"PRACTICALLY IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES": THE 1ST REGIMENT, NATIONAL GUARD OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1903-1912

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ABSTRACT

In the early twentieth century, reformers within the U.S. War Department attempted to create a more robust and formalized reserve system to augment the regular army. While many regular officers advocated a federalized reserve, they were opposed by members of the National Guard Association, who insisted that state troops remain the nation's second line of defense. In 1903, Congress passed the Dick Act, which stipulated that militia and National Guard units would continue to serve as the primary reserve to the regular army. To ensure Guardsmen were up to the task, Congress also required that state units conform to the regular army's organization, armament, and discipline.

This thesis examines the changes facilitated by the Dick Act within Pennsylvania's National Guard, by focusing specifically on a single unit- the 1st Regiment of Infantry. It begins by exploring failed efforts by federal and state officials to change the 1st Regiment by 1908. It then examines the effects of increased federal funding and oversight on the regiment after 1908, and how these factors led to changes in the way the unit trained. Annual reports from the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania and the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs provided the majority of the information for this thesis. Contemporary periodicals and documents maintained in the First Regiment Infantry Museum also helped to shed light on the activities of the 1st Regiment between 1903 and 1912. This thesis concludes that by 1912 the 1st Regiment achieved relative parity with the regulars in terms of organization and equipment, the type of field training it conducted, and the type of training its officers attended.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Following the Spanish American War, reformers within the U.S. War Department attempted to improve the U.S. Army's ability to meet foreign and domestic threats to national security. As part of these efforts, they attempted to create a more robust and formalized reserve system to augment the regular army. Many regular officers advocated a national reserve force, which they believed would be free from the friction that accompanied mobilizing state volunteer and militia units in the past.[1] Those who proposed such a system met stiff resistance from members of the National Guard Association and many members of Congress, who believed that state troops should continue to serve as the nation's second line of defense.[2]

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[1] Ronald Glenn Machoian, *William Harding Carter and the American Army: A Soldier's Story* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 181-86.

[2] Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 108-9; Martha Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 22-26, Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 141-43; Jim Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co., 1964),179-86; John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 138-39; Charles D. McKenna, "The Forgotten Reform: Field Maneuvers in the Development of the United States Army, 1902-1920," (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1981), 66-67; Allan R. Millett, and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*. Rev. ed. (New York, Free Press, 2012), 295-96; Russell F. Weigley, *Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 150; William R. Roberts, "Reform and Revitalization, 1890-1903,"in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 210-11.

These opposing groups reached a compromise with the passage of the Militia Act of 1903, often referred to as the Dick Act. The Dick Act stipulated that state militia and National Guard units would continue to serve as the primary reserve to the regular army, provided they conformed to the regular "organization, armament, and discipline" by 1908.[3] In order to ensure state units met these standards, the Dick Act authorized the War Department to provide state forces with federal equipment, increased federal funding for state forces, and required state units to conduct a total of twenty-nine days of training each year. The Dick Act also called for regular army officers to inspect and advise state forces. Finally, the law authorized the use of federal funds for state forces to conduct training alongside regular troops and for state officers to attend regular army schools. While the Dick Act did not actually require state troops to participate in these last two training opportunities, they were included in the Dick Act in order to provide state forces with opportunities to ensure their men and officers were trained in a similar manner to the regular Army.[4]

Most historians argue that the Dick Act failed bring state forces up to regular army standards and therefore failed to create a reliable reserve force for the regular Army. Noting friction between state and federal officials, many scholars contend that while state forces may have been better armed and equipped, they remained tied to their traditional peacetime roles as ceremonial or strike-breaking forces. Historians also frequently note the poor performance of state troops at joint maneuvers with the regular

[3] Fifty-Seventh Congress, Session II, 1902, "An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other Purposes," Public Law No. 33, January 21, 1903.

[4] Fifty-Seventh Congress, Session II, 1902, "An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other Purposes"; Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 109-11; Doubler, 144-45; Hill, 186-89; Mahon, 139-40; McKenna, 67-68; Weigley, 150, 174.

army and highlight the lack of attendance of state officers at Army schools.[5] The generally accepted narrative continues that as a result of these shortcomings, the National Guard did not become a viable national military reserve until after the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916.[6] A few historians note that the Dick Act effected some positive changes, but the extent of these improvements varied greatly from state to state.[7]

The specific improvements that occurred in certain states as a result of the Dick Act are addressed in some state-level military histories.[8] Only a handful of historians who have examined this period, however, have detailed the changes that occurred as a result of the Dick Act within an individual regiment (the primary organization of both the regular army and National Guard in 1903).[9] And while historians have noted the poor

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[5] Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Army Enters the Twentieth Century, 1904-1917," in Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts, eds., *Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 220-22; Doubler, 149.

[6] Machoian 187; Millett, and Maslowski, 295-96; Gregory J.W. Urwin, *The United States Infantry: An Illustrated History, 1775-1918* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1988), 150.

[7] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 123-28, Mahon, 140-48.

[8] Joseph G. Bilby, *New Jersey: A Military History* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2017), 170-75; Jerry Cooper, with Glenn Smith, *Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard* (Fargo, N.D.: North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, 1986), 117-49; William A. Pencak, Christian B. Keller, and Barbara A. Gannon, *Pennsylvania: A Military History* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2016), 212-15. All are state level military histories that focus on the Dick Act and its impact to varying degrees.

[9] Harmon Yerkes Gordon, *History of the First Regiment Infantry of Pennsylvania and Antecedent and Successor Echelons to the 103d Engineer Battalion (Infantry Division), Pennsylvania Army National Guard (The Dandy First), 1777-1961* (Philadelphia: Legal Intelligencer, 1961), 110-14, 121. While an excellent history of the regiment covered in this thesis, it provides very little detail about the impact of the Dick Act on the unit. Also see Barry M. Stentiford, "The Meaning of a Name: The Rise of the National Guard and the End of a Town Militia," *Journal of Military History* 72 (July 2008): 727–54 and George N. Vourlojianis, *The Cleveland Grays: An Urban Military Company, 1837-1919*

record of state units and officers at army maneuvers and schools, few scholars have attempted to determine if particular states or individual units began to improve the quality of their own training and model it on that of the regular army as a result of the Dick Act.[10]

Jerry Cooper provided the most plausible explanation for why certain state units improved more than others in *The Rise of the National Guard*. He noted a direct correlation between states that spent more money on their forces and the performance of those units. Cooper, however, also made another interesting observation concerning the State of Pennsylvania, a state noted for the relative proficiency of its troops. Not only did Pennsylvania spend more money than all but one other state on its troops, but it also was the first state in the Union to create a state police force, and it did so specifically to relieve the National Guard of Pennsylvania of strike-breaking and riot control duty. The combination of increased funding and the ability to focus on military duties, certainly aided Pennsylvania Guardsmen in becoming a more capable reserve for the regular army.[11]

More than most historians, Jerry Cooper and Michael Doubler focused on the impact of several actions taken by the federal government in 1908. First, Congress passed an amendment to the Dick Act, on May 27. This amendment not only lifted certain geographic and temporal restrictions on the mobilization of the National Guard in the event of a national emergency, but it also nearly doubled federal funding for state

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(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2002), 91-100. Both are histories of individual militia companies and focus on the changing nature of their ties to the local community.

[10] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard,* 142-43; Doubler, 128, 144-48.

[11] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard,* 132, 48, 181-83; Cooper, *Citizens as Soldiers*, 118, Doubler, 151-52.

forces.[12] Cooper went so far as to call it as "the most important national legislation in militia history."[13] Cooper also noted that as a result of the 1908 amendment and a large volume of negative reports from regular army officers assigned to observe state forces, the War Department created the Division of Militia Affairs to provide increased federal oversight on state forces. The Division of Militia affairs, in-turn, pushed to assign more regular army Inspector-Instructors to state forces. Increased federal funding and oversight appears to have provided excellent dividends in states that made additional efforts to improve the quality of their forces, such as Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts.[14]

This thesis expands on the work of Cooper, Doubler, and others by examining the changes facilitated by the Dick Act within Pennsylvania's National Guard by focusing specifically on a single unit- the 1st Regiment of Infantry. The combination of increased funding and direct supervision from the War Department transformed the equipment, organization, and training of the 1st Regiment between 1903 and 1912. By 1912, the 1st Regiment conformed to regular army equipment and organizational standards, conducted field maneuvers in a manner similar to that of the regular army, and its officers participated in a robust system of professional development at the state and unit level. Prior to 1908, the state made some progress in securing new uniforms and equipment, but the regiment failed to conform to regular army organizational standards, carried outdated weapons, and its field training and officer training left something to be desired. After changes at the federal level in 1908, the 1st Regiment made tremendous strides, achieving

[12] Millett and Maslowski, 295-96.

[13] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard,* 111.

[14] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard,* 112-17, 142-43; Doubler, 151-52.

relative parity with the regulars in terms of organization and equipment, the type of field training it conducted, and the type of training its officers attended. This trend appeared to continue after 1912, as the unit received upgraded equipment and went through realistic field training. The 1st Regiment's officers also increasingly took their role more seriously; one of its officers even contributed an article to an army professional journal in 1914. While the 1st Regiment certainly did not become a carbon-copy of a regular infantry regiment, it used the twenty-nine days of drill required by the Dick Act to conduct training that compared well to regular army standards by 1912.

By the time of the Dick Act's passage, the 1st Regiment possessed a rich history, tracing its lineage to predecessor militia and volunteer units that had fought in the Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Civil War, and Spanish-American War under a variety of unit designations. Following the Spanish American War, the state officially designated the unit as the 1st Regiment Infantry, National Guard of Pennsylvania. The 1st Regiment consisted of a headquarters section and three battalions. Each battalion consisted of four companies, and each company totaled 60 officers and men. Including the field and staff officers, the regiment's total strength rested at approximately 750 personnel.[15]

The state assigned the 1st Regiment to the 1st Brigade of the state's division. The division consisted of three brigades, each comprised of several units from the various branches of the service. Specifically, each brigade consisted of between four to five infantry regiments, one to two troops of cavalry, and in the case of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, one battery of light artillery and one Gatling gun battery, respectfully. In total,

[15] State of Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1903* (Harrisburg: William Stanley Ray, State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1904), 423.

the division contained fourteen infantry regiments, five troops of cavalry, one battery of light artillery, and one Gatling gun battery, with a total combined strength of 9,500 officers and men.[16]

The 1st Regiment, based in Philadelphia, enjoyed an excellent reputation with the local community, as well as with state officials. The regimental commander, Colonel Wendell P. Bowman, was a respected Philadelphia lawyer, a veteran of both the Civil War and Spanish American War, and had commanded the regiment since 1887.[17] While the 1st Regiment may have been an excellent National Guard unit, and its officers enjoyed solid reputations, it remained to be seen whether or not it could measure up to the standards of the regular army. From 1903 to 1908, the 1st Regiment struggled to adapt to the changes required by Dick Act and to become a capable reserve to the regular army.[18] The road ahead would prove to be a rocky one.

[16] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1903*, 2-3.

[17] Sam Hudson, *Pennsylvania and its Public Men* (Philadelphia: Hudson & Joseph, 1909), 211.

[18] James W. Latta, *History of the First Regiment Infantry National Guard of Pennsylvania (Gray Reserves) 1861-1911* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1912), 6; Gordon, xv-xvi, 106.

CHAPTER 2

FAILURE: 1903-1907

The half a decade that followed the passage of the Dick Act marked a period of limited progress for the 1st Regiment. It received new uniforms and a few new pieces of equipment, but did not consistently receive upgraded weapons or meet regular army standards of organization. The 1st attempted to conduct a field maneuver like the regular army, but it amounted to little more than a recreation of a Civil War battle, and failed to impress the unit's regular army advisor. Loathe to break with old patterns, the officers of the 1st Regiment continued to focus on ceremonial and social duties and attended little training that would prepare them for modern warfare. Certainly, the unit was slightly better prepared to serve in a reserve capacity by the beginning of 1908 than it had been in 1903, but it still fell short of the level uniformity, organization, and proficiency that the Dick Act had envisioned.

Uniforms, Equipment, Armament, and Organization

The Dick Act specifically required state troops to be equipped, armed, and organized in the same manner as the regular army by January 21, 1908. It also authorized state troops to be issued the same "stores and supplies" as issued to regulars. In order to facilitate the process of arming, equipping, and organizing state troops like the regular army, Congress authorized the War Department to issue weapons and equipment directly to the states, and authorized federal funds for the states to purchase these items as well. As a result, Pennsylvania began providing its troops with new uniforms and equipment between 1903 and 1908, but it failed to secure the most up-to-date rifles prior to the

deadline. The entire National Guard of Pennsylvania also struggled to conform to federal standards of organization, and the 1st Regiment was no exception. As a result, the 1st Regiment made only partial progress, failing to comply with federal law in the time required.

In 1903, the 1st Regiment turned out in state issue uniforms made from a different material than the khaki uniforms the U.S. Army adopted in 1902.[19] When Colonel James Regan, of the 9th U.S. Infantry, observed the National Guard of Pennsylvania in 1904, he noted that the entire Guard wore uniforms which were "not of our color, but that of a French grey which after being worn a while looks like dirty linen." He also observed that the men wore black leather shoes, leggings, and dark blue flannel shirts that were similar to those currently worn by the U.S. Army. Acknowledging the intent of the Dick Act, he commented that "as these troops under existing orders may be called into the service of the United States, there seems to be no good reason against their conforming strictly to our uniform in color, make and other details"[20] In this spirit, Pennsylvania replaced the state issued khaki uniform with the standard U.S. Army version in 1906.

Pennsylvania Guardsmen wore this new uniform, along with new campaign hats and leggings for the first time at the summer encampment later that year.[21] While these uniforms were closer in appearance to the current U.S. Army uniform, Major Joseph T. Dickman, the regular officer assigned to observe the 1st Brigade in 1906, noted that "the

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[19] Latta, 506; Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr., ed., *Regulations and Notes for the Uniform of the Army of the United States, 1902* (Staten Island, NY: Manor Publishing, 1976), 22.

[20] State of Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, 1904* (Harrisburg: Harrisburg Publishing Co., State Printers, 1905), 345.

[21] State of Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1906*, (Harrisburg: Harrisburg Publishing Co., State Printers, 1908), 6, 284, 400.

canvas leggins [sic], said to be according to the Army standards, were too long for comfort in marching."[22] During this time, the state also replaced one of the Guardsman's most important accoutrements. The blue web cartridge belt of the outdated Mills pattern gave way to the U. S. Army pattern, woven pocketed cartridge belt with suspenders.[23] The 1st Regiment also turned in its single-shot, "trapdoor" Springfield rifles and received magazine rifles of the Krag-Jorgensen design almost immediately after Congress passed the Dick Act.[24] Adopted by the regular army in 1892, the Krag was already past its prime. The Pennsylvanians were still carrying Krags in 1907, as the state had not yet acquired the new 1903 Springfield rifles used by the regular army.[25] While some progress had been made, clearly the 1st Regiment was not uniformed and equipped exactly like the regular army.

The state of Pennsylvania also failed to force units to adapt to the organizational structure required by the War Department. In the early 1900s, a regular company consisted of nearly double the number of privates as found in the 1st Regiment's companies. Regular companies also included two military cooks and musicians, which were not included in the 1st Regiment's table of organization.[26] While the War Department did not require state companies to maintain the same number of privates as a

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[22] Ibid., 415.

[23] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1904*, 345; State of Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1905* (Harrisburg: Harrisburg Publishing Co., State Printers, 1906), 326.

[24] Latta, 524.

[25] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1904*, 227; State of Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1908* (Harrisburg: C. E. Aughinbuagh, Printer to the State of Pennsylvania, 1910), 401.

[26] War Department, *Field Service Regulations: United States Army, 1905* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 19.

regular army unit during peacetime, it did insist that the Guard companies enlist cooks and musicians. The War Department also stipulated that each Guard regiment maintain a regimental cook, band, and hospital section, as found in regular regiments.[27]

Following the passage of the Dick Act, the 1st Regiment added the appropriate number of musicians and a hospital section to its table of organization, but it did not enlist cooks at the company or regimental level.[28] Throughout this period, several regular army and National Guard officers remarked that the Guard as whole continued to hire civilian cooks by contract for their summer camp.[29] To correct this deficiency, Pennsylvania's state headquarters issued General Orders, No. 10, in 1907. This order stated "this practice should be discontinued, and special efforts be made to have cooks regularly enlisted and thoroughly trained."[30] By early 1908, however, it appears that the 1st Regiment had not followed this entreaty and still deviated from federal regulations.[31]

By the beginning of 1908, the 1st Regiment's personnel dressed much like regular soldiers, but they were not armed or organized like the regular army. It is interesting to note that this failure to comply with the regular army table of organization resulted from their failure to assign cooks to each company, as this directly affected how the organization functioned whenever it took the field. Since the regiment made progress in

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[27] War Department, *Regulations of the War Department Governing the Organized Militia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 26.

[28] Latta, 525.

[29] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1905*, 73-75.

[30] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1907* (Harrisburg: Harrisburg Publishing Co., State Printers, 1909), 297.

[31] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1908* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908), 115.

emulating the appearance of a regular army unit, what it did or did not do in field operations increasingly became a concern of the regular army advisors assigned to observe the regiment.

Field Training

The 1st Regiment, and most of the National Guard of Pennsylvania had attended some form of summer encampment nearly every year since 1869.[32] Some of these training exercises had been observed by regular army officers in an unofficial capacity.[33] For the first time, however, the War Department detailed a serving regular officer in 1903 to observe the Guard's summer encampment and report on the condition of the troops involved.[34] Over the course of the next five years, the War Department gradually increased the number of regular army officers sent to observe the Pennsylvania National Guard.

Initially, the regular officers assigned to this duty reported that while the Guard encampment made for a fine ceremonial spectacle, the citizen soldiers failed to take full advantage of an ideal opportunity to conduct extended-order drills or field maneuvers. The importance of these exercises had become apparent to many military theorists during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An increase in the complexity, scale, and lethality of warfare necessitated a departure from close-order drill and small unit training. Military theorists recognized that increased dispersion and the ability to properly

[32] Gordon, 89.

[33] Ibid., 108.

[34] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1903*, 644.

maneuver large formations could mean the difference between success or failure on the modern battlefield. During the late nineteenth century, the U.S. Army began to close smaller posts and whenever possible assigned an entire regiment to the same post. The army also placed more of an emphasis on the use of extended-order formations and large-scale training exercises. As time went on, the Guard attempted to conduct these modern tactical exercises, but by the end of 1907, ceremonial training and inspections still consumed the majority of time Guardsmen spent at annual encampments.[35]

Field maneuvers that involved units larger than a regiment were a relatively new phenomenon even for the regular army. The first was held at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1902, and despite some initial friction, those who witnessed it generally regarded it as a success, and therefore worth repeating. [36] The following year, the War Department sponsored two slightly larger field maneuvers, one at Camp Young, Kentucky, and the other once again at Fort Riley. The Dick Act authorized the Secretary of War "to provide for participation by any part of the organized militia of any State or Territory on the request of the governor thereof in the encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the Regular army."[37] Consequently, a large body of state troops participated in these exercises.[38] In September 1904, nearly 5,000 regular troops and 21,000 state troops from seventeen different states participated in field maneuvers at Manassas,

[35] McKenna, 14-16, 19.

[36] McKenna, 59-66; Clark, 204-5.

[37] Fifty-Seventh Congress, "An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other Purposes."

[38] McKenna, 72-73; Clark, 204-5.

Virginia.[39] Troops from the National Guard of Pennsylvania were conspicuously absent from these maneuvers.[40] Instead, Pennsylvania opted to continue to conduct the same type of annual encampment that they had in previous years. The 1st Regiment therefore joined the rest of the division at Camp Quay, established on the battlefield of Gettysburg in July of 1904.[41]

Colonel James Regan, the same officer who noted that the state issue uniform did not conform to regular army fashions, also observed what he believed were several deficiencies or missed opportunities in the type of training that the Guard conducted at Camp Quay. The most egregious shortcoming was that Pennsylvania Guardsmen focused more on inspections and ceremonial duty than they did on realistic combat training. He not only described deficiencies in the Guard's routine, but also recommended several ways that the citizen soldiers could conduct more realistic training. In addition, Regan concluded that the present length of the annual summer encampment was too short to incorporate the full extent of the changes he proposed.

Upon arriving at Gettysburg, Colonel Regan found the encampment "rife with inspections," and noted that Guardsmen devoted most of their time was to close order drills, formal inspections, and parades. According to his estimate, the Guard allocated nearly five days to these activities, and spent most of the remaining three days of the encampment setting up and breaking down the camp. The extent of these administrative and ceremonial activities not only prevented the Guardsmen from receiving more realistic

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[39] McKenna, 86-88; Clark, 204-5; Doubler, 149.

[40] "The Week's Doings in National Guard Circles," *Philadelphia Inquirer,* August 14, 1904.

[41] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1904*, 6.

training, but also prevented Colonel Regan from delivering the lectures on tactics that he had prepared prior to his arrival. As a result of what he observed, he concluded that there was a need for "a radical change in the system of duties as now carried on in the camps of the Guard of Pennsylvania." He accordingly explained to Guard officers how they could shift the focus of the annual encampment from ceremonial duty to combat oriented training.[42]

Colonel Regan believed the terrain around Gettysburg was well suited to conduct field maneuvers. In this spirit, he explained to several Guard officers that an "excellent opportunity offered itself for an exhibition of grand tactics over the broad battle-fields of Gettysburg." He elaborated that "this could have been done by outlining the enemy with one brigade with its outposts to be driven in by two other brigades coming from an opposite direction with advance and rear guards." Not limiting his vision to the role of infantry brigades in such maneuvers, he also noted that the "cavalry could have been used for a screen and for security and information." In Colonel Regan's opinion, such activities would provide a much more valuable and realistic experience for the Guard.[43]

As much as Colonel Regan hoped that the Guard would adopt his suggestions, he ultimately concluded that eight days was not enough time to accomplish all of these activities. He recommended extending the encampment to "say two weeks or fifteen days."[44] It remained to be seen if the State of Pennsylvania would be amenable to an extension of the summer encampment. Nevertheless, Regan had provided Guard officers

[42] Ibid., 345.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

with valuable feedback that could help them shift the focus of their summer encampment.

Colonel Regan's report provides an accurate picture of the state of training in the Pennsylvania National Guard in 1904. The entire Guard clearly exhibited more concern for its traditional ceremonial role than with becoming a true combat-ready reserve for the regular army. Regan did not indicate that he spoke directly to any officers from the 1st Regiment, but his remarks were incorporated into Pennsylvania's annual Adjutant General's Report, and they were readily available to all Guard officers later that year. Their willingness to incorporate any of Colonel Regan's proposed reforms, and specifically those regarding the conduct of more realistic training, would demonstrate if the 1st Regiment took its new role the under the Dick Act seriously or not.

The following year, the National Guard of Pennsylvania took a dispersed approach to its annual encampment, having each brigade occupy a different location. For eight days in July, the 1st Regiment joined the rest of its brigade at Camp Pattison, established near the Bucks County village of Perkasie. The War Department detailed Major Thaddeus W. Jones, of the 13th U. S. Cavalry Regiment, to observe the encampment. Before arriving, he noted that the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania informed him that the encampment's location in agricultural country would make extended field exercises impossible. Jones nonetheless made his way to Perkasie, and once there recorded careful observations concerning the training conducted by the 1st Brigade.[45]

Like Colonel Regan, Major Jones observed that most of the eight days of camp were consumed with ceremonial duties. He noted that drilling focused mainly on "the

[45] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1905,* 6, 385.

school of the soldier and the school of the squad in preparation for the inspection of the Brigade by the Inspector General." Due to the lack of sufficient terrain for field maneuvers, the 1st Brigade staged regimental or brigade reviews, parades, and inspections nearly every day of the camp. Major Jones also "gave no practical instruction," but when the brigade commander, Colonel John W. Schall, asked him to point out mistakes and deficiencies, he quickly complied.[46]

Some units within the brigade, however, at least attempted to carry out some form of practical training. Major Jones observed that across the brigade "some practice was had in advance guard duty." Additionally, while the 1st Regiment and the majority of the brigade did not conduct any practice marches, Company G, 2nd Regiment, did execute a forty-two-mile march back to Philadelphia at the end of the encampment, reaching its destination within a day-and-a half. Major Jones also noticed a captain in the 2nd Regiment holding a signal class for two lieutenants and twenty enlisted men.[47] There were signs that some things were changing within the 1st Brigade, but the 1st Regiment generally passed the summer encampment of 1905 in the same manner that it had in previous years.

In 1906, the National Guard of Pennsylvania returned in a body to Gettysburg for its summer encampment. This year, however, the War Department assigned five regular officers to observe the proceedings. The officer who led this detail, Major Joseph T. Dickman, had written the army's *Field Service Regulations* the year prior to his attendance at the Guard's camp. This manual integrated the drill of all branches of the

[46] Ibid., 387-89.

[47] Ibid., 387-90.

service into a single cohesive document for the first time in the army's history.[48] Dickman was also one of the General Staff officers who helped plan the regular army's 1903 maneuvers at Camp Young and Fort Riley.[49] The presence of four additional officers enabled Dickman to focus his attention on the division headquarters, while his associates each observed a brigade. Captain John W. Furlong, also a member of the General Staff, was assigned to the 1st Brigade.[50]

Captain Furlong remarked that once again the 1st Brigade spent almost the entire camp conducting guard mounts, dress parades, reviews, and inspections. He did not witness any practice marches, nor by his account did a single unit in the brigade train in heavy marching order. He only saw one battalion attempt a single drill in a combat formation and noted that for the majority of the camp "no attempt was made to give thorough instruction in advance guard or outpost duty." Instead, the 1st Brigade focused on conducting close order drills, only occasionally attempting company and battalion-level training in extended order. He, did take notice, however, of what he referred to as a "so-called field maneuver."

The press coverage for this event featured an exciting article titled "An Imaginary Battle Fought at Gettysburg." The author noted that the 1st Brigade occupied the position held by the Union III Corps during the battle of Gettysburg, and that the 1st Regiment was posted in a line of battle in a patch of woods near the Peach Orchard. It then described the mock-combat in which the men of the 1st Brigade defended their position against an

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[48] Clark, 217.

[49] Clark, 218, McKenna, 69.

[50] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1906,* 6.

imaginary enemy for several hours.[51] Despite the article's positive tone, Captain Furlong was not impressed. He described the operation as follows:

> The only movements made were to have two companies face to the rear to simulate the maneuver that occurred when the center of the line was broken by Barksdale's and Kershaw's Brigade, [in the original battle on July 2, 1863] and to have a portion of the line to the left of the wheat field withdraw about 200 yards and then charge forward. The regiments were marched individually to the line to be occupied and deployed on it in a manner that would be impossible in the face of an enemy. No supports or reserves were placed and many portions of the line occupied were untenable.

Perhaps Captain Furlong's most damning statement came at the end of his report, which was initially submitted to the War Department and later forwarded to the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania at the end of the summer. He bluntly stated that "from a professional point of view the exercise was worthless and a waste of time."[52] Despite Furlong's criticism, this exercise demonstrated at least a slight indication that the Pennsylvania National Guard was beginning to take its new role more seriously. The fact that the Guardsmen struggled in their first attempt at a new training event is not surprising. While Furlong's critiques were likely justified, the real significance of this simulated battle was not in how well the men performed, but that it happened at all in the first place.

Unfortunately, the 1st Regiment made minimal progress in field training the following year during its separate brigade encampment, again held at Perkasie.[53] The lack of available maneuver space once again precluded large field exercises, but the

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[51] "An Imaginary Battle Fought at Gettysburg," *Reading Eagle,* July 25, 1906.

[52] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1906,* 422.

[53] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1907,* 64.

Pennsylvania Division's Inspector, Colonel Frank Sweeny, noted that despite the fact that "little opportunity is afforded for practice in field exercises," the men performed relatively well in extended order, advance and rear guard maneuvers, and outpost exercises.[54] Aside from giving more attention to extended order drill and outpost exercises, however, it appears that there was little difference between the brigade encampments at Perkasie in 1905 and 1907.

The attempted maneuver at Gettysburg in 1906 and focus on extended order drills at Perkasie in 1907 showed that the 1st Regiment was progressing to some degree. As with armament and organization, however, the progress of the National Guard of Pennsylvania largely fell short of the intent of the Dick Act. The actions of the entire division during the annual encampments of 1904 to 1907 differed only slightly from what it had done prior to the passage of the Dick Act. The same can be said for the training the 1st Regiment's officers attended during those years.

Officer Training

The Dick Act authorized the use of federal funds for state officers to "attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military school or college of the United States."[55] At the time Congress passed this legislation, these schools consisted of garrison schools at various army posts and the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.[56] One month later, Congress passed the General Staff Act, creating the Army

[54] Ibid., 409.

[55] Fifty-Seventh Congress, "An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia."

[56] Nenninger, 227-29. Nenninger notes that the garrison schools and the school at Fort Leavenworth underwent a series of changes in structure, curriculum, and name throughout the 1890s and 1900s. Even in official correspondence from the 1900s, the

War College.[57] Like field maneuvers, these schools were fairly new products of reforms within the regular army, but regular officers and political leaders alike generally recognized their positive impact on the army. Congress therefore likely hoped that that the attendance of state officers at these schools would improve the overall efficiency of the National Guard.[58]

As already noted, state officers rarely attended these courses in the first few years following the passage of the Dick Act, and if they did, they tended not to perform well. Pennsylvania officers did not prove an exception to this general trend, as none of them attended the General Service and Staff College, War College, or any garrison schools between 1903 and 1908. Whether this was due to a lack seriousness about their new role, or an inability to secure time away from civilian jobs, the initial result was that officers in the Pennsylvania National Guard continued to be trained in the same manner that they had prior to the passage of the Dick Act. Unfortunately, this meant that they were virtually untrained for their jobs.[59]

At the time, officers in the National Guard of Pennsylvania received little to no formal training prior to their commissioning. Between 1903 and 1907, only three officers in the 1st Regiment received some form of military training at the universities they

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Leavenworth school is often referred to as the Infantry and Cavalry school. According to Nenninger, however, it was officially renamed the General Service and Staff College in 1902.

[57] Machoian, 157.

[58] Nenninger, 220, 227-29.

[59] Nenninger, 220, War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs,* 1908, 161.

attended.[60] Enlisted men in each company elected their junior officers, and the junior officers in turn elected the regiment's field grade officers.[61] This is not to say that the officers were completely unfit or unqualified for their roles. When Major Jones observed the 1st Brigade in 1905, he commented that commissioned officers were "generally men of high intelligence and education, of nearly all professions and lines of business in civil life."[62] While they may have possessed some of the qualities and attributes that make for good officers, they were still in need of proper training if the 1st Regiment was to ever take the field in support of the regular army.

In 1905, the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania acted to correct these deficiencies by issuing General Orders, No. 13, which highlighted a communication received from the War Department. That document directly requested that Pennsylvania's governor, Samuel W. Pennypacker, forward "the names of such officers of the organized militia of your State as you may recommend for admission to the army service schools for the coming term, under the provisions of section 16 of the Militia Act of January 21, 1903."[63] Despite this encouragement, the governor did not nominate any Guard officers for advanced schooling prior to 1908.

With Guard officers unwilling or unable to attend army schools it seemed as if the Dick Act had little impact on the National Guard of Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, a glimmer of progress in officer training occurred within the 1st Regiment during this time.

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[60] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1904*, 106-7; Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1906*, 156; Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1907*, 137.

[61] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1904*, 237-38; Gordon, 113.

[62] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1905*, 388-89.

[63] Ibid., 307.

In 1907, the new regimental commander, Colonel J. Lewis Good, reported that a "series of schools for its commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Regiment were held monthly, the latter being presided over by the several majors."[64] If Guard officers could or would not attend army schools, it seemed that in the 1st Regiment at least, the field officers responded by creating their own system of training. Localized instruction was not exactly what the proponents of the Dick Act had in mind for educating Guard officers in the science and art of war, but at least it was a step in the right direction.

At the close of 1907, the officers of the 1st Regiment could be described as intelligent and well-educated civilian professionals, who were elected by their men to military office. A few officers had received military training at civilian colleges and the unit provided some training at the regimental level. No officers, however, had received the level of training that was becoming increasingly typical for regular army officers at this time.[65] Despite the best of intentions, the Dick Act had done little to improve the quality of officers across the National Guard of Pennsylvania.

In terms of the weapons and equipment, organization, and the type of training conducted at company armories and the annual summer encampments, the 1st Regiment was little changed on January 21, 1908, from what it had been five years earlier. Despite wearing new uniforms, attempting some field maneuvers, and holding classes for officers, they were not truly prepared to serve as a reserve to the regular army. In short, the original Dick Act had failed to adequately promote the efficiency of the 1st Regiment,

[64] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1907*, 64-65.

[65] Nenninger, 228-30.

National Guard of Pennsylvania. If the 1st Regiment was going to improve, changes needed to be made at the federal, state, and local level.

CHAPTER 3

SUCCESS: 1908-1912

Pennsylvania was not the only state to struggle to bring its troops up to regular army standards following the passage of the Dick Act. As of January 21, 1908, only twenty-one states had fully complied with the specifications of the law.[66] As a result, Congress, the National Guard Association, and the War Department took several steps to correct this issue and bring all state forces into compliance. Congress first issued Public Resolution No. 4 on January 16, 1908, and later passed an amendment to the Dick Act on May 27, 1908. Both the public resolution and amendment stipulated that the deadline for state forces to adhere to the organization, armament, and discipline of the regular army would be extended until January 21, 1910.[67] The National Guard Association also succeeded in convincing Congress to double the annual federal budget for state troops, bringing the total federal expenditure on state forces to $4 million a year. Finally, the War Department authorized the creation of the Division of Militia Affairs in January 1908. The combination of an extended deadline, increased funding, and especially, the establishment of an office that directly coordinated the efforts of state troops at the federal level had a positive effect on the 1st Regiment over the course of the next five years.[68]

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[66] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1908*, 44.

[67] United States Congress. "An Act to Further Amend the Act Entitled 'An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia and for Other Purposes,'" in *Statutes at Large of the United States of America*, Ch. 204, 32:774-80, May 27, 1908 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1908); State of Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909* (Harrisburg: The United Evangelical Press, 1914), 7.

[68] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 111-12; Derthick, 28.

In *The Rise of the National Guard*, Jerry Cooper noted that prior to the creation of the Division of Militia Affairs, federal oversight of state troops officially fell on the U.S. Adjutant General's Office, which coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of War and a single army officer assigned to the War Department, Lieutenant Colonel James Parker. This informal and complicated system kept the War Department's role in the affairs of state troops to a minimum. The creation of the Division of Militia Affairs streamlined the supervision of state troops, and the War Department therefore asserted more direct control over state forces. The Division of Militia Affairs took responsibility for the issue of arms and equipment to state troops, made assessments and recommendations concerning their training, and determined the role state troops played in joint maneuvers with the regular army. It was also led and staffed by a group of regular officers, who Cooper noted were "committed to rationalizing military policy." [69]

State troops felt the impact of the Division of Militia Affairs almost immediately. In 1909, the division noted that when Congress stated in the Dick Act that state troops should conform to regular army discipline, they did not clarify exactly what this entailed. The *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs* for 1909 therefore included a passage that clarified what the term discipline would mean from then on. As far as the Division of Militia Affairs was concerned, discipline meant "such instruction and drill and methods as are generally employed to produce military efficiency of troops."[70] As such, the division emphasized that increased attention would be devoted to "matters of instruction and drill." That year, the Secretary of War, Jacob M. Dickinson, authorized

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[69] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 111-12.

[70] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1909* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 3.

the creation of a subdivision within the Division of Militia Affairs to oversee the instruction and drill of state troops. The creation of this office, and the assignment of regular army inspector-instructors directly to state units would profoundly change the 1st Regiment.[71]

Between 1908 and 1912, increased funding and direct attention from the Division of Militia affairs helped the 1st Regiment become more like a regular army regiment. By the time the new deadline approached, the 1st Regiment was organized and equipped the same as a regular regiment. Under the supervision of the Division of Militia Affairs, the focus of its summer encampments shifted from ceremonial duty to field training and maneuvers. Also with the division's help, the Pennsylvania National Guard established a thorough system of officer education at the battalion, regimental, brigade, and state level. Improvements in training and officer education did not come about in conjunction with any large joint maneuvers, or the attendance of Guard officers at army schools, as the original Dick Act had intended. Instead, guidance from the Division of Militia affairs and regular inspector-instructors enabled officers in the regiment's chain-of-command to create a local and state training system modeled on the regular army, and modified to suit the peculiarities of the Guard.

Uniforms, Equipment, Armament, and Organization

With the extended deadline and the additional funding provided by the 1908 amendment to the Dick Act, the State of Pennsylvania followed the direction of the Department of Militia affairs in correcting many of the uniform, equipment, and

[71] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1909*, 4.

organizational deficiencies within its National Guard. By 1909, the Division of Militia affairs noted that all Pennsylvania's citizen soldiers were "sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for field duty."[72] During this time, Harrisburg and the War Department also worked together more effectively, ensuring that as the regular army upgraded their uniforms and equipment, the Pennsylvania National Guard received similar items in a timely manner. Conforming to the organization of the regular army took slightly longer, as Pennsylvania was among two states in 1909 whose units did not yet follow regular army tables of organization.[73] By 1910, however, the Division of Militia Affairs reported that all state troops conformed "practically to the organization and equipment of the regular army," just in time to meet the extended deadline of the amended Dick Act. [74]

Almost immediately after the 1908 amendment to the Dick Act, Pennsylvania began upgrading Guard uniforms and equipment. First, the state replaced the improper leggings observed by Major Dickman, and issued Guardsmen the same leggings worn by the regular army.[75] The state also purchased new U.S. Army dress coats from the federal government and issued them to the Guard, "thus providing the Division with a dress and full-dress uniform for the first time in its history."[76] Later that year, the state headquarters issued new uniform regulations which stated that all uniform items must "conform in quality, design, and color, except where otherwise indicated, to the United States Army

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[72] Ibid., 5.

[73] Ibid., 102.

[74] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1910* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), 7.

[75] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1908* (Harrisburg: C. E. Aughinbuagh, Printer to the State of Pennsylvania, 1910), 399.

[76] Ibid., 8.

standards."[77] Finally, the state replaced the Krag-Jorgenson rifles carried by infantry regiments with the more up-to-date 1903 Springfield rifle.[78]

In 1909, the state replaced the Guard's grey woolen blankets and blue flannel shirts with the current army issue olive drab blankets and olive drab shirts. These blankets and shirts "were obtained from the War Department on the requisition of the Governor and as a charge against the annual allotment of funds to the State of Pennsylvania."[79] The state also issued russet leather shoes and newly designed U. S. Army canteens.[80] The following year, the state issued all troops an additional olive drab khaki uniform and new olive drab winter overcoats, both of the current U. S. Army pattern, and the 1st Regiment turned in its outdated sky blue kersey overcoats. [81] During this time, the 1st Regiment, along with all infantry regiments of the National Guard of Pennsylvania, enlisted permanent cooks for the first time in their history, enabling them to conform to the U.S. Army *Field Service Regulations.*[82]

In 1911, the state headquarters granted the 1st Regiment an annual clothing allowance, specifically so that the regiment would always be "kept fully supplied" with current U.S. Army field uniforms and equipment.[83] The following year, when the regular

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[77] Ibid., 321.

[78] Ibid., 401.

[79] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909,* 12.

[80] Ibid., 278, 280.

[81] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1910* (Harrisburg: William Stanley Ray, State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1914), 7.

[82] Ibid., 40, 93, 444.

[83] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1911* (Harrisburg: William Stanley Ray, State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1916), 6.

army modified the design of the service uniform, the entire Guard quickly received an issue of new olive drab cotton service coats and breeches. Also that same year, the state issued each regimental headquarters and infantry company a set of signal flags, which jibed with changes to the *Infantry Drill Regulations*.[84]

It is clear that by the end of 1912, the State of Pennsylvania and the Division of Militia Affairs had established an effective system whereby the Guard would remain properly uniformed, equipped, and armed, regardless of changes in U.S. Army regulations. Organizational parity had been a slightly more difficult thing to achieve, but for the time, Guard and regular army regiments were configured the same way. With all state units properly organized and equipped fairly quickly after 1908, the Division of Militia Affairs began to place increased emphasis on the drill and instruction of state troops. This caused the 1st Regiment to conduct increasingly realistic training over the course of the next several years.

Field Training

The Division of Militia Affairs emphasized that state forces that were armed and equipped like the regular army also needed to upgrade their training to ensure that if they were called into active service, "they will be available as field troops." The division noted that Guardsmen across the country generally spent too much time conducting ceremonial training and close order drills.[85] Based on the previously noted observations of regular army officers, this was certainly true of the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment. To correct this,

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[84] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912* (Harrisburg: William Stanley Ray, State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1916), 6-8.

[85] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1909,* 5.

the division reminded state troops that "field service efficiency is the main objective of armory as well as camp instruction."[86] In addition to enumerating this standard, the division established a system that encouraged state units to comply.

While they encouraged units to simulate field training in their armories, officers in the Division of Militia Affairs acknowledged that the best opportunities for state troops to experience field conditions came during state encampments, or in joint maneuvers with the regular army. The division therefore established a policy whereby joint maneuvers would take place during even numbered years, and they encouraged states to conduct their own encampments during odd numbered years. To reinforce this recommendation, they reminded states that section fourteen of the Dick Act, legally required their troops to attend encampments annually.

The Division of Militia Affairs recommended that during these encampments, state troops should focus on "the instruction of companies, battalions, and regiments in the details of extended order drill," and only conduct close order drill at training sessions held at unit armories. The division's new emphasis on field efficiency resulted in the 1st Regiment training more like a regular army unit. Almost immediately, close order drill was practically confined to the armory and the majority of time the regiment spent at each summer encampment was filled with extended-order drills and field maneuvers.[87]

In 1908, as the 1st Regiment had done in many previous years, it encamped with the entire National Guard of Pennsylvania on the Gettysburg battlefield. This year, however, represented a radical break with the past. Rather than endeavoring to perfect

[86] Ibid., 9.

[87] Ibid.

close-order drill, the 1st Regiment spent almost its entire time at Camp Hays practicing extended-order drills and field maneuvers. During the eight days that each regiment occupied the camp, only two days were devoted to traditional formal inspections and reviews. A third day was dedicated to inspecting each regiment's ability to conduct extended-order drill and outpost duty.[88] Finally, one day was dedicated for camp set-up and another for camp break-down. This gave each regiment three full days to devote to the practice of field maneuvers.

The State of Pennsylvania secured more than three thousand acres of the battlefield for the division to conduct maneuvers.[89] Major General John A. Wiley, the division commander, remarked "the maneuvers, which were a new feature of the camp, and which were planned and conducted by the three brigade commanders, were, I believe, very instructive, especially so to the regimental officers and enlisted men."[90] The division inspector-general, Colonel Frank Sweeny, commented that "the work at the camp was practically confined to the 'war game.' No close order drills were held, except a few evening parades and the review by the Commander-in-Chief." [91] Each brigade used their allocated time and space slightly differently, but in the 1st Brigade, the maneuvers increased in size on a daily basis, starting with company and battalion maneuvers on the first day, and concluding with a brigade level maneuver on the final day.[92] As intended

[88] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1908,* 410, 482, 504.

[89] Ibid., 6.

[90] Ibid., 59.

[91] Ibid., 482, 504.

[92] Ibid., 482.

by the Division of Militia Affairs, the 1st Regiment, and the Pennsylvania National Guard as a whole, now focused on field duty.

Not only was more time and space allocated for field training than in previous years, but more regular army officers attended the Guard's annual encampment than ever before, and they played a more direct part in encampment's operation. The War Department assigned a total of fifteen regular army officers to serve at Camp Hays, and three were specifically assigned to 1st Brigade. Instead of serving as mere observers, Captain Bernard Sharp, First Lieutenant Robert L. Collins, and First Lieutenant Creed F. Cox acted as instructors and umpires during the 1st Brigade's maneuvers.[93] The 1st Brigade's commander (and former colonel of the 1st Regiment), Brigadier General Wendell Bowman, commented that these officers "performed efficient services in the company, battalion, regimental and Brigade maneuvers, all of which were instructive and well executed."[94]

The significance of the camp's focus on field efficiency was not lost on the press, or on the chain-of-command. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* thoroughly covered each day of the maneuvers thoroughly, noting that they were the "first of their kind the First Brigade has ever been called to take part in."[95] This comment is especially interesting, as it seems to confirm that the editors of the *Inquirer* did not consider what occurred at Camp Henderson in 1906 as a true field maneuver. General Wiley gave the new emphasis on field maneuvers a glowing endorsement, noting that "the excitement of 'playing the war

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[93] Ibid., 7-8.

[94] Ibid., 66.

[95] "Philadelphia Regiments to Participate in an Interesting and Novel Sham Battle Today," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 21, 1908.

game' and the breaking of the monotony of close order drill undoubtedly increased the esprit de corps of the Division."[96]

Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Pennsylvania National Guard continued to rotate between division encampments in even-numbered years and brigade encampments in odd-numbered years. In 1909, Harrisburg changed the location for the 1st Brigade's encampment from Perkasie, to Mount Gretna, in Lebanon County. There in July 1909, the 1st Brigade established Camp Pennypacker, named after the Civil War hero, Major General Galusha Pennypacker. The terrain around Mount Gretna was more conducive to field training and this, combined with the direct supervision of the Department of Militia Affairs, ensured that the training at Camp Pennypacker continued to focus on field efficiency.[97]

The War Department detailed six regular army officers to assist the 1st Brigade at Camp Pennypacker. These officers were again assigned as instructors and umpires, and Captain James A. Woodruff, Corps of Engineers, was assigned to work with the 1st Regiment. Eight Guard officers from the 1st Brigade, including First Lieutenant G. Rushton Howell, a battalion adjutant from the 1st Regiment, joined the regular army officers as umpires.[98] The War Department also assigned Troop D, 15th U.S. Cavalry and a detachment of regular engineers to work with the 1st Brigade.[99]

As General Bowman had done at Camp Hays the previous year, he arranged a series of progressive field maneuvers, this time with the assistance of the regular officers

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[96] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1908*, 59.

[97] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 5, 47.

[98] Ibid, 47.

[99] Ibid., 5.

present.[100] Over the course of four days, the men of the 1st Regiment progressed from battalion to brigade-level maneuvers. On the first day, the regiment, accompanied by Captain Woodruff, moved out from the main camp to the terrain designated by General Bowman for its maneuvers. Once there, the regiment engaged in two sets of field problems, the first simulating a battalion attack in the morning and the second consisting of a regimental attack in the afternoon. Bowman and Woodroof designed the problems to test the battalion and regimental commander's ability to properly deliver field orders, employ advance guards, and deploy their units for an attack. In both exercises, a small body of Guardsmen acted as the regiment's opposing force. At the end of each problem, Captain Woodroof, assisted by Guard umpires, delivered an after-action review on the site of the maneuvers.[101]

On the morning of the second day, the 1st Regiment, with one troop of cavalry attached, marched out of camp and received an order to halt and establish a camp as if it was near an enemy force. Umpires then evaluated the unit's ability to properly erect the camp and establish outposts. That afternoon, rather than face an assumed enemy, the 1st Regiment participated in a set of maneuvers against another regiment in the brigade. On the third day and fourth day, all units from the brigade participated in a single daily exercise, planned and supervised by the division's chief umpire, Major Daniel H. Boughton.[102]

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[100] Ibid., 6.

[101] Latta, 590-91; Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 46.

[102] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 46-47.

During the last two days of exercises, General Bowman formed two provisional brigades and pitted them against each other. He assigned the 1st Regiment to the "Blue Brigade," which also consisted of 6th Regiment, two troops of cavalry, one field artillery piece, sanitary troops, and a detachment of U.S. Army engineers. Similarly, the opposing "Red Brigade," consisted of the remaining infantry and cavalry units of the 1st Brigade, a detachment of National Guard sanitary troops and engineers, and Troop D, 15th U. S. Cavalry. During these maneuvers, two battalions from the 1st Regiment succeed in capturing half of Troop D when the regular cavalrymen unknowingly entered an ambush the 1st's battalions established along a road.[103]

Throughout the encampment, the officers of the 1st Regiment received instruction from their counterparts explaining how to properly write field orders, execute advance and rear guards, and conduct an attack or advance. At the conclusion of the final day of maneuvers, the Guard officers engaged in a discussion with their instructors about the organization of the regular army. The subject of outposts and map reading were also addressed in several lectures. The inspections conducted at Camp Pennypacker also continued to evaluate each regiment's ability to conduct extended-order drill, advance and rear-guard operations, and outpost duty.[104] General Bowman noted that "the course of lectures and instruction received by the officers of the Brigade at their home stations during the Winter and Spring months prepared them very substantially for the work mapped out for them in the field."[105]

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[103] Latta, 591; Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909,* 47.

[104] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 416.

[105] Ibid., 47.

In August 1910, the majority of the Pennsylvania Division occupied Camp Gobin at Gettysburg. The entire 3rd Brigade did not attend this encampment, however, as it had participated in joint maneuvers with the regular army at a camp established one month earlier, also at Gettysburg.[106] The efforts of the Division of Militia Affairs were clearly apparent, as Colonel Sweeny noted that the U.S. Army directly coordinated the conduct of both camps.[107] Under the watchful eye of twelve regular army officers serving as instructors and umpires, the division devoted almost all its waking hours at Camp Gobin to field training.[108] The 1st Regiment engaged in small patrols, outpost duty, advance and rear-guard operations, reconnaissance operations, and the conduct of increasingly larger simulated attacks and defenses. So extensive was the program of field maneuvers that it included an exercise encompassing the entire division.[109]

The inspections conducted at Camp Gobin also continued to emphasize the proper performance of field duty. After watching the entire division rotate through advance and rear-guard exercises, Major Harry G. Koerner, from the division staff, remarked that "the disposition of the various units, as a rule, were properly made, distances well maintained and the object of the movements understood." Captain Matthew H. Taggart, also from the division staff, similarly noted that it was a "credit to the National Guard of Pennsylvania that the several organizations exemplified Out-Post Duty so well as they did."[110] Another

[106] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1910*, 5.

[107] Ibid., 446

[108] Ibid., 6, 35.

[109] Ibid., 66.

[110] Ibid., 441-42.

division staff officer noted that the work "was so satisfactory as to elicit praise from the Army officers, who were assigned to the several commands as instructors."[111]

On March 3, 1911, Congress authorized the Division of Militia Affairs to assign serving regular army officers directly to state units to serve as inspector-instructors. The division intended to assign one officer to each Guard infantry regiment, but due to a temporary personnel shortage, it initially detailed a single officer to each state headquarters.[112] The division selected Major Charles S. Farnsworth of the 16th U.S. Infantry to serve as the as Inspector-Instructor of the National Guard of Pennsylvania.[113] While the War Department waited to commission more regular officers, it continued to temporarily assign regular army officers from line units as inspector-instructors for state encampments. The commander of the Department of the East, Major General Frederick Dent Grant, accordingly detailed Major Edwin V. Bookmiller of the 9th U.S. Infantry to serve with the 1st Regiment at the annual encampment of 1911.[114]

As had become the custom for odd-numbered years, the Pennsylvania National Guard encamped by brigades in 1911, and the 1st Brigade encamped at Mount Gretna for eight days in July.[115] There, as well as at the spring inspections in April, the focus

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[111] Ibid., 446.

[112] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1911* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 48-50. In order to provide enough regular army officers for each Guard infantry regiment, Congress also authorized the War Department to commission two hundred additional officers, but by late 1911, not enough men had been commissioned to fill these positions.

[113] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1911*, 8; War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1911,* 48-50.

[114] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1911*, 323.

[115] Ibid., 5.

continued to be on field work. For the first time in the Guard's history, inspectors quizzed Guard officers and non-commissioned officers on the topics of field orders, advance and rear-guard operations, outpost duty, and map reading.[116]

The ultimate display of the new focus on field efficiency came the following year, when the 1st Regiment encamped with the rest of the division at Camp Stuart, Gettysburg, in July 1912.[117] The War Department assigned an unprecedented number of regular army officers to the encampment. Twenty-two regular officers assisted Major Farnsworth as instructors and umpires. In addition, the Guard's division commander assigned Major Farnsworth to serve as the division chief of staff for Camp Stuart.[118] Major Farnsworth, serving also as chief umpire, assigned Captain E. Van D. Murphy of the 18th U.S. Infantry as the instructor and umpire for the 1st Regiment.[119] Not only was there twelve-times the amount of regular army officers assigned to the annual encampment as there had been in 1904, but the training conducted by the 1st Regiment would have pleased Colonel Regan.

A major feature of Camp Stuart was a graded regimental maneuver. The 1st Regiment, along with all the regiments in the division, was given an order to march out from the main camp, acting as an advance guard for a simulated brigade of infantry. After marching for approximately a mile, the men halted and established a camp, pitching shelter tents and establishing outposts. Following an inspection of the outposts, they broke camp, and marched towards the main camp as if they now composed the rear-guard

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[116] Ibid., 177.

[117] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 5.

[118] Ibid., 485.

[119] Ibid., 336, 493.

of a brigade. During their return march to the main camp, they came under attack, repulsed this threat, and continued on their way.[120]

In less than a decade, the annual encampment that Colonel James Regan found "rife with inspections," and close-order drills had given way to one rife with field maneuvers and extended-order drills. The terrain around Gettysburg in 1908, 1910, and 1912 and at Mount Gretna in 1909 and 1911 witnessed exhibitions of both minor and grand tactics. The 1st Regiment participated in maneuvers from company to division echelon, against both a simulated enemy and actual opposing forces. Guardsmen frequently gathered to hear lectures on tactics and after-action reviews of their maneuvers from scores of regular army officers. In short, thanks to the efforts of the Division of Militia Affairs and a cadre of regular and Guard officers, the "radical change," that Colonel Regan had suggested eight years earlier had now become reality. A similarly radical change also occurred in the training of the 1st Regiment's officers.[121]

Officer Training

The Division of Militia Affairs initially concentrated on improving the field efficiency of state troops by ensuring that entire units conducted field training during annual encampments. In doing so, the division soon accomplished one of the goals of the Dick Act, ensuring that many state units conducted training with regular army units, or at least conducted similar training on their own.[122] It quickly became apparent, however,

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[120] Ibid., 335.

[121] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1904*, 345.

[122] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1910*, 43.

that another recommendation of the Dick Act was being largely ignored. The Division of Militia Affairs reported that only forty-seven state officers attended army garrison schools in 1908. None of these forty-seven officers were from the National Guard of Pennsylvania. [123]

Responding to the lack of attendance at army schools, the Division of Militia Affairs established correspondence schools in 1909 for both officers and enlisted men in nineteen states, including Pennsylvania.[124] These courses provided at least a rudimentary military education to those who took them. The following year, the Division of Militia Affairs proclaimed that "the only feasible way of producing any effect throughout the whole mass of the Organized Militia must be reached through a preliminary instruction of the commissioned officers thereof." The division announced that "for the first time a special effort has been made to instruct the officers of the Organized Militia apart from the enlisted personnel." In order to do so, the division arranged for the states themselves to host camps of instruction for their infantry officers, and ensured that competent regular army officers were detailed as instructors. These camps of instruction, as well as a growing number of schools at the regimental and state levels, resulted in a fundamental change in military education for the officers of the 1st Regiment.[125]

Initially, the training that the officers of the 1st Regiment received throughout 1908 proceeded in generally the same manner as it had in previous years. The regiment

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[123] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1908*, 161.

[124] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1909*, 9.

[125] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1910*, 44. It is worth noting that in April 1909, seventeen officers from the Guard's 9th Regiment attended a two-day session of the Army War College. Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 9.

continued to hold officers' schools, but in addition to being supervised by the regiment's majors, these schools were supervised by Major John H. Duval, a retired regular army officer, and Captain F. C. Marshall of the 15th U. S. Cavalry.[126] Other than the addition of these regular instructors, however, the training for officers of the 1st Regiment remained virtually unchanged.

In 1909, however, General Bowman proudly reported that he "inaugurated an Officers' School for the commissioned officers of the entire Brigade, and a series of most instructive lectures were delivered at the school."[127] Major Duval delivered the first lectures in January, addressing the topics of maneuvers and outpost duty. He also provided the attending officers with a critique of the brigade's performance during the previous year's maneuvers based on the observations of the regular army officers who attended Camp Hays. As a result of the amount of interest generated by these lectures, General Bowman scheduled additional ones throughout the next several months.

The lectures delivered during the spring of 1909 covered many aspects of field training and were delivered by some of the most knowledgeable and competent officers in the regular army. Many of the regular officers who delivered lectures to the 1st Brigade's officers were serving at the Army War College or on the General Staff at the time, and at least five of the instructors were later promoted to general officer rank.[128] Throughout March and April, officers from the 1st Brigade attended a series of lectures

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[126] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General*, *1908*, 77. F. C. Marshall later became a brigadier general and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross in World War I.

[127] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General*, *1909*, 45.

[128] Among the future generals that delivered lectures to the 1st Brigade during the spring of 1909 were Eben Swift, Fox Connor, Frank S. Cocheu, R. K. Evans, and Ralph H. Van Deman.

that addressed topics such as infantry fire in battle, night operations, the use of advance and rear guards, patrols and orders, and formations for attack and defense. Finally in May, the lecture series concluded with a class on map reading and road sketching. General Bowman also allowed non-commissioned officers from the brigade to attend these lectures as well. Impressed by the quality of the instruction and the number of officers and non-commissioned officers who attended, General Bowman believed that the lecture series did much to prepare brigade's officers and non-commissioned officers for the encampment at Mount Gretna that summer.[129]

The 1st Regiment also continued to hold its own schools for officers and non-commissioned officers. The new regimental commander, J. Colonel Lewis Good, reported that "special schools for officers and non-commissioned officers" were conducted on six occasions during June and July. Throughout the year, with the exception of August and September, officers also attended normal monthly schools. To assist with the instruction of enlisted men, the War Department also assigned nine sergeants to serve as inspector-instructors for the National Guard of Pennsylvania. One of these nine men, Sergeant Roger E. Carlisle, of the 1st U. S. Infantry, reported to the 1st Regiment in October 1909. Colonel Good remarked that Sergeant Carlisle's instruction during the fall and winter proved "efficient and satisfactory in every way."[130]

The year 1910 proved to be a landmark year for the training of officers of the 1st Regiment. As the year began, the 1st Regiment continued to hold monthly schools for officer and non-commissioned officers. The regiment also initiated additional monthly

[129] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 45.

[130] Ibid., 54.

officers' schools at the battalion level, beginning in November of 1910.[131] The greatest impact on officer education, however, came via the efforts of the Department of Militia Affairs. From May 19 to 23, officers from the 1st Regiment were among the 392 infantry officers from across the state that attended the first camp of instruction, which was held at Mount Gretna.[132] Brigadier General C.B. Dougherty, the 3rd Brigade's commander, commanded the camp of instruction. By his estimation, the attendance represented approximately 62 percent of the infantry officers in the Pennsylvania National Guard. He felt that "taking into consideration that the State forces will go into camp again in July and August, the showing is remarkable."[133]

The Department of Militia Affairs also arranged for a correspondence school to take place prior to the camp of instruction. Captain George Thorne of the 24th U.S. Infantry prepared a map problem in April and sent it to the officers of the National Guard of Pennsylvania. Prior to the June camp of instruction, a total of 296 Guard officers responded with solutions to the problem. Captain Thorne and a team of two lieutenants corrected these responses, and returned the corrected document, along with a copy of the approved solution to all the Guard officers who had responded.[134]

The camp of instruction itself included courses on map reading, extended-order drill, advance and rear-guard operations, patrolling, and the preparation of field orders.[135] In addition to the lectures, the students also engaged in practical exercises and tactical

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[131] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1910*, 69-70.

[132] Ibid., 6.

[133] Ibid., 89.

[134] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1910*, 50.

[135] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1910*, 262.

walks. Sixteen regular army officers instructed and guided the Guard officers in the conduct of these exercises.[136] Regarding both the camp of instruction and the preceding correspondence course, Captain Thorne believed that the camp was an "unqualified success," and recommended that correspondence courses be conducted once a month, beginning six months in advance of the next camp of instruction.[137]

The camp elicited similar praise from the Guard officers who attended. General Dougherty stated that "the consensus of opinion of all the officers present, is that the Camp of Instruction was highly beneficial and valuable."[138] Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Williams, in temporary command of the 1st Regiment, stated "the camp of instruction has certainly proven very beneficial and instructive to all officers and should be held yearly. This is the consensus of opinion of the officers of the First Regiment."[139] General Dougherty also noted that several commanding officers wanted to extend the length of the camp of instruction. Regardless, he believed that "a larger amount of knowledge and instruction has been disseminated in a brief space of time than could possibly be done by any other means or methods confined wholly to armory practice."[140]

Based on the positive feedback, the Division of Militia Affairs recommended that Pennsylvania schedule another camp of instruction for the following year.[141] The state complied, and the Pennsylvania National Guard reopened the camp at Mount Gretna in

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[136] Ibid., 89-90.

[137] Ibid., 50.

[138] Ibid., 90.

[139] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1910*, 54.

[140] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1910*, 90-91.

[141] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1911*, 27.

May. The recommendations of Guard and regular officers alike also resulted in an extension of the camp's period of instruction, which was now set at seven-days. Three hundred and eighty-three Guard officers attended the camp, which was commanded by C. B. Dougherty, now a major general and the commander of the Guard division."[142] Twenty-four regular army officers, led by Major Carl Reichmann of the General Staff served as instructors. Most of these officers were assigned to regimental classes, and Captain Robert Alexander of the 19th U.S. Infantry presided over the regimental class of the 1st Regiment.[143]

Once again, the camp elicited high praise from both the regular army instructors and their Guard students. In a telegram to General Dougherty, Major Reichmann asserted "I am more convinced than ever of the splendid success of Camp of Instruction, the full benefits of which will become more apparent with time."[144] General Dougherty himself believed the camp was "highly instructive, and at the same time impressed every officer with the value of such lectures."[145] At the conclusion of the camp, Reichmann asked the regimental commanders to provide specific recommendations on how to improve it the following year. Colonel William Eidell, recently appointed to command of the 1st Regiment, suggested "that the instruction include the construction of trenches and the use of intrenching tools."[146]

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[142] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1911*, 7.

[143] Ibid., 31, 313.

[144] Ibid., 32.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Ibid., 31.

Prior to the camp of instruction, the commander of the U.S. Army's Department of the East, Major General Frederick D. Grant, also recommended that Guard officers prepare by completing a recommended reading list. He suggested that all officers study the topics of orders, the service of security, infantry in the attack and defense, and advance guard and outposts, as found in the *Field Service Regulations*. Additionally, second lieutenants were encouraged to become familiar with field orders, tactical principles and problems, and military deportment. It is unclear whether the officers of the 1st Regiment completed this reading list in time for the camp of instruction. Judging from the positive comments of both regular and Guard officers, however, it is likely they came away from the camp of instruction with at least a basic understanding of these concepts. Several officers from the 1st Regiment also received another unique opportunity to hone their professional skills in the months preceding and following the camp of instruction.[147]

In the spring of 1911, a growing crisis with Mexico prompted the War Department to order almost one-fifth of the regular army to assemble in San Antonio, Texas. The large gathering of troops served to calm American concerns over the situation, but it also created a training opportunity for the regular army. With so many troops gathered in one area, the provisional Maneuver Division quickly set about conducting large-scale training exercises.[148] Capitalizing on the opportunity to offer Guard officers the chance to observe training that would be "of interest and value in connection with the practical and routine duties that fall to officers on duty with troops in

[147] Ibid., 245-46.

[148] Machoian, 230-31.

the field," the Division of Militia Affairs authorized their attendance at the Maneuver Division encampment.[149]

In response to Division of Militia Affairs' authorization, Pennsylvania sent fifty-five officers to the Maneuver Division's camp at San Antonio. These officers resided at the camp over three fourteen-day periods.[150] Among the fifty-five Pennsylvanians, were four members of the 1st Regiment. The first to attend was Captain Joseph Klapp Nicholls of Company D, who departed for Texas in early April 1911.[151] Captain Thomas F. Meehan, of Company I and Captain William C. Levering, of Company H attended in April and May, respectively, and Captain Edward J. Adams, of Company B, attended in June.[152] The Division of Militia Affairs requested that all officers who attended the camp submit a report upon the completion of their tour of duty. Based off the reports received from all state officers who attended, the division concluded that "the militia officers obtained considerable information of interest and profit to themselves from a professional standpoint."[153]

The same could be said about the camp of instruction held the following year. It was the largest and most complex camp of instruction the Pennsylvania National Guard had mounted to-date, with nearly 450 Guard officers attending the camp at Mount Gretna in June.[154] The War Department assigned twenty-six regular army officers to serve as

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[149] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1911*, 159.

[150] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1911*, 7.

[151] Ibid., 239.

[152] Ibid., 252-53, 258, 275.

[153] War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1911*, 159.

[154] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 34; War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1912* (Washington, D.C.: Government

instructors, and Major Charles S. Farnsworth, the senior inspector-instructor assigned to Pennsylvania, designed the curriculum."[155] The six-day course of instruction featured an elaborate division of classes, organized according to rank and duty position.[156] Classes "A" through "D" accommodated general officers, field grade officers, battalion and regimental adjutants, and adjutants-general. Classes "E" through "G" consisted of brigade and regimental quartermasters, battalion quartermasters, brigade and regimental commissaries, and the inspectors of small arms practice. Finally, classes "H" through "M" instructed the brigade inspectors and all company-grade officers.[157]

The officers from each class rotated through a series of fifteen different tactical walks over the course of several days. During these walks, regular advisors taught Guard officers how to maneuver units on actual terrain, but the troops themselves were not present for these exercises. The lack of troops enabled the instructors to slowly guide the Guard officers without fear of boring enlisted soldiers. It also allowed the regulars to provide their citizen soldier counterparts candid feedback, without having to worry about the consequences of embarrassing them in front of their men. Farnsworth designed the walks to teach Guard officers how to lead a company, battalion, or regiment as part of an advance guard, in a general attack, or holding a defensive position. The instructors taught Guard officers how to properly array their forces, control rates of fire, select defensive

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Printing Office, 1912), 62. General Dougherty's report lists the attendance at 432, but the CDMA report states 450.

[155] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 35; War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1912*, 62. Again, there is a slight discrepancy between the two reports, as the CDMA Report states twenty-six regular officers were assigned. General Dougherty's report states that the number was twenty-eight.

[156] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 6.

[157] Ibid., 466.

positions, construct trenches, erect obstacles, and operate as part of a larger force. In addition to tactical walks, instructors delivered lectures on topics such as military sketching, company and regimental administration, and field sanitation. Major Farnsworth also designed and delivered a special course for the general officers and regimental commanders.[158]

Just as the scope of the 1912 camp of instruction had drastically expanded, the recommended reading list announced ahead of time grew as well. All officers were now expected to glean from both the *Field Service Regulations* and *Infantry Drill Regulations*. From the former, they were expected to study the topics of commands and orders, battalion combat principles, intrenchments, patrols, and marches and camps. From the latter, they were expected to familiarize themselves with patrolling and signals, the service of security, marches and convoys, the care of troops and ammunition supply, combat abbreviations and signs, and wagon, pack, and rail transportation. General officers, inspectors-general, field grade officers, and regimental adjutants were also expected to study topics such as regimental combat principles, ammunition supply, and night operations from the *Infantry Drill Regulations*, and messages, field maps, and laws of war from the *Field Service Regulations.*[159]

Throughout the remainder of the year, the officers of the 1st Regiment continued to improve their military skills in their armory, located at Broad and Callowhill Streets in Philadelphia. Regimental schools for officers, non-commissioned officers and even

[158] Ibid., 467-73.

[159] Ibid., 300.

privates were now held on a weekly, rather than monthly basis.[160] In October 1912, the state headquarters published General Orders, Number 13, which outlined a comprehensive system of drill and school work to be conducted at unit armories from October 1912 to April 1913.[161] The impetus for such a system originated the previous year, when the state headquarters ordered Major Farnsworth and Major General Dougherty to coordinate "in formulating a plan to be followed by the respective organizations with a view of promoting uniformity of instruction."[162]

This school system that Major Farnsworth and General Dougherty had designed was part of a much larger plan for a progressive two-year course of instruction for officers and enlisted men alike. Like the curriculum for the camp of instruction, it was divided into classes. Brigade commanders, adjutants-general, and inspectors-general occupied one class. At the regimental level, personnel were divided into three classes: field grade officers and adjutants, company grade officers, and non-commissioned officers and privates. Major Farnsworth and General Dougherty arranged the classes so that the students would in two years address all aspects of their duties as covered in the *Infantry Drill Regulations* and the *Field Service Regulations*.[163]

Farnsworth and Dougherty also provided guidance regarding how the courses were to be taught and evaluated. They reminded instructors to employ the applicatory method then used at regular army schools. They also required that the instructors consult the senior regular army inspector-instructor about their proposed lectures prior to

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[160] Ibid., 59.

[161] Ibid., 496.

[162] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1911*, 401-2.

[163] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 498.

delivering them. Additionally, Farnsworth and Dougherty stipulated that an examination would be administered to all officers and non-commissioned officers of the division at the conclusion of the first period of instruction in April 1913. The content of these examinations was also subject to the approval of the senior inspector-instructor.[164]

Officers and non-commissioned officers who scored 70 percent or higher were to be issued certificates of proficiency, and those who scored 90 percent or higher would be commended in published orders. Any officer or non-commissioned officer who obtained a certificate of proficiency would be exempt from further examinations, provided the officer was not promoted, or that a new set of regulations was not adopted by the U.S. Army. The plan also called for those officers who completed the entire two-year course of instruction to be given more advanced map problems and additional reading requirements to further improve their skills.[165]

From 1908 to 1912, the enlisted men of the 1st Regiment continued to elect their company grade officers, and these officers continued to elect the regiment's field officers.[166] Aside from these practices, however, little connected the system of officer selection and training prior to the 1908 amendment with that which followed. By 1912, the officers of the 1st Regiment participated in an education system that familiarized them with almost all aspects of the regular army's way of conducting military business. If Guard officers could or would not attend army schools, the Division of Militia Affairs had succeeded in bringing army schools to the National Guard of Pennsylvania.

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[164] Ibid., 499.

[165] Ibid., 500.

[166] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1909*, 26; Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 320; Gordon, 122.

In three distinct areas, the 1st Regiment was fundamentally different in 1912 than it had been in 1903 or 1907. The unit was uniformed, armed, equipped, and organized exactly like a regular army regiment. The entire regiment routinely engaged in open-order drill and field maneuvers, directed and supervised by regular army officers and non-commissioned officers. The officers of the 1st Regiment attended separate training, also directed and supervised by regular officers. These three areas directly corresponded to what the Dick Act specified would be necessary to make a state unit function as a reserve to the regular army. In the end, all it took to ensure that the 1st Regiment became a proper reserve unit was a cadre of regular army officers and non-commissioned dedicated to the task.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

There were several areas in which the 1st Regiment did not change as a result of the Dick Act. For one thing, several companies of the regiment continued to function as both military and social organizations. Despite the eventual presence of a more thorough system of officer education, the men still elected their commissioned officers until at least 1912.[167] In addition to the regiment's military elections, several companies also held elections for its fraternal organization, which was referred to as the "civil body" of the company. In 1908, the men of Company G, whose civil body was known as the "Old Corps," elected the company's first sergeant as vice president and the first lieutenant as secretary.[168] This social dynamic, which seemed to undermine military good order, did not go unnoticed by regular army officers and non-commissioned officers, but it served a valuable function for the Guard. [169]

Jerry Cooper highlighted that in some cases Guardsmen intentionally maintained a democratic social dynamic in their organizations in order to encourage recruitment and attendance at drill. This social component was especially valuable in the Guard, as neither the state nor federal government paid citizen soldiers to attend drills at unit armories. Cooper specifically noted that in 1911, a battalion commander in the Pennsylvania National Guard encouraged attendance at drill periods by hosting dances

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[167] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 320.

[168] Minute Book, A.C.W.G, Co. G, 1st Regt. of Infantry, N.G.P., Dec. 15, 1908, First Regiment Infantry Museum Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.

[169] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 143-45.

afterwards.[170] In fact, this officer was Major Alfred H. Pierson, commander of the 1st Regiment's 3rd Battalion.[171] The maintenance of civil bodies and coupling social events with drill sessions may have detracted slightly from the unit's focus on field efficiency, but they were both part of an effort to combat a more serious issue plaguing the regiment.

Absenteeism was also an issue in the 1st Regiment. Judging by company morning reports, the annual reports of the Division of Militia Affairs, and the annual reports of the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, it appears that attendance at inspections and annual encampments varied, but rarely fell below 80 percent.[172] If the data contained in the first sergeant's report for Company G is representative of the rest of the regiment, however, it appears that attendance at monthly drill periods often fell below 60 percent.[173] The fact that summer encampments and inspections witnessed higher attendance ratios is not surprising. The only time soldiers received pay was at the annual encampments, and the Division of Militia Affairs used attendance at inspections to determine if a state should continue to receive federal funding.[174] The fact that up to 20 percent of the 1st Regiment

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[170] Ibid.

[171] "What the States are Doing," *National Guard Magazine* 8 (December 1911), 453.

[172] Morning Report of Co. G, 1st Regiment Infantry, 1st Brigade, NG. of Pa., July 11, 1907, First Regiment Infantry Museum Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; War Department, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1909*, 196, *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs,* 1910, 203-4; *Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1911*, 130; Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 397.

[173] First Sergeants Report, Company G, 1st Regiment, N.G.P., First Regiment Infantry Museum Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.

[174] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 110, 114, 144. Cooper noted that the first time the War Department actually withheld federal funding was in 1912, when the state of Arkansas lost over $100,000 worth of federal equipment. In general, it appears the War Department used this tool cautiously.

missed these important activities indicates that the efforts to ensure attendance through social functions were probably warranted, but did not completely curb absenteeism.

Regardless of the 1st Regiment's peculiar social culture and struggles with absenteeism, it still changed in a positive manner as a result of the Dick Act and the efforts of the Division of Militia Affairs. The Dick Act explicitly required that state units adopt the armament, tables of organization, and discipline of the regular army. By 1910, the 1st Regiment was armed, equipped, and organized like a regular regiment. After the Division of Militia Affairs defined discipline in terms of instruction and drill, the 1st Regiment received the kind of training as the regular army, and therefore conformed to regular army discipline. Neither the Dick Act nor the Division of Militia Affairs stipulated that a unit had to dissolve its civil bodies, attain a certain percentage of attendance at normal drill periods, or even perform military tasks to a certain level of proficiency for that matter.[175] While Militia Affairs recorded what it considered deficiencies in state unit performance, the 1st Regiment complied in all areas actually required by law by 1912.

In addition, the 1st Regiment indirectly achieved two of the goals of the Dick Act. While the regiment never participated in large joint maneuvers and its officers never attended army schools, the efforts of the Division of Militia Affairs brought the benefits of these maneuvers and schools to the 1st Regiment. Under the supervision of regular army officers, the 1st Regiment conducted field maneuvers at the brigade and division level during its summer encampments. Regular officers also supervised the instruction of the regiment's officers in almost all aspects of the *Field Service Regulations* and *Infantry*

[175] Fifty-Seventh Congress, "An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia."

Drill Regulations, using the same applicatory method in vogue at army schools. In doing so, the regiment achieved what sections fifteen and sixteen of the Dick Act intended when they authorized federal funds for state troops and officers to attend joint maneuvers and army schools.

In 1903, the 1st Regiment carried outdated weapons, had a table of organization at variance with the regular army's, focused on ceremonial drill, and its officers received little-to-no military education. By 1912, the 1st was armed, equipped, and organized according to regular army standards and the regiment's officers and men received essentially the same training as regulars. Commenting on this remarkable transition across the entire National Guard of Pennsylvania, Major General Dougherty said "the Guard has so far progressed along lines that are in great contradistinction to the methods pursued in the years preceding."[176] That such a transition occurred in such a comparatively short time was due in large part to the increased federal funding facilitated by the 1908 amendment to the Dick Act and the establishment of the Division of Militia Affairs. These two factors, combined with generous state funding, ensured that by 1912, the 1st Regiment, National Guard of Pennsylvania was, as Charles Dick desired, "practically in the service of the United States."[177]

Despite the tremendous progress made by the 1st Regiment, the years following 1912 saw the reemergence of an effort to create a federal reserve distinct from the National Guard. While by no means perfect, the 1st Regiment was at least receiving regular-style training. The same could not be said for all state units. The reports of the

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[176] Pennsylvania, *Report of the Adjutant General, 1912*, 36.

[177] Charles Dick describing the role of National Guard units as quoted in Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 122.

Division of Militia Affairs teemed with negative observations pertaining to units from many different states. In addition to disparaging comments about the lack of proper training, these reports also highlighted that absenteeism and excessive socializing continued to prevail in most state units.[178] Even the 1st Regiment was not immune to these last two failings. In 1912, the Attorney General of the United States, George W. Wickersham, exacerbated concerns over the reliability of state units by ruling that parts of the 1908 amendment to the Dick Act were unconstitutional.[179] In his opinion, state units could not serve outside of the United States unless Congress approved a declaration of war. Many regular army officers believed that the failure of state units to meet federal standards and their inability to serve in contingency operations beyond the country's borders, necessitated the creation of a federalized reserve for the regular army.[180]

Almost simultaneous with Attorney General Wickersham's decision, the War Department published a document titled, *Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*. This document announced the creation of permanent peacetime brigades and divisions for the first time in the U.S. Army's history. The proposal also organized state troops into twelve regionally based divisions. Many state units struggled to adhere to new regulations proposed by the *Organization of Land Forces*, and resisted the integration of their regiments into composite divisions from several states. Generally, this conflict did not affect the National Guard of Pennsylvania, as their regiments were already organized into brigades and a division, and therefore did not need to be integrated with troops from

[178] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 111, 144-45.

[179] Ibid., 114; Millet and Maslowski, 296.

[180] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 114-15; Doubler, 154-55; Millet and Maslowski, 296.

other states. Most of the National Guard of Pennsylvania was simply incorporated into the 7th Division.[181] Regardless of how smoothly this transition occurred in Pennsylvania, it caused enough trouble in other states to add to growing concerns about the reliability of state troops.[182]

The combination of negative reports, the Wickersham ruling, and difficulties stemming from the implementation of the *Organization of the Land Forces* lent added weight to what became known as the Preparedness Movement.[183] Alarmed by the outbreak of war in Europe, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, published a *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* in 1915.[184] Garrison proposed a "Continental Army" of 500,000 federal volunteers to support the regular army. It also relegated state troops to the traditional internal defense role filled by militia units in the past. Once again, the National Guard Association opposed confining state troops to the third line of defense and vehemently opposed Secretary Garrison's plan.[185]

Joined by other opposition groups, the National Guard Association succeeded in defeating Garrison's plan, and in in its place Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916.[186] The National Defense Act guaranteed that state troops would remain the primary reserve of the regular army, and officially designated all state troops as the National Guard. It also achieved another longtime goal of the National Guard

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[181] Doubler, 153.

[182] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 115; Doubler, 152-53; Millet and Maslowski, 304-5.

[183] Doubler, 155; Millet and Maslowski, 306; Weigley, 204-7.

[184] Doubler, 156; Weigley, 218.

[185] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 117-18; Doubler, 156,

[186] Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 127; Doubler, 157-58.

Association, federal pay for all National Guard drill periods, not just annual encampments. In exchange, Guardsmen were now required to attend forty-eight drill periods and a two-week summer encampment every year. They were also subject to Presidential mobilization in the event of a national emergency.[187] Such a national emergency occurred almost immediately after the act's passage. With tensions along the Mexican border reaching an all-time high, President Woodrow Wilson used the powers granted him by the National Defense Act, and ordered thousands of National Guard troops to the Mexican border.[188]

While Congress, the War Department, and the National Guard Association debated the future of the American military reserve system, the 1st Regiment continued to receive the same training as they had before the implementation of the *Organization of Land Forces*. Most of the National Guard of Pennsylvania became the 7th Division, but for the 1st Regiment, the change was hardly noticeable at first. The regiment continued to receive upgraded equipment from the regular army, and even added a signal section to the regimental headquarters.[189] The 1st Regiment joined the rest of the 1st Brigade at the annual encampment at Mount Gretna in 1913, and in 1914, the state shifted the location for the division encampment from Gettysburg to Mount Gretna.[190] In 1915, the state improved the facilities at Mount Gretna and its entire National Guard save the 2nd

[187] Doubler, 158; Millet and Maslowski, 307.

[188] Doubler, 159-61

[189] "Field Radio Service of the First Regiment," *Philadelphia Record*, July 13, 1915.

[190] Gordon, 120.

Brigade encamped there in July.[191] Once again, the 1st Regiment participated in brigade-level maneuvers during this encampment.[192]

The Division of Militia Affairs continued to guide Guard officer education and armory instruction, and the system of instruction originally designed by General Dougherty and Major Farnsworth expanded into a four-year course of in 1914.[193] Following the guidance of the Division of Militia Affairs, Major Joseph Klapp Nicholls, one of the 1st's officers who had attended the 1911 Maneuver Division encampment, held a series of classes for 2nd Battalion in October 1914.[194] That same year, Nicholls also submitted an article to *Infantry Journal*, recommending what he believed were the best methods for training National Guard recruits.[195] This action demonstrated that at least one officer in the 1st Regiment took his role seriously enough to contribute to one of the army's premier professional journals. Finally in 1915, more officers from the 1st Regiment attended the camp of instruction at Mount Gretna than had done so in any previous year.[196] In 1916, troops from the 7th Division joined the 158,000 National Guardsmen ordered to the Mexican border. As part of the 7th Division, the 1st Regiment took part in its first active assignment as a reserve to the regular army.[197]

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[191] "Mount Gretna in Camp Dress," *Public Ledger*, July 4, 1915.

[192] "First Brigade in Sham Battle," *Public Ledger*, July 16, 1915.

[193] "National Guard to Take up Special Training Course," *Public Ledger*, October 18, 1914.

[194] "National Guard," *Philadelphia Press*, October 18, 1914.

[195] Joseph K. Nicholls, "Handling Recruits in the National Guard," *Infantry Journal* XI (July 1914 - June 1915): 507-25.

[196] Gordon, 121.

[197] Ibid., 122, 124.

The 1st Regiment, National Guard of Pennsylvania, ceased to exist in July 1917. With the entry of the United States into World War I, the federal government consolidated Pennsylvania's 1st and 13th Regiments, to form the 109th U.S. Infantry Regiment. The 109th Infantry and several other Pennsylvania regiments came together to form the U.S. 28th Infantry Division.[198] As part of the 28th Division, the 109th fought in France during World War I. Upon the regiment's return from France, the State of Pennsylvania attempted to reform its traditional organizations, but problems with recruitment and new guidance from the War Department resulted in another change to the unit's designation. The men of the old 1st Regiment formed the core of what became known as the 103rd Engineer Regiment.[199]

At the outbreak of World War II, the 103rd Engineer Regiment was re-designated as the 103rd Engineer (Combat) Battalion. The 103rd Engineer Battalion fought throughout France and Germany, participating in well-known battles, such as the Battle of the Bulge.[200] To this day, the 103rd Engineer Battalion remains part of the Pennsylvania National Guard, and its members have recently deployed in support of the Global War on Terror. Despite the passage of more than 100 years, and several official re-designations, the unit still maintains a connection to its past, retaining the nickname the "Dandy First" in honor of the 1st Regiment, National Guard of Pennsylvania.[201]

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[198] Ibid., 127-28.

[199] Ibid., 209-11.

[200] Ibid., 235.

[201] Angela King-Sweigart, "'Dandy First' 103rd Engineer Battalion Change of Command," *Defense Video Imagery Distribution System*, originally posted on *July 12, 2014*, accessed on Nov. 15, 2017, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/136290/dandy-first-103rd-engineer-battalion-change-command.

Active duty members of the 1st U.S. Army also continue to observe, coach, and train members of the 103rd Engineer Battalion on a routine basis, ensuring that the latter can perform as part of the primary reserve to the U.S. Army. Whether today's members of 1st Army and the 103rd Engineer Battalion realize it or not, they perpetuate a tradition established between 1903 and 1912.

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