhance the cost-efficiency of outsourcing

<sup>24</sup> The role of independent production companies largely changed from the mid-2000s. Particularly, the production of dramas was taken over by independent production companies in the late 2000s. For instance, 98% of SBS dramas, 74% of MBC's, and 47% of KBS's were made by independent production companies (S. Moon, 2011).

production. Indeed, it was found that production costs of outdoor shooting would be three times higher unless VJs were employed (S. Kang, 2000). To conclude, the emergence of soft-documentary in the early 2000s was an outcome of the articulation among the development of filming/editing technologies, the expansion of independent production companies, and the shift in terrestrial networks' audience share and financial conditions.

As the chief producer of *VJ Special Forces* acknowledged, there were controversies over the meanings of soft-documentary (J. Choi, 2001). It could take the form of American video journalism, where journalists shoot and edit their own stories or still-occurring events (Oh & Heo, 2010). However, television networks' pursuit of cost-efficiency and viewer ratings prioritized "fun" and "spectacle" over a journalistic approach (S. Kim, 2004). As a result, soft-documentary addressed light issues that could satisfy audience curiosity, focusing on dramatic visual styles (J. Choi, 2001; Oh & Heo, 2010). In the beginning, *VJ Special Forces* hardly featured food-related items. Although each episode was comprised of four different segments,<sup>25</sup> only five segments involved food items in the first year of broadcasting. The frequency increased a bit in the second year, featuring 13 food-related items, but it was not until October 2002 that *VJ Special Forces* addressed food items on a regular basis. As Table 11 demonstrates, *VJ Special Forces* aired food-related items biweekly in October 2002, and began to feature them every week in November 2002, a frequency that has continued to be effective.

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<sup>25</sup> The number of segments was not settled in the first two years. From its premiere to May 2001, *VJ Special Forces* involved four food-related items per episode. After that, it only featured two items until January 2002. From February 2002, it began to include food food-related items on a regular basis (KBS, n.d.b).

Table 11

*The Increase of Food-Related Items in VJ Special Forces*

Date	Food-related items
8/23/02	-
8/30/02	-
9/6/02	-
9/20/02	-
9/29/02	Meat market in Seoul
10/4/02	-
10/11/02	Secrets of long-lived restaurants
10/18/02	-
10/25/02	Survival of <i>tteok-bokki</i> town
11/1/02	-
11/8/02	Oden in the winter time
11/15/02	Street vendors
11/22/02	The war of side-dish market
11/29/02	Global popularity of pork back-bone stew
12/6/02	Lunchroom vs. restaurants in campus town
12/13/02	The success of low key restaurants run by ordinary person
12/20/02	-
12/27/02	-
1/3/03	-
1/10/03	Winter delicacy, acorn jelly
1/24/03	Winter delicacy, from half-dried herring/billfish to seaweed fulvescens
1/31/03	Raw fish town in Pusan &
2/7/03	Korean table d'hote in South <i>Jeolla</i> province
2/14/03	The story of porridge
2/28/03	Renowned restaurants near train station & Making <i>jang</i> (Korean soy sauce, soybean paste, and red pepper paste) in rural areas
3/7/03	King crab in <i>Yeongdeok</i>
3/14/03	Fermented skate in <i>Heuksan Island</i>

*Note.* Adapted from “VJ Special Forces, Watching Previous Shows,” by KBS, n.d.b.

Due to the success of *VJ Special Forces*, its followers, such as *6mm Exploring the World* (2003) and *Infinite Zone Q* (2004), employed the same format, placing food-related items in the foreground. This increased attention to food is not irrelevant to the production practices of the soft-documentary. In the case of *VJ Special Forces*, three independent production companies alternately produce one episode every three weeks,

and average production costs for each episode were less than 28 million KRW (Oh & Heo, 2010).<sup>26</sup> Because of the limited time and budget, VJs tend to make a quick sketch rather than delve into selected items. To compensate for the lack of analytical and/or critical perspective, the soft-documentary focuses on sensual pleasure by developing its own genre conventions, such as dynamic camera movement, a large number of cuts, and fast-paced editing (S. Kim, 2004; Oh & Heo, 2010). In other words, the soft-documentary, as a “readerly” text, delivers *plaisir* (pleasure) more than *jouissance* (bliss) to its audience (Barthes, 1975). Food was selected as a main item given the perspective that it could create instantaneous pleasure, and thus captivate an audience. Indeed, *VJ Special Forces* used more cuts and more florid camera movements when it dealt with food items so as to enhance the audience pleasure (Oh & Heo, 2010). The result was very successful in that the food items were most favorable in ratings (Youm, 2016).

Although soft-documentaries feature eating scenes to heighten sensual pleasure, it is hard to describe it as “food porn.” As Figure 8 indicates, it was not until the early 2010s that the term “food porn” was used to explain food media.<sup>27</sup> As far as food is concerned, the major function of the soft-documentary was to provide its audience with information about *matjib* (renowned restaurants).

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<sup>26</sup> The production costs were calculated based on episodes produced in the first half of 2010. When the episodes included overseas filming, the costs were 3 million KRW higher than the average (Oh & Heo, 2010). As of November 26, 2017, 28 million KRW is the equivalent of 25,770 USD.

<sup>27</sup> According to the search result via *BIGKinds*, the first news article on food porn appeared in 2008, and the concept of food porn became more prevalent in the mid-2000s. Since the search result was the outcome of analysis of only eight daily newspapers, it cannot represent all Korean news media. However, it reveals a general trend in journalistic discourses of food porn.




Figure 8. The Number of News Articles on Food Porn. Adapted from the search results of news articles on “food porn” via BIGKinds

In 2002, South Korea hosted the 17<sup>th</sup> FIFA World Cup in conjunction with Japan. This international sports event invigorated and globalized the Korean food service industry, whose growth was hampered by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (Y. Chong, 2011).<sup>28</sup> The domestic restaurant industry developed special menus and improved service quality in the face of “accelerated globalization.” Also, as various foreign culinary cultures were introduced, the Korean food service industry became more diversified (Y. Chong, 2011). Statistics Korea’s “National Survey of Business” demonstrates this shift. As “non-Western” culinary others increasingly appeared in the Korean food landscape, it added the “other foreign-style restaurants” item to its survey in 2006 (see Table 11) (Statistics Korea, 2006). Additionally, as the five-day workweek bill was submitted to the National Assembly in 2002, the Korean food service industry developed various marketing strategies to catch prospective customers (Y. Chong, 2011). As the bill was approved in 2003 and became effective in 2004, the demand for eating out actually

<sup>28</sup> The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis caused a large-scale restructuring and early retirement in South Korea. As many retirees jumped into the food service industry, the number of restaurants increased in the late 1990s. However, this quantitative growth did not lead to the diversification of the food service industry.

increased in the mid-2000s. It is noteworthy that the expenditure on groceries decreased during the same period (see Figure 9).

Table 12

*The Growth of Non-Western Foreign Restaurants*

Year	Total businesses	Total employees
2006	424	2,148
2007	537	2,786
2008	726	3,586
2009	861	4,256
2010	1,030	5,142

Note. Adapted from “National Survey of Business,” by Statistics Korea, 2006.




Figure 9. The Shift in Expenditure on Eating-Out and Groceries (2000-2007). Adapted from “Monthly Average of Household Economic Index per Consumption Sectors,” by Statistics Korea, 2017a. The numeric unit for the Y-axis is 1 KRW.

The introduction of a five-day workweek facilitated major conglomerates’ entry into eating-out business, which contributed to the expansion and diversification of the food service industry. For example, Hyundai Department Store—a subsidiary company of Hyundai group—opened a fusion restaurant, FUREA, in 2002; the Lotte Group took over the American family restaurant, TGI Friday, in the same year; and Shinsegae, an affiliated company of Samsung, expanded its restaurant, Carne Station, and was planning to launch a new restaurant brand in 2003 (N. Kim, 2002, October 1). Interestingly,

economic depression in 2003 dented consumer confidence (Y. Chong, 2011) and intensified economic polarization (see Table 13), which could have a negative impact on eating-out culture. However, the diversification and/or polarization of food prices and items induced consumers from various classes to participate in eating out.

Table 13

*The Increase of Economic Polarization and Relative Poverty Rate*

Year	Gini's Coefficient	Relative Poverty Rate
2000	0.279	10.4
2001	0.29	11.3
2002	0.293	11.1
2003	0.283	12.1
2004	0.293	12.8
2005	0.298	13.6
2006	0.305	13.8
2007	0.316	14.9
2008	0.319	14.7

*Note.* Adapted from “Income Distribution Index,” by Statistics Korea, 2017b.

Another factor that impacted the Korean food service industry was a series of events that challenged consumer perceptions of food safety. In particular, the 2003 “mad cow scandal” (BSE) led to a sharp downturn in the market share of American beef, which occupied 75.9% of the Korean beef market in early 2003, and led to the implementation of the place-of-origin marking system on meat products (S. Kim, 2017, November 21). Incurring serious economic losses, avian influenza (AI) also enhanced consumer awareness of food safety concerns in the same year. Additionally, the 2004 *mandu* (dumpling) affair and the 2005 made-in-China kimchi scandal shocked the whole country, and made people aware of the significance of food materials (S. Lee, 2005,

January 6).<sup>29</sup> Because of these continuing food problems, “well-being” emerged as a keyword of the food service industry, facilitating the opening of smaller-sized private restaurants that offered healthy and non-standardized foods (Y. Chong, 2011). Although the growth of well-being discourse did not have a direct influence on people’s quest for *mat* (taste) or *matjib* (renowned restaurants), it expanded the range of the food service industry, and made people think of quality before quantity (Y. Chong, 2011).

As I discussed earlier, the 2000 Broadcasting Act provided a legal basis for the Korean broadcasting industry to enrich its broadcast contents and promote fair competition. Specifically, the Act adopted a recommendation-license system for broadcasting business, and made it easier to launch cable networks (Korea Broadcasting Commission, 2000).<sup>30</sup> As a result, the number of cable channels exponentially increased in the early 2000s, and within this context two food-devoted channels—Food TV and Channel F—opened in 2000. Encompassing different television formats, these two channels provided a variety of information about food, such as home meal recipes, professional cooking skills, restaurant information, market information, and so on (A. Kim, 2014).

However, cable channels were in their nascent stage in the early 2000s, and their audience share was much less than that of the terrestrial networks (Korea Cable TV

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<sup>29</sup> The Korea Food and Drug Administration announced that made-in-China kimchi had five times more lead content than domestic products, and nine out of 16 Chinese kimchi contained parasite eggs (S. Oh, 2017, October 2). In 2004, the Korea Consumer Protection Board found that domestic dumpling manufacturers used low-grade ingredients for dumpling stuffing (S. Lee, 2005, January 6).

<sup>30</sup> The Act broadened the definition of “broadcasting business operator,” incorporating not only terrestrial broadcasting business operators but also CATV and satellite broadcasting operators and program providing business operators (Korea Broadcasting Commission, 2000).

Association, n.d.) (see Figure 10).<sup>31</sup> Particularly, subscription-based Food TV was not able to induce many viewers, and thus its influence on food culture was not crucial (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). Channel F also could not establish its identity as food TV in the early 2000s, and changed its channel identity a few times until 2011 (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016). Nevertheless, Channel F gained high popularity among 25-to-40-year-old women, who were considered “trend-setters” and/or major consumers of the food service industry (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014). Additionally, by airing 18 hours a day, it circulated a large amount of food images and information, which were actively consumed by restaurant-goers.




Figure 10. Total Sales of Cable TV from 1995 to 2014. Adapted from “Industrial Statistics,” by Korea Cable TV Association, n.d. The numeric unit for the Y-axis is 1 million KRW.

Further, the proliferation of online social network services and web blogs allowed users to share restaurant reviews and matjib (renowned restaurant) information, and helped them express themselves through food matters (E. Na, 2015). Specifically, launched in 1999, a Korean social network service, Cyworld, functioned as a major

<sup>31</sup> In 2002, the audience share of cable networks was 27.8% while that of the terrestrial network was 70.8% (Korea Cable TV Association, n.d.).

virtual space where users communicated with their friends and subscribers (Ahn & Chun, 2008). By uploading their selfies and photos of other figures and objects, Cyworld users constructed and shared their online identities. The rapid growth of digital cameras facilitated this process, which became the most popular electronics in the mid-2000s (B. Kang, 2004, July 21). Although Cyworld was not a food-oriented social network service, it enabled its users to express “who they are” through “what they eat” in a new media environment, and routinized it as a new lifestyle (E. Na, 2015). Moreover, by lessening the distance among consumers, producers, and products of the food service industry, it enhanced people’s interest in renowned restaurants and their exposure to restaurant information (K. Shin, 2004, April 12).




Figure 11. The Increase of News Articles on Matjib (Renowned Restaurants) from 2000 to 2007. Adapted from the search results of news articles on “matjib” via BIGKinds.

Within these contexts—including but not limited to the hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, the implementation of a five-day workweek, a series of food scandals, the launch of food-devoted cable channels, and the introduction of social network services—the public’s interests in renowned restaurants sharply increased (see Figure 11), and the food service industry steadily expanded during the early 2000s (see Table 14).

Table 14

*The Number of Total Businesses and Employees in Food Service Industry (2000 to 2003)*

Year	Total business	Total employees
2000	570,576	1430,476
2001	579,416	1523,069
2002	595,791	1586,409
2003	605,614	1594,789

*Note.* Adapted from “National Survey of Business,” by Statistics Korea, 2006

The rise of *matjib* programs occurred to satisfy these social demands, and thus to attract more viewers. Although the relationship between popular media and popular trends raises the chicken-or-egg controversy, television producers tend to prioritize audience expectations and fulfill their needs.<sup>32</sup> One of my interviewees, who is a chief producer of a food-devoted cable network, stated:

I think that the order of the necessities of life has changed from clothing-food-shelter to food-clothing-shelter as people’s income levels have been elevated. We try to lead popular trends, but more importantly, we—media people—ultimately should follow what viewers think and reflect their trends. I believe that there have been public needs to find restaurants that serve more delicious foods and that are more enjoyable and fancy (J. Lee, personal communication, July 7, 2016).

The other predominant form of food television, infotainment shows, also produced a large amount of information about renowned restaurants. As I discussed above, this hybrid television format emerged in the early 1990s in South Korea to achieve both commercial interests and public benefits. By incorporating different television

<sup>32</sup> Through their criticism of the culture industry, Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) argue that it just “pretends” to be based on consumers’ needs. They assert that consumers’ needs and demands are manufactured by the culture industry. The discussion of the relationship between the culture industry and audience is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, I suggest to understand Korean television producers’ tendency to reflect popular trends as their risk-hedge strategy and/or means of securing audience ratings.

formats, such as quiz shows, talk shows, and variety shows, the infotainment show has enlarged its range since then, circulating information about art, medicine, health, law, and interior design (G. Park, 2004). As food and renowned restaurants became a widespread public concern, terrestrial networks began to feature food as a main subject of their infotainment shows. Specifically, MBC's *Find! Delicious TV* (2001) devoted most of its airtime to delivering information about renowned restaurants. As a talk-variety show, it aimed to contribute to food culture. However, it consistently focused on matjib rather than mat (taste). For this reason, the Korea Communications Standards Commission warned MBC about its commercial-oriented production practices in 2011 (C. Kim, 2012). However, due to its high ratings, the program airtime expanded from 45 minutes in 2001 to 70 minutes in 2005 (A. Kim, 2014), and other television networks continuously borrowed its format.

The prevalence of the matjib infotainment show was also related to the liberalization of imported Japanese popular culture. After President Kim Daejung announced an open-door policy for Japanese popular culture while he was visiting Japan in 1998, the import of Japanese pop culture was implemented through a four-step process of liberalization. Particularly, the third liberalization policy (2000) allowed the inflow of Japanese broadcasting programs for the first time; and the fourth one (2004) further accelerated this process. Consequently, total imports of Japanese broadcasting programs increased by 250% over the previous year in 2000, and almost 200% between 2003 and 2004 (see Table 15).

Table 15

*The Import of Japanese Broadcasting Programs*

Year	Terrestrial TV	Independent production company	Total
1998	-	-	1,791
1999	-	-	1,090
2000	-	-	2,731
2001	1,543	95	1,638
2002	540	1,535	2,075
2003	1,090	1,370	2,460
2004	551	4,348	4,899

*Note.* Adapted from “An Analysis of the Impacts of Import Liberalization of Japanese Pop Culture,” by J. Park, 2006, p. 133 (Unit: 1,000 USD).

This increased exposure to Japanese broadcasting programs led to the growth of official/unofficial copies of Japanese television formats. Specifically, it made Korean television producers realize the importance of food in viewer ratings and copy popular forms of Japanese food TV (Park & Baek, 2013). For example, SBS’s food variety show, *Decision! Taste to Taste*, was produced in 2003 through the format purchase of Yomiuri TV’s *Dochi no ryōri show*; and *Lee Hongryeol’s Show* was blamed for its copying of the Japanese show, *Bokyabura tengoku* (A. Kim, 2014; Park & Baek, 2013). Likewise, *Find! Delicious TV* was also a copy of Japanese food show (G. Hwang, personal communication, 2016, May 27).<sup>33</sup> Thus, we need to understand the prevalence of matjib infotainment shows within the context of inter-regional media flows between South Korea and Japan.

As discussed above, Korean society witnessed a series of food scandals during the mid-2000s. These food crises enhanced people’s perceptions of food safety, and made “well-being” a keyword of public discourse. For example, according to Statistics Korea’s

<sup>33</sup> In an interview with me, Gyoik Hwang, a food critic and food columnist, stated that *MBC’s Find! Delicious TV* was a copy of Japanese food television. Given that he was a counselor of the program, his statement holds credibility.

2003 social survey index, 44.9% of respondents picked “health” as the most important thing, and Samsung Economics Research Institute reported that well-being was one of the 10 hottest items of 2003 (A. Kim, 2014). Journalistic discourse on well-being also exponentially increased between 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 12), and the well-being *jok* (well-being tribe) emerged as a crucial consumer of various culture industries (Kim & Park, 2003, August 14).




Figure 12. The Explosion of News Articles on Well-Being during the Mid-2000s. Adapted from the search results of news articles on “well-being” through BIGKinds.

This explosion of well-being discourse had a direct impact on the television industry. For instance, producers of terrestrial networks, who were seeking for new contents to attract a more general audience, paid great attention to well-being, and aired 90 segments regarding well-being for one week in 2005 (Park & Baek, 2013). In so doing, the Korean television industry approached well-being through physical health although global well-being is measured by various criteria, such as finances, community, physical condition, purpose, and social well-being (E. Na, 2015).<sup>34</sup> In particular, because

<sup>34</sup> While Gallup & Healthways measures well-being based on these five criteria, the OECD looks at more diverse experiences and living conditions of people and households. Its criteria includes: safety, housing, life satisfaction, access to services, civic engagement, education, jobs, community, environment, income, and health (OECD, 2011.).

of the above-mentioned food scandals and the ancient belief that food and medicine share the same roots, well-being infotainment shows addressed food as a main subject, featuring such issues as food safety, healthy food, and dietary therapy (S. Kim, 2015).

*Happy Table*'s program purpose effectively illustrates this trend as in the following:

We didn't realize that *danmuji* (pickled radish) was in mandu (dumpling) before mandu scandal occurred. What do we eat today? Raw fish per kilogram is cheaper than 10 thousand KRW! You get what you pay for, but is it going to be safe? Through experiment, investigation, and analysis of food items, [we will] show how, where, and what to eat for better and healthier diet, and recreate healthy foodways by addressing curiosities, misunderstandings, and truths of a food item (KBS, n.d.a).

Table 16

*The Rise of Momzzang (Chiseled Fitness) Discourse in the Mid-2000s*

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
News Article	0	0	0	4	470	252	224	213	268	248

*Note.* Adapted from the search results of news articles on "momzzang" through BIGKinds.

Along with food safety issues, the enactment of a five-day workweek increased people's attention to lifestyle. The *momzzang* (chiseled fitness) syndrome, which gained widespread recognition in 2004 (see Table 16), further emphasized links among body, food, and well-being (S. Kim, 2015). Although the soft-documentary and infotainment shows emerged as primary formats of food TV in the early and mid-2000s, other forms were still active in the Korean television industry. For instance, the global popularity of game/competition shows (de Solier, 2005) and the opening of Japanese broadcasting programs led to the development of competition-centered food variety shows; recipe shows moved to and survived on food-devoted cable channels; and morning shows, travel shows, and magazine shows continuously featured food.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the historical development of Korean food TV from the 1980s to 2007. Specifically, I divided it into three broad periods, including: 1) the era of instructional cooking shows (1980s-1993), 2) the era of genre hybridization (1993-2000), and 3) the era of soft-documentary and infotainment shows (2000-2007). This periodization is research-specific, and thus, does not aim to offer indisputable historical “fact.” Nevertheless, it helps us understand how Korean food television has evolved through an interaction with other television formats depending on historical conditions.

In the first section of this chapter, I discussed the predominant formats of food TV in each period, and introduced representative examples of these formats. In the next section, I provided a detailed description of both internal and external factors that situated the development and transformation of Korean food television. Particularly, I highlighted the intertwined relationship between television production and wider social contexts, including but not limited to political change, government policy, international relations, inter-regional relations, economic conditions, consumerism, development of broadcasting/communication technologies, and so on. For example, I argued that the prevalence of instructional cooking shows from the late 1980s to 1993 was inseparable from the following social conditions: President Chun’s strict control over the press and broadcasting; the enactment of the Fundamental Act on the Press; the collapse of commercial broadcasters; the launch of color broadcasting; the recommencement of morning broadcasting; government-driven national events (e.g., Gukpung 81); the Amendment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Act; the rise of foreign franchised

restaurants; the growth of GDP per capita; the hosting of international sports events; and the complete liberalization of overseas travel.

These findings show that the evolution of a certain television genre is not a product of the television industry's internal structural changes but an outcome of the "articulation" of industry, audience, and various socio-historical contexts. In addition, it will help us gain a better understanding of food TV's discursive practices about the nation, which I will discuss in Chapter 6. In the next chapter, I will explore the multilayered social conditions that brought about the explosion of food TV from the late 2000s to the mid-2010s. In particular, I will critically examine existing research on Korean food television and identify significant factors from the perspective of food TV producers.

CHAPTER 4  
THE EXPLOSION OF FOOD TV SINCE 2008 AND THE ARTICULATION OF  
MULTILAYERED SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The late 2000s mark a turning point in the history of Korean food TV. From this period on, food began to be found in all television genres, encompassing magazine programs, travel shows, variety shows, talk shows, reality shows, game/survival shows, dramas, and documentaries. Moreover, new forms of food TV, such as *meokbang* (eating shows) and *cookbang* (cooking shows), developed through the interaction between video streaming services and the television industry and among various television genres. In Chapter 3, I discussed the predominant formats of food TV in each period and the social imperatives that allowed the development of these formats. This chapter will also describe how food has been addressed by the Korean television industry since 2008. However, because of its fully-fledged status, I will pay more attention to the social conditions that led to the “explosion” of food TV rather than identifying particular formats that prevailed post-2008.

The Explosion of Food TV from 2008 to the Present

Since the 1980s, the Korean television industry has continuously featured food either as information or entertainment. Because of its close and inseparable relationship with people’s daily lives, food has been a major subject of television producers. One of my interviewees, who has been in television production for 15 years, explained the industrial meanings of food in the following way:

In fact, food is always an important topic among television producers regardless of their division. It’s because food, particularly eating, is very

intimate to our life... We have programs where doctors or lawyers appear. But, we only need them when we are sick or involved with legal problems. When it comes to food, it is directly connected to our everyday lives. For this reason, television producers and writers are always thinking and talking about food. Indeed, there have been many successful cases. I guess it's a matter of sympathy. Because we eat food every day and we know much about it, food seems to arouse audience's sympathy very easily (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

Yet, it was not until the late 2000s that food cut across all television genres and became an end rather than a means (W. Ryu, 2015). While talk shows in the 1990s used food to open a conversation, talk is now subordinated to food. Likewise, while food used to function as a spatial background to TV dramas, it has now become a core element of narrative developments and character relations. Additionally, food preparation and eating are now among the most popular scenes of reality shows and real-variety shows; and food-devoted entertainment shows, such as meokbang and cookbang, have emerged as a new trend of the Korean television industry throughout the 2010s (Jang & Kim, 2016; S. Kim, 2015).

As Table 17 demonstrates, terrestrial networks increasingly produced food-focused programs after 2008 in the form of documentaries, entertainment shows, talk shows, infotainment, reality shows, and variety shows. Along with terrestrial networks, cable networks and general programming channels, such as tvN, Olive, JTBC, TV Chosun, MBN, and Channel A, as well as affiliates of terrestrial networks, including SBS Plus and MBC Everyone, have created a large number of food programs since the late 2000s. For example, tvN made food-centered dramas, talk shows, reality shows, and cooking shows, such as *Let's Eat* (2013), *Three Meals a Day* (2014), *Wednesday Food Talk* (2015), and *House Cook Master Baek* (2015). Suggesting good-hearted restaurants and bistros every week, Channel A has aired its investigative reporting program, *Eatable*

*X-File*, since 2012. JTBC has also produced a number of food programs since its channel opening in 2011, and its signature program, *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator* (2014), has achieved high viewer ratings. Reestablishing its identity as a food-devoted channel in 2011, Olive has further contributed to the expansion of Korean food TV by providing the television industry with abundant human and discursive resources.

Table 17

*Food TV Produced after 2008 by Terrestrial Networks*

Broadcaster	Program Title	Year
MBC	<i>Silver Green, Home Is Good</i>	2009
	<i>The Table of Medicine</i>	2009
	<i>MBC Live Tonight</i>	2014
	<i>Seven Tasters</i>	2014
	<i>My Little Television</i>	2015
KBS	<i>Noodle Road</i>	2008
	<i>Living Show, Your 6 O'Clock</i>	2009
	<i>Live Broadcast, Today</i>	2009
	<i>Explorers of Korean Food</i>	2010
	<i>Live Info Show</i>	2010
	<i>Good Morning, Korea</i>	2011
	<i>A Korean's Dining Table</i>	2011
	<i>Rediscovery of Korea</i>	2011
	<i>The World Is Delicious</i>	2012
	<i>Happy Together<sup>a</sup></i>	2012
	<i>Live Info Show+</i>	2013
	<i>Food Odyssey</i>	2014
	<i>The King of Food</i>	2014
SBS	<i>Amazing Recipe</i>	2015
	<i>Korea Cook</i>	2009
	<i>Competition! Star Chef</i>	2009
	<i>Live Broadcast Today</i>	2009
	<i>Authentic Taste of Korea</i>	2010
	<i>Barefooted Friends</i>	2013
	<i>Cooking Korea</i>	2014
EBS	<i>Baek Jongwon's Top Three Kings</i>	2015
	<i>A-Thousand-Year-Old Table</i>	2011
	<i>Longevity Family: Secrets of Health</i>	2012
	<i>Cooking Vision</i>	2013

*Note.* Adapted from "A Study on the Relationship between Korean Food TV and Food Culture since the 1980s: From *Today's Cooking* to *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator*," by S. Kim, 2015, p. 121; "Emergence of Internet Meokbang (Foodcasting) and Its Hegemonic Process in Media Culture," by Hong & Park, 2016, p. 132; and "Formats and Contents of TV Food Programs and Their Meanings: A Semiotic Study on *Korean Cuisine and Dining* of KBS-TV," Park & Baek, 2013, pp. 72-73.

<sup>a</sup>Though it was premiered in 2007, *Happy Together* involved a food-oriented segment in 2012.

### Multilayered Social Conditions of Food TV's Explosion

As I discussed in Chapter 3, genre is not a self-generating classificatory system; rather, the development and evolution of genre are embedded in cultural, political, economic, and industrial contexts. The explosion of food TV from the late 2000s also stood at the intersection of various social conditions.

Table 18

#### *Social Conditions of Exponential Growth of Food TV since the Late 2000s*

Previous Studies	Findings
Kim, A. (2014)	Global financial crisis Mad cow disease
Choi, K. (2015)	"Korean Food Globalization" project Low production cost of food TV Neoliberal economy The increase of emotional hunger and demand for vicarious pleasure
Kim, S. (2015)	The growing discourse on well-being The overseas expansion of the Korean food service industry Neoliberal food culture
Kim, H. (2015)	"Korean Food Globalization" project The increasing demand for vicarious pleasure and social relations The emergence of new media platforms
Na, E. (2015)	The prevalence of well-being discourse and lookism The increase of single-person household The dissolution of traditional family system Low quality of life
Ryu, W. (2015)	The demand for emotional eating and vicarious pleasure The structural changes in television industry The increasing use of social media The growth of social discourses on well-being and healing
Hong & Park (2016)	Low production cost of food TV The commodification of emotion The emergence of neoliberal subjects Mad cow disease The growth of self-broadcasting
Jang & Kim (2016)	The increase of single-person household The increase of social demand for emotional healing The intersection of subculture and new media platforms The increase of single-person household Economic depression and growing sense of unhappiness/deficiency The increasing demand for vicarious pleasure and emotional healing The prevalence of well-being discourse and lookism Low production cost of food TV

*Note.* Adapted from the findings of previous studies on Korean food TV, which are identified within the table.

Previous studies have explained these social contexts in terms of: 1) structural transformations of the television industry; 2) emerging new media platforms; 3) the global economy and its influences on the domestic economy; 4) shifts in household structure; 5) increasing social discourses on well-being and lookism; 6) growing demands for emotional healing and vicarious pleasure; and 7) the implementation of the “Korean Food Globalization” project (K. Choi, 2015; Hong & Park, 2016; Jang & Kim, 2016; A. Kim, 2014; H. Kim, 2015; E. Na, 2015; W. Ryu, 2015) (see Table 18). Although these studies provide meaningful interpretations of Korean food TV’s exponential growth, none of them involve an empirical investigation of production practices. Here, I will elucidate social imperatives that affected media practitioners’ production of food TV based on in-depth interviews with 11 television producers.

#### *The Structural Changes in the Korean Television Industry*

The late 2000s mark a pivotal moment for the Korean television industry in that the legal apparatus for “general programming channels” was established. Before the implementation of the 2009 Broadcasting Act, a company belonging to a business group and a corporation operating daily newspapers were prohibited from running “a terrestrial broadcasting business or a program providing business engaged in general programming or specialized programming of news reports, or own[ing] the relevant stocks or equity shares” (Korea Communications Commission, 2009, January 1). In November, 2009, the restriction on broadcasting business ownership largely changed:

A company belonging to an enterprise group...and its affiliates (including specially related persons), or a corporation (including specially related persons) operating daily newspapers...shall not own stocks of equity shares in excess of 10/100 of the total stocks or equity shares of a terrestrial broadcasting business operator, and shall now own stocks or equity shares in excess of 30/100 of the total stocks and equity shares of a

program providing business operator engaging in general programming or specialized program of news reports (Korea Communications Commission, 2009, November 1).

Although this new Act appears to execute a negative regulation on the ownership of broadcasting business, it opened up the possibility for an enterprise group and a newspaper company to operate program-providing business and to engage in terrestrial broadcasting business. Specifically, the Act allowed the emergence of “general programming channels,” which blurred the long-standing distinction between terrestrial broadcasting networks and non-terrestrial networks. Before November 2009, non-terrestrial broadcasting businesses were limited to “specialized programming,” which refers to “an act of specially organizing broadcast programs of a particular broadcast field” (Korea Communications Commission, 2009, January 1). General programming—“an act of organizing the broadcast programs so as to form a mutual harmony between the diverse broadcast fields such as news reports, culture, and entertainment”—was only available to terrestrial broadcasting business operators (Korea Communications Commission, 2009, January 1). As the 2009 Broadcasting Act expanded the definition of broadcasting business operator and allowed their entry into general programming, major newspaper companies launched their own general programming channels, such as TV Chosun, Channel A, JTBC, and MBN, in 2011.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, the overall deregulatory policies on broadcasting business ownership enabled terrestrial networks to expand their affiliates.

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<sup>35</sup> MBN was established in 1993 as a CATV broadcasting business operator. In its early stage, MBN only broadcasted specialized economic programs. Later, it changed its specialized area from economy to news reports. It was relaunched as a general programming channel in 2011.

The new broadcasting Act and the proliferation of broadcasting operators accelerated channel competition among terrestrial networks (and their affiliates), general programming channels, and cable networks. This enhanced competition escalated industrial demands for experienced producers and writers, and thus, labor mobility across different forms of broadcasting operators largely increased. All my interviewees working in the television industry acknowledged this structural transformation in the late 2000s and the early 2010s, and explained its multilayered impacts as follows:

You know, tvN used to be a cable channel. But, we now aim at general programming rather than specialized programs. I guess it's because of the advent of general programming channels. As many production people transferred to general programming channels, there were ongoing concerns about the dying out of cable networks. So, cable channels couldn't just stand by; they had to do something (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

I think that cable networks began to be more specialized from the late 2000s either being music channel, travel channel, or food channel. In early days, there were not many cable channels that established their own color...I guess there was a kind of relationship between the growth of general programming channels and the specialization of cable networks (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016).

I came to JTBC in 2011 right before its launch. I used to work at KBS as freelance assistant producer...I transferred because I wanted to keep working with my colleagues and seniors at a new place (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

As quoted above, the expansion of television channels made each cable network rethink its channel identity so as to survive intense competition. For example, while tvN attempted to move beyond special programming channels to compete with terrestrial networks and general programming channels, Olive reestablished its identity as a food-devoted channel to beat other cable networks. One interviewee, who used to work at a

terrestrial network, illustrates how these structural changes impacted the production of food TV:

When there were only terrestrial networks and cable networks, food used to be considered a specialized item for cable networks. With the advent of general programming channels, we've got more television channels and more enhanced competition all of a sudden. These channels have to produce something to fill airtime regardless of subject matters...But, we have a limited pool of entertainers and experts...Within these contexts, food gained more attention from television producers (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

Although the ecological shift in the television industry entailed increased interest in food in general, each network's approach to food and its role in the growth of food TV were different depending on its channel identity. As I discussed in Chapter 3, a cable network, Olive, started as a food-devoted channel in 2000; it then changed its specialty to beauty and fashion in 2005; and it finally reestablished its identity as a food-committed channel in 2011.<sup>36</sup> Since then, Olive has made a significant contribution to the Korean food TV despite its limited audience group—females between the ages of 25 and 40—and its lack of far-reaching influence on the entire television industry. Particularly, it enriched human resources for food TV production in two ways. As my interviewee stated below, there was no established pool of food TV experts before the early 2010s because of the institutional routines of the Korean television industry:

Back then, there was no such thing as professional food TV producer...In general, producers with less experience have no choice in selecting programs. It's very rare for them to design their own programs. There are more chances for them to get assigned food programs. If they were successful, then they would be assigned similar programs. That's the way we build up our career. In Korea, it's virtually impossible that producers

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<sup>36</sup> Olive belongs to an entertainment and media company, CJ E&M, which is affiliated to a larger company CJ Group. As CJ Group involves various dimensions of the food industry from food supply to restaurant franchise, Olive's channel identity and its program contents are not separable from CJ Group's marketing strategies. I will discuss this relationship later in Chapter 5.

with 4-to-5-year experience select programs of their own discretion (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

Indeed, most of my interviewees, who are currently considered “experts,” had little experience in food TV before the late 2000s. For this reason, Olive began to employ producers and writers, who had any production experience regarding food TV, from the late 2000s on. In order to build “originality” as a food-devoted TV channel, Olive even provided its producers with cooking classes, and invested a lot in production staffing and filming devices. A chief producer of Olive stated:

I think we employ more professional production staff, including food stylist, space stylist, and food-specialized camera teams. Producers keep training to reach semi-professional or professional level...Filming food is not easy. To enhance the visual aspects of food, we care a lot about camera angles and colors. So, we use more expensive camera devices than other television networks...We also pay attention to food presentation, and thus, we employ food stylists and art directors as well. Further, because we keep communicating with professional chefs, we need to think of every details...Although other channels have addressed food, there have been no tone and manner...To make food the main character requires many things, such as camera angle, shoeing equipment, lighting, and editing (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016).

Considering the interviewee’s position at Olive, his statement should not be accepted as fact without cross-checking. Yet, other interviewees also acknowledged Olive’s contribution to the specialization of production staff. For example, a producer of SBS Plus—an affiliate of terrestrial network, SBS—admitted that his production staff, including camera crews, food stylists, and television writers, developed their careers at Olive (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).<sup>37</sup> A documentary producer of KBS also claimed that Olive’s 2011 re-launch and its investment in food TV production

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<sup>37</sup> This interviewee used to work for KBS and its affiliates. Due to his production experience in food-related documentary and culture programs, he was invited to Olive in 2011 when it reestablished its channel identity. After working at Olive for four years, he moved to SBS Plus as a food TV expert.

should be recognized (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014). Of course, Olive was not the only network that contributed to the growth of food TV production experts. However, its efforts to develop its own tone and manner—a combination of properties, values, and personality—led to a continued investment in production staff and devices, which in turn transferred to other television networks due to the enhanced labor mobility in the television industry.

Olive's other contribution is its discovery of talented figures. Since 2008, Korean food TV has largely expanded across different television genres. Particularly, entertainment shows, such as survival shows, competition shows, and variety shows, have addressed food as a major theme (A. Kim, 2014; E. Na, 2015; E. Noh, 2016). As all my interviewees agreed, entertainment shows require what they called "manpower." In other words, they need interesting figures who can mediate food and television, and who can attract audiences. However, those figures rarely existed before the early 2010s, and thus, food was often addressed either as information or as a mere device of entertainment (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). Indeed, chefs and cooks used to appear as "teachers" or experts before the early 2010s. Olive changed this preexisting conception of food experts in the television industry by increasing their media exposure and by demonstrating their credentials. My interviewees discussed the significance of "manpower" in entertainment shows and Olive's role in developing it as follows:

There is no linkage between restaurant and entertainment shows. But, we can use figures...Through a series of experiments, we have been able to discover chefs with star quality. You said you did an interview with a producer of *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator*...Almost all chefs in early episodes came from Olive TV. Simply speaking, the producer of that show was able to use credited figures. It was Olive that created and examined a pool of chefs. Through various recipe shows and cooking shows, Olive has presented chefs in front of camera. From the producer's

perspective, well-known chefs are just an ordinary person. You know, it is very risky to make programs with an “ordinary” person. But, Olive did demonstrate their possibility...“Uh...this guy is a good talker and showman.” In so doing, Olive provided a chance for other producers to design and produce programs with those chefs. There were *Master Chef Korea* and *Great Competition for Korean Food*. Within these contexts, television producers realized that they could create entertainment shows focusing on food. They found food’s great possibility (G. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

I can say that *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator* is a cooking-variety show. On the program, we talk, eat, and pick winners and losers. So, it’s a comprehensive cooking-variety show...By taking formats of sports broadcasting and competition shows, we can show audiences chefs’ personal charms and their showmanship... Because they have to cook in 15 minutes, chefs should be skilled in cooking. But, it’s not everything. I made the cast with chefs with showmanship and interesting personalities (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

My program, *Kukgadaepyo (Cook Representative)*, couldn’t be produced without *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator*. You know, this program is where chefs are playing national team matched against other countries. Without widespread recognitions of and favorable feelings for particular chefs, this program cannot persuade or attract audiences. If chef Lee or chef Choi were just a person who cooked in the kitchen, viewers wouldn’t be curious about them, and wouldn’t understand why they are appearing on television... Actually, figures are one of the most important things in producing this kind of program (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

When I organized the cast of my program, I picked chef Oh because he was quite a showman and had personal charms compared to other chefs. On other programs, he showed his showmanship and demonstrated how he could attract viewers... We need a person who can cook and amuse the audience rather than the best chef (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

As quoted above, producers of entertainment programs approach food in a different way: they tend to focus on “people” rather than food itself or restaurants. Since its channel re-launching, Olive has continuously tested those people and created a group of “figures,” who have later become public resources for the broadcasting industry. It is noteworthy that producers of food entertainment shows, particularly from terrestrial

networks or general programming networks, did not have personal interests in or professional knowledge about food even though their programs have been largely successful. In other words, without the presence of suitable “players,” they would not produce food-devoted entertainment shows. My interviewees admitted this and explained how they perceived food entertainment shows:

Personally, I don't have much knowledge about food. I approached food from the perspective of entertainment, so I was able to make full use of food without sufficient knowledge about food (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

I've never thought about making food programs. You know, food programs are something that cable networks used to make... The underlying motto [of this program] was entertainment... When it comes to details, it's different. However, food program is not that different from other entertainment shows. From the producer's perspective, producers are mediators of experts and viewers. Compared to my former program, *Immortal Song*, this program [*House Cook Master Baek*] is virtually the same in that it addresses a group of experts... The subject is different, but the way in which I arrange, mediate, and communicate is pretty similar (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

The growth of “manpower” driven by Olive opened up the possibility for producers without professional knowledge to engage with food TV production across different forms of television networks. Particularly, the increasing production of food entertainment shows, where chefs are addressed as both entertainers and professional cooks, brought about the formation of a subgenre called “cookbang” in the mid-2010s. While most cable networks, including Olive, pursued specialization in response to the structural changes in the television industry, other television networks, which aimed at general programming, took different approaches, and thus, contributed to food TV in different ways and to different degrees.

Launched in 2011, general programming channels have positioned themselves in-between narrowcasts and broadcasts (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016). According to the 2009 Broadcasting Act, they were supposed to improve the diversity of broadcasting contents by encompassing various broadcast fields, such as news reports, culture, and entertainment (Korea Communications Commission, 2009, November 1). However, because of low viewer ratings at an early stage, they began to focus on particular genres so as to compete against preexisting general programming networks, namely terrestrial networks (Han, Zhou, & Joo, 2016). Specifically, they steadily increased the ratio of news reports and variety shows while sharply reducing that of other genres, including TV debate, education/culture/art shows, animation, music shows, quiz/game shows, infotainment, comedy, and sports (see Table 19).

Table 19

*Programming Ratio of General Programming Channels from 2012 to 2015*

Networks	Year	News	Current Affairs	Docu	Life Information	Drama	Variety Show	Others
JTBC	2012	12.9	7.1	18.5	3.8	21.5	15.2	20.4
	2013	9.6	1.2	8	9	19.8	39.9	11.7
	2014	16.4	8.9	6.2	16.8	24.1	18.9	7.9
	2015	21.3	0	0	5.4	5.2	54.3	5.5
TV Chosun	2012	14.4	13.1	25	3.9	19.6	12.2	11.6
	2013	28.9	20.1	8.2	11.5	3.6	31.5	5.1
	2014	39.5	9.5	6	6.7	4	38.2	2.8
MBN	2015	33.6	10	1.4	15.1	3.9	32.9	2.8
	2012	42.4	12.4	12.2	5.7	7.2	6.6	12.9
	2013	25.1	5.6	18.7	9.5	1.3	17.3	21.9
Channel A	2014	32.4	7.7	18.4	4.8	0.7	26.5	9.4
	2015	32.6	4.7	13.8	6.4	11.4	25.8	4.9
	2012	12.4	17.7	15.5	9.1	11.5	24.8	6.9
	2013	28.8	20.3	9.6	14.3	0.6	24.3	1.8
Channel A	2014	28.9	18.4	7.7	14.2	3.3	19.1	7.6
	2015	40	11.6	8.7	15	2.9	18.9	2.6

*Note.* Adapted from “Changes of programming of general programming channels,” by Han, Zhou, & Joo, 2016, p. 263.

Although this programming strategy was successful in achieving viewer ratings, it negatively impacted their genre diversity. For example, the average viewership of general

programming channels increased from 0.047% to 1.531% between 2011 and 2015, but their genre diversity index was getting lower during the same period (D. Roh, 2016).

Considering their limited genre diversity, general programming channels are not distant from cable networks. However, producers of general programming channels distinguish their production practices from those of specialized cable networks. In particular, they claim that they are closer to terrestrial networks in terms of their goals, organizational culture, and target audience. As my interviewees stated:

JTBC is very similar to terrestrial networks. Because it's a general programming channel, its goal and culture are not different [from terrestrial networks]...JTBC is in the middle of cable TV and terrestrial networks...When it comes to program management or program quality, we are very conservative like terrestrial networks (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

Producers with general programming style consider something universal when they design their programs. Producers of Olive or other specialized cable networks address cutting-edge subjects and aim to appeal specific audience group. But, my colleagues or producers of JTBC care more about universality of subjects whatever they might be. You know, tvN is a kind of cable TV channel, but it's different because we pursue general programming...We do not think of a particular group of people when designing programs. As I told you, Olive's *Tasty Road* addresses young female adults as a main audience. We're different. Because I'm from terrestrial networks, I don't consider a particular group. It's my style, and it's the style of my companies...Television networks that pursue general programming, such as KBS, MBC, SBS, JTBC, tvN, do not limit their audience group...They are addressing the general Korean audience (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

Because of their "conservative" approach to new trends and audience groups, producers of general programming channels doubted the potential of food/chefs for entertainment shows. Even though they realized the necessity of new subjects and new formats for entertainment shows, they were uncertain of food's capacity to attract a

general audience. The producer of *Cook Representative*—a spin-off program of *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator*—explained this uncertainty as follows:

Indeed, [producers of] entertainment shows are always looking for new subjects. This is related to the flow of the entire television industry. You know, talk shows and music programs used to be at the center of entertainment shows. As they gradually declined, real-variety shows and *gwanchal* (observation) entertainment shows have become the center of entertainment. As they were getting saturated, production people had to find new subjects...It's not official, but we were really worrying about the success of *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator*, particularly in the pre-production stage. We asked ourselves, "Will this food program go well?" "Is it going to be fine?" "Will the audience be interested in this kind of program?" Because there was a prevalent notion that food belonged to culture program or infotainment, we were not sure about the outcome of food-entertainment mixture...That's why I was worrying about the program (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

Although their involvement in food TV came a bit later than that of cable networks, general programming channels made a significant contribution to food TV by expanding its viewership and demonstrating the potential of food for entertainment shows. As producers of Olive acknowledged below, Olive has focused on a limited group of viewers in terms of age, gender, and economic class:

Each cable channel has a specific target audience. Olive's target audience is female from the age of 25 to 49 (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

According to our analysis, the major audience of Olive has a monthly income over 5 million KRW. Actually, we intended this to some degree. We agreed on the idea that Olive had to be classy. Every detail was oriented to "high-end." Simply speaking, we thought that culture was coming down from high-level people (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

Also, Olive paid more attention to those who would have an interest in food/cooking and who would watch food TV with a purpose. On the other hand, general programming channels prioritized entertainment rather than food; made viewers perceive

their programs not as food TV but as entertainment shows; and thus, attracted more general audiences (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016). Additionally, the great success of general programming channels' food programs reasserted the effectiveness of professional chefs as televisual figures, and facilitated the explosion of food TV in the mid-2010s. Even the producers of *Olive*, who "discovered" those chefs, recognized the role played by general programming channels:

Chef Choi gained recognition to some degree as he appeared as "crazy chef" on Food TV. Due to the limited viewership, however, he could not reach the general public. While he was appearing on *Olive Show* and *Olive's* other programs, he became known to more people. But, it was not until *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator* that he became a star chef and TV celebrity. You know, he now has a large fandom (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

The growth of non-terrestrial networks and the following channel competition prompted terrestrial networks' involvement in food TV in various ways. Although general programming channels started in 2011, the discussion about their necessity began much earlier. For example, through its "Road Map for Promoting Multimedia Broadcasting," the Korea Communications Commission announced the high likelihood of approving general programming channels in 2007. In the same year, the Korea Communication Association hosted a symposium on "how to introduce general programming channels," where media scholars discussed the future role of general programming channels (H. Park, 2007, April 3). As the prospect of general programming channels became more realistic in the late 2000s, terrestrial networks had to figure out how to position themselves in multimedia and multichannel broadcasting environments. The production of high-quality documentary was one of the outcomes of these efforts. Specifically, public broadcasting stations, such as KBS and EBS, actively promoted the

production of globally competitive documentaries from the late 2000s. As my interviewees who have produced documentaries at terrestrial networks noted:

There was a project called “Global Great Project” that promoted high-quality documentary production by offering 200 million KRW for each episode. There were a large number of applicants both inside and outside of KBS. The purpose of the projects was to make a documentary that could be competitive in global markets. My program, *Noodle Road*, was selected within this context (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

EBS had made several nature documentaries and special documentaries. However, documentary itself did not gain much attention in EBS, although there were a few human interest documentaries. In the late 2000s, there was a growing demand for what we called “high-class documentary,” which would be based on in-depth investigation and academic research. You know, like the BBC. By offering more production time and more production cost, albeit insufficient. We had a three-week long workshop and discussed how to manage this project, *Docuprime*. EBS has a documentary committee... The most important thing is that we invite public participation. Through a rigorous filtering system, including three-round review and two-round presentation, producers are able to avoid top-down decision making and reflect their own interests. That’s why we have a diversity of topics. It is a kind of open system that provides EBS members with an opportunity to produce documentaries regardless of their positions or divisions... When it comes to contents, we focus on academic research and approach... The next thing is visual aesthetics. Because documentary focuses on contents and documentation, its visual aspect can be coarse. *Docuprime* aims to offer a film-like look if not film itself (J. Lee, personal communication, January 2, 2015).

You know, KBS is a public broadcaster. Thus, it has its own responsibility and approach to take. It should be kind of classy. Through the perspective of humanities, we need to make a positive influence on our society (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

As quoted above, terrestrial networks’ efforts to reestablish their channel identities led to their promotion of high-quality documentary production. In so doing, they encouraged producers to bring up their own interests and offered relative autonomy in their production practices. Within this context, documentary producers began to address food from the perspective of the humanities based on their personal interests

rather than through top-down decision-making processes. Indeed, all my interviewees from terrestrial networks' documentary divisions admitted that their involvements with food documentaries were initiated for personal reasons, such as family background and educational background. However, terrestrial networks had a "preferred" topic for the food documentary: it had to address Korean food. The producer from KBS explained terrestrial networks' long-lasting preference for Korean food as follows:

Until 7 to 8 years ago, most food documentaries were special programs for national holidays. Those programs used to address Korean food. The other format was a program like *Discover Food, Discover the World*, which was a kind of travel shows...Another category was a program that showed grotesque foods from foreign countries...There were rare cases that addressed foreign foods through the perspective of culture and history...Basically, Korean viewers have a certain attitude; it's true, and producers know that it's reality. No Korean food, no high ratings...When we address national pride, people like it. For example, food documentaries have focused on the superiority of Korean foods, such as *doenjang* (soybean paste) and kimchi. It seems like there're no other foods. But, (laugh) it has worked out (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

For this reason, terrestrial networks' tendency to feature Korean food continued in the late 2000s. Specifically, the essence, archetype, and superiority of Korean food remained as major topics of food documentaries; and foreign foods were rarely addressed by documentary producers (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014). However, the success of *Noodle Road*, which won the Peabody Award and the grand prize from the Korean Communications Commission, partly changed this tendency. As the producer of *Noodle Road* states below, the program received negative comments from viewers when it first aired, but it gained widespread recognition due to the award winning, and paved the way for producers and viewers to expand the boundary of food documentaries:

I believe you can still access to the bulletin board of the program. Early viewer comments blamed the program for *mugukjeokseong* (a lack of national odor)...People kept questioning why Korean *guksu* (noodle) was not foregrounded. I think it was addressed in episode 3 or 4. If it were other programs, Korean noodle would be a main character and foreign noodles would be addressed as a reference...Actually, the program didn't get positive reactions from the company...Then, how did it change? To my understanding, it's because the program won the awards in both Korea and abroad. As it won the awards, KBS reran the program repeatedly. In so doing, the program was reevaluated by viewers. You know, it was an unprecedented attempt. Interestingly, now people take it for granted. We can make documentary series on non-Korean foods. Actually, there was no one who opposed my new program, *Food Odyssey*. Things changed...It is a big change that we can make documentary on foreign foods and people accept it (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

In sum, the increasing discussion on general programming channels made terrestrial networks rethink their channel identities, and facilitated the production of high-quality documentaries. Although there is an ongoing tendency towards featuring Korean food, documentary producers of terrestrial networks have enhanced the recognition of food as a significant part of culture through their anthropological and sociological approaches.

Another contribution that terrestrial networks made to food TV was brought about by the rise of online broadcasting. In the mid-2000s, there was a growing demand for the convergence of broadcasting and telecommunication (Y. Yum, 2008). In order to lay the legal groundwork, the Korean government established the Broadcasting and Telecommunication Integration Promotion Committee in 2006, and enacted the Internet Multimedia Broadcast Services Act in 2008 (Kim & Chung, 2012). As it aimed to ensure “the proper operation of broadcasting business using Internet multimedia,” the Act allowed the emergence of an “Internet multimedia broadcasting” environment, where broadcasting services and “broadband integrated services” would be converged (Ministry

of Science and ICT, 2009, July 31). This multimedia broadcasting environment promoted the rise of new broadcasting services, such as IPTV, social TV, and online broadcasting, in the late 2000s (Kim & Chung, 2012; Yoon & Zo, 2014). Particularly, video streaming services, which enabled users to retransmit TV channels or live-stream their own contents, gained widespread recognition from the late 2000s, rearranging the landscape of the television industry. For example, Afreeca TV (All Free Casting TV) demonstrated the power of real-time personal broadcasting in 2008 when its users live-streamed a candlelight vigil and the police's excessive use of force against it (Hong & Park, 2016).

This new media platform gave rise to a new form of food TV, meokbang—a portmanteau of eating and broadcast (meokneun-bangsong)—in 2008. Meokbang initially referred to real-time personal broadcasting, in which BJs (broadcasting jockeys) live-streamed their consumption of vast quantities of food on Afreeca TV (Donnar, 2017). It rapidly became a major content of online self-broadcasting, featuring more than 3,500 channels in June 2015 (Hong & Park, 2016). As meokbang contents gained huge popularity among online users, the term moved beyond subculture jargon, and entered into mainstream media. Specifically, as the eating scenes of the film *The Yellow Sea* (2010) attracted the public's attention, meokbang became an object of humor, parody, and spectacle in various media industries (Hong & Park, 2016; E. Na, 2015). Although terrestrial networks' conservativeness delayed their involvement with meokbang (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014), they actively incorporated it into their talk shows, reality shows, and variety shows from 2012 on. For instance, KBS's talk show, *Happy Together*, created a segment "Nighttime Snack Bar" in 2012, in which celebrities introduced and ate their favorite easy-to-cook foods; *Barefooted Friends*,

SBS's real-variety show, changed its main theme to "eating home-made foods" in 2013; and other real-variety shows, such as *Dad! Where Are We Going?*, *I Live Alone*, and *Real Men*, began to highlight eating scenes (A. Kim, 2014). In so doing, terrestrial networks expanded the boundary of meokbang from "online-limited self-broadcasting on eating" to "broadcasting contents featuring eating scenes" as the following news articles describes:

We've got a new "child star." The most favorable star in MBC's entertainment show, *Dad! Where Are We Going?*, which recorded 10% in viewer ratings, is a 7-year-old boy Hu—a child of Minsoo Yoon... Particularly, his eating scenes, in which he eats boiled eggs and instant black noodles, have gained a lot of attention. It is said that he is going to be a rising star of meokbang after actor Jungwoo Ha, who has been well-known for his meokbang acting in *The Yellow Sea* (Y. Kim, 2013, February 4).

As the meaning of meokbang broadened and was widely circulated by terrestrial networks, meokbang further penetrated into public discourse in the mid-2010s, and contributed to the explosion of discourses on food and cooking (see Table 4).

Table 20

*Increasing News Articles on Cookbang, Meokbang, and Food or Cooking*

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Cookbang	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	555	216	64
Meokbang	2	0	7	2	2	692	829	1598	518	508
Food or Cooking	2,143	3,156	3,541	3,354	3,485	4,604	4,974	8,216	5,817	1,712

*Note.* Adapted from the search results of news articles on "cookbang," "meokbang," and "food or cooking" via BIGKinds.

*The Shift in Household Structure and the Rise of the Sampo Generation*

From the late 2000s to the present, South Korea has witnessed the sharp increase of single-person households. According to the Statistics Korea's population census, the percentage of single-person households reached 23.8% in 2010 and 27.2% in 2015 (see

Figure 13). While the number of more-than-four-person households largely declined from 6,450,000 (44%) to 4,670,000 (25%) between 2000 and 2015, that of single-person households doubled from 2,260,000 to 5,060,000 in the same period. In other words, the traditional family structure collapsed in the past decade (Jeon & Ahn, 2016). Indeed, the survey results of the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission shows that the decline of traditional family values has been a major factor of this shift in household structure (E. Na, 2015).<sup>38</sup>

As anthropological and sociological studies of food demonstrate, eating is not just a physiological practice, but a social and cultural practice (Appadurai, 1981; Belasco, 2008). People eat food together to express their group identities, create social interactions, and cement social bonds (Belasco, 2008). The increase of single-person households diminished the opportunity for people to communicate with others through food. For example, the percentage of those who eat breakfast with family members dipped below 50% in 2013 for the first time, and the percentage of those eating dinner together decreased from 76% in 2005 to 65.1% in 2013 (E. Na, 2015). In addition, it has been found that single-person households are less likely to have breakfast and more likely to consume instant foods (see Table 21). Moreover, the ratio of undernourishment turns out to be much higher among single-person households (11.7%) than others (6%) (Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2015).

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<sup>38</sup> The survey results of the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission attributes this shift to the decline of traditional family values, (28.85%), the intensification of individualism (23.6%), the increase of unmarried people (23%), and the deterioration of economic condition (20.3%) (E. Na, 2015).




Figure 13. The Increasing Percentage of Single-Person Households. Adapted from “Household Structure according to the Number of Household Members and the Average Number of Household Members,” by Statistics Korea, 2017c. The numeric unit for the Y-axis refers to a percentage of single-person households.

Table 21

*The Difference in Food Consumption Behaviors between Single-Person Households and 2+-Person Households*

Food consumption behaviors	Single-person households	2+-person households
The ratio of skipping breakfast	33.50%	18.10%
The ratio of consuming instant foods <sup>a</sup>	119.40%	100%

*Note.* Adapted from “The Increase of Single-Person Households and Its Impact on Food Industry and Policy Task,” by Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2015, pp. v-vi.

<sup>a</sup>The ratio of consuming instant foods was calculated by setting 2+ person households as 100%.

The growth of single-person households affected not only food consumption behaviors but also the food industry. The food processing industry expanded home meal replacement (HMR) markets; the food distribution industry increased the number of convenience stores and online shopping sites; and the food service industry enlarged quick service restaurant (QSR) markets and delivery/to-go services (Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2015). My interviewee, who worked as a business development specialist for the Lotte Group, explains this change in the food industry as follows:

People eat out because they don't have enough money. When people eat together, it's cheaper to buy raw ingredients and cook at home...But, there are people who can't afford to eat out or who are too busy to eat out. For those people, food industries made home meal replacement (HMR), which is a meal ready to eat...When it comes to Lotte, we don't do restaurant business except for quick service restaurant (QSR), such as Lotteria. Our concern is HMR. Basically, HMR is what you buy and eat at convenience stores. It's not something you eat at restaurants or cafes. You know, the most well-known HMR is *samgakimbap* (seaweed covered triangular rice ball). As single-person households increase, we're getting similar to Japan. The variety of Japanese HMRs is incomparable. Why? After the collapse of bubble economy, it became harder for ordinary Japanese people to eat out. Also, it's because of the increase of single-person households, particularly in urban areas...Like Japan, Korea has expanded QSR and HMR markets. All the retro foods that you can buy at supermarkets or convenience stores, for example, packaged cold noodles and packaged *yukgaejang* (spicy beef soup), appeared in the mid-2000s, although the market size was not as big as now...In the past, people purchased pork meat, onion, and scallion at different places, and cooked at home. Now, we can buy all the ingredients at one place. It was not until the mid-2000s. But, from the late 2000s, people began to buy seasoned meat at mart, and just grill at home. These items are called ready-to-cook (RTC). It's a sort of HMR (B. Lee, personal communication, December 26, 2014).

As quoted above, the increase of single-person households led to the growth of HMR and QSR markets, which in turn accelerated single-person households' tendency towards eating alone. The proliferation of eating alone even coined neologisms, such as *honbap* (eating alone) and *honsul* (drinking alone), in the mid-2010s (see Table 22). Despite their negative implications, these terms became keywords of the food service industry as the following news article describes:

During lunch break, food courts near Gangnam station were packed by *honbapjok* (eating-alone tribe). As eating-alone people have increased to save money and time, food service industries have opened *ilinsikdang* (one-person restaurant) to target those people...*Master of Fight* is a famous *bossam* (boiled pork) restaurant among honbapjok...The owner, Yoha Park (28), states, "I decided to open this restaurant because there were not many places where people could eat alone. Because Shinrim-Dong is a residential area for single-person households, there are many office workers who eat alone in the restaurant or order for to-go." Indeed, one-person restaurants are concentrated in Shinchon, Hongdae, and

Shinrim areas where the ratio of single-person households is high (J. Im, 2015, April 2).

Table 22

*The Increase of Journalistic Discourses on Honbap and Honsul*

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Honbap	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	35	216	363
Honsul	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	332	373

*Note.* Adapted from the search results of news articles on “honbap” or “honsul” via BIGKinds.

Although eating alone emerged as a new cultural phenomenon and its positive images were largely circulated by the consumer product and food industries,<sup>39</sup> it could not arouse a sense of belongingness, and thus deepened emotional hunger (Hong & Park, 2016; E. Na, 2015). Describing contemporary Korean society as a “hunger society,” Changyun Joo (2013) suggests that emotional hunger results from a lack of human relations and economic resources. Eating alone enhanced this sense of social alienation and increased a demand for emotional connectedness (Jang & Kim, 2016). The explosion of food TV is closely related to this increasing sense of emotional hunger and a desire for emotional ties. Notably, recent studies on Korean food TV have shown that people watch food TV to experience vicariously the pleasures of eating, cooking, and being together (Hong & Park, 2016; Jang & Kim, 2016; E. Na, 2015; W. Ryu, 2015). For example, through a study on the relationship among viewer motivation, satisfaction, and parasocial interaction of food TV, Jang and Kim (2016) demonstrate that vicarious experience is the most significant motivational factor of food TV watching (see Table 23).

<sup>39</sup> In order to interpellate single-person households, advertising and marketing industries coined new terms, such as single-sumer and solo-economy (J. Im, 2015, April 2).

Table 23

*Motivational Factors of Food TV Watching*

Motivational factor	Items	%
Vicarious pleasure	To feel connected when eating alone	22.39
	When missing <i>jibbap</i> (home-made meal)	
	When controlling the diet	
	When I do not want to cook	
	When there is nothing to eat	
Entertainment	Because eating <i>with</i> watching tastes better	18.68
	Because competition among chefs is interesting	
	Because chef's cooking skills are spectacular	
	Because there are many entertainment elements	
	Because of preference for particular chefs	
Information	Because it gives good cooking tips	15.31
	Because it gives simple and easy recipes	
	To gain information about ingredients and cooking wares	
	To gain information about restaurants	
Killing time	To visit renowned restaurants	9.18
	Because it is good to spend time	
	Because it does not require serious involvements	

*Note.* Adapted from "Need for Interaction or Pursuit of Information and Entertainment: The Relationship among Viewing Motivation, Presence, Parasocial Interaction, and Satisfaction of Eating and Cooking Broadcasts," by Jang & Kim, 2016, p. 170.

Here, it is important to distinguish the vicarious pleasure of eating/cooking from that of social interaction. As Adema (2000) observes, food TV offers vicarious pleasure through visual and psychological experiences of cooking, tasting, hunger, and/or passion. Korean food TV also provides the vicarious experience of eating and cooking. According to German market research center, GfK, Korean people spend 3.7 hours per a week cooking, and their knowledge about and passion for cooking ranked last out of 22 countries (see Table 24). GfK accounts for this lack of cooking time in terms of the

increase of single-person households, the development of HMR products, and the advanced delivery culture (S. Park, 2015, April 3).

Table 24

*Average Cooking Time per a Week in 2015*

Country	India	South Africa	Indonesia	Italy	Spain	U.K.	U.S.A.	China	France	Germany	South Korea
Cooking time per a week	13.2	9.5	8.3	7.1	6.8	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.4	3.7

*Note.* Adapted from “Cooking: Attitudes and Time Spent,” by GfK, 2015.

Additionally, the rise of *eolzzang* (it-girl) and *momzzang* (hot body) syndrome and the proliferation of lookism intensified the obsession with diet (Jang & Kim, 2016; H. Kim, 2015). These socially-constrained foodways enhanced a desire for vicarious gluttony, and meokbang and cookbang satisfied that desire by providing an imagined experience. My interviewees, including food TV producers and food critics, explained the relationship between food TV and vicarious eating/cooking pleasure as follows:

As people travel abroad more frequently, they have more experiences of and knowledge about foreign cuisines and restaurants. However, they do not know much about how to cook them. For example, people might try *tom yum goong* when they travelled in Thailand. But, they don't know what ingredients are in it, and where its sour taste comes from...For this reason, I attempt to show it to viewers through cooking competition. I don't expect our viewers to understand and follow instructions given by professional chefs. It can be too difficult for them to absorb...But, I think it can create some pleasures (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

I'm not 100% sure about viewership of food TV and why people watch it. It might be different depending on the characteristics of each program. However, I think that popular food TV programs provide their viewers with vicarious pleasure. You know, because they can't eat like what they see on TV (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

Staring at other people's eating is very embarrassing. An act of eating is similar to sexual activity. The central nervous system for sexual pleasure is connected to that for appetite pleasure. For this reason, looking at eating is not different from peeping at sexual intercourse...It is not easy to take a

close look at others' eating at home. That's why television producers have been hesitant [to make meokbang], even though they have known that it would guarantee viewer ratings. I'm not sure when it exactly started, but celebrities, particularly beautiful ladies, are now devouring foods on television, like on *Tasty Road*. It's a huge stimulus. We boldly watch it without filtering...This is porn, professional pornography. Viewers are just imitating pleasure by seeing other's pleasure...That's why we can tell meokbang is food porn...Cookbang is not different. Although well-known chefs cook on cookbang...it is always followed by a meokbang scene in which people exaggerate their reactions...The techniques of meokbang are getting more sophisticated. *Baek Jongwon's Top Three Kings* is a representative example. You know, there is a big screen on top of the studio. This spatial structure makes audiences and panelists look upward...Their eyes turn upwards, and their mouth is naturally open, which makes them look like they are drooling. In other words, a pose of craving is "naturally" made (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27 2016).

As quoted above, meokbang and cookbang provide their audiences with the psychological experience of eating and cooking. In so doing, they exaggerate the pleasure of eating and let their audiences consume and copy a fantasy of the pleasure. For this reason, food TV has often been blamed for its pornographic representations (Kaufman, 2005; Ketchum, 2005).<sup>40</sup> However, vicarious eating/cooking pleasure cannot fully explain the expansion of food TV. As I discussed above, the increase of single-person households intensified emotional hunger, created a desire for social interaction, and aroused a nostalgia for home, family, and friends (E. Na, 2015). Indeed, there was a growing demand for *jipbap* (homemade meal) in the mid-2010s, when the number of single-person households sharply increased (see Figure 14). Food TV satisfied this demand by offering a place in which viewers experience a parasocial interaction. It has

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<sup>40</sup> A food critic and columnist, Gyoik Hwang's critique of Korean meokbang is in line with Ketchum's analysis of the Food Network. Analyzing Anthony Bourdain's *A Cook's Tour*, Ketchum describes the following images as pornographic images: "eyes slightly closed while looking up, limbs slightly open, with both pain and pleasure on his entire face" (Ketchum, 2005, p. 230).

been found that BJs (Broadcasting Jockeys) and users of online meokbang, which later transferred to terrestrial networks, call each other “family” so as to experience emotional ties and confirm their comradeship (Ahn & Choi, 2016).




Figure 14. The Sharp Increase in Journalistic Discourse on Jipbap in the Mid-2010s. Adapted from the search results of news articles on “jipbap” via BIGKinds. The numeric value for the Y-axis refers to the number of news articles.

Particularly, the demand for (para) social interaction proliferated among the *sampo* generation. *Sampo* is a portmanteau of *sam* (three) and *po* (giving-up), which was first introduced by *Kyunghyang Shingmun*’s special report on welfare policies. This term was coined to account for the hopeless reality of the young generation, who would give up three important things: relationship, marriage, and childbirth (Yoo & Park, 2011, May 11). It was later expanded to 5po and 7po by incorporating human relations, home ownership, dream, and hope. As Table 25 indicates, the youth unemployment rate steadily increased from the late 2000s, and reached almost 10% in 2016. As a result, youth inactivity, which refers to the share of young people not in education, employment, or training (NEET),<sup>41</sup> continued to rise during the same period. Also, a growing number

<sup>41</sup> According to OECD (2015), young people in education “include those attending part-time or full-time education, but exclude those in non-formal education and in educational activities of very short duration.” Employment covers “all those who have been in paid work for at least one hour in the reference week of the survey or were temporarily absent from such work.”

of irregular positions and other jobs with poor labor conditions caused young people to lose their motivation to work and give up the job hunt altogether (S. Kim, 2015, August 5). For this reason, South Korea had the third-highest percentage of NEETs among the OECD's thirty-three member countries in 2013 (S. Kim, 2015, August 5) (see Table 26).

Table 25

*The Increase in Youth Unemployment (2006 to 2016)*

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Unemployment rate (%)	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.6	3.7
Youth unemployment rate (%)	7.9	7.2	7.2	8.1	8	7.6	7.5	8	9	9.2	9.8

*Note.* Adapted from "Economic Activity Census," by Statistics Korea, 2018. Youth refers to the age range from 15 to 29.

Table 26

*Percentage of Youths Who Are "NEETs" in OECD Countries (2013)*

Countries	Turkey	Mexico	South Korea	US	UK	France	Germany	Japan	OECD average
NEETs rate	24.90%	18.50%	15.60%	10.80%	8.70%	6.80%	5.60%	4.60%	8.20%

*Note.* Adapted from "South Korea Has Third Most NEETs among Developed Countries," by S. Kim, August 5, 2015.

According to OECD (2015), young people who are NEET are at risk of "becoming socially excluded, with income below the poverty-line and without the skills to improve their economic situation." Another OECD report shows that good health and a good job are two of the most important elements of subjective well-being (OECD, 2016, May 31). The decline of youth employment and the following growth of NEETs largely affected the life satisfaction of young people in South Korea. The International Comparative Study of the Happiness Index for Children and Young People demonstrates that South Korean young people felt the least happy of any members of the OECD from 2009 to 2014. Although South Korea jumped to 19<sup>th</sup> place in 2015, it sank to the bottom

again in 2016 (E. Jeong, 2016, May 3). Within these contexts, young people gave up important parts of their lives, such as relationships, marriage, and even hope, and began to fulfill their various desires by consuming televised images or fantasies. A food critic and columnist, Gyoik Hwang, explains how those material conditions accelerated the consumption of food TV:

One of the biggest concerns of TV producers is to find what is lacking. What is lacking in Korea? There is the so-called 5po generation. Not having a relationship, not getting married, and so on. Why? It's because their desire has been frustrated...Then, there should be something that can offer vicarious pleasure...Television fulfills this desire for vicarious experience. How? You know, there have been programs about fake romance and fake marriage...While watching fake romance, people react as if it was their own romance. This happens because people have mirror neuron, which allows them to absorb others' pleasure...Meokbang and cookbang are not different. Now, we don't have someone to eat together with or share food with...Korea is an enormously competitive society...Now, we need to eat by ourselves. The taste of food does not solely come from food itself. We embrace others' pleasure. That's why it is more delicious when we eat with someone else. The taste is escalated by the interaction...Our desire is determined by material base. If we're in a situation in which we can eat together, have a relationship, purchase a house, and nurture children, we might not need to look for fake pleasure given by broadcasting programs. You know, Korea ranked last in OECD's happiness index (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27, 2016).

As Hwang points out, the long-lasting economic depression (see Table 28) and the following low life satisfaction accelerated people's pursuit of vicarious pleasure, and the Korean television industry actively responded to that demand. For example, dating game shows and fake marriage shows, such as *Couple* (2011 to 2014) and *We Got Married* (2008 to 2017), achieved high viewer ratings in the early and mid-2010s when the sampo generation became an object of public concern. Featuring celebrity dads traveling with their child or being left to care for their kids alone, parenting reality shows, including *Dad! Where Are We Going?* (2013 to 2015) and *The Return of Superman* (2013

to the present), became one of the predominant television formats in the mid-2010s. It is noteworthy that childbirth was among the sampo (three giving-ups), and the birth rate of South Korea has been much lower than the OECD average (see Table 27).

Table 27

*The Total Fertility Rates<sup>a</sup> (2008 to 2016)*

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Korea (%)	1.192	1.149	1.226	1.244	1.297	1.187	1.205	1.239	1.172
OECD (%)	1.800	1.700	1.800	1.700	1.700	1.700	1.700	1.700	-

*Note.* Adapted from “The Shift in Birth and Death,” by Statistics Korea, 2017d and “Fertility Rates,” by OECD, 2017.

<sup>a</sup>OECD (2017) defines the total fertility rates as “the total number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years (15-49).”

Table 28

*The Increasing Income Inequality and the Low Economic Growth in South Korea*

Year	Gini's coefficient	Relative poverty rate	GDP
2008	0.319	14.7	28,660
2009	0.32	15.4	28,320
2010	0.315	14.9	30,380
2011	0.313	15	31,230
2012	0.31	14.4	32,100
2013	0.307	14.5	32,620
2014	0.308	13.5	33,590
2015	0.305	14.2	35,200
2016	0.317	15.4	36,530

*Note.* Adapted from “2017 Income Distribution Index,” by Statistics Korea, 2017b and “Gross Domestic Product,” by OECD, 2018a.

The prevalence of food TV should also be understood from this perspective. It cannot be disembedded from the material contexts, specifically economic conditions that promoted the public’s demand for vicarious pleasure (E. Na, 2015). Yet, vicarious pleasure does not exhaust the results of those contexts. Although long working hours and

fast-paced lifestyles made it harder to cook and eat at home, curiosity about food and how to cook remains strong across the globe (De Backer & Hudders, 2016; Matwick & Matwick, 2014). My interviewees from the television industry understood this cultural phenomenon in relation to changing consumer trends, and explained how the media industries respond to these trends as follows:

In my opinion, the earlier generation born in the 60s was able to get a secure job and purchase a house. Their life patterns were similar that those of our parents' generation. But, my and younger generations are in a difficult situation...

Not many people dream big, and there are not many things that can comfort us. I don't think the younger generation saves money to accomplish bigger things...The whole social structure prevents young people from dreaming a bigger goal. This is why people pursue happiness by consuming something small...Given their financial conditions, people are trying to find small things that could make them happy. I think this tendency towards small happiness is closely related to our socio-economic circumstances. The broadcasting industry is also related to this whole social structure (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

I guess it's been a few years since people began to invest in small, but valuable, things. Because of worsened financial conditions, our consuming abilities have been constrained...For this reason, people tend to consume smaller things, such as cosmetics, clothes, and foods. Food is one of them...Food is what people can consume at the average level, through which they can communicate with others...You know, there were expressions, such as *doenjangnyeo* and *doenjangnam*, which refer to those who tend to buy a cheap meal so they can over-spend on conspicuous luxuries. They used to post photos of good cars and luxurious watches on their SNS to brag about their wealth. But, you know, they were highly blamed for their vanity, and their negative images were largely circulated. Food is different. It's not like purchasing a Mercedes. It's socially acceptable. But, it can give you satisfaction or pleasure...It can give you a feeling that you are not excluded or alienated from popular trends...We can call it rational consumption in that we satisfy ourselves through small consumption...It is related to socio-economic structure, particularly economic depression. Media industries operate within a whole economic structure. The public's consuming trend is also inseparable from that structure. I guess food was chosen within this context. When media people talked about interior, I thought that interior would not be suitable for our economic condition. You know, we cannot purchase a house...I don't think interior will work out unless economic conditions allow people to

buy a house or our housing culture changes. The public's interests in food are closely related to their attitude to and pattern of consumption (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016).

As quoted above, the two interviewees pay attention to different lifestyles and consuming trends between the young and old generations, which were driven by overall financial conditions. They both acknowledge young people's harsh realities that compelled them to give up "bigger" goals. However, they argue that those realities heightened not only their demands for vicarious pleasure but also their actual interest in food. Particularly, they point to the Goldilocks effect of food in neoliberal consumer society: food is neither too expensive to consume in daily lives nor too luxurious to be socially accepted; in addition, it is neither too simple to express one's taste nor too trivial to offer a sense of happiness and inclusion. In other words, food has the right "temperature" as a consumer product in the given economic conditions. The Korea Rural Economic Institute's statistics reports demonstrate this consumer trend of the younger generation (see Tables 29 and 30).

Table 29 shows that householders younger than 39 are likely to spend more money on eating out, and their frequency of eating out is much higher than that of other groups. For example, while 27 % of group 1 eat out more than twice per a week, the ratio of other groups is less than 11%: 8.9% for group 2, 10.4% for group 3, and 6.3% for group 4. The report also shows that the younger generation is less concerned with price when making a decision on eating out. In a similar vein, Table 30 illustrates the younger generation's stronger enthusiasm for food, including a willingness to pay for food, a higher tendency to visit renowned restaurants, and a higher tolerance for unfamiliar food.

Table 29

*Patterns of Eating-Out per Householder's Age Group*

Monthly expenditure on eating-out						
Householder age	Below 10k KRW	10k-30k	30k-50k	50k-100k	Over 100k	
Younger than 39 (Group1)	0.8	6.9	9.4	24.5	58.1	
40-49 (Group2)	0.6	6.5	10.1	28.9	53.7	
50-59 (Group 3)	1.2	11.4	15	30.7	41.4	
Older than 60 (Group 4)	8.6	28.4	18.8	22.4	21.3	
Frequency of eating out						
Householder age	Everyday	4-5/week	2-3/week	Weekly	Biweekly	Monthly
Younger than 39	1.1	2.4	23.5	27.7	25.6	14.1
40-49	0.1	2.1	6.7	26	31.7	24.8
50-59	0.6	1.7	8.1	14.3	29.1	29.4
Older than 60	0.4	0.2	5.7	9.6	26.3	31.7
Reason for not eating out						
Householder age	Price	Waiting	Taste	MSG use	Nutrient	Amount
Younger than 39	34.7	4.3	4.6	11.1	0.8	15.8
40-49	51.5	2.3	3.9	15.2	0	3.2
50-59	53.5	2.1	7.6	17.9	1.2	0.7
Older than 60	50.1	6.8	9.4	11.9	1.8	0.3

*Note.* Adapted from “2014 Statistics Report on Patterns of Food Consumption,” by Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2014, pp. 198-203. The number of respondents per age group differs as follows: 495 for under 39; 885 for 40-49; 651 for 50-59; 561 for over 60.

Table 30

*Dietary Life and Lifestyle per Householder Age Group*

Lavish money on food					
Householder age	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Younger than 39	4.8	21.1	39.2	33.2	1.7
40-49	8.1	24.8	38.9	25.9	2.2
50-59	8.6	29.3	36.7	23.5	1.9
Older than 60	17.7	39.7	31.8	9.8	1
Tend to visit renowned restaurants					
Householder age	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Younger than 39	7	24.1	36.7	29.9	2.4
40-49	8.9	27.4	40.1	20.2	3.5
50-59	11.8	36.6	30.4	19.2	2
Older than 60	22.9	43.2	23.9	8.9	1

Table 30, continued

Householder age	Like to try unfamiliar food				
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Younger than 39	3.3	16.4	44.3	31.6	4.2
40-49	3.4	21.6	45.6	27.3	2.1
50-59	4.4	26	42.7	24.5	2.5
Older than 60	6.6	35.7	45.4	11.4	0.9

*Note.* Adapted from “2014 Statistics Report on Patterns of Food Consumption,” by Korea Rural Economic Institute, 2014, pp. 249-260. Henceforth, I will use group 1, group 2, group 3, and group 4 for each age category in ascending order.

The Korean television industry followed this trend to entice more viewers. Given their awareness that television should be in tune with audiences’ concerns, television producers actively addressed food so as to communicate with the younger generation’s pursuit of “small happiness” (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016). In this light, a chief producer of food-devoted cable network, Olive, stated, “The most important thing is viewers rather than eating-out itself. Now, viewers are consumers of food and the food service industry. They actively seek information through various channels, including SNS, blogs, and so on. The television industry tries to satisfy this demand, and reflect the publics’ consuming trend” (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016). In other words, the production practices of the television industry are embedded in given social conditions, particularly economic contexts, which determine the public’s material condition, and in turn, generate a sense of deficiency, social demands/desires, and popular trends.

#### *The Rise of Gourmet Culture and the Shift in Cultural Legitimacy of Food*

As I discussed in Chapter 3, Korean society entered the era of mature consumer society, in which commodities are defined by what they signify, in the mid-1990s. From this period, the meaning of food changed from something to eat to something to enjoy,

and people began to consume food for symbolic purposes rather than nutritional ones. However, it was not until the late 2000s that epicurism pervaded people's daily lives. Although economic polarization and the growth of relative poverty made people pursue vicarious pleasure on the one hand, the era of GDP US\$30,000 offered material conditions in which people would consume food to find their own happiness, on the other hand. As Table 31 indicates, the frequency of eating out steadily increased throughout the 2010s except for 2012, when economic recession hampered the growth of the food service industry. Even in 2012, a tendency towards value-based consumption elevated, and the food industry released a variety of premium products to satisfy consumer desire for "small happiness" (S. Ahn, 2016, June 9).

Table 31

*The Ratio of Eating-Out More than Once per a Day*

Age	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
1 to 2	6.5 (%)	5.4	8.1	5.9	8.7	11.9	14.3	15.9
3 to 5	15.0	10.7	16.4	12.8	15.2	25.1	41.3	36.6
6 to 11	16.4	15.1	13.1	15.4	14.9	21.1	31.8	32.2
12 to 18	33.4	33.2	38.4	40.2	36.7	46.4	47.7	50.4
19 to 29	40.3	40.4	42.0	47.0	33.0	43.3	38.3	40.8
30 to 49	27.0	29.1	29.2	32.0	30.3	37.2	36.3	36.6
50 to 64	14.3	14.1	17.6	19.0	19.3	22.0	23.7	23.9
Over 65	3.5	2.5	3.4	3.3	3.3	5.0	4.0	4.8
Total	23.7	23.9	25.3	27.2	24.2	30.1	30.3	30.8

*Note.* Adapted from "National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys," by Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2015. The numeric value refers to the percentage of respondents who eat out more than once per a day.

Moreover, the scale of the food service industry continuously enlarged from the late 2000s in terms of businesses, employees, and total sales (see Table 32). Also, the diversity of the food service industry was largely enhanced from the late 2000s (see Table

33). Given that “Western” includes American, French, and Italian, and “other foreign” encompasses various ethnic cuisines, the expansion of these two categories shows the diversification of the Korean food service industry. This quantitative and qualitative shift in the food service industry provided a basis for the growth of gourmet culture, and people’s attention to *misik* (epicurism) increased from the late 2000s and peaked in 2015 (see Figure 15).

Table 32

*The Increasing Size of Food Service Industry (2006 to 2012)*

Year	Business (%)	Employee (%)	Sales (%)
2006	420,817 (-)	1,174,545 (-)	42,905,284 (-)
2007	423,628 (0.7)	1,214,358 (3.4)	47,917,210 (11.7)
2008	420,708 (-0.7)	1,213,326 (-0.1)	51,941,895 (8.4)
2009	421,856 (0.3)	1,233,084 (1.6)	56,120,621 (8.0)
2010	425,856 (0.9)	1,248,545 (1.3)	55,527,218 (-1.1)
2011	439,794 (3.3)	1,301,278 (4.2)	59,637,095 (7.4)
2012	451,338 (2.6)	1,347,209 (3.5)	63,119,481 (5.8)

Note. Adapted from “National Business Surveys,” by Statistics Korea, 2006.

Table 33

*The Number of Restaurant Businesses per Cuisine*

Year	Korean	Chinese	Japanese	Western	Other foreign
2006	274,172	22,637	5,272	10,210	424
2007	276,273	22,433	6,524	10,177	537
2008	279,702	21,771	6,022	8,856	726
2009	278,978	21,466	6,268	8,610	861
2010	281,551	21,071	6,259	7,997	1,030
2011	289,218	21,458	6,707	8,533	1,177
2012	289,218	21,458	6,707	8,533	1,503
2013	299,477	21,503	7,466	9,954	1,588
2014	301,939	21,550	7,740	10,397	1,789
2015	304,005	22,041	8,657	11,204	2,164

Note. Adapted from “National Business Surveys,” by Statistics Korea, 2006.




Figure 15. The Increasing Journalistic Discourse on Gourmet. Adapted from the search results of news articles on “misikga (gourmet)” on BIGKinds.

Television producers recognized this rise of gourmet culture. However, they responded to this consumption trend in different ways depending on their personal experience and organizational culture as the following example illustrate:

I guess it was around the early 2010s that food culture changed in a significant way. Before the early 2010s, matjib (renowned restaurants) was at the center of broadcasting programs and the public’s concerns. After the early 2010s, people began to recognize and focus on chefs. In the past, people used to know just the restaurant’s name. For example, when it comes to pasta restaurant, people only talked about Elbon the Table. Now, they are talking about Hyeonseok Choi, a head chef of the restaurant...Now, people go to the restaurant based on the chef’s name value rather than the restaurant’s reputation. There are many consumers who only know chefs’ names; they do not know restaurants’ names, such as Elbon the Table or Midgard; but they know about Hyeonseok Choi and Raymond Kim...This means a lot in food culture...Food became a source of pride and personal asset...Gastronomic culture has recently been established. People pay a lot of attention to gourmandize. That’s why [food TV has changed as well] (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

Personally, I don’t like people posting what they eat on Twitter or Facebook. You know, a lot of people take photos of restaurants and foods and post them on their SNS these days. I don’t like this trend...I think there is cultural toadyism underlying this trend. I don’t like the way in which media represent man’s cooking either. It is described as something very sweet. I thought it was a bit ridiculous. But, as you see, I produce this kind of program. I guess it was an outcome of counteraction (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

We are talking about the authenticity of pasta and pizza, but we are not talking about the authenticity of *japchae* (glass noodles with stir-fried vegetables and meats). It's because those who know the authentic taste of Korean food are already old generation. Also, they are too busy to talk about food. We are talking about foreign food before addressing Korean food in a serious way. For example, we just talk about the authentic taste of steak and spaghetti. That's why [I produce this documentary] (J. Lee, personal communication, January 2, 2015).

As noted, producers of cable networks are more sensitive to market trends as they address a particular demographic group as their main audience. Specifically, a food-committed cable network, Olive, kept a keen eye on new trends in food culture because of its relation to the mother company—CJ Corporation (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). CJ Corporation is a Korean conglomerate holding company, which is comprised of numerous businesses across various industries, including the media industry and food industry. For example, it involves every aspect of the food industry, such as food manufacturing/processing (Cheiljedang), food distribution (CJ Freshway), and food service (CJ Foodville). Olive belongs to CJ's entertainment and media contents subsidiary company, CJ E&M. Because of this internal relation, producers of Olive obtain information about food culture more easily on the one hand; and are compelled to lead and/or reflect culinary trends instantaneously on the other hand (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). On the contrary, terrestrial networks, general programming channels, and cable networks that pursue general programming offer producers relative autonomy in designing and producing their programs (J. Lee, personal communication, January 2, 2015; H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016). Although their production practices are not free from company intervention, they have more room to apply their own perspectives (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016; W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014). Due to these different

organizational cultures, television producers engaged with gourmet culture in different ways. However, as the above-quoted interviews demonstrate, the rise of gourmet culture became an non-frivolous issue in the television industry, and promoted the production of food TV whether it was a reflection of or a “counteraction” to that trend.

Another factor that facilitated food TV production was the shift in food’s cultural legitimacy. According to Bourdieu (1990), all cultural areas and products have different values. For example, comics, photography, and opera are not equivalent in dignity. In other words, “the various systems of expression, from theatre to television, are objectively organized according to a hierarchy independent of individual opinions, which defines cultural legitimacy and its gradations” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 95). In this sense, Bourdieu (1990) divides cultural areas into three spheres: the sphere of legitimacy, the sphere of the legitimizable, and the sphere of the arbitrary. The sphere of legitimacy traditionally consists of socially authorized cultural areas such as painting, sculpture, literature, and theatre (p. 96). It has a stronger symbolic order, internal principle, legitimate aesthetic system, and higher relative autonomy than the other spheres (S. Lee, 2005, pp. 67-70). Within the sphere of legitimacy, “consumers feel measured according to objective norms, and forced to adopt a dedicated, ceremonial and ritualized attitude” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 96). For this reason, consumers with the preferences and knowledge of this sphere are considered “cultivated.” On the other hand, clothes, cosmetics, decoration, cookery, and other ordinary aesthetic choices constitute the sphere of the arbitrary. In this field, consumers do not need to be taught aesthetic systems or symbolic orders; and thus, they are regarded as simple consumers. Moreover, preferences for this sphere are perceived as the arbitrariness of individual taste or the anarchy of tastes

(Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 95-97). The sphere of the legitimizable exists between vulgar practices and noble cultural practices. According to Bourdieu, this sphere encompasses such areas as cinema, photography, jazz, and chansons. However, this cultural hierarchy is relatively defined. The “high” position of literature gains its meaning in relation to the “low” position of other everyday aesthetic choices. In addition, this relative relationship among cultural areas is not fixed, but takes different shapes in a given society at a given moment; namely, it is ever-changing.

To determine the legitimacy of a particular cultural area requires extensive study of various factors, including but not limited to: 1) the existence of legitimate authorities that distribute, communicate, and legitimize knowledge;<sup>42</sup> 2) the existence of “consecrated works”; 3) the degree of autonomy with respect to power relations, especially economic and political principles; 4) that which can be measured by the division between the field of restricted production, in which producers produce for other producers, and the field of large-scale production, in which producers produce for market; 5) the development of its own aesthetic system and artistic language (Bourdieu, 1990; 1993). Therefore, it is hard to define how the cultural legitimacy of food has changed without an exhaustive analysis of these factors. However, it can be assumed that food or cookery has moved beyond the sphere of the arbitrary in that taste in food has gained symbolic values, through which people distinguish themselves from others.

Although people do not feel forced to acquire knowledge about and a ritualized attitude

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<sup>42</sup> According to Bourdieu (1990), each sphere has its own institution, “whose function is not only one of communication and distribution but also one of legitimation” (p. 97). For instance, the sphere of legitimacy has legitimate authorities of legitimation such as universities and academies. On the contrary, the sphere of the arbitrary relies on non-legitimate authorities of legitimation—fashion designers, advertising, etc. The sphere of the legitimizable has critics or clubs as competing authorities of legitimation (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 96-98).

toward food, food practices are no longer regarded as “vulgar” or “arbitrary” cultural practices (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 96-97). In addition, authorities of legitimation have expanded from cooks and advertising to professional critics, journalists, and academics. My interviewees, including a food critic/columnist and a food historian/anthropologist, explained this change through their personal experiences as follows:

I was a reporter for *Nongmin Shinmun* (Farmers Newspaper)...I got interested in food in 1992. In early 2002, I made a business trip to Japan, which was my first overseas trip. While I was watching TV in my hotel room, I found that Japan had a large number of food shows, featuring a variety of national cuisines. There were dozens of books on food at the bookstore, including cooking/food comics. Back then, it was said that Korea was 20 years behind Japan when it comes to culture industry. So, I thought that Korea would have similar food culture in 10 or 20 years. That's why I decided to be a food-specialized journalist...Back then, there was no such thing as a food journalist or food critic. Novelists or public/popular figures used to write their opinions and thoughts on foods or restaurants for newspapers. Underneath their writings, there was restaurant information, such as credit card acceptance, parking availability, and menu price (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27, 2016).

[Food] has become a theme of history in the past decade. It was not addressed as a serious research topic before. Although anthropologists have studied food, there was no one who was specialized in food studies. As Marvin Harris's *Riddles of Food and Culture* was introduced, there was a growing interest in food in academia...In 1994, we had a symposium on food at the annual conference of the Korean Anthropology Association. However, no researchers have persistently studied food. There were a few lectures on food in anthropology, but it was based on individual taste. There was no regular curriculum regarding food. Since the mid- or late 2000s, sociology, folklore, and humanities began to approach food through an academic lens...Food is a main theme of food science. However, it's still minor of minor in the humanities; it hasn't settled in academic institutions. You know, New York University has a Food Studies program, and SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies) has a Food Studies center...Compared to this global trend, Korea is still very behind (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014).

The two interviewees point to Korea's lagging behind in the academic and journalistic investigation of food. In particular, they refer to the absence of legitimate

authorities in the past, and describe how knowledge of food used to be circulated by individual arbitrary taste. At the same time, they speak of the shift in authorities that produce and distribute symbolic values of food, such as food columnists and food scholars.<sup>43</sup> This relative growth of legitimate authorities from the mid- or late 2000s offered the Korean television industry symbolic resources, by means of which it could justify its representation of food and facilitate the production of food TV.

As my interviewees acknowledged, television producers consult legitimate authorities of food in pre- and post-production stages so as to obtain professional knowledge and validate their programs (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016; K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). While this institutional routine was limited to documentary production before, it has extended to other forms of food TV, including food variety shows and food game/competition shows, since the late 2000s (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27, 2016). Moreover, as knowledge about and preference of food gained more symbolic values, authoritative knowledge creators became popular figures and began to make frequent appearances on TV programs, redistributing symbolic values of food and foodways. As referenced above, whether or not food entered the sphere of legitimacy is still a question to be examined by either quantitative or qualitative research. However, Korean television producers were aware of the changing cultural status of food, perceived it as an opportunity to accelerate their

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<sup>43</sup> Bourdieu (1993) suggests that researchers consider both the material production and the symbolic production of the work—the production of the value of the work. He argues that contributors of production include “not only the direct producers of the works in its materiality (artist, writer, etc.) but also the producers of the meaning and value of the work—critics, publishers, gallery directors and the whole set of agents whose combined efforts produce consumers capable of knowing and recognizing the work of art” (p. 37). Although food columnists and food scholars are more oriented to the symbolic production, they also engage in the material production of food TV.

production of food TV, and attempted to interact with and/or enhance this change as in the following:

Korean television used to make fun of cooks and cookery. For example, we used to call those who cook Korean or Chinese food *jubangjang* (head cook).<sup>44</sup> They were not represented in a cool way...For example, comedy shows portrayed them as someone naïve or ignorant. All of a sudden, the term “chef” replaced *yorisa* (cook), *yorisa* (cook), and *jubangjang* (head cook). You know, “chef” has a positive image, and the fact that we use this term shows that their status has changed...The public’s perception of cooking was also a bit negative. Until 10 to 15 years ago, cooking had been considered an area for women or unsuccessful men. It was just a skill. People did not think of restaurant-going or food consumption as a cultural activity. Not many people had intellectual interests in food. Things changed just 7 to 8 years ago (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

I think Korea is in a seminal stage. People began to value their knowledge about food. They carefully consider ingredients and think of what they want to eat...When they eat out, they don’t just follow the media’s suggestions; they actively seek their own places, like hidden gems...I think food has become an important object of taste, and a different food culture has been constructed (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

I guess it’s been 5 to 10 years [since people’s perception of food changed]...People’s curiosity of food sharply increased as food was regarded as an object of taste...I think we have to know about the history embodied in food. We can fully enjoy food when we know about and talk about food’s history...Also, we can improve the dignity of eating when we know about food. In my opinion, it is hard to say that our food culture has been fully developed although what we eat has significantly changed. I think we still need to share more about attitudes and manners of food/eating. The perspective of the humanities will help to do so. TV has made a positive impact on food culture, and it should do so (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

Food’s departure from “vulgar practice” or “the anarchy of taste” accompanied the rise of legitimate authorities and people’s (re)appreciation of its symbolic values, and

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<sup>44</sup> *Jubangjang* is a compound word of *jubang* (kitchen) and *jang* (leader or boss). For this reason, an English translation should be head cook or head chef. However, *jubangjang* has a different meaning from “chef” or “cook”; it embodies negative meanings surrounding *jubang* and those who work in *jubang*.

vice versa. According to their company's organizational culture, its institutional routine, and their personal experience, television producers read and responded to this cultural shift in different ways in terms of time period, degree of legitimacy, future development, the media's role, ways of application, and so on. Nevertheless, my interviewees suggested that it was widely realized by television producers, and thereby materialized on television programs. Particularly, the ascendance of food/eating in cultural hierarchy aroused sociological, anthropological, and historical interests in food, and promoted the production of food TV approached through a humanities perspective.

*The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Downturn in Advertising Market*

The global financial crisis, which began in 2007 with a crisis in the American subprime mortgage market, led to a sharp drop in share prices in all major world markets, followed by a series of collapses (Gokay, 2009, February 15). Although the US government's dramatic interventions staved off an entire crash of the world's financial markets, the crisis engendered the decline of the world economy throughout the late 2010s (Gokay, 2009, February 15). South Korea was also exposed to this international financial crisis, and faced serious economic challenges, such as capital flight, liquidity crunch, and decrease in domestic and external demand (Analytica, 2008, October 9). Compared to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea did not witness substantial economic losses and bank failures due to robust export performances in the pre-crisis era, the Korean government's prompt intervention, and policy coordination among leading economies (C. Heo, 2009). Nevertheless, its financial vulnerability constricted the growth of its domestic economy, and lowered domestic purchasing power and business confidence. For example, GDP per capita decreased from USD 28,656 to USD 28,320

between 2008 and 2009; business confidence sharply deteriorated in 2008; household consumption expenditure rapidly decreased from 2008 to 2009; and the investment of private and government sectors largely shrank during the late 2000s (see Table 34).

Table 34

*The Aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis in South Korea*

Year	GDP per capita (USD)	Business confidence index (BCI) <sup>a</sup>	Household disposable income (annual growth rate %) <sup>b</sup>	Domestic demand forecast (annual growth rate %) <sup>c</sup>
2006	25,828	99.42	3.83	5.1
2007	27,823	99.71	3.05	5
2008	28,656	95.96	1.68	1.1
2009	28,320	99.71	1.78	-2.7
2010	30,377	99.97	3.59	8.3
2011	31,228	98.87	2.4	3
2012	32,097	98.14	1.85	0.8
2013	32,616	98.85	3.95	1.4
2014	33,587	98.8	3.65	3
2015	35,204	98.15	4.18	3.9

*Note.* Adapted from OECD's statistical data for Korean economy, including "Business Confidence Index (2018b)," "Domestic Demand Forecast (2018c)," and "Household Disposable Income (2018d)."

<sup>a</sup>The business confidence index (BCI) is calculated based on "enterprises' assessment of production, orders and stocks, as well as its current position and expectations for the immediate future" (OECD, 2018b). It is measured in comparison to long-term average state (100).

<sup>b</sup>Real household net disposable income is defined as "the sum of household final consumption expenditure and savings, minus the change in net equity of households in pension funds" (OECD, 2018c).

<sup>c</sup>Final domestic demand is "the sum of final consumption, investment and stock building expenditures by the private and general government sectors in real terms" (OECD, 2018d).

This economic recession made a huge impact on the Korean broadcast advertising market, reducing its scale from 2,392.4 billion KRW to 2,199.8 billion KRW, and to 1,918.2 billion KRW between 2007 and 2009 (see Table 35). As Figure 16 demonstrates, the market scale in the first two quarters of 2008 did not go down significantly in comparison to the 2007 scale. In August, the scale actually increased from the previous year by 279 billion KRW, essentially due to the Beijing Olympics (Maru, 2009, January 9). However, as the global financial crisis affected the Korean domestic economy in

September 2008, the broadcast advertising market rapidly declined, and its aftermath continued until the second quarter of 2009. For instance, the scale in January 2009 was 33% (54.2 billion KRW) smaller than that in 2008. Also, the number of advertisers dropped from 4,895 in 2007 to 4,658 in 2008 (H. Doh, 2010, January 13).

Table 35

*Advertising Market Scale of Terrestrial Networks from 2005 to 2014<sup>a</sup>*

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2012	2013	2014
Scale	2,402,103	2,467,622	2,392,471	2,199,837	1,918,234	2,216,196	2,375,356	2,180,050	2,067,538

*Note.* Adapted from “Census of Broadcasting Industry,” by Ministry of Science and ICT, 2014.

<sup>a</sup>Here, terrestrial networks includes terrestrial television broadcasting, terrestrial radio broadcasting, and terrestrial DMB broadcasting. The scale does not include sales of product placement (PPL).




Figure 16. The Monthly Scale of Broadcast Advertising Market from 2007 to 2009. Adapted from “Report on Broadcast Advertising Market,” by Korea Broadcast Advertising Corp. (KOBACO), quoted in Maru (2009, January 9) and H. Doh (2010, January 13). The numeric unit for Y-axis is 1 billion KRW.

Researchers argue that this decline of the broadcast advertising market brought about the expansion of food TV to a certain extent (Jang & Kim, 2016; A. Kim, 2014; W. Ryu, 2015). In particular, they claim that the television industry took advantage of the lower production cost of food TV to counteract diminishing advertising revenues.

Additionally, they point to food TV's easy access to product placement (PPL) as the other cause of its proliferation (W. Ryu, 2015). However, my interviewees, who have been involved with food TV production, denied these assumptions, and pointed out multiple additional elements that must be taken into consideration when producing food programs, as follows:

Because we deal with food, [the way in which we make programs] is a bit different. We have a separate team, who manage kitchen wares and food materials. Because the visual aspect of food presentation is important, we need a special team who can make the right choice regarding plates... This is a big difference from other entertainment shows. We have experts in food and cookery within our production team... [The assumption that the production cost of food TV is cheap] is not true. To cast chefs requires high costs. Additionally, food TV includes special effects, such as kitchen, water, and gas. For this reason, we need to spend more money on set design. We also need to consider ventilation, fire prevention, and sanitation. In fact, there are more things to prepare. The production cost of food contents is not lower than that of other programs (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

We have a food team. It's indispensable. We need a team who can quickly prepare food materials and ingredients, and make on-site arrangements. You know, food requires careful management (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

You know, we have to cook. So, we need more production staffs, including food stylists, than other general entertainment shows. Basically, we need food stylists and/or a food team. When we produce in a large scale, we even use a separate team for dish washing... A kitchen is a really dangerous space. We bring this kitchen into the studio, where we use fire, water, and knives. In fact, when we make a large-scale survival program, we get emergency crews and ambulances on the scene... We even require a professional who can deal with propane gas because it is illegal for an unlicensed person to manage it... Along with safety issues, we also should be in tune with chefs. Because we need to discuss with chefs the size of wok, a type of pan, and the quality of ingredients, the production of food TV takes longer than that of other programs... Also, given that we have to incorporate those different elements and install more cameras, the production cost [of food TV] is higher than that of other programs (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

When we do overseas filming, the size of production staffs is around 50, including program host and cast. It is a minimum size. Along with 11 to 12 camera operators, we prepare and install a lot of cameras, including mini-cam, remote camera, and DSLR camera. Because we need to provide chefs with a better environment, we discuss a lot with them...For example, I've never had a meeting with the cast to discuss about set or stage design. Although I used to talk to the cast about a feeling of stage [when I produced other programs], I never talked about the floor plan like this time (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

Because television cannot offer actual taste, we care a lot about visuality and sound. We are trying to pick up sound in detail. You know, the sound of the cutting board and the sound of simmering/boiling. In fact, there are a lot of microphones hidden in the kitchen (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

In contrast to researchers' assumption that the production of food TV is easy and cheap, the quotes above demonstrate that it is costly and requires considerable time, as well as a paying close attention to a variety of elements. Examples include not only kitchen wares and food materials, but also ventilation, fire prevention, safety, and sanitation. In addition, because food's taste and smell cannot be delivered by television, producers pay careful attention to visual and acoustic dimensions, which in turn increases the production cost of food TV. Moreover, the need for production staff and filming equipment is not different from that of other variety shows or real-variety shows. This challenges researchers' claim that food TV demands only 70% of the production cost of other entertainment shows (W. Ryu, 2015).

The issue of product placement is more complicated than that of production cost: its impact on food TV production is differently materialized depending on TV networks' organizational culture and producers' internal position, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5. However, my interviewees disagreed with the assertion that product placement is a major factor of food TV's sharp growth. As they stated:

There can be product placements. There are a few programs that depend on product placement. However, the biggest thing is the production budget of our channel, Olive. It is case by case. What is more important is viewer rating rather than product placement... Viewer rating is an indicator of what viewers actually want... For that reason, it is much more important than product placement or advertising. It might be a chicken-and-egg question. If its viewer rating is high, a program gets offered more product placements. From the production perspective, we care more about what the public wants and what the public is concerned about rather than what we can get offered (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016).

There is a production budget called “standard production budget.” We rarely produce programs based on external sponsorship. This program [Please Take Care of My Refrigerator] has been made by the production budget of JTBC’s entertainment division. We get offered indirect advertising or product placement while we make programs. However, what is more important is the standard production budget (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

At times, big food corporations, such as Daesang, Pulmuone, and Sempio, offer product placement. But, it does not happen all the time; it is on a case-by-case basis. Sometimes, we get offered product placement from an advertising agency; but again, it’s not always. So do home appliances, such as refrigerators, blenders, and ovens: sometimes they are offered in the form of products; other times, home appliance companies send both money and products. Although there are different ways, [in which product placements are implemented,] its market scale is not that big so far (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

*A Korean’s Dining Table* is only made by internal production budget. It’s 100%... With rare exceptions, we get external funding (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

You know, our parent company engages in food business. But, we absolutely reject an offer of product placement so as not to adulterate our intention (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

My interviewees acknowledged that there are offers of product placement from food corporations and advertising agencies. Indeed, one of my interviewees stated that the design of a few programs, specifically beauty programs, is preceded by product placement or other types of indirect advertising (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016). It is also noteworthy that TV commercials of food products increased by 11.6%

even in 2008 when the financial crisis ripped through South Korea (H. Doh, 2010, January 13). Yet, most of my interviewees argued that their production relies on internal production budgets regardless of their network affiliation—whether it be terrestrial network, general programming channel, or cable network—and do not prioritize product placement over other elements, such as viewer ratings, popular trends, and professional integrity.

The decline of the broadcast advertising market, which was driven by the global financial crisis, would affect the Korean television industry in many ways. It can be assumed that it would enhance channel competition, lead to the rise/fall of particular genres/programs, and have an influence on overall internal production budgets and broadcast programming. These assumptions ought to be verified by scholarly research. More importantly, there has been no empirical evidence that demonstrates the relationship between the downturn in the broadcast advertising market and the growth of food TV. Also, my findings show that food TV is not produced because of its cheap production cost or its advantage in incorporating product placement. This dissertation's findings contradict researchers' presupposition that the rise of food programs stems from the fact that they are easy and cheap to produce and benefit from product placement. Clearly, further investigation of this issue is needed.

### Conclusion

It is certain that the production and the consumption of food TV have sharply increased since the late 2000s in Korea. Since then, food began to cut across all television genres, and became an end rather than a means of the Korean television industry. Previous studies interpreted this new cultural phenomenon as an outcome of various

social contexts (see Table 18). Although these studies offer meaningful discussions about Korean food TV's exponential growth, none of them is built on an empirical investigation of production practices. In this chapter, I attempted to fulfill this lack of empirical research by providing an insider's perspective. Based on in-depth interviews with food TV producers, I argued that the explosion of food TV was driven by the following factors: 1) structural changes in the Korean television industry; 2) a shift in household structure and the rise of the sampo generation; and 3) the rise of gourmet culture and a shift in the cultural legitimacy of food.

This finding shows that television production is inherently embedded in given material and discursive conditions, and the effects of these conditions are mediated by television networks' organizational culture and television producers' assumptions about their audiences. Some of my findings are in line with previous studies on Korean food TV; however, my analysis challenges the presumed relationship between the decline of the broadcast advertising market and the growth of food TV. In Chapter 3, I discussed how the downturn in the television industry's advertising revenue contributed to the emergence of the one-person production system, and in turn, boosted the production of the food soft-documentary in the early 2000s. This discussion seems contradictory to my recent finding that food TV is not dependent on its low production costs or its advantage in incorporating product placement. Yet, it does not mean that my findings have internal inconsistencies; it rather demonstrates that social contexts are differently articulated in television production at various historical moments.

This chapter does not aim to deliver an "exhaustive" explanation of food TV's multilayered social conditions. Neither does it deny other possible interpretations. Its goal

is to provide a detailed description of the social contexts which not only shaped the evolution of food TV but also, more importantly, conditioned food TV's production of a particular discourse on the Korean nation. While Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the conjuncture of food and television, the following chapter will explicate the state-food-television nexus by examining the Korean government's involvement with national cuisine and its influence on the production practices of food TV.

CHAPTER 5  
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, FOOD INDUSTRY, AND  
TELEVISION PRODUCTION

In his foundational essay *Encoding/Decoding Model of Communication*, Stuart Hall describes how dominant—not determined—messages are produced by complex encoding processes. He argues that the discursive practice of message production is framed by various constituents of broadcasting structures, such as “routines of production,” “historically defined technical skills,” “professional ideologies,” “institutional knowledge,” and “assumption about the audience” (Hall, 2001, p. 164). Taking the example of television, he further claims that media discourse is not generated within a closed system, but embedded in the wider socio-cultural and political structure. In other words, he distinguishes “the articulation of language on real relations and conditions” from “the transparent representation of the real,” and perceives media discourse as the result of a multi-layered discursive practice (Hall, 2001, pp. 167). This notion of encoding succinctly explains Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach for discourse analysis, which encompasses analyses of text, discourse practice, and social practice, and which underlies the research methods of this dissertation.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I offered a detailed description of the development of food television in South Korea and of the social and historical contexts in which food television has been situated. Given that discursive practice mediates text and social practice (Fairclough, 1995), this chapter elaborates on the production practices of Korean food television. Similar to Stuart Hall, I read television production as a social space where power relations, ideological frameworks, and institutional routines are negotiated.

In particular, this chapter investigates the interplay among government, food industry, and television production. As I discussed earlier, 2008 marks a turning point in the history of the Korean government's involvement with the national cuisine. For example, the Lee Myungbak administration declared 2008 the "Year of Korean Food Globalization," and enacted the Food Industry Promotion Act for the first time in 2008. In order to promote Korean food both domestically and globally, the Korean government not only supported the development of the food industry but also actively utilized the television industry. Thus, the post-2008 era provides a vantage point from which we can observe how power relations are articulated in television production. In the following, I will illustrate the significant actors and strategies of Korean food globalization, and will discuss the economic and political contexts of the Korean government's increased interest in food. After then, I will explain how the government's concerted efforts to promote Korean food affected the production practices of food television.

#### The State's Involvement with National Cuisine

On February 25, 2008, MyungBak Lee, the 17<sup>th</sup> President of South Korea, announced the globalization of *hansik* (Korean food/Korean cuisine) as a national project. One month later, the Minister of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MFAFF) declared 2008 the "Year of Korean Food Globalization" (S. Park, 2008, March 18, p. 4). He announced that the Korean government would promote the sustained growth of the food and agriculture industry, establish a national food cluster, and make Korean food one of the five most popular cuisines in the world by 2017 (Y. Jeong, 2008, April 21, p. 17). Although it marked a watershed in the state's involvement with national cuisine, it was not an unprecedented case. For example, the Korea Food Tourism Association and

the Korea Cooks Association hosted the first Seoul International Food Competition in 2000 (K. Lee, 2007, May 3, p. 16). The Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT)—currently, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism (MCST)—launched the “Han-Style” project in order to industrialize and globalize Korean “traditional” cultures (Y. Song, 2007, June 13, p. 3). Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)—now, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA)—Korea Agro-Fisheries and Food Trade Corporation (aT), and Korea Foodservice Industry Association had jointly sponsored the Seoul International Food Industry Expo since 2006 with the goal of laying the cornerstone of Korean food globalization (Y. Jeong, 2007, October 9, p. 18).

Table 36

*The Government's Major Projects Regarding Korean Food Promotion*

Time	Organization	Activity
Jun, 2004	MCT	Included food as part of "Creative Korea" project
May, 2005	MCT	Included food as part of "Han-Brand" project
Feb, 2007	MCT	Announced a comprehensive plan for "Han-Style"
Oct, 2008	MFAFF	Held proclamation ceremony for "Korean Food Globalization" project
Dec, 2008	MFAFF	Established "General Planning for Korean Food Globalization"
Apr, 2009	MFAFF	Established "Implementation strategies of Korean Food Globalization"
		Launched Korean Food Globalization Committee
Mar, 2010	MFAFF	Launched Korean Food Foundation (MFAFF-affiliated organization)
Jun, 2013	MCST & MAFRA	Jointly established "Plan for Promoting Food Tourism"
Feb, 2014	MAFRA	Announced "Plan for Developing Policies on Korean Food"
Jan, 2014	National Assembly	Kihyeon Kim, a member of National Assembly, proposed a legislative bill on Korean food promotion
Oct, 2015	MCST & MAFRA	Launched Korean Food Policy Council, and proposed "Intensification Plan for Korean Food Promotion Policy"

*Note.* Adapted from “A Basic Study on the Legislation of the Promotion of Korean Food (Hansik) Culture,” by S. Lee, 2016, p. 15.

Before 2008, however, each agency and organization implemented separate and often contradictory projects; and there was not an integrated system for establishing and globalizing Korea as one brand (Y. Song, 2007, June 13, p. 3). For example, while the Korean government had promoted “Dynamic Korea” as a national brand since 2002, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy had used “Premium Korea”; the MCT, “Han-Style”; and the Korea Tourism Organization, “Sparkling Korea.” In addition, the MAF and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHE) had vied for taking the initiative in the food industry until President Myungbak Lee revised government organization in February, 2008 (S. Woo, 2007, September 6, p. 15). When President Lee took office on February 25, 2008, he encouraged cooperation among government agencies, private sector experts, and related industries. As a result, the first Korean Food Globalization Committee (KFGC) was founded on May 4, 2009 in order to implement policies geared toward the promotion of Korean food worldwide.

#### *“Creative Korea” and “Han-Style” Projects*

The Korean government’s attention to Korean food culture became visible in 2004, when the Ministry of Culture and Tourism was dedicated to promoting national culture under the slogan of “Creative Korea.” Along with clothing and housing, food was selected as a critical part of Korean national culture. Given the significance of national brand in the era of globalization, the MCT initiated a new cultural policy “Han-Brand” in November, 2004, which aimed to preserve and foster national and traditional culture; to promote Korean-style lived culture; and to establish the Korean cultural identity (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2009). Two years later, the project was renamed “Han-Style,” and a special committee was launched in July, 2006, encompassing 10 different

government ministries. In its 2008 policy white paper, the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (henceforth, KCTI), which is the MCT-affiliated policy research organization, identifies the goal of the Han-Style project in the following way:

The purpose of the Han-Style project is to discover and foster cultural contents that have both Korean uniqueness and global universality. It also aims to raise the national image by branding our unique culture, and thus, create economic value. Han-style refers to a Korean style inherent in traditional cultures, such as *hangul* (Korean language), *hangsik* (Korean food), *hanbok* (Korean traditional clothing), *hanok* (Korean traditional housing), *hanji* (Korean traditional paper), and *gukak* (Korean traditional music), which represent and symbolize our culture, and which are possible to familiarize, industrialize, and globalize. It is expected that this project will contribute to making Korean style a new life-style (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2009, pp. 173-174).

Whilst previous projects viewed traditional culture as an object of preservation and restoration, the Han-Style project aimed to raise a global profile of Korean traditional culture, and pursued overseas expansion through the commodification and industrialization of culture (see Table 38). As quoted above, Korean food was selected as part of the essence of Korean unique culture, and was largely promoted for its industrialization and globalization. For instance, the Han-Style Supporting Committee held a series of Korean food festivals in different countries; developed 20 localized hansik menus in order to improve the quality of overseas Korean restaurants; and put top priority on Korean food at Han-Style Exhibitions (see Table 38). The MCT's efforts to foster and globalize Korean food continued throughout the 2010s. Particularly, the MCT viewed Korean food as a cultural archetype, and used it as a driving force of contents industry. Moreover, it attempted to expand the global market by connecting Korean food with other Korean cultural contents, such as K-pop and K-drama (Y. Lee, 2012).

Table 37

*The Implementation Process of the Han-Style Project*

Time	Important activities of the Han-Style project
Jun-Dec, 2005	Held 12 forums to collect extensive opinions on branding Han
May, 2006	Reported strategic plans for the Han-Style project to the 5th National Image Committee Replaced Korean studies with Korean traditional music among six focused areas
Jul, 2006	Established Han-Brand Supporting Committee Composed 6 divisions (e.g., planning and management/hangul/hanbok/hanji/hansik/hanok)
Sept-Oct, 2006	Held the 1st "Han-Style Exhibition," and developed 100 national symbols
Dec, 2006	Industrialized Han-Style strategies, and selected promising service businesses
Feb, 2007	Announced "Comprehensive Planning for Han-Style Project" (Launched 40 overriding tasks)
Jun-Nov, 2007	Held "Han-Style Overseas Cultural Event" in Shanghai, Tokyo, London, and Paris
Aug, 2007	Made a final decision on trademark registration of Han-style (both Korean and English)
Jan-Dec, 2008	Implemented each division's leading projects (e.g., hansik, hanbok, hanok, and hanji)
Jun-Nov, 2008	Held "Han-Style Overseas Cultural Event" in Tokyo, Paris, Berlin, and New York
Jul-Aug, 2008	Held the 2nd "Han-Style Exhibition"

*Note.* Adapted from "2008 White Paper on Cultural Policy," by Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2009, p. 179.

Table 38

*The MCT's Promotion of Korean Food*

Time	Location	Event
2006	Korea	Selecting 13 Korean foods as part of 100 national symbols
2007	Japan	Developing 20 Korean food menus
2007	China	Developing 20 Korean food menus
2008	Hong Kong	Developing 20 Korean food menus
2008	Vietnam	Developing 20 Korean food menus
Oct, 2008	France	Korean Food Culture Festival
Sep-Oct, 2008	Germany	Well-Being Korean Food Festival
Sep-Oct, 2008	America	Taste of Korea

*Note.* Adapted from "2008 White Paper on Cultural Policy," by Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2009, pp. 176-181.

*The Economic and Political Contexts of the Government's Increased Interest in Food*

Although the MCT's "Creative Korea" and "Han-Style" projects were concerned with Korean food, it was not until 2008 that the Korean government became assertive about the global promotion of Korean cuisine. This focused attention to food was mainly initiated by the government's awareness of the increasing size of the global food industry and of other countries' efforts to make their own food cultures global. For example, the 2008 market breadth of the global food industry was 4,800 billion USD; IT industry, 1,500 billion; and auto industry, 1,000 billion (M. Lee, 2008, September 18). In addition, the Netherlands and Denmark nurtured the food industry as a driving force of their national economies, establishing food clusters, such as the Food Valley and Öresund Clusters. Thailand, Japan, and Italy also made sustained efforts to globalize their national cuisines, with examples being "Kitchen to the World," "TRY Japan's Good Food," and "Ristorante Italiano Certificate," respectively.

Based on this awareness, Wooncheon Jeong, Minister of MFAFF, announced that MFAFF would promote the food industry, establish a national food cluster, and make Korean food one of the world's best five cuisines (Y. Jeong, 2008, July 28). My interviewees from government agencies, who were once involved with the Korean food globalization project, explained this economic context as follows:

Before 2008, there was no such thing as a Korean food division in government ministries... Within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, there was a discussion about the significance of food in expanding the export of domestic agricultural products... That's why we were trying to promote Korean food... We referred to Thailand and Japanese cases. In case of Thailand, the government directly managed [overseas] restaurants. We began to examine its applicability in the Korean context... In case of Japan, sushi has been promoted since the 1970s. We reviewed its promotion strategies (Y. Park, personal communication, May 13, 2016).

The final goal of promoting Korean food is to revitalize our economy. Let's say that we spent a lot of money on promoting Korean food, and didn't get any economic effects. It's meaningless. It should create a ripple effect throughout the economy. However, we hide that part. In fact, promoting culture, food, and food culture should be related to job creation, tourism, food export, and so on... These are inherent in Korean food globalization, but they are not foregrounded... You know, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan got great profits by promoting their foods and food cultures. I think that we also aimed to derive economic benefits like those countries... We did not benchmark just one country. It is not possible to apply another country's strategy to Korea as it is, because culture, history, and geography are different. We internally researched various cases, including Thailand, Italy, France, and Japan (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015).

Farming and fishing industries used to focus on production. In order to develop these industries, there should be a consistent policy that can encompass processing, sales, and service. Based on this awareness, food was added to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries... We referred to other countries' cases. We reviewed how other countries connected food industry with agriculture, fishery, and forestry... It occurred when the transition team was reorganizing the ministries... When it comes to Japan, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries paid more attention to the primary industry although it carried out food-related policies. Several European countries had food-related bureau, which was in charge of food processing and sales... We aimed at expanding [agriculture and fisheries] into the secondary and tertiary industries, including food processing, service, and sales (M. Yoo, personal communication, May 18, 2016).

As described above, the economic foundation and other countries' successful cases paved the way for the Korean Food Globalization project, and continuously provided a rationale for the project as the new Minister of MFAFF stated in 2012:

Our goal of globalizing Korean food is being achieved in enterprising ways: to apply sustainability to our food, agriculture, forestry, and fishery industries... Japan, Italy, and France, these and other countries renowned for culinary culture, are devoting considerable public and private resources to make their own food culture global (K. Seo, 2012, p. 4).

However, its implicit relation to President Lee's economic and foreign policy initiatives, which required the ratification of KORUS FTA (The Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea), should not be ignored.

The market-oriented economic policy of MyungBak Lee was called MBnomics, and his stated goals were expressed in the “747 Plan”: 7% annual growth in GDP, 40,000 USD per capita, and making Korea the world’s seventh largest economy (M. Hwang, 2008, February 23). When he was a presidential candidate, Lee associated his economic policies with foreign and security policies, claiming that Korea had to strengthen national security and foreign relations for the 7% annual growth in GDP (E. Nam, 2007). Particularly, Lee’s foreign policy initiative, the MBdoctrine, advocated tightening the US-Korea alliance. He stated that he would rebuild better relations with the United States through a greater emphasis on free market solutions (M. Kim, 2008, August 20). For example, at the open forum of presidential candidates held by the Korean Advanced Farmers Federation on November 6, 2007, Lee defined the KORUS FTA as an unavoidable reality. He said, “You may say that you do not want KORUS FTA, but you are the person who will overcome FTA,” and, “Do you think you can go easy with the current farm management? You can’t” (K. Jang, 2007, November 7).

Considering the ratification of the KORUS FTA as one of the critical factors in implementing MBnomics and the MBdoctrine, Lee sought a way of justifying his policies and obtaining the consent of those who would suffer a loss caused by the KORUS FTA. Particularly, in order to reduce the opposition from farmers and fishermen and to compensate a putative loss of the rural, Lee announced that he would transform the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries into the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Y. Jeong, 2008, July 28). On December 20, 2007, the day after he was elected president, Lee claimed that his attempt to reorganize ministries reflected his plan to change the concept of agriculture from a primary industry to a secondary and tertiary

industry, which would include food processing, distribution, and service (Y. Jeong, 2007, December 20). At the public meeting with representatives of farmers and fishermen on January 21, 2008, he also stressed that the goal of combining the food industry with agriculture and fisheries was to create added value and to avoid a potential crisis resulting from the expansion of agricultural product importation (J. Yim, 2008, February 14).<sup>45</sup> Although the economy was foregrounded, Lee's governmental reorganization was not irrelevant to his attitude toward the KORUS FTA. Within this context, the Korean government began to address food as an industry, and implemented the Korean Food Globalization project as a tool for improving the national economy. This close, but implicit, relationship between the KORUS FTA and Korean food globalization is properly described on the weblog of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), which is designed to give an easy explanation of the government's foreign policies to ordinary people:

Korean food globalization will be rapidly developed as the age of FTA has arrived. Korean food globalization is the best opportunity for agriculture and fisheries, which may suffer a loss because of FTA. Once Korean food globalization is begun by FTA, the export of Korean agricultural products will be innovatively increased. The fear that Korean agriculture will be damaged by FTA is groundless. Rather, due to FTA, we will be able to expand our market and our agri-food all over the world (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], 2012, February 21).

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<sup>45</sup> Drawing on Lee's pledges and plans, the MFAFF also established "Making-Money Agriculture and Fisheries, Rural Areas Worth Living In" as a new goal of agricultural administration so as to enhance the competitiveness of Korean agriculture and to face market-opening, which would be followed by the KORUS FTA (M. Baek, 2008, March 19; S. Woo, 2008, March 16). Yet, the focus of the MFAFF was on promoting the agri-food industry rather than stabilizing rural household incomes (M. Baek, 2008, March 19).

*Towards the Establishment of the Korean Food Foundation*

As discussed above, the Lee administration tethered food to agriculture, fishery, and forestry rather than health, welfare, and/or culture. This industry-oriented reorganization accelerated the government's involvement with Korean food, and characterized the Korean Food Globalization project from the outset. My interviewees accounted for the meanings of this reshuffling as follows:

Previously, food safety was top priority. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was devoted to food safety. The government did not approach food from the perspective of industry. It seems that President Lee [added food to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries] because he realized the significance of food industry in developing national economy and the necessity of policies on food industry promotion rather than food safety and nutrients. You know, he publicized himself as the economy-devoted President...I'm not sure but food-related policies were part of his election pledge (S. Kim, personal communication, May 24, 2016).

Korean food globalization was highly related to [the governmental reorganization]. As food was added to [the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries], we sought to develop a new project regarding food. The Korean Food Globalization project was an outcome of this effort. Previously, there was no budget allocated to [food]. In order to promote food industry, we [MFAFF] secured a large amount of budget and developed different projects. The Korean Food Globalization was one of core projects...Before 2008, food industry promotion was not an important issue. The Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Food & Drug Administration focused on such issues as safety, hygiene, and regulation. As the MFAFF was organized, food industry promotion became a serious issue, and new Acts were enacted between 2007 and 2008, including "Framework Act on Agriculture and Fisheries, Rural Community and Food Industry" and "Food Industry Promotion Act" (Y. Park, personal communication, May 13, 2016).

Since food was addressed as industry rather than culture, it was added not to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, but to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries...For this reason, Korean food globalization was implemented by supporting overseas expansion of Korean restaurants and food companies rather than revolving around culture (H. Kim, personal communication, January 5, 2015).

As my interviewees acknowledged, the Korean Food Globalization project was an outcome of governmental reorganization, which was conditioned by the above-mentioned economic and political contexts. It was designed as part of the “Comprehensive Plan for Fostering Food Industry,” which aimed at invigorating food manufacturing, improving the efficiency of the food service industry, industrializing traditional food, and globalizing Korean food (Y. Jeong, 2008, July 28). As it was publicized as the First Lady’s project, it soon became a national issue and received wide publicity. In the following, I will illustrate how the project had been proceeded until March, 2010, when the Korean Food Foundation was established as the only official organization of Korean food globalization.

Since its reorganization, the MFAFF has played a significant role in globalizing Korean food in concert with its affiliated organization, aT, the mission of which was to secure domestic and overseas competitiveness of agricultural products, and increase the incomes of farming and fishing households (aT, n.d.). However, due to the lack of budget and experience, their activities were not systematically organized, and remained nascent. My interviewees, who were in charge of the Korean Food Globalization project in the very early stage, evaluated their activities as follows:

I was in charge of the Korean Food Globalization project in 2008, when the MFAFF first started it...Back then, there was no Korean food-devoted bureau. We [MFAFF] had the Food Industry Policy Office for the first time in 2008...As part of new projects, we started the Korean Food Globalization, which I had responsibility for...Our major tasks encompassed every dimension of Korean food. For example, we supported Korean restaurants; financed Korean restaurant opening and promotion; managed public relations; held various exhibitions for Korean food promotion; and advertised in broadcasting media...Because it was a newly launched project, we did not have enough budget allocated to Korean food globalization in 2008. In 2009, we had a special budget for Korean food globalization...Almost 80% of the budget was used for publicity,

including public relations and food expo participation. 20% was for financing Korean restaurants...Due to the lack of the budget, we could not carry out diverse tasks...Back then, we focused on holding a food expo (Y. Park, personal communication, May 13, 2016).

In the very beginning, we held the Korean Food Globalization Forum, inviting various professionals. My major responsibility was to organize the Forum. I also worked on how to expand Korean restaurants at domestic five-star hotels, and how to apply the Food Industry Promotion Act. The Forum was comprised of a variety of people encompassing academia, industry, and the government, such as owners of renowned Korean restaurants, food researchers/stylists, professors, and so on...Because it was a very early stage, we did not have a clear definition of Korean food globalization. For this reason, we attempted to collect and put together different opinions, and discussed about efficient policies and strategies for Korean food globalization...Back then, we focused on promotional events, surveys, and research and development (M. Yoo, personal communication, May 18, 2016).

As quoted above, the early governmental policy was limited to a few areas, such as the global promotion of Korean food, research and development of Korean food, and financial aid to overseas Korean restaurants. For example, the MFAFF held a “Global Food Festival” in September, 2008, inviting cooks of diplomatic offices and owners of overseas Korean restaurants (S. Park, 2008, March 18). In the same year, the MFAFF hosted a Korean Food Expo (KFE) from October 13 to October 19 at the aT center in order to raise the global profile of Korean food and expand the exportation of Korean agricultural products (S. Eum, 2008, May 23). The major focus of research and development was on the standardization and compilation of Korean “traditional” food. On May 23, 2008, the Rural Development Administration (RDA) published a book that compiled Korean traditional food. The MFAFF valued this book as the foundation of Korean food globalization, and claimed that the globalization of traditional food would lead to the development of the domestic food industry (S. Eum, 2008, May 23). Four months later, the MFAFF developed the standardized Korean restaurant menu guide for

global consumers, considering a standardization as the groundwork for globalization (M. Lee, 2008, September 18).

Along with these efforts, the MFAFF endeavored to establish the legal infrastructure for the expansion of domestic food and agricultural industries and the globalization of Korean food. The enactment of the Food Industry Promotion Act was an outcome of these endeavors. Enforced in March, 2008, the Act aimed to “contribute to improving people's quality of life and developing the national economy by promoting the sound development of the food industry through reinforcement of the link between the food industry and the agricultural industry, and stably providing a variety of quality food by enhancing the competitiveness of the food industry (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2008, March 21).” The Act later became a legal basis for the establishment of the Korean Food Foundation, and facilitated legislation of other food (industry)-related laws, such as the Support of Diet Education Act, the Food Service Industry Promotion Act, and the Kimchi Industry Promotion Act. Moreover, the Korean Food Globalization Forum, which was organized by the MFAFF, functioned as an important space where professional opinions on Korean food were discussed and strategies of Korean food globalization were designed. At the Forum, the MFAFF and aT announced the core tasks of the project in October, 2008 as the following: 1) overseas expansion of Korean restaurants, 2) the establishment of specialized Korean culinary institution, 3) the development of standard recipe of 100 representative foods, 4) the establishment of global networks among overseas Korean restaurants, 5) making Korean food one of the world's best five cuisines, and 6) the publication of a Korean restaurant guide (K. Jang, 2008, October 10).

In April, 2009, the first Korean Food Globalization Committee (KFGC) was launched, comprised of 36 members, including ministers and vice-ministers of relevant ministries,<sup>46</sup> scholars, professionals of international relations, Korean food experts, farmers and fishermen, *hallyu* celebrity YongJun Bae, and cartoonist YoungMan Heo—the author of food comics *SikGaek* (J. Shin, 2009, May 5). The foundation of the KFGC brought about more concentrated and strategic efforts for Korean food globalization. The main strategies that were carried out throughout 2009 could be summarized into four categories: marketing Korean food and food culture; promoting particular Korean dishes; developing Korean food professionals; and establishing domestic infrastructure. Among them, however, much attention was paid to the global promotion of Korean food like in 2008, as my interviewees noted:

In the beginning, we focused on the promotion of Korean food. In the late 2000s, we held various events in foreign countries, and publicized Korean food by utilizing media. For example, we invited foreign celebrities to show them our Korean food (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015).

As Korean food globalization gained public attention, there was a sharp increase in overseas promotional events and domestic media exposure. You know, such things as cooking demonstrations and participatory events/festivals, where foreign people could taste Korean food for free. I mean, it was a lot (T. Kim, personal communication, January 5, 2015).

The marketing of Korean food and food culture were implemented in diverse ways. For example, on May 7, 2009, the MFAT-affiliated organization, Korea Foundation, held a promotional event in Washington D.C. in order to introduce U.S. politicians to Korean food. In July, the MFAFF appointed a *hallyu* star, Rain, as an honorary ambassador for Korean food globalization (K. Jeong, 2009, July 13). A few

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<sup>46</sup> They include the MFAFF, the MCST, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MSF), and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE).

months later, the MFAFF hosted “Amazing Korean Table,” inviting global celebrity chefs to discuss how to globalize Korean food (J. Lee, 2009, October 5). Moreover, the MFAFF and the KFGC sponsored a non-verbal performance “Bibap Korea” to raise global awareness of bibimbap (NEWSIS, 2009, August 4). In September, the aT held the “Korea Food Products Fair” in Japan, Russia, India, and China so as to increase the export of Korean food products (Jeong, 2009, March 11). On October 16, the First Lady YoonOk Kim, as an honorary president of the KFGC, appeared on CNN and talked about the superiority of Korean food (S. Lee, 2009, October 20). Further, with financial support from the MFAFF, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) produced several television documentaries that examined the possibility of Korean food globalization by interviewing global celebrity chefs and surveying foreign people’s attitudes toward Korean food. Sponsored by the MFAFF, the Korean reality show *Infinite Challenge* ran a *bibimbap* advertisement in the *New York Times* on December 21, 2009.

Although marketing of Korean food was carried out by promoting Korean food in general, the MFAFF and the KFGC selected specific food items, such as kimchi, bibimbap, *tteokbokki*, and *makeolli* (rice wine), to spearhead Korean food globalization. As a result, the International Kimchi Association—currently, the Kimchi Association of Korea (KAK)—was launched on May 15, and the MFAFF invested 50 million USD in establishing an International Kimchi R&D center as part of its globalization project (G. Cho, 2009, May 15). It also hosted the “Korea Kimchi Festival” in Tokyo in September, 2009 (S. Kim, 2009, September 19). Similarly, a Bibimbap R&D center was established in 2009, and the JeonJu Bibimbap Globalization Committee was newly launched in the same year. Moreover, the MFAFF organized a “Tteokbokki Festival” in March, 2009 in

order to contribute to the export of *gochujang* (red chili paste), and sponsored a “Makeolli Expo” in November (M. Lee, 2009, March 11; S. Jeong, 2009, November 10).

Table 39

*Strategies for Implementing Korean Food Globalization in 2009*

Project	Strategy
Establishing infrastructure of Korean food industry	Establishing legal and institutional infrastructure for Korean food industrialization
	Modifying financial support policies to fill enterprise demands
	Opening web portal for Korean food, including foreign language service
	Providing professional culinary education in concert with renowned hotels and universities
Korean food masters	Designating specialized universities in Korean food cookery
	Opening courses on Korean food at renowned global culinary school
	Creating state-certified "International Certificate of Korean Cuisine"
Star Korean restaurants	Expanding Korean restaurants at five-star hotel
	Fostering celebrity chefs
	Nurturing Korean food as tourist product by constructing high-quality Korean food road
Creating Korean food buff	Constructing "1 Million Global Word-of-Mouth Network" through mega events
	Expanding opportunities for foreigners to experience farming and fishing communities
Korean food globalization R&D	Supporting Hansik Experience Center
	Expanding technical development to improve the versatility and marketability of Korean food
	Providing customized support through R&D professionals with industry-university-institute collaboration
Korean food image UP	Constructing luxurious image of Korean food
	Improving Korean food image through storytelling
	Improving hygiene and service of Korean restaurants
Easy-to-understand Korean food	Highlighting "safety" as competitiveness of Korean food
	Standardizing recipe of representative Korean foods preferred by foreigners
	Making easy-to-understand and familiar Korean food for foreigners
Promoting Korean food culture	Constructing inter-ministry network to promote Korean food globalization
	Promoting Korean food through overseas television networks
	Correcting false information on overseas online site
Korean food brand 100	Promoting high-brow Korean food focusing on foreign opinion leader
	Making food service industry venture business and improving investment conditions
	Fostering 100 global Korean food brands
	Differentiating Korean food menus according to type and region

*Note.* Adapted from “A Basic Study on the Legislation of the Promotion of Korean Food (Hansik) Culture,” by S. Lee, 2016, p. 18.

The process of Korean food globalization in 2010 was not much different from what was described in “Strategies for Implementing Korean Food Globalization,” which the MFAFF developed in 2009 (see Table 39). Promotional events and media relations still characterized the Korean Food Globalization project, and financial aid to domestic food corporations and overseas Korean restaurants continued regardless of their efficiency (T. Kim, personal communication, January 5, 2015).

Table 40

*Culinary Courses on Korean Food at Overseas Institutions*

Year	Institution	Budget (KRW)	Attendee
2010	Hattori Nutritional College (Japan)	350 million	1,376
	Tsuji Culinary Institute (Japan)		
	Drexel University (US)		
2011	Hattori Nutritional College (Japan)	260 million	1,042
	Drexel University (US)		
2012	Hattori Nutritional College (Japan)	250 million	1,223
	Drexel University (US)		
	Yangzhou University (China)		
2013	Drexel University (US)	270 million	180
	Center for Culinary Arts (Philippines)		
	University College Sedaya International (Malaysia)		
	Yangzhou University (China)		
2014	Drexel University (US)	270 million	218
	Center for Culinary Arts (Philippines)		
	University College Sedaya International (Malaysia)		
	SDR (Thailand)		
	Yangzhou University (China)		
2015	Drexel University (US)	TBD	TBD
	Center for Culinary Arts (Philippines)		
	University College Sedaya International (Malaysia)		
	SDR (Thailand)		
	Yangzhou University (China)		
	Yanbian University (China)		
	Hanoi Tourism College (Vietnam)		

*Note.* Adapted from “A Basic Study on the Legislation of the Promotion of Korean Food (Hansik) Culture,” by S. Lee, 2016, p. 30.

Newly emphasized were the localization of Korean food and the overseas education on Korean food. For example, the MFAFF and the aT developed region-specific localized menus and modified recipes according to the appetites of targeted countries, including America, China, Japan, and Vietnam (D. Yoo, 2010, March 9). In cooperation with the Korean Food Research Institute (KFRI), the MFAFF also built a standard unit of *gochujang*—GHU (*Gochujang* Hot Taste Unit) to expand gochujang exports (S. Yoo, 2010, March 16). In addition, the MFAFF and the aT began to offer lectures and classes on Korean food at well-known foreign culinary institutions and universities (see Table 40).

In sum, the Korean government began to approach food from the perspective of industry in 2008, based on awareness of the increasing scale of the global food industry and other countries' success. Additionally, the KORUS FTA, which was inseparable from President Lee's foreign and national security policies, made the government more concerned with the export of Korean agricultural and marine products. The Korean Food Globalization project was designed as part of the government's attempt to promote the domestic food industry. Of course, cultural and symbolic motivation to foster Korea's soft power, specifically in line with tourism and the Korean wave, and the desire to improve the national image should not be ignored. In fact, the goal and strategy of Korean food globalization significantly changed in 2013, when President Park took office, and since the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism became more involved with the project. However, my analysis shows that the early form of the government's involvement with food was primarily shaped by economic purposes. Table 41 summarizes major strategies of Korean food globalization from 2008 to 2010.

Table 41

*Major Strategies of Korean Food Globalization before the Establishment of the KFF*

Year	Organization	Strategies
2008	MFAFF & aT	Overseas expansion of Korean restaurants The establishment of specialized Korean culinary institution The development of standard recipe of 100 representative foods The establishment of global networks among overseas Korean restaurants Making Korean food world's best five cuisines The publication of Korean restaurant guide
2009 <sup>a</sup>	MFAFF & aT	Restoring Korean restaurants at five-star hotels in Korea Standardizing the degree of spiciness and saltiness of Korean food
2009	KFGC	Developing professionals on Korean food Building the infrastructure for Korean food globalization Fostering star chefs and flagship restaurants Expanding the opportunity of Korean food experience Expanding Korean food-related research and development Improving global image of Korean food Marketing Korean food culture Establishing supply system of domestic agri-food products Making 100 Korean food brands
2010	KFGC	Standardizing and localizing Korean food Supporting and investing in Korean food corporations and restaurants Marketing Korean food and food culture Developing Korean food professionals

*Note.* Adapted from my analysis of news articles on “Korean food” and “Korean food globalization,” searched via BIGKinds.

<sup>a</sup>The 2009 strategies refer to what were newly added to the 2008 strategies.

*The Korean Food Foundation and Thereafter*

On March 17, 2010, the Korean Food Foundation (KFF) was established, replacing the first Korean Food Globalization Committee (KFGC). The Food Industry Promotion Act provided the legal basis for its foundation. Article 17 states, “The state and local governments shall endeavor to keep tradition[al] local food and dietary culture up-to-date by conducting research and discovering such food and dietary culture and improve the nation's image through globalization of Korean food and dietary culture

(Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2008, March 21).” As written in its online newsletter *Taste of Korea*, the KFF aimed to “foster appreciation for Korean food culture around the world and spur growth of related industries, such as agriculture, food services, and tourism, as well as to improve Korea’s national image” (Korean Food Foundation, 2012a, January, p. 10). In order to achieve this goal, the KFF pursued 5 strategies, including: 1) standardizing Korean food, 2) cultivating Korean food specialists, 3) strengthening the competitiveness of Korean restaurants, 4) constructing a Korean food database, and 5) raising the global profile of Korean food (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015). Although other government institutions, such as the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, implemented their own food-related policies, the KFF functioned as the only official organization of Korean food globalization. In addition, its status became more secured due to the amendment of the Food Industry Promotion Act and the Enforcement Decree of the Food Industry Promotion Act.<sup>47</sup> Thus, the KFF provides a vantage point for understanding how the Korean government has promoted food and what it has pursued through its national cuisine. Table 42 features major activities of the KFF during the Lee Myungbak administration.

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<sup>47</sup> Article 17 (Globalization of Traditional Food and Dietary Culture) of the Food Industry Promotion Act states, “In cases where deemed necessary to globalize traditional food under paragraph (1), the State and local governments may subsidize expenses incurred in advertising the Korean traditional food and dietary culture, assisting Korean restaurants opening branches overseas and food industry opening overseas markets, improving competitiveness of the food industry operating overseas, etc” (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2008, March 21). In addition, Article 39 of the Enforcement Decree of the Food Industry Promotion Act entrusts authority to the KFF as follows: “The Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs shall entrust the affairs related to the globalization of the traditional food and dietary culture provided for in Article 17 of the Act to the institutions for Korean food globalization projects designated under Article 17-2 of the Act” (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2012, July 22).

Table 42

*Major Activities of the Korean Food Foundation from 2010 to 2012*

Time	Major activities
Mar, 2010	Founded the Korean Food Foundation
Apr, 2010	Sponsored KBS World's TV show <i>Delicious Korea</i>
May, 2010	Filmed Korean food promotional events to be used for international events Sponsored KBS's TV show <i>New Korean Food Explorers</i> Organized a Korean food sampling event in Lyon
Jun, 2010	Sponsored a Korean cooking contest and festivals for the "Korea-China Food Culture Exchange Exhibition" Organized Korean food receptions for the "Korean Night" event held to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Korea -UAE diplomatic relations Organized Korean food receptions for the Korea Society event Sponsored YTN's TV show <i>Global Korean</i>
Jul, 2010	Sponsored local events held to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War
Aug, 2010	Organized Korean food receptions for PGA Championships
Sep, 2010	Sponsored a discussion event for G-20 Korean food promotional events at the "G-20 Seoul Speakers' Consultation" Organized receptions for the 30th session of the "FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific" Co-hosted the "Seoul Gourmet 2010" Promoted Korean royal food and traditional food for the "2010 Baekje Cultural Festival"
Oct, 2010	Promoted Korean food at the G-20 Summit Signed an agreement between with Japanese Hattori Academy on recommended Korean restaurants in Tokyo Organized "Korean Night," a Korean food reception for the "5th World Chinese Entrepreneur Korea Forum"
Nov, 2010	Organized a Korean food promotional hall in the Cheongwadae (the Blue House) Sarangchae Hosted a Korean food promotional booth for the "15th Agriculture Day" Hosted a Korean food promotional booth at the "Busan International Seafood & Fisheries EXPO"
Dec, 2010	Produced Korean food posters to distribute to Korean restaurants overseas Sponsored American PBS's TV show <i>Kimchi Chronicles</i>
Feb, 2011	Sponsored Korean food receptions for "New York Concept Korea Fusion" Held a media discussion "Korean Food on Lunar New Year's Holiday" in New York Published <i>Recommended Korean Restaurants in Tokyo</i> Held Korean food receptions for "New York Concept Korea" Held a media discussion on Korean Seolnal food in New York
Mar, 2011	Held a conference in Shanghai for the designation Super Junior as Korean food ambassadors Held an appointment ceremony to designate Super Junior as Korean food ambassadors

Table 42, continued

Time	Major activities
Apr, 2011	Sponsored the Bibimbap World Tour Group Managed the Korean Food promotion booth in the 2011 Seoul International Food Product Industry Exhibition Participated in the New York Korean Food Mobile Kitchen Campaign Sponsored the Bibimbap World Tour Advertisement by Youths
May, 2011	Exhibited Korean food for the G20 Seoul Speakers' Consultation Participated in the '2011 Korean International Cooking Contest' hosted by the Korean Cooks Federation Held a media and blogger event for 'Korean Food Night' in Beijing Sponsored the 2011 Korean San Chae Exposition Held a Korean food sampling for the Fiesta Asia-The Taste of Korea
Jun, 2011	Participated in the 2011 Traditional Alcohol and Korean Food Festival' hosted by the Korean Traditional Alcohol Promotion Association Hosted the 'Searching for the Korean Food Experience' program Held a Korean food fam tour with the organizing committee for Madrid Fusion
Jul, 2011	Organized 'Angelo Sosa's Korean Food Party' with Korean food supporters Participated in the 12th Korean Food Cooks Union Tasting Day, in China and sponsored the 10th International Tasting Exposition
Aug, 2011	Supported the promotion of Korean Food at the Korean Food Exhibition at the Harrods Department Store in the UK Organized a TV program segment 'The Globalization of Korean Food' for a YTN news program ('Global Korean') Sponsored the 2011 Seoul International Restaurant Industry Exhibition Sponsored the 'Korea Day' event of the New York Korean Restaurants Association
Sep, 2011	Sponsored the 2nd Korean Image Communication Research Association C20, CCF (Cultural Communication Forum)
Oct, 2011	Sponsored a hanbok fashion show 'the King of Joseon goes to New York event' in New York Held a foreigner food tour event Held a Korean cooking contest with foreign residents in Korea
Nov, 2011	Held a special event to mark the publication of a guidebook for Paris, France Held a special event to mark the publication of a guidebook for London, the UK Appointed President of European Chamber of Commerce in Korea as Korean food promotion ambassador Held a Korean food promotional booth at an event for the EU-Korea Industrial Cooperation Day Held a Korean lunch campaign 'New York meets Korean Food' Participated in the 14th Worlds of Flavor (CIA International Food Conference)

Table 42, continued

Time	Major activities
Dec, 2011	Held a contest ‘Korean Food Recipes with Super Junior’ Held a special event to commemorate for the publication of guidebooks for 5 western European countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium)
Jan, 2012	Published Foreign Recommended Korean Restaurants (Western Europe, and Tokyo Editions) Held a Korean food sampling event on Korean Day in Washington Attended a welcome dinner reception and held a Korean food booth for Madrid Fusion 2012 (Korea participated the event as Guest of Honor)2012
Feb, 2012	Held an award ceremony for the contest Korean Food Recipes with Super Junior
May, 2012	Published Korean food storytelling book in six languages Published ‘Old Korean Restaurants Koreans Love’ Published a 2012 guide for standardized Korean food menu in foreign languages Organized Korean food receptions for the Korea-France Culture Night Organized Korean food receptions for a meeting of the Korean Adoptees Association in Paris Designated as Korean food globalization agency by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs
Jul, 2012	Held the 'Scholars Set a Joseon Era Family Table' symposium Filmed and aired a KBS' Korean food cooking program Seri's Star Kitchen
Sep, 2012	Sponsored Korean traditional snacks for the 33th Congress of the International Council of Women Released Korean food promotional DVDs
Oct, 2012	Held a Korean food fam tour with prominent Chinese media in tandem with Seoul Metropolitan Government Organized Korean food receptions for the SKAL International Congress Promoted Korean food in tandem with ‘Food and Film Festival’ in New York
Nov, 2012	Held the K-food campus road show Sponsored a TV show ‘A Korean's Dining Table: Overseas’ Held a Korean food fam tour with non-Korean supporters of Korean food Held a Korean food promotional event in Shanghai to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China
Dec, 2012	Held a Korean food fam tour with French figures Recorded and released an album of K-food songs Held a contest for standardized Korean food menus in foreign languages

*Note.* Adapted from “Key Activities and Archiverments,” by Korean Food Foundation, n.d.

As Table 42 demonstrates, the KFF was devoted to the global promotion of Korean food and the overseas expansion of Korean food industry and restaurants since its foundation. For example, it hosted the “2010 Korea Food Expo” and the “2010 Seoul Gourmet Show” in order to reach the MFAFF’s goal of 6.4 million food exports (Y. Jeong, 2010, November 16; B. Kim, 2010, September 30). In 2011, the KFF hosted and sponsored various global events, including but not limited to the “Second Korea Day Festival” in New York, the “Culture Communication Forum” in Seoul, the “Korean Food Exhibition” at Harrods department store in London, and the “Office Lunch Delivery Campaign” in New York (KFF, 2011, October; J. Shin, 2011, August 8). It also participated in global food expos as a corporate sponsor or a guest of honor, such as the CIA’s “International Food Conference” and “Madrid Fusion 2012” (Korean Food Foundation, 2012b, February). Moreover, the KFF actively utilized political and sports events, including the G20 summit and the PGA championship, and developed cultural events in association with hallyu contents and celebrities (Korean Food Foundation, 2012b, February).

The KFF facilitated the overseas expansion of the Korean food industry both directly and indirectly. For instance, while it invested 1.6 million USD in CJ Bibigo, which started a bibimbap franchise business in May, 2010, it published *Bibimbap Franchise Overseas Expansion Master Book* and sponsored the cultural event “Bibimbap Table” that had traveled all around the world to serve 10,000 people bibimbap (K. Yoon, 2010, May 10; T. Kwon, 2011, November 15). Due to the lack of official documentation, it is hard to conclude whether or not the KFF supported particular Korean food companies or brands. Also, the way it promoted the Korean food industry changed from

time to time. However, the Korean government made continuous efforts to foster global Korean food corporations, as discussed by my interviewees below:

There was so-called model business. You know, bibimbap and tteokbokki businesses. It does not make any sense...For example, Bonjuk [rice porridge franchise] has shut down its business in China...As a budget was allocated to the Korean Food Globalization project, the KFF had to spend it. Because government-affiliated organizations cannot give money to individuals, it supported large food companies. It selectively supported domestic franchise businesses, but it was fruitless...Now, the government supports in a different way. For example, it conducts market research to help overseas expansion of individual food corporations, financially supports the participation in global food fairs/expos, and provides consulting services so that domestic food companies improve their global competence...Things have changed. Previously, the government used to offer a direct support (T. Kim, personal communication, January 5, 2015).

Rather than providing financial support in a direct way, we [KFF] now conduct a variety of research on behalf of food companies. For example, research on overseas Korean restaurants, global trend, and global food service industry, which requires big budget. It costs from 500 thousand KRW to 1 million KRW...We also offer consulting service upon the individual request. For example, when Tudari [casual dining franchise] asked us to share our know-how and requested our direct cooperation, we couldn't do so because we're public organization. If we supported a particular company, then there would be complaints from other companies about our unfairness...For this reason, we rather provide research and consulting services...We also cooperate with large food corporations, such as CJ, SK, and Sempio. Actually, all we can do is to promote and raise a global awareness of Korean food...The MFAFF and other ministries address tax and financing issues (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015).

As quoted above, the KFF's support of the domestic food industry changed from direct financial assistance to research/consulting services and MOU-based cooperation. Also, much of its work on food industry promotion has transferred to the aT's newly-established bureau "Food Business Support Center." However, it does not mean that the Korean government has been less concerned with the food industry; rather, it implies that governmental policies on food industry have been more diversified and refined. In order

to expand overseas Korean restaurants, the KFF started the “Recommended Korean Restaurants” project from the beginning, and has published *Foreign Recommended Korean Restaurants*, in Japan, Southeast Asian countries, and Western European countries. Another important KFF project was “Flagship Korean Restaurant,” which started in September, 2011, under the assumption that building high-end Korean restaurants would greatly contribute to the globalization of Korean food (Korean Food Foundation, 2011, October). Although it spent 5 million USD, the project faced fierce criticism from both domestic people and restaurant owners in New York City, and ended in failure (C. Oh, 2012, October 4; The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, 2013, June 21).

The policy orientation of the KFF has slightly changed according to historical circumstances, such as a growing demand to foster the domestic food service industry, the enactment of the Food Service Industry Promotion Act, regime change and subsequent government reorganization, increasing popularity of K-pop and K-drama, growth of Korean inbound tourism, and so on. For example, the growing demand for fostering the domestic food service industry led to the Food Service Industry Promotion Act in September, 2011, which aimed at “developing the national economy in a healthy way by creating foundations for the promotion of the food service industry and by increasing the competitiveness of the food service industry through the legislation of matters necessary to foster and support the food service industry” (Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2011, September 10).

Based on the Act, the MFAFF newly established the “Food Service Industry Division” and the aT launched the “Food Service Promotion Department,” which

supervised and/or cooperated with the KFF. As a result, the KFF was asked to turn its attention to the domestic food service industry rather than the global promotion of Korean food. In addition, because of the KFF's failure with the "Flagship Korean Restaurant" project, absence of tangible results, narrow approach to Korean food, large yearly budget, and lack of transparency in budget management, the second KFGC started in February, 2012, calling for concerted efforts among different governmental organizations (Korean Food Foundation, 2012c, February; D. Kim, 2012, January 4).

Moreover, regime change in 2013 made the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism a major actor of Korean food globalization, and led to the growth of MOU-based collaboration among governmental agencies (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015; H. Kim, personal communication, January 5, 2015). As such, the KFF designed a new project "A Five-Year Plan for Korean Food Globalization" in 2013, which encompassed the following tasks: 1) establishing infrastructure, 2) research and development, 3) fostering specialists in Korean food, 4) strengthening global competitiveness, and 5) strengthening communication (Korea Industrial Development Institute, 2013). Two years later, the Council of Korean Food Policy was launched in order to maximize synergy among the MCT, the MFAFF, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Rural Development Administration (RDA), Cultural Heritage Administration (CHA), Korea Tourism Organization (KTO), and the KFF (S. Lee, 2016).

By reading Korean food as a key cultural content, the Council aimed at reinforcing hallyu, improving the national image, increasing the export of agricultural products, and facilitating overseas expansion of the Korean food service industry (S. Lee, 2016). In order to achieve this goal, the Council developed five major strategies, which

required a joint effort of different governmental agencies (see Table 43). Although the Council's new plan emphasized the convergence of food, culture, and tourism, and cooperation among different organizations, its core strategies were not far from the previous ones developed by the KFF or the MFAFF. It still addressed the national cuisine as a driving force of national economy, and used it as a tool for improving national image and global competence.

Table 43

*Plan for Strengthening Korean Food Promotion Policy*

Strategy	Participant
Rediscovering the value of Korean food	MCT, MFAFF, MFA, CHA, RDA
Expanding convergence of Korean food, culture, and tourism	MCT, MFAFF, RDA, Center for Creative Economy and Innovation (CCEI)
Supporting overseas expansion of Korean food and agricultural products	MCT, MFAFF, MFA
Reinforcing domestic and global promotion of Korean food	MCT, MFAFF, MFA, relevant organizations
Strengthening infrastructure of Korean food promotion	MCT, MFAFF, MFA, CHA, relevant organizations

*Note.* Adapted from "Plan for Strengthening Korean Food Promotion Policy," by the Council of Korean Food Policy, 2015 (as cited in S. Lee, 2016, p. 20).

In this section, I discussed how the Korean government has promoted Korean food since 2008, by focusing on the policy orientation and detailed strategies of the KFF. Of course, the KFF's activities do not encompass the policies and projects of all governmental agencies. However, given the official and authorized status of the KFF, its approach to Korean food provides a basic understanding of the ways in which the Korean government has promoted and utilized its national cuisine. Reviewing policy projects of various governmental agencies, including, the MCT, the MFAFF, the KFF, the Cultural Heritage Administration, the Korean Cultural Heritage Foundation, and the Korean

Tourism Organization, the KCTI succinctly delineates the Korean government's involvement with Korean food as in Table 44.

Table 44

*The Korean Government's Major Policy Projects Regarding Korean Food*

Major project	Strategy
Preservation and succession of Korean food culture	(Re)discovering the archetype of Korean food Preserving the archetype of traditional food and designating cultural transmitters Designating outstanding cultural products and expanding their market
Application of Korean food culture and cultivation of relevant industries	Improving image of traditional food and expanding its dissemination Utilizing Korean food as a cultural resource for the invigoration of culinary tourism Developing and utilizing Korean food-related cultural contents
Globalization of Korean food culture	Raising a global profile of Korean food and food culture Expanding overseas expansion of Korean food and food culture
Cultivation of Korean food specialist	Supporting Korean-food specialized culinary institution Fostering Korean food specialists at local level and supporting the transmission of Intangible Cultural Heritage

*Note.* Adapted from "A Basic Study on the Legislation of the Promotion of Korean Food (Hansik) Culture," by S. Lee, 2016, pp. 21-33.

### The Articulation of Power Relations in Korean Food TV

In order to promote and justify their policies, governmental agencies actively utilize different media outlets, ranging from public transportation to print media, electronic media, and digital media. While promoting its national cuisine, the Korean government also made use of various media so as to increase the public's attention to Korean food and relevant policies. In this section, I will discuss the way in which government policies are publicized through domestic media in general, and how the major actors of Korean food globalization—the MFAFF and the KFF—publicized their

policy projects. Then, I will elucidate the intertwined relationship between the government's involvement with food and production practices of Korean food TV.

*The Execution of Government Advertising through Domestic Television*

In order for Korean governmental organizations<sup>48</sup> to promote their policies, they must go through open tendering procedures via the Public Procurement Service (henceforth, PPS). Once each organization's public relations division<sup>49</sup> has posted a notice of bid on the PPS's website *Narajangteo* (Korea ON-Line E-Procurement System), PR and ad agencies participate in the tender either separately or jointly. Then, the PPS reviews and filters out application submissions focusing on their plan for budget execution. Afterwards, the public relations division of each government organization requests PR and ad agencies to provide a detailed schedule for public relations and media promotion, and makes a final decision based upon their budget plan, efficiency, plausibility, and so on (S. Cho, personal communication, May 25, 2016). When the budget is over 30 million KRW, this procedure must be mediated by the Korea Press Foundation (KPF), which serves as agency for government advertisements and campaigns (Korean Press Foundation, n.d.). Yet, the KPF's role in the decision-making process and the execution of government advertising is quite limited; it rather tends to

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<sup>48</sup> Here, governmental organizations include: all national administrative organizations, local government, public enterprises and institutions, local public corporations, and special vehicle companies (Korean Press Foundation, n.d.).

<sup>49</sup> Generally, each ministry's public relations division, which is under a spokesperson's office, takes the responsibility for government advertising. In case of the MFAFF, however, its affiliated organization, Korea Agency of Education, Promotion and Information Service in Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, plays a bridging role.

function as a middleman between the government and PR/ad agencies, specifically with respect to money flow (S. Cho, personal communication, May 25, 2016).<sup>50</sup>

Despite its limited role, the KPF provides a lens through which one can identify the budget scale of the Korean government's policy advertising, because most of government advertising is executed and channeled by the KPF. For example, 2,332 out of 2,622 government advertisements were bridged by the KPF in 2015 (W. Choi, 2016, September 5). As Table 45 demonstrates, the budget of government advertising steadily increased from the late 2000s to the mid-2010s. However, it is not easy to figure out how government advertising is carried out and how the advertising budget is spent because government organizations execute their media promotion budget not on a case-by-case basis but through a "turn-key system," which allows them to entrust PR and ad agencies with the task of public relations and media promotion as a whole; e.g., media and social events, advertising, and sponsorship (Lee, & Kang, 2015, December 8; Y. Park, personal communication, May 13, 2016).

Table 45

*The KPF's Execution of Government Advertising from 2009 to 2015*

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Advertisement execution/channeling (1 million KRW)	381	396	420	470	470	470	578
Year-on-year rate (%)	19.6	3.9	6	12.1	-0.1	0	23

*Note.* Adapted from "Details of the KPF's Execution of Government Advertising," by W. Choi, 2016, September 5.

Yet, we can infer the ways in which the Korean government promotes its policy projects from the recent investigations from members of the National Assembly and

<sup>50</sup> When the budget is over 30 million KRW, governmental organizations send money to the KPF first. Then, the KPF charges up to 30% commission on a case-by-case basis, and pays PR/ad agencies the rest of it (S. Cho, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

journalists. As Jeongae Han and Jaejeong Bae—members of the National Assembly—discovered in 2015, the Korean press published a huge number of promotional news articles on behalf of government ministries without revealing their sponsorship. According to them, these news articles took the form of “impartial” and “objective” reports, but covertly produced government-friendly discourses (C. Jeong, 2015, December 31). For example, *Dong-a Ilbo*’s special report series, “K-Food Craze in Global Village,” described the increasing popularity of Korean food in Asian and European countries and discussed how to continue the K-food fever in a seemingly neutral way (C. Park, 2015, June 9; June 15).

Table 46

*The MCT's Budget Execution for Media Promotion in 2009*

Production Date	Contents	Advertising media	Production cost (unit: 1,000 KRW)	Advertising cost
2/26/2009	Four Major Rivers Development (Magazine)	Monthly Restoration Society	4,884	5,500
6/5/2009	Four Major Rivers Development (Magazine)	FORCA Journal	9,499	4,000
6/18/2009	Four Major Rivers Development (Theatre/Online)	Theatre (190), Online media (17)	24,926	298,440
6/25/2009	Broadcasting Act (Newspaper)	Daily newspaper (12), Economy newspaper (8), local newspaper (38)	1,290	710,215
7/24/2009	Broadcasting Act (Broadcasting)	SBS, KBS, YTN, MBN, Local commercial broadcasting, Online media (13)	70,000	177,400 <sup>a</sup>
7/31/2009	Broadcasting Act (Magazine)	Weekly Gonggam	4,400	-
	Total		117,999	1,592,655

*Note.* Adapted from “Who Will Take Responsibility for Government Advertising in 2009,” by B. Jeon—member of the National Assembly, 2010, July 12.

<sup>a</sup>The MCT paid 132,400 for television promotion of “Broadcasting Act,” but the total amount spent by other ministries was 529,500 KRW.

However, by referring to the MFAFF's research data and citing the aT's announcement as valid evidence, the news reports highlighted the achievement and the significance of the government's food-related policies. Not surprisingly, it was later found that the MFAFF paid 40 million KRW for these news articles. In 2015, the MFAFF spent 660 million KRW on this type of promotional news article (C. Jeong, 2015, December 31). Other ministries and their affiliated organizations similarly promoted their policies by sponsoring the publication of news articles and the production of TV shows in a furtive way. In 2009, the MCT spent 1,363 million KRW in order to justify the "Four Major Rivers Development" project and the new "Broadcasting Act" (see Table 46); and the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) executed a budget of 6,100 million KRW for its policy promotion in 2014 (B. Jeon, 2010, July 12; J. Song, 2015, September 23).

Table 47 provides a detailed description of how government policy is embedded in and promoted by various media outlets, including newspapers, radio, and television. In 2014, the MOEL developed a new campaign, "*Ilgayangdeuk*," which stressed work-life balance. In order to deliver its message to the public, the MOEL made contract with a PR agency, allocating 1,150 million KRW. Based on the PR agency's strategies, major daily newspapers and online news media published a series of news articles on the MOEL's new campaign in a government-preferred way. Radio programs introduced the public to the campaign through listener-participation segments (e.g., quizzes, counseling). Television programs, including entertainment shows and music shows, incorporated the campaign's core messages in much subtler ways (J. Song, 2015, September 23). For instance, MBC's real-variety show, *I Live Alone*, placed the campaign in casual

conversation between colleagues in the entertainment business, and carefully designed the mise-en-scène so that it could hide its relation to government advertising from viewers.

Table 47

*The MOEL's Media Promotion of "Ilgeoyangdeul (Work-Life Balance)" Campaign*

Medium	Program	Date (Frequency)	Cost (10,000 KRW)
TV	SBS, <i>Morning Wide</i>	Jun. 5 (2)	2640
	SBS, <i>Inkigayo</i>	Jun. 1 (2)	2200
	MBC, <i>Live This Morning</i>	Feb. 29	4700
	KBS, <i>Live Info Show+</i>	Nov. 26	
	MBC, <i>I Live Alone</i>	Nov. 21	2200
	KBS, <i>Hello Counselor</i>	Dec. 1	4000
	tvN, <i>First Day of Work</i>	Dec. 11 (2)	2200
	MBC, <i>Docuprime</i>	Dec. 25	6050
Radio	MBC, <i>Good Morning FM</i>	Jul. 2	
	MBC, <i>Women's Time</i>	Aug. 26	4400
	MBC, <i>Singeul Beongeul Show</i>	Oct. 28	
	MBC, <i>This Is Radio Age</i>	Oct. 3	
Newspaper	<i>Dong-a Ilbo</i>	Feb. 20 (20)	23000
	<i>Financial News</i>	Jun. 11 (3)	1100
	<i>Naeil Shinmun</i>	Oct. 27 (2)	1000
	<i>Herald Economy</i>	Nov. 13 (2)	1000
	<i>News1</i>	Nov. 24 (10)	2000

*Note.* Adapted from "Was the Entertainment Show Government Advertisement?" by J. Song, 2015, September 23.

This "Work-Life Balance" example shows the intertwined relationship between government organizations, PR/ad agency, and media. It also shows how media deliberately promote government policy without making it explicit to viewers. However, it is not the case that government organizations design a particular set of strategies for their policy/campaign promotion; it is PR and ad agencies that plan detailed strategies and negotiate with media practitioners. Yet, government organizations exert their authority through the process of selecting PR and ad agencies. Table 48 below offers an example of how a PR and/or ad agency carefully designs a set of promotional strategies

when it participates in government organizations' tender for engagement for PR/ad agency.

Table 48

*Media PR Strategies for Promoting Nonsmoking Campaign*

Stage	1st stage (May-July)	2nd stage (July-November)	3rd stage age (November-December)
Purpose	Increasing the public's awareness and interests	Changing the public's attitudes and behaviors	Expanding the outcome of the campaign
Objective	Changing the public's recognition of smoking by stressing negative impacts of smoking	Inducing the public's participation in nonsmoking through celebrities-participating/endorsing campaign	Expanding social consensus on nonsmoking by introducing successful cases and outcomes
Broadcasting publicity	KBS2, <i>Live Infor Show</i> KBS, <i>Vitamin</i> MBC, <i>Economy Magazine</i> SBS special edition <i>Nonsmoking Experience 24 Hours</i>	KBS, <i>Documentary</i> EBS, <i>Docuprime</i> SBS, <i>Morning Wide</i> (5 part) SBS, radio campaign	YTN, three-part news reports YTN, appearing on talk segments
Newspaper publicity	<i>JungAng Ilbo</i> , three-part special article Experts writing for newspapers	<i>Chosun Ilbo</i> , journalists-participating special article (3) Celebrities writing a column for newspapers in relay <i>Maeil Business</i> , special article (5)	<i>JungAng Ilbo</i> , special article
Media PR	Enhancing media exposure of nonsmoking events and campaigns	Special article, column, interview	Special article, column, interview

*Note.* Adapted from "Media PR for Nonsmoking Campaign," shared by S. Cho, 2016, May 22. This document was developed in 2015 by a PR agency that participated in the Ministry of Health and Welfare's tender for "Nonsmoking Campaign Media PR."

While promoting Korean food, the MFAFF and the KFF also actively utilized broadcasting and newspapers so as to enhance the public's awareness of their policy and further achieve widespread consensus. Like other government organizations, they go through open tendering procedures via the PPS and make a contract with a PR/ad agency

based on the turn-key system in general. My interviewees from the MFAFF explained its general process of media PR and advertising as the following:

We have a particular affiliated organization called “Korea Agency of Education, Promotion and Information Service in Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [henceforth, EPIS],” which is in charge of the MFAFF’s PR and ad task...Once our goal, mission, and audience are determined, the EPIS posts a notice of tender, and then PR and ad agencies are selectively invited to give a presentation. After the first review process, selected PR and ad agencies provide more detailed ideas and plans. After a careful negotiation and modification process, we make a final decision and execute media promotion (S. Kim, personal communication, May 24, 2016).

Generally, a spokesperson office is in charge of the MFAFF’s policy promotion. But, each bureau has its own publicity budget...Each bureau does what it can do, but the spokesperson office develops an overall plan for policy promotion on an annual basis (M. Yoo, personal communication, May 18, 2016).

As quoted above, the MFAFF’s policy promotion is carried out by different actors, including its affiliated organization—the EPIS—the spokesperson office, and relevant bureaus. While the overall agenda and budget are designed by the spokesperson office, particular strategies and media relations are developed by the EPIS; and at times each bureau implements its own small-scale promotion plan. Based on this structure, the MFAFF publicizes its policy in a wide range of ways, encompassing outdoor advertising, transit advertising, newspaper advertisement, virtual advertising, digital signage, product placement, production sponsorship of television documentary, and so on (S. Kim, personal communication, May 24, 2016). When it promotes its policy through television, the MFAFF either goes through an open tendering procedure or sponsors particular programs based upon the request of television networks or production companies. In either case, the MFAFF goes through the negotiation process in the pre-production stage. However, similarly to other government organizations, the MFAFF hides its presence,

and tactfully conceals its purpose of policy promotion in concert with television producers. My interviewees described this process as follows:

Our publicity budget is allocated annually. Then, television networks and production companies make a request for sponsorship. There have been quite a few requests...When I worked for the MFAFF, food TV was not much prevailing. But, there were several requests for financial aid from television networks. You know, our ministry was very concerned with the promotion of Korean food. Thus, we sponsored the production of food-related programs...Our criteria included viewer ratings, program's popularity...show host, and relevance to Korean food (Y. Park, personal communication, May 13, 2016).

For example, we collaborated with *Infinite Challenge* in advertising bibimbap [in New York]. Through the mutual agreement on the degree of [bibimbap] exposure, we paid part of production cost...Back then, we actively promoted Korean food globalization. That's why we were looking for different media outlets...Along with entertainment shows like *Infinite Challenge*, we were also involved with the production of television documentaries, which introduced the achievements of Korean chefs working in foreign countries or invited renowned foreign chefs to taste Korean food and experience Korean culture (M. Yoo, personal communication, May 18, 2016).

We often use popular entertainment shows, such as *Infinite Challenge* and *2 Days & 1 Night*...We and television producers plan the program together...In other words, we employ television product placement as an advertising tool...For example, when casts of entertainment shows eat or cook, we place particular agricultural and marine products in that scene. We also promote agritourism and local products by inserting scenes in which members of entertainment shows meet and talk with head of a village, visit tourist spots, and experience local-specific products...All are product placements. We try to incorporate them into storytelling of television shows. I mean, in a very natural way...We carefully negotiate this process in pre-production stage (S. Kim, personal communication, May 24, 2016).

There was increasing support for television drama and documentary. Before our organization [KFF] was founded, the MFAFF supported quite a few programs. When it comes to television drama, there were diverse ways to promote Korean food. Examples include: Korean food becoming a major element of narrative development; food companies becoming a spatial background; the significance and superiority of Korean food being naturally discussed; and Korean restaurants being described as a meeting

place for families and friends. Moreover, those television shows often go abroad (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015).

As my interviewees observed, the MFAFF employed indirect advertising methods, such as sponsorship and product placement, when it executed policy promotion through television so as to conceal the relationship between government policy and television production. In order to enhance the efficiency of policy promotion, it carefully negotiated with media practitioners with regard to the channel and degree of media exposure, reputation and viewer rating of program, and the program's relevance to Korean food, whether or not being mediated by PR and ad agency. Particularly, the MFAFF placed indirect advertising in such genres as documentary, entertainment shows, and drama, and promoted not only Korean food in general but also specific dishes, including bibimbap and tteokboki, which were selected as exemplary models of Korean food by the early Korean Food globalization Forum. Examples include KBS's *Star Chefs Are Meeting Korean Food 2010*, KBS Joy's *Korean Food Globalization Project*, *National Team*, KBS's *Korean Food, Cooking Health* (special edition of *Mysteries of the Human Body*), KBS's *Korean Food Globalization* (special edition of *30 Minute Docu*), MBC's *Korean Food Globalization Finds Its Way through Seasoning* (special edition of *Prime*), KBS's *Tteokboki Globalization Project*, and MBC's *New York Landing Operations* (special edition of *Infinite Challenge*). Concealing their relations to government policy, these programs legitimized the Korean Food Globalization Project, and circulated a discourse about the superiority of Korean food in terms of healthfulness, standardizability, and localizability with particular attention to bibimbap and tteokboki. Interestingly, journalistic discourse on bibimbap and tteokboki proliferated during the

same period (2008 to 2010), which demonstrates the government's integrated policy promotion plan (see Figure 17).




Figure 17. The Number of News Articles on "Hansik," "Bibimbap," and "Tteokbokki" in Conjunction with "Globalization." Adapted from the search results of news articles on "hansik & globalization," "bibimbap & globalization," and "tteokbokki & globalization" via BIGKinds.

Table 49

*The MFAFF's Publicity Budget for Korean Food Globalization*

Year	Budget/Execution	Million KRW
2009	Budget	2,150
	Execution	2,601
2010	Budget	7,915
	Execution	6,204
2011 <sup>a</sup>	Budget	6,444
	Execution	4,990
2012	Budget	5,845
	Execution	4,932

Note. Adapted from by "An Audit Report: Inspection of the Execution of Korean Food Globalization Support Project," by The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI), 2013, June 21, p. 30.

<sup>a</sup>The MFAFF's publicity budget for Korean food globalization was entrusted to the KFF in 2011.

Since its foundation, the KFF has taken over the MFAFF's publicity task with regard to Korean food "globalization." While the MFAFF implemented its own plan to promote Korean food in general, it entrusted policy promotion business to the KFF, specifically when it was concerned with the "globalization" of Korean food (The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, 2014). On an annual budget of 5 to 6 million USD (see

Table 49), the KFF sponsored both domestic and foreign TV shows; organized the production of Korean-food-related TV shows in concert with foreign TV networks; and at times, directly engaged in the production of special programs on Korean food. Table 50 shows how the KFF has promoted Korean food via television since its establishment.

Table 50

*The KFF's Key Activities Regarding Television-Based Policy Promotion*

Year	Promotion of Korean food through television
2010	Sponsored KBS World's TV show <i>Delicious Korea</i> Sponsored KBS's TV show <i>New Korean Food Explorers</i> Sponsored YTN's TV show <i>Global Korean</i> Sponsored American PBS's TV show <i>Kimchi Chronicles</i>
2011	Organized a TV program segment <i>The Globalization of Korean Food</i> for a YTN news program <i>Global Korean</i>
2012	Filmed and aired a KBS' Korean food cooking program <i>Seri's Star Kitchen</i> Released Korean food promotional DVDs
2013	Sponsored a KBS TV show <i>A Korean's Dining Table: Overseas</i> Sponsored Mokpo MBC's TV show <i>Korean Food Made Simple</i> Supported an Israeli TV show and held a farm tour with the production team
2014	Cooperated with Vietnam's national channel VTV3 to film a special TV program for Korean food Cooperated with BTV's show <i>Beijing-kuo</i> to film Korean food special Sponsored the Seollal Special of <i>A Korean's Dining Table</i> (Korean food in Germany, pork trotters, and bean sprouts) Publicized Korean food through American TV channel NBC's broadcast Produced and broadcast <i>Discovering Korean Food</i> with Gizzy Sponsored the episode of Dried Pollack Soup of <i>The Best Cooking Secrets</i> , a TV program on EBS Promoted Korean food in association with NBC in the U.S.
2015	Promoted Korean food in association with the Indonesian broadcasting company Trans 7 Produced the special TV program at the Vietnamese state-run broadcasting company VTV3
2016	Produced a Korean food program on ChannelA. Aired a promotional program for the culture of sauces on KBS <i>6 O'Clock My Hometown</i> .
2017	Produced and aired a documentary on Korean food on Arirang TV.

*Note.* Adapted from "Key Activities and Achievements" by the KFF, n.d.

As demonstrated in Table 50, the KFF mainly sponsored domestic TV shows in its early phase. Afterwards, it extended its attention to foreign television in order to raise the global profile of Korean food. The KFF's sponsorship of TV shows, whether domestic or foreign, was focused on documentaries and news programs, the messages of which are generally credited as "factual" information. Although details were different, the KFF employed a similar narrative development in both domestic and foreign TV shows. The secretary general of the KFF explained the dominant form of the KFF-sponsored foreign TV shows as follows:

Last year, we promoted Korean food in association with NBC. The program featured a renowned chef, Edward Lee, visiting Korea and tasting local Korean foods. You know, there is a growing trend towards local food in foreign countries. This program was actually related to the promotion of Korean culinary tourism...Although we have sponsored various programs, the underlying narrative is tasting Korea...The format is quite similar: foreign chefs and celebrities come to Korea; experience Korean food landscape; taste different Korean foods, including street food; introduce foreign viewers to Korean food and culture (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015).

From the perspective of government organizations, however, it is not necessary to make a clear distinction between domestic TV and foreign TV, particularly when it comes to the outcomes of their sponsorship. As table 50 shows, the KFF increasingly sponsored and collaborated with foreign TV networks. Although the main audience of these foreign TV shows was not domestic, the shows were often rescheduled on Korean TV networks, and gained Korean viewers' recognition through the KFF's domestic PR activities. In other words, the KFF-sponsored foreign TV shows became media events that aimed to emphasize the globally-approved superiority of Korean food, and in turn, to infuse the domestic population with national pride, thus justifying the government's policy on Korean food globalization. Likewise, domestic TV shows sponsored by the

KFF attempted to stress the prestige of Korean food in cosmopolitan cities (e.g., *A Korean's Dining Table: Overseas*), narrate the superiority of Korean food from the global perspective, and confirm the inextricable relationship between food and the nation by showing Korean immigrants' foodways (e.g., *A Korean's Dining Table: Dining Table of Korean Immigrants in Germany*). While these domestic TV shows addressed Korean viewers as their main audience, the global popularity of Korean media contents blurred the boundary between domestic viewers and overseas viewers. The KFF took advantage of this cultural phenomenon as described here:

Recently, we have focused on overseas media. For example, we have promoted Korean food in association with Indonesian and Vietnamese broadcasters. For domestic use, we sponsored MBC's drama *Fated to Love You*. We provided actors and actresses with Korean food catering service, had interviews with them, and filmed these scenes in the format of semi-documentary. You know, those actors and actresses are very popular in the Greater China Region. Thus, we offered this documentary to Chinese video-sharing websites, satellite broadcastings, and culinary institutions (D. Kim, personal communication, January 6, 2015).

In sum, similar to other government organizations, the major actors of Korean food globalization, such as the MFADF and the KFF, promoted and legitimized their policy projects through various media outlets. When they employed television, they tended to use indirect advertising methods, including sponsorship and product placement, in order to conceal their presence in the programs. In the following section, I will discuss how the government's involvement with Korean food and its following publicity plans influenced Korean food TV's production practices.

#### *The Negotiation of Habitus, Institutional Routines, and Power Relations*

As discussed above, government organizations must go through the open tendering procedure via the Public Procurement Service for their media PR and

advertising. In practice, however, the interplay between government organizations and television is realized through both official and unofficial ways on a case-by-case basis.

My interviewees working in the television industry explained these different channels of communication as follows:

There are some cases that the KFF, the MFAFF, or the aT directly supports our programs...At times, PR and/or ad agency make an offer (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

It is a matter of networking...The way [in which we interact with government organizations] is really various. Sometimes my former colleagues personally contact me, and sometimes a PR and ad agency makes an offer. Also, there is a chance that one of my uncle's friends is a government official. It happens on a case-by-case basis. Private networking is as important as public procedure (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

Through both public and private channels, the MFAFF and the KFF attempted to facilitate the production of television programs that would feature Korean food as main subject. As my interviewees acknowledged below, their sponsorship affected the growth of food TV to a certain degree:

I think that the government's Korean Food Globalization project affected the television industry to some degree. For example, there was government funding that television producers could apply for...I made a program on Korean food with a financial support from the KFF. It was globally distributed through KBS World...There are some items that do not attract viewers...However, people like food. As broadcasting companies could get external funds, there was a remarkable increase of television programs on Korean food (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

The KFF funded a lot of television programs, including documentaries and other culture programs. I also got government funding when I made a program on Korean food (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

I'm not 100% sure, but I believe [the government's project] made some impacts [on KBS]. It's not my first-hand experience. I guess it was an early pre-production stage of *Food Odyssey*. It was really important for *Food Odyssey* to secure funding from external sources. Back then, the

First Lady Kim was an honorary president of the KFF. I heard that it was easier for *Food Odyssey* to receive the government's funding. When it comes to *A Korean's Dining Table*, there was government's sponsorship when it made special episodes on Korean food in New York City (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

Through a large publicity budget (see Table 49), the government's Korean Food Globalization project encouraged television producers to be involved with food-related programs in the late 2000s. However, its funding was not equally distributed to food TV in general; it only sponsored when the program highlighted "Korean" food. Thus, it is important to distinguish the quantitative growth of Korean-food-related programs in the late 2000s from the recent food TV fever. My interviewees explained the limited effects of the government's sponsorship as follows:

I've heard about it [the government's sponsorship of food TV production]. In my case, however, there was no interaction. I didn't get any financial support from the government. Neither did I get influenced by the government-driven projects (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

It [the Korean Food Globalization project] is not strongly related to current cookbang fever...It is a different story. The government's support was only focused on the globalization of Korean food. It was devoted to promoting the superiority and the wholesomeness of Korean food...Although the government sponsored various culture programs, I don't think it laid a cornerstone of recent craze for food TV. You know, *Please Take Care of My Refrigerator* or *House Cook Master Baek* is not an outcome of the government's support. Because production cost is enormously high, broadcasting companies do not produce programs regardless of viewer ratings or marketability...They produce based on audience's needs (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

Of course, we cannot conclude that the recent craze for food TV, which has swept South Korea in the past decade, is irrelevant to the government's media PR/advertising plan. Indeed, *Infinite Challenge's* special episode on bibimbap advertising in New York City, which was sponsored by the MFAFF, gained widespread publicity and enhanced the

public's general interests in food. Thus, investigation of the relationship between the government's sponsorship and the increased social demand for food TV is needed. However, my analysis shows that the government's selective funding processes entailed limited effects on the explosion of food TV in comparison to other factors that I discussed in Chapter 4, such as: 1) the structural changes in the Korean television industry and the following channel competition, 2) the increased number of single-person households and the rise of the sampo generation, and 3) the growth of gourmet culture and the shift in the cultural legitimacy of food.

While sponsoring Korean-food-focused programs, the MFAFF and the KFF took a light-handed approach to television producer's production practices. In addition, television producers actively negotiate the government's requests, either direct or indirect, with their habitus—a set of dispositions or learned behaviors that provide individuals with a sense of how to act and respond in the course of their daily lives (Bourdieu, 1990), professional integrity, institutional routines, and assumptions about the audience. Although government organizations' offers of sponsorship and product placement gradually increased in the early and mid-2010s due to the soaring popularity of food TV, their influence was constantly mediated by the television producers' negotiation processes. My interviewees described the government's influence on their production practices, and their negotiation processes as follows:

Government organization does not interfere in television production as long as we [government organization and television producer] share the overall objective...Because the government sponsors program production after reviewing our [producers'] proposal and content value, it does not meddle in our production as long as we stick to our proposal (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

When they go through an open tendering procedure, government organizations would carefully review our proposal. After then, however, they do not influence on our production (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

When we get offered sponsorship by government organization or local government, we think about its possible impacts on our program's integrity. If it does not interfere in our program content, then we accept its sponsorship (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

I think we were able to secure sponsorship from the KFF or other government organizations. You know, the government was really devoted to the globalization of Korean food. If we did so, then we needed to pursue the value that the government wanted. It is not ethical if we do not adjust our orientation or value [after receiving the sponsorship]. Because we took a different stance on Korean food from the government, we didn't actively look for sponsorship (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016).

We've got offered sponsorship and product placement by the Rural Development Administration and the aT. They requested us to use domestic organic food in our program. However, our program's unique feature is that chefs are only using ingredients that are "in" the guest's fridge. You know, those requests do not fit into this characteristic of our program. We cannot go against it. That's why we've turned down those requests (H. Seong, personal communication, May 20, 2016).

The production cost of our program is pretty high because we do cooking competitions at overseas restaurants. Since hotel and flight fees account for a large portion of our production cost, we occasionally accept sponsorship for these items. We do so because tourism organization/administration, either Korean or foreign, does not ask us to incorporate product placement or advertise particular brands and products...Actually, we've got a lot of offers. However, we turn down these offers if they do not meet audience's expectation, and if they damage our integrity (C. Lee, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

We've got offered product placement by different government organizations, including the aT and the MFAPF...However, we've turned down all the offers. If they were meaningful for our audience, we would've accepted them. But, they weren't, and we didn't want to be subordinated to [the government's influence] (M. Ko, personal communication, May 25, 2016).

As quoted above at length, all my interviewees referred to the limited influence of the government on their production practices, and their relative autonomy. They claimed

that they were relatively free from government intervention as they prioritized their professional integrity, programs' essential characteristics, and audience expectations. Although the overall structure of the television industry is not separable from the state's political power as discussed earlier in Chapters 3 and 4, a television producer's individual production act is irreducible to political circumstances according to my interviewees. They pointed, rather, to the ownership and organizational culture of television networks as one of the major influential factors in their production practices. My interviewees stressed the different organizational cultures of cable networks, particularly CJ-affiliated networks, and terrestrial networks as follows:

In Korea, terrestrial networks have a relative autonomy from external factors. Cable networks are different. For example, the CJ group uses its cable networks as a marketing tool (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

SBS Plus is a cable network, but it is affiliated to the terrestrial network, SBS. I believe that we have greater autonomy than producers of other cable networks. In our company, producers have the authority to design and organize their programs. On the other hand, CJ-affiliated cable networks have a "collective" organizational culture. For example, when production department has a meeting for program design, programming department and marketing department actively participate in the decision-making process. [When I worked for CJ], it was called "multilateral meeting." Because of this culture, each producer's power is quite limited [in CJ-affiliated cable networks] (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

Our company, MBC Plus, is MBC's affiliated company. Our organizational culture might be slightly different from MBC's culture. However, I think that there is a bigger difference between [our organizational culture] and that of CJ-affiliated cable networks. Whereas CJ prioritizes money, we are relatively free from it. I think producers in our company have more authority (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

The production cost is counted as "expenses" while sponsorship and advertising revenue are considered "sales." Program production is interlocked with this expenses-to-sales relationship...It was really

painful...to be swayed by sponsorship. For example, I received 100 million KRW sponsorship from CJ last year; and 300 million KRW, this year. It means that I have to increase promotion-to-sales ratio by three times. Sometimes, I think that my program [*Master Chef Korea*] is part of CJ's marketing strategies (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014).

As my interviewees acknowledged, each television network's organizational culture, which is partly determined by its ownership, shapes producer autonomy and authority in a different way, and in turn, mediates the influence of sponsorship and advertising, whether they are being offered by government organizations or food industries. However, the fact that government advertising had limited and mediated effects does not mean that state power did not circulate in the production practices of food TV. Although the government did not compel the production of Korean-food-focused programs, it pushed the television industry to "voluntarily" involve in it by increasing state funding for media contents and sponsoring particular programs. Likewise, through "selective" review processes, the government led television producers to deliver shared messages about Korean food and participate in its discursive practice. It is worth recalling what I quoted above: "Government organization does not interfere in television production *as long as we share the overall objective* [emphasis added]" (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). In other words, the government "encourages" the television industry to share its policy agenda, and to frame it in a government-preferred way without acknowledgment of deep involvement. The following comment from a producer shows how this relationship is embedded in production routines:

No one applies for government funding or participates in open tendering procedure for the purpose of criticizing Korean food. The government would never support it. To denounce Korean food is really [hard]. You

know, television has hardly challenged the connection between Korean food and national pride. In Korea, there are many programs that address the issue of food safety. However, they do not portray Korean food itself as problematic; rather, they point to particular ingredients or restaurants. Basically, media do not [challenge] Korean food. But, I think it is not limited to Korean situation (W. Lee, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

As I discussed above, television producers take into consideration a variety of factors, such as their professional integrity, audience expectations, and organizational culture, when they deal with sponsorship and/or advertising. To put it another way, it means that they incorporate this request as long as it does not require a significant change in their program's overall framework. My interviewee explained this production routine as follows:

[Government sponsorship] can make an impact on program contents. However, we need to feature the cooking process in any case. Because it is a matter of ingredients, it does not seriously affect our program. It is just a matter of whether we use shrimp or abalone for *doenjang jjigae* [soybean paste soup]... There is Korean Producers & Directors Association, of which members include radio producers, documentary producers, and so on. Local governments invite the members of the Association in every season. Last time, I was invited to visit *Wando* [Wando Island]. Local officials gave us a tour of sightseeing spots and introduced us to local products... After that, MBC Music brought idol groups to Wando and filmed music program there (M. Heo, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

As quoted above, details such as minor ingredients and filming locations are often considered as interchangeable elements, which would not betray audience expectations or producer professional integrity. However, they function as an important channel through which government policy can be promoted and its connoted message can be naturalized. Although it is not directly related to government policy on Korean food globalization, the above-quoted example shows how television producers contribute to the promotion of government policy without their full realization. For example, the main narrative of my

interviewee's program *Madam's Secret Recipe* develops as the following: visiting the embassy, introducing the represented country's (food) culture, and sharing Korean food with the ambassador's family. When the program featured the Royal Danish Embassy in Korea and the Embassy of the Republic of Ecuador in Korea, members of the program cooked Korean food using pork meat and shrimp imported from Denmark and Ecuador respectively. While my interviewee acknowledged that ambassadors attempted to promote their homeland products and used those products for mutual benefits, she did not recognize that her program could possibly justify the Korean government's recent market intervention in the pork industry in 2014 (E. Kim, 2017, July 7). As discussed above, the government does not coercively exercise its influence on television production, and television producers negotiate—and at times challenge—state power. Nevertheless, their taken-for-granted production routines make it possible for the government's policy agenda to be widely disseminated and represented in a government-preferred way.

### Conclusion

Television production is not only framed by broadcasting structure, but also embedded in the wider socio-cultural and political structure. It functions as a site where power relations, ideological frameworks, and institutional routines are negotiated. In 2008, there was a significant change in the power relations and ideological frameworks surrounding Korean food. The Korean government began to perceive Korean food as a driving force of the national economy, and thus, put concerted efforts into the globalization of its national cuisine. Therefore, the post-2008 era provides a vantage point for observing the interplay between nation-state and television production. Given this

recognition, this chapter examined how state power has been exercised, negotiated, or challenged by food TV's production practices.

Based on a neoliberal understanding of globalization, the Korean government utilized national cuisine to raise its global profile, to enhance Korea's soft power, and more importantly, to improve the national economy. In so doing, it continuously aroused national consciousness by highlighting the superiority and rich history of Korean food. In order to justify its policy project and depoliticize its discourse on Korean food, government organizations actively utilized domestic television. Despite the television industry's vulnerability to political circumstances, my analysis shows that state power is not directly articulated in television production; rather, it is negotiated with and mediated by television producers' habitus, professional integrity, audience expectation, organizational culture, and production routines.

However, the limited and/or mediated effects of state power do not mean that television production is free from state intervention. Although the Korean government does not exercise forceful power, it makes television producers "voluntarily" participate in its discursive practice. In addition, through taken-for-granted production routines, television producers disseminate government messages without their full consciousness. While Chapter 4 elucidated the significant social conditions that led to the explosion of food TV, this chapter focused on how power relations were articulated in food TV's discursive practice of production. Taken together, these two chapters will help us contextualize food TV's knowledge production with regard to the Korean nation, which I will discuss in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER 6

## THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONNESS IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

In our everyday lives, we tend to take culinary practices and traditions for granted. Considered so natural and normal, our foodways—for example, what we eat, where we eat, when we eat, how we eat, with whom we eat, etc.—become “virtually transparent” (Parasecoli, 2011, p. 646). The ubiquitous nature of food-related practices, particularly, make their ideological and political relevance almost invisible (Parasecoli, 2008). Yet, our food and foodways are embedded in not only ecological and physiological contexts but also “economic, political, religious, ideological and emotional relationships between people” (Cwiertka & Walraven, 2001, p. 2). Thus, the study of food-related practices can reveal “the distribution of patterns of signification across time and space,” and “the relevance of social tensions, negotiations, and conflicts in the creation of meaning” at local, national, regional, and/or global level (Parasecoli, 2011, p. 647).

While anthropologists, sociologists, and historians have constantly engaged in the study of food, media and communication scholars have historically paid less attention to this subject. However, as television became increasingly concerned with foodways, media scholars began to address food television as a set of cultural texts, through which they investigate diverse issues, ranging from educational, ideological, and symbolic roles of television to the construction of meanings surrounding class, sex, gender, age, ethnicity, and so on (Adema, 2000; De Backer & Hudders, 2016; de Solier, 2005; Hansen, 2008; Kelly, 2017; Ketchum, 2005; Oren, 2013; Parasecoli, 2008; Swenson, 2009; Wright & Sandlin, 2009). The main focus of this chapter is in line with these

preceding studies in the sense that it perceives television as a major repository of visual elements, ideas, and discourses that constitute our imagination and reality, and that it is rooted in the idea that food television does not simply tell audiences how to cook but instead ascribes ideological meanings to food and food-related practices (Kelly, 2017; Parasecoli, 2008). It departs from other research by addressing a relatively less-studied subject, namely food television's discourse of the nation. The close relationship between food and the nation has been demonstrated by anthropologists and historians, who have focused on food production, distribution, preparation, and consumption. However, it has not gained much attention from media and communication scholars.

In this chapter, I will fill this gap in academic research by elucidating Korean food TV's discursive practices with respect to the Korean nation. Below, I will briefly discuss the interplay between state, nation, and television in order to situate my analysis. Then, I will delineate Korean food TV's discursive construction of the nation by employing both historical and textual analyses. For the analysis of pre-2008 food TV, I use a variety of secondary resources, such as broadcasting white papers, academic works, trade journals, and news articles. I will discuss Korean food TV's detailed discursive properties articulated since 2008 based on the analysis of concrete examples that featured Korean food as a main subject; examples include KBS's *A Korean's Dining Table*, EBS's documentary series *Docuprime*, and Olive's *The Great Competition for Korean Food*. Finally, I will illustrate what factors exerted a significant influence on food TV producers' discursive practices with respect to the Korean nation.

### The Interplay between State, Nation, and Television

Despite its seemingly essential nature, the congruity of nation and state is an outcome of a historical process where both political and ethnic elements operated to varying degrees. As Smith (1991) notes, every nation-state contains civic (political) and ethnic (cultural) elements in different forms, and thus, produces a distinctive form of nationhood depending on specific historical and political conditions. In Korea, the notion of nation emerged in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in response to Japanese colonialism (D. Youn, 2013), defining the Korean nation as an “ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive collectivity” (Shin, Freda, & Yi, 1999, p. 469). Like *minzoku* in Japanese, the Korean term *minjok* was developed in 1907 in order to call for strong ethnic nationalism, and became a talisman for the Korean nation (K. Chang, 2010). Primordial sentiments, such as *hyeonltong* (blood ties) and racial purity (Geertz, 1973), were continuously invoked to create a notion of the national “we” as an extended family, and to strengthen the binding force of the Korean nation. Since then, there has been substantial overlap among race, ethnicity, and nation in Korea: race has functioned as a “marker” of ethnic identity; and in turn, has played an “instrumental role” in defining the Korean nation (Shin, Freda, & Yi, 1999, p. 469). The conflation of race, ethnicity, and nation can be found in current linguistic usage of the term *minjok*: it connotes not only “ethnic nation” but also “race.”

This “racially-configured ethnic nation” has been at the center of Korean statist discourse. Although it does not reflect social “fact” (J. Ahn, 2013), it has functioned as the general “truth” of Korea in Foucault’s terminology. Of course, hegemonic discourse of the Korean nation has taken different shapes according to both domestic and international circumstances. It took the form of monoracial anti-colonial ideology under

Japanese colonialism; ethnic-based anti-communism ideology, during the post-war era; economic ethnic nationalism, between the 1960s and the mid-1980s; anti-regime resistant nationalism, in the late 1980s; global and transnational Korea, before the late 1990s; anti-neoliberal ethnic nationalism, from the late 1990s to the 2000s; and pop nationalism and multicultural nationalism, from the 2000s to the present (J. Ahn, 2013; K. Chang, 2010; Y. Cho, 2008; J. Joo, 2011; Lee & Lee, 2015; H. Park, 1996; J. Ryu, 2012; Shin, Freda, & Yi, 1999; D. Youn, 2013). However, the emphasis on *danil minjok* (unitary nation) has been a tenet of the Korean nation even though it has been articulated to varying degrees depending on the above-mentioned historical conditions.

While the military dictatorship governed South Korea from 1961 to 1987, the Korean government produced the ideology of strong nationalism with an emphasis on “pure” blood ties. In order to gain their political legitimacy and forestall criticism of the government, President Park Chunghee and Chun Doo-hwan used television as a propagandistic tool, and suppressed the freedom of the press and broadcasting. For example, the Park administration amended the Broadcasting Act in 1971 to make the Broadcasting Ethics Committee a legal agency, and in turn, to strengthen government censorship of the broadcasting industry. In 1974, President Park released Emergency Measure No. 9, which heavily restricted freedom of speech (J. Ahn, 2013). The Chun administration also took a heavy-handed approach to the press and broadcasting, and exercised strict control over television. As discussed in Chapter 3, President Chun rearranged the broadcasting industry through the enactment of the Fundamental Act on the Press, and forged a state-controlled broadcasting environment. As a result, Korean television “voluntarily” served as a powerful Ideological State Apparatus till 1987,

naturalizing statist ideologies and prompting them to be accepted as “non-ideological ‘common sense’” (Fairclough, 1985, p. 739). In so doing, Korean television marginalized cultural others, who were perceived as threatening the racial purity of the Korean nation, and successfully propagated anti-communism and anti-Japan nationalism (J. Ahn, 2013).

Since 1987, Korean society has experienced multiple major social transformations. The torture case of Jongchul Park, which disclosed the government’s brutal abuse of power, and President Chun’s speech on indirect presidential election triggered the nationwide democracy movement, and toppled the militant authoritarian regime. Due to political democratization, the Korean broadcasting industry gained relative freedom from state control, and became more liberalized and commercialized throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. Particularly, the 1990 Amendment of Broadcasting Act allowed for the establishment of the commercial network, SBS; cable TV started in 1995 based on the enactment of the Cable Television Act; the 2000 Integrated Broadcasting Act diversified television production by facilitating independent production; and the 2009 Broadcasting Act deregulated broadcasting ownership and brought about a new form of television network—the general programming channel. This ecological shift in the broadcasting industry reconfigured the long-lasting power relationship between state and television, and enabled Korean television to imagine the Korean nation in a different way.

The late 1980s also marked a turning point in the proximity of globalization to everyday life in Korea. Due to two consecutive international sport events, namely the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Korea attracted global attention and began to perceive the Korean nation through the global gaze (R. Joo, 2012). In

addition, the global force of market opening compelled the Kim Youngsam administration (1993-1998) to declare *seggyehwa* (globalization) as a national project, and thus, to create a national image of the “New Korea” (J. Ahn, 2013; D. Seo, 1994). In the early and mid-1990s, Korea also witnessed a large influx of labor from northeast China, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian countries (H. Park, 1996). This inflow of foreign migrant laborers was accelerated after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which put Korea under the control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This economic crisis brought neoliberal capitalism to Korea, and created the need for a cheap labor force from nearby Asian countries (see Figure 18). Along with the rapid increase in the number of migrant workers, the growth of international marriage greatly affected the ethnoscape of Korean society.




Figure 18. The Influx of Foreign Workers from the Late 1980s to the Early 2000s. Adapted from “Realities and Options of the Industrial Skill Trainee Program for Overseas-Invested Firms,” by K. Yoo, 2005, p. 70.

As Table 51 demonstrates, international marriages steadily increased in the late 1990s and reached a pinnacle in the mid-2000s. Likewise, the number of foreign residents sharply increased throughout the 2000s. This demographic shift caused by neoliberal capitalism and transnational movements increased the familiarity with cultural

others on the one hand, and on the other, it enhanced an awareness of difference between the national “in-group” and racial/ethnic “out-group” (Featherstone, 1996).

Consequently, the Korean government was required to integrate different racial and ethnic groups into Korean society. Within this context, it employed multiculturalism as a discursive means to manage *intranational* cultural diversity (Ang, 2001). For instance, the Korean government announced “A Plan for Promoting the Social Integration of Mixed-Race and Immigrants” in April 2006 (J. Ahn, 2013), and enacted the “Multicultural Families Support Act” in March 2008 in order to improve “the quality of life of multicultural family members and *the unity of society* [emphasis added] helping multicultural family members enjoy stable family living” (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2008, September 22).

Table 51

*The Growth of International Marriages and the Increasing Number of Foreign Residents*

Year	International marriages	Foreign residents
1993	6,545	76,374
1994	6,616	95,778
1995	13,493	123,881
1996	15,947	167,664
1997	12,473	201,186
1998	11,592	182,788
1999	9,823	206,895
2000	11,695	244,172
2001	14,523	267,630
2002	15,202	287,923
2003	24,775	437,014
2004	34,640	469,183
2005	42,356	485,477
2006	38,759	632,490
2007	37,560	765,429
2008	36,204	854,007
2009	33,300	870,636
2010	34,235	918,917

*Note.* Adapted from “Population Census: Marriage with Foreigners per Cities and Towns,” by Statistics Korea, 2016 and “The Current Condition of Registered Foreigners according to Gender and Regions,” by the Ministry of Justice, 2017.

In this light, Ahn (2013) argues that statist discourse of the Korean nation underwent a transformation from a monoracial Korea (-1987) to a multicultural and global Korea (1987 to the present). Focusing on the media representation of *honhyeol* (mixed-race) groups, she demonstrates a symbiosis between the Korean government's discourse of the nation and Korean television's imagination of the nation. Particularly, she perceives multicultural representation of racial others as part of a national project to imagine Korea as a "global" nation, and claims that Korean television appropriates multicultural subjects to create a fantasy of multicultural Korea or to reinforce the pre-existing ethnic nationalism (J. Ahn, 2013). In the following section, I will discuss how Korean food TV has reproduced, modified, or challenged hegemonic discourse of the nation.

#### Making a Distinctive Korean Face in Globalization

As discussed in Chapter 3, Korean television addressed food as an object of enlightenment and education throughout the 1980s. Although food TV incorporated more entertainment elements toward the late 1980s, its main focus was on educating housewives about modern lifestyles and domestic work. This characteristic of early food TV was a continuation of the Korean government's long-lasting attitude towards food, broadcasting, and culture. From the 1960s until 2007, the Korean government had seen food as a target of regulation and improvement. The Food Sanitation Act, which was enacted in April 1962 by the Park Chunghee administration, states its goal as "to contribute to the improvement of *national health* [emphasis added] by preventing sanitary dangers and harm caused by food and improving the quality of food (Ministry of Food and Drug Safety, 1962, April 21). As discussed above, the military regime used

broadcasting as an ideological machine for securing its political legitimacy and naturalizing its policy. Likewise, culture was appropriated to justify the government's economy-centered modernization project and to promote the idea of "national" culture. Enacted in August 1972, the Culture and Arts Promotion Act describes the goal of culture as follows:

The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of *national culture* through the succession to the *traditional culture* [emphasis added] and art of Korea and the creation of a new culture, by supporting projects and activities for promoting culture and art (Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, 1972, August 14).

This approach to food, television, and culture continued until Korean society experienced political democratization, economic liberalization, and cultural diversification in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. For this reason, early food TV was not free from state control, and served to justify the government's modernization project and to revitalize traditional culture. For example, the two state-controlled public broadcasters, KBS and MBC, produced a series of special programs on Korean food, the goal of which was to introduce local specialties, "discover" local foods, promote Korean traditional foods, and promote the superiority of Korean food (see Table 52).

Particularly, when the Chun administration organized a huge national festival, *Gukpung 81* (National Customs 81), in order to arouse national consciousness, KBS greatly contributed to making it a media event. In so doing, KBS stressed the diversity of *hyangto eumsik* (local foods) and represented them as critical constituents of national cuisine. As Appadurai (1981) observes, the construction of national cuisine requires a removal of *intranational* differences. From this perspective, the emphasis on local diversity can hamper the imagination of one nation. Here, it is important to note that a

discourse of *hyangto* does not contradict the dominant discourse of the Korean nation as an “ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive community.”

Table 52

*Special Entertainment Shows on Korean Food Aired from the 1980s to 1992*

Broadcaster	Program Title	Broadcast Date
KBS2	<i>The Scent of Tradition Spread in Hanmadang</i>	5/23/1981
	<i>Live Broadcast, 83 Harvest Festival</i>	11/19/1983
	<i>84 Seoul International Folk Festival</i>	9/16/1984
MBC	<i>Competition for Cooking Korean Food</i>	10/30/1983
	<i>The 2nd Competition for Cooking Korean Food</i>	04/29//1984
	<i>A Special Edition for the Asian Games, "Korean Traditional Food"</i>	09/22/1986- 10/02/1986
	<i>A Special Edition for Chuseok (Korean Thanksgiving Day), "Today's Cooking"</i>	09/28/1987- 10/05/1987
	<i>A Special Edition for Summer, "Today's Cooking"</i>	07/27/1989- 08/02/1989

*Note.* Adapted from “A History of TV Entertainment Programs in Korea,” by Kang & Yoon, 2002, pp. 198-525.

In Korean language, *hyangto* refers to both birthplace and rural area/old village. Thus, it spurs a nostalgic feeling about one’s hometown whether it is being imagined or experienced. In addition, through the identification of land, people, and culture, the term *hyangto* and the feelings aroused by its mention connote the racial and ethnic sameness of the Korean nation. Within this context, *hyangto eumsik* (local foods) became main ingredients of culinary television in the 1980s. While promoting local foods and representing them as traditions, early Korean food TV enhanced a sense of national belongingness. The Korean government’s economy-driven modernization project entailed rapid urbanization (see Table 4), which in turn created a demographic gap between the rural and the urban as well as a fear of loss of one’s hometown. Local foods fulfilled people’s desire for home; helped them identify their situatedness; and promoted the idea

of the nation as an extension of one's hometown. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), there are three overlapping types of invented traditions: those for social cohesion, those for legitimizing institutions and authorities, and those for socialization. Depicted as traditions, local foods on food TV functioned as a means to enhance social cohesion at the national level and to legitimize the government's modernization project.

Other main menus of early Korean food TV included royal cuisine and modern cuisine. Although detailed properties of *Today's Cooking* and *Home Cooking* are not available, we can infer their menu construction from "instructors" of the programs, who contributed to both material and symbolic production of food TV, and relevant news articles. For example, the first cooking specialist of *Today's Cooking* was the head of Sudo Cooking Institution, which was credited as an "excellent organization" for diet improvement by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1970 and "the first cook training institution" by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1972. Boksun Han, the second cooking specialist of *Today's Cooking*, was a state scholarship student in Joseon dynasty Royal Cuisine, which was designated as part of intangible cultural heritage. As their backgrounds suggest, they delivered a lecture on modern and royal cuisine on food TV, and prompted them as a "normal" Korean dishes that housewives needed to learn. Because of the gap between televised versus experienced Korean food, viewers often raised complaints against idealistic representations of Korean food as follows:

MBC's morning program, *Today's Cooking*, only introduces luxurious dishes that are exclusive to upper-class families. I don't know why the program features those high-class foods. The authorities emphasize the improvement of foodways and frugal lifestyles, but television programs constantly use expensive ingredients, such as beef, ginkgo, pine nut, and walnut (B. Jang, 1985, February 25).

By featuring royal dishes of the Joseon dynasty as a crucial part of Korean cuisine, early food TV highlighted the common ancestry and the shared past of Korean people, which in turn provided a discursive basis for ethnic nationalism (Smith, 1999). This representational practice also deployed the idea that “our” ancestors had similar food experiences, and rendered particular foodways a distinctive national heritage of Korea (Brulotte & Di Giovine, 2014). As mentioned in the quote above, early food TV did not pay attention to class diversity; it rather represented upper-class food practices as standardized foodways in modern Korea. In other words, it portrayed the Korean nation as “what we’d like to be”—modernized and economically developed Korea—rather than “what we actually are.”

As globalization became more visualized due to the Seoul Asian Games and the Seoul Olympic Games, Korean food TV began to incorporate more “foreign” foods and recipes. Through this menu composition, it promoted the idea that “Korea” is not contradictory to “global,” and they can coexist without the loss of “Koreanness.” The special edition of *Today’s Cooking*, the main theme of which was how to serve foreign guests, efficiently demonstrated this representational practice:

Go (show host): Today, we are going to talk about how to serve foreign guests...How can we apply Korean foods to Western styles?

Hwang (special instructor): It is not complicated. We can serve Korean food in Western service order. We do not need to change the taste of Korean food...

Go: What is basic table manner?

Hwang: There is no difference between Eastern and Western styles. When we invite guests, we serve them with respect...Today, I did not change the taste of Korea. While keeping the Korean flavor, I just changed the order of service and added comfortable utensils, such as folk and knife...

Yoon (interior designer): We do not need to change indoor decoration even though we serve foreign guests. We can use our unique materials...For example, we can make table mat with Korean hemp cloth.

Through the emphasis on similarity rather than difference between “Korean” and “Western,” the program attempted to relieve a fear of cultural others and a fear of putative loss of Koreanness. It showed the competence of (modern) Koreanness in comparison to “foreignness.” Here, significant cultural others, in relation to which the Korean nation is envisioned, are reduced to the Western; other foreignness is entirely excluded from the discussion of “global.” For example, the program interchangeably used Western with foreign, and described Western as a culturally homogeneous group. Another strategy that food TV employed in the face of globalization was an emphasis on the superiority of Korean food. Between 1983 and 1984, MBC hosted and live broadcasted the “Competition for Cooking Korean Food,” and explained its purpose like this:

MBC live broadcasted the competition for Korean food as Korea is going to host international sport events, such as the 1986 Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. By discovering indigenous Korean foods and informing foreigners about these foods, we aimed to spread the superiority of Korean food and to improve Korean people’s dietary life. The first “Competition for Cooking Korean Food” contributed to the revival of Korean unique foods, which otherwise would be forgotten (MBC, 1984, p. 265).

As quoted above, the program attempted to face the infiltration of foreign culture through “indigenous” and “unique” Korean foods, and depicted these foods as a repository of Korean food’s superiority. It also suggested that Korean people’s diet would be improved not through mixture with foreign foods but by the resurrection of indigenous Korean foods. Although the program aimed to inform foreigners of the superiority of Korean food, its message was geared toward domestic viewers. Put differently, the program reinforced the notion that the Korean nation was based on its ethnic core, and represented ethnic purity as a strong weapon of the Korean nation. Interestingly, the

excellence of Korean foods was evaluated from the Western perspective: the program invited the wives of French, West German, Swiss, American, and Italian ambassadors as the panel of judges (MBC, 1984, p. 167). This production routine shows that Korean society was struggling for nationness *and* began to see itself from the perspective of significant cultural others in the era of accelerated globalization. Food historian and anthropologist, Youngha Joo, explained this obsession with the superiority of Korean food as the following:

In comparison to other societies, Korea has a stronger historical complex because of colonial and war experience. For this reason, we've been seeking for something traditional and historic about Korean food... Since the 1970s, Korean society has greatly stressed the superiority and cultural identity of Korean food. As we encountered cultural others more and more in the late 1980s, we needed to show them something about ourselves. Particularly, during the Seoul Olympic Games, we had to disclose our old things that we had an inferiority complex about. That's why [we highlighted the superiority of Korean food] more and more from the late 1980s (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014).

In the early 1990s, Korean society underwent a more accelerated processes of globalization. Because of the global force of economic liberalization, President Kim declared globalization as his key policy in 1994, and Korea became a member of the WTO and the OECD in the mid-1990s. Particularly, the 8<sup>th</sup> Multilateral Trade Negotiations—the Uruguay Round—pushed the Korean domestic agricultural industry into the global economy system, and forced market-opening of agricultural products, even including rice, which was considered the staple of the Korean diet. Within this neoliberal economic context, the notion of *shintoburi* (body and land are inseparable) prevailed in Korean society throughout the 1990s (see Figure 19).




Figure 19. The Prevalence of Shintoburi Discourse in the 1990s. Adapted from search results of news articles on “shintoburi” via BIGKinds.

Table 53

*Examples of News Articles on Shintoburi in 1993*

Title of news article	Newspaper	Date
"Fury over Cancer-Causing Imported Wheat"	<i>HanKuk Ilbo</i>	2/5/1993
"Hot Item, Shintoburi Rice"	<i>SeGye Ilbo</i>	2/15/1993
"Let's Eat Our Agricultural Products"	<i>KyungHayng Shingmun</i>	2/28/1993
"Applying Music Therapy to Clinical Medicine Through Shintoburi Music"	<i>Seoul Shinmun</i>	4/3/1993
"My Secret of Health, Traditional Diet and Catnap"	<i>SeGye Ilbo</i>	4/25/1993
"The Shintoburi Wave in Bakery"	<i>KyungHayng Shingmun</i>	8/22/1993
"My 23 Years of Shintoburi, Farmer Ahn"	<i>Seoul Shinmun</i>	9/12/1993
"Domestic Banana Has Disappeared"	<i>Hankyoreh</i>	10/15/1993
"National Nutrition and Wholesome Diet"	<i>Seoul Shinmun</i>	10/28/1993
"Man and Nature Are One, A Book about the Idea of Shintoburi Has Been Published"	<i>Hankuk Ilbo</i>	11/23/1993
The Spirit of Shintoburi is Really Needed"	<i>KyungHayng Shingmun</i>	12/4/1993
"'Rice Has Collapsed,' Shocking and Outrage"	<i>KyungHayng Shingmun</i>	12/6/1993
The Massive Influx of Imported Agricultural Products, Thought on Right Food Is Needed	<i>KukMin Ilbo</i>	12/7/1993

*Note.* Adapted from the search results of news articles on “shintoburi” on BIGKinds.

As Table 53 demonstrates, Korean news media blamed imported agricultural products for their harmful effects (e.g., “Fury over Cancer-Causing Imported Wheat”); raised fears of loss (e.g., “Domestic Banana Has Disappeared”); portrayed domestic products as a means of healthy life (e.g., “National Nutrition and Wholesome Diet”);

suggested shintoburi as a material and discursive means to resist neoliberal global economy (e.g., “The Massive Influx of Imported Agricultural Products, Thought on Right Food Is Needed”); and represented shintoburi as a normative food practice of Korean people (e.g., “The Spirit of Shintoburi is Really Needed”). In other words, they highlighted the inseparable relationship between body, land (or terroir), and the nation, and widely circulated the ideological discourse about Korea as a “territorially-defined biological nation.” Although the Nationality Act defines a Korean national based on the personal nationality principle,<sup>51</sup> the shintoburi discourse defined both territory and blood ties as ethnic cores of the Korean nation, and as a result, strengthened the congruity between state and nation.

Korean food TV also contributed to the proliferation of the shintoburi discourse. Although examples in Table 54 are not exhaustive, they show how Korean television directly incorporated the shintoburi discourse in its production. For example, KBS produced a special entertainment show, *Hurrah, the Indigenous*, in 1997 in order to “discover the *pure native* [emphasis added], and thus, to remind the values and meanings of our things” (Kang & Yoon, 2002, p. 335). Likewise, MBC aired a special program, *Our Love to the Fields of Our Hometown*, in 1994. As its title indicates, the program aimed to promote the consumption of domestic agricultural products, particularly in the face of the aftereffects of the Uruguay Round.

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<sup>51</sup> The Korean Nationality Act defines a Korean national as: “1) A person whose father or mother is a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of his or her birth; 2) A person whose father was a national of the Republic of Korea at the time of his death, where father died before his or her birth; and 3) A person who is born in the Republic of Korea, where both of parents are unknown or have no nationality. An abandoned child found in the Republic of Korea shall be recognized as born in the Republic of Korea” (Ministry of Justice, 1998, June 14).

Table 54

*Special Programs on Korean Food Aired from 1993 to 1999*

Broadcaster	Program Title	Broadcast Date
KBS	<i>International Cooking Festival: I Am the Best Cook</i>	6/19/1994
	<i>Game Show, Great Gathering of Cooking Masters</i>	9/26/1996
	<i>Hurrah, the Indigenous</i>	9/15/1997
	<i>Theme Variety-Rice Cake</i>	2/16/1999
MBC	<i>Our Love to the Fields of Our Hometown</i>	9/10/1994

*Note.* Adapted from “A History of TV Entertainment Programs in Korea,” by Kang & Yoon, 2002, pp. 198-525.

This shintoburi discourse increasingly dominated Korean television due to changes in the food landscape. As discussed in Chapter 3, the opportunity to encounter culinary others sharply increased in the mid-1990s. Because of the growth of GDP and the rise of advanced consumerism, the food service industry expanded both quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, the number of Chinese restaurants in Seoul escalated from 3,003 to 3,994 between 1983 and 1993; Japanese restaurants, from 566 to 2,293; and western restaurants, from 2,793 to 9,586 (Cwierka, 2012). Also, the import of foreign food materials considerably increased in the 1990s (Pemberton, 2002). The proliferation of culinary others generated a fear that Korean traditional culture would be damaged by foreign culture (S. Kim, 2015), and thus, generated a discursive and affective focus on Korean food. Moreover, the global “achievements” of Korean food provided a basis for shintoburi discourse. Examples include the upsurge in the export of kimchi to Japan (Yonhap News, 1992, April 25), Michel Jackson’s compliment about bibimbap, which became a huge media event in 1997, and Korean Airline’s award from the International Flight Catering Association for bibimbap. While the influx of foreign foods enhanced exclusivist nationalism (S. Kim, 2015), the global “victory” of Korean food made it possible to see Korean national culture in a positive manner. These seemingly

disparate phenomena contributed to the expansion of shintoburi discourse, and reinforced social discourse on the superiority and uniqueness of Korean food culture.

In order to justify the superiority of Korean food, Korean television attempted to represent it as scientific knowledge. From a traditional Marxist perspective, scientific knowledge is in sharp contrast to ideology: whereas ideology reflects the interests of a dominant group and serves to reproduce its power, scientific knowledge reveals the interests of power itself (Williamson, 1978). Korean television blurred this distinction between “false” knowledge and “scientific” knowledge. Although I could not analyze every food documentary produced in the 1990s, my interviewee, who was frequently invited to advise on food documentary production, explained the main characteristics of the 1990s food documentary as the following:

Food was a new subject of documentary in the 1990s. There was a “must-do” thing in food documentary production. It was scientific verification of the superiority of Korean food through a laboratory experiment. Particularly, scientific demonstration of efficacy of [Korean food]. For example, in order to prove the effectiveness of kimchi, a food documentary tested cancerous mice, and showed how kimchi could suppress the propagation of cancer cells even though the causal relationship was not rigorously examined. There was a strong obsession with scientism...From the Japanese colonial period to the Park Chunghee administration, Korean food was an object of improvement, modernization, and even eradication. [Korean society] had a complex about Korean food. I think that Korean television’s obsession with scientism was an outcome of this complex. It always showed how good Korean food was for one’s health. I had a big fight with documentary producers in the 1990s because they never changed their production practices...[These practices] are still prevalent. The superiority and uniqueness of Korean food. Viewers also like these themes (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014).

This production practice of Korean food documentaries—the obsession with scientism—succinctly shows how Korean food television shapes the “truth” about the Korean nation from a Foucauldian perspective. Refuting a fixed distinction between

ideology and scientific facts, Foucault (1980) stresses the *becoming* nature of truth. He argues that the formation of scientific discourse, which is linked to a contestation over power, governs the issue of truth and falsehood (Foucault, 1980; Hall, 2006). By offering “scientific” knowledge about Korean food, food TV represents ideological discourse about the Korean nation as the verified and thus indisputable “truth.” As quoted above, this production practice, formed in the 1990s, has been a crucial means by which food TV distinguishes true and false statements, and has become a constituent of the general politics of truth, particularly when it comes to Korean food. KBS’s documentary series—*What Have We Eaten?*—exemplifies this production practice:

The first episode “Korean’s Life—Rice” illustrates why Korean people have to eat rice by identifying distinctive biological characteristics of Korean people...The second episode “The Mystery of Microorganism—doenjang (soybean paste)”...explores how a microorganism is activated when a soybean is transformed into doenjang (Yonhap News, 1998, July 1).

As discussed in Chapter 3, the structural change in the Korean television industry and the rise of consumerism led to the growth of food variety shows and food talk shows, which became predominant forms of food TV in the 1990s. Since these programs addressed food as an element of entertainment, they rarely produced scientific knowledge about Korean food. Rather, they attempted to reflect the shift in the food service industry and popular trends in food consumption. Specifically, they emphasized taste and individuality to meet the lifestyle of X-Generation, the main audience of entertainment shows. Echoing the qualitative change in the food service industry, food variety and talk shows introduced various foreign foods, encompassing American, Japanese, Chinese, Italian, German, and French cuisines. For example, KBS’s *Pipi Cooking Room* often featured unfamiliar foods, such as crab gratin and roulade; MBC’s *Choi Hwajeong’s*

*Delicious Story*, which aired after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, addressed how to cook fancy foods (e.g., pasta) in a cost-effective manner; and *Lee Hongryeol's Show* introduced easy-to-make fusion foods, such as rice pancakes and pizza dumplings (K. Lee, 1998, October 10; D. Nam, 1999, April 24).

This increasing exposure of “culinary others” on food TV can be interpreted as Korean television’s racial reconfiguration or its changing discourse on the Korean nation from monoracial to multicultural Korea (J. Ahn, 2013). However, the incorporation of culinary others was not connected to “racial others.” Exotic flavors and “foreignness” were mediated by familiar and “normal” Koreanness. Although domestic kitchen sets, housewives, and royal/local foods were replaced by indoor/outdoor settings, young adults, and foreign foods, the strangeness of culinary others was domesticated by Korean food-specialized cooks or the layperson (S. Kim, 2015). As such, the presence of racial others was highly restricted, and the culinary otherness was portrayed as belonging to cosmopolitan Korea. It is within this context that 1990s food TV frequently featured fusion food. The following news article rightly described this production practice:

The latest episode of *The Best Table* featured various types of ramyeon (instant noodle). By adding bulgogi or imitating Chinese *nurungjijang* (scorched rice soup), it made bulgogi ramyeon and “sounding ramyeon.” By adding a simple idea, it heightened the quality of food. This type of food is called “fusion food” or “sense cook.” Fusion food refers to the combination of Eastern and Western cooking. For example, Chinese dish, *tangsuyuk* (sweet and sour pork) is served with Western sauce; Korean food is seasoned with mayonnaise; and kimchi is added to hamburgers...In Cheongdam Dong, where yuppies often visit, there is a food street called “Fusion Belt,” which specialized in fusion food (D. Nam, 1999, April 24).

As mentioned above, the increasing presence of fusion food was a trend in both food TV and food service industry in the 1990s. For this reason, it can be said that 1990s

food TV merely reflected a shift in the food service industry. Yet, what food TV represented was not just popular food practice, but a dominant perception of how to address the strangeness. According to Simmel (1950), strangeness arises through the unity of nearness and remoteness and the interaction between strangers and non-strangers. In order for his/her exoticness to be recognized, the stranger must be intimate and accessible. However, the stranger's charm and significance are embraced as long as he/she is not an "owner of soil," both in the physical and figurative sense (Simmel, 1950, p. 403). In other words, the stranger should be neither too far nor too close. Therefore, the interaction between strangers and non-strangers is "the suspended inclusion of a familiar foreigner" (Hirose & Pih, 2011, p. 1486). The growing appearance of fusion food on food TV can be understood from this perspective: the strangeness of foreign food was mitigated by the connection to familiar Korean elements; it was included as long as it did not harm Korean "soil"; and familiar strangers, such as Japanese, Chinese, and Western others, were allowed to show their charm.

In sum, the forced globalization processes and the enhanced influx of foreign foods entailed the proliferation of shintoburi discourse in the 1990s. Korean food TV actively promoted this ideological discourse that naturalized the equation between three "mundane and unconsciously waved flags of identity"—the body, food, and the landscape (Palmer, 1998, p. 183). In so doing, it highlighted the superiority and uniqueness of Korean food by representing ideological discourse as scientific truth. Due to the shift in popular trends and the food service industry, food TV increased the exposure of culinary others on the surface, and formed the idea of cosmopolitan Korea. Yet, the range of others was quite constricted, and their strangeness was domesticated by

“Korean” elements so that it would not threaten preexisting imagery of Koreanness. In other words, Korean food TV embraced the foreign through cultural assimilation processes, which Iwabuchi (1998) called “hybridism [emphasis added].”

In the 2000s, Korean society underwent an expansion of the food service industry due to the implementation of the five-day workweek, major conglomerates’ entry into the eating-out business, the hosting of the 17<sup>th</sup> FIFA World Cup, and a series of food scandals. The changes in media landscape, such as the launch of food-devoted cable channels, the import liberalization of Japanese popular culture, and social network services, also contributed to the public’s increasing interests in food and renowned restaurants. Additionally, the large inflow of foreign migrant labors and the growth of international marriages not only increased the number of foreign residents but also diversified the Korean food service industry. Reflecting this shift, Statics Korea’s “National Survey of Business” added “other foreign-style restaurants,” as distinct from “Western” restaurants, to its survey for the first time in 2006.

According to Ji-Hyun Ahn (2013), different racial and ethnic groups living “in” Korea began to appear on Korean television after the mid-2000s. She argues that Korean dramas and entertainment shows have cast racial others in leading and supporting roles since then. Examples include SBS’s *Bride from Hanoi* (2005), *Kkamgeun’s Mother* (2006), *Witch, Yu-Hui* (2007), *Nice to Meet You, In-Law* (2007), KBS’s *Love in Asia* (2005), *Spring Waltz* (2006), *Nineteen Romance* (2006), *A Chat with Beauties* (2006), *I Came to Pick Flowers* (2007), *Miwoona Gouna* (2007), and MBC’s *My Lovely Samsong* (2005) and *Sweet Spy* (2005).

However, Korean food television did not reflect the fact that Korea became a hybrid or multi-ethnic society, which was an irreversible phenomenon in the global era (S. Choe, 2009, November 1). As discussed in Chapter 3, the predominant formats of Korean food television in the 2000s (2000 to 2007) were soft-documentary and infotainment shows, although earlier formats, such as instructional cooking shows, morning shows, food travel shows, and food variety shows did not completely vanish. Through these formats, Korean food television circulated a large amount of information about delicacies, matjib (renowned restaurants), and well-being. Yet, the information was limited to domestic matters and a few cultural others, who were perceived as “significant.”

For example, MBC’s food infotainment show, *Find! Delicious TV*, spent most of its airtime “discovering” various Korean dishes and restaurants. In addition, although the program aimed to introduce “a variety of national cuisines” (as cited in A. Kim, 2014, p. 33), it only focused on “familiar” foreign cuisines. During the first five months after its premiere (November 2001 to March 2002), the program constantly compared Korean dishes to those of Japanese and American origins. Here, it is important to note that Japan and the US were major actors that brought about the rise of Korean ethnic nationalism. Specifically, the history of “comfort women,” who worked as sex slaves for the Japanese Imperial Army, and the emergence of the “Amerasian (a person born to a US military father and an Asian mother)” under the US occupation enhanced patriarchal “pure-blood” nationalism in Korea (J. Ahn, 2013; Shin, Freda, & Yi, 1999).

Table 55

*Menu Composition of MBC's Find! Delicious TV*

Date	"Great Competition of Food (Overseas)"	"Great Competition of Food (Korea)"
11/10/2001	<i>Ramen</i> (Japanese)	Bibimbap
11/17/2001	<i>Sushi</i> (Japanese)	<i>Galbi</i>
11/24/2001	<i>Tonkatsu</i> (Japanese)	<i>Samgyetang</i>
12/1/2001	Korean food in Los Angeles (American)	Foreign food in Korea
12/8/2001	<i>Omurice</i> (Japanese)	<i>Kimchijjige</i>
12/15/2001	Steak (American)	<i>Sundubu</i>
12/22/2001	<i>Soba</i> (Japanese)	<i>Mandu</i>
1/5/2002	Lunch menu in Tokyo (Japanese)	Lunch menu in Seoul
1/12/2002	Hamburger (American)	Tteokbokki
1/19/2002	"Town" food (American)	Food in campus town
1/26/2002	<i>Buchim</i> (Japanese)	<i>Kalguksu</i>
2/2/2002	Hot pot (Japanese)	<i>Jeongol</i>
2/23/2002	Lunch box (Japanese)	<i>Hanjeongsik</i>
3/2/2002	Traditional snack (Japanese)	Cake
3/9/2002	Food at resorts (Filipino)	Vegetarian food
3/16/2002	Japanese best food (Japanese)	Korean best food
3/23/2002	Chicken dish (Japanese)	<i>Samgyeopsal</i>
3/30/2002	<i>Donburi</i> (Japanese)	<i>Haejangguk</i>
Date	"Legend of Kitchen"	"Great Competition of Food"
1/13/2007	<i>Seolleongtang</i> (Korean)	<i>Jjigye</i> (Korean)
1/20/2007	Spicy braised short ribs (Korean)	Handmade dish (Korean and foreign foods in Korea)
1/27/2007	<i>Cheonggukjang</i> (Korean)	Colorful food (Korean)
2/3/2007	<i>Dongtaejjigye</i> (Korean)	Low-priced food (Korean)
2/10/2007	<i>Kimchijjigye</i> (Korean)	Spicy food (Korean and foreign food in Korea)
2/17/2007	Braised pork ribs (Korean)	Food in the eight provinces of Korea (Korean)
2/24/2007	Duck BBQ (Korean)	<i>Jjim</i> (Korean)
3/3/2007	<i>Gamjatang</i> (Korean)	Grilled dish (Korean and foreign food in Korea)
Date	Undecided	"Nangman Sikgaek (House guest with Romance)"
3/10/2007	" <i>Jumong</i> -Casts-Recommended Food" (Korean)	Baby octopus hot pot (Korean)
3/17/2007	"The Price in Old Days" (Korean)	Grilled beef tripe (Korean)
3/24/2007	"Find the Best Time" (Korean and foreign food in Korea)	Braised mackerel with kimchi (Korean)
3/31/2007	"Newscaster-Recommended Spring Food" (Korean and foreign food in Korea)	Steamed king crab (Korean)

Note. Adapted from "Video On-Demand," by MBC, n.d.

It is also noteworthy that Japan and the US let Korean society undergo both self-identification and self-othering processes with respect to its national cuisine. Japanese colonialists coined the term *Jeosun eumsik* (food of the Joseon dynasty) in order to distinguish it from their mainland food; Korean intellectuals “voluntarily” used this expression to propagate Korean identity; and the term was replaced by *hansik* (Korean food/cuisine) for administrative purposes when the modern form of Korean nation-state was established (Y. Joo, 2011). Enacted under the Eisenhower administration, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, also known as PL – 480 or Food for Peace, authorized the shipment of surplus commodities to “friendly” nations. President Kennedy reinvigorated this Food for Peace program in order to “narrow the gap between abundance here [US] and near starvation abroad” (Office of the Historian, n.d.).

This food-focused US foreign assistance had great impacts on Korean dietary culture. As concessional food items, such as wheat and corn, were offered by the US, the Park Chunghee government started the “Honbunsik Jangryeo Undong (Campaign for Mixed Grains and Wheat Flour Food Consumption, henceforth HJU Campaign)” in the 1960s, and as a result, the Korean daily diet became westernized in a significant way (J. Gong, 2008). In addition, as President Johnson stressed the recipient nation’s agricultural reforms and nutritional improvements (Office of the Historian, n.d.), the Korean government carried out a “Diet Improvement Campaign” and coercively regulated everyday food consumptions based on American nutritional science. Thus, the idea that Korean food was inferior to Western food was widely circulated, and it continued until the 1980s (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29).

Food TV during the 2000s partly challenged this hierarchical relationship. As *Find! Delicious TV* exemplified, food TV placed Korean, Japanese, and American food in equal positions. While 1990s food TV faced the enhanced globalization processes in a defensive or evasive manner through *shintoburi* discourse, 2000s food TV paid more attention to the global competence of Korean food through the positive comparison between Japanese and American dishes and their Korean counterparts. For example, the globally well-known Japanese dishes, such as *ramen*, *sushi*, *tonkatsu*, and *donburi*, were paralleled by *bibimbap*, *galbi*, *samgyetang*, and *haejanguk*, respectively. Additionally, when the program featured “best” Japanese and Korean dishes, it highlighted the excellence of Korean food, claiming, for example, that “our” rice cakes were much more beautiful than Japanese traditional confectionary. In a similar vein, when addressing Korean food in Los Angeles, it focused on how Korean food enhanced the national prestige of Korea in the US. Interestingly, the program depicted emigrant populations as *dongpo* (blood-kin compatriots) rather than *gyopo* (Koreans residing in foreign countries), and thus, aroused a sense of fraternal ties and fellow feeling (H. Park, 1996). Put differently, the program showed both the “locality” and “globality” of Korean food in relation to historically significant others.

The representative example of soft-documentary, *VJ Special Forces*, also promoted the global competence of Korean food. Although it did not hesitate to feature long-standing traditions of other cuisines (e.g., “Secret World! Chinese Traditional Food”), its coverage was restricted to a few familiar “strangers,” such as Japan and China. Similarly to *Find! Delicious TV*, it did not involve other culinary or racial strangers. The globality of Korean food was forged by stressing: 1) Koreans’ ability to

assimilate other cuisines and 2) the supremacy of Korean food. For example, when it introduced sushi artisanship (e.g., “Mesmerizing One’s Taste: The World of Sushi in Korea and Japan”), it depicted how perfectly Korean society absorbed the Japanese signature dish, and how competitive the Korean spirit could be in comparison to Japanese *monozukuri* (artisanship). Moreover, when the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) swept East Asian countries in 2003, the program aired “Kimchi Conquers SARS in China,” spreading the untested assumption that kimchi could prevent the contagious disease, which was in line with governmental and journalistic discourse back then. This representational strategy continued in 2007, an example being “[Korean Food] Conquers the Global Taste.”

As discussed earlier, *hyangto eumsik* (local food) was a main ingredient of Korean food TV in the 1980s. It functioned as a strong symbolic reminder of one’s hometown, and aroused a sense of nostalgia in the era of urbanization and globalization. According to food historian and anthropologist Youngha Joo (2011), *hyangto eumsik* does not have a long history, and the local-food identification was an outcome of the government’s efforts to enhance national consciousness and the food service industry’s marketing strategy in the 1980s. Yet, Korean food TV concealed this invented nature of *hyangto eumsik*, and continuously represented it as a form of cultural heritage. Although food TV in the 2000s addressed *hyangto eumsik* in the form of restaurant information or as an object of sensual pleasure, and thus, did not directly associate it with tradition, it subtly reinforced the assumption about *hyangto eumsik*’s rich history by connecting food to the natural conditions and social conventions of the local (e.g., “King Crab in *Yeongdeok*” and “Fermented Skate in *Heuksan* Island”). Likewise, it represented seasonal

food as a reflection of the local's climatic characteristics and the traditional rituals passed down by ancestors ("Winter Delicacy, from Half-Dried Herring/Billfish to Seaweed Fulvescens"). Through these representations, food TV in the 2000s highlighted the diverse, and at the same time, unifying self-image of the Korean nation. As in Featherstone's (1996) observation of the bilateral relationship between the nation and globalization, Korean food TV responded to the increase in culinary and racial others through the emphasis on distinctive "national face" (p. 56).

Table 56

*Food-Related Segments in VJ Special Forces (January 2003 to June 2003)*

Date	Food-related segment
1/10/2003	Winter delicacy, acorn jelly
1/24/2003	Winter delicacy, from half-dried herring/billfish to seaweed fulvescens
1/31/2003	Raw fish town in Pusan
2/7/2003	Korean table d'hote in South <i>Jeolla</i> province
2/14/2003	The story of porridge
2/28/2003	Renowned restaurants near train station & Making <i>jang</i> (Korean soy sauce, soybean paste, and red pepper paste) in rural areas
3/7/2003	King crab in <i>Yeongdeok</i>
3/14/2003	Fermented skate in <i>Heuksan</i> Island
3/21/2003	Mesmerizing one's taste: The world of sushi in Korea and Japan
3/28/2003	Secret world! Chinese traditional food
3/28/2003	Like father, like son! The secret of old restaurants
4/4/2003	Magic hand - The world of <i>suta</i> (hand-pulled noodles)
4/11/2003	Half money and half people - Korean melon commotion in <i>Seongju</i>
5/2/2003	The SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) rush - <i>Gamsugwang</i> ([where] are you going) in <i>Jeju</i>
5/9/2003	Extraordinary, Chinese great dishes coming to Korea
5/16/2003	<i>Sammanri</i> (12,000 km) along with festivals - Traveling to folk market sites throughout Korea
5/23/2003	Don't miss customers over the wall
5/30/2003	From snack to staple food - Bread on dining table
6/6/2003	Here's lunch box! Japanese <i>ekiben</i> (lunch box sold at train station)
6/13/2003	Mission! Transport mackerel alive
6/13/2003	<i>Imonejib</i> (cozy restaurant) in campus town
6/20/2003	Kimchi conquers SARS in China
6/27/2003	Eel hits the whole country in sweltering summer days and in economic depression

Note. Adapted from "VJ Special Forces, Watching Previous Shows," by KBS, n.d.b.

The difference between food TV in the 1980s and the 2000s resides in the fact that the latter provided Korean (traditional) food in the form of a commodity. While disseminating the information about renowned restaurants, food TV in the 2000s portrayed Korean food as something to be consumed rather than an object of preservation and restoration (S. Kim, 2015). Local foods, seasonal foods, and other “traditional” foods, such as bibimbap and galbi, were represented as a constituent of Korean lived culture—*han*, which was assumed to have global universality like its Japanese counterparts *wa* (e.g., *wagyu* [Japanese beef] and *washoku* [Japanese cuisine]). Particularly, by stressing the diversity and the wholesomeness of Korean “commodities,” it encouraged its viewers in “flag-waving” in their everyday lives (Billig, 1995; Foster, 1991) and to imagine the global competitiveness of national culture. This representational practice corresponds to the Korean government’s new approach to Korean tradition, which came to be visualized in the mid-2000s. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism initiated the “Han-Brand” project in 2004 in order to “raise national image” and “create economic value” (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2009, p. 173). Although the relationship between the government’s cultural policy and food TV’s representational practice in the mid-2000s requires a thorough investigation, both show how Korean society became involved in globalization differently from before—shifting from a defensive and reactive manner to one that was more strategic and/or proactive.

In this section, I delineated how Korean food television discursively constructed the Korean nation from the 1980s to 2007. Between the 1980s and the early 1990s, it invented *hyanto eumsik* as tradition, represented royal and modern cuisine as “standard” Korean food that housewives needed to learn to make, and featured “Western” cuisine

(e.g., American and French) in response to globalization. Under the military dictatorship and the state-controlled broadcasting environment, Korean food television reinforced the dominant discourse of the Korean nation—as an ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive community, and highlighted the common ancestry and shared past of Korean people. By focusing on the similarity or the superiority of Korean food to the “foreign,” it also attempted to relieve a fear of putative loss of Koreanness in the era of globalization. Shaped by neoliberal economic conditions, the growth of culinary others in the 1990s (1993 to 1999) entailed the proliferation of shintoburi discourse. This notion of Korea as a territorially-defined biological entity was distributed as the “truth” through Korean food television’s “scientific” verification processes. Although food variety shows and talk shows increased the exposure of culinary others, this change was not connected to the incorporation of racial others in Korean food television. My analysis also shows that the strangeness of cultural others was only accepted as long as it was domesticated and downplayed so as not to threaten Korea’s ownership of its “soil.”

In the 2000s (2000 to 2007), Korean society underwent diversification of the food service industry and a sharp increase in the number of foreign residents. Yet, Korean food television did not reflect these changing material conditions; rather, it reinforced the assumed linkage between nature and culture, and stressed the continuity between the past and the present by revitalizing Korean indigenous food. In comparison to the 1990s, the representation of culinary others was limited to a few historically significant others that let Korean food experience both self-identification and self-othering processes. However, it is important to note that food TV of the 2000s attempted to change the hierarchical relationship between Korea and these others, and shifted from a reactive to a proactive

approach to globalization. These findings show how Korean food television consistently struggled for Koreanness and differently incorporated culinary and/or racial others when facing the accelerated globalization processes. Based on the analysis of concrete media texts, which featured Korean food as a main subject, the next section discusses what discursive knowledge Korean food television produced with respect to the Korean nation after 2008, when the food-media-nation conjuncture began to be rearticulated.

#### The Rediscovery of Koreanness and the Search for the Archetype

Since 2008, the production of food TV has sharply increased in Korea. In Chapter 4, I argued that this explosive growth of food TV was driven by both internal and external factors of the Korean television industry. The post-2008 era also witnessed the Korean government's proactive involvement with Korean food promotion. Based on the neoliberal understanding of globalization, the Korean government utilized national cuisine in order to enhance Korea's soft power and to improve national image and national economy. While promoting its national cuisine, the Korean government made use of domestic television so as to increase the public's attention to Korean food and to justify its policy projects. As discussed in Chapter 5, however, state power was not directly articulated in television production; rather it was mediated by television producer's habitus, professional integrity, audience expectation, organizational culture, and production routines. Yet, my analysis showed that television producers participated in the government's discursive practice through their taken-for-granted production routines, albeit without their full consciousness. Thus, it is important to compare Korean food TV's definition of Korean food with that of the government.

Table 57

*The Korean Government's Legal Definition of Traditional Food*

Food-related laws	Definition of traditional food
Food Industry Promotion Act (enacted in 2008)	The term "traditional food" means food with unique taste, flavor, and color of traditional Korean cuisine, which is produced, processed, and cooked according to the Korean traditional recipes using Korean agricultural and fishery products as main raw materials or ingredients.
Support of Diet Education Act (enacted in 2009)	The term "traditional diet culture" means a lifestyle or behavior pattern related to diet indigenous to the Korean people, which is deemed to have traditional and cultural value worthy of promoting at the national level

*Note.* Adapted from "The Food Industry Promotion Act," by Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2008, March 21; "The Support of Diet Education Act," by Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 2009, November 28.

Interestingly, the Korean government has not developed a clear definition of Korean food even though it has actively promoted Korean food both domestically and globally for the past ten years. Instead, it presumed the existence of "traditional" food, and equated it with *hansik* (see Table 57). For example, enacted in 2008, the Food Industry Promotion Act defines traditional food in a self-referential way: "traditional" food refers to food that embodies unique features of "traditional" Korean cuisine, and that uses Korean "traditional" recipes. Pursuing the inheritance and the development of traditional diet culture, the Support of Diet Education Act also defines "traditional" diet culture as one that has "traditional" value. Through these legal definitions, the Korean government highlights the rich history and the uniqueness of Korean food, and equates "Korean" with "traditional" and "indigenous." This discursive practice can be found in governmental organizations' recent publications on Korean food:

Korea's culinary tradition stretches back as long as Korea itself: some 5,000 years. With a history like that, it should come as no surprise that Korean cuisine has developed an incredibly rich and varied menu reflecting the country's unique geographic, climatic, and cultural conditions (Korea Foundation, 2010).

The tradition of Korean food (hansik) developed over 5,000 years of human habitation in the Korean Peninsula, driven by a large variety of foods available over the four distinct seasons. This tradition embodies the cheerfulness and grace of the Korean people (Korean Food Foundation, 2014).

Television programs—which feature Korean food as a main subject—offer similar definitions of Korean food. In its episodes “Speaking of Korean Food,” EBS’s *Docuprime* represents Korean food as an embodiment of Korean minjok’s historical experience. Although it does not provide a rigid definition of Korean food, it stresses the distinctive flavor principles and preparation methods of Korean food, and relates them to the “unique” characteristics of Korean minjok. When it discusses the future of Korean food, it concludes that the abundance and the superiority of indigenous food products will foster the diversity of Korean food. In a similar vein, Olive’s *Great Competition for Korean Food* emphasizes the inseparable relationships between nature, food, and traditional values. In its opening scene, the program defines Korean food as the following:

Korea’s beautiful four seasons. They are God’s blessing and the root of colorful hansik. Hansik is the art of taste that uses abundant seasonal ingredients and embodies rich *sonmat* (the taste of hand).

Literally, *sonmat* can be translated as the taste of hand into English. However, it refers to mother’s or grandmother’s touch in Korean. By portraying *sonmat* as a crucial constituent of Korean food, the program arouses a feeling that Koreans’ *jeongseo* (sentiment) is inherent in Korean food, and attempts to strengthen the continuity between the present and the past. Similar to *Docuprime*, *Korean’s Dining Table* (KBS) does not clearly define what Korean food is. Yet, while tracing each local’s indigenous agricultural and marine products, the program represents Korean food (culture) as

cultural heritage that connects *cheon* (sky or climate conditions), *ji* (land), and *in* (human being) (Production team of Korean's Dining Table, 2011). Next, I will discuss the detailed discursive properties of each program, and how they create discursive knowledge about the Korean nation.

EBS *Documprime*'s special edition on Korean food, "Speaking of Korean Food," is comprised of three episodes, addressing the past, the present, and the future of Korean food respectively. My interviewee, who produced this special edition, explained its goal as follows:

I wanted to explore such questions as: 1) what is "our" food?; 2) how has it evolved and what is its current form?; and 3) how do we eat now? I hoped viewers would think about Korean food more deeply. I didn't suggest any answers or solutions because our program is not an investigative reporting. I just wanted to describe the phenomena and to share our ideas with viewers (J. Lee, personal communication, January 2, 2015).

As stated above, the program tackles the complexity of Korean food and attempts to disclose its hybridized nature. Rather than hiding the short-lived origins of Korean cuisine, it accounts for the complex histories of trade links, cultural exchange, and colonialism embodied in the evolution of Korean food. For example, the program tries to challenge the assumption that food in the Joseon Dynasty is the prototype of Korean cuisine, and that it was distorted by colonialism, war experience, and westernization. Particularly, in its second episode, which examines the modernization processes of Korean cuisine, the program reveals how Korean "traditional" foods, such as *sinseollo* (royal hot pot) and *gujeolpan* (platter of nine delicacies), were commercialized and/or invented by Japanese colonizers. In addition, the program rejects the fixed definition of Korean food, and stresses the ever-changing nature of food culture. To put it another

way, the program views the evolution of Korean food as an outcome of the negotiation between the local and the foreign, and between the old and the new.

What is foregrounded in the program, however, is not the mixed nature of national cuisine but a fear of loss and a sense of nostalgia. On the surface, the program applies the lens of critical hybridity and problematizes boundary fetishism. It narrates how the current form of Korean food (culture) has developed through interactions with colonialism, industrialization, and globalization. Yet, the primary attention is given to what has vanished. For instance, while suggesting rice, *jang* (sauces), and kimchi as a set of basic Korean foods, which are elements of national cuisine (Belasco, 2008), the program focuses on the uniqueness and the diversity of Korean food (culture), and laments the loss of “traditional” *jang* and local variations of kimchi. Particularly, when the program features the history of *ganjang* (soy sauce), which has been perceived as the “secret of Korean taste” along with *gochujang* (chili paste) and *doenjang* (soybean paste) (Korea Foundation, 2010, p. 16), it asserts that Korean traditional soy sauce has disappeared because of Japan and Korean government-driven modernization procedures, and affirms the necessity to resurrect culinary traditions and practices. At the end of the second episode, it narrates:

The future of Korean traditional food is murky. We have put more efforts to copying others’ things than researching Korean traditional culinary skills. There is not much time left. Before it is too late, we need to restore and develop vanishing Korean food culture.

Although the program stresses the significance of Korean traditions, it does not identify what Korean culinary traditions are; rather, it represents what have been vanishing as traditions. In order to justify its assertion, the program utilizes various discursive strategies, including surveys with young adults and teenagers, interviews with

older people, visits to *jonggajib* (head family house)—who have preserved old culinary practices, uses of visual effects and spectacles, and references to culinary others. For instance, whenever it features cooking scenes, the program inserts images of natural landscape and utilizes symbolic signs, which arouse a feeling of nostalgia, such as *gamasot* (iron pot), grandmother, and *hanok* (Korean traditional house). By deploying these metaphoric signs, the program implants the idea of Korean food as valuable tradition in viewers' minds. Additionally, through pseudo-scientific methods, the program implies its argument as scientifically-proven knowledge. Even though it only involves 5 to 20 participants for its experiment and survey, the program offers the results of its analysis in the form of statistical evidence by utilizing numeric values and diagrams. The validity of its argument is self-confirmed through the use of declarative statements, such as: "Korean young people do not know the taste of traditional soy sauce." The use of *jongga*, which refers to the head family of a major patriarchal blood line, as a spatial background and a visual spectacle further enhances a sense of connectivity to the past. Through the visual emphasis on generational transmission of *sonmat*, the program portrays national cuisine as a unique heritage handed down through blood ties. By featuring the ancestral rites of *jongga*, it also connotes the inseparable relationship between Korean cuisine and Confucian traditions and rituals. Taken together, these strategies serve to legitimize the illusion that something good existed in the past; they also transform foodways into cultural heritage, which "must" be passed down through the generations; and they invoke strong emotions about what may have disappeared.

The emphasis on the imagined loss is further enhanced when the program discusses the future of Korean cuisine. The narrator asserts: “The modern form of Korean cuisine, which was constructed under the colonial administration of imperial Japan, embodies the history of sorrow.” Although it appears to challenge the preexisting discourse on the relationship between Korean cuisine and Japanese colonialism, it reinforces the idea that the archetype of Korean cuisine was damaged by and forgotten through Japanese intervention. However, the program does not just mourn the forced loss of Korean culinary traditions; it strongly calls for the resurrection of what died out. In particular, by showing the reversed hierarchical relationship between Korea and Japan, it highlights the superiority of Korean culinary traditions. For example, through the interviews with Japanese people and Korean restaurant owners, the program states:

During the Japanese colonial period, our *minjok* was despised for eating kimchi and smelling garlic. Our *minjok*'s food was an object of disparagement and mockery...Now, Korean food is widely spread throughout Japanese society. It is deeply rooted in Japan. Korean food, which was derided as savage food, has become a crucial part of the Japanese food service industry.

According to Wright (1985), historical memory provides a ground for making sense of the present. In contrast to this, the program summons the present in order to revisit and reconstruct the past. In other words, the current popularity of Korean food and other Korean cultural artifacts, such as K-pop and K-drama, are appropriated to validate the prestige of “Koreanness,” which is assumed to have existed from the past. Here, it is important to note that the program suggests Koreanness as a “spirit” that is inherent in Korean traditions. As Hobsbawm and Ranger (1984) write, tradition is different from convention in that the former is invariant and ideological while the latter is changeable and technological. Although the program points out the process-like nature of culinary

traditions, what it refers to are “conventions” rather than traditions. In the program, traditions are rather represented as an uncontaminated and impregnable essence constituting Koreanness.

As discussed above, the program does not explicitly specify the origin or the prototype of Korean culinary tradition. However, it implicitly sets the late Joseon Dynasty as the idealized past, in which Korean culinary traditions originate. For instance, the program features *jongga*, which has preserved its own culinary practices from the late Joseon period, as an exemplary model of cultural inheritor; uses cook books published in the late Joseon Dynasty as historical reference; and stresses exploitation and oppression under Japanese imperialism. Put differently, the late Joseon period—the pre-colonial era—is discovered as “monumental history,” in Nietzsche’s terminology, for the present purpose. Through this “discovery,” the program spreads the belief that “the great thing existed and was therefore possible, and so may be possible again,” and brings together things that are incompatible—the past, the present, and the future (Nietzsche, 2009, pp. 102-104). According to food historian and anthropologist, Youngha Joo, this discursive practice is not limited to television production, but functions as general truth about Korean culinary traditions:

When it comes to the archetype of *hansik*, most researchers paid attention to the late Joseon Dynasty. Because the period of Japanese colonialism was regarded as the period of contamination, they noted the pre-colonial era... This tendency was more enhanced around the government’s declaration of the Korean Food Globalization project. Researchers have rarely studied the colonial period; most of them have explored Korean food based on the literature published in the late Joseon Dynasty (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014).

Premiering on January 6, 2011, KBS’s *Korean’s Dining Table* has addressed a variety of Korean agricultural and marine products. With a format of experiential

documentary, it has focused on three dimensions of Korean food—locally-specific indigenous food materials, the lived culture of local residents, and representative examples of local food culture. On its official website, the production team explains core elements of narrative construction as follows: 1) the historical and geographical contexts of particular dishes, 2) the story of those who preserve the archetype of food, and 3) the scientific rationality of local food and food culture (KBS, n.d.c). As discussed in Chapter 4, this program was designed in line with KBS's efforts to produce high-quality documentary in multimedia and multichannel broadcasting environments, which was shaped by the 2009 Broadcasting Act.

In order to distinguish itself from other food-related programs, *Korean's Dining Table* has explored historical, cultural, economic, and political contexts of local foods from the perspective of the humanities. For this reason, the program has received favorable evaluations from media critics and viewers, and its message has been regarded as “valid” information (Park & Baek, 2013). Studying the formats and content of *Korean's Dining Table*, Park and Baek (2013) write that the topic of each episode varies regarding food materials, geographic areas, and timeliness. However, as Table 58 demonstrates, the program has continuously brought together food and geography: examples include winter cod in Geoje (Ep.1), mullet in Ganghwa Island (Ep.16), bamboo shoots in Damyang (Ep. 20), and potato in Gangwon province (Ep. 30). It is also noteworthy that the purpose of the program is to inform viewers of the historical conjuncture of food, geography, and people (KBS, n.d.b). Thus, it is not necessary to distinguish food materials from geographic areas when we categorize the contents of *Korean's Dining Table*. Rather, the special editions, which address food practices of

Korean overseas, should be taken into consideration because they feature a different agent and locality of Korean food.

Table 58

*The Contents of Korean's Dining Table*

Date	Title
1/6/2011 (Ep.1)	Enamored by <i>jeong</i> (affection) and taste, winter cod in Geoje
2/3/2011 (Ep.5)	Special edition for New Year's Day - Deep-rooted taste of Korea, <i>jongga</i> (headhouse)
3/10/2011 (Ep.9)	Taste of fermentation made by longing, table of seaside villages in Seosan
04/07/2011 (Ep.13)	Heartbreaking taste of <i>gohyang</i> (hometown), table of displaced people from Hamgyeong province
05/05/2011 (Ep.16)	Mullet in Ganghwa Island
06/02/2011 (Ep.20)	Taste of vitality-bursting bamboo grove - bamboo shoot dishes in Damyang
07/07/2011 (Ep.25)	Heartwarming hospitality, a banquet in one dish - <i>Samgyetang</i>
08/04/2011 (Ep.30)	The power of Gangwon province, Pyeongchang potato
09/01/2011 (Ep.33)	Wholesome food in Shinan given by angel island
10/06/2011 (Ep.38)	Dining table of <i>pungryu</i> (enjoyment) in Jinju over flowers
11/03/2011 (Ep.42)	Mother's table encountered in Central Asia - Uzbek Korean
12/01/2011 (Ep.46)	Rich meal of <i>namdo</i> (South Jeolla province) melted in <i>arirang</i> melody - Indigenous table in Jindo
1/2/2014 (Ep.153)	Mother and storeroom - winter table in Hangyeryeong
02/06/2014 (Ep.158)	Spring within winter, seaweed table
03/06/2014 (Ep.162)	Do you know <i>bangpung</i> (a medicinal plant of the family Umbelliferae)? - table of spring in Geumo archipelago
04/03/2014 (Ep.166)	Mother's side dish storage - Table of <i>gaetgut</i> (marine products caught on the mud flat) in Taean
05/01/2014 (Ep.168)	Give youth back to me! The power of Gyeongsang province, chives
06/05/2014 (Ep.173)	It's not because I'm afraid of it, but because it's lacking, "sprout of lacquer tree"
07/03/2014 (Ep.177)	In search of the taste of backwoods over ninety-nine mountain bends
08/07/2014 (Ep.181)	Crayfish lives in the valley - Table of Hanu Mountain in Uiryeong
09/04/2014 (Ep.185)	Gourd <i>namul</i> (seasoned vegetables) and mother
10/09/2014 (Ep.188)	Special edition for the National Foundation Day - I will live in Baekdu Mountain
11/06/2014 (Ep.192)	Good day to have chicken
12/04/2014 (Ep.195)	A small giant on dining table - salted shrimp
01/05/2017 (Ep.301)	Legend is coming in the New Year - Smelt fish
2/2/2017 (Ep.305)	The land of Hanra Mountain and <i>oreum</i> (volcanic cone) - Table of <i>malteuri</i> (packhorse driver)
03/02/2017 (Ep.308)	Opening the repository of the East Sea - <i>Wangdolcho</i> (giant underwater rock) in Uljin
04/06/2017 (Ep.312)	What is filled in your spring - the gift of Yokji Island
5/4/2017 (Ep.316)	Special edition for Family Month, the only dish in my life
06/01/2017 (Ep.320)	Beat the heat - Stamina food for summer time
07/13/2017 (Ep.325)	Are you missing islands - <i>Dokdo</i> of the West Sea, <i>Gyeokryeokbiyeoldo</i>
08/03/2017 (Ep.327)	Island in the land - Summer dining table in <i>Muldori</i> village
09/07/2017 (Ep.332)	From Hamyang to Jangsu - Table of <i>Yuksimnyeong</i>
10/05/2017 (Ep.336)	Do the people rich - Dining table in Yeosu
11/02/2017 (Ep.340)	I'm going to Garorim Bay though fall foliage is everywhere
12/07/2017 (Ep.345)	The taste that I don't want to share, how delicious is it - The hidden taste of meat

*Note.* Adapted from "The Introduction of the Program," by KBS, n.d.c.

Given this recognition, I divided the contents of *Korean's Dining Table* into the following three categories: food-geography, timeliness, and overseas. After an initial reading of the first episode of every month, I found that the program repeats similar textual properties, including main theme, narrative structure, argumentation style, visual composition, and rhetorical figure. Based on my initial analysis and my interview with the former chief producer of the program, I selected three episodes—1, 5, and 89—for close-reading, which addressed each content category for the first time.

The major focus of the program is on the food-nature-people identification. While introducing particular food and food culture of each local, the program stresses that locally-specific dishes are inseparable from geographical, climatic, and ecological conditions, and that locally-specific food and food culture are a reflection of unique characteristics of local people. In order to highlight this relationship, the program carefully visualizes the local's landscape and its agricultural and marine products in their own environment. My interviewee—the former chief producer of the program—explained its emphasis on visuality as follows:

No matter what food materials we address, we try to show them in their own nature. When it comes to seaweed, we film it under water...It takes a week to 10 days to film one episode...We spend much of our time capturing the ingredients on camera in their own natural environment. For Korean nature is embodied in [Korean food] (Y. Hwang, personal communication, December 17, 2014).

Through this production routine, the program shows the unique characteristics of each local's natural and cultural conditions. However, it represents them as material and cultural elements that could contribute to the great diversity of national culture.

According to Cwiertka (2006), a diversity of local food practices is downplayed in favor of the construction of national cuisine. Yet, Korean food television and the government

have continuously celebrated local diversity, and have used it to enrich national cuisine and raise national consciousness. *Korean's Dining Table* participates in this discursive practice. Although the program features the food-nature-people identification at the local level on the surface, it extends this identification to the national level by connecting it to minjok. For example, in the first episode, the presenter states, "Because our minjok enjoyed the beauties of life with its own customs, Geoje Island had a unique custom." This statement shows that the program is built on the assumption that local people are part of the Korean danil minjok (unitary nation), and that they share the same cultural practices. In a similar vein, the eighty-ninth episode ends with the presenter's statement: "Our *migak* (palate) has been inscribed on our DNA for generations. I think that Korean's *ipmat* (taste) has the most powerful vitality." Even though this remark does not directly involve the term, danil minjok, it suggests that Koreans are a homogeneous group, whose relationship is constructed through bloodlines.

The idea of danil minjok is further discussed when the program features the lives of overseas Korean immigrants. In the episode, "Hansik Captivates New Yorker's Taste," the program depicts how Korean immigrants have survived in New York City, where "various racial groups and their cultures compete with each other." Through the example of market merchants and farmers, the program implies that Koreans' diligence was the key to their success. This "assumption" is confirmed by authoritative white male Americans: "They make up almost half of the business in market. Over the last 40 years, it's been a story of very successful industry created by the hard-working Korean people." Here, diligence is suggested not as something to obtain, but as part of Koreanness, which is inherent in Korean minjok. By emphasizing the shared experience with ancestors and

by designating diligence as deeply “rooted” in Korean people, the program transforms an explanatory description into a normative prescription.

The emphasis on unique Koreanness is continued to the discussion of its supremacy. The program pays particular attention to Korean food’s nutritional value. The exploration of hansik’s nutritional value underlies much of *Korean’s Dining Table*. While introducing a variety of locally-specific ingredients and recipes, it provides detailed information about hansik’s nutritional benefits through a scientific approach. As noted earlier, Korean food television promulgated the superiority of Korean food in the form of scientific knowledge in order to legitimize shintoburi discourse, which was produced in response to forced globalization in the 1990s. Since then, this discursive practice has continuously been repeated by Korean food television, and *Korean’s Dining Table* is no exception. For example, it explains the process of preparing cod roe jeotgal (fermented food using salted fish or shellfish) as follows:

When cod roe is salted and dried for 15 days, its skin becomes dark and its texture changes. When cod roe is cured in low salt concentration, it produces amino acid and lactic acid, and its protein ferments and breaks down.

This scientific approach serves to prove the wisdom of the ancestors. By referencing cookbooks and medical books published in the late Joseon Dynasty, the program underscores a long history of Korean culinary traditions, and shows how these traditions fit into and precede modern nutritional science. The production team of the program proudly displays this production practice: “Every food has its own science... We aim to provide viewers with accurate information about our food by showing the wisdom of our ancestors, and through the nutritional approach to food materials” (KBS, n.d.c). In order to stress the nutritional benefits of hansik, the program even falsifies facts. For

example, when it features New Yorker's love of Korean food, the program deliberately mistranslates interview contents into Korean:

Interviewee: I think the reason I like it [Korean food] is because it doesn't have a lot of carbs

Translation: I like Korean food because it's very nutritious.

Interviewee: Instead of rice, you can switch to brown rice if you want, but in general it [Korean food] most means vegetables and high proteins. So for me, it makes me feel really good.

Translation: Most of all, I feel like I'm becoming healthier when I eat high-protein Korean food.

As quoted above, the interviewee says that she likes Korean food because it contains fewer carbohydrates and it does not necessarily include rice. However, there is no mention of carbohydrates or rice in the translation; "it doesn't have a lot of carbs" is replaced by "it's very nutritious." This intentional mistranslation occurs because the program has consistently reinforced the notion of rice as a staple food of Korean cuisine. Indeed, the first image, which pops up in its opening scene, is that of rice. Likewise, the program highlights the nutritional value of Korean cuisine by replacing "feel really good" with "become healthier."

The belief in the superiority of Korean food—whether it comes from ancestral wisdom or scientific "fact"—provides a basis for the claim about Korean food's versatility and global competence. Although this claim is limited to the special episodes that feature overseas Korean immigrants and/or overseas Korean food, and thus, does not cut across all episodes, it is worth noting that "the 'locality' of national culture is neither unified nor unitary in relation to itself" (Bhabha, 1990, p. 4). As its title implies, the special episode "Hansik Captivates New Yorker's Taste" visualizes how Korean food has expanded into a wide range of New York's food scenes from food truck to high-end restaurant, and how it has satisfied the palates of diverse racial groups. In so doing, the

program implies that Korean food has not just reached a global standard, but has surpassed it. For example, it represents Korean food as an oasis in the heart of New York City, which is represented as a fast-food-dominated nutritional desert. While discussing the virtue of the farmers' market in New York City, it attributes the origin of New York City's organic farming to Korean agricultural immigrants, stating that: "In fact, those who started organic farming in New York were Korean agricultural settlers."

Here, what is foregrounded is not a food itself, but an authentic Koreanness. Through the interviews with foreign customers and Korean restaurant owners, the program portrays invariant Koreanness as key to Korean food's global competence and versatility. In particular, it reproduces the idea that "the most Korean thing is the most global one," which emerged in the mid-1990s along with *shintoburi* discourse. While interviewing a successful Korean restaurant owner, the program narrator comments, "The *truth* [emphasis added] that the most Korean thing is the most global one is applicable to food matters." This narration is followed by an interviewee stating, "The most important thing is to show my identity as it is rather than modify it." In other words, the program suggests that what must be preserved is not the authentic taste of Korean food but an abstract mind of Koreanness, and that this Koreanness will make it possible for the "locality" of Korean food to cross terrestrial borders.

The emphasis on Koreanness is further enhanced when the program addresses seasonal foods and ancestral rites. Similar to *Docuprime, Korean's Dining Table* stresses a loss of assumed cultural prototype. Superficially, the program depicts vanishing season-specific food practices. However, by connecting these food practices to cultural rituals shared by ancestors, specifically in the late Joseon Dynasty, it makes a semantic

transition from food to *jeongseong* (true heart) and *maeum* (mind), which are assumed to be embodied in those rituals. In other words, what is celebrated and missed on the program is not just a diversity of Korean food, but Korean lived culture, in Raymond Williams's terminology, that must be preserved from generation to generation. In order to arouse a feeling of nostalgia, visual spectacles, such as the gamasot (iron pot), *jangjakbul* (wood fire), *jangdok* (crocks), *jeolgu* (mortar) and *maetdol* (millstone), are constantly filmed; and sonmat, which metaphorically signifies the true heart and mind, is described as a linkage that connects the past, the present, and the future. At times, the program shows diverse culinary and cultural conventions, which vary according to each family. Yet, the diversity is represented as a different materialization of a homogeneous Koreanness. As the fifth episode exemplifies, what the program values are the cultural and spiritual roots of Korean cuisine.

Produced by food-devoted cable channel, Olive, *Great Competition for Korean Food* does not attempt to deliver “scientific” knowledge about Korean cuisine. As a competitive cooking reality show, its primary focus is on the competition between participants. However, through its selective format and composition, the program produces particular discourses about Korean food in a nuanced way. Specifically, based on its main program components—competitors, judges, and events, it promotes such discursive themes as: 1) the diversity of Korean food, 2) the loss of culinary archetype, 3) the nature-food-people identification, and 4) the embodiment of Koreanness in Korean food. Overall, the program selects competitors according to the geographical division of South Korea,<sup>52</sup> and highlights the different ingredients, dishes, and culinary traditions of

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<sup>52</sup> In Season 1, participants are selected from eight provinces within South Korea. In Season 2 to 4, North Korea is featured as one province of Korea as a whole.

each province. The competition is carried out by following a two-event cycle that takes place within one episode. The events typically include a special match, in which competitors cook a given dish using locally-specific agro-fishery products, and a death match (elimination round), which does not necessarily require local food materials.

*Great Competition for Korean Food* does not go through nationwide auditions; competitors are selected by the production team in the pre-production stage. My interviewees, who produced Season 2 and Season 3 respectively, accounted for their selection of the cast as follows:

Sometimes, we receive a recommendation from a government office and municipal office as well as from masters of *hyangto eumsik* (local foods). Mostly, we select participants after visiting their restaurants, tasting their foods, and meeting them in person (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016).

The purpose of *Great Competition for Korean Food* was to remind viewers of vanishing Korean foods. That's why we frequently feature forgotten foods...Indeed, we notify the participants of [this purpose], and we actually search for those who can [cook these dishes] (G. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

As quoted above, the production team strategically selects those who can meet the implicit purpose of the program—the restoration of forgotten Korean foods. As Table 59 demonstrates, the range of participants is quite similar throughout all three seasons. It encompasses specialists in royal cuisine, masters of *hyangto eumsik*, restaurant owners who can cook vanishing local foods, and members of *jongga* (head family). This selective casting shows how the program approaches Korean food. Although its producers personally define Korean food as “what *ordinary* [emphasis added] Korean people have eaten” (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016), the program puts priority on royal, *banga* (the food of *yangban* [the scholar elites in the Joseon era]), and local

cuisines, which are assumed to have vanished. Like *Docuprime* and *Korean's Dining Table*, this program positions culinary traditions of high class in the late Joseon Dynasty as the archetype of Korean food, and seeks to remind its viewers of the superiority and diversity of Korean food, and in turn, the necessity to resurrect what has been forgotten. As discussed earlier, local diversity is not contradictory to the long-standing notion of *danil minjok* (unitary nation) because the “locality” of each local, defined based on geographical or administrative division, does not refer to racial or ethnic differences. Rather, it serves to enrich the culture of Korean *minjok*, which is represented as a biologically and culturally homogeneous racial/ethnic group.

The analysis of missions that are assigned to each episode can also reveal what foods the program represents as major constituents of Korean cuisine. According to my interviewees, the production team of *Great Competition for Korean Food* informs its participants of each week's mission before filming in a studio (G. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). Even though the program takes the format of a “reality” show, its participants are asked to find their own key ingredients and rehearse cooking demonstrations beforehand (J. Ha, personal communication, December 16, 2014). In addition, the production team carefully tailors the competitors' recipes and ingredients in order to locate them within “the internally-defined boundary of Korean cuisine,” and eventually to meet the above-mentioned purpose of the program—the resurrection of forgotten Korean foods (G. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016). In other words, each week's mission is a reflection of the negotiation processes between producers and competitors with regard to Korean cuisine.

Table 59

*The List of Competitors in Season 1 to 3*

Season	Province	Features
Season 1	Seoul	Specialists in royal cuisine
	Gyeonggi	Owners of farm-to-table restaurant
	Gangwon	Specialists in hyangto eumsik (local foods)
	North Chungcheong	Master craftsman cooks
	South Chungcheong	Owners of renowned restaurant
	North Jeolla	Owners of renowned restaurant
	South Jeolla	Successors of namdo eumsik (South Jeolla province dishes)
	North Gyeongsang	Masters of steamed carp
	South Gyeongsang	Members of the head family
	Jeju	Masters of perch dishes
Season 2	Seoul	Masters of hanjeongsik (Korean table d'hote)
	Gangwon	Female divers
	North Chungcheong	Cooks using 100-year ancient cook books
	South Chungcheong	Cooks of hyangto matjib (local renowned restaurants)
	North Jeolla	Specialists in Jeonju dishes
	South Jeolla	Masters of tteokgalbi (grilled short rib patties)
	North Gyeongsang	Members of jongga (the head family)
	South Geyongsang	Award winners of world cooking competition
	Jeju	Specialists in Jeju pork
	North Korea	Legendary chefs
Season 3	Seoul	Master craftsman cooks
	Gangwon	Specialists in hyangto eumsik (local foods)
	North Chungcheong	Specialists in hyangto eumsik (local foods)
	South Chungcheong	Award winners of world cooking competition
	North Jeolla	Owners of renowned restaurant
	South Jeolla	Specialists in namdo eumsik (South Jeolla province dishes)
	North Gyeongsang	Members of the head family
	South Gyeongsang	Owners of renowned restaurant
	North Korea	Masters of North Korean foods
	Jeju	Specialists in Jeju hyangto eumsik (local foods)

Table 60

*The Mission of Each Episode from Season 1 to Season 3*

Season	Episode	Mission
Season1	Ep.1	Make a best dish using local products presented to the King
	Ep.2	Cook a best spicy dish using local products, which embodies local characteristics
	Ep.3	Make a bibimbap using local products, which embodies local characteristics
	Ep.4	Make a best chicken dish using local products, which embodies local characteristics
	Ep.5	Make a best <i>tteok</i> (rice cake) using local products, which embodies local characteristics
	Ep.6	Make a best local dish, which matches with Korean unique alcohol, makgeolli (unrefined rice wine)
	Ep.7	Make a best local pork dish
	Ep.8	Make a best local egg/roe dish
	Ep.9	Make a best local <i>jeongol</i> (hot pots)
	Ep.10	Make a best local <i>ocheop bansang</i> (a table setting composed of 5 dishes)
Season2	Ep.1	Feast food
	Ep.2	Grilled dish
	Ep.3	Beef dish
	Ep.4	Korean desert
	Ep.5	Live fish
	Ep.6	Stamina food
	Ep.7	Best local food (consolation match)
	Ep.8	<i>Bangaeng</i> (rice and soup)
	Ep.9	Kimchi
	Ep.10	Noodles (quarterfinal)
	Ep.11	<i>Ocheop bansang</i> (a table setting composed of 5 dishes) (semifinal)
	Ep.12	Korean's 3 meals (final)
Season3	Ep.1	Best flavor in the world
	Ep.2	Traditional jang (sauces)
	Ep.3	<i>Mandu</i> (dumpling)
	Ep.4	<i>Juansang</i> (a table with alcohol and side dishes)
	Ep.5	Special dish for summer
	Ep.6	<i>Dagwasang</i> (a desert table with tea)
	Ep.7	Best local food (consolation match)
	Ep.8	<i>Bokdarim</i> (stamina food for summer time)
	Ep.9	<i>Bapdoduk</i> (side dishes, stews, and soups that go perfectly with rice)
	Ep.10	Broth (quarterfinal)
	Ep.11	<i>Sanhaejinmi</i> (all sorts of delicacies) (semifinal)
	Ep.12	Traditional table setting (final)

As Table 60 shows, Season 1 brings local agro-fishery products to the forefront, and stresses the food-nature-people identification. Particularly, it represents local products as an embodiment of local characteristics (e.g., “Make a bibimbap, using local products, which embodies local characteristics”). As an entertainment show, the program exaggerates the conflicts between competitors, who come from different geographical provinces, and overemphasizes the uniqueness of each local’s food materials and culinary traditions. For example, when the competitors introduce their key ingredients, the surprised expressions of other competitors and judges are captured through close-up or extreme close-up shots. While evaluating competitors’ cooking skills and their dishes, judges often take for granted the relationship between local foods, local people, and *jiyeoksak* (locally-specific characteristic or odor). In the first episode of Season 1, judges say, “Seoul food has been cooked in this way by nature,” “You did great in trimming beef meat as a Seoul person,” and “This shows *seoulsak* (Seoul’s characteristic) and *jejusak* (Jeju’s characteristic) as they are.”

However, the program uses local differences to promote the diversity of national cuisine just as *Korean’s Dining Table* does. As narrated in the opening scenes (Season 1 and Season 2), *hansik* is portrayed as the art of taste that can encapsulate various local ingredients or a large vessel that can contain Korea’s eight provinces. In other words, different local ingredients and cooking skills are called for to make Korean cuisine appear varied and versatile. Seasons 2 and 3 pay more attention to inventing the prototype of Korean cuisine. As listed in Table 60, the missions in Season 2 and Season 3 include particular table settings, such as *bansang* ( a table of rice, soup, and side dishes), *bangaeng* (rice and soup), *juansang* (a table with alcohol and side dishes), and

*dagwasang* (a desert table with tea), which were developed in the late Joseon period. In the last episode of Season 3, competitors are even asked to prepare three “traditional” table settings, including *juksang* (a table for early morning meals with porridge), *myeonsang* (a table with noodles), and *gyojasang* (a big table prepared to serve many guests for family celebrations), although these terms are not commonly used in contemporary Korea. Through these missions, the program reinforces the connectivity between the past and the present, and highlights the rich history of Korean cuisine.

Within the program, judges function as producers and distributors of symbolic capital as they evaluate competitors’ cooking skills and dishes. For viewers, they are seen as owners of knowledge because of their authority credited by the television industry. Selected based on their public awareness, expertise, and showmanship (J. Lee, personal communication, June 7, 2016), judges of *Great Competition for Korean Food* pay great attention to *johwa* (balance) among other criteria throughout all three seasons. Especially, they are concerned with the balance in ingredients, cooking methods, nutrients, and colors. In the last episode of Season 1, one of the judges, who plays a leading role in the program because of her authority in Korean cuisine, states: “We will see the balance of food colors, cooking methods, and nutrients. Particularly, we will see if obangsaek (five cardinal colors) are properly demonstrated.” This emphasis on balance is in line with governmental organizations’ approach to Korean food. For example, in its book *Traditional Food: A Taste of Korean Life*, the Koreaa Foundation describes balance as the unique characteristic of Korean food as follows:

The traditional Korean diet consists of balanced, nutritious meals that are made through a variety of cooking methods and techniques developed over generations of experimentation. The main dish of rice, with its accompanying side dishes, provides all the necessary nutrition and taste to

keep Korean people healthy... The basic dish is created from a wide variety of ingredients, which combine to form a nutritious, tasty meal. One rule for each meal is that the method of preparation (for example, grilling, frying, or steaming) is not to be repeated, nor are the same ingredients to be used twice. Therefore, the traditional Korean cook has to be very inventive (Korea Foundation, 2010, p. 12).

As referenced above, the idea of hansik as the balanced meal is used to speak of the inventive, nutritious, and diverse nature of Korean food. The mission of each season's last episode is designed to tell the virtue of Korean food as the balanced meal. Examples include ocheop bansang (a table setting composed five dishes) in Season 1, Korean's 3 meals in Season 2, and three traditional table settings in Season 3. This representational practice shows that the program seeks to find the core of Korean food in culinary practices of particular classes—royal family and yangban (the scholar elites or noble family)—given that ordinary people in the Joseon era did not have enough food sources to materialize johwa in their everyday food practices (Y. Joo, 2011).

Moreover, the emphasis on the balanced color composition reinforces the notion that Koreanness is inherent in Korean food by nature. As discussed in Chapter 1, the bibimbap commercial, which was advertised at Times Square in New York City in 2010, materialized the color scheme of obangsaek by adding irrelevant ingredients to bibimbap preparation. Likewise, *Great Competition for Korean Food* attempts to demonstrate the five colors—white, black, yellow, blue, and red—that symbolize Yin-Yang and the Five Element theory. For example, all dishes presented in the first episode of Season 1, feature the five colors regardless of cooking methods or ingredients, and this representational practice continued throughout all three seasons (see Figure 20). It is important to keep in mind that this representational practice was an outcome of the negotiation processes between program producers, judges, and competitors. Thus, the use of five colors shows

what meanings were preferred and deliberately inscribed by both material and symbolic producers of the program—namely, the embodiment of Korean philosophy or spirit in Korean food.



Figure 20. The Visualization of Obangsaek in Great Competition for Korean Food

Overall, my analysis shows that television programs, which featured Korean food as a main subject, produced similar knowledge about Korean cuisine and the Korean nation across different genres. They represented Korean food as a cultural heritage that was passed down by blood-given ancestors, and that should be preserved for generations. Not surprisingly, the major focus was given to the uniqueness, diversity, and superiority of Korean food, which in turn accounted for its versatility and global competitiveness. Although local differences were discussed to varying degrees, they were commonly represented as a different materialization of a homogeneous Koreanness, and as part of national resources, which would enrich national (culinary) culture. Another common discursive theme was the emphasis on a fear of loss. Specifically, the pre-colonial era—

the late Joseon Dynasty—was depicted as the idealized past, and thus, culinary and cultural traditions in this period were suggested as the archetype or the prototype of Korean (food) culture. Yet, not all cultural practices in the late Joseon era were called for to constitute the repertoire of national culture; only those of high class—royal family and noble family—were discussed as what had vanished and what needed to be resurrected. In so doing, these programs reinforce the notion of *danil minjok* (unitary nation), whose relationship is constructed through blood lines. By stressing the invariant Koreanness and the connectivity between the past and the present, they also represent the Korean nation as a biologically and culturally homogeneous racial/ethnic group, and an experientially constructed inter-subjective entity.

Interestingly, there is a homological relationship between the government discourse on Korean food and Korean food television's. As discussed in Chapter 5 (see Table 44), the Korean government has put great efforts to discover and preserve the archetype of Korean food, and to designate it as a national and global cultural heritage. As an outcome of these efforts, kimchi was designated as the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO in 2013; Jeonju City, as the Creative Cities Network of Gastronomy in 2010 (S. Lee, 2016). My interviewee explained his work experience with the government on the *hansik* archetype project as the following:

After the government launched the Korean Food Globalization project, I was invited to participate in its *hansik* archetype project. They told me to review the literature published in the late Joseon era. I received a three-year research funding...Because I was against the idea that the late Joseon is the archetype, I strongly asked them to include the Japanese colonial period. However, [it was not embraced]...Discourses on health and history, they best appeal to the public (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014).

As he acknowledged, the Korean government intentionally ignored the influence of Japanese colonialism on Korean cuisine, and located the archetype of Korean food in the late Joseon era. In order to reaffirm its preexisting assumption, it funded academic research and rejected contradictory findings. This discursive theme is to be found in all three programs that I analyzed. Although *Docuprime* addressed the complexity of Korean cuisine to a certain degree, it mourned for the contamination of Korean cuisine under the Japanese colonialism, representing it as “the history of sorrow.” Other programs also found the *hansik*’s archetype in the late Joseon Dynasty, and aroused a feeling of nostalgia, which would become a strong way of preserving identities (Belasco, 2008), through the emphasis on the loss of the archetype. Other discursive themes, such as the food-nature-people identification, the superiority and diversity of Korean food, and the embodiment of Koreanness in Korean food, are also shared by the Korean government and food television. Government organizations’ recent publications below show the intimate relationship between them:

The natural conditions of the land...provided Koreans with a large variety of ingredients. People could also harvest seasonal wild herbs and plants from the mountains and hills. Hence, Korea’s culinary tradition evolved around the seasons...Korea’s indigenous regional cuisines reflect the geographical and climatic characteristics of that region. Made from cooking methods which are exclusive to that region and inherited from ancient times, regional cuisines are an intangible cultural heritage of immense value. Seasonal customs, rites of passage, and regional foods that reflect local customs all account for the great diversity and variety of *hansik*...The utensils also represent the balance of *yin and yang* [emphasis added]: the round spoon symbolizes yin and the chopsticks yang (Korean Food Foundation, 2014, pp. 11-12).

Korean cuisine is drawing major interest as a healthy cuisine with nutritional *harmony* and *balance* [emphasis added]. In fact, Koreans have traditionally viewed food as “medicine,” a means to keep oneself healthy and strong... (Korea Foundation, 2010, p. 7).

Thus, it is important to discuss how this symbiotic relationship between government discourse and media discourse has been formed. As noted, the Korean television industry has gained relative autonomy from state power since the political democratization in the late 1980s. In addition, while promoting Korean food both domestically and globally, the Korean government took a light-handed approach to television production. Particularly, my analysis showed that television producers actively negotiated state's intervention—whether it being direct or indirect—with their habitus, professional integrity, institutional routines, and assumptions about the audience. However, it was also found that television producers were involved with the government's discursive practice through their “voluntary” participation in the government's “selective” funding processes, and their taken-for-granted production routines. Based on my interviews with television producers, I argued that they partly modified their production practices as long as they would not betray audience expectations. Here, we need to pay attention to what audience expectations mean for television producers. As my interviewees commonly claimed, television producers put priority on their viewers' expectations, and attempted to incorporate their assumptions about their audiences into the program production. These assumptions are not just concerned with details of the program production; rather, they are more related to the ways, in which television producers perceive, frame, and visualize the subject—Korean food—in their programs. The following quotes show how audience expectations operate in television production:

While I was producing the program, I found how imagery [of Korean food] was *manufactured by mass communication* [emphasis added]. On television, we can see the scenes, in which rice is beautifully cooked in gamasot (iron pot) in rural areas...I wanted to capture this kind of scene

on camera, but it was really hard to find people who cooked rice in gamasot. They did so only when they were filmed on television camera...In most cases, I had to go visit particular places and ask them to perform it...We have some images about the archetype of Korean food in our mind. However, it is completely different from our reality...It is just our imagination that gamasot is better than electric rice cooker. However, I cannot help reproduce this imagery and the gap between televisual images and realities. I faced this dilemma...From viewers' perspective, there should be an image [about the archetype of hansik]. But, there is no such thing in reality...When we visited jongsajib (the head family house), they cooked rice in electric rice cooker. It doesn't fit into [viewers' expectation]...We cannot say that there is no one who cook rice in gamasot. However, *what is obvious is that it is a concept or an image that is favored by the television industry and audiences* [emphasis added] (J. Lee, personal communication, January 2, 2015).

We need a particular format to make television programs. For example, we divided [Korea] into eight provinces. In fact, food in South Chungcheong province is very similar to that in North Jeolla province due to their geographical proximity. When I produced *Great Competition for Korean Food, Season 2*, I met a variety of experts. Some of them told me that we had to divide according to mountain range and coastline. Indeed, foods near west coastline are quite similar. We [producers] should have this knowledge. However, it's hard to explain it to viewers. That's why we divide teams through eight provinces...Otherwise, it's hard for viewers to have a clear understanding. *It fits into what viewers expect* [emphasis added] (K. Ok, personal communication, June 1, 2016).

As highlighted above, television producers are aware of the gap between televisual images and realities, and of other possible ways to represent Korean food or the Korean nation. Yet, when they face a dilemma, they tend to make a choice, which can fit into the images and assumptions already made in audiences' mind. As Foucault (1980) argues, a discourse, as a particular way of speaking and thinking about a subject, produces certain knowledge about the subject. According to him, when the knowledge has real effects on social perceptions and practices surrounding the subject, it becomes and functions as the truth. He continues to claim that the truth status of knowledge is determined by the struggle between competing discourses. Television producers serve to

reproduce *the* discourse, which already functions as “true,” rather than provide counter discourses. Of course, they are involved with *the* discourse to varying degrees depending on their organizational culture, professional integrity, and individual habitus. Also, they do not aim to disseminate an illusion or a false consciousness through deliberate distortion of realities. However, their production routines and institutional ideologies, which prioritize audience expectations, make them reproduce what has already been reproduced because it would make sense to viewers more efficiently and easily. In other words, both television production and audiences’ expectations are situated within a regime of representation, which governs representational practices and rules (Hall, 1997b), or a regime of truth, in Foucault’s terminology (1980), which organizes the truth status of a discourse. The following quotes demonstrate the regulatory force of this regime:

In general, Korean society loves the expression, “archetype.” I believe that the government is still working on the hansik archetype project. I was told that the term is powerful enough to persuade members of the National Assembly [to approve the project] with no further information. I told other scholars or public officials not to use this term, because there is no such thing as archetype in culture. They understood what I was saying, but they said that they needed to use it because it was the easiest way to persuade other people (Y. Joo, personal communication, December 29, 2014).

I did a lot of interviews with the press, and talked a lot about the Korean Food Globalization project on television camera...How dare does the government define culture? Like music and literature, food is culture. So, I have insisted that state should never define hansik. However, this statement has always been removed from my interview. Why? For most people are in favor of the project...and thus, my statement would make viewers unpleasant. That’s what I heard [from television producers] (G. Hwang, personal communication, May 27, 2016).

These quotes show that the regime of representation/truth about hansik is not contained to a limited sphere of Korean society. Its power cuts across various actors of

discourse production, such as the government, media, academia, and the public. The homological relationship between government discourse and television discourse on Korean food is an outcome of this regulatory force of the regime of representation/truth rather than of the government's compelling power. As Hall (1997b) and Foucault (1980) write, this regime is not fixed, but changing through the interaction with political and economic contexts. However, each society has its own regime at a given historical moment. This regime epitomizes a prevailing model of social life, and celebrates one particular economic and social formation. My analysis shows that Korean food television also (re)produces a predominant model of the Korean nation through its peculiar definition of the relationship between the modern and the old, the urban and the rural, the local and the nation, and the nation and the global.

### Conclusion

Food television does not just deliver menus and recipes to its audiences. It ascribes ideological meanings to food and food-related practices. In this chapter, I delineated how Korean food television has produced particular knowledge about Korean cuisine and the Korean nation since the 1980s. Specifically, this chapter examined how Korean ethnic nationalism, which was built on the notion of *danil minjok*, was reproduced or challenged by Korean food television. In the 1980s, when the military dictatorship controlled the broadcasting industry (1980 to 1987), Korean food television served to justify the government's modernization project and to promote the government-driven cultural project, *Gukpung 81* (National Conventions 81). Though its emphasis on *hyangto eumsik* (local foods), Korean food television fulfilled people's desire to return home and promulgated the idea of the nation as an extension of one's hometown. While

featuring royal cuisine and modern cuisine as its main menus, it also stressed the common ancestry and the shared past among Korean people, and focused on “what we’d like to be” more than “what we actually are.” In the face of globalization, it affirmed the symbiotic relationship between “Korean” and “Western,” and promoted the superiority of Korean food in order to relieve a fear of cultural others and of putative loss of Koreanness.

In the early 1990s, Korean society underwent the more accelerated processes of globalization. As the 8<sup>th</sup> Multilateral Trade Negotiations—the Uruguay Round—made the Korean domestic agricultural industry belong to global economy system, shintoburi discourse (body and land are inseparable) proliferated across Korean society. Korean food television actively participated in this ideological discourse, which equated the body, food, and the landscape. Specifically, it represented shintoburi discourse as a form of scientific truth so as to legitimize the superiority of Korean food. In so doing, it portrayed both territory and blood ties as ethnic cores of the Korean nation, and reinforced the arbitrary relationship between state and nation. Due to the shift in popular trends and the food service industry, the 1990s food TV (1993 to 1999) increased the exposure of culinary others on the surface. However, my analysis showed that the appearance of culinary others was not connected to that of racial others, and that their strangeness was embraced as long as it would not threaten Korean cultural “soil.”

Korean society witnessed diversification of the food service industry and a sharp increase in the number of foreign residents in the 2000s (2000 to 2007). Yet, Korean food television did not reflect the fact that Korean became a multi-ethnic society. By revitalizing Korean indigenous food, it rather reinforced the assumed linkage between

nature and national culture, and retold the continuity between the past and the present. In other words, it responded to the growth of cultural others through the emphasis on distinctive national face. Interestingly, food TV of the 2000s challenged the hierarchical relationship between Korea and historically significant cultural others—Japan and the US, and began to depict Korean traditions as globally-competitive commodities. Put differently, Korean food television shifted from a reactive to a proactive approach to globalization.

Food TV in the post-2008 period was not much different from previous ones. My analysis of three representative examples demonstrates that similar discursive themes have revolved around Korean food. It still celebrated the superiority, diversity, and uniqueness of Korean food, and strengthened the food-nature-people identification at the national level. The stress on a fear of loss and the pursuit of the archetype were commonly found across different genres, and the notion of *danil minjok* was constantly reproduced. Taken together, these findings show how Korean food television has struggled for Koreanness and variously incorporated culinary and/or racial others when facing the accelerated globalization processes.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

By reading food television as a cultural text, through which the nation is narrated and envisioned, this dissertation examined the evolution of Korean food television and its articulation of Koreanness in contemporary globalization. Theoretically, I suggested understanding the nation as a discourse or a regime of truth from the Foucauldian perspective. In order to bring Foucault's relativistic notion of truth into play, this dissertation employed Fairclough's three-dimensional approach for critical discourse analysis (CDA). Through this approach, it aimed to conduct a thick description of Korean food television's discursive practice with regard to national cuisine and the Korean nation.

Overall, I argued that Korean food television has constantly struggled for Koreanness through its interaction with political, economic, and cultural contexts over the past four decades. Although it has changed its detailed discursive properties depending on historical circumstances, my analysis shows that Korean food television has rarely challenged the notion of the Korean nation as an ethnically homogenous and racially distinctive collectivity. Since the 1980s, Korean society has undergone accelerated globalization processes. In the 1980s, globalization became close to the surface of everyday life due to two consecutive international sport events—the 1986 Seoul Asian Game and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The Trade Liberalization of Foreign Processed Food in 1987 and the Liberalization of Overseas Trip in 1989 also increased opportunities to encounter cultural/culinary others. The global force of market opening,

which pushed the Korean domestic agricultural industry into the global economy system, compelled the Korean government to declare *seggyehwa* (globalization) as a national project in the mid-1990s. During the same period, Korea also witnessed a large influx of labor forces from northeast China, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian countries. The inflow of foreign migrant labors was more accelerated after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which made Korea experience neoliberal capitalism and look for a cheap labor force from near Asian countries. Along with the rapid increase of migrant workers, the growth of international marriage also affected the ethno landscape of Korean society throughout the 2000s.

However, Korean food television has not reflected these changing material conditions. Although it has steadily increased the exposure of culinary others, the presence of racial/ethnic others has been lacking on Korean food television. In addition, it has downplayed the strangeness of culinary and racial others so as not to threaten Korea's ownership of its terroir and "pure" blood. To put it another way, only the signifier of cultural others has been appropriated to preserve Koreanness, and at the same time, to create the illusion of multicultural Korea. Korean food television has rather responded to these material shifts through the emphasis on assumed primordial qualities of the Korean nation, such as blood ties, landscapes, memories, and rituals (Featherstone, 1996; Smith, 1991). This discursive practice of Korean food television demonstrates that television production is "the articulation of language on relations and conditions" rather than "the transparent representation of the real" (Hall, 1980, pp. 94-95).

The pursuit of Koreanness has been at the center of Korean food television's discursive practices. Yet, as detailed in Chapter 6, the ways in which Korean food

television represents the Korean nation and faces globalization have varied according to social contexts since its birth. For example, while it addressed globalization and the growing international connection in a defensive and evasive manner from the 1980s to the 1990s, it began to take a proactive approach from the 2000s, highlighting the global competitiveness of Korean cuisine. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I explicated the complexity of these social contexts by dividing the history of Korean food television into four periods: 1) the era of instructional cooking shows (1980s-1993), 2) the era of genre hybridization (1993-2000), 3) the era of soft-documentary and infotainment shows (2000-2007), and 4) the era of food TV explosion (2008 to the present). This periodization was developed given the significance of both the television industry and the food industry for the investigation of the food-media-nation nexus. My findings show that the development and the transformation of television genre are not a product of the television industry's internal structural changes, but an outcome of the "articulation" of industry, audience, and various socio-historical contexts. Among others, I argued that the formats and contents of Korean food television were interlocked with such factors as: political change, government policy, broadcasting laws, broadcasting/communication technologies, international relations, inter-regional relations, global/domestic economic conditions, urbanization, consumerism, tourism, household structure, gourmet culture, and cultural legitimacy of food.

Chapter 3 explored the above-mentioned contexts through the historical analysis of secondary resources, including but not limited to broadcasting white papers, academic works, trade journals, news articles, and industrial statistics. In Chapter 4, I investigated the multilayered social conditions of food TV's explosion in the post-2008 era based on

both historical analysis and institutional analysis. By incorporating insider perspectives into my analysis, I attempted to offer a more accurate explanation of the social contexts rather than an “exhaustive” description. Taken together, these two chapters demonstrate that social contexts are differently articulated in television production at various historical moments. Particularly, my observation of “inconsistency” in the relationship between the broadcast advertising market and television production supports the claim that articulation is the form of linkage that is not necessary, determined, and absolute for all time (du Gay et al., 1997).

In order to explore the discursive nature of power and the political nature of discourse (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1980), Chapter 5 examined the interplay between state power and Korean food television. Since 2008, there have been significant changes in power relations and ideological frameworks surrounding Korean food. The Korean government has used national cuisine to raise its global profile of national image, to enhance Korea’s soft power, and more importantly, to improve the national economy. In so doing, it has actively utilized domestic television to promote and justify its policy project—the Korean Food Globalization. For this reason, I read the post-2008 era as a vantage point for observing the articulation of state power in television production.

Despite the television industry’s general vulnerability to political circumstances, my analysis shows that state power is not directly articulated in television production; rather, it is negotiated with and mediated by television producers’ habitus, professional integrity, audience expectations, organizational culture, and production routines. However, the limited and/or mediated effects of state power do not mean that television production is free from state intervention. Based on in-depth interviews with food TV

producers, I demonstrated that the government makes television producers “voluntarily” participate in its discursive practice through a light-handed approach and indirect advertising methods. It was also found that television producers disseminate government messages even without their full consciousness due to their taken-for-granted production routines.

In Chapter 6, I discussed what discursive knowledge Korean food television has produced regarding Korean cuisine and the Korean nation within given social contexts and through its relationship with state. Under the military dictatorship, food TV in the 1980s served to promote the government’s cultural project that was designed to arouse national consciousness. With its emphasis on *hyangto eumsik* (local foods), it spurred a nostalgic feeling of one’s hometown, and at the same time, represented the nation as its extension. By featuring royal and modern cuisine as its main components, it also highlighted the common ancestry and shared past of Koreans, and attempted to portray Korea as a modernized and economically developed society. While facing the global force of economic liberalization, 1990s food TV (1993 to 1999) promulgated the notion of Korea as a “territorially-defined biological nation” through *shintoburi* discourse (body and land are inseparable). This ideological discourse increasingly dominated Korean television due to the proliferation of culinary others in the food service industry. Specifically, food TV in the 1990s raised fears of loss and generated a discursive and affective focus on Korean food by offering *shintoburi* discourse in the form of indisputable “scientific” truth. This finding challenges a Marxist distinction between ideology and scientific facts, and supports Foucault’s (1980) claim on the *becoming* nature of truth.

Food TV in the 2000s (2000 to 2007) spent most of its airtime rediscovering indigenous Korean foods and their uniqueness. In so doing, it concealed the invented nature of *hyangto eumsik* (local foods), and continuously depicted them as a cultural heritage. Rather than echoing the shifts in the food landscape and ethno landscape, it emphasized a distinctive “national face” of Korea. The difference between food TV in the 2000s and before resides in the fact that the former portrayed Korean (traditional) food as a globally-competitive commodity. By stressing the diversity and the wholesomeness of Korean “commodities,” it encouraged its viewers to imagine “global Korea” in their everyday lives. Food TV in the post-2008 period was not much different from previous ones. Through the intertextual analysis of representative examples, I confirmed that Korean food television’s search for “unique” national cuisine and its struggle for Koreanness have invariantly continued over the past four decades.

Due to its interdisciplinary nature, my dissertation contributes to several intersecting fields of study. First of all, it sheds light on the intersection of food, media, and the nation. Our food and foodways are embedded in not only ecological and physiological contexts, but also economic, political, and ideological relationships between people (Cwiertka & Walraven, 2001; Parasecoli, 2008). Thus, they can signal inclusion and exclusion, intimacy and distance, and rank and rivalry at the local, national, regional, and global level (Appadurai, 1981). The close relationship between food and the nation has been demonstrated and problematized by an increasing number of anthropological, sociological, and historical studies. However, most studies have explored the limited dimensions of food practices, such as food production, consumption, and classification. Although our food practices are widely mediated by popular media,

they have not paid much attention to this relationship. As television was increasingly concerned with foodways, media and communication scholars recently began to see food television as a set of cultural texts and to investigate its ideological functions with regard to class, sex, gender, and ethnicity.

Yet, the conjuncture of food, media, and the nation has hardly been studied by both academic disciplines. The understanding of the nation as a transitional cultural polity underlies the overall research agenda of this project. The anthropological notion of food as deep play also paves the way for this dissertation. It also stands on the studies that perceive television as a major repository of visual elements, ideas, and discourses that constitute our imagination and reality. In this light, my dissertation participates in a dialogue with current scholarship of food, media, and the nation respectively. It departs from and contributes to each scholarship by explicating the complexity of a less-studied subject, namely food television's discourse of the nation.

My dissertation also engages a body of literature on the nation and globalization. Previous research, which particularly celebrates the proliferation of identity politics, has viewed the nation and globalization as dichotomous terms. It has argued that the growing international connection between people—whether it being mediated or not—weakens the binding force of the nation. It is obvious that globalization challenges the nation, but it does not eliminate the nation. My historical analysis of Korean food television shows that an increased awareness of cultural others enhances a struggle for nationness.

Although it has changed its discursive strategies depending on historical circumstances, Korean food television has continuously produced symbolic reminders of the nation in the face of accelerated globalization processes. In concert with the government to varying

degrees, it has provided its viewers with cultural resources through which they reclaim a sense of situatedness, imagine their nation and co-nationals, and confirm their ownership of symbolic order. Through the analysis of the Korean government's policies on food, broadcasting, and globalization, I also discussed how the nation-state appropriates the banality of food and is involved in television production to produce and disseminate statist discourse of the nation in response to globalization.

These findings demonstrate the inextricable relationship between the nation-state and globalization, and support the claim that the nation-state engages in the globalization process as a strategic actor rather than remain in the receiving end of globalization. Because of different social compositions, histories, and power resources, each nation-state experiences globalization in a different way. Thus, the discussion of the nation and globalization cannot be oversaturated. As scholars of critical hybridity suggest, we can achieve a better understanding of globalization by exploring various times, patterns, types, and styles of mixing processes and by problematizing the assumed fixity of (national) boundaries. In other words, the refinement of discussion about the nation and globalization requires diverse case studies situated in different contexts. Through the critical approach to Korean food television and the government's cultural policies, this dissertation revealed how culinary and racial others were appropriated and hierarchically integrated to mark a boundary of the Korean nation, and how the Korean government attempted to strengthen its own position on global cultural/economic map. Hence, this dissertation, as an instrumental case study, will contribute to the ongoing discussion on the complex relationship between the nation-state and globalization.

Understanding the nation as a discourse in a Foucauldian perspective, this project employed critical discourse analysis as both theoretical and methodological framework for the investigation of television's discursive construction of the nation. To put it another way, this dissertation stands on the intersection of television studies and discourse studies. In particular, it shows how television studies can benefit from critical discourse analysis, the goal of which is to examine both the socially-situated and the socially-constructing nature of discourse. Through a critical analysis of Korean food television's discursive properties with regard to the Korean nation and of diverse socio-historical contexts that shaped these properties, I elucidated the dialectical relationship between television texts and their situational contexts.

More importantly, by investigating the negotiation processes of television producers, this dissertation advanced our understanding of television production as a mediator of text and social practice. In addition, my findings that challenge other researchers' presupposition explain the necessity of empirical studies on "encoding" processes. Media text is constitutive of social relations and knowledge, and it is "sensitive barometer of sociocultural change" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 52). However, my analysis shows that organic relations and complex plays between text and context cannot be fully understood without an examination of discursive practice of production. Taken together, these findings demonstrate the versatility and effectiveness of the three-dimensional discourse analysis in television studies, and more broadly, critical media/cultural studies.

Here, it is important to note that discursive practice, which mediates text and social practice, is not limited to the field of production. Discourse is the instrument of the

social construction of the reality: it is socially constitutive of knowledge, situations, social roles, and identities. Providing an abundant resource and topic for other types of discourse, media discourse also contributes to the social construction of reality. However, this reality is constructed not *by* discourse but *within* or *through* discourse. The functions, consequences, or results of discourse are mediated by the recipients' (social) minds. Likewise, identity is not just given to us by discourse. As Hall (1995) rightly argues, identity is a meeting point between "the ideological discourses" and "the psychological or psychical processes" (p. 65). Although discourse constructs particular subject positions for us, our identity is temporarily constructed when we attach ourselves to these positions. Therefore, we need to pay attention to the discursive practice of reception for a thorough study of discourse.

In my analysis, I discussed what subject positions and discursive knowledge Korean food television produced with regard to the Korean nation. Yet, I did not make conjectures about how its audiences would interpret them, and how they would construct their national identity through the interaction with these subjection positions. For this reason, I deliberately used "nationness" instead of "national identity" throughout the dissertation, which might limit the meanings of my discussion. Hence, my future research will explore the other dimension of discursive practice—reception. Based on in-depth interviews with food TV consumers, I will investigate the intersection of media discourse, food practice, and (national) identity construction. In order to enrich my discussion, I will further examine how the intersection is differently configured by viewers' cultural/economic/social capital and by their class/gender identification.

Through the holistic and interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation explicated the food-media-nation nexus, which has gained little attention from both media/communication scholars and food scholars. Given the bilateral relationship between the nation and globalization, I extended my discussion to the conjuncture of food, media, nation, and globalization. My future study will complicate and refine the discussion on this subject. The nation-state's efforts to carve out its global position through national cuisine are not Korea-specific.<sup>53</sup> Thus, I hope my dissertation will inform media and communication scholars of food's symbolic roles, and facilitate food scholars' involvement with media discourse. Finally, I would like to end my dissertation by reiterating the close relationship between food, popular media, and the nation: "food and the nation are so commingled in popular discourses that it is often difficult not to think one through the other" (Bell & Valentine, 1997, p. 168).

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<sup>53</sup> Those who designated their national cuisine as the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity include Croatia (2010), Mexico (2010), France (2010), South Korea (2013), Japan (2013), Georgia (2013), Cyprus/Croatia/Spain/Greece/Italy/Morocco/Portugal (2013), Turkey (2011; 2013), Armenia (2014), North Korea (2015), UAE/Saudi Arabia/Oman/Qatar (2015).

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