

# Political Eruption

How Daraa Became the Epicenter of Revolution

By Emre Gunaydin

## Introduction

There is a large body of scholarly work out there already that discusses the many ways in which dictatorships combat resistance and uprisings. The goal of this paper is not to explain generally how authoritarian regimes repress unrest, but to hone in on the Syria of 2011, and look at what may have been the inciting incident of what has become a decades long civil war, Daraa. What makes Daraa unique as a case and valuable to study is it shows us all at once both the sectarian dynamics of the Assad Regime and how they utilize local networks to maintain stability, but also how they have no qualms about shifting to violent repression if deemed necessary. Daraa also shows us how ethno-religious identity in Syria allowed for the rapid mass mobilization of the citizenry to demonstrate against the regime. In conjunction with this, there will then be a discussion of the effects of state repression in Daraa.

The first section of this paper will examine the immediate context of the Daraa uprising in 2011, which inevitably will include a discussion of the early impacts of the Arab Spring. Next will be the ordering of events in Daraa during early 2011. It is important to note that this paper will only discuss the non-violent protests, and will not examine the violent uprising that took place later at the beginning of the civil war period. A brief summary of the Assad Regime will follow, with a focus on their repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. This is mainly to establish their style of ruling, and to show examples of previous unrest and the regime's response to those challenges to state authority.

This paper will use both qualitative and quantitative data to examine the Daraaa case. By qualitative information, this means mainly interviews and eyewitness accounts. Quantitative data refers to facts such as the ethnic makeup of a certain region of Syria. I will use previous literature

on the topic, mainly secondary sources, to examine the theoretical landscape for potential explanations for mobilization in Daraa. Eyewitness accounts will be used to discuss both mobilization of protesters in Daraa, as well as the effects of state repression on protest movements.

A note on the word sectarian: in the context of this paper the word sectarian means conflict between ethno-religious groups, rather than focusing on religious sects. The violence does not necessarily have to be targeted at another group because of their ethno-religious background, but often the two go hand in hand.

A note on the spelling of Daraa: Depending on the source, it can either be spelled Daraa Dara'a, Dar'a, Dera, etc. To avoid any possible confusion, I have chosen to always spell it like Daraa in this paper.

## **Background**

The Assad Regime has been in power in Syria since 1970, when Hafez al-Assad's wing of the Baath party seized control of the government. This is not to be confused with the 1963 coup, where the Ba'ath party seized political power for itself and ousted Islamists and other political factions from government. Under Hafez, Syria began a dramatic transition from a state centered on the religious sunni elite in Aleppo, Hama, and Damascus into a state that was much more secular, and dominated by the interests of minority groups such as the Alawites and Christians. Hafez was himself an Alawite, an ethno-religious minority that splintered off from Shi'ism in the late tenth century. Sectarian tensions grew during this period, and reached a boiling point by the end of the 1970's. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political

party, massacred 83 Alawite cadets at an artillery school in Aleppo. [Talhamy, 2012] This began a period of retaliatory violence between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state, leading to a period of open revolt by the brotherhood in cities such as Aleppo, Homs, and Hama between 1979 and 1981. Being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offense during this time. Members of the state, and by extension the Baath Party, became targets of car bombings and assassinations. This period of violence culminated in the Hama massacre. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood rebelled and executed Baath Party officials in the city, seizing control of it for themselves.

In response, Alawite-led units, including Hafez's own brother Rifaat, surrounded and laid siege to the city. Whole neighborhoods were burned to the ground. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood had their entire families executed. [Celso 2017] Much of the city was flattened, and in the ensuing weeks the survivors were combed through in a hunt for any surviving dissidents, with those suspected of being part of the brotherhood being tortured and executed. Estimates put the death toll in the tens of thousands.<sup>1</sup> There is an argument to be made that this traumatic episode in Syrian history lay the groundwork for a new social contract in Syria, wherein the regime made it quite clear it had no hesitations using extreme violence to quell any threats to state authority. [Friedman 1990] In particular, it was made clear that the state would not tolerate religious extremists, especially those of the majority faith group in the country, Sunni Islam. In the aftermath, domestic unrest dramatically declined. Hafez al-Assad ruled unopposed until his death in 2000, whereby his son Bashar took power.

There was hope initially that Bashar would be a welcome spark for Syria. He was highly educated, having studied medicine in London. A new generation of young Syrians believed he

---

<sup>1</sup> Amos, Deborah. 02/12/2012. *30 Years Later, Photos Emerge From Killings in Syria*.  
<https://www.npr.org/2012/02/01/146235292/30-years-later-photos-emerge-from-killings-in-syria>

could be the liberal reformer that pushed Syria into the 21st century. However, they were left disappointed by the lack of radical reforms, economically or politically, that they believed his accession to the presidency would bring. “In February 2001, when asked whether a transformation was on the way in Syria, Bashar al-Assad emphasized the word "development" which, to the president, means to progress from already existing foundations.” [Becker 2005]

By the summer of 2010, much of the Arab World became embroiled in political turmoil. The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia sparked protests that spread across the Arab World. People took to the streets in nearly every country, marching for better political rights. We also began to see variance among the different regimes as to how they planned to deal with the crisis. In some nations, such as Morocco or Jordan, the existing government structures promised reforms to the people in exchange for an end to the demonstrations. Indeed Bashar al-Assad, dictator of Syria, had also promised some reforms to the Syrian people including the removal of emergency law, basically martial law, after forty-eight years.<sup>2</sup> But demonstrations had already been going on for about a month, and it became clear this was not enough for the protesters. What is remarkable about the Syrian case is that in an incredibly short time frame (weeks), protests had not only erupted and spread nationwide, but had become radical enough that the promise of reform was no longer enough to satisfy the people.

Much of the previous literature on the Syrian Revolution all points to one place when looking at its inception, Daraa. Daraa is a small town in southern Syria, close to the Golan Heights and Jordan. Its population is predominantly Sunni tribes that live in extended family networks that extend across the Daraa region and into northern Jordan as well.<sup>3</sup> There was

---

<sup>2</sup> A state of emergency was declared in Syria after the seizure of power by the Baath party in 1963. This is the emergency law that Bashar al-Assad is referring to. Marsh, Katherine. 04/16/11. *Syria Protests continue as Bashar al-Assad promises reform*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/16/bashar-al-assad-syria>

<sup>3</sup> (Mazur 2020) - Full citation in references

nothing particularly noteworthy about Daraa in and of itself prior to 2011. In fact, you might be forgiven for thinking that Daraa must have been the origin of protests in Syria if it is so important but this is not true. But as the Arab Spring spreads across borders from its origins in Tunisia, it begins to destabilize the authoritarian regimes it comes into contact with. In Syria, Daraa is important because it is where we begin to see consistent demonstrations that can no longer be contained by the state. To clarify, “contained” by the state, I refer to not just repression but also to the local networks that existed throughout Syria between the Assad Regime and powerful local actors/tribes/clans.

Origin stories for protests are interesting because insights about the civilian population can be gleaned through examining them, even if they are not perhaps fully true. One origin story for the protests in Daraa came up time and time again in the literature. The story goes that everything began when a group of teenage boys spray painted the phrase “*Ash-shab yurid isqat al-nizam (The people demand the end of the regime)*” on the wall of a school. This is a popular phrase that first began in Tunisia, but had also spread to other countries in the region. For example, the protesters in Tahrir square in Egypt would also use the chant. Its appearance in Syria should come as no surprise then. But the next part is what caused the stir. They also wrote the phrase, “It’s your turn now Doctor.”<sup>4</sup> The police quickly detained a number of teenage boys in connection with the graffiti.<sup>5</sup> The head of security in Daraa governorate is a man called Atif Najib, an Alawite who is a distant cousin of Bashar al-Assad, and he is well known for his disdain for the local communities. Multiple times the boys’ families, particularly the Elders, came and pleaded with the security forces to release them. Reportedly, Najib told the families

---

<sup>4</sup> The word “Doctor” in the graffiti refers to the fact that before the death of his father Hafez al-Assad, Bashar was studying ophthalmology in London with the goal of becoming a doctor.

<sup>5</sup> Tarabay, Jamie. 3/15/2018. CNN. “*For many Syrians, the story of the war began in Dara’a.*” <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/15/middleeast/daraa-syria-seven-years-on-intl/index.html>

“Forget your children. Go home to your wives and make more children. And if you do not know how, bring your wives and we will show you.” [Pearlman 2018] This alone was enough to enrage the local community as we shall see down the line.

Regardless of how truthful this story may be, though by all accounts at least most of this story is accurate<sup>6</sup>, it sheds light on the relationship between the Assad regime and the ordinary citizenry. As an ethno-religious minority in a position of power, the Assad’s put many Alawites into positions of power throughout the state. They also took care, however, to ensure that there were connections to local elites throughout Syria in order to stabilize their regime and gain legitimacy among the much-larger Sunni and Shia communities. [Mazur 2020] This is why, for example, the elders of the boys’ families visit the security forces in order to plead for their release. This shows that these local networks created by the state were at least effective enough that these connections were trusted by strong local actors to settle disputes between the state and citizenry.

## **The Theoretical**

### **Mobilization:**

There is a large amount of literature that discusses popular mobilization and what brings ordinary citizens out onto the streets. Before discussing what model of revolution Daraa conforms best to, it is reasonable to discuss the conditions that allowed for the rapid mobilization of people in this area. One reason why Daraa was able to mobilize in the way it did was the existence of large-scale family networks across the Daraa region. Daraa was an agrarian province, one that was solidly Ba’ath and was even referred to as “*khizanat al-Ba’ath*” or

---

<sup>6</sup> Tarabay, Jamie. 3/15/2018. CNN. “*For many Syrians, the story of the war began in Dara’a.*” <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/15/middleeast/daraa-syria-seven-years-on-intl/index.html>

“Storehouse of the Ba’ath”. As a mostly rural area, it was spared the upheaval and violence of the Islamist uprisings in the 1970’s and 80’s that occurred in larger urban areas like Aleppo, Damascus or Hama. However, this did not translate into preferential treatment for the region. Much like most Sunni-dominated areas of Syria, Dar’awis faced harassment from security officers. Atif Najib, already discussed earlier, was famous for his disregard of the locals. Daraa had a large migration-based economy as well. In 2009, Daraa governorate had the second highest share of remittances in total household income. [Barout 2011] These migratory patterns built and strengthened extended family networks which were already present in the local communities. [Leenders 2012] One example of how tight the social circles of Daraa are can be seen by the following example. The Najib quote from earlier about going home to their wives and making more children became notorious among the people of Daraa. “Nearly every person whom I met from Daraa could quote them verbatim. “Everyone in Daraa knows each other,” a man explained. “So everyone found out. And people were really angry when they learned what had happened” (interview with A. Sh., Ramtha, Jordan, October 6, 2012).” [Pearlman 2020] This showcases how quickly word spread through the community about the episode. A lack of local economic opportunities as well as these strong networks of familial ties would be key for later political mobilization.

It can be difficult to reconcile Daraa’s reputation as a Ba’ath stronghold with the events that ended up taking place there. Structuralist arguments like those of Skocpol fail to explain the uprising in Daraa because the Assad Regime at this point (February-March 2011) was certainly nowhere near collapse. There was no vacuum of state power, and in fact the state was able to hinder and repress protests effectively in Daraa at first. One interviewee discusses how “Many people came, but the security forces were already there and ready. They quashed it before it even

began. People came, saw the security forces, and left immediately.” [Pearlman 2018] This was an experienced security apparatus that had been in place since the late 1980’s as previously mentioned in relation to the aftermath of the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion. One argument that can explain the surprising scale of protests in Daraa may be preference falsification. [Kuran 1991] The Daraa example fits best with Kuran’s idea of revolution unpredictability, as a strong area of support for the Baath party and the regime, as well as being more of a regional town than a city. Certainly, Daraa is much smaller than an Aleppo or Damascus, or even a Homs. The Arab Spring as a whole generally ties nicely to Kuran’s discussion of how fragile regimes can often appear stronger than they are because of a lack of honest political debate in the public sphere. Much like the residents of the states of Eastern Europe, many Syrians were likely discontented by the regime in private, but they were not willing to voice their opposition in the public sphere. Another parallel that can be drawn is that much like the people of Eastern Europe could look to the Prague Spring or the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to see the consequences of dissent, many Syrians could look to the harsh repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 70’s and early 80’s to find the consequences of showing opposition to the Assads. The next paragraph discusses a way in which the problem of collective action was solved and how the social pressures that make preference falsification enticing began to come apart in Daraa.

Religion is often given an outsized influence in discussing motivations for popular demonstrations, however for Syria this is not the case. In Syria, mosques simply solved the challenge of collective action logistics in a country where civil society was so stifled that dissenters against the state lacked any other space to make their dissatisfaction known. “There were no autonomous civil organizations, other free social spaces, or robust networks of trust that could serve as “mobilizing structures” that social movement scholars find crucial for organizing

challenges to authority. (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996)“ [Pearlman 2022] For example, one interviewee discusses how a christian man came to the mosque just to join in the demonstrations. “He lined up and prayed with everyone else. And when he bowed, the necklace fell out. The pendant was a cross... the christian young man said, “I came here to go out in the demonstration with all of you.” [Pearlman 2022] We will see how important these civil organizations can be by the fact that informal ones, known as committees, sprung up throughout Syria in order to spread information on where and how to protest. [Mazur 2020] We can also see the outsized influence of mosques as a gathering place for dissenters by the fact that on both March 11th and March 18th, the dates of the first two protests in Daraa, began after Friday prayers. From here, the disproportionate and violent response of the state allowed for the gaining of momentum by protestors, as many bystanders began to join in popular demonstrations of dissent.

In conclusion, Daraa had a combination of strong family networks throughout the community, as well as a history of economic stagnation. We can also see the effects of an ethnicized authoritarian regime through the actions of Atif Najib, the Alawite security official who had little regard for the sunni population of Daraa. Even though the regime had made connections with local elites in order to gain legitimacy in the area, these connections were not enough to stop the state from engaging in disproportionate repression when it felt itself threatened.

### **Repression:**

In general, the Assad Regime engaged in both discriminate and indiscriminate violence when dealing with protesters. The scale of the repression also varied from area to area. “Whereas nonviolent demonstrations were met with minimal repression in some areas of the country, other

areas saw increasing violence.” [Mazur 2020, pg. 96] For example, while the regime lay siege to Daraa in late May, the city centers of Damascus and Aleppo saw little violent contention. [Mazur 2020, pg. 97] Even when looking at Daraa we see examples of both. Discriminate violence was immediate. The very first protest action that took place on March 11th at the governor’s mansion to protest the detention of the schoolkids led to the killing of two civilians.<sup>7</sup> As previously discussed, many of the schoolboys came from notable families of the area, and by shooting these protesters the state had started a blood feud with the families of these boys. On March 18th, after another Friday prayer an even larger crowd marched through the streets of Daraa, calling again for the boys’ release. Again, security forces responded by opening fire, leading to the deaths of four people. [Leenders 2012] The next day, however, when funeral processions turned into bigger demonstrations, security forces turned to tear gas instead of just opening fire. This was to be an outlier episode rather than a sign of a faltering security apparatus. However, the gravity of the situation was acknowledged by the fact that “chief of Military Intelligence Rostom Ghazali and Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal al-Muqdad arrived in [Daraa] to offer condolences and meet local notables. They also announced that the detained schoolboys would be released immediately.” [Leenders 2012] This is notable for showing that the regime began to understand this was no ordinary demonstration, and that this movement could not just be crushed with violence (at least in Daraa). We can see that repression varied from area to area and more importantly, that it did not curb protests but instead created further momentum that allowed for the demonstrations to snowball out of control.

As previously mentioned, regime responses varied greatly from region to region, or even from case to case. Contention by protestors was also varied. Local committees had been

---

<sup>7</sup> Macleod, Kevin. 10/13/11. *Syria: How it all Began*.  
<https://theworld.org/stories/2011-04-23/syria-how-it-all-began>

organized across Syria that were used by dissidents to relay where and how to protest. [Mazur 2020] Despite the efforts of these committees, protestors in “In spite of coordinating committee efforts to prevent the arming of challengers, some protestors began to carry rudimentary weapons to demonstrations in cities like [Daraa] and Homs.” [Mazur 2020, pg. 96] Regardless of whether these weapons were for self-defense or not, it was to be another step towards civil war. The gradual arming of protestors brought another disproportionate response from the state, “which laid siege to Daraa in late May”. [Mazur 2020, pg.96]

Repression also increased sectarian tensions within the country. Pearlman quoted that, “When they started killing Sunni civilians randomly as opposed to just those protesting... my atheist friends began asserting their Sunnism, which is now more of a social than a religious identity.” [Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami 2015, 110] This is extremely interesting considering that much of the framing of the civil war that was to come describes the conflict as a “sectarian” one, meaning one centered around violence between ethno-religious groups. Pearlman seems to suggest that at least some of those who found themselves on one side or another of ethno-religious divides were not as passionate about their identity prior to the outbreak of protests. On the one hand, this shows the efficiency of the Ba’athist regime to suppress groups such as the Sunnis, but also that their efforts were unable to remove the underlying ethnic identities of these groups no matter how hard they tried. In terms of Daraa however, it is important to note that it is not ethnic tensions that caused violence to increase, but issues pertaining to the local area in particular. A key issue was the detainment of the young schoolboys in response to the graffiti, rather than any Sunni versus Alawite rhetoric. The graph below supports this theory as well.

112


*Events of the Syrian Uprising*

FIGURE 4.4. Coding instances of challenge

This graph charts the proportion of challenger-incumbent interactions that are violent as well as the scope of their identity claim. In this case the challengers would be the protesters and the incumbent would be the Assad Regime. The “scope of identity claim” means how broad are the disputes of the protests, as well as is there an ideology behind the demonstrations, such as Islamism, Kurdish nationalism, etc. Daraa is an interesting case because as the graph shows the initial protests were largely peaceful. In terms of violence, it ranks below places like Homs or Dayr al-Zur, although it is important to note that those are two urban areas with much larger

populations than Daraa. I would argue that this lack of violence in interactions between the citizens and the state is what allowed for Daraa to sow the seeds of the Syrian Revolution. Daraa had just enough violence to provoke local citizens to protest on the streets, without the heavy-handed repression of larger urban areas like Damascus or Aleppo that would make protesting extremely difficult. It's fascinating as well because Daraa, unlike some of the other cities on the graph, had fairly small-scale issues that led to challenger actions. The people of Daraa were not chanting for democracy for Syria, or an end to the regime, but for the release of young schoolboys who were detained by security forces. An interesting further exploration of this argument could ask if coalescence around smaller, more local issues generated a more cohesive protest movement that proved durable under state repression.

## **Conclusion**

Daraa was in many ways the perfect storm. The region was economically vulnerable, being primarily agricultural and rural. The ethnic makeup of Daraa was majority Sunni in contrast with the Alawite and Christian ruling elite of the Assad Regime. This stoked resentment between the majority population, who was left outside of the political process, and the minorities who had all of the control. More importantly, however, the area also had many strong tribes and clans which led to extensive networks of people in the area whose ties were not dependent on the state. This allowed for the rapid spread of anti-government messaging and planning of protests.

Not only were there conditions for rapid mobilization of citizens in Daraa, but the repression that followed also lent itself to increasing tensions between the citizenry and the state. Daraa had enough indiscriminate violence to incentivize bystanders to partake in protest actions,

but not enough indiscriminate violence to successfully quell the demonstrations before they reached critical mass and became more than the security apparatus of the city could handle. Multiple interviews discuss the impact of state violence on their decision to join the protesters in the street, and while we will never fully know due to preference falsification how sincere these interviewees were, it is clear that there were ramifications to the state's decision to repress. [Kuran 1991]

Much has been made about the uniqueness of the Arab Spring, and it was certainly an unprecedented wave of demonstrations that swept across the MENA region, but Daraa shares many characteristics of various other revolutions throughout history. What we can gain from examining the Daraa case is that strong local networks between citizens allowed for the rapid emergence of protesters. State repression was effective at first, but as the crowds grew, even indiscriminate violence was not enough to curb demonstrations any longer, leading to a breakdown of state authority in the process. Daraa fell in the "sweet spot", where there was enough state repression to provoke a mass uprising of people, without the strong state response that could potentially have crushed the movement while it was still in its infancy.

In conclusion, a variety of factors came together to make Daraa a viable place for demonstrations to not only occur, but to gain enough momentum to attract nationwide attention and sympathy. Daraa was a regional city, much less heavily policed than Damascus or Aleppo. The police that were stationed there were corrupt and excessively violent. The Alawite officer Najib's derogatory attitude towards the sunni locals serves as a microcosm of the state's character as one where the majority were ruled over by the minority, and ordinary citizens were reminded of this fact. This of course contributed to ethnic and religious tensions that would bubble under the surface through first Hafez, and then the early years of Bashar's rule over Syria.

However, this does not mean that Daraa is an example of ethnic tensions boiling over. To the contrary, Daraa features intensely local disputes which pertain only to them. Unlike other areas where protests occurred in the early days of the Syrian Uprising, they protested against local problems rather than for grand ideologies. Daraa serves as a fascinating case for understanding why certain areas rebel and how they mobilize, as well as their relationship/response to state repression.

## References

- Barout, Mohammed Jamal. 2011. *The past decade in Syria: the dialectic of stagnation and reform*. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Doha.  
[https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The\\_past\\_decade\\_in\\_Syria\\_the\\_dialectic\\_of\\_stagnation\\_and\\_reform\\_Part\\_1\\_of\\_5.aspx](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_past_decade_in_Syria_the_dialectic_of_stagnation_and_reform_Part_1_of_5.aspx)
- Becker, Carmen. “Strategies of Power Consolidation in Syria Under Bashar Al-Asad: Modernizing Control Over Resources.” *The Arab Studies Journal* 13/14, no. 2/1 (2005): 65–91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27933934>.
- Celso, Anthony N. 2017. “Hama’s Ominous Shadow and the Stalled Jihadist War in Syria.” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 28 (1): 82–98. doi:10.1215/10474552-3882808.
- Conduit, Dara. 2019. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria*. Cambridge Middle East Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108758321.
- Friedman, Thomas L.. From Beirut to Jerusalem. United Kingdom: Anchor Books, 1990.
- Kuran, Timur. “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 7–48.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2010422>.
- Leenders, Reinoud. (2012). “Collective Action and Mobilization in Dar'a: An Anatomy of the Onset of Syria's Popular Uprising.” *Mobilization*. 17. 419-434.  
10.17813/maiq.17.4.gj8km668p18611hj
- Mazur, Kevin. 2021. *Revolution In Syria: Identity, Networks, and Repression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pearlman, Wendy Religion and Mobilization in the Syrian Uprising and Civil War 2022. In *The Oxford Handbook of Politics in Muslim Societies*, edited by Melani Cammett and Pauline Jones. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pearlman, Wendy. Contingency and Agency in a Turning Point Event: March 18, 2011, in Daraa, Syria. 2018. In *Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings*, edited by Frédéric Volpi and James M. Jasper, 111–34. Amsterdam University Press.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt20krz3k.8>.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1994. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173834.
- Talhamy, Yvette. 2012. “The Muslim Brotherhood Reborn.” *Middle East Quarterly* 19 (2): 33–40.

<https://search-ebshost-com.libproxy.temple.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=72260263&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

- Yassin-Kassab, Robin, and Leila Al-Shami. *Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War*. 2nd ed. Pluto Press, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt21215fd>.