


A Crisis of Identity:

Advertising & the British Ministry of Information's Propaganda Posters of World War II



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INTRODUCTION

In October 1935, the British Committee of Imperial Defense gathered to discuss the prospect of a war with Germany. Its report proposed the creation of a Ministry of Information to “present the national case to the public at home and abroad in time of war...[and] to provide for the preparation and issue of National Propaganda.”¹ The Ministry was officially established on 4 September 1939, the day after Great Britain declared war. Shortly thereafter, members of the War Cabinet met to discuss the nascent agency’s goals. The tone at this meeting differed greatly. Hugh Macmillan, who had been appointed the department’s first Minister, stated, “I have no intention of conducting a propaganda campaign in Great Britain.”² The Ministry of Information, created to conduct national propaganda, was being led by a Minister who adamantly did not want to be seen as a propagandist. This ambivalence would haunt the Ministry of Information throughout the Second World War. The British government claimed that having a Ministry to control information and publicity was imperative; yet, despite its importance, there was a remarkable amount of confusion about the actual mission and responsibilities of the department.

British politicians in a Home Publicity Sub-Committee meeting in 1938 saw the upcoming conflict as fundamentally “a war of ideas.”³ Building on the experience of World War I, when propaganda had proved a powerful tool, governments viewed their ability to sway public opinion and enlist home front participation as absolutely essential. British politicians had

¹ Ian McLaine, *Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information* (London: George, Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1979), 12.

²The National Archives (TNA): The Cabinet Papers, 1915-1981. CAB 67/1/34. “The Scope and Organisation of the Ministry of Information,” October 10, 1939. <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/DoLUserDownload/summerbeckley@templeedu/cab/67/1/34/0001.pdf>.

³ McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 20.

observed the effective exploitation of propaganda during and after the Bolshevik revolution.⁴

British propagandists were also aware that Joseph Goebbels's "Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda," founded in 1933, exercised unprecedented influence over the culture of Nazi Germany. As historian Zbynek Zeman wrote, "The competition was for the highest stakes: for the allegiance of their own peoples and the maintenance of their morale."⁵

Yet, British politicians did not want to identify themselves with Russian communists or German Nazis. As a consequence, they would be forced to look outside the immediate realm of propaganda.

The salience of this growing effort to influence public opinion did not pertain solely to the sphere of government. In recent years, advances in technology and psychology had generated a dramatic expansion of advertising in the commercial sphere. Increasingly, businesses became interested in developing research-based strategies to manipulate the minds of the public. As British propagandists sought to relate to their public without succumbing to Goebbels' techniques, they turned to the commercial world as their inspiration.

This essay identifies the burgeoning fields of advertising and public relations as crucial to the way the Ministry of Information perceived itself and developed its propaganda. It argues that by identifying themselves with the respected, scientific field of advertising, officials in the Ministry were able to view their work as legitimate and disassociate themselves from the negative connotations conventionally linked with propaganda. The issue of how democracies can be persuaded and manipulated remains extremely relevant to society today. In an era characterized by an increased reliance on social media, understanding the Ministry of

⁴ Aylmer Maude, "Machine-Made Propaganda," *The Sackbut*, July 9, 1929.
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:bp-us:&rft_dat=xri:bp:article:ea66-1929-000-00-000009:1.

⁵ Zbynek Zeman, *Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II* (London: Orbis Publishing, 1974), 8.

Information and its behavior leads to a greater understanding of the historical development of the power and purposes of propaganda.

Progressive individuals during the 1920s and 1930s dramatically transformed the field of advertising; these developments would be highly influential for the British Ministry of Information's work. Advances in psychology in the early 20th century fueled much of this transformation. Transnationally, new scientific understandings of the human brain and interest in developing strategies of influence and manipulation. Edward Bernays, an American intellectual recognized as the father of public relations, pioneered these new strategies in advertising after the First World War. His work helped businesses recognize the growing importance of public relations. As advertising increased in other areas of public life, politicians increasingly recognized the importance of relating to the public through media. It was not until 1933 that the British Post Office became the first Government Department to appoint a Director-General of Public Relations.⁶ This new interest in the manipulation of public beliefs and attitudes would be seen most dramatically in the extraordinary success of Nazi propaganda in Germany.⁷ All of these elements contributed to the decision of the British government to begin planning for a Ministry of Information in 1935.

From its inception, there was much uncertainty about the organization and objectives of the department. Reflecting this confusion, between 1939 and 1941, the Ministry of Information went through a quick succession of three Ministers. Although the British government appreciated civilian morale as extremely important, leaders failed to set down clear

⁶ Balfour, Michael, *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979), 53.

⁷ Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist, first explored the idea of a "collective conscience" in his 1893 work *The Division of Labour in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1997 [1893]). He used this term to describe the shared beliefs and moral attitudes which act as a unifying force within a society. Bernays addressed this issue in his discussion of a "public conscience" in *Crystallizing Public Opinion* (New York: Bone & Liveright Publishers, 1923).

responsibilities and specific guidelines for the Ministry.⁸ The Ministry quickly became the scapegoat of the press and gained a reputation for leading to political suicide among government officials. It comes as no surprise that the Ministry's early propaganda attempts were not well received. Several poorly thought-out poster campaigns and botched censorship issues caused skepticism and distrust among both government members and the general public. The appointment of Brendan Bracken, a successful publisher and close friend of Winston Churchill, as Minister of Information in July, 1941, marked a turning point. He remained in that position through the end of the war and led the Ministry in a more respected and fruitful direction.

While much scholarship exists relating to wartime propaganda and the Ministry, no one has adequately explored the crucial intersection between the commercial and governmental sectors that came to fruition in British propaganda. In examinations of the Ministry of Information, scholars have predominantly focused on the marked change in leadership between the failure of the first three leaders and the charisma of Brendan Bracken. The emphasis on individuals has kept historians from examining the underlying influences on the creation of propaganda over the course of the war. Several scholars have touched on the link between commercial advertising and political propaganda, but not in the depth and with the rigor that is necessary.⁹ Shifting the focus to the importance of the commercial world and its developments adds a new dimension to our knowledge of British propaganda and provides a fuller understanding of the Ministry's transformation over the course of the Second World War.

⁸ McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 13.

⁹ James Aulich, *War Posters: Weapons of Mass Communication* (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2007). A graphic designer, Aulich focuses on the art styles of British propaganda posters, but writes of the influence of figures like Bernays, Scott and Le Bon. See also Edward Purcell, *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1973) for links between new psychological understandings and government persuasion techniques and Zbynek Zeman, *Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II* (London: Orbis Publishing, 1974) for connections between the technical level of commercial advertising and political propaganda.

The commercial advertising world had a direct influence on the Ministry of Information's propaganda; this study examines this relationship in three separate sections. The first traces developments in the fields of advertising and psychology, showing how key figures such as Edward Bernays drew direct connections between the commercial and government sectors. The second section examines the perceptions that those within the Ministry of Information had of themselves. Based on minutes of government meetings and memoirs of the Ministers, this section documents how these men viewed their own identities as propagandists. Third, this essay analyzes specific poster campaigns of the Ministry of Information. In doing this, it demonstrates how the Ministry utilized advertising techniques in the creation of their propaganda. The development of the Ministry's campaigns reveals direct connections between the commercial and political practice of publicity. Collectively, these sections provide robust support for the argument that commercial advertising substantively affected the Ministry of Information during the Second World War.

CHAPTER I: Crucial Developments in the Interwar Period

To understand the impact of advertising on the Ministry of Information, it is first necessary to examine the decades leading up to its creation in 1939. Specifically, we must consider the legacy of World War I propaganda, identify significant scientific and technological advances, and trace the progression of the advertising and public relations industries. Pinpointing and assessing these critical developments of the interwar period provides us with a deeper understanding of the society in which British propagandists found themselves at the outbreak of the Second World War.

A snapshot of the propaganda campaigns of the First World War reveals why British politicians were so eager to distance themselves from the practice. Propaganda, as Edward Bernays observed, carried a “decidedly sinister complexion” to the British because of its use in the First World War.¹⁰ Various agencies within the British government had been assigned publicity duties during the war, briefly uniting into a Ministry of Information between February of 1918 and January of 1919. To encourage recruitment and bolster confidence in the justice of their cause, British propaganda focused on dehumanizing the German soldiers. Alfred Harmsworth (Lord Northcliffe), a newspaper magnate who played a key role in this propaganda, promulgated posters and newspaper advertisements that portrayed the Germans as ruthless savages.¹¹ Illustrations showed German women taunting wounded soldiers, children crying outside their shelled homes, and British prisoners being unfairly treated by German citizens. For example, one 1918 poster called observers to “Look! Read! and Remember!” the injustices

¹⁰ Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928), 21.

¹¹ Anthony Rhodes, *Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion, World War II* (Secaucus, NJ: The Wellfleet Press, 1987), 107.

afflicted on a group of captured British fishermen. Lord Northcliffe and his cronies did not hesitate to embellish, or simply invent, stories about their enemy's malevolence. The press characterized Northcliffe's campaigns as "splendidly successful" and claimed that the British people reveled in the moral superiority implicit in the propaganda.¹² Nevertheless, after the war, Northcliffe boasted about his accomplishments and foolishly revealed his disreputable techniques.¹³ The British people discovered that many of the "German atrocities" that had bolstered their support for the war had been grossly exaggerated or purely fictional. The betrayal and ensuing backlash expressed by the British people after this revelation caused the government to shy away from any further propagandist attempts during peacetime. This legacy of earlier British propaganda would play a key role in the attitudes of the Ministers of Information during the Second World War.

The interwar period witnessed several phenomena that factored in to the way that those in the Ministry would eventually perceive themselves and develop their propaganda. Technological changes altered the way in which information could be spread. Earlier inventions such as the railroad, telephone, telegraph, radio, and airplane had set the stage for the world of advertising.¹⁴ Ideas could now spread much more rapidly than ever before. In an article for the *New York*



David Wilson, "How the Hun Hates," 1915-1918, UK.

¹² Lewis Melville, "British Propaganda During the War," *The Bookman*, October, 1920, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:bp-us:&rft_dat=xri:bp:article:e574-1920-059-49-000828:2

¹³ Rhodes, *Propaganda*, 107.

¹⁴ Bernays, *Propaganda*, 12.

Times in 1927, the novelist and social commentator H.G. Wells wrote that these modern means of communication had created a whole new world of political processes. “Ideas and phrases,” Wells wrote, “can now be given an effectiveness greater than the effectiveness of any personality and stronger than any sectional interest.”¹⁵ Concepts could now be transformed into slogans and images that could be rapidly distributed to the masses.

Scientific advances also contributed to the new world of advertising that emerged during this era. The growth of psychology as a science greatly influenced the strategies of this new advertising. Carl Jung’s *Psychology of the Unconscious*, translated to English in 1916, greatly influenced Western intellectuals’ study of psychological theory. Neurosurgeon and psychologist Wilfred Trotter researched social psychology, popularizing Gustave LeBon’s theories of the unconscious. In his famous 1916 work, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, Trotter formulated the concept of the “herd instinct.”¹⁶ Sigmund Freud published his influential works throughout the 1920s and 1930s. His theories, particularly about the unconscious mind, were seminal in the evolving field of psychology.¹⁷ American political journalist Walter Lippmann wrote extensively on democracy, news, and group psychology; in his 1922 work, *Public Opinion*, Lippmann coined the term, the “manufacture of consent,” to describe the process of manipulating public attitudes. It was an era of exploration and discovery of the inner workings of the human mind. These advances prompted a new interest in advertising. Understanding how the brain worked added a new dimension to the way businesses dealt with their consumers.

Edward Bernays, a native Austrian and “double nephew” of Freud, condensed the works of these

¹⁵ H.G. Wells, “A New China Stirs the World,” *New York Times*. January 23, 1927.

¹⁶ Wilfred Trotter coined the term “herd instinct,” using it to describe humankind’s predisposition to act, not out of individuality, but in keeping with the general population. Trotter theorized that this powerful instinct played a large role in determining a person’s opinions and enthusiasms.

¹⁷ Sigmund Freud brought the theory of the “unconscious mind” to prominence. He used it to describe the cognitive processes of repressed feelings, perceptions, and desires that unintentionally influence the conscious mind.

influential psychologists and applied them to both commercial advertising and government propaganda.¹⁸

Bernays identified these new psychological understandings as fundamental to effective advertising. He explained, "Theory and practice have combined with sufficient success to permit us to know that in certain cases we can effect some change in public opinion with a fair degree of accuracy by operating a certain mechanism, just as the motorist can regulate the speed of his car by manipulating the flow of gasoline."¹⁹ New concepts about the unconscious, herd instinct, and public opinion contributed to the strategies developed by advertisers to affect consumers. By latching on to ideas developed by psychologists and utilizing its new understandings of the workings of the brain, advertising grew in stature as a respected, scientific field.

Businesses recognized clever advertising and effective manipulation of public opinion as the best way to beat competition in a growing market. Companies began to employ specific techniques based on new psychological understandings. For example, Wilfred Trotter's research had concluded that when making a decision, the mind's first impulse was to follow the example of a trusted leader.²⁰ Subsequently, advertisers began to focus on gaining personal endorsements from public figures. To illustrate, having popular actress and socialite Diana Manners endorse a cosmetic product proved to be a very successful sales

"Beauty is the touchstone of life. Without it we might as well live on the barrenest Mount Sinai for our own, for everybody's sake, it's every woman's duty to follow her beauty. She can effectively accomplish this business by the Pond's Method, by using Pond's Two Creams."

Diana Manners

Portrait of Lady Diana Manners in Her Wedding Gown
by Sir James J. Swanwick, R.A.

The Lady Diana Manners

—most beautiful woman of the English Aristocracy
praises this care of the skin

THE Lady Diana Manners is the most beautiful woman of her generation. Beauty is in her blood. Dorothea Vernon of Haddon Hall, famous beauty of Elizabethan days, was one of her ancestors. And her mother, the Duchess of Rutland, was a creature of rare loveliness when she was lady-in-waiting to the Queen.

Lady Diana's beauty is fabulous. The modelling of her face, the lift of her head, the dignity of her figure, declare her "the daughter of a hundred castles." But the glint of gold in her hair, the starry blueness of her eyes, these touch the heart-strings, being heaven sent.

And the lip's own petals are not more snowy-white, more satin-soft, than Lady Diana's skin. Sculptors and painters have begged her to sit for them, for, as a great English painter said, "she has the most beautiful complexion in the world."

No wonder she's the darling of the most exclusive Society of two continents and "England's best ambassador in making friends of Americans for England."

Lady Diana—whose creed is "Beauty is the touchstone of life"—knows the need of keeping all her own beauty untouched by wind and cold, the harsh lights and make-up of the theatre, and the late hours of her exacting social life.

How Lady Diana Keeps Her Beauty
So she literally bathes her face and neck in cold cream and protects them with a delicate finish provided by a second cream.

For, like so many of the beautiful women of England, of America, Lady Diana Manners has found the Two Creams that keep the skin its exquisite best no matter how it's taxed.

Before retiring or after any unusual exertion

Apply Pond's Cold Cream generously on the face and neck. Wipe it off with a soft cloth, taking away the day's accumulation of dirt, dirt and powder. Finish with a dash of cold water or a rub with a bit of ice.

Before you powder, smooth over your newly cleansed face a delicate film of Pond's Finishing Cream. It keeps your complexion fresh and protected for hours against any weather, gives it the softest finish imaginable and holds your powder with a velvety smoothness and surprisingly long.

Like Lady Diana Manners you can "effectively accomplish the business." Begin to use Pond's Cold and Vanishing Cream. Soon you'll have a beautiful complexion, not a thing you envy. The Pond's Extract Company.

FREE OFFER!—Mail this coupon today for free value of these two famous creams and a little booklet telling what many famous beauties think of them.

Yes! Pond's Extract Company, Dept. B
131 Hudson Street, New York

Please send me free tubes of Pond's Cold and Vanishing Cream.

Name:

Street:

City:

State:

EVERY SKIN NEEDS THESE TWO CREAMS

February 1st, 1925

In using advertisements see page 6 93

¹⁸ Bernay's father was the brother of Freud's wife, and his mother was Freud's sister.

¹⁹ Bernays, *Propaganda*, 47

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 50.

strategy. Bernays' work had emphasized the importance of making the printed message "attractive and persuasive."²¹ Businesses began to employ artists to create their advertisements – among them were Frank Taylor, Tom Purvis, and John Gilroy, who became known for their successful poster campaigns for companies like Shell and Guinness.²² These new strategies, and a significant increase in magazine and newspaper circulation, generated a new emphasis on visual art.²³

While advertising gained a respected standing and became progressively more integral to commercial life, propaganda began to gain an even more heinous reputation than it had previously. The Communist Party in Russia utilized propagandistic methods in their rise to power. British observers worried about the role that their "subtle, insidious propaganda" had played in communist success.²⁴ In response, British journalists warned the public against the danger of being "subtly influenced, led away on the wrong tack, insidiously poisoned and subverted" by government propaganda.²⁵ This fear of propaganda's power intensified with its use in Nazi Germany. As Adolf Hitler rose to prominence in the 1930s, he employed propaganda to gain control over more and more aspects of German life. In February 1933, soon after Hitler had been sworn in as Chancellor, the Reichstag building in Berlin was set on fire. Blaming militant communists, Hitler obtained an emergency decree to place restrictions on civil liberties, most notably freedom of the press.²⁶ Then on 13 March he established the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda under the leadership of Dr. Joseph Goebbels. Hitler, more than any other politician before him, believed that the key to political success lay in the

²¹ Bernays, *Propaganda*, 64.

²² Holme, *Advertising*, 78.

²³ Bernays, *Propaganda*, 63.

²⁴ Meriel Buchanan, "The Peril of Red Propaganda," *Saturday Review of Politics*, May 9, 1936, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:bp-us:&rft_dat=xri:bp:article:e951-1936-161-00-076534:1

²⁵ Buchanan, "The Peril of Red Propaganda," *Saturday Review of Politics*.

²⁶ Rhodes, *Propaganda*, 11.

manipulation of public perception. In *Mein Kampf* he dedicated two entire chapters to extolling the effectiveness of propaganda. Political propaganda had been used before, as evidenced by the British in World War I. However, nothing on the scale of Goebbels's propaganda had ever been seen before. Goebbels wielded utter, totalitarian control over the media, arts, and all sources of information. Following one of Hitler's public speeches, Goebbels wrote in his diary that that the Nazi's "psychological difficulties have been overcome... The enthusiasm of the audience exceed anything that the human mind can imagine."²⁷ Leaders in Great Britain watched as Goebbels's propaganda played a vital role in indoctrinating the German masses to the Nazi cause.²⁸

It was against this backdrop that in 1939 the British government established the Ministry of Information. Developments in technology, science, advertising and political propaganda during the interwar years placed the Ministry of Information in an extremely complex situation. Ministers found themselves drawn to the field of advertising in an attempt to seek an identity that distanced them and their mission from the negative connotations propaganda had acquired in the preceding decades.

²⁷ Joseph Goebbels, *The Goebbels Diaries*, trans. and ed. Louis Lochner (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), 27.

²⁸ Rhodes, *Propaganda*, 11.

CHAPTER II: The Ministry's Search for Identity

The early years of the Ministry were haunted by a search for a respectable identity. Associated with the communist movements of the 1920s and with the Nazi regime in Germany, propaganda was anathema to the British. By identifying with the new, scientific field of advertising, however, British officials found a way to view their work as legitimate. After struggling through a period of confusion, the Ministry adopted an identity influenced by the recent developments in the field of advertising. The first three Ministers of Information failed to come to terms with their identity as propagandists. It was under the leadership of Brendan Bracken, a media specialist who had made his fortune in publishing, that the perception of the Ministry shifted to something of which its members could be proud. A chronological exploration of the ways these leaders spoke about their positions as propagandists reveals this important transformation in identity.

The creation of a Ministry of Information produced great controversy within the British government. In July of 1939, the House of Commons heatedly debated the issue. Lieutenant-Commander Reginald Fletcher admitted that the British cause was not being “put forward” as well as it should be.²⁹ Yet he stressed that the government must not be “hypnotised” by Goebbels’ propaganda machine; England was not a totalitarian country, Fletcher contended, and had no need for “stupefying the minds of our people.”³⁰ His comments illustrate the essential conflict regarding propaganda. Most politicians recognized the need for a centralized government department responsible for dispensing information to the public. Yet they feared

²⁹ House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 28 July 1939,

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/jul/28/supply-2#S5CV0350P0_19390728_HOC_215

³⁰ Ibid.

taking on the qualities of their enemy. As the Labour Party leader Dr. Haden-Guest aptly stated during the Parliamentary debate, “The margin between information and propaganda is a very difficult one to define.”³¹ The House of Commons came to no definite conclusions about the Ministry in July. Until its role was sufficiently defined, the Ministry would struggle in its efforts.

The first Minister’s brief tenure reflected this struggle, lasting a short four months. Hugh Pattison Macmillan had been appointed as the first Minister of Information at its inception in September of 1939. He spent his short time as Minister confused and dissatisfied in his role. Before the outbreak of the war, Lord Macmillan served as a judge in the House of Lords. Macmillan certainly did not conceive of himself as someone suited to leading the Ministry of Information. He had been on the outskirts of the Ministry of Information in 1918, but Macmillan admitted that he did not know exactly why Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain chose him as Minister.³² He saw his role as a judge to be in opposition to the “controversial political office” of propaganda.³³ Proud of his position as an objective administrator of the law, Macmillan feared that associating himself with propaganda would besmirch his reputation.

News organizations, unsure of the extent to which the Ministry’s control of information would affect them, felt threatened and were quick to criticize. One journalist remarked that it was strange that Macmillan, a judge trained to exercise the strictest impartiality and most careful accuracy, would have been selected as “Minister of Propaganda.”³⁴ Framing the Ministry as the antithesis of impartiality and labeling Macmillan as the “Minister of Propaganda” rather than the Minister of Information reveals the negative attitude with which the media observed this new

³¹ House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 28 July 1939, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/jul/28/supply-2#S5CV0350P0_19390728_HOC_215

³² Lord Macmillan, *A Man of Law’s Tale* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1953), 166.

³³ *Ibid.*, 166.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Ministry. Because those within the Ministry did not have a clear sense of their role or responsibilities, outside observers projected their own negative perceptions onto them.

Macmillan attempted to portray the Ministry in a more positive light. “I have no intention of conducting a propaganda campaign in Great Britain,” he stated, seeking to counter the media’s rumors of twisted information and censorship.³⁵

Several mishandled situations, however, fueled the criticism of the Ministry. Macmillan had been charged with the responsibility of distributing important war information to the public. Administrative confusion and a lack of authority hindered his efforts. Government Departments, particularly the War Office, Air Ministry, and Admiralty, were responsible for transmitting news regarding the war to the Ministry of Information; the Ministry would then pass this news on to the press. In this way, the Ministry of Information would serve as a vehicle of communication between the government and the public.³⁶ The Government departments, however, were reluctant to put war information in the hands of the Ministry of Information. Thus, while the public looked to Macmillan for authoritative news of the war, he was completely dependent on other departments for knowledge. “I felt this anomalous position of responsibility without power to be really an impossible one,” he explained.³⁷ Ultimately, this would prove to be an insurmountable frustration for Macmillan.

This exasperation permeated Macmillan’s time as Minister. He thought that the Ministry itself was very unusual and took no pride in his position.³⁸ He admitted that he had only the

³⁵ “Cabinet Memorandum: The Scope and Organisation of the Ministry of Information” October 10, 1939. Lord Macmillan. Page 7. <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentonline/DoLUserDownload/summerbeckley@templeedu/CAB/65/1/44/0001.pdf>.

³⁶ Macmillan, *A Man of Law’s Tale*, 170.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 165.

vaguest notion of what his duties actually were.³⁹ When he was asked to step down from his position, in January of 1940, he was relieved to pass the baton.

Macmillan's successor also failed to find an admirable and satisfying identity as Minister of Information. John Reith, an executive of the British Broadcast Company, struggled with the lack of clarity presented by the British government. His diary reflects this frustration; one entry reads, "One is told to do a job by a man who says one ought to do whatever one is asked to do, but who won't and can't tell you what the job is, nor what, if any, support he will give."⁴⁰ Like earlier critics, Reith was skeptical as to whether there was even a place for a Ministry of Information within the British government. Following a conversation with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Reith wrote, "I said he could abolish the Ministry altogether if he liked but it was exotic and belonged to the dictator regimes."⁴¹ He associated the propagandist duties of the Ministry with Nazi Germany and did not believe that it had any proper position within the British political scheme.⁴²

Changing political arrangements on a broader scale soon affected the Ministry. In May of 1940, Chamberlain's government collapsed and Winston Churchill came to power; in the subsequent political reordering, John Reith was relegated to Minister of Transport. Reith, like Lord Macmillan, was ready to leave, summarizing his time in the Ministry of Information as "a dirty business in every way."⁴³ Seen as inherently evil by its leader, the Ministry made no progress in repairing its standing with the public in its four months under John Reith.

The third Minister of Information held his position slightly longer than his predecessors, but he struggled with the same issue of identity. A Conservative Party politician who had

³⁹ Ibid., 168.

⁴⁰ John Reith, *The Reith Diaries* (London: William Collins Sons & Co.), 236.

⁴¹ Ibid., 244.

⁴² Ibid., 245.

⁴³ Ibid., 251.

actively criticized Chamberlain's appeasement policy, Duff Cooper was a friend of Winston Churchill. The tone of Cooper's period as Minister was set before he even took up office. Soon after his appointment as Prime Minister, Churchill met with Duff Cooper to ask him to fill the position of Minister of Information. Churchill apologized to Cooper for offering him the role, explaining that politics limited his freedom in the construction of his Cabinet. The new Prime Minister promised that he would try to raise the status of Minister of Information.⁴⁴ Apparent in Churchill's attitude was the notion that the position as Minister of Information was something of which to be ashamed. This attitude reflected the continuing theme present in the first two ministries; no one in Churchill's cabinet saw the Minister of Information as a respected position. The negative connotations of propaganda continued to haunt the Ministry.

Although Cooper sought to distance himself from this reputation, his attempts to construct a positive image for the Ministry failed. He tried to conceive of his role strictly as a distributor of information. "I sought never to distort or minimize the truth but to keep it in proper proportion to the whole," he explained in his memoirs.⁴⁵ This defensive attitude is implicit throughout his writings. He acknowledges the fact that his position is not respected, commenting that every British man thought he would make just as good a Minister of Information.⁴⁶ In addition, Cooper agreed with his predecessor that propaganda had no place within the British government.⁴⁷ He acknowledged that some sort of organization of communication was important, but he could not come to terms with the implications of propaganda.⁴⁸ His concerns about the Ministry were exacerbated by the fact that he got little support from the Prime Minister. Referring to Cooper, Churchill guiltily commented, "You

⁴⁴ Duff Cooper, *Old Men Forget* (London: Hart-Davis, 1953), 280.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 286.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 288.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

should never harness a thoroughbred to a dung cart.”⁴⁹ Churchill personally liked his Minister of Information, but was not convinced of the role of propaganda within the British government.

Like his forerunners, Cooper left the Ministry with a sigh of relief.⁵⁰ He knew he had not been successful as Minister. He wrote, “One cannot do even propaganda well unless one believes it to be of the very highest importance.”⁵¹ None of the first three Ministers had been able to wholeheartedly support the idea of propaganda. The next Minister would radically change this mindset and subsequently transform the Ministry.

Brendan Bracken differed greatly from his predecessors in age, attitude, background, politics, and strategy. He was at least a decade younger than the previous Ministers and defined himself in opposition to other political officials. In private writings, he referred to individuals of the previous generation as “old Edwardian frumps.”⁵² Perhaps more importantly, he believed they had been “out of touch with life in England before the war.”⁵³ Bracken believed that these older politicians, enveloped in the world of politics for so long, had lost sight of the broader British culture; he, on the other hand, a prominent, young businessman, had been immersed in contemporary English life. He had risen from a nondescript Irish background by making his way in the publishing field. His extensive experience in the media world would prove invaluable to his political career.

Bracken was not thrilled about the idea of becoming Minister; he had observed the position turn into a political graveyard, tarnishing the reputations of the last three leaders. However, Winston Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitkin), a Minister of

⁴⁹ Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart’s diary, 21 December 1947 as found in Charles Lysaght’s *Brendan Bracken* (London: Allen Lane, 1979).

⁵⁰ Cooper, *Old Men Forget*, 288.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 288.

⁵² Brendan Bracken, *My Dear Max* (London: Historian’s Press, 1990), 51.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 51.

Information during the First World War, convinced Bracken that his help was needed. He accepted the position on July 20 of 1941 and would lead the Ministry throughout the remainder of the war. The day after Bracken took office, Lord Beaverbrook sent Bracken a letter. Its content reflected the reputation of the Ministry, yet also signaled the new direction the Ministry would take under Bracken's leadership:

My dear Brendan,

In the ordinary way, it would be looked on as sarcastic or even an unfriendly act to offer a man congratulations on becoming Minister of Information.

In your case this is not so. You are going to make a great success in this office. Your gifts of imagination and energy will be given a scope they have never enjoyed before. And the glory you win will be all the brighter because it shines in a dark and dismal sky.⁵⁴

Combining expertise in media and politics, Bracken successfully forged a new identity for the Ministry. Bracken became the first of the Ministers to view his work as honorable as well as important. He expressed his conviction: "This is a people's war and the people must be told the news about the war because without them and their spirit, we cannot achieve victory."⁵⁵ Bracken saw publicity as something that could either unite or divide a government and its people. By viewing the Ministry through the lens of publicity, he transformed propaganda into a positive endeavor. "Instead of being a whipping boy and a butt for cartoonists," one associate explained, "[the Ministry] began for the first time to feel a sense of pride in its achievements, and to be a force to be reckoned with."⁵⁶ He attributed the Ministry's newfound success to the fact that Bracken defended its honor and developed its sense of self-confidence.⁵⁷ Bracken brought to the Ministry techniques used in advertising and oversaw the Ministry's transformation into a respected government department. Established in the world of media, Bracken served as

⁵⁴ Bracken, *My Dear Max*, 50.

⁵⁵ Charles Lysaght, *Brendan Bracken* (London: Allen Lane, 1979), 194.

⁵⁶ Ronald Tree, *When the Moon was High: Memoirs of Peace and War, 1897-1942* (Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1975), 173.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

proprietor to *The Banker*, *The Financial News*, *Investors Chronicle*, and *the Practitioner*. His existing connections in the industry proved crucial to his success. For example, he made good use of his relationship with Lord Beaverbrook. The media mogul Beaverbrook headed several influential newspapers. Because of his relationship with Bracken, Beaverbrook promised the support of his publications. The media criticism that had haunted the first three Ministers immediately started to change.

Bracken viewed his job as a continuation of his work in media, and by identifying with the new, scientific field of advertising, he was the first leader to legitimize the work of the Ministry. Subtly shifting the Ministry's identity from propagandists to public relations practitioners proved essential in winning over the approval of the public. Unlike his predecessors, Bracken refused to adopt an apologetic tone when speaking about the Ministry.⁵⁸ His ability to view his role positively gave confidence to others in their view of the Ministry. Bracken won over journalists with his open and pragmatic attitude. He brought them into his confidence, flattering them by relaxing censorship rules and trusting them to handle information wisely.⁵⁹ Under Bracken, "Starchy official communiqués and non-committal answers gave way to hard-hitting arguments and tit-bits from late night chats with the Prime Minister."⁶⁰ Giving the public more access to the Ministry, Bracken established an atmosphere of frankness and trust. His attitude and actions were clearly shaped by the strategies that had been developed in the advertising industry.

Grouping himself with the media industry, Bracken was able to disassociate the Ministry from the negative connotations typically linked with propaganda. Recent developments in advertising had grown out of advances in technology, science and political understandings; when

⁵⁸ McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 242

⁵⁹ Charles Lysaght, *Brendan Bracken* (London: Allen Lane, 1979), 196.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

the Ministry of Information based its efforts in these advances, their propaganda was much more successful. The recent growth in the field of advertising proved crucial to the success of the Ministry. While early efforts failed, officials in the Ministry eventually branded themselves as public relations practitioners and created their propaganda out of that identity.

CHAPTER 3: Advertising's Influence on the Ministry's Posters

The Ministry's eventual alliance with the field of advertising revealed itself in the propaganda it created. Tracing the evolution of the Ministry of Information's propaganda campaigns over the course of the war exposes how identifying with advertising deeply affected the creation and success of propaganda posters. Although the Ministry also issued propaganda through the mediums of radio and film, the intersection of commercialism and politics can most prominently be seen in the department's production of posters. In November 1939, the War Cabinet ordered the creation of the Committee on Issue of Warnings Against Discussion of Confidential Matters in Public Places. This Committee, consisting of officials from several government departments (including the Ministry of Information), concluded that posters were the most effective way of distributing their message. The Committee's report explained that through the distribution of hundreds of thousands of posters in various locations, shoppers, office workers, housewives, managers, laborers, artisans, politicians – the entirety of the masses – could be reached through the dissemination of propaganda posters.⁶¹ Government officials identified this medium as the ideal way to serve the broadest population.

The more the Ministry of Information aligned with the advertising industry, the better their campaigns were better received. Brendan Bracken modeled the Ministry on successful businesses. On a regular basis, he sought “the advice of the experts of the advertising profession.”⁶² Bracken sought input from publicity experts in the commercial world, recognizing

⁶¹ “Committee on the Issue of Warnings Against Discussion of Confidential Matters in Public Places.” War Cabinet meeting. *The Cabinet Papers*. 13 November 1939. Cab/6/2/38. <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/DoLUserDownload/summerbeckley@templeedu/cab/67/2/38/0001.pdf>.

⁶² Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007.

the need to fundamentally shift the identity of the Ministry. Beyond brought those from the advertising world directly into the creation of propaganda by employing them within the Ministry. Under its other Ministers, the Ministry had been peopled with amateurs. One civil servant recalled sarcastically that many of the Ministry's initial employees were "spare keepers from the Zoo."⁶³ Bracken, on the other hand, chose to bring in experts from the advertising industry. By 1944, he was able to describe the Ministry as no longer "a nest of amateur singing-birds," but rather, "a large force of professional publicists."⁶⁴ Making these changes, Bracken sealed the link between the commercial and government sectors.

The influence of advertisers within the Ministry of Information can be seen in the progression of poster campaigns over the course of the war. Early campaigns were not well-received, primarily because they did not take accurate stock of the mindset of the British people. The Ministry designed its first propaganda posters in April of 1939, before Great Britain had even declared war. This first campaign consisted of three designs; each had bold white lettering on a red background and featured a crown at the top. The slogans on the three posters read "Keep Calm and Carry On," "Freedom is in Peril/Defend it with all Your Might," and "Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution will Bring Us Victory."⁶⁵ The "Keep Calm" design was held in reserve, but the latter two debuted in the days immediately after the outbreak of war. A. P. Waterfield, a civil servant with no experience in the field of publicity, designed the "Your Courage" slogan as a "rallying war-cry that will...put us in an offensive mood at once."⁶⁶

⁶³ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp.rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ For more on these early designs, see Amy Elizabeth Limoncelli's *Looking the East End in the Face: The Impact of the British Monarchy on Civilian Morale in the Second World War* (Bachelor of Arts thesis, The College of William and Mary, 2010). <https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/bitstream/handle/10288/1945/LimoncelliAmy2010.pdf?sequence=1>

⁶⁶ Waterfield to Ivison Macadam, 17 July 1939 as found in Ian McLaine's *Ministry of Morale*, 31.

The public, however, responded very differently to the poster.

An editorial in the *The Times* commented:

...the insipid and patronizing invocations to which the passer-by is now being treated have a power of exasperation which is all their own...the implication that the public moral needs this kind of support, or if it did, that this is the kind of support it would need, is calculated to provoke a response that is neither academic nor pious...Every citizen of this country knows quite well why it is at war and is fully prepared for his or her part. The common determination is unbounded, and deserves better than to be sprayed with copybook platitudes.⁶⁷

John A. Milne, Vice-President of the Royal Society of



Arts, complained that the poster insulted the intelligence of the British people.⁶⁸ He argued that it served as “more a source of irritation than an inducement to follow its injunctions.”⁶⁹ Milne’s editorial reflected the growing frustration of the populace at the inconsistency in messages provided by their leaders. On 3 September, King George had addressed the British population, calling them to unite and make the war cause their own.⁷⁰ Yet the efforts of the Ministry of Information, not backed by sufficient research on the public consciousness, failed to convince Britons that this was in fact, to use Bracken’s words, a “people’s war.” David Low, a political cartoonist, observed these early failures and blamed the Ministry’s lack of “familiarity with the techniques of persuasion.”⁷¹

As the Ministry progressed, particularly after Brendan Bracken came to power, it adopted advertising’s strategy of focusing heavily on market research. New advertising techniques

⁶⁷ “Poster Patriotism,” *The Times*, Saturday, Sep 23, 1939; pg. 7; Issue 48418; col E .

⁶⁸ John A. Milne, “Poster Patriotism” (Letters to the Editor), *The Times*, Thursday, Sep 28, 1939; pg. 6; Issue 48422; col B.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ King George VI. “Address to the nation.” September 3, 1939. *BBC Archives*. “WWII: Outbreak: Britain on the Brink of World War II.” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/ww2outbreak/7918.shtml>.

⁷¹ David Low, *Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957), 322.

centered on the advances in psychological research that had occurred in past decades. Under Brendan Bracken's leadership, and the subsequent influx of advertisers into the Ministry, specific research techniques were used to develop strategies. In August 1941, the month after Bracken took office, the War-time Social Survey merged into the Ministry of Information. Bracken utilized their methods of questionnaires and interviews as a way to gauge public opinion. During Duff Cooper's tenure, the Ministry had operated with the vague goal of "helping to maintain the morale of the people."⁷² Instead of trying to "stimulate public morale," Bracken explained, he would use new methods of research to "break down psychological barriers."⁷³ Officials began to rely on Home Intelligence reports and the work of Tom Harisson's Mass Observation project to determine what would garner a positive response from the public. While early leaders had assumed that the best method was to provide dramatic morale-boosting messages, research showed that a significant component of civilian morale was affected simply by receiving ample news. Whether the news was good or bad, the British people craved to be on the *inside* of their government's activities. They would gladly bear sacrifices as long as they felt they had the confidence of their leaders.⁷⁴

⁷² Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (6 August 1940) 41-64, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CAS5CV0363P0-0001

⁷³ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007

⁷⁴ McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 279.




The influence of expert advertisers is evident in the way the Ministry of Information's poster campaigns shifted over the course of the war. These new employees of the Ministry began utilizing the psychological understandings that had benefited businesses' advertising over the past decades. For example, Trotter and Le Bon's research had concluded that the mind's first impulse was to follow the example of a trusted leader.⁷⁵ Winston Churchill's speeches were wildly popular among the British people.⁷⁶ The Ministry of Information learned to capitalize on that reputation, utilizing Churchill's phrases on some of their most successful posters. For example, an image of Churchill against a background of British airplanes and tanks, with his phrase, "Let us go forward together," took advantage of Churchill's popularity and included the masses as a part of the "us" that was fighting the war.

⁷⁵ Bernays, *Propaganda*, 50.

⁷⁶ McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 99.

The success of the Ministry of Information's posters, as measured by public responses and intelligence reports, rose with the increased use of advertising techniques. One way this can be seen is in the adoption of graphic design techniques developed in advertising firms. The Ministry's early posters were simple; white text on a solid colored background. Aneurin Bevan, a Labour Party politician, complained that, "the impression is now universal that if the Germans do not manage to bomb us to death the Ministry of Information will bore us to death."⁷⁷ When John A. Milne had complained about the "Your Courage" poster, he suggested the production of more artistic posters that would "interest and stimulate the public and act as an inspiring tonic."⁷⁸ He pointed out the fact that Great Britain had many talented poster artists that could be put to use by the Ministry. Advertisers in the 1920s and 1930s had realized the need to make the printed message "attractive and persuasive" in order to be competitive.⁷⁹ Brendan




⁷⁷ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (21 September 1939) 1058-61, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/sep/21/ministry-of-information#S5CV0351P0_19390921_HOC_217

⁷⁸ John A. Milne, "Poster Patriotism" (Letters to the Editor), *The Times*, Thursday, Sep 28, 1939; pg. 6; Issue 48422; col B.

⁷⁹ Bernays, Propaganda, 64


Bracken had recognized this issue before he even became Minister. In a House of Commons debate in 1939, he had stated that the world was already “dazed and bored by propaganda.”⁸⁰ He solved this problem by bringing in advertising experts. Bracken spoke of “borrowing” from the professions of the advertisers he employed.⁸¹ The Ministry’s posters clearly reveal this type of borrowing in the popular advertising graphic styles they utilize.

The intersection of the commercial and the political can ultimately be seen in the way businesses utilized the war effort for their own advertising purposes. In the same way that the Ministry of Information adopted the techniques of commercial advertising, businesses eventually latched onto the conflict as a way to promote their products. For example, a wartime advertisement for Gala lipstick showed an image of a servicewoman and proclaimed that, “its use in moderation is an asset to our wartime morale.” The complete intertwining of commercial publicity and governmental persuasion crucially affected the output of the Ministry of Information.



CHARACTER

A WOMAN'S LIPS are a key to her character, and to-day lips have a firmer and more resolute line, for they shape words of command, laugh at danger, and with a smile suppress weariness and pain. A little lipstick gives added character to the mouth and added self-confidence to the wearer. It is for this reason that the makers of Gala continue to manufacture this famous lipstick and suggest that its use in moderation is an asset to our wartime morale.



Gala Lipstick, 4/6. Refills (fit almost any case), 2/6.
Gala Powder, 4/6. Gala Cream, 4/6.

THE *Finest* LIPSTICK IN TOWN

⁸⁰ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (28 July 1939) 1883-916, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1939/jul/28/supply-2#S5CV0350P0_19390728_HOC_215

⁸¹ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007

CONCLUSION

In a Parliamentary debate on 29 June 1944, British politicians discussed the past of the Ministry of Information and attempted to determine its future. The prevalent sentiment expressed was that the Ministry had undergone an “extraordinary transformation” over the course of the war.⁸² In 1940, the Ministry’s own leader had verbalized its widespread reputation when he called it “a dirty business in every way.”⁸³ Yet, by 1944, the Ministry’s status had clearly improved. A report of the Official Committee on the Machinery of Government described the Ministry as having “a thoroughness and solidarity, combined with flexibility and enterprise, which are hall-marks of administrative efficiency.”⁸⁴ Clearly, something at its core had changed.

Several officials in the June 1944 Parliamentary debate credited the Ministry of Information’s success to Brendan Bracken’s charisma. Bracken, however, recognized that the true reason for the Ministry’s transformation went deeper. Ultimately, it was an underlying recognition of the need to use “all modern devices of publicity” that caused the fundamental shift in the Ministry.⁸⁵ Only when officials were able to conceive of themselves as public relations practitioners, rather than propagandists, were they able to form an effective Ministry. Identifying with the burgeoning field of advertising allowed the Ministry of Information to view its work as legitimate and disassociate itself from the negative connotations of political propaganda.

⁸² Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007

⁸³ Reith, *The Reith Diaries*, 251.

⁸⁴ Draft report of the Official Committee on the Machinery of Government on the post-war plans for the MoI, 28 March 1944, INF 1/941 [as found in McLaine’s *Ministry of Morale*, 241].

⁸⁵ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007

Political leaders saw World War II as fundamentally “an ideological war.”⁸⁶

Consequently, this era saw an unprecedented focus on the way governments could persuade and manipulate their subjects. In Great Britain, this came with complications as officials struggled to justify the usage of propaganda. The Ministry of Information’s central conflict of propaganda’s place within a democratic society is relevant to our world today. Understanding the identity crisis undergone by the Ministry of Information forces us to think more deeply about how we respond to propaganda in our own day and age. Ultimately, the actions of the Ministry of Information during the war helped normalize the commercialization of government. In March 1946, the Ministry of Information was transformed into the Central Office of Information, which exists in Great Britain to this day. The need for government propaganda, initially intended to exist only during the crisis of warfare, lingered into peacetime. Today, every major government has some type of publicity department. Political consultants are ubiquitous, and government officials and departments throughout the world hire public relations firms’ film directors, producers, and editors. Even Al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden had his own media consultant.⁸⁷ Leaders find it necessary to sell government, like any other product, to their consumers. By identifying with advertising, the Ministry of Information helped normalize the practice of propaganda in democratic nations. Transformed by new mediums, disguised by new nominalizations, government propaganda still exists, seeking to mold the minds of the masses. The identity crisis of the British Ministry of Information during the Second World War forces us to examine our own government’s system of publicity and raises fundamental questions about how we determine propaganda’s true place in a democratic society.

⁸⁶ Parliamentary Debates, Commons, (5th ser.) (29 June 1944) 769-938, http://gateway.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp-us&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:rec:CDS5CV0401P0-0007

⁸⁷ David Ignatius, “How Al Qaeda Tried to Control the Media,” *Washington Post*, March 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/al-qaedas-attempts-to-control-the-media/2012/03/20/gIQAbu0EQS_story.html?hpid=z2.

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