DRUG PRODUCTION, AUTONOMY, AND NEOLIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM IN INDIGENOUS COLOMBIA

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1970s, Colombia's indigenous communities have been the beneficiaries of state-sanctioned cultural and territorial rights. They have also been extensively impacted by the drug trade in their territories. This dissertation examines how drug crop cultivation in indigenous territories has impacted the struggle for indigenous rights in Colombia. It is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out primarily with the Nasa indigenous community in the southwestern department of Cauca, Colombia. I argue that the drug trade has contributed to the accelerated transition of indigenous agricultural communities from a primarily subsistence-based economy to a cash-based economy that is dependent on the circulation of global commodities. I also argue that drug control policies have contributed to neoliberal multiculturalism in that they have helped to undermine the political autonomy of indigenous communities. Finally, state-regulated institutions such as schools and child welfare circulate moral narratives that emphasize family structure as a cause for social problems rather than political and historical conditions. I conclude with an assessment of how identity may be used for indigenous communities who continue to struggle for cultural and territorial rights in Colombia's post-conflict era.

This is dedicated to my parents, Lucila and Terrence.

And to all the indigenous women

and men holding up the sky

in a 500 year earthquake.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:
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Indigenous Rights vs. The Drug Trade

In the early 1990s, the Nasa indigenous community of Colombia's southwestern department of Cauca were prime beneficiaries of multiculturalist policies solidified in Colombia's 1991 Constitution. Today, indigenous people make up 3% of Colombia's population, and they hold over 10% of Colombia's national territory. Two of Colombia's 102 Congressional Senate seats are reserved for indigenous senators. These new rights were the culmination of decades of struggle by Colombia's indigenous communities, often led by Nasa activists and organizations, and were based on a validation of cultural difference that Colombian liberals previously saw as a barrier to the project of national modernization.

For the Nasa, as for much of the Andean agricultural community, this wave of multicultural rights paralleled the proliferation of drug crop cultivation in their territory. For at least 30 years, members of the Nasa community have been cultivating coca, marijuana, and poppy for the illicit drug trade. Poppy cultivation for heroin first drew serious attention to the issue of drug crop cultivation in the region in the late 1980s, although many elder *comuneros* (community members) recount their experiences of

growing marijuana and coca in the 1970s. As a primarily agricultural community, the Nasa face many of the same risks and benefits of drug crop cultivation as their non-indigenous *campesino* (small farmer) counterparts. Cash crop economies subject cultivators to boom and bust cycles far out of their control. The illicitness of the drug trade makes them a target for social and political marginalization. Finally, the drug trade has also entrenched the country's armed conflict between the military and insurgent left- and right-wing forces in these rural territories. However, because drug crops consistently sell for more than licit cash crops such as coffee, many in the community have taken on the risks associated with drug crop cultivation.

Indigenous drug crop cultivation presents a paradox for indigenous people striving for multicultural citizenship. As the demands of indigenous people found new legitimacy within the Colombian nation-state under multiculturalism, their participation in illegal drug crop cultivation threatened this newfound legitimacy. Multicultural rights are structured on salvage anthropological notions of indigenous identity that hold that indigenous people are stewards of the country's national heritage and landscape. Because drug crop cultivation is an illicit activity that positions the indigenous community in opposition to state governance, it renders the prospect of total citizenship for indigenous communities who participate in it

nearly impossible. This creates a harrowing challenge for indigenous leaders who must interface between the state and the community.

To present indigenous drug crop cultivation as something indigenous communities do willingly is to risk the gains of the indigenous movement. The far right, notoriously opposed to multicultural rights, contends that indigenous people are cunning allies or malicious dupes of the drug trade and therefore undeserving of state resources and land. For this reason, liberal-oriented responses to drug crop cultivation have highlighted the lack of viable alternative economic options for poor Andean farmers as the primary motivator for their participation in this illicit activity, and have funneled scholarly efforts toward supporting economic alternatives that would facilitate the successful integration of these communities into Colombian society (see e.g. Farthing and Ledebur 2015 on coca markets in Bolivia). For indigenous communities, these efforts took on an additional cultural feature that aimed to conserve "traditional" indigenous values and lifeways, which drug production is alleged to disrupt. However, these efforts overlook the productive (not to say positive) social effects of the drug trade on these communities as well as the ways in which the drug economy acts as a mediator of neoliberal governance in these communities.

In spite of these advances, indigenous people are still subject to the oppressive forces of global capitalism. Nowhere is this more evident than in the proliferation of the drug trade in northern Cauca, where much of the economy turns on drug production, and the resulting cash surge has facilitated the entrance of global commodities. Thus while they have made some local redistributive gains such as acquiring land from landowning elites, the drug economy integrates them further into a global hierarchy of production and, as I emphasize later, consumption.

In this dissertation, I describe how the drug trade has contributed to the subversion of the political, economic, and cultural autonomy of the Nasa indigenous community**.** In the rest of this chapter I outline how state drug policies have undermined the political autonomy of indigenous leaders. In Chapter 2, I sketch the history of indigenous political activism in northern Cauca. As I show, most anthropological writings that focus on the upswell of Latin America's indigenous movements in the 1990s and early 2000s have either overlooked or repudiated their relationship with Latin American popular leftist movements. However, I argue that the repression of these movements and their demands for wealth redistribution led to the proliferation of the drug trade in Colombia's rural regions, and the reproduction of social inequalities in the drug trade's structure.

In Part II (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), I trace how the drug economy has facilitated the rapid transition from an economy based on artisan production and small scale exchange to a cash-based economy that is dependent on global commodity consumption. One of the primary mechanisms of this transition is drug traffickers' introduction of off-market global commodities, particular motorcycles, into Nasa territory. This has been instrumental in transforming the rural Nasa people from a community of small agricultural producers to one of cash-dependent consumers. In Part III (Chapters 6 and 7), I describe how interventions by the Colombian state in indigenous education and family life seek to restructure indigenous social life to suit this cash-based economy. In particular, I trace how the prolonging of adolescence by schools and child welfare institutions, along with increasing requirements for schools to adhere to state mandated criteria, has removed Nasa young people from agricultural work while implementing new regimes of supervision over family relations. In all of these cases, I also discuss the role of memory and representations of the past in justifying or challenging these transitions.

Drug traffickers vs. drug producers

Most popular histories of the drug trade in Colombia mark its beginning with Pablo Escobar's notorious enterprise in the late 1970s and 1980s. Colombia became known the world over as the leading exporter of cocaine and a crucible of unspeakable violence at the hands of Escobar and other drug entrepreneurs who struck back at the state that frantically tried to rein them in. Among these vengeful acts of the drug traffickers were the assassinations of judges, journalists, and politicians who furthered the cause of extradition to the United States. It also included the organization of urban paramilitary gangs who continue to terrorize some of the country's poorest neighborhoods to this day. In some policy circles, Colombia was referred to as a "narcodemocracy" for the ways in which the state was corrupted by or held hostage to the interests of drug traffickers (Youngers and Rosin 2005). Escobar's reign came to a dramatic end in 1993 when, with the assistance of U.S. Special Forces and intelligence agencies, Colombia's military shot down Escobar on a rooftop in Medellín.

While Colombian drug trafficking is the subject of innumerable texts, documentaries, and dramatizations, drug production is a lesser known component of the drug commodity chain outside policy circles. Within policy circles, drug production is a regular focus due to U.S. supply-side reduction strategies, which target "producer countries" such as Colombia and have

dominated international drug policy since the 1970s alongside the increasing criminalization of demand in the U.S. Outside of these policy circles, drug production is less dramatic and less spectacular to the general public. Drug crop farmers as well as cocaine laboratory workers are represented as part of the social backdrop in mainstream media. They are poor farmers, often darker skinned and humble compared to the modern, urban, and savvy drug entrepreneurs. While elements of the racialization and urban/rural divide between drug traffickers and drug crop producers are true, the complexity of drug crop producers' worlds is rarely portrayed.

Needless to say, drug crop producers make up a crucial part of the drug commodity chain, but they are the most exploited. Drug crop cultivators earn about 2% of the overall profit (Camacho, Gaviria, and Rodriguez 2011; Ramírez, Stanton, and Walsh 2005). For example, while the U.S. street value of a pound of marijuana is generally over $1,000, a Nasa farmer in 2015 was earning about $10-15 for that same pound. While in some cases farmers are compelled by armed groups to produce, the higher earnings from illicit crops compared to licit crops often provides enough incentive for cash-poor Colombian farmers to grow drug crops without much coercion. Small-scale entrepreneurship exists within producing communities, in which some individuals rent plots to grow coca or marijuana and sell to *compradores*, or

buyers. There is a strong dividing line between production and trafficking, as compradores generally do not invest in land, and indigenous people almost never cross into the comprador class. As Sanabria (1993) pointed out in his work on Bolivia, because of the relatively small profits of production compared to trafficking and export, there is little incentive for traffickers to control production. In fact, this provides more incentive to maintain that dividing line – investing in production would drive up costs, so there would be less profit to be made.

How did drug crop cultivation come to indigenous Cauca? As with the rest of Colombia, illicit crop cultivation is the result of a number of factors. Principal among these were the consolidation of drug trafficking enterprises by the Medellín and Cali cocaine cartels, and the repression of drug production in surrounding countries. Drug crop cultivation began in the 1970s with marijuana, and its prevalence in Cauca began in the 1980s with poppy. In liberal circles, it is generally held that farmers continue to grow illicit crops because of a lack of profitable licit alternatives.

The emergence of drug crop cultivations

The history of drug crop cultivation in Colombia often begins with marijuana cultivation on the Caribbean coast in the 1970s. Although there is

less documentation of drug crop farming in other parts of the country at this time, elder Caucan farmers recall cultivating marijuana during this period. When I interviewed the former mayor of a northern Caucan town, he recounted the following:

Los cultivos ilícitos siempre han estado. En las comunidades indígenas, no es que sea una cosa nueva. Hubo la bonanza de la marihuana en los años 70-80. Pues en la comunidad no tenía tanta fuerza, por varias razones, ¿no? Pero después vino la bonanza de la amapola. …O sea son temporadas. De eso siempre ha estado. Yo de la amapola, de la marihuana en los ochenta, pues realmente yo no recuerdo, porque era un asunto bastante, como se dice, cojibido. ¡Hoy en día lo que pasa es que eso ha vuelto publico! Ese para mi es de las grandes diferencias. ¡Hoy cultivaban por ahí en el patio de la casa y no pasa nada! No, en el tiempo pasado eso fue arriba, escondido en el monte. La bonanza de la amapola si, abrió un poco mas... lo de la coca se cultivaban unas matas de la coca cerca de la casa pero se utilizaba para los rituales, para el mambeo, pero el resto de los cultivos estaban lejos. ¡Hoy en día a nadie le da vergüenza tener cientos de matas ahí en el patio! Para mi esa es una de las grandes diferencias que ha cambiado, ¿no? Pero de toda manera, siempre ha estado presente. (15-07-28	Illicit crops have always been there. In the indigenous communities, it is not that it is a new thing. There was the marijuana boom in the 1970s and 80s. Well in the community it did not have so much strength, for various reasons, no? But after that came that poppy boom... In other words, they are seasons. Of that it has always been. Of the poppy and marijuana in the 80s, well I don't remember because it was an issue well enough, how would you say, blanketed. Today what happens is that that has become public! That for me is one of the great differences. Today they cultivate there in the patio of the house and nothing happens! No, in past times that was up, hidden in the mountain… Some coca plants were cultivated close to the house but it was used for rituals, for chewing, but the rest of the crops were far away. These days no one is a shamed to have hundreds of plants there on the patio! For me that is one of the greatest differences that have changed. But in any case, it has always been present.

[Diomedes] ~2:38).	

Colombia's notoriety as a cocaine-producing country was preceded by what was called *la bonanza marimbera,* or the marijuana boom, of the 1970s. There were several factors that contributed to the proliferation of illicit crops in the country. Primary among these, according to Colombian anthropologist Darío Fajardo (2014), was the failure of agrarian reform. This failure to redistribute lands from Colombia's feudalistic land tenure system left hundreds of thousands of peasant farming families still landless. With the encouragement of the Colombian government and the promises of resources that rarely came through, these families joined the colonization of unsettled lands in remote parts of the national territory. Contraband entrepreneurs provided the means and infrastructure for marijuana production and export, leading to precarious boom and bust economies in these remote settlements (Tovar 1993). These entrepreneurs grew in power and influence, and collaborated with both established landowning elites and the Colombian military in money laundering activities, thus reinforcing the power differential between poor farmers and landowners. I elaborate on this historical process in Chapter 2.

Other factors that contributed to the growth of the drug industry in Colombia in the 1970s included U.S. repression of marijuana cultivations in

Mexico and Jamaica. Marijuana cultivation became especially prevalent on Colombia's northern coast, but spread to other remote parts of the country, including Cauca, in the following years. Some Nasa comuneros claim that illicit marijuana was grown in Cauca at this time, but most of the documented history of illicit crop cultivation in this period focuses on the Caribbean coast. Furthermore, the expulsion of drug traffickers from Chile at the hands of the dictator Augusto Pinochet left a gap that Pablo Escobar and his contemporaries quickly filled. Illicit coca production was not yet prevalent in Colombia, but drug traffickers imported coca paste from Peru and Bolivia to process into cocaine at laboratories in Colombia.

Marijuana cultivations on Colombia's northern coast were the first targets of U.S. supply-side policies under President Nixon, who authorized the aerial spraying of herbicides to suppress marijuana production. In 1974, the Colombian government issued a decree that prohibited these cultivations and outlined corresponding sentences. It also included provisions for economic alternatives for indigenous people and campesinos who had settled in remote areas and were growing illicit coca, although these were rarely enforced or pursued. As a decree, these policies were tenuous until they were etched into law under Law 30 of 1986.[1]

[1] Unlike the U.S., Colombia's legal system includes decrees. These are orders issued by Colombia's executive branch, including the President and Ministry offices. Decrees have less

Heroin and Poppy (1980s)

Official Colombian documentation notes that poppy cultivation was first detected in Colombia in 1986, and most of it was concentrated in indigenous territories (Thoumi 1999). Before poppy flowers bloom, they form a resin on the outside of the bud that contains opium, which is used to make morphine, heroin, and other opiate substances. Poppy was significant in that it laid the foundations for agricultural commercialization of subsequent cash crops, especially in highland areas. It required land divisions, irrigation, and chemical fertilizers, as coca production would also require in the 1990s. The reason for the spike in poppy cultivation in Colombia is unconfirmed, but has been linked to a crisis in production in Afghanistan at the time (Field 1993).

Poppy cultivation was a major turning point for Caucan indigenous people in the drug trade. The former indigenous mayor quoted above also described how, as he remembered it, poppy brought the drug trade out in the open for indigenous comuneros in the higher-altitude parts of northern Cauca:

Yo lo que más recuerdo de la bonanza	What I remember most from the

judicial authority than laws in that they have fewer sanctions associated with them. However, they often set a precedent for laws that will be authorized after a longer legislative process in Colombia's Congress, such as in this case.

de la amapola - yo creo que es el que más daño hizo a la economía indígena aparte de la coca y la marihuana. La razón es la siguiente: la coca y la marihuana siempre un producto de tierra caliente. Siempre lo había sido, en hace 20, 30 40 años. Entonces pensar en cultivar la coca y la marihuana en la parte alta no era posible. Porque estas tierras eran frías. Hoy cambio el clima. Hoy la marihuana se puede sembrar en López, en La Tolda. La coca se puede sembrar, ya no es una cuestión de clima. Me impresionó ver una marihuana linda ahí en Santo Domingo - ¡eso es muy frío! Eso hace 30 años era imposible pensar marihuana ahí. Pero mire como eso ha cambiado. La única diferencia es que se demora más en crecer. Yo creo que ese elemento del cambio climático también incide. Pero digo que la amapola causo mucho problema porque eso fue directamente a la parte alta y fría. Eso invadió los páramos, invadió toda la parte alta, donde estaban los productos del maíz, del frijol, las hortalizas, la cebolla. [15-07-28 [Diomedes] ~6:12]	poppy boom – I believe it is the one that did the most damage to the indigenous economy apart from coca and marijuana. The reason is the following: coca and marijuana were always a product of warmer earth. It always was, since 20, 30, 40 years. So to think of growing coca and marijuana in the high part was not possible. Because those lands were cold. Today the climate has changed. Today marijuana can be planted in [various higher altitude towns]… Coca can be grown, it is no longer a question of climate. I was impressed to see a beautiful marijuana plant in Santo Domingo [high altitude town] – that's very cold! Thirty years ago it was impossible to think of marijuana there. The only difference is that it takes longer to grow… I think that the element of climate change is also a factor. But I say that poppy caused a lot of problems because that went directly to the high and cold part. That invaded the *páramos*,[2] it invaded the whole higher part, where there were the crops of corn, beans, vegetables, onions.

Elder indigenous people also recalled the dramatic social changes brought on by the cash flows of poppy, especially the influx of consumer goods such as motorcycles. I elaborate on this in Part II.

[2] *Páramo* refers to an Andean mountain ecosystem that is renowned for its biodiversity.
[3] Coffee is usually sold in a measure called an *arroba*, which is equivalent to about 25 lbs.

Poppy cultivation also marked the beginning of socially liberal interventions by the government in illicit crop production in indigenous communities. The network of indigenous councils representing drug-producing communities in northern Cauca formed out of these encounters with the government and gave rise to the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca, ACIN). ACIN has become the major governing body of the indigenous communities of northern Cauca. ACIN is affiliated with the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (*Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca*, CRIC), although the experiences of ACIN's northern Cauca constituency with the drug trade and the armed conflict has at times contributed to bitter political tensions between the organizations.

Drug laws passed during this time made provisions that recognized the cultural traditions of indigenous drug crop cultivators. Law 30 of 1986, or "Ley 30," which has become colloquial code for drug offenses, is the foundation of much of Colombia's drug policy. Article 7 authorizes the regulated production and consumption of narcotics by indigenous communities "in accordance with the uses and practices derived from their tradition and culture" ("*de acuerdo con los usos y prácticas derivadas de su tradición y cultura"*); and Article 88 commissions the government to promote

crop substitution programs "in favor of indigenous people and settlers who have dedicated themselves to the planting of coca" ("en favor de los indígenas y colonos que se hayan dedicado a la explotación de plantaciones de coca"). These provisions showed that the Colombian government recognized indigenous people's experience in the drug economy as culturally distinct, and gave them some protected legal status.

Illicit Coca (1990s)

Widespread cultivation of coca for the drug trade arrived in Cauca and the rest of Colombia in the 1990s. Prior to this, illicit coca had primarily been cultivated in Peru and, to a lesser extent, Bolivia. Eradication efforts in Peru led to what policy scholars have called a "balloon effect," in which suppression of illicit crop production in one country consistently leads to growth in another, rather than to overall reduction in drug supply (Ramírez, Stanton, and Walsh 2005; Rouse and Arce 2006). In the 2000s, Colombia became known as the world's leading cultivator of coca for the cocaine industry. This title shifted back to Peru in 2012 following government eradication efforts.

Unlike marijuana and poppy, coca had been cultivated in the region before the arrival of the drug trade. This cultivation took place on a small

scale, as dried coca leaves were used for medicinal and ritualistic purposes. Coca chewing, as Bolivia is well known for, had long gone out of common practice in northern Cauca. The Spanish and mestizo elites considered coca chewing a barbarous practice, even though colonial officials promoted the use of coca by indigenous people working in the gold and silver mines throughout the Andean region until the 19th century. Campaigns against it only increased once the coca markets declined in the 20th century (Gootenberg 2008). Policies such as Decree 896 of 1947 declared the total prohibition of coca, but they were rarely enforced. The arrival of cocaine laboratories in the 1970s led to stricter enforcement (Henman 1987:111).

Marijuana returns (~2011)

In the early years of my fieldwork in Colombia, 2010-2011, marijuana plots were visible in northern Cauca, but not nearly as prevalent as coca. By 2015, marijuana had eclipsed coca in much of the controversy in the region around illicit crops, even though extensive coca cultivation continued. In 2012-13, many households sought to gain from the boom economy of the *cripin,* or "creeping" strain of marijuana that sold for up to 600,000 Colombian pesos (about $300 USD at that time) per pound. By 2014, the price had plummeted to about 30,000 COP ($10-15 USD). This was

comparable to the price of an equivalent yield of coffee.[3] Nasa farmers often pointed out to me that the advantage of marijuana over a comparable licit crop such as coffee was that marijuana had lower production costs and produced yields more quickly and frequently (several times a year) than coffee, which yielded no more than two harvests per year. These differences in costs and benefits provided sufficient incentives for individuals and families to continue growing marijuana.

Drugs and Indigenous People

The impact of the illicit drug economy on indigenous communities has rarely been examined by scholars. Notable exceptions include Field (1994, 1996); more recently Grisaffi (in press); and in geography, Steinberg, Hobbs, and Mathewson (2004). While some scholars have researched the drug economy in agricultural communities, some of which may have been indigenous, they did not focus on indigenous identity (e.g. Ferro 1999; Ramírez 2011; Sanabria 1993).

Colombian indigenous people's lives overlap with the drug economy in two crucial ways. The first is by a direct relationship to it. By 1999, it was estimated that 41% of Colombia's indigenous people had been directly affected: either they had participated in the drug trade or drug traffickers

[3] Coffee is usually sold in a measure called an *arroba*, which is equivalent to about 25 lbs.

had set up operations in or near their communities (Perafán 1999). The second is through the claim to a distinct historical relationship with the raw materials of drug production: plants and land. This is distinct from what is found in other sites of drug production, such as a methamphetamine laboratory in the United States, or a cocaine laboratory in a non-indigenous rural part of Colombia where producers do not assert such claims. For example, coca is widely known as a plant native to the Andes, recognized for its "traditional" use among the Nasa and other Andean indigenous communities before the Conquest and, more important, before drug trafficking (Henman 1978). However, this claim extends to plants in general, as a key aspect of Nasa cosmovision is recognition of agency in all of the plant crops that they cultivate, whether illicit or not (Rappaport 1985, 1998; Yule 2004).

This cultural-historical claim was a key focus of the literature on indigenous people and drugs in the 1980s. This literature was primarily concerned with the salvaging, in the face of encroaching Western culture, of these spiritual practices involving plants. Ethnographies of the Andean region focused on the ways that indigenous communities used substances such as coca as a form of cultural defense (Allen 1981, 1988). *Cultural Survival* published a special issue as well as a report on the impact of the

cocaine trade on indigenous coca users-turned-cocaine producers (Plowman et al. 1986). In the 1990s, researchers of Latin American indigenous communities turned their focus to the rise of indigenous movements (Langer and Muñoz 2003; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Sieder 2002; Warren and Jackson 2003; Yashar 2005; Van Cott 1994, 2000). Very little scholarship, however, has considered the paradoxical relationship between the rise in indigenous social and political capital since the emergence of indigenous movements and the proliferation of drug economies in indigenous territories.

The Nasa Experience and the Stakes of Agency

The experiences of the Nasa in northern Cauca provide a productive case for examining the relationship between multiculturalism and the illicit drug trade in indigenous communities. In addition to being a site of coca and marijuana production and a locus of the armed conflict between the Colombian military, right-wing paramilitaries, and left-wing guerrilla forces, northern Cauca is also the cradle of Colombia's modern indigenous movement. The Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (*Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca*, CRIC) was formed in 1971 amid the struggle for agrarian reform. In the decades following its formation, CRIC and various indigenous

activists in the country made unprecedented advances in securing rights for indigenous people. Their activities culminated in the cultural and territorial rights conferred in the 1991 Constitution. They also laid the foundations for a network of other indigenous organizations, umbrellaed under the National Organization for Indigenous People of Colombia (*Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia*, ONIC). CRIC's accomplishments have gained for Colombia's indigenous movements significant political and social capital as well as wide respect in the mosaic of Colombia's social movements.

However, for the Nasa and other indigenous communities who have attained much of the territorial control they fought for, violence and conflict continue to plague everyday life. Drug crop cultivation is one of the most visible outward signs of the incompleteness of the struggle for indigenous rights. Unlike threats from armed groups, coca and marijuana plots are right out in the open, 24 hours a day. Their danger is not due to any villainous nature of the plants themselves, as alleged by the infamous "La Mata Que Mata" campaign, a public service radio and television ad that featured a child's voice saying that coca and marijuana kill. Rather, the plants signal conflict because of the social relationships they represent. Like other drug crop growers, Nasa cultivators of coca and marijuana are agricultural

producers who occupy one of the most subordinate positions in the drug commodity chain. Drug crop production further exacerbated the armed conflict as various groups sought to control the drug trade.[4] For students of indigenous social movements, this continuous subordination and threat of violence in Nasa everyday life clashes dramatically with the triumphalist vision of newfound political access and "cultural capital" (Warren 1998: 50) won through social movements.

The drug trade and the armed conflict also threaten the political capital of the indigenous movement. Increased political recognition as well as resources from the Colombian state put pressure on indigenous leaders to denounce and take measures to control illicit activities in the territory. Conservative officials, such as former President Alvaro Uribe, portray the Nasa as working in collusion with the armed leftist insurgent group, the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Fueled by right-wing discourses, popular media in the early 2000s portrayed the FARC as drug traffickers (Ramírez, Stanton, and Walsh 2005). This portrayal conflated guerrillas and drug traffickers, two groups with dramatically different structures and objectives. The proximity of indigenous communities to the armed conflict and drug trafficking has

[4] As Sanabria (1993) notes, Bolivian *cocaleros* tended to operate independently of drug traffickers. This was evident in Cauca as well, where it never appeared that the Nasa were overtly coerced into growing drug crops.

compelled indigenous leaders to take firm public stances against illicit crop production as well as the FARC guerrilla insurgency, and to turn pressure onto the community to refrain from growing drug crops. To this day, indigenous leaders outwardly reject drug crop cultivation in their territories and generally avoid contesting any prosecution by the Colombian state of indigenous comuneros charged with drug offenses.

Because of the potential accusation that the indigenous community intentionally colludes with the FARC and drug traffickers, *agency* becomes a delicate issue in the representation of Nasa participation in the drug trade. The extent to which, and the ways in which, the Nasa *willingly* grow illicit crops determines the extent to which they are deemed deserving or undeserving of state benefits and general social respectability. Conservatives who are usually opposed to indigenous land rights have drawn on the stereotype of indigenous *malicia*, or cunning, to characterize their participation in the drug trade. As one prosecutor with whom I spoke put it, "The indigenous people in Cauca hide their drug crops under tall palm trees so the helicopters cannot detect them. And when they are captured by the police, their leaders come to rescue them from prosecution." Neither of these notions was true.

In order to contest conservative accusations of collusion with outlawed groups, liberal NGOs and advocates for indigenous people have presented indigenous cultivators as unwitting participants in the drug trade. Drawing on tropes of indigenous people as innocent and stewards of the earth, they portray the criminal drug economy as antithetical to their essential character. From this point of view, indigenous people who participate in the drug trade are victims of manipulation or intimidation by guerrillas or drug traffickers, who are often mistakenly conflated in the media and popular Colombian imagination. Liberals go to great lengths to make the correct distinction between these groups to diminish the agency of indigenous people in the drug trade.

Indigenous drug crop production troubles anthropological arguments in support of indigenous agency, because if indigenous people grow drug crops with the same agency that they actively construct identities and represent themselves, then their political capital is delegitimized in the eyes of the state. Not only does the liberal notion of unwitting drug trade participants refute the anthropologically venerated agency of indigenous people, but it also fails to explain the normalization of drug crop cultivation in indigenous communities where outright coercion by powerful groups is not apparent.

As the former mayor highlighted in our interview, the drug economy has long been a normal fact of life for the Nasa as well as for other communities of northern Cauca. It is not just the practice of a few. As one mestizo activist described illicit crops in his own region of Colombia, they are the "life-blood of the economy" (*sangre de la economía*). If we treat the drug economy strictly as deviant, we risk not understanding the ways it complements, and even serves, licit economic and political interests. The subjection of a bureaucratized indigenous leadership to national drug laws has helped to undermine the potency of indigenous identity as an organizing tool. As I show in the following chapters, the drug economy helped to facilitate the entrance of consumption-based capitalism in northern Cauca.

Anthropology of Drug Production

In spite of the seemingly endless number of works on the drug trade in the U.S. and Latin America, very little of it is ethnographic. For example, Sarmiento and Krauthausen (1991) note that over 100 edited scholarly works on the cocaine market were produced between 1986 and 1990 in Colombia alone. As with most analyses of the drug economy, these works draw primarily from official quantitative data and journalistic sources, and the majority tend to focus on trafficking rather than production.

Ethnographies of drug production are rare, likely due to obvious concerns about access and security.

Very important exceptions to this include María Clemencia Ramírez's *Between the Guerrillas and the State* (2011) and Harry Sanabria's *The Coca Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia* (1993), both of which examine the positioning of coca-growing campesinos in Colombia and Bolivia, respectively. Each positions coca growers differently. For Ramírez, the *cocaleros* of Putumayo demand citizenship and inclusion by articulating an identity based on abandonment by the state. Sanabria does not interpret the practices of illicit coca growers in Bolivia as operating outside dominant market forces, but in response to them. My work is more closely aligned with this latter position, as I show that indigenous drug crop farmers are not operating outside the state or market forces, but in direct relation with them.

My work is situated among a growing set of ethnographies that have shifted away from highlighting the failures of the drug war to examining how the drug economy facilitates governance of what had been conventionally categorized as ungovernable or outlawed subjects and territories (Arias 2006; Ballvé 2012; Muehlmann 2014; Polson 2013). These ethnographies are preceded by critical works that have shown how drug prohibition has provided the mechanisms for ulterior aims of social control in the U.S.

(Alexander 2012; Musto 1999; Provine 2008; Reinarman and Levine 1997).

Introducing the Nasa of northern Cauca

The Nasa are an indigenous community that primarily inhabit the highland region of Cauca. They also live in the neighboring departments of Huila, Valle del Cauca, and Putumayo. Numbering about 200,000 according to *cabildo* censuses, they are the second largest indigenous group in Colombia after the Wayuu of the northern coast. In Cauca, they share most of the Andean highlands with other indigenous communities, in particular the Misak, Coconuco, and Yanaconas. They have a long history of resistance to and negotiation with the Colombian state.

The Nasa of Cauca are generally represented by two major organizations: the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (*Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca*, CRIC), and its biggest subsidiary, the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (*Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca*, ACIN). CRIC was established in the midst of Colombia's agrarian reform, which I detail in Chapter 2. ACIN was formed in 1994 out of negotiations with the Colombian government over substitution programs for drug crops grown in indigenous territories. Although ACIN is a subsidiary of CRIC, they tend to be at odds with one another. CRIC was founded in

northern Cauca, but relocated its offices to the departmental capital, Popayán, and tends to cater to the more "culturally" oriented central and eastern indigenous municipalities such as Tierradentro. ACIN, on the other hand, represents six municipalities, nearly all of which are situated amid the harsh realities of the drug trade and Colombia's armed conflict. ACIN is notorious for their confrontational style and pervasive strains of militant politics, which put them at odds with the less politically combative CRIC.

Most of the Nasa of northern Cauca live on one of fourteen *resguardos*, or collective land holdings for indigenous people recognized by the government. Each resguardo is governed by a *cabildo*, or council that manages the local political and social affairs. Several resguardos are also municipalities.

Figure 1. Cauca, Colombia.



POBLACIÓN	Personas	%
INDÍGENA	248.532	20
NEGRA	255.839	20.16
MESTIZA	764.566	59.84
TOTAL	1.268.937	100

Figure 2. Map of Cauca showing indigenous *resguardos* ("Resguardos Indígenas")

The Nasa have an autochthonous language, *nasa yuwe*. About a third of them are bilingual in Spanish and Nasa Yuwe, and a small, aging percentage of them are monolingual in Nasa Yuwe. The rest are monolingual in Spanish. These proportions vary regionally within Cauca and other parts of Colombia. Nasa Yuwe has been considered as either a Chibcha language, related to other Andean indigenous languages, or in its own stand-alone category (Pachon 1997). The Nasa have traditional dress, which includes a shawl for the cold mountain weather, and the Andean *mochila* or bag, but

today most people dress with jeans and backpacks. Unlike the Misak, also of Cauca and known for their purple capes and bowler hats, or the Kogis of the northern coast, who are often shown with their white robes, the Nasa do not wear the kinds of traditional dress that are the typical outward markers of "exotic" indigenous people. If they choose to distinguish themselves, they most typically do so by carrying a *baston de mando* – a wooden staff symbolizing authority and protest – or wearing something that bears the red and green flag of CRIC.

The Nasa frequently attract media attention because of their situation amid Colombia's armed conflict. Nasa municipal centers and their surrounding areas were periodic battlegrounds for confrontations between the Colombian military and armed insurgent groups. For example, in July of 2011, leftist insurgents detonated a bomb, killing five and injuring almost a hundred, in the main square of Toribío, an indigenous town heavily patrolled by Colombian troops. The Nasa were also at the forefront of the 2004 and 2008 countrywide protests, known as the *Mingas*, that contested former President Alvaro Uribe's free trade negotiations. This has earned them, especially those of the north, a reputation in the public mind for being belligerent.

Figure 3. Nasa indigenous guards physically remove Colombian soldiers from a post in Toribio, Cauca. *El Espectador,* 17 July 2012. "Asi fue la agresion a los soldados por parte de indigenas en Cauca" http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/galeria-360668-asi-fue-agresion-los-soldados-parte-de-indigenas-cauca

Non-Colombian anthropologists working with Colombia's indigenous communities have tended to overlook the Nasa, especially those of northern Cauca. Anthropologists were usually attracted to indigenous communities deemed to be less affected by Western society, such as those of Colombia's Amazon region (Jackson 1991) or the Kogi of the Caribbean coast, infamously studied by Colombia's father of anthropology, Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff,

followed by Wade Davis. As highland agriculturalists with more interaction with the Colombian state, the Nasa were considered less "authentically" indigenous than these other communities (Warren and Jackson 2003). Andeanists have also tended to direct their scholarly attentions toward more populous indigenous communities of Bolivia and Peru. When anthropologists have studied the Nasa, they have largely focused on those of Tierradentro, a region more remote from major cities than northern Cauca.

Joanne Rappaport has prolifically produced the bulk of North American anthropological research on the Nasa. Working primarily with CRIC and based in Tierradentro since the 1980s, her work has mostly focused on the relationship between history, memory, and the construction of identity (Rappaport 1985, 1994, 1998, 2005). Although Colombian anthropologists have worked extensively with the Nasa throughout the decades, this is represented less in published works than in the *indigenista* legacy of solidarity and collaboration with indigenous causes (see Caviedes 2002 on the history of solidarity activists).

The indigenous people of northern Cauca have been ardent agriculturalists as well as belligerent negotiators, weathered in confrontations with powerful entities and state institutions (Findji 1992; Findji and Rojas 1985; Sanders 2004). As long as they have had land to work,

they have always worked dually for both subsistence and external markets, whether as sharecroppers or as landed resguardo residents. Their leaders have engaged in what Joanne Rappaport, who has conducted decades of fieldwork with the Nasa, has called "strategic essentialism," and those who were less institutionally oriented have always been tenacious, as evidenced by their participation in land recuperations and their permanence on the resguardo amid conflicts that seek to drive them out. It could be argued that the drug economy is part of a much longer tradition of negotiating various political and economic forces while sustaining territorial permanence.

However, the drug trade has presented unprecedented challenges to indigenous economic, political, and cultural survival strategies. As it has in other poor and conflict-ridden communities, the drug trade has produced a prevalent ambivalence. For as long as indigenous people could hold back the tide of capitalist instability through strategically combining subsistence and cash crops, they could resist the cultural fragmentation that came with globalization. The political baggage of the drug trade has forced indigenous people to confront issues of cultural change that preceded, but were aggravated by, the drug economy.

The drug trade represents the latest iteration of a series of global-commodity booms in Cauca since the colonial period. Like the production of

other global commodities such as gold, quinine (extracted from the cinchona tree for use in making malaria medicine), and coffee, drug crop production creates profits through the extraction of surplus value from the labor of indigenous people in exchange for wages. However, the cash profits from the drug trade are significantly higher than those from previous commodities, and consequently have unprecedented effects on the community. On one hand, the profits from drug cash crops have provided an incentive for people to stay in the territory instead of searching for work in urban centers. As an economically viable alternative to growing other cash crops, drug crop cultivation allows the Nasa to sustain agriculture as a key part of Nasa identity. On the other hand, these same profits have rapidly accelerated the integration of Nasa cultivators into neoliberal capitalism as consumers increasingly dependent on global commodities for their way of life. For these reasons, the drug economy has facilitated continuity at the same time as it has enabled a dramatic rupture with past practices of consumption and production in the territory.

Introducing Manzaná

Manzaná, where the longest stretch of my fieldwork took place in 2015, is a world apart from the indigenous rallies that were the focus of earlier periods of my fieldwork (2011-2014). These events were always heavily politicized and featured people donning red and green CRIC flags and hats, carrying the wooden staffs (*bastones de mando*) of the indigenous guard, and giving seemingly endless speeches about the indigenous movement. Cultural markers were also saliently present, such as the sacred *tulpa* (a spiritually symbolic fire pit with various offerings of herbs surrounding it) with *thé walas* (traditional medicine people) and pious elders, as well as young people, keeping guard over it. If one moved solely in these spaces, it would be easy to believe that such political consciousness and its markers permeate the entire indigenous community. One would imagine, for example, that everyone was familiar with CRIC and its history, and that this was tied to a strong sense of indigenous identity that would be openly expressed on a daily basis. However, most overt expressions of Nasa identity and cultural politics are subsumed in the bustle of everyday life. Nearly everyone wears jeans, sneakers or boots, and other clothing that indicates access to urban markets.

Manzaná is part of an indigenous resguardo, but also part of a municipality. Thus it is governed by two authoritative bodies – the municipal

mayor's office, which is usually held and staffed by indigenous people, and the indigenous cabildo. The mayor's office is subject to the regulations of the Colombian state. The council, which receives support from the Colombian central government, is subject to the regulations of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (*Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca*, ACIN) and the still broader Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (*Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca*, CRIC) and enjoys significantly more political autonomy from the Colombian state than does the mayor's office. However, the cabildo must constantly work with the councils of other resguardos. Indigenous officials and political activists circulate through both of these structures. Generally, these two governing bodies cooperate, though there are always reasons or opportunities for tensions between them.

Though a rural town, Manzaná is far from sleepy. The air constantly buzzes with the sound of motorcycles zipping up and down the main drag. Dogs bark, roosters crow, and there is the occasional hog snort and horse whinny. The first *chiva*, or large bus, rumbles through at 5:00 a.m., sounding its bullhorn for early travelers to Santander de Quilichao, the closest urban hub, an hour and a half away. Other chivas pass throughout the day, loading and unloading goods and people in near equal weights.

The drug economy that has come to make up a large part of economic life is evident in the landscape. Looking out from the town, plots of marijuana of varying sizes are readily visible, some covered with plastic tarps. At about 5:30 every evening, lights hung from wires in neat rows over the plots turn on to burn throughout the night over a marijuana strain that allegedly requires 24-hour light to grow quickly for the best plot turnover. This makes the marijuana plots, whose color matches much of the landscape during the day, immediately visible at night, and the dozens of sets of lights on any slope attest to the place that the crop has in current life. Coca, on the other hand, with its much lighter shade of green, is always easier to pick out in daylight. Although much attention recently has been given to marijuana, it has in no way eclipsed the cocaine economy. While coca is still used traditionally for medicine and rituals, a large portion continues to be used for cocaine production.

The Conflict

Until the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC in 2016, Colombia endured one of the world's longest-running internal conflicts. Since the 1960s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, FARC), a left wing, peasant-based, guerrilla insurgent group, had been operating in much of Colombia's rural territories. While most national and international media attention has focused on the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian state, the majority of Colombia's political violence has been committed by the Colombian military and right wing paramilitaries.

The FARC gained the most international notoriety in the 1990s when they began to take more dramatic measures for financing their operations after the fall of the Soviet Union and the extermination of many of their urban allies involved with the *Unión Patriótica* (Patriotic Union), a left-wing political party that represented progressive mayors, judges, journalists, and human rights defenders. They engaged in kidnapping of elite politicians and wealthy individuals for ransom. They also levied a *gramaje,* or per-kilogram tax, on cocaine traffickers for cocaine produced in the territories that they controlled.

Prior to the 1990s, Cauca had long been one of the red zones of the conflict. The FARC had been operating there for decades. The *Sexto Frente* (Sixth Front), notorious for their aggressive style, was led by "Sargento Pascuas," one of the few remaining original founders of the guerrilla movement. The Sexto Frente encamped and operated around indigenous

territories, but did not directly control them. Over the years, the FARC had occupied indigenous towns numerous times. For people living in the *cascos urbanos*, or municipal town centers, the most common interactions would be with FARC-allied civilians, known as *milicianos*, who lived in the towns but reported back to the FARC. Who was and who was not a *miliciano* was never an open matter, but was generally known. The Colombian military's presence, by contrast, was highly visible. They had bases in the municipal centers and patrols on the roads between villages, especially those leading into and out of them. The Colombian military patrols were the FARC's hottest targets.

Interactions with armed militants or their auxiliaries were not uncommon for people in the territory. In a conversation with Mercedes, a school principal who facilitated much of my work in Manzaná, she commented that many guerrilla fighters had been coming to Manzaná. Months before, students had reported seeing coffins full of ammunition being unloaded near the school where they studied. "It worries me," she said. "I think they come here because they know a lot of people here." One time they had left their uniforms and guns near a field where kids were playing. The kids had tried on the uniforms. "I went and told them they had to stop."

Telling the guerrillas to stop anything was not a casual affair. Mercedes told of how the guerrillas had tried to recruit her son. She confronted them and demanded that they stop. They responded with death threats to her cell phone. Mercedes requested protection from the Colombian government. They sent her a bullet-proof vest. Meanwhile, she sent her son to study in Santander in order to get him away from the influence. Although she also considered ways to leave herself, she would not leave her husband or her work with the community.

I typically got wide-eyed looks when I told urban Colombians that my research was based in northern Cauca. The region had become known through reports of attacks by the FARC and their confrontations with the military that would air intermittently on national news stations. It seemed at times almost a sort of luck that, on days when we were traveling to northern Cauca, my travel companions and I would watch reports of an earlier or ongoing attack in or near the place that we were visiting. We decided that we would only be deterred from our travels by inside information. If our local contacts didn't warn us not to go, then we would go. By the time we arrived later in the morning, things had calmed down, or we would learn that whatever had happened was at some distance from wherever we were.

The conflict made itself known to me less through bullets flying through the air than through the tensions that permeated everyday life. These were not always obvious to an outsider, but they became most palpable for me through how my movements were directed and to whom I was told that I should, and especially should not, talk. These tensions also revealed themselves in conversations, as people talked about how their lives had been threatened for clashing with the interests of local armed forces, whether the guerrillas, drug traffickers, or the military.

My 2015 fieldwork benefited from relative calm, thanks to peace-negotiation talks accompanied by ceasefires between the FARC and the Colombian government, which allowed for a long lull in the violence. The reports of confrontations were farther between than they had been in previous years. Although in earlier years it had been typical to hear, or hear about, shooting confrontations or grenade attacks in villages in northern Cauca, only once during my 2015 fieldwork did I hear shots. That day, a focus group that I was conducting at a school was interrupted by the sound of gunshots coming from one of the surrounding slopes. A student who was giving a presentation continued without interruption. The other students would have kept straight faces if they had not been laughing at mine, which

revealed that I was obviously disturbed by the sounds. "Hizo falta!" one of them said of the gunfire, alluding to the long period of time since they had last heard it: "We missed it."

Doing Research in Cauca

I began my research, which took place between 2010 and 2016, by working in the summer of 2010 in Bogotá with a non-indigenous solidarity activist to promote the *Festival de la Hoja de Coca* (Coca Leaf Festival) in northern Cauca. I took my first trip to northern Cauca that year, attending a three-day meeting of Caucan indigenous youth. In the following summers (2011-2014), I continued to visit northern Cauca to build relationships with leaders, activists, and comuneros. I participated in rallies and rituals, and learned as much as I could about the social and political context. This prepared me for a seven-month fieldwork period in 2015. For most of this period, my energies were committed to conducting a series of workshops with indigenous youth at La Terraza, a primary and adult education program in Manzaná, Cauca. I also conducted interviews with indigenous leaders, activists, students and teachers.

As northern Cauca was a conflict zone with heavy FARC, military, and paramilitary presence, my ability to stay in the region for longer than a few

days at a time was highly limited. For this reason, I was based in Cali, the city where my mother was born and where much of her family continues to live. Cali is Colombia's fourth-largest city; located in a valley between two Andean mountain ranges, it has a tropical climate. From Cali, it was a two- to three-hour journey to the comfortably cooler Manzaná, with much longer travel times to other parts of northern Cauca, depending on the location of the destination along the region's unpaved and sometimes hazardous mountain roads.

My entry into the Nasa community in northern Cauca was facilitated through Nasa women who studied at the Universidad del Valle in Cali – among them, Adriana, who introduced me to her sister Mercedes, the coordinating principal of La Terraza. Both of the sisters had garnered reputations throughout northern Cauca as well as in their social circles in Cali for their confrontational styles, unapologetic advocacy for women's empowerment, and persistence through grueling battles with governing authorities at all levels for resources for their education programs. Adriana was one of the founding members of the indigenous council at the Universidad del Valle. She was also a member of a collective of mostly non-indigenous students who had traveled to northern Cauca as activists and collaborators with several community projects.

Among this collective of student solidarity activists was Camilo, who came to be my research assistant and confidant throughout the years of this research. At that time, Camilo was a political studies major, later to become a master's-level student of anthropology at the Universidad del Cauca. He had cut his activist teeth among various radical student groups in Cali, and his participation with the Cauca solidarity collective eventually landed him in the middle of a deadly 2008 protest in northern Cauca in which thousands of Nasa comuneros blocked the Pan-American Highway on a march to Bogotá. The impact of this experience led him to commit many of his following years to the indigenous struggle in northern Cauca, where he came to work, live, and teach for long periods of time. His belief in the significance of my research project, his contributions to its logistics, and his keen political insights at countless junctures were invaluable. His commitment to community-based activist praxis also provided a reflective resource to ensure that my work was carried out as sensitively as possible.

With Mercedes, Adriana, Camilo, and others, I was able to circulate throughout northern Cauca among a trusted group of activists and comuneros who had strong wills and a variety of critical viewpoints. Because I had dual citizenship as a Colombian citizen, and Mercedes had most of the ultimate say as to whether I could carry out research at her school, I did not

have to wrestle with many bureaucratic channels to obtain access to the community. Although I sought and obtained permission from the governor of the local cabildo, I kept a low profile, and the cabildo seemed quite indifferent to me. This had advantages and disadvantages. The greatest disadvantage was that, as I was less embedded in the formal bureaucracy beyond La Terraza, I had very little formal protection, which meant that the logistics of relatively safe travel in and out of a conflict zone depended on the availability of Mercedes, Camilo, and others in their trusted circle.

The advantages of this were that I had a relatively high degree of autonomy in my project, independent of the political objectives of the cabildo. I was more subject to Mercedes's needs and objectives, and I welcomed her sincere, community-based approach. This also required that the project be participatory and win the favor of student participants. I believe that this relationship with Mercedes and other local activists allowed student participants to be more at ease when speaking with me. I was also able to hear more critical perspectives of the cabildo than might otherwise have been possible. Most community activists and comuneros deferred to the cabildo, but there were also varying degrees of distrust of the male-dominated governing body and resentment of its bureaucratic structure.

These tensions were not the focus of my research, but they eventually led me to consider more deeply the relationship between the state, the cabildo, and the community as a crucial factor in how people understand the drug economy.

Outline of the Chapters

The following chapters trace particular ways in which the drug trade has threatened the political and economic empowerment of the Nasa.

In the rest of Part I (Chapter 2), I trace 20th-century Nasa history preceding the solidification of multiculturalist rights in Colombia's 1991 Constitution. I focus especially on the relationship between the indigenous movement and popular leftist movements for agrarian reform in the 1960s and 1970s. I contest several anthropologists' interpretations of this relationship as well as the contention that the success of "cross-class" movements justifies an abandonment of class-based analysis. I also describe how the outcome of the 1970s movement for agrarian reform led to the proliferation of an illicit drug crop economy in Cauca with class and race hierarchies that paralleled those of licit economies. Finally, drawing on Hale's (2006) concept of neoliberal multiculturalism, I problematize some

anthropologists' notions that neoliberalism has provided opportunities for indigenous autonomy.

In Part II, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I provide a sketch of the cultural and economic aspects of illicit drug crop cultivation in indigenous territory. In Chapter 3, I describe how many Nasa comuneros have come to understand drug crop cultivation as part of an immoral economy. In Chapter 4, I show how the drug economy has irreversibly created a new cash-based consumer economy in a community whose members have historically been producers. In Chapter 5, I discuss the context, possibilities, and limitations of indigenous entrepreneurship in alternative coca and marijuana markets, which have been upheld in drug policy circles as the most favorable solution to the "problem" of the drug trade for indigenous communities. Together, these chapters suggest that the drug trade has helped to ensure that the full realization of indigenous rights and well-being is inextricably tied to social, political, and economic structures far beyond the boundaries of indigenous territories and the reach of indigenous leaders.

Part III, Chapters 6 and 7, is primarily based on the workshops that I carried out in Manzaná with students of an adult-education program. I describe how schools and child welfare organizations, as urban-based liberal institutions, have contributed to the prolonging of adolescence in the Nasa

community, thus restructuring family relations in the community. In Chapter 6, I show how a rising moral panic over drug use makes up part of a larger moral panic over youth, irresponsible parenthood, and delinquency. In Chapter 7, I describe how narratives of the past are used to contest or justify the interventions of state institutions. Together, these chapters show that, despite the claim that schools are institutions that cultivate indigenous autonomy, their modeling on urban liberal values undermines the social and economic structures that they often strive to conserve through classroom teaching and cultural expression.

I conclude with a summary of my arguments and comments on the future of the Nasa community and the drug trade in the post-conflict era.

CHAPTER 2

THE NASA, AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DRUG TRADE

The drug trade came to Cauca, as it came to other parts of Colombia, on the tail of decades of class conflict and a failed agrarian reform policy in Colombia's countryside. This context is crucial for understanding how the drug trade reflects and reproduces ongoing socioeconomic inequality in Colombia, and how neoliberal multiculturalism fails to address this inequality for indigenous people. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of this class conflict and of agrarian policy in the first half of the 20th century, which together by the 1970s, set the stage for the emergence of the drug trade as well as the contemporary indigenous movement. I highlight the role of indigenous activists in these historical moments and challenge assertions by scholars of indigenous movements that these movements were founded on an ideological separation from class politics.

The Nasa as Campesinos vs. Indigenous People

The Nasa live at the intersection of two political subjectivities: indigenous and *campesino*, or peasant farmer. As one of Rappaport's

informants proclaimed in the 1980s, “To be Páez [Nasa] is to be a farmer”[5] (Rappaport 1985:43). In the most general terms, "indigenous" refers to people descending from communities settled in the Americas before the 16th-century conquest. "Campesino" (which I will use to refer to peasant farmers in Latin America) describes a class condition of a small farmer. The two are not mutually exclusive categories, as it is obvious that any individual or group can both claim indigenous identity and live as peasant farmers. However, state and colonial institutions, and social movements, have shaped distinct political histories of these categories, even though they have overlapped in everyday as well as political contexts. This distinction has required groups such as the Nasa, who straddle these political categories, to strategically integrate themselves to, and to shape, the movement that will best represent their claims. In the last several decades, the "indigenous" category has been the most productive - so much so that now, campesinos in Colombia are working to mold an identity in terms of the ethnic criteria used by the state in according land rights to indigenous people.

Scholars have also treated the categories as discrete. For anthropologists studying peasant lifeways, following either Redfield's (1971) or Marxist theoretical lines, indigenous identity was not an important factor

[5] “Páez” was the name most frequently used by Spanish colonial officials and Colombian researchers until the 1980s. Today the Nasa refer to themselves as “Nasa.”

in their approaches. Conversely, North American anthropologists of the 1970s studying indigenous people generally did not concern themselves with indigenous involvement in the peasant movements. By the late 1970s, the agricultural reform movement had died down, and in the 1980s, the environmental movement and the global indigenous movement converged on tropes of salvaging quickly disappearing landscapes and people (Conklin and Graham 1995). Many indigenous people continued to live as small farmers, but anthropological attention focused less on political economy than on cultural survival of "traditional" lifeways and, increasingly, on the shaping of the terms of identity in encounters with the state (e.g., Urban and Sherzer 1991). These latter studies rarely examined how such changing terms of identity affected indigenous people as peasant farmers, as many of them focused on lowland, or Amazonian, indigenous people, who were less often agriculturalists and were thus less "integrated" into Colombian society than Andean indigenous people generally were (Jackson 1991).

The political debate over whether Andean agricultural indigenous communities such as the Nasa align more with the campesino or indigenous identity dates back to the emergence of the modern indigenous movement in the 1970s. At issue was which movement could best represent their

interests. The peasant movement was steeped in the struggle for land and heavily influenced by the class-struggle rhetoric of Marxist popular movements. Indigenous communities were heavily involved in the peasant movement. However, as the strength of the peasant movements dissipated in the 1970s, Latin American anthropologists concerned about the disappearance of indigenous lifeways helped to steer indigenous movements toward cultural rights based on identity (Troyan 2015). For these anthropologists, the popular left, which often saw identity and its associated "traditions" as a barrier to effective class struggle, was as much a threat to indigenous survival as the right.

The debate has mostly faded into the background as the success of the indigenous movement in winning territorial and cultural rights has allegedly shown the potency of identity as an organizing tool. For several anthropologists of indigenous movements, the failure of popular Marxist movements' attempts to win state power, and the subsequent success of indigenous movements, attest to the declining significance of class as a conceptual foundation for social movements and political action (Colloredo-Mansfeld 1999; Ramos 2002; Warren 1998). There is obviously some truth to the notion that indigenous ethnic identity has provided a platform for the successful launching of indigenous people to political power. In order to have

public legitimacy, the Colombian state must now increasingly, if only rhetorically, address the needs of indigenous people, as well as those of Afro-descendant communities, women, and other groups.

The present challenges for indigenous agricultural lifeways presented by the drug trade suggest a continued high relevance of the debate between the relative potency of "class-based" and "identity-based" struggles. For the Nasa and other communities with territorial rights, land and agricultural livelihood still matter. Furthermore, claiming triumph of identity over class as a more effective strategy overlooks several important historical factors: the defeat of popular Marxist movements by powerful state and elite interests; "soft-power" strategies in which governments made social provisions, including land concessions, to potential revolutionary bases to counter communist and socialist movements among ethnic communities (see Rappaport 1994: 9); the self-defeating politics of some leftist visionaries and organizations that were disjoined from the needs and political orientations of their bases, ethnically identified or not (as in the case of ANUC, which I elaborate below); and finally, the contributions that the so-called "class-based" movements *did* make to progressive politics, including indigenous ascendancy to public offices.

Charles Hale's work has most critically engaged the outcomes of indigenous movements in Latin America. With the term "neoliberal multiculturalism," he highlights the ways in which multiculturalist policies such as cultural and territorial rights have failed to interrupt, or have even served, the interests of neoliberal capitalism in Latin America (Hale 2002, 2005, 2006). He draws from critics of North American multiculturalism (Fraser 1997; Goldberg 1994) who contrast its success in implementing limited forms of recognition with its failures to effectively redistribute resources to historically oppressed groups. All of these authors contend that multicultural politics in these regions has favored identity narratives that downplay redistributive demands. Similarly, drug crop cultivation in indigenous territories indicates the limitations of indigenous rights to address deeply entrenched class conflicts.

In this chapter I outline a brief history of the agrarian conflicts that led up to the proliferation of drug crop cultivation in indigenous territories. I preface this history with a review of some prevailing anthropological portrayals of indigenous movements that downplay their political and ideological intersections with leftist popular movements. As I show by means of this history, the conditions of agricultural life formed the original basis of indigenous mobilization in the 20th century. This directly challenges

portrayals of indigenous movements as discretely "identity-based" rather than "class-based." Furthermore, the outcome of these mobilizations, which granted land but not a comprehensive agrarian policy, would also set the conditions for the entrance of drug crop cultivation into indigenous territories. The drug trade in indigenous Cauca attests to the continuing significance of class divisions at local and global levels as one of the primary challenges to the success of Colombia's indigenous movement.

Anthropologists of indigenous movements privilege identity over class

The emphasis on the role of identity in indigenous movements draws from new social movement theory (see Buechler 1995 for a review). European scholars such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) contended that post-industrial societies had entered a "post-Marxist" phase where class struggle between the industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie had become generally irrelevant. Gender, ethnicity, environment, and other categories made up sites of "post-Marxist" fields of struggle. Pre-industrial societies such as those of Latin America and other parts of the "Third World" had yet to move historically past the industrial phase, and were thus devoid of the "historicity" necessary to construct and politically act on such categories. Latin American theorists challenged this last argument, asserting that social

actors in the Third World did indeed construct collective identities beyond class and use them as platforms for political action (see Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998; Escobar 1992; Escobar and Álvarez 1992; Quetzil Castaneda 2004). For several anthropologists of indigenous movements (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Ramos 2002; Warren 1998), the success of indigenous movements throughout Latin America is an important example of this. They point to the "cross-class" structure of indigenous movements as evidence of the political potency of ethnic identity over the class orientation of the popular left.

Kay Warren's work in Guatemala provides an example of this uncomplicated view of the divergence between the indigenous movement and the popular left in Guatemala. Her research focuses on how Maya intellectuals have challenged critics of the Pan-Maya movement on both the left and right by centralizing race and coloniality. After describing how right-wing social and political forces explicitly defended the impunity of dictatorships and racist policies, Warren focuses particularly on the tensions between the leftist popular movement and the indigenous movements. She draws almost exclusively from the writings of Mario Roberto Morales, a political leftist turned journalist, to show the leftist attacks on the Mayanist movement. In line with orthodox Marxist thought that saw identity and

culture in general as an ideological barrier to resolving material contradictions under capitalism, Morales argued that there is no such thing as a true Mayan, thus racism against them is a construct made up by social scientists, and that pan-Mayanism is a marketing ploy for tourism and international funders.

Warren uses Morales's writing on the Maya to stand in for a more complex history of the relationship between the indigenous community and popular social movements. The scant use of ethnographic or historical sources showing the relationship between these groups seems to paint an uncomplicated picture of identity necessarily pitted against class. This leaves open many questions about whether ideological overlap ever existed between the movements in Guatemala.

Similarly, Alcida Ramos, a Brazilian anthropologist, also sets indigenous movements historically and ideologically apart from the popular left. She asserts that this recognition of indigenous rights in various Latin American countries sheds light on the ethnicity versus class debates. She writes: "There is… a major *difference* in the ideologies that inform class and ethnicity: in one case, a quest for a uniformity of interests of the 'workers of the world, unite!' type; in the other case, the quest for legitimate diversity" (Ramos 2003:274). Ramos does not differentiate between what class and

ethnicity mean as analytic categories for social researchers and what they mean as rallying points for social movements.

Morales's attack on Pan-Mayanism certainly echoes many classical Marxist activists who saw traditional social structures and their corresponding symbolic forms such as religion as counterrevolutionary and therefore repudiated the "identity" focus of social movements during and after the 1960s. Racism within the left is also not to be understated. The integration of the political agendas of specific groups with that of a broader socialist or communist agenda is an ongoing point of tension. As Warren documents, this can erupt into clashes between these groups. However, the most incendiary leftist critiques of any indigenous movement, and indigenous rebuttals to those critiques, belie the historical and contemporary moments of overlap between them.

The pitting of identity against class has significant political and analytical consequences. While conflicts over the role of identity may have been a legitimate factor in tensions between indigenous communities and the mestizo left, neoliberalism has played a significant role in shaping the outcome of the indigenous movement as well as the reluctance to acknowledge contributions of the left to it. More important, the emphasis on identity overlooks the historical role of powerful political and social elites in

shaping the violent and resource-poor conditions of the majority of indigenous people. In the rest of this chapter, I describe how social elites undercut the outcome of Colombia's agrarian reform movement, in which the Nasa and other indigenous communities participated, which enabled the introduction of drug crop cultivation in Colombia's rural territories.

Indigenous People in Colombia's Rural Conflict

Rural conflict, agrarian reform, and armed insurgency set the stage for the indigenous movement

The first half of the 20th century in Colombia was marked by rapid industrialization and increasing rural unrest. Like other Latin American countries, Colombia's agricultural economy was primarily structured around the *latifundio* – a large estate in which either tenant or itinerant workers provide much of the agricultural labor. Many indigenous people lived on *resguardos,* or government-recognized collectively owned indigenous land, but many indigenous people living on and off of *resguardos* worked seasonal harvests, and some even lived as sharecroppers. Sharecroppers were charged with paying *terraje*, or rent in cash or labor, in exchange for tenancy on a landowner's property.

The inability of sharecroppers and other landless farmers to secure land and other resources was a major grievance that fueled unrest. Peasant attempts to defend their interests politically or with arms were violently repressed by state and non-state forces who defended the interests of landowning elites. Because many landowners neglected their estates and did not produce, the Colombian government recognized that agrarian reform policies that would grant land access for peasant farmers were necessary for increasing the country's agricultural productivity. However, this put the government at odds with powerful landowning elites, who sought to blunt the redistributive effects of agrarian reform. The social outcomes of Colombia's agrarian reform laid the groundwork for both the current indigenous movement and the illegal drug trade.

One of the early 20th-century upsurges against the *latifundio* system was led by a Nasa indigenous man in what has been termed the *Quintinada*. This movement, which took place from 1914 to 1918, was led by the indigenous sharecropper Manuel Quintin Lame, who was born to a sharecropping family outside Cauca's capital of Popayán. Lame's campaign spread throughout of Cauca and he began leading rallies, agitating locally and in Bogotá against *terraje* and for the defense of already existing resguardos in Cauca from encroachment by land-hungry white and mestizo *hacendados*.

The *Quintinada* uprising was met with severe repression and eventually faded. However, along with Lame's treatise, *Los Pensamientos del Indio que se Educó en las Selvas Colombianas* (The Thought of the Indian who Educated Himself in the Colombian Forests), the *Quintinada* served as a foundation for later indigenous struggles for land.

The social tensions in Colombia reached a breaking point on April 12, 1938, when progressive Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Elicier Gaitan was shot in the street in Bogotá. Riots in Bogotá spilled into the countryside, and throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Colombian countryside was ravaged with violence between Liberals and Conservatives and their surrogates, leaving over 100,000 dead and many hundreds of thousands more displaced. While some may argue that the period of *La Violencia* never ended because many of Colombia's current armed groups trace their roots to this historical period, others mark the end of this period with the *Frente Nacional* (National Front), an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties to alternate power between them from 1958 to1972.

Colombia's relationship of deference to the United States was also formalized during this period under what was called the *Respice pollum* ("Look to the north") doctrine. Because this doctrine held the U.S. up as a model for political and social organization, it also laid the international

foundations for U.S. intervention in Colombia's social, economic, and political problems (Camacho Arango 2010; Dallanegra Pedraza 2012; Torres and Augusto 2010). These interventions over the following century ensured political subordination of the Colombian government to the U.S. in exchange for U.S. military and economic assistance to stifle unrest in the country.

The 1950s and 1960s were largely dominated by Cold War politics. Social unrest in the countryside was not only a partisan matter between Liberals and Conservatives, but a class struggle between landless peasants and wealthy landowning elites who used violence as well as legal means to repress attempts at redistribution. The organization of peasants to defend themselves against the assaults of the elite landowning classes culminated in the formation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo*, FARC – EP) in 1966. The Colombian government was alarmed at the establishment of what they called "mini republics" that issued direct challenges to the authority of the Colombian state in the years shortly following the success of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. The rise of the FARC and other guerrilla insurgent groups launched Colombia into one of the world's longest-running civil conflicts and would become the major focal point of international politics in Colombia.

Like the rest of the rural population, Colombia's Andean indigenous communities were embroiled in the conflict. As landowners lost political prestige at the national level amid the rise of new manufacturing elites, they sought to hold on to their political and social prestige by influencing local governments. Indigenous peasants protested landowners' requiring more work days each week (Cátedra Nasa Unesco 2001). Many were also very politically active, some as party loyalists (Sanders 2004) and others with more radical politics that were at times aligned with the left. In Cauca, the eastern region of Tierradentro was especially known for its alliance with political parties (Jimeno 2014). Indigenous activists who were exasperated with the traditional Conservative and Liberal political parties gravitated to Cauca's northern region, which became the base for indigenous organizing in the early 1970s.

In response to mounting pressures in the countryside, the Colombian government passed, in 1961, Law 135, or the Agrarian Reform Law, which sought to redistribute vacant and unused lands to landless peasants under the auspices of the newly established Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (*Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria,* INCORA). In 1968, Colombian President Alberto Lleras Restrepo established the National Association of Peasants (*Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos,* ANUC).

This program was implemented with support from the Alliance for Progress – a program of international assistance for social welfare that was intended to stem the appeal of communism in Latin America – under U.S. President John F. Kennedy, alongside Plan Lazo, a program of counterinsurgency assistance launched in 1962 to combat the growing armed resistance in the countryside. Through ANUC, Lleras Restrepo hoped to build a social base for liberal reforms that would be able to challenge the landowning elites who were resistant to agrarian reform. Lleras Restrepo saw these reforms as necessary to increase the country's agricultural productivity and to stem the swelling population of the urban poor (Zamosc 2004).

The implementations of these reforms incited a tremendous popular response. The modernizing social and political objectives of the national program quickly got away from the Lleras Restrepo administration, as radicalized urbanites led many of the campaign's rural workshops with revolutionary agendas. Land reform became one of the key demands of the movement. In 1971, with the support of ANUC's Executive Committee, several regional chapters carried out land occupations throughout the country, making for one of the largest coordinated mass actions in the country's history (Zamosc 2006).

The success of these attempts at redistributive agrarian reform was very limited. Landowners were compensated by the state to buffer their losses. Over two decades, the program titled over three million hectares to about 60,000 eligible families – a mere 7.5% of 800,000 families in need of land (Arango 1994). Landowning elites also mounted strong resistance that culminated in the counter-reformatory Pact of Chicoral in 1972. This formal agreement assured landowners of restricted agrarian reform and political support for large-scale agricultural production. It also tightened criteria that defined which estates would be subject to expropriation and redistribution. Law 135 of 1961 was modified so that a greater proportion of the state compensation for land would be paid in cash, and high interest would be paid to the landowner on the remaining debt. Furthermore, it curtailed INCORA's activity and provided incentives for mechanized agriculture (Zamosc 1972).

The Pact of Chicoral signaled the success of the elites' counter-reform efforts and ultimately the failure of the government to rein in the rampant inequalities of the countryside (Fajardo 2014). Agrarian reform gave way to development under the World Bank-backed initiative of the Integrated Rural Development Program (*Desarrollo Rural Integrado*, DRI), which focused on implementing Green Revolution programs to provide food for the urban poor. These development programs framed the condition of campesino

farmers not as the result of historical inequalities between poor farming campesinos and landowning elites, but as the result of campesino people being stuck in history and entrenched in "traditional" ways of life that needed to be modernized (Escobar 1994).

1971: The indigenous movement formally emerges, with leftist influence, under CRIC

Indigenous people were highly active in ANUC. ANUC had an Indigenous Secretariat, and various activists founded CRIC in northern Cauca right around the same time as the land recuperations. It was in this context that several indigenous and non-indigenous activists who had been active in ANUC and other organizations met in the municipality of Tacueyó in northern Cauca to form the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (*Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca*, CRIC). CRIC was founded over the course of two meetings held that year: the first in February, the second in September.

The nature of CRIC's formation is a point of contention for anthropologists and other historians of the movement, as CRIC's cooperative role with ANUC and other popular-based organizations tends to be overlooked in favor of the notion that their political programs were antagonistic. For example, Alcida Ramos asserts that CRIC separated from the

Marxist-oriented ANUC once "it became clear to the Indians that their *ethnic* cause was being overpowered by the class struggle that guided the peasant movement" (2003:261, emphasis added), and that: "We have seen in the case of the Colombian CRIC organization how the Indians detached themselves from the peasant and urban revolutionary movements the moment their common cause was superseded by considerations of class, on the one hand, and of ethnic identity, on the other" (2004: 273). According to Ramos, the cause of CRIC's formation was an incommensurable clash between their "ethnic" cause and ANUC's "class" cause. However, CRIC did not claim this clash as the reason for their formation.

Although CRIC formed independently in 1971, they continued to work alongside ANUC. ANUC's radical elements and subversive political approach dissolved by 1973 (Zamosc 2006). According to Pablo Tatay, a renowned non-indigenous solidarity activist who had been active with CRIC since its founding, the relationship between the two organizations until this time was hardly antagonistic. When I asked whether the distinction between CRIC and ANUC was due to "cultural" reasons, he responded:

***PT**: Eso es típico de los antropólogos – demostrar- [laugh]. ¿Tú no eres antropóloga?*	**PT**: That is so typical of anthropologists – to show that – [laugh]. Aren't you an anthropologist?

***AZ**: Sí, pero ¡suéltalo sin pena!*

***PT**: No, no, pues, que buscan razones de ese tipo, ¿no es cierto? Por ejemplo, es decir, que esencialmente el movimiento indígena por su aspecto cultural debía ser distinto del movimiento campesino y la verdad es que la separación nunca tuvo ese orígen porque pues, dentro del ANUC pues estaban los indígenas con sus propias características y eso no contradecían necesariamente la orientación del ANUC…*
(13-07-15 Pablo Tatay Entrevista ~28:00)

AZ: Yes, but let it out, without fear!

PT: No, no, well, that they look for those sorts of reasons, isn't that right? For example, this is to say, that essentially the indigenous movement, in its cultural aspect must have been different from the campesino movement and the truth is that *the separation never had that origin*, because well, within ANUC there were indigenous people with their own characteristics, and that did not necessarily contradict ANUC's orientation…

***PT**: No hubo una ruptura propiamente, tal vez en el congreso del '77, pero ya la ANUC estaba en las ultimas. En ningun momento se trató de enfrentarse a la ANUC ni de separarse oficialmente del ANUC.*
(13-07-15 Pablo Tatay Entrevista ~32:25)

PT: There was no rupture - perhaps in the 1977 congress, but at that time ANUC was in its last moments. There was never a moment when CRIC tried to confront ANUC or tried to separate from ANUC.

The contributions of the popular left to CRIC's formation are also often glossed over. In her documentation of CRIC's history, Brett Troyan (2015) points out that the first meeting and the strong influence of leftist activists there are usually overlooked. Several renowned leftists were present, including non-indigenous activist Gustavo Mejía, often named as one of the founders of CRIC. The primary focus was on land recuperations, and

only one of the five points articulated at this meeting emphasized the fortification of indigenous culture, whereas the second meeting is typically highlighted as the one where CRIC's mission solidified into what are now known as its seven founding points. The emphasis on this second meeting overlooks the influence of the Marxist popular movement on CRIC's formation.

At the second meeting, in September of 1971, several anthropologists were present, including renowned Colombian anthropologist Victor Bonilla, who had written about the Nasa. Bonilla, who strongly believed in the need for indigenous political autonomy, attended CRIC's second meeting and proclaimed the importance of indigenous identity (Troyan 2015). This influence resulted in the addition of two more points emphasizing the need for cultural fortification to the original five. CRIC's seven points from that meeting are as follows:

1. *Recuperar las tierras de los resguardos.*	1. Recuperate *resguardo* lands.
2. *Ampliar los resguardos.*	2. Expand the *resguardo* lands.
3. *Fortalecer los cabildos indígenas.*	3. Fortify the indigenous councils.
4. *No pagar terraje.*	4. Do not pay rent.
5. *Hacer conocer las leyes sobre indígenas y exigir su justa aplicación.*	5. Make known the laws about indigenous people and demand their just application.
6. *Defender la historia, la lengua, y las costumbres indígenas.*	6. Defend indigenous history, language, and customs.
7. *Formar profesores bilingües para educar de acuerdo con la situación*	7. Train indigenous professors to teach about the situation of indigenous people in their respective

de los indígenas en sus respectivas lenguas. languages.

Throughout the first decade of CRIC's existence, the organization continued to be heavily influenced by leftist ideology and rhetoric (Rappaport 2006). In 1979, they asserted their vision of culture as a basis for struggle, but they saw no conflict between culture and class struggle: "Defendemos nuestra cultura pero a la vez somos parte de la lucha de clases" ("We defend our culture, but at the same time we are part of class struggle") (CRIC 1981:216). They also tempered the essentialist tendencies of "cosmic indigenism" emerging in Peru and Bolivia, stating the following in 1980:

Es idealista suponer que las civilizaciones indígenas del pasado puedan tener todas las soluciones para el mundo de hoy y más aún creer que sólo con nuestra voluntad podemos borrar cinco siglos de historia de América Latina. Igualmente idealista es olvidar los factores económicos en el análisis de nuestros problemas. Desde el saqueo de los españoles hasta la explotación capitalista de hoy en día, son intereses fundamentalmente de tipo económico *los que están en la raíz de todas las formas de opresión, incluida la opresión racial contra nosotros los indígenas.*
(CRIC 1981: 231, emphasis added).

It is idealistic to suppose that the indigenous civilizations of the past can have all the solutions for today's world, and even more so to believe that, with only our will, we can erase five centuries of history in Latin America. Equally idealistic is to forget economic factors in the analysis of our problems. From the looting of the Spanish to the capitalist exploitation of today, *it is fundamentally economic interests that are at the root of all forms of oppression*, including racial oppression against us, the indigenous people.

Nearly ten years into CRIC's existence, we see not just a class-oriented discourse, but a class-*dominant* discourse in which race is explicitly subordinated to class as a basis of oppression. The continued influence of the traditional left is highly evident here, again contradicting the idea of a clean break between the left and the indigenous movement.

The historical relationship between the left and the indigenous movement is crucial for understanding indigenous movement politics in the later decades of the 20th century. The revolutionary left was certainly not entirely innocent of racism and dismissive attitudes toward indigenous people. However, the narrative that the left and right are equally complicit in oppression against indigenous people obscures the history of overlap between the popular revolutionary movements and indigenous activism. The repudiation of the political alignment between the left and indigenous people potentially reinforces the project of neoliberal multiculturalism, which has been in part to undermine the revolutionary left by sequestering the political agendas of indigenous and other "identity-based" movements from demands for more radical political restructuring and wealth redistribution. By the end of the 20th century, indigenous leaders found themselves increasingly needing to adhere to state criteria for legitimacy, recognition and resources. In the 21st century, their proximity to insurgent guerrilla forces, and

comuneros' participation in illicit crop cultivation became major bargaining chips for the state to temper radical indigenous demands.

1980s: Indigenous people continue their struggle for land

In 1979, indigenous resguardos faced attack when Colombian President Julio César Turbay proposed the "Indigenous Statute," which sought to dissolve collective land rights for indigenous people. Turbay saw this as a measure to repress the growing guerrilla movement with which he believed indigenous communities were allied (Rappaport 1994). Under CRIC's leadership, Caucan indigenous people and other indigenous organizations rallied to contest the statute, forming the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (*Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia*, ONIC) in 1982.

Under the more progressive presidency of Belisario Betancur, beginning in 1982, indigenous people succeeded in securing land rights. Seventy-eight new resguardos were created, which brought thousands of hectares under indigenous control (Gros 1991). Colombia's 1991 Constitution authorized the formation of indigenous territorial entities (*entidades territoriales indígenas,* ETIs), which held intermediate status as territories that did not meet the criteria to be resguardos but were entitled to

some indigenous political control (Field 1996). As of 2005, resguardos and ETIs made up nearly 30% of Colombian national territory (Stocks 2005). The cementing of these rights constituted an unprecedented success in indigenous negotiations with the state. However, these would be quickly undermined by continued political repression and neoliberal policies. Capitalist entrepreneurs took advantage of this situation to build up the drug economy in the country's remote areas such as northern Cauca.

Neoliberal multiculturalism, drugs, and indigenous disempowerment

Both the proliferation of drug crop cultivation and the granting of multicultural rights have taken place in the context of what anthropologists and other scholars have referred to as a "neoliberal" era. Neoliberalism loosely refers to the set of policies that includes the privatization of public goods, the retrenchment of the welfare state, and structural adjustment that took hold throughout the world beginning in the 1970s, to the benefit of a rising elite class of financiers (Harvey 2005). It also refers to a corresponding ideology in which the free market, entrepreneurialism, and individualism are promoted and privileged in order to legitimize these policies.

As scholars have shown (Andreas 1995, 2004; Sanabria 1993), the proliferation of illicit crop cultivation in the Andes is the result of

international neoliberal policies that have privileged U.S. agricultural exports. Structural adjustment and free trade have left countries with debilitating debt, while farmers, indigenous and non-indigenous, are unable to compete with agricultural surpluses of the global north. Although territorial rights, bilingual education, and indigenous jurisdiction have created spaces of collective identity-building and local empowerment in indigenous communities, they have been unable to compete with the restructuring social and economic effects of these international policies. Indigenous drug crop cultivation is one of the clearest examples of evidence of this. Although territorial rights authorized collective land holdings for indigenous communities, they did not protect against the neoliberal policies that facilitated the entrance of the drug trade and other exploitative capitalist social relations into those territories.

Although the economic policy changes have been in place since the 1970s, anthropologists did not use the concept of neoliberalism extensively until the early 2000s, at which time it began to serve as a more refined alternative to "globalization" (Ganti 2014). Anthropologists have approached the study of neoliberalism with two related emphases. The first highlights the material effects on groups and individuals, particularly disenfranchisement and dispossession (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Elyachar 2005; Ferguson

2006; Greenhouse 2012). The second, based on Foucault's notion of governmentality, highlights technologies of the self and subject formation in contexts of entrepreneurialism, competition, and depoliticization (Fairbanks 2009; Ferguson 1994; Paley 2001).

Anthropologists have often characterized neoliberalism as a "rollback of the state." For example, one definition holds that "this ideology is rhetorically antistate and places unlimited faith in the 'magic of the market' to resolve all social problems… Neoliberals see the state, in comparison to the market, as a bumbling, inefficient, and frequently corrupt actor whose presence constantly encumbers the market's unselfish actions" (Gill 2000:3). However, this definition risks obscuring the ideological origins of neoliberalism, which was primarily a response to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s.

The term "neoliberalism" was drawn from the vocabulary of the Mont Pelerin Society, which consisted of a group of economists and scholars that met in Mont Pelerin, France in 1947. Headed by Friedrich von Hayek, the group's mission was to create a network of intellectuals to defend individual freedom, which they believed was being threatened by the central economic planning, collectivism, and socialist ideology of the Soviet Union. As Mirowski (2009) points out, the ideology of the Mont Pelerin Society was not antistate.

Unlike their liberal predecessors, they did not believe that a good society was "natural," but that it needed to be assured through state intervention. These advocates of neoliberalism did not argue for the withdrawal of the state from economic affairs; on the contrary, they believed that a strong state was necessary to guarantee free enterprise and competition.

"State retrenchment" hardly characterizes northern Cauca. For the past five decades, the FARC guerrilla insurgency, and more recently the drug economy, have compelled Colombian state intervention, whether through militarization or liberal campaigns of alternative development. Today, the signing of the peace agreement between the FARC guerillas and the Colombian government has led to high concentrations of state-backed transitional programs throughout Cauca and much of Colombia. A parallel may be drawn between the Colombian state and the rest of the Western world in their responses to what they perceived as communist threats: as a strong state response was needed to compete with Soviet-style communism, a strong state response was also needed in Cauca and other parts of rural Colombia to defeat, politically and militarily, the threats posed by the FARC (which had significant support from the Colombian Communist Party and its Soviet allies) and other guerrilla insurgencies to the authority of the Colombian state.

Anthropologists have generally been ambivalent about the impact of neoliberalism on indigenous communities. While neoliberalism has introduced and legitimized new forms of global inequality, the argument goes, it has also created new opportunities for indigenous people and other communities that make up "civil society." Edward Fischer (2011:16), a U.S. anthropologist, writes: "Civil society, it is shown, has multiple potentials – it may even serve uncivil ends. Yet it also provides a space for grass-roots activism and the inclusion of marginalized voices in national dialogues."

Fischer's assertion that neoliberalism has enabled grassroots mobilizations implies that these various civil society sectors were not previously mobilized. Many contemporary indigenous movements throughout Latin America, including CRIC, emerged from leftist popular movements that sought to seize central state power in order to implement social and economic redistribution. As indigenous movements diverged from the left, they moved away from the objective of state power and focused more on making demands on the state for the benefit of their particular communities, such as demands for land and resources for cultural preservation. These struggles resulted in the achievement of cultural and territorial rights, as well as the right to limited forms of political participation. According to various anthropologists, this divergence from the

left has was a move for political autonomy from the designs of political movements that did not forefront the specific needs of indigenous communities. For example, Warren (2002) presents indigenous renunciations of the left are alongside the racism of the right, suggesting a false equivalency between the two.

Charles Hale's work highlights the consequences of this divergence. In what he calls neoliberal multiculturalism, he describes how, despite the gains of the indigenous movement, demands for cultural recognition are more easily met than more radical demands for redistribution of wealth and resources, which are muffled. Prominent Maya activist Dmitri Cojti Coxil summarizes the evolution of response to indigenous demands: "Before it was 'no,' but now it is '*sí pero'* ['yes, but']" (Cojti Coxil cited in Hale 2005:18). Under the logic of neoliberal multiculturalism, indigenous people make up part of civil society, which is broken into manageable groups with corresponding demands, which are to be addressed through government-sanctioned channels and limited access to state power.

Neoliberal multiculturalism put indigenous leaders in a difficult position from which to respond to drug crop cultivation. In order to qualify for resources, they must cooperate with national policies. These include neoliberal policies that have undermined the ability of small farmers to sell

licit cash crops and led many farmers to grow illicit drug crops. Protesting these policies has meant aligning themselves with non-indigenous campesinos and other social sectors in the popular left, as they did in 2004 and 2008 during country-wide protests known as the "Mingas," which included a demand for the repeal of U.S.-backed free trade agreements. However, the potential of public and political backlash to these radical mobilizations puts the recognition of indigenous rights, as well as their demands, at risk. Then-Colombian President Alvaro Uribe harshly admonished the indigenous leaders of the Minga mobilizations for having unrealistic demands. As Murillo (2014) pointed out, fear of this backlash, along with the belief among some activists that the indigenous leaders should focus more on demands for rights specifically for indigenous communities, caused a political splintering in the Mingas. By tempering the extent to which indigenous communities may organize themselves politically with the popular left, neoliberal multiculturalism has also limited how indigenous communities can respond to repressive drug policies and international agricultural policies that undermine their economies.

Conclusion

Anthropologists and other scholars of indigenous movements have tended to elide the role of leftist popular movements in the history of

indigenous movements, while highlighting the potency of identity for making political gains in countries that have granted multicultural rights to indigenous communities. Prominent indigenous leaders such as Manuel Quintin Lame and the founders of CRIC all collaborated with, if not participated in, leftist social movements at various junctures. Although indigenous people perceived themselves as having distinct indigenous identities, as Lame's *Pensamientos* demonstrates, anthropologists contributed heavily to the movement's emphasis on identity. However, for anthropologists studying indigenous people who continue to depend on agriculture as their primary economic activity, the history of agrarian class struggles is just as pertinent to understanding and evaluating the outcomes of the indigenous movements as the history of identity construction in encounters with the state. As with non-indigenous campesinos, agrarian policy and the struggle for agrarian reform set many of the conditions that would facilitate the entrance of drug crop cultivation into indigenous communities.

PART II:
DRUG PRODUCTION AND NEW CONSUMER CITIZENS

CHAPTER 3

THE DRUG TRADE AS AN IMMORAL ECONOMY

The immoral economy and new consumption practices

One of the most dramatic impacts of the drug economy in northern Cauca was the transition from an economy based on small-scale trade to a cash-based economy with heavy circulation of global commodities. Nasa comuneros and activists interpreted this economic restructuring in ways that varied across individuals, groups, and regions. Some welcomed what they perceived to be an improved quality of life. The more critical voices consistently drew on a dualistic vision of a more corrupted, selfish, modern (usually capitalist) "now" and a traditional, wholesome, respectful "then." The "then" of previous times typically referred to a subsistence, or regionally self-sustaining, economy that served as the moral base that capitalistic and accumulative practices corrupted. Together, the drug economy, global commodities, and the new set of social relations that they introduced constituted what I call an immoral economy.

This notion of morally corrupt economic practices was evident at a meeting of the Álvaro Ulcué Youth Movement (*Movimiento Juvenil Álvaro Ulcué*, MJAU). Here, young Nasa activists mulled over the impact of the drug trade in their community. The MJAU activists were renowned for their

vigorous discourse of cultural resistance, laden with overtones of northern Cauca's notoriously militant politics. Among the problems that they identified as having been brought about by the drug trade were emerging consumer practices. According to them, the desire for money and commodities was the root of many social problems brought on by the drug economy. These desires were often set in dichotomies of "modern" versus "traditional" lifestyles in which consumption of global commodities was a mark of corrupt modernity. One activist proclaimed to his peers at a meeting:

¿Qué estamos consumiendo? Estamos alimentado a nuestros cuerpos y pensamientos. Y muchas cosas de afuera. Tenemos que pensar en la tierra antes de enamorarse de la ropa, de la moto. La belleza no dura. Queremos ser como los blancos, pero tenemos que ser como somos de verdad, como pueblos originarios.	What are we eating? We are feeding our bodies and our thoughts. And lots of stuff from outside. We need to think about the land before we fall in love with material things like clothes and motorcycles. Beauty doesn't last. We want to be like the whites, but we have to be like we really are, like original peoples. **(13-?-? FN AsambleaMJAU)**

For Nasa cultural critics such as those in MJAU, global commodities are one of the most visible signs of the breakdown of social cohesion of past times that has been brought on by the drug trade. These commodities, which include name-brand clothes, cell phones, and motorcycles, are also one of the

most visible effects of the cash surge brought on by drug crops in indigenous territories. Like the youth quoted above, cultural activists often presented these commodities as at odds with their core identity as "original peoples," and as distractions from their most valued resource, land. For many in the youth movement, these commodities represented an immoral economy, and these practices of consumption were crucial mechanisms that pulled them into it.

Historically, the drug economy that arrived to Cauca in the 1970s was the latest in a series of cash-crop economies in which the Nasa had participated in from the 19th century onward. In the 19th century, the Nasa had cultivated coffee and *fique* (a fiber used for making rope and twine) and had also felled cinchona trees (the source of quinine) in exchange for cash from outside entrepreneurs. In each case, the small amounts of cash enabled the Nasa to purchase petty commodities produced outside their territory such as salt, clothes, and utensils. Each of these also led to social tensions among indigenous communities living on *resguardos*, especially because a cash economy brought by outsiders interfered with the authority of indigenous leadership. Because they disrupted social cohesion and the political authority of the cabildos, these tensions led many Nasa comuneros

to be critical of these cash economies, regardless of whether or not they were illicit.

Several factors added an acute moral dimension to Nasa comuneros' critiques of drug crop cultivation. Principal among these was its illegality, which constrained how indigenous comuneros could talk about the drug economy and its impact. Second was the presence of armed groups who extracted profits from the drug trade and regularly threatened indigenous community members. Finally, there was the stigma associated with the drug products themselves. All of these intensified the misgivings around drug crop cultivation and further compelled Nasa comuneros and cultural activists to draw on nostalgic notions of "the way things were before," when money and outside commodities were not as commonplace as they are now. New economic practices based on cash and outside commodities were often measured against an idyllic past of cultural autonomy, economic self-sufficiency and harmonious social relations, which can be considered key elements of a "moral economy."

In peasant studies literature, a "moral economy" generally refers to a pre-capitalist system of exchange that maintained social cohesion and buffered inequalities among small-scale agriculturalists. However, as Raymond Williams (1973) pointed out, scholars have often romanticized the

past when they use the term “moral economy” to describe a socially harmonious “pre-capitalist” past that never existed, as "pre-capitalist" social arrangements were nearly as, or just as oppressive as the capitalist ones. As I describe in the previous chapter, indigenous peasant life in Cauca was always fraught with inequalities and social conflict. This does not mean, however, that there were not real differences in practices and social relations between current and previous generations. The concept of moral economy is useful to examine how people interpret changes in these practices. Rather than taking Nasa cultural activists’ notions of an idyllic pre-capitalist past for granted, I borrow the notion of the moral economy from the peasant studies literature and place it in the imaginary schema of Nasa cultural critics. This analytical relocation allows us to examine what informs this construction of the past and to distinguish it from the reality. In the context of oppressive social relations such as those experienced in Cauca's drug economy, this ultimately allows us to gauge more accurately what is new about drug crop cultivation, compared to other cash-crop economies, and what is not.

In this chapter, I describe how the drug trade is seen as what I call an “immoral economy,” or an economy that is counter to nostalgic notions of a moral economy. I describe two major factors that shape this view of the drug economy as immoral. The first is the social and political disruption brought

on by the drug trade's cash surge, which amplifies the problems brought on by previous cash-crop economies. The second is the illegality of the drug economy. This illegality extensively shapes local discussions about drug crops and muffles critiques of anti-drug policies. In the next chapter, I argue that the drug trade *is* historically distinctive because of how its profits have enabled an unprecedented surge of global commodities in the region.

Conceptualizing im/moral economies as imaginaries

The notion of the moral economy was introduced by historian E. P. Thompson (1971) in his discussion of food riots in 18th-century England, and taken up by James Scott (1976) in *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. The moral economy is the set of values and practices of exchange that subordinated people engaged in for survival and subsistence. These included horizontal expectations of individuals and groups within the subordinated community, but also expectations of elites. In the analyses of both authors, the violation of these expectations by elites empowered by capitalism – whether middleman entrepreneurs (Thompson 1971) or agrarian landlords (Scott 1976) – provided the spark for rebellion for food rioters and peasants, respectively.

Neither Scott nor Thompson is clear in distinguishing the moral economy as an empirical set of practices and values in a specific place and time from an ideological basis for rebellion. For Thompson (1971) and Edelman (2005), it is a concept that social agents use to make claims on states and elites in moments of collective action. Scott outlines a more structural definition of the moral economy in which it is the system of horizontal exchange between peasants, embedded in a larger feudalistic social system. Once the conditions of the feudal system change in a way that destabilizes the horizontal system of exchange, peasants are likely to rebel. The moral economy takes shape in different moments for different authors – for Thompson, in the minds of stakeholders in the moment of rebellion, and for Scott, in normative social relations *before* the rebellion.

Anthropologist and historian William Roseberry (1989) takes them to task for this. He acknowledges the significance of drawing attention to the roles of pre-capitalist practices of artisans and peasants in challenging modernization theorists' dismissal of the past. However, he argues that this should not come at the cost of empirically understanding social conditions of the past. Roseberry continues, drawing from Williams (1973):

> [A]s some might argue, the 'moral economy' need not have existed in the past; it may be *perceived* in the past from the perspective of a

> disordered present. The images of a moral economy may be a *meaningful* image even if 'what actually happened' was less idyllic. But as Williams suggests, the perceptions of the past will depend upon the relative positions of the perceivers; different idealizations and evaluations will emerge depending on distinct experiences of a 'physical and economic domination of a significantly total kind.' (1989:57)

Edelman (2005), who argues for identifying the role of the moral economy in contemporary peasant movements, may count among those for whom, according to Roseberry, the past existence of the moral economy matters less than what it means for a group of perceivers. The strategic ways that peasant and agricultural movements draw on notions of the past as ideological foundations might be highly productive for confronting the growing behemoth of agro-industry today, which motivates much of Edelman's work. However, Edelman repeats the mistake, as he, like Scott and Thompson, seems less concerned with the empirical reality of the moral economy – what the actual practices were – than its instrumentalization as a basis for social agents to make claims on states and elites in moments of collective action. Even if all three authors accept it as an imaginary, they still take it as a given in the confrontation between peasant farmers and the state and other elites.

As I present it here, the moral economy is not an objective set of values or practices, but a persistent imaginary of values and practices in an

ongoing narrative deployed by leaders, educators, and activists about social change in indigenous Cauca. Although it may be influenced by outside frameworks of past indigenous social practices, I do not examine the role of this imaginary in indigenous people's challenging of the state; rather, I examine how it is constructed and deployed within the community. By setting the moral economy in the realm of the conscious schema of Nasa cultural critics, we are able to compare the ideal with what we can empirically gather about the past. This allows us to more readily identify points of continuity and change.

Scott's representation of the moral economy of peasants in Southeast Asia is especially relevant to the Nasa, who had much in common with Scott's peasants before their struggles for *resguardo* land entitlements in the 1970s and 1980s. Like Scott's peasants, previous Nasa generations were sharecroppers, proletarianized migrant agriculturalists, or both. Today, many are small farmers on their own plots in indigenous *resguardos*, although many, especially younger people, tend to work itinerantly in harvests on other indigenous and non-indigenous farms, including coca and marijuana harvests. Past practices before the transition to a cash-based consumer economy are very present in the memories of elders, which they expressed in nostalgic fashion most frequently in their critiques of today's

modern social and economic relations. For them, the moral economy represented an ideal, drawn from recent memory of previous economic conditions, of social harmony between individuals. The moral economy, for our purposes, is an idealized concept of this previous system of exchange, informed partly by historical memory and partly by elders' and cultural activists' critiques of new consumption practices. In the next section I review some of the characteristics of the past moral economy.

The Nasa moral economy is rooted in economic independence

Key to Nasa comuneros' notion of the moral economy is economic independence. Among Nasa activists, the past practices of consumption and production that exemplified the ability to meet basic needs without depending on outside commodities were the ones that should be conserved or revived. For example, one indigenous educator described the cultivation of the *tul*, or subsistence plot, as the ideal agricultural activity. A former indigenous mayor described the past as a time when indigenous people ate in abundance and variety. Although he was skeptical of the *tul* as a viable economic prospect for the community, he still shared with the educator a notion of the past as idyllic and culturally wholesome.

In an oral history of an elder documented by the Cátedra Nasa, a project coordinated by UNESCO, Nasa elders emphasize a self-sufficient way of life:

Pero dijimos que era muy poco lo que se compraba y vendía, porque la tierra daba para el sustento. Había suficiente revuelto. Ni siquiera manteca se compraba porque la sacaban ellos mismos. Únicamente se sufría por la sal. Se caminaba a pie de Jambaló a Santander y a Silvia para buscar la sal. La Sal Reina era traída del Huila y se colocaba a la orilla del fogón. Durante la violencia la situación se puso más difícil. Entonces hasta buscaron la sal en las minas de aguas saladas que habían en este resguardo. Dice Don Ignacio Guejía: "Los indígenas se defendían ellos mismos, sin esperar ayudas del estado. Hacían hasta ollas y platos de barro." Vestidos y jigras se hacían, y se intercambiaron en el trueque. (24)	But we said that very little was bought and sold, because the earth gave us sustenance. There was enough to go around. Not even lard was bought because they made it themselves. The only thing we lacked was salt. One went by foot from Jambaló to Santander and Silvia to look for salt. The Reina salt [a brand name] was brought from Huila and was put at the edge of the fire pit. During the violence, the situation got more difficult. So they looked for salt in the mines of salt water that were in this *resguardo*. Don Ignacio Guejía says: 'The indigenous people took care of themselves, without expecting help from the state. They even made pots and plates of clay.' They also made dresses and bags, and they exchanged them through barter.

Nasa comuneros made their own lard, pots, plates, dresses and bags and traded them locally. As one elder asserted, this showed their independence, or autonomy, from the resources offered by the state. Salt was the only thing that the Nasa needed but could not produce themselves.

The differences between this past "moral economy" and the subsequent immoral economy of the present were primarily marked by changes in consumption habits. Eating or drinking foods that had to be purchased, rather than grown locally and prepared in the home, was a mark of generational disjuncture and, as elders saw it, social deterioration. For example, in another oral history documented by the Cátedra Nasa, an elder remarked:

En cuanto a la comida recomienda Don Alfonso: "Los nietos ya no comen sancocho, porque la mama se va a trabajar y trae remesa como arroz, fideo, panela, carne. Sería mejor que aprendieran también a comer sancocho de mote, frijol, arracacha, y plátano y para el desayuno arepa de maíz sin café. Porque anteriormente, si Dios bendecía, se comía variado." (15).	In regard to food, Don Alfonso recommends: 'The grandchildren no longer eat *sancocho*, because the mom goes to work and brings *remesa* like rice, noodles, panela, meat. It would be better if they would learn to eat *sancocho* of corn, beans *arracacha*, plantain, and for breakfast, corn arepa without coffee. Because before, if God blessed, eating was varied.'

Sancocho – a stew of locally grown vegetables and tubers, flavored with animal fat when it was available – was a staple dish of past generations. The vegetables that the elder named – corn, beans, *arracacha* (a tuber vegetable native to the Andean region), plantains, and corn – were all grown in Cauca for local trade and consumption. The *remesa* (side dishes, or

complements, including juices) foods that he mentioned were produced externally and had to be purchased. Rice, for example, was produced in far away regions of Colombia, or in the U.S. For older generations, rice was associated with money, and was rarely eaten except at weddings or other celebrations. Pasta noodles, made from semolina flour, were largely imported. *Panela* (unrefined cane sugar) and coffee, although both were produced locally, were usually produced for Colombian urban or international markets. These externally produced foodstuffs were associated with the diet of the younger generation, which represented a lamentable break from that of the older generations.

The practices of self-sufficiency described here did not constitute the full set of social and economic relations in which these practices were embedded. Although the Nasa met many of their basic needs through local artisanal production, these practices of self-sufficiency were situated in a more complex social and economic framework. Much of that framework was determined by land tenure, which varied among Nasa communities throughout Cauca, although in nearly all cases, the Nasa had a primarily subsistence agricultural life.

Segundo Bernal (1954), a Colombian anthropologist, provided an insightful overview of farming life among a landed Nasa community in

Tierradentro, in central Cauca, in the 1950s. Community members worked on their own farms, which were titled to them by the *cabildo*, or indigenous council. The cabildo gave them the right to work and live on a given piece of land, but the cabildo ultimately owned the land and could take it away if the family was not working it sufficiently. There were exceptions in cases where a particular family inherited the land cleared and worked by their ancestors, in which case the cabildo titled the land but did not own it. Farmwork took place primarily in the months of planting and harvest; individuals used downtime months to contract themselves out to nearby commercial farms as *jornaleros* (migrant harvesters). The small amount of money that they earned from cash crops such as coffee, and from day laboring in the slow months between planting and harvesting, was spent on simple commodities, especially salt, panela and rice. Comuneros got through times of scarcity by means of the food given at commercial farms, and especially, Bernal noted, with the help of *guarapo* (fermented sugar-cane juice) and coca, which provided "a sedative effect on hunger pangs" (Bernal 1954).

The Nasa of Tierradentro whom Bernal studied lived in a setting more ideal for ethnographic research, in that their resguardos were more remote and thus more removed from threats of large landowners whose land holdings flanked major urban areas. This allowed him to study what were

thought to be more "natural" processes of social change without interference from outside non-indigenous social actors. At the time of his study, the Nasa who lived in the rural areas closer to Cali or Popayán, Cauca's capital city, lived as sharecroppers on haciendas or on resguardos that were under constant threat of appropriation by land-hungry elites in the region.

Regardless of their land-tenure situation, until the 1980s, the majority of Nasa people met the needs of daily life through small-scale trade, subsistence agriculture, and artisanal production. Such practices constitute what scholars often describe as a moral economy. As Raymond Williams pointed out, the conflation of these practices among peasants and their larger social context in which they were embedded was a typical misrepresentation of pre-capitalist practices by anthropologists and non-indigenous cultural activists. The UNESCO oral-history volume accurately highlights a prevalent sense of pride among Nasa elders in the economic independence of their younger days. The volume is replete with such discourses from elders who supported cultural conservation and lamented social change. Yet the authors of the volume did not include the fact that many parents and grandparents encouraged their children to study so that they would not have to "suffer" by working the land as they did in past generations.

Nasa comuneros themselves did not usually frame the past in strictly ideal terms. There were certainly cases in which comuneros would talk about these practices of the immoral economy, such as eating rice and pasta noodles, to make a moralistic or judgmental point about today's consumption practices in the community. This was evident when the elder Don Alfonso from the above Cátedra Nasa quotation pointed to mothers going to work as the reason children no longer eat sancocho. Yet even in such instances, comuneros could discuss the social conditions of the time and draw connections between these local practices and the larger social context. In many cases, they would trace the cause of these practices back to social forces originating outside of the indigenous community.

Even though Nasa comuneros did not separate these practices from their larger context, the concept of the moral economy is still useful, in Roseberry's terms, to understand indigenous peasant farmers' past practices of self-sufficiency and small-scale trade as a "meaningful image." These practices made up crucial parts of the Nasa's past social reality, but were framed within the larger and typically oppressive social context of agrarian feudalism. Because these practices were strongly present in the historical memory of Nasa elders with whom I spoke, and evoked nostalgia and pride for many of them, this meaningful image was prevalent throughout the

community. It became the comparative basis for many Nasa comuneros' critique of new practices, especially those brought on by the immoral economy of the drug trade.

The drug trade brings the immoral economy

The drug trade was pivotal in bringing about changes to economic practices that Nasa comuneros saw as disruptive. Javier, a well-read Nasa activist in his mid-30s, was especially attentive to the economics of the drug trade and its social consequences. He recounted the troubling effects of poppy cultivation in the 1980s:

La amapola en la parte fría creció altísimo y trajo muchos conflictos. Primero en la parte muy pendiente empezaron a adecuar los terrenos. Fue algo que no hacen con el frijol ni maíz pero a la amapola porque representaba dinero, entonces lo arreglaron. Hacían arados en época de lluvia, y todo esa tierra lo bajaba. Por otro lado los jóvenes agarraron a comprar armas, y a comprar motos, salir a beber, estropear a la gente, porque tenían dinero. Ellos querían estropear, golpear a la gente, herirlos. El cabildo no pudo controlar eso. Hicieron muchos intentos pero no. Y el que controló fue eso, fue los precios bajos. El gramo estaba a 1,000, y	Poppy grew a lot in the cold [high-altitude] region and brought many conflicts. First in the steep areas, they began to divide up the lands. It was something they don't do with beans and corn but with poppy, as this represented money, they organized it. They plowed in the rainy season, and so much of that land went down [eroded]. Another issue was that young people went to buying arms, buying motorcycles, going out to drink, attacking people, because they had money. They wanted to attack people, injure them. The council could not control that. They tried many times but they could not. What controlled them were the low prices.

fue bajando hasta que bajó hasta 100, 120 pesos el gramo, y ya no, no garantizaba. Entonces dejaron de sembrar. Ahora la amapola casi no los ve. (14-07-22 [Javier].mp3 ~1:21:50)	The gram was at 1,000 pesos, and it went down to 100, 120 pesos per gram, and then no, there was no profit, so they stopped planting. Now you hardly see poppy around here.

Poppy first disrupted the landscape. Tilling in the rainy season loosened soil, causing it to erode. People also divided up their lands in ways that they previously had not cared to do for other crops that yielded lower profits. Finally, the cash flow empowered young people to form gangs. Once poppy-resin prices tumbled, the cash flows dried up, which finally "controlled" the delinquent gangs that the indigenous authorities could not.

Although Javier identified many social problems brought on by the drug trade, he was not worried about recovering ways of life that had preceded it. Rather, he was more concerned about the threat that dependency on outside sources for subsistence presented to the sustainability of Nasa agricultural life. If people stopped working the land, they would "have to do like Japan, and import [food]" (~1:06:35). This sustainability was not necessarily a matter of clinging to old ways, even though, as we spoke, Javier drew on memories of past practices. He recalled things such as no one caring about clothing style or colors, because nearly everyone wore the same style of clothing, and going without shoes was not

unusual. People from the colder highland region would exchange food crops with people from the warmer lowland region to make up for uneven harvest seasons. For Javier, these were more matter-of-fact aspects of older ways of life than elements of a nostalgic past that needed to be conserved. He acknowledged that times had changed, and even expressed frustration at some Nasa people's reluctance to adopt new technological strategies for better farm outputs. He was, however, highly skeptical of the chemical-intensive technologies of alternative development programs that had been introduced in northern Cauca.

For Javier, the threats that drug crop cultivation posed to Nasa agricultural life were the same as those brought on by previous cash-crop economies. The boom and bust of *fique*, a crop used for making twine and widely cultivated in several parts of Cauca in the 1980s, served as a warning against dependency on coca and marijuana cash crops. Javier recounted his memory of the crisis when fique busted:

En Polonuevo llegó un momento en que fue auge cultivo de fique, porque el fique en ese momento era, representaba una economía importante. Entonces los Nasas cayeron, fue en el monocultivo del fique. Y como representaba valor, entonces cosechaban y vendían, y con	In Polonuevo, a moment came that was the fique boom, because in that moment, it represented an important economy. So the Nasa fell into fique monoculture. And as it represented value, they harvested and sold it, and with that they could buy food products, and they forgot to plant

ese mismo podían comprar productos alimenticios, y se les olvidó sembrar lo propio. Fue tanto que después que hubo la crisis fiquera que llamaron, o sea no los compraron, tuvieron niños que se murieron de hambre. Al no vender ese fique tuvieron que conseguir como sea plátano, yuca, y hacer algo de sancocho, y los niños no estaban acostrumbrados a comer sancocho ni sopa de maíz. No comieron y se fueron muriendo. Otras familias por no aguantar hambre se fueron, tuvieron que ir a algunas fincas a robarles plátanos y yuca. Y eso ocurrió fue en la parte fría digamos. **(14-07-22 [Javier] ~15:12)**	their own food. It went so far that after the crisis of fique, as they called it, in other words no one would buy it from them, there were children who died from hunger. Because of not being able to sell that fique, they had to get however they could plantain, yuca, and make something of a *sancocho*, and the children were not accustomed to eating *sancocho* or corn soup. They didn't eat and they died. Other families because of their hunger went to some farms and stole plantains and yucca. And that happened in the cold part.

As with drug crops, *fique* cultivation also led to social disintegration. Children died of hunger and neighbors stole from one another. This was not because of illegality of the crop, but because of the high risk of the monoculture economy, which the community did not buffer with subsistence crops; and when it crashed, there was not enough money to buy food and local food crops were scarce. The hunger crisis following the *fique* crash demonstrated the risks of export-oriented monoculture.

The morality story of fique echoes those of other licit agricultural boom and bust economies. Rappaport (1998: 111) recounts the social consequences of the quinine rush of the 1850s, one of the first agricultural

boom economies recorded for the Nasa. Quinine was a key ingredient in malaria treatments at the time. It was extracted from the bark of the cinchona tree, found in high quality and abundance in Silvia, Cauca. To the dismay of authorities, many resguardo residents took the opportunity to become cinchona-tree fellers for wages. They went into the forest for days at a time, making themselves unavailable for collective-work days. The wages earned, though small compared to the final profit, made them less motivated to work for subsistence crops in the resguardos. The quinine economy also led to a flurry of land grabs by entrepreneurs and hacendados in regions where cinchona was believed to grow. Indigenous lands that were not protected by clear resguardo titles were vulnerable to being grabbed by nearby large landowners, although indigenous cabildos disputed many attempts to usurp their lands (Rappaport 1998: 111). Finally, cinchona-tree felling led to widespread deforestation of the region, still evident today in the region's landscape. The quinine economy busted by the 1880s with the establishment of cinchona plantations in southeast Asia, which were more productive and efficient for European entrepreneurs than the foraging-based production in Colombia.

Alcohol consumption is a mark of the immoral economy

Nasa comuneros identified an immoral economy in the changed consumption practices brought on by the cash flows of the drug trade. Although rice and other imported foodstuffs had been made available by previous cash-crop economies, comuneros often pointed to changes in alcohol consumption as evidence of the disruptive nature of the drug economy. Alcoholism has been common in the community for generations, and Nasa comuneros often blamed the drug trade for exacerbating it. The money from the drug economy made hard liquors more available and enabled people to flaunt status through public consumption.

As in other Andean communities that were anthropologically renowned for their attitudes toward drunkenness, drinking alcohol and drunkenness are widely accepted among the Nasa. Before the Spanish conquest, indigenous communities had long brewed *chicha*, a beverage made from fermented corn, and it continues to be drunk today during festivals and rituals. It was not unusual to see even young children drinking it at festivals. *Guarapo*, a mild sugar-cane-based liquor, was also common. For older generations, it was common for this to be served at lunchtime, between morning and afternoon harvesting shifts.

Javier saw these casual practices of drinking in the past as the basis of more deleterious forms of drunkenness seen today. Bar fights, domestic and

sexual abuse, motorcycle accidents, and unintended suicides associated with alcohol were tragically too common. Drawing on notions of the moral economy, Javier presented these past practices as acceptable in a time when accumulation of cash and material possessions was not a priority. He put it this way:

Mi papá desayunaba chicha de maíz. En otras familias, era guarapo de caña. Incluso hasta ahora puede ver familias, personas que se emborracha mucho. Les gusta mucho el guarapo de caña. Estaba leyendo un libro de Diego Castillón libro en que los españoles critiquen al indio nasa porque es muy perezoso, un borrachín. Eso fue en una época en que la mayor preocupación era no mas la comida. No habían necesidad de ropa porque ya había. El resto del tiempo era para la diversión, en juegos, en tomar, y utilizando coca. A ellos les parecía que eran perezosos. Rasgos de eso todavía en algunas familia. Se emborrachan, y no atienden las necesidades que hay en la casa. Hay niños enfermos, no ponen cuidado a la casa cayendo. **(14-07-22 [Javier] ~47:17)**	My father drank chicha for breakfast. In other families, it was *guarapo.* Even now, you can see families, or persons, who get drunk a lot. They like the cane *guarapo* a lot. I was reading a book by Diego Castillón [a Colombian anthropologist] in which the Spanish criticize the Nasa indian because he is very lazy, a drunk. That was at a time when the only major concern was food. There was no need to buy clothing because it was already made. The rest of the time was for fun, for games, for drinking, and for chewing coca. To them [the Spanish] it looked like the Nasa were lazy. You can still see this in some families. They get drunk, and they don't attend to the needs of their houses. Children are sick, and they don't pay attention to the house falling apart.

The notion of drinking alcohol in a moral economy in which "the only major concern was food" challenged the Spanish stigmatization of indigenous

drunkenness about which he had read. Earlier generations had had less to worry about, as most daily needs were met by local or regional agricultural production, so drunkenness was not seen as unusual or counterproductive. Javier suggested, however, that this acceptability carried over into unacceptable practices of today. Times have changed, and drunkenness is now a cause for concern, as it leads individuals to neglect the needs of their households.

Javier's thoughts reflect Heath's (1958) interpretation of drinking practices in the Andean Camba community in Bolivia. In the 1950s, he challenged North American stigmatization of alcohol by presenting the acceptability of drinking and drunkenness among the Camba. However, by 2004, Heath pointed to the lumber industry and illicit cocaine markets as undermining the moral economy that made drinking acceptable.

The drug economy led to changes in alcohol-drinking patterns that built on older practices. For those who had bolstered their incomes through marijuana or coca harvesting, providing alcohol for groups of friends conferred status. This harks back to the older practice *of mingas*, or long days of collective agricultural work on a family's land after which the family would host a party with abundant food, chicha, and dancing (Bernal 1954).

The drug economy also changed what kinds of alcohol people drank. On our way to a nearby town notorious for its marijuana cultivations, a regular visitor to the town commented that people there did not even want *aguardiente*, the regionally industrialized anise-flavored cane liquor, for their parties anymore. "*Puro whiskey*!" they said. Only whiskey. Whiskey, as an imported distilled liquor, indexed a more cosmopolitan class status than the more easily available aguardiente, to say nothing of the antiquated chicha.

Cultural activists and leaders tried to uphold traditional drinking practices. In rituals such as the *saakhelu*, a seed-exchange ritual, the indigenous council provided *canoas*, or canoes, full of chicha. Anyone with an empty bottle could go and refill at will. Authorities often prohibited other distilled liquors, although this was difficult to control as they could easily be purchased. During one saakhelu, a young man showed me a bottle of aguardiente that he had hidden in his jacket. In general, most people seemed to be satisfied with the bottomless chicha supply. In these situations, drunkenness was not seen as transgressive so long as it was the result of traditional drinks.

This narrative of a corrupt economy wreaking havoc on traditional practices and autonomy was pervasive in discussions at Nasa public assemblies. The benefits of the cash surge were rarely discussed, and

acknowledgments of the ways in which drug crop cultivation helped people meet important needs were usually stifled. The reasons for this, as I show in the next section, are traceable to the illicitness of the drug trade and the pressure on the community to adhere to Colombia's anti-drug policies.

Public stigma of growing drug crops is primarily driven by their illicitness

Community discussions of drug crop production were nearly always marked by tones of shame and disapproval in progressive community spaces such as the school where I carried out workshops on drug use. Given the ways in which the drug economy, as a cash-crop economy, contributed to social and economic disruptions like others before it, this seemed at first to me to be consistent with critiques of other cash-crop economies. But in more private settings, Nasa comuneros were more prone to acknowledging the good things that the cash of the drug trade brought them – improvements to their houses, clothes for their children, paying back of debts. It was rare that such acknowledgments would be voiced in open assemblies, where it was commonplace for indigenous leaders to list the disruptions caused by the drug trade in tones ranging from shame to reluctant acceptance. To acknowledge benefits of the drug trade would be to challenge these leaders and, by extension, the state for whom they increasingly had to perform.

Although my time at La Terraza was primarily committed to talking about drug use, discussions about drug crop cultivation inevitably came up. Omaira, a teacher at La Terraza, was passionate about having critical discussions about the drug trade. Like so many in the community, Omaira was witness to both sides of the experience. As a single mother of two, marijuana cultivation helped to supplement her income. At the same time, her teenage son had only recently recovered from a year-long cocaine addiction, which she alleged had been enabled by *microtráfico*, or local trafficking of cocaine in and around producing communities. Like many Nasa comuneros, she held that drug use and addiction was one of the most pernicious effects of the presence of the drug trade in the region. Omaira was a committed teacher and a particularly outspoken and deeply reflexive thinker. She knew that her story was not unusual, and she had a personal stake in challenging the shame associated with the drug economy and reflecting openly about its benefits as well as its hazards. She summarized for her students the problems in the community that had been brought on by the drug economy:

43:20 *Se cultiva la marijuana porque nos ayuda para nuestra economia, para... poder comprar la comida es algo económico. Son (inaudible) de algunas necesidades. Pero esto, si uno lo dimensiona mucho mas, esto creó*	Marijuana is cultivated because it helps us with our economy, to… to be able to buy food is something economic. They are (inaudible) of some necessities. But this, if you size it up more, created a lot of

mucha dependencia, porque hoy el muchacho ya no piensa en trabajar, por ejemplo, decir es que me voy a sembrar es que un cultivo de papa…o sea, el muchacho hoy ve el cultivo ilícito como una forma de sobrevivir. Por ejemplo, uno ve ya los jóvenes en el colegio vendiendo, porque ya o sea no ven otra forma de trabajar sino que ellos dicen por ahí es mas fácil… No quieren esforzarse mucho para ganarse, sino que quieren fácil. Es mas, hoy es difícil conseguirse un trabajador para azadonear. Yo había luchado para conseguirme una señora que me trabaje en la casa cuidándome la niña. No mas hace peluqueando. Entonces, el señor va y dice no, es que estoy en la sombra, almuerzo, no me asoleo, estoy adentro de la casa, me estoy ganando la plata… Entonces mire, eso ha traído muchas situaciones, y lo mas tenaz es que la gente prefiere acabar con el cultivo de comida, de café, para sembrar esa mata. … Trae, ¿por qué consecuencias? Porque, resulta, que usted trabaja, mire, mire los problemas que trae... Trabaja, le da plata, pero cuando usted peluquea — Ya en la EPS ya empezaron a llegar la cantidad enfermos de peluquear marihuana y [inaudible]. Y ya no saben que remedio darles. Si, porque es algo que esta generando de, o sea la enfermedad… Todo lo que estamos consumiendo es harinas, y es cosa traída, ni siquiera lo cultiva en la finca. Entonces es fácil que la gente coge plata comprar, no para [inaudible] sino traer de afuera. Se esta volviendo un problema en la	dependency, because now, the young man does not think about work, saying, for example, "I'm going to plant myself, say, a potato crop"… I mean, today the young man sees the illicit crop as a form of surviving. For example, you can see now the kids in the school selling, because now I mean they don't see another way of working, they say that it is easier that way… They don't want to work very hard to earn anything, they want it easy. Even more than that, it is difficult to find a worker to hoe the soil. I have fought to get a woman who will work in the house to take care of my daughter. They do nothing but *peluqueando*. So the older man says no, well, I am in the shade, I eat lunch, I don't get sunburned, I'm in the house, and I'm earning money... So look, that has brought many situations, and the craziest thing is that people prefer to abandon food crops and coffee to plant that plant [marijuana]. It has consequences, why? Because it turns out that you work, and look, look at the problems it brings… You work, it gives you money, but when you *peluquea* — in the EPS [health service] so many have arrived ill from *peluqueando* and [inaudible]. And now they don't know what medicine to give them. Right, because it's something that is coming from, I mean the illness… *Everything that we are eating are flours, and they are things brought*

alimentación, en la salud, se esta volviendo un problema de dependencia, se esta volviendo un problema social. Eso es como la raíz. Ve que uno que tiene un tinto de marihuana, lo ve tomando cada ocho días. El tener esa plata ha generado una situación...preocupante... Frente a todo eso es que tenemos que pensar en estos talleres, es ¿adónde nos va con llegar todo esto? ¿Adónde vamos a llegar? Los que estamos aquí reflexionamos. **(15-05-02 Cic3Tall2 SitiosRiesgo.wav ~43:20)**	*from outside, not even grown on the farm.* They get money to buy, not to [inaudible] rather to bring from outside. It is becoming a problem in eating, in health, of dependency, it is becoming a social problem. That is like the root. You see the one who is growing a little marijuana, you see him drinking [alcohol] every weekend. Having that money has created a situation. All of this is what we have to think about in these workshops, where is all of this taking us? Where are we going? Those who are here must reflect.

Omaira listed a host of social problems brought on by drug crop cultivation in indigenous territory. Among them was a change in eating habits: people increasingly ate flours and other imported foods, things "not even grown on the farm." Others included kids selling drugs in the schools, the unavailability of other labor forms, and new illnesses suffered by those working the harvests. All of these signified a breakdown in social cohesion, and they were, as she saw it, symptoms of *dependency* on easy money brought in by the drug economy.

Omaira also acknowledged the economic advantages of illicit crop cultivation: "There are necessities," she said. The benefits of cash flow were what made the drug economy sustainable and attractive despite the other

problems that it brought with it. Yet although many indigenous community members could reap the benefits of the drug trade, they were reluctant to openly acknowledge these benefits. It was much more common for people to associate drug crop production with shame and a laundry list of negative effects on the community, as Omaira did. Her short acknowledgment of economic "needs," juxtaposed with the description of a nefarious "dependency" created by the drug trade, exemplifies the ambivalence that marked so much discussion of the drug trade among Nasa comuneros. Doing otherwise could potentially position them against the efforts of indigenous leaders who had to answer to anti-drug policies of the Colombian state.

This, of course, did not stop everyone from pointing out the advantages of the drug trade. In one of the workshops, Marco Evelio told the story of his experience *metiendo vicio*, or using drugs, an even greater point of shame, which for him ran together with his experience of growing drug crops. Marco Evelio boldly told his story of drug use at the risk of ridicule from his classmates. He began using drugs when he was younger, encouraged by a friend who was "like a brother" to him. Marco Evelio never specified exactly what he had been using other than alcohol, but parts of his story suggested marijuana and cocaine. "I loved drinking. We smoked, and I did my vices," he said, suggesting that he was smoking marijuana and likely using cocaine or

possibly *basuco*. "I would drink for three or four days straight, and I didn't feel it," he said, again suggesting cocaine. After roughly five years, he said, he quit at the behest of his wife, without any outside intervention.

Marco Evelio openly refused to attach shame to his experiences. He followed his story by pushing back against the stigma associated with drug crop cultivation and drug use:

Acá de pronto las autoridades que dice, el cabildo de pronto a esas personas que se ayuden verdaderamente, que lo necesitan. Hay unos que lo hacen por una necesidad, porque en una casa le hace falta muchas cosas, porque tienen problema con la economía. Tantas cosas que hoy en estos días está pasando en esta situación. Y a veces es por no... trabajar por no buscarse en otra forma. Es que uno ahora nosotros mismos estamos cultivando, ¿por que? Porque eso es que nos da plata, y eso nos da para dar comida a la familia, pa vestir a los hijos. Con eso, unos, estamos capacitando. Unos han salido de eso, ya, y ¡ahora son profesores! Y ¡uno ve! No solamente uno, ¡hasta los profesores! No hay pena en decir que yo fui asi, asi y eso por uno reflexionar y uno mismo aprender. Yo viví eso, y pues a mi me sirve. Si un día que mi hijo o que un sobrino este en eso que yo puedo decir eso porque, porque uno lo hizo, y uno	The council, the authorities say things. They should help those people who need the help, they need it! There are some who do it out of necessity, because at home they are in need of many things, because they have a problem with the economy. So many things today, these days, are happening in this situation. And sometimes for not… (inaudible)… working after not finding another way. So now we ourselves are cultivating it, why? Because it gives us money, and it allows us to feed our families, to clothe our children. With this, we are helping ourselves get by. Some people have gotten out of it, and now they are teachers! And I see that! It's not just me, it's even the teachers! *There is no shame in saying that I was that way*, because it allows me to reflect and learn. I lived that, and it helps me. If one day my son or my nephew is doing the same thing, because I did it, he can say "OK, *Papá*, why use this?" and I can

puede decir "Bueno, Papá, ¿por qué toma esto?" y yo le explico por qué.. (15-04-18 Cic3Tall1 ~88:21)	tell him why.

In Marco Evelio's testimony, cultivating drugs and using them ran together. It was clear that he sought to head off ridicule from his classmates as he audaciously pointed out that many people, including teachers, had grown illicit crops. Growing illicit crops was not a cause of delinquency or even drug use. Rather, his drug use, he contended, was a result of his social circles. Illicit-crop cultivation was a result of economic necessity – situations in which the councils should intervene and offer resources – and could lead to social mobility, as in the case of teachers. In this context of the school, he delicately suggested that shaming anyone for growing drug crops was a form of hypocrisy. As for using drugs, even though he renounced it and said that quitting had made his life better, he saw it as a learning experience that he could use to relate to his younger family members. In this way, Marco Evelio challenged the notion, so often upheld in public discourses, of the drug economy as immoral.

Marco Evelio's statements were quite radical, considering how hesitant people were to openly discuss the benefits of drug crop cultivation, even when they were so clear for people like Omaira who, as a single mother, had

needs that were not uncommon in the community. He also pointed out that the council had a role in addressing the needs that people often met through these cultivations. In this way, he alluded to a sore point for indigenous leadership: that the drug trade could provide for families and individual needs in ways that the councils could not. Community and cabildo leaders frequently bemoaned the loss of authority brought on by coca and marijuana cultivations. Because people can earn money on their own, they would say, they don't think that they need the cabildo for anything. The leaders would also complain that no one comes to the *mingas*, or collective-work days on collective plots, because they prefer to be *desmoñando*, or harvesting marijuana.

The discourse of the immoral nature of the drug economy, as exemplified by Omaira's laundry list of social problems, was privileged over testimonies of benefit from the drug trade like Marco Evelio's. This discourse on the effects of the drug trade was shaped by the pressure on indigenous leadership to control drug crop cultivation in indigenous territories. The drug economy threatened the legitimacy of indigenous leaders in the eyes of the state. To admit that drug crop cultivation helped individuals or households, or to contest the indigenous leadership's enforcement of national drug laws, would be to put comuneros at odds with their leaders, to

draw stigma from other comuneros, or to suffer possibly worse consequences.

Even though the mandate that indigenous leaders enforce anti-drug laws in their territories privileged notions of the drug trade as immoral and disruptive of past practices, it was not the only reason Nasa comuneros saw the drug economy as problematic and immoral. As Javier showed, it had disruptive impacts on practices of consumption and production that re-shaped social relations in the territory. These disruptive impacts were not the result of illicitness or the loss of past practices, but the result of dependency on the cash economy.

Conclusion

For Nasa comuneros, the moral economy was a "meaningful image" of the past that served as a basis for critiquing the social impact of the drug trade in Nasa territory. Nasa leaders and comuneros shared a common narrative about the immorality of the drug trade. However, what made the drug trade immoral was not that it disrupted past social relations. Rather, the moral economy provided a fundamental index for measuring social changes. For some, this immorality consisted of dependency on commodities produced outside the territory, new forms of social and economic division,

and environmental damages brought on by the drug trade. For activists such as Javier, the more threatening effects of drug crop cultivation, such as hunger and youth delinquency, were the result of dependency on monoculture cash crops, and were similar to the effects of dependency on licit cash crops such as *fique*.

Although many of these effects were demonstrably real, the pervasiveness of this narrative of immorality, I contend, was largely encouraged by laws against drug crop cultivation. These laws issued by the Colombian state pressured indigenous leaders to proclaim themselves to be in opposition to the drug trade in indigenous territory, thus putting themselves at odds with many comuneros. This was evidenced by the reluctance to point out the benefits of the cash surge except in relatively private settings, and in critical subtexts such as the one that subtly surfaced in Marco Evelio's testimony, through which he pointed a finger at the bureaucratized indigenous council for their failure to address the needs of comunero households.

A more balanced examination of the drug trade that admits these cash-based benefits means discussing the future of the Nasa as participants in a globalized cash-based economy. As I show in the next chapter, there were ways in which the influx of commodities from the drug trade *did* create

a near-irreversible dependency on cash and exploitative social relations. I also describe how drug traffickers introduced a particular commodity – motorcycles – to Nasa farmers in order to motivate them to produce drug crops.

CHAPTER 4

TWISTED MOTORCYCLES AND NEW CONSUMER ECONOMIES

Motorcycles make the Nasa consumers of global commodities

Before the entrance of the drug trade into indigenous territories, money from cash crop cultivation and migrant harvesting had allowed indigenous peasant farmers to purchase some basic goods such as clothes and foodstuffs. The drug economy produced an unprecedented availability of cash, leading to a jump in access to more expensive commodities. Although these included clothes, foodstuffs, and home electronics, the most visible among them were motorcycles. Motorcycles, which replaced horses as a household's form of transportation, became one of the most publicly visible signs of the drug trade in the region. To this day, Nasa comuneros, leaders, and activists regularly bring up motorcycles in conversations about the drug trade, whether it is how they were the first purchase an individual made from their earnings, how the drug trade led to motorcycle gangs, or, as I discuss further, the problem of *motos torcidas* (twisted motorcycles), or motorcycles without paperwork.

Nasa activists who were critical of the drug trade saw the relationship between changing consumer practices and drug crop production as an issue of primary concern. For them, the influx of global commodities

facilitated by the increase in cash flow to the region was problematic in two related ways. The first was that these global commodities created new forms of class competitiveness within the community. New divisions were created based on who could afford certain goods and who could not. For families with few economic options, this often came down to who was willing to engage in drug crop cultivation and who was not. The second was the social relations they represented beyond the community, including more immediate economic actors such as drug traffickers, and their integration into the global capitalist system. As a result, these commodities often signified a breakdown in the social values that were represented in the nostalgic idealizations of the moral economy of previous generations.

There were ways in which the influx of global commodities represented a definitive social historical shift. This influx transformed a community of people that, for most of their history, had lived as producers of goods for themselves and others into a community of global commodity consumers. This increased dependency on outside commodities, and the need to earn cash to pay for them, made them more vulnerable to the fluctuations of the market and the possibilities of inflation, thus legitimating the fears of dependency in the immoral economy narrative. As I show in this chapter, drug trafficking entrepreneurs have helped to buffer these

instabilities by providing these commodities — motorcycles in particular — at below-market prices.

Most anthropological work on global commodities has tended to examine sites of production and sites of consumption as separate from one another. Appadurai's compilation *The Social Life of Things* (1986) is a seminal work in the anthropology of commodities in which he and other authors follow objects through their "lives" of being consumed and exchanged by humans. Little et al.'s (2000) volume examines alienation and how commodities come to be alienated from their producers. Yet there is little in these works that examines these producing communities as consumers, and how consumption changes over time in producing communities.

A notable exception in the discipline of geography is Cindy Katz's work in the rural town of Howa, Sudan, where she observed what she called a burgeoning "rural cosmopolitanism" (Katz 2004:225-6). This rural cosmopolitanism was expressed in, among other things, the circulation of global commodities and the increasing desire for them. These new material relationships to the urban world propelled and reflected a form of "time-space expansion," in contrast with Harvey's notion of "time-space

compression." The world may be shrinking in the cities where capital is concentrated, but in rural places like Howa, it is getting bigger.

With the idea of rural cosmopolitanism, Katz highlights the increasing fluidity between the city and the countryside. However, she makes no value claim for the urban as the natural outcome of historical progress. Rather, she describes the specific ways that rural sites respond and adapt to the changes brought on by global capitalism. She also captures how the rural endures over time rather than folds into the urban.

As in Howa, the circulation of global commodities in Cauca contributes to this growing rural cosmopolitanism. With motorcycles, brand name shoes, and smartphones, Nasa people increasingly share a consumer culture with others throughout the world. The drug trade has been instrumental in this transition from a smaller scale consumption culture to a cash-based consumer economy. While the availability of these goods signals progress and an advanced quality of life for many, they also represent integration into new forms of global social inequality. In this chapter, I describe how these commodities are instrumental in the integration of the Nasa into a global social economic hierarchy.

Motorcycles are crucial commodities in this process. Although the profits of the drug trade have facilitated the entrance of numerous global

commodities into Cauca, I focus on motorcycles for three reasons. The first is that they almost invariably came up in conversations about the social consequences of the drug trade, some of which I will document here. The second is their unique role, as vehicles of transport, in promoting rural "development" and facilitating the integration of the Nasa community into global capitalism as both consumers and producers. The third reason I focus on them is because of the way, according to numerous accounts, that they were introduced to Cauca – that is, illegally, often by drug traffickers themselves, at below market price. Following other scholars who examine the articulation between the licit and illicit as cooperative rather than antagonistic (Ballve 2012; Polson 2017), these three aspects of motorcycles' now prevalent presence in Cauca represent how the illicit drug economy facilitates integration into the licit global capitalist economy.

Motorcycles bring development and fear to urban Colombia

In Colombia, the number of motorcycles on the road has skyrocketed in the past decade. At any given time of day, major and small urban centers buzz with motorcycles zipping up and down, and during rush hours they can be seen maneuvering through the gluts of buses, cars, and other motorcycles. The large majority of motorcycles have engines of under 150 cubic

centimeters. These are much smaller engines than those in most of the motorcycles seen in the U.S., which are usually 250 cc and above. The flooding of the market has steadily decreased prices, making motorcycles relatively accessible to households of all strata.

Motorcycles also have a gendered component. Colombians often distinguish “women's” motorcycles from fully manual transmission motorcycles. “Women’s motorcycles” are usually scooters or other motorbikes with automatic transmissions — allegedly easier for women to drive because they do not require the complexities of clutches and gear shifts. They also tend to be more expensive. Although men can be seen driving scooters, it is quite rare to see women driving fully manual transmission motorcycles.

In development discourses, motorcycles have represented significant promise as vehicles of physical and class mobility for countries of the Global South (Truitt 2008). In Colombia, the majority of drivers are from the country’s lower income strata. The Automotive Sector of Colombia's National Business Association celebrates the increased access to motorcycles as a means of creating access to the middle class for Colombia's poor (Guesguan 2015). They point out that motorcycles offer a relatively affordable way for individuals from lower-income households to get to work.

Motorcycles have also contributed to incomes in poor and working class households in less celebrated ways. In neighborhoods with poor access to public transport, many have taken to working as *mototaxistas*, or motorcycle taxis taking riders in the locale for a small fee. While this has helped to supplement household incomes, these drivers have increasingly become targets of regulation in cities such as Cali where they allegedly compete with newly implemented public transport systems.

In Colombian public life, motorcycles have also represented significant threat. Theft of motorcycles is common. The threat of theft at gunpoint makes many drivers especially wary while stopped at intersections. Motorcycles became notorious for being the vehicles of *sicarios*, or assassins who ride as passengers and, once the driver comes within range, shoot their target dead and then speed off. Countless deaths of public officials, human rights defenders, and victims of *limpiezas sociales* (social cleansings; see Chapter 7) by this tactic have made motorcycles symbolic of potential extreme violence in the public imagination. For this reason, in many of Colombia's cities, it is illegal for men to ride as motorcycle passengers.

Official and scholarly studies of automobility are predominantly focused on urban areas (Featherstone et al. 2005; Urry 2004), so analysis of the social impact in rural areas is scarce. For Cauca, and likely for other rural

areas involved in the drug economy, the transition to motorcycles as a primary mode of transport was accelerated by the drug economy. By looking at the relationship between the drug economy and motorcycles in Cauca, we can better articulate the role of the illicit economy in helping to advance state goals of mobility and development for "traditionally oriented" indigenous people of Colombia.

Drug traffickers bring *motos torcidas* to Cauca to grease the wheels of drug crop production

As in other parts of rural Colombia, motorcycles are ubiquitous in Cauca. They are the most constant disrupter of the otherwise usually pristine soundscape. While buses, trucks, and chivas are common for transporting large quantities of goods and people, motorcycles are the primary way that individuals and families transport themselves. Faster and requiring less daily maintenance than horses, and more affordable and better suited to narrow and unpaved roads than cars, motorcycles become the vehicle of choice for individuals (though up to three or four riders is not unusual) traveling within and between rural villages. With the occasional scooter exception, the majority of motorcycles are fully manual transmission — more suited to the road conditions. Although these manual transmission motorcycles are typically owned and driven by men, it is not unusual for women to know how

to drive them, especially in cases where a motorcycle might be shared by a couple or a household.

One afternoon, on a long *mototaxi* ride to a meeting a couple towns away, my driver, Emilio, told the story of how he had gotten his first motorcycle. For my fieldwork, *mototaxis* were a useful fallback for when buses or trusted acquaintances with motorcycles were not available. Similarly, they were a crucial form of mobility for those in the town without their own, who could afford them at roughly $2000 pesos (about $1 USD) for every 15 minutes. They were also an additional source of income for comuneros who put their own motorcycles to work. *Mototaxistas* marked themselves with colored vests so that they could be flagged down, although most people could identify them by face.

Emilio was a man in his early 40s. He had earned his first motorcycle when he was 14 years old by harvesting poppy resin (used to make heroin) during the poppy boom in the late 1980s. "And what about horses at that time?" I asked him. "I love horses!" he responded eagerly, and he nostalgically recounted the varieties of horse breeds that he favored. But horses quickly went out of style. He went on to recall the first man in his home village who bought a motorcycle. "Everyone said that man with a motorcycle is *el grande*! He has money!" he said nostalgically. And after that,

of course, everyone wanted a motorcycle. "Granted," he said, "many of them were *torcidas*."

Motos torcidas, or "twisted motorcycles," referred to motorcycles without proper paperwork. Drug gangs, allegedly collaborating with local guerrillas, introduced motorcycles in northern Cauca in exchange for cash at below market prices or directly for drug crop products. Although the origins of these motorcycles were impossible to trace, Nasa leaders and comuneros believed that most of them had been stolen in nearby cities or towns, or had been used for criminal activity, and then had been "dumped" in remote places such as rural Cauca. I did not have access to drug traffickers to inquire further about this, and statistical data was not available, but this narrative was pervasive among Nasa leaders and *comuneros.*

Because there are few to no police patrolling the mountain roads, rural riders worry little about adhering to vehicle documentation requirements. Indigenous councils are seeking to control the problem of motos torcidas, which increasingly nettles indigenous leaders seeking legitimacy for the community with the state. On one of the days when we conducted a workshop in Manzaná, several students were late because they had been stopped at a checkpoint set up by the council to check for paperwork. While leaders strive to control the problem of twisted

motorcycles in the territory, the fact remains that the majority of people in the community could not afford a motorcycle at full market price.

Emilio's story highlights not only how motorcycles were an outcome of the drug economy, but also how the desire for motorcycles was a facilitator of it. Having a motorcycle made one "big." Not having one, by contrast, made one subject to immobility and even shame when it came to things like showing off to women and others in the community. This motivated Emilio and others in his home village to work for the drug trade. From the 1980s until today, this desire for a mark of class status such as a motorcycle and other commodities drove hundreds of young people to cultivate and harvest in the drug trade. Because of the desire for a motorcycle and the class mobility that it represents, young people go to work to harvest marijuana or coca to earn enough to buy it. In this respect, global commodities are not objects solely to be used or consumed, or shown off to the community in Baudrillard's (1978) sense, but are also *productive.*

Drug trafficking gangs deploy this productive capacity of the commodity by making it accessible at a low price. Selling these bikes at below market price, or even bartering them directly for coca paste or marijuana harvests, is key to how they facilitate the drug economy today. Nasa comuneros who cultivate drug crops earn less than 2% of the profit from the

drugs that they help to produce. With these meager earnings, they could not afford a motorcycle at a full market price. Thus the productive effect of the motorcycle is only sustainable while the price is deflated in this local market. Concurrently, the accessibility of a desirable good such as a motorcycle helps to maintain the value of this 2% profit margin for the community. That is, so long as people can afford to get things that they want with the incomes of the drug economy, they will continue to work in that economy, in spite of their subordinate position in it. For Nasa critical activists, the effectiveness of this dynamic for acquiescing the community to this subordination is especially tragic.

This incentivizing of labor by providing desired commodities has obvious advantages for drug traffickers. Drug traffickers do not have to coerce farmers to produce, nor alienate them from their land to make them need to work for survival wages. Rather, drug traffickers must engage in reciprocal relations with Nasa farmers in order to exploit their labor in an increasingly money-based economy in rural Cauca. Motorcycles, as global commodities and objects of desire, grease the wheels of the drug trade. Drug traffickers' manipulation of these desires, particularly insecurities among young people, is a crucial mechanism for facilitating the participation of the community.

Motorcycles created a whole new consumer market of secondary commodities also produced outside the territory and even outside the country, such as gas, parts, and the occasional helmet, integrating the community directly into the moneyed economy. The increased use of motorcycles compelled the building of roads and gas stations and the growth of *cascos urbanos*, or municipal town centers. One indigenous elder recalled to me how Montería had been but a small strip, but had expanded wildly further up and down the mountain slopes that flanked it. This infrastructure would be conducive to the drug trade and to other economies as well. In contrast with notions that drug crop production is counter to development, or represents a failure of it, drug traffickers and this access to global commodities have advanced "development" better than any cash crop or alternative development program in the region.

At the same time, drug traffickers' introduction of motorcycles dramatically expands the demands of subsistence in the new global economy – even if we take subsistence to mean, in the strictest sense, food. Most food consumed in Cauca today is purchased from outside the region. Without a dramatic breakdown and restructuring of the regional economy, the region would not be able to sustain itself economically today without the availability

of transport via motorcycle. Subsistence is now dependent on motored transport and its auxiliary commodities, such as gas and motorcycle parts produced outside the region. By introducing motorcycles, the illicit drug economy made the Nasa into consumers dependent on global commodities for their livelihoods.

Nasa cultural critics problematize desire in the immoral economy

For Nasa cultural critics, motorcycles were commodities that represented the immoral economy. The desire for them was a vice, a giving in to malicious social relations. In the immoral economy, the commodity spoils of the cash economy colluded with the corrupt tendency of desire to disrupt harmonious social relations. As far as some critics were concerned, other comuneros' desire for these commodities was the primary culprit of the disruption. One day I was speaking with Jason, a 20 year old indigenous activist who critiqued the consumer culture that he saw engulfing the young people around him:

Todo el mundo tiene moto. Hasta uno, mejor dicho, hasta uno sale del vientre de la mamá y ya quiere moto. ¡Todo el mundo quiere moto! Y ¿qué generó esto? Como todo el mundo quiere moto, entonces, a veces uno no tiene	Everyone has a motorcycle. It's like one comes out of the womb, and he wants a motorcycle. What has this *generated*? As everyone wants a motorcycle, then, as one doesn't have the money to buy one from the

para comprarlas en almacén, pues con papeles al día, entonces existe el narcotráfico, ¿qué hace? Genera bandas delincuenciales, entonces ¿qué hace? Va, mandan a robar motos para luego subirlas a vender allá. Entonces, cuando tú quieres moto, te vendemos una a menor precio. Y como tú quieres moto y quieres sembrar marihuana, entonces tú me haces el sembrado de marihuana y yo te doy esta moto. Entonces, como están los jóvenes, es vivir a la moda, entonces como todo el mundo tiene moto entonces me voy a hacer el cultivo de marihuana, que va a llegar es a decir el señor y me dice, "Vea, le doy este moto por ese cultivo de marihuana," sí. Entonces eso es la vida fácil que quiere el joven. (16-08-06 [Jason] mjau.m4a ~35:55)	store, at least with updated paperwork, then what do the drug traffickers do? They generate delinquent gangs, and what do they do? They steal motorcycles to take them up to sell there. They say, when you want a motorcycle, we will sell it to you at a lower price. And as you want a motorcycle and you want to grow marijuana, well you can grow the marijuana and I will give you this motorcycle. And so, as young people always want to live the latest trend, so if everyone has a motorcycle, I am going to grow marijuana, and the man will come to me and say, "Look, I'll give you this motorcycle for that marijuana crop," right. So that's the easy life that the youth wants.

Notably, Jason focused his blame on the youth, drawing on notions of youthful capriciousness and the desire for motorcycles. Young people are practically born wanting a motorcycle, they "always want to live the latest trend" and want "the easy life." For Jason, it was this vice-like desire for a motorcycle that *generated* gang activity and other forms of delinquency to meet the demand, and compelled people to work for it. Concurrently, Jason's wording evokes agency on the part of drug traffickers in manipulating the collusion between drug crop production and the desire for global commodities. Nasa cultural critics would shift between placing blame on

Nasa *comuneros*' desire and the designs of drug traffickers and others *de afuera* (from outside), but what was certain was that these interests colluded toward the ultimate end of drug production.

It was not always clear whether this moralization of motorcycles and other global commodities was rooted in a concern over the new web of dependency on exploitative social relationships or was more a result of leaders who increasingly harped on the illegality of motorcycles and their links to the drug trade. As with the immoral economy, the narrative passed along a social continuum, and it was certain that the leadership's finger-wagging amplified these more social-structural concerns. During assemblies, governors often made statements about the need to regulate the undocumented motorcycles in the area. For example, Teófilo, a member of ACIN's indigenous judiciary committee, stated to me:

Nadie ha salido de problema económica. La gente se incentiva por el consumo. En la época del auge de la amapola, habían muchas motos robadas. No sabemos qué le pasó con esas motos, si las tenían lesionadas. Cambiaron la coca por la moto. Y si hubo algo mal con la moto, ¿qué podrían decir la gente? ¿Que hicieron negocio con la guerrilla? ¡Vaya y reclame! (FN 15-3-19 [Teofilo] Evernote**)**	No one has resolved any economic problem [by growing drug crops]. People are incentivized by consumption. In the time of the poppy boom, there were many stolen motorcycles. We don't know what had happened with those bikes, if they were involved in a crime. They used to exchange coca for a motorcycle. And if there was something wrong with the motorcycle, what could the people say? That they did business with the guerrilla? Go ahead and file a

	complaint!

Teófilo took an especially judgmental stance toward people growing drug crops. As he saw it, they were deluded by notions that the profits of drug crop cultivation would solve their financial problems. And if they ran into any problems with their motorcycles, whether mechanical or for being linked to a crime, it was their own fault for being duped by drug traffickers and the guerrillas.

State controls limit indigenous social mobility in the drug trade

Even though motorcycles and the drug economy enabled physical and social mobility, there were social and political mechanisms that limited this mobility and ensured the subordinate status of indigenous people as producers in the drug economy. The Nasa could not break into the profitable markets controlled by drug traffickers. Drug traffickers had access to the vehicles, roads, and corrupt officials to facilitate continuous transport of drug products in and out of the territory. According to comuneros, such controls were often enforced by the military and law enforcement officials through a kind of racial profiling. For example, if an indigenous person goes to Cali with a large backpack, he is stopped by police at the bus terminal and searched.

For them, this profiling attested to the state's collusion in market protection, as *compradores* and drug traffickers presumably did not have to deal with such barriers.

Several Nasa comuneros noted that there are many indigenous people in prison for small trafficking. In order to measure the frequency with which indigenous people were being arrested for drug trafficking, I attempted to gather judicial data on indigenous defendants prosecuted for drug offenses. This proved to be a difficult task, as different prosecutors' offices had different database systems. Furthermore, as one prosecutor in Popayán, the capital of Cauca, pointed out, the vast majority of such cases would not have anything on record indicating that the defendant was indigenous, unless she or he attempted to formally file an appeal for the right to indigenous judicial process. This rarely happened for a number of reasons, which included lack of awareness about the option and even lack of confidence in the indigenous judicial system (Ariza and Zambrano 2012; Gómez 2000). It was an especially challenging, and often futile, process for indigenous defendants charged with drug trafficking, because most judges and prosecutors considered a violation of Colombian society at large and thus restricted to their jurisdiction. This, along with risking the appearance of defending

indigenous drug production and trafficking, discouraged such interventions from indigenous leaders.

I also attempted to gather data on indigenous people incarcerated for drug offenses, where there is more incentive for reporting of indigenous status. Once in prison, indigenous people have the right to appeal for culturally specific conditions, to which prisons may or may not accede. Several prisons have indigenous *patios*, or cell blocks especially for indigenous people. Although this data is technically public, it is not readily accessible. Ariza and Zambrano (2012) provide informative statistics from their work on the subject. As of 2012, they report that, with 209 inmates, the Nasa have the highest number of incarcerated *comuneros* of any indigenous community, making up almost a third of the 663 reported cases. This is far and away disproportionate to the smaller numbers of inmates from other indigenous communities (fewer than 60 for each), including the much more populous Wayuu, of whom only 32 are inmates. They do not explain this disproportionate number, nor do they account for how many Nasa are incarcerated for drug offenses, although they do report that, overall, drug offenses account for 117 of the 663 indigenous cases in the country, the second most common offense after homicide.

In the course of this work, I spoke with Diógenes, a renowned lawyer who worked closely with ACIN and regularly represented indigenous defendants in Colombian courts. Diógenes had intimate knowledge of the indigenous judicial system and facets of indigenous culture. According to his experience with the indigenous community and the courts in Cauca, "El indígena es definitivamente el victima del narcotráfico" (The indigenous person is definitively the victim of the drug trade). He openly stated his belief that drug traffickers set up indigenous people on small trafficking ventures so that indigenous comuneros would be caught down the road by the police or the military. Almost every day, he insisted, there were indigenous youth being processed for small trafficking charges. The contraband was almost always marijuana, although sometimes coca paste and, very infrequently, heroin base (by this he likely meant poppy resin used to make heroin). This, he insisted, was a trap:

¡Para mi es trampa! … Es como un negocio, insisto. Es un negocio para la policía y el narcotraficante. El narcotraficante dice que vea, le voy a entregar estos indígenas, coganlos que van en tal bus en tal meta, y el grande si los paga para que, o sea, el policía tiene que mostrar a sus superiores que están cayendo. Pero el grande no cae. El grande cuando hay estudios de un año, cuando hacen seguimiento de un	To me, it's a trap!… It is like a business, I insist. It is a business for the police and the drug trafficker. The drug trafficker says that look, I'm going to send you these indigenous people, get them in this bus on this way, and the big one [drug trafficker] pays so that, I mean, the police have to show their superiors that they [drug traffickers] are falling. But the big one does not

año porque alguien habló. Les tienen que tomarse un año de persecución, intercepción de teléfonos. Este pequeño es el despiste para justificar que no caigan.	fall. The big one falls when there is an investigation for a year long, when they follow up for a year because someone talked. They have to take a year of prosecution, wire taps. This little one is the distraction to justify why they [big drug traffickers] don't fall.

The disproportionate numbers of indigenous people suggested to him a collaboration between the drug traffickers and the military to give the appearance that they were enforcing the law. "Se puede comprobar lo que acabé de decir" (You can test out what I just said), he said, acknowledging that he was not offering immediate evidence for this collaboration between drug traffickers and the military, but that it could be empirically tested, even if, in practical terms, this was nearly impossible.

Diógenes was not alone in his conviction about the relationship between the state and drug trafficking. Indigenous people were aware of these relationships, even if they did not always share them with me openly. In an interview with Mauricio, a former councilman and weathered indigenous activist of ACIN, he too insinuated the military's complicity with drug trafficking when he pointed out that the routes most used by drug traffickers were some of the most militarized in the region. *No son ciegos,* he

said nonchalantly. They (the military officers posted on the roads) are not blind.

One day, at a meeting of the Movimiento Juvenil, Mauricio, a prominent Nasa leader and former political prisoner, deftly outlined the indigenous community's place in the hierarchy of the global drug trade to a group of adolescents and young adults. He challenged them with two rhetorical questions. The first was, "Are you producers, or traders?" At first the crowd responded hesitantly, until Mauricio rephrased his question: "The farmer that milks the cow, is he a producer, or a trader? And when he processes the milk to make yogurt, is he a producer, or a trader?" The crowd deliberated, but Mauricio continued shortly afterward: "He is still a producer! *You are not drug traffickers!"* he said insistently, pushing back against shallow media portrayals of indigenous people as drug traffickers or colluders of drug traffickers. He went on: "*Los narcotraficantes* are those who form organized groups [who control] the market. Some of them stay here in the territory, most of them come and go. And they gain way more than the producers. They are capable of buying consciences, of buying power, the military, and the government."

He followed this with another question: "Who gains more than anyone from drug trafficking?" The audience guessed, "The traffickers! The

guerrillas!" He continued, "Not the producers, not even the drug traffickers. It's the banks! The financial sector! The banks and the government make more money than the guerrillas. And the military gets its money from the government. So *drug trafficking will not stop."* After outlining this bleak situation, Mauricio proposed that youth look to alternatives in the arts, sports, and tourism. Then he closed his speech, almost ominously. "You now have a choice. You can defend your territory or go to the big cities like Cali. You will decide."

Mauricio was no doubt responding to a common conflation of the coca farmer, guerrilla collaborator, and drug trafficker that was propagated by both the media and government statements, particularly in light of Plan Colombia in the early 2000s. More important, he was highlighting the subordinate position that the indigenous community held in the global commodity chain of illicit drugs. Further, he was reaffirming what had already been made public, most recently by the 2012 ruling on the charge that HSBC executives had laundered up to $6 billion for drug trafficking organizations. They were ordered to pay a $2 billion settlement and received no jail time.

Many Nasa *comuneros* as well as rural inhabitants throughout Colombia unequivocally attest to the improved quality of life brought by the

increased availability of things such as motorcycles, cell phones, and shoes. However, the control of social mobility through profiling and incarceration temper the illusions of modernization and progress. Whether drugs or motorcycles, licit or illicit, the social and racial hierarchies remain relatively consistent in the circulation of global commodities.

Conclusion

Together, the circulation of discounted, high demand commodities and a practically state-sanctioned restriction of indigenous entrance into the market assure the continued positioning of Nasa farmers as producers in the drug commodity chain. According to the sharpest critics, global commodities such as motorcycles merely grease the wheels of a machine that does not guarantee any returns for the producers and necessitates cheap available labor.

These mechanisms that maintain the hierarchies of drug crop production in indigenous territories have important implications for land rights and for the significance of the resguardo. In his work on poppy cultivation in Nasa communities in the 1990s, Les Field asserted that the indigenous resguardo represented a space of autonomy from which indigenous people could experiment and determine their own futures, and in

which drug crop cultivation represented security against the uncertainties of alternative development programs (Field 1996). Although the resguardo has provided the space for political and some economic autonomy, it has also historically served as a place from which elites could draw indigenous labor. Today, it can be said that the resguardo continues to serve this purpose of being a source of labor for drug production. Making available cash and goods that make drug crop production beneficial for Nasa comuneros seeking status and an improved quality of life is a crucial strategy used by drug traffickers to ensure the continuation of drug crop cultivation. However, this improved quality of life does not necessarily mean a leveled playing field of social and economic relations between indigenous agricultural producers and other social groups. The subordinate status of Nasa drug crop cultivators is also maintained through arrests of small-scale indigenous traffickers, which helps to limit their access to drug trafficking.

The continued extraction of surplus value from indigenous labor in indigenous territories shows that land rights alone do not protect from the subordinating relations of capitalism, and it also shows how the drug economy reinforces neoliberal governance. While indigenous land rights are crucial conditions for indigenous autonomy and economic self-determination, drug traffickers and corrupt military officials undermine this

potential for autonomy. Broader questions of what mode of production, for whom, at what price, and who controls the prices stand unaddressed. These issues are at the heart of many ongoing debates over the future of land rights and agriculture for indigenous farmers. At the same time, they are convoluted by the obligatory political performance of denouncing the drug trade. While they go unresolved, the drug trade fills in as a form of governance, integrating indigenous drug crop cultivators into a global hierarchy of subordinated producers and, increasingly, consumers.

Under neoliberal multiculturalism, indigenous people have won cultural and territorial rights. While these rights have created the conditions of possibility for indigenous people to decide collectively how to position themselves in the global economy, the drug trade has undermined their aspirations to political and economic autonomy. Under a neoliberal multicultural framework, the most prominent "solution" to the drug problem has been to cultivate entrepreneurialism in indigenous crop-growing communities. I elaborate on this in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

THE EXPEDIENCY OF CULTURE IN NEW COCA AND MARIJUANA MARKETS

Coca culture has become expedient for indigenous interventions in the coca market

As anthropologists have observed, the positioning of indigenous people in the global economy has shifted under neoliberalism. Whereas before, officials in development agencies held that indigenous culture and "traditions" were a hindrance to social and economic advancement in the modern world, they now consider it an asset (DeHart 2010). Concurrently, indigenous people are drawing on this wave of cultural capital to strategically reposition themselves in the global market. In Guatemala, Maya vendors "perform" indigeneity through traditional dress and language to appeal to tourists and entice them to buy their crafts (W. Little 2004). In Bolivia, market women assert their entrepreneurial skills as well as their indigenous identity in local craft markets (Scarborough 2010).

Drug decriminalization and commercialization in dozens of countries are also dramatically restructuring the global drug economy. Although Portugal and Holland have long had progressive drug policies, it is Uruguay that has led this new wave of changing policy in not only decriminalizing

marijuana, but also regulating a market of marijuana for recreational use throughout the country. Over half of U.S. states have authorized commercialization of marijuana for medicinal purposes, while two have done so for recreational use. The decriminalization of marijuana and its exploitation for medicinal purposes has also become a sort of advocacy "gateway" for emphasis on therapeutic use of other illicit substances such as MDMA, "psychedelics," including Amazonian ayahuasca, and even coca and cocaine.

The emphasis on the decriminalization of use, and subsequent commercialization for various therapeutic and recreational purposes, have left unattended much of the question of how indigenous people will be positioned within these new market configurations. Indigenous people are uniquely situated in the history of the drug economy in that many claim a distinct historical relationship with various drug plants. Coca and ayahuasca (*yagé* in Colombia) had both been used by indigenous communities for a long time before European and non-indigenous people began to use them. The exploitation and mass circulation of most drugs in the world were the result of European colonial contact with indigenous communities that had long been working with these substances. The exploitation and circulation of these substances even helped to expand European colonialism (Jankowiak

and Bradburd 2003). Ethnopharmacology and human rights advocates have begun to articulate these cultural-historical claims as bases for the application of intellectual property laws that would treat knowledge about plants such as coca, as well as their genetic material, as the property of indigenous people (Carpenter 2004; Norchi 2000; Stabinsky and Brush 2007; Whitt 1998). However, these proposed applications of intellectual property laws have made little headway.

Unlike crafts or other ethnic products, indigenous enterprises for substances such as coca take on a more explicitly political dimension because of their illegality. This transition from illegality to legality also, ironically, allows indigenous people to stake a claim more easily than they would in other legal markets where established non-indigenous enterprises have long been operating. Intellectual property laws would be instrumental to the ability of indigenous people to intervene with protectionist policies that would limit, at least to some degree, the flexibility of capitalist exploitation by non-indigenous corporations. However, they would require a significant amount of political organization and strength. Bolivia, under President Evo Morales, has been a prime example in the showing of this strength with the expulsion of the DEA and the establishment of nationally regulated coca

production for the country's expansive coca market – in direct defiance of the 1961 UN Convention that outlawed coca worldwide.

The legitimacy of this coca policy in Bolivia among scholars and activists, along with the subsequent movement for the "defense of coca," was largely made possible by an uncomplicated association of coca with tropes of indigenous spirituality. Notions of coca as a wholesome spiritual plant, profoundly sacred to indigenous people, desecrated by its transformation into cocaine, simplified a complex history of coca commodification under Spanish colonialism in the Andes. Spanish colonial officials encouraged the use of coca as a labor enhancer for indigenous indentured servants. Furthermore, coca is not transformed into cocaine. Rather, cocaine is extracted from coca as one of the plant's major alkaloids. I do not mean to deny here coca's spiritual significance for indigenous communities, nor to downplay the value of its physiological effects, but to highlight how these simple narratives and tropes are deployed for complex political-economic purposes. As in the Maya marketplace (W. Little 2004) or with ethnic products sold at Walmart (DeHart 2010), culture has become expedient in indigenous peoples' struggle to assert themselves in these new drug markets.

In *The Expediency of Culture*, George Yúdice (2003) argues that culture, in its symbolic forms such as art and music, has come to be seen as a

resource in the late 20th and early 21st century. He describes how liberal institutions have sought to operationalize culture as a mediator of social difference in the face of ongoing social inequalities wrought by neoliberal policies. In this way, Yúdice urges us to examine the privileging of "culture" in institutional settings, and the ways that its production and circulation obscure class relations. So in analyzing how coca cultures have informed coca political economies, I mean to go beyond examining how indigenous people use "strategic essentialism" to assert themselves in the global market by examining the limits of this expediency. To what extent does this repositioning subvert conventional hierarchies within capitalism? Does it simply create new ones? These questions are crucial for understanding whether or not newly legalized drug markets will benefit indigenous drug crop cultivators.

Marketing the tradition of coca

One thing that marks indigenous people's experience apart from others in the drug commodity chain is their cultural-historical claim to drugs' raw materials. This claim, which is especially pronounced in drug policy circles, has lent itself to binary distinctions between "traditional" and "modern" uses of sacred plants. Bolivian drug policy in recent years is an

example. Under President Evo Morales, a former coca grower, Bolivia implemented a policy of "social control" in which the government regulates coca production for a legal internal market. This works well in Bolivia, a country where many people continue to use coca on a regular basis. Under the slogan "Coca yes, cocaine no," the government has supported a campaign that depicts cocaine as a white man's drug, and its production and consumption as the continuation of colonial practices, while coca is presented as a traditional plant of indigenous people. This has provided a model that sets traditional coca against its derivative product, cocaine.

Coca is documented as biologically native to the Andes, and was historically used and distributed in the Incan empire prior to the Spanish conquest. Coca's continued distribution was advanced by Spanish colonial officials who saw that it helped indigenous laborers get through long days working in silver mines and haciendas. The market was controlled largely by Spanish entrepreneurs, even though they generally saw coca-chewing as repulsive (Gootenberg 2008). Coca helped to facilitate the extraction of surplus value from indigenous laborers. This contrasts with notions of a contained economy of coca production and consumption, and of coca being a strictly spiritual plant embedded solely in pre-capitalist contexts.

In spite of this complex history, both indigenous and non-indigenous activists have wielded simplified, coherent discourses on the "traditional" uses of these plants to promote indigenous interests in the rise of alternative coca and marijuana markets. Yet these discourses developed by flowing back and forth between policy activists and people on the ground, all in the meantime constructing a more abridged version of the past in which indigenous people made historical claims on drug plants. Within the Nasa indigenous community, cultural activists touted the production and sale of these products – coca teas and marijuana pomades, for example – at rituals and other events, ostensibly to challenge the symbolic contamination of sacred plants by the drug trade.

These historical claims to history are recognizable to most Nasa people, as they always contain elements of people's personal memories of social realities. As people drew on these historical memories of substance use, they would often embed the action of substance use in a nostalgic version of the past. This was almost always less about offering the truth of past social relations than to serve a point about the relative moral decline of the present. For many, then, resuscitating these lost practices in the community, or even reformatting them to suit more urban styles of

consumption, as with alternative coca and marijuana products, was an important step toward rescuing the community from moral decline and social integration.

Even though Andean people throughout Colombia have a history of chewing coca, it is uncommon today in northern Cauca. The chewing of coca had fallen out of common practice by the mid-20th century (Henman 1987). Even by the 1950s, Bernal (1954) noted, albeit without much elaboration, that coca cultivations were seen as "for the whites." While in a Tierradentro resguardo, he observed that only elders chewed coca during their work days, speaking little in order to savor the bulges in their lower lip, while younger people passed the days conversing with one another.

Multiculturalist policies have allowed indigenous people to grow coca for traditional use

In Colombia, drug policies pertaining to illicit-crop-growing communities are shifting dramatically amid two major events. First, peace accords between the FARC guerrillas and the Colombian government were signed in October 2016, ending the hemisphere's longest-running armed conflict. The agreements have authorized crop substitution programs for rural communities that have been growing illicit crops. Second, in December

2015, the Colombian government issued a decree that authorized licenses for the cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes. In the years leading up to these events, a steady effort had been made by indigenous entrepreneurs to protect the right to sell coca-based products. The remarkable successes in these efforts were enabled by multiculturalist policies that privilege indigenous rights. I quickly review these multiculturalist policies to describe how they have enabled coca culture.

Multiculturalist reforms in Colombia, built up throughout the 1980s and solidified in the 1991 Constitution, resulted in real political, economic, and social gains for indigenous people. Two senatorial seats in the national Congress are reserved for indigenous officials. Indigenous resguardos make up nearly a quarter of Colombia's national territory. Markers of indigenous culture, such as dances and music, are routinely invoked and celebrated in public spaces. As one indigenous academic noted jauntily, "Thirty years ago, we were ashamed to call ourselves indigenous. Now today, everyone wants to be indigenous, even non-indigenous people!"

These shifts were supported by changes in ideological notions of indigenous people. Before the passing of the 1991 Constitution, the 1890 Constitution, ratified by a conservative government, held indigenous people to be minors incapable of full reasoning. The 1991 Constitution, drafted by a

progressive group, including two indigenous activists, solidified much of the progress made in regard to indigenous rights in the country. That same year, the Colombian Congress adopted ILO Convention 169 under Law 21. A 1996 Constitutional Court decision recognizing indigenous jurisdiction captures this shift:

[D]e lo que se trata, es de cambiar la perspectiva del análisis, ya no fundada en un concepto de inmadurez sicológica, *sino en la diferencia de racionalidad y cosmovisión que tienen los pueblos indígenas.* El juez, en cada caso, debe hacer un estudio sobre la situación particular del indígena, observando su nivel de conciencia étnica y el grado de influencia de los valores occidentales hegemónicos, para tratar de establecer si conforme a sus parámetros culturales, sabía que estaba cometiendo un acto ilícito. De determinarse la falta de comprensión del contenido y alcance social de su conducta, el juez deberá concluir que ésta es producto de una *DIFERENCIA* valorativa y no de una *INFERIORIDAD* en las capacidades intelecto-volitivas; en consecuencia ordenará devolver al indígena a su comunidad para que sea juzgado por sus propias autoridades. (Sentencia T-496 / 1996, emphasis added)	[I]t is a matter of changing the perspective of analysis, no longer founded on a concept of psychological immaturity*, but on difference of rationality and cosmovision* that indigenous communities have. The judge, in every case, must do a study of the particular situation of the indigenous person, observing his/her level of ethnic consciousness and the level of the influence of hegemonic Western values, to try to establish whether, with respect to his/her cultural parameters, he/she knew that he/she was committing an illicit act. If a lack of understanding of the content and social impact of his/her behavior is determined, the judge must then conclude that this is the result of a DIFFERENCE of values and *not of any INFERIORITY* in intellectual-volitional capacities; consequently, [the judge] will order that the indigenous person be returned to his/her community to be judged by his/her own authorities.

This change echoed notions that gained prevalence throughout Latin America of indigenous people as stewards of the earth, and thus key protectors of the nation's territory and cultural patrimony. As the text of the above Court decision reveals, these notions borrowed from orthodox anthropological notions that set bounded indigenous culture against the corrupting, "hegemonic" forces of Western cultures. Importantly, indigenous identity was not to be determined by heritage or resguardo census, but by how little the individual knew about Western values. For state institutions, indigeneity was based on notions of bounded culture.

It was by this reasoning that indigenous people were given unique rights in regard to coca production. Law 30 of 1986, which is the country's dominant drug policy law, includes special provisions for indigenous people. The National Psychoactives Council (*Concejo Nacional de Estupefacientes*) was to regulate the production and consumption of drug plants by indigenous communities "in agreement with the uses and practices derived from their tradition and culture." Furthermore, the law required crop substitution programs for indigenous and campesino communities that had been engaging in coca crop production for the drug trade.

In the similar way to how Ladinos in Guatemala reacted to the recognition of indigenous rights (Hale 2006), these culturally-specific

protections for indigenous people have warranted suspicion from non-indigenous people. Political conservatives often accused indigenous people of taking advantage of the protected status of their territories to grow illicit crops. As they saw it, this made indigenous people undeserving of land rights. They supported these accusations with unsubstantiated claims. For example, when I spoke with a prosecutor in Cali, she stated that indigenous people hide their coca and marijuana under palm trees so that helicopters cannot detect them. This was certainly not the case in Cauca, as most plots were out in the open. The same prosecutor also insisted that because of indigenous jurisdiction, indigenous authorities will not allow their community members to be processed under Colombian law, but will come to their "rescue." This is also not true, except in the particular instances where indigenous jurisdiction applies.

Prior consultation is the tool for indigenous protectionism

One of the greatest multiculturalist gains in the face of ongoing assaults on indigenous equity is the right to prior consultation (*consulta previa*). Prior consultation is authorized by the International Labor Organization's Convention 169, the same convention that compelled governments to recognize indigenous people's rights. It requires that the

entrepreneurs of extractive projects that will exploit primary resources in indigenous territories must consult with indigenous communities that will be affected by the project before carrying it out. Colombia, along with various other Latin American countries, has adopted this tenet of the International Labor Organization Convention with Law 21 of 1991, and communities have been able to use it successfully in several instances (Galvis 2011).

The right to prior consultation is one of the few legal mechanisms through which indigenous people, and likewise rural Afro-descendant communities, can articulate their demands to the state. However, its legal functions are limited in several ways. The consultation does not grant veto power to the communities, so they do not have power to stop any projects altogether. There is also no standardized structure of representation, and representational hierarchies vary across communities, making each assertion of the right to prior consultation a unique bureaucratic process. Finally, it has also created antagonism between indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, as well as non-ethnicized rural campesino communities. As a result, campesinos in many instances are using state rubrics of ethnicity to construct themselves as an ethnic group in order to be eligible for the right to prior consultation.

Amid drug policy reforms of the past few years, the right to prior consultation has been a crucial legal tool in the struggle for what I call indigenous protectionism in new drug markets. In broad economic terms, protectionism refers to policies that favor a certain group of sellers against others in a market. In this instance, indigenous protectionism refers to the policies privileging indigenous people's sales of formerly criminalized drugs or drug plants, namely coca and marijuana. Although this term has generally not been used in the various contexts where indigenous rights to prior consultation have been debated, many of the typical responses to protectionism have been echoed in these debates. In particular, various groups of non-indigenous entrepreneurs are incensed at the notion of being excluded from access to the market.

The Piñacués have been at the forefront of indigenous coca protectionism; Sentence T-477 was a landmark case

At the forefront of the movement for indigenous protectionism in the coca market is the Piñacué family, a Nasa family well known in Colombia's indigenous political and intellectual world. Jesús Piñacué was the first indigenous senator to be elected to Colombia’s national Congress. In the 1990s, Fabiola Piñacué began Coca Nasa, a small company selling coca-based

products. She and her husband, David Curtidor, have long been active in defending the rights of indigenous people to sell coca-based products — and in defending the demands for prior consultation from non-indigenous entrepreneurs. Because coca is part of the cultural patrimony of indigenous people in Colombia, they argue, selling it is a form of extraction that requires prior consultation.

The Piñacués have had much judicial success in their defense of coca. In 2011, they filed a *tutela*, or legal complaint, against the Colombian government for broadcasting the notorious public service campaign "La Mata Que Mata." This couple of 30-second radio and television messages featured a child's voice declaring: “La coca, la marijuana, la amapola, mata. ¡No cultives la mata que mata!” (Coca, marijuana, and poppy kill. Don't cultivate the plant that kills!). By the end of the year, a Supreme Court judge ordered the messages off the air as the result of a *tutela*, or formal complaint activating a judicial process, against the National Directory of Narcotics, which sponsored the messages. This result demonstrated a substantial amount of political strength of (albeit quite elite) indigenous leaders in the country to exercise their right to cultural patrimony.

Their work culminated in a court case won in 2012, in which they pressed charges against a non-indigenous coca entrepreneur for selling coca.

In this ruling, Sentence T-477, the Constitutional Court re-affirmed the already declared notion of coca as the intellectual property of indigenous people. As intellectual property, it falls under the requirements of prior consultation.

Requerir a la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio a fin de que en el marco de sus competencias, ejecute las acciones tendientes a evitar que en un registro marcario se usen los conocimientos tradicionales indígenas, manifestados por ejemplo en su simbología, mitos, vestimentas, cantos, en la comercialización de productos relacionados con la hoja de coca por personas ajenas a dicho colectivo social.	To require the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce to implement, within the framework of its competencies, actions to prevent indigenous traditional knowledge, such as symbology, myths, dress, and songs, from being used in a trademark registration for the marketing of products related to the coca leaf by persons not of said social collective.

Notably, this court decision does not completely prohibit coca commercialization – likely allowing Coca Cola to continue marketing its products – but prohibits its marketing based on association with indigenous people or culture. Such marketing without indexing indigenous people would be quite a feat for any enterprise, given the common association of coca with indigenous people. As a result, this win put up a major barrier to the sale of coca and coca-based products by non-indigenous entrepreneurs without prior consultation.

Non-indigenous coca entrepreneurs reject cultural claims

This demand for prior consultation has incensed many non-indigenous entrepreneurs interested in the coca market. These entrepreneurs have used discourses that portray coca as an element of regional, rather than ethnic, patrimony. These discourses were extensively voiced at an open meeting held during the Drug Policy Alliance's 2015 Reform Conference. The goal of the meeting, organized by officials of the Open Society Foundation, was to discuss the prospects for new coca markets in Colombia. At this meeting, I casually asked whether one of the proposals for coca commercialization that was being discussed had been drawn up in collaboration with indigenous communities. I pressed the discussion by echoing indigenous people's claim that coca is indigenous. There were no Colombian indigenous individuals present. Based on the responses, it was evident that those attending had very present in their minds the Piñacués' protectionist activism, as they had elaborate arguments against the notion that coca strictly belongs to indigenous people.

One woman, a Colombian advocate for non-indigenous campesino organizations, responded with the following:

Yo pienso que la coca es de todos los pobladores. Es para todos y todos la	I believe that coca is for all inhabitants. It is for everyone and all

podemos transformar. Todos tenemos derecho a sembrar producto agrícola. Si se da en nuestro región, tenemos derecho a trabajarla. Sería absurdo pensar que unas personas pueden y otras no… Yo personalmente creo que entre más productos haya, entre más industria haya, hay más oportunidades para la coca. Porque no podemos decir, si tú tienes este color de piel, o tú tienes estos ojos de este color, tú sí puedes sembrar, y tú no puedes sembrar. ¡La tierra es de todos! ¡La tierra es para todos*! Y la coca es un producto de la tierra que tiene que ser para todos.* (**15-11-20 DPA ~7:16)**	of us can transform it. All of us have the right to plant agricultural products. If it grows in our region, we have the right to work it. It would be absurd to believe that some people can and others cannot…. I personally believe that between more products, and more industry, there will be more opportunities for coca. Because we cannot say, if you have this skin color, or this eye color, you can plant, and you can't plant. *The land belongs to everyone! The land is for everyone!* And coca is a product of the land that must be for everyone.

In a near-classic defense of liberal economics, she later closed with this statement: "Yo como ser individual, como ciudadano, como persona libre, debo elegir qué produzco, y a quién se lo vendo. Y yo como consumidor debo tener la posibilidad de elegir qué compro y a quién se lo compro" (As an individual being, as a citizen, as a free person, I must choose what I produce and to whom I sell it. And as a consumer, I must have the possibility to choose what I buy and from whom I buy it) (ibid ~51:14). The freedom of market choice is linked to the freedom of the individual. As with liberal economic arguments, this discourse obscures the fact that those who benefit the most from this "freedom" are capitalist entrepreneurs with the ability to move commodities across borders and sell them. Producers, especially poor

indigenous drug crop cultivators, do not have this opportunity to “choose to whom [they] sell” their products.

A second woman, European and English-speaking, who worked with a large organization supporting drug policy reform and declared herself a "coca enthusiast," responded with the following:

> There's a lot of discussion about who has a right to grow coca, and who is indigenous, and who is not. But if you take a step back, if you're an outsider, for me the question is not who has a right to grow it. For me it's more about an indigenous wealth of a given *region* than whether people who grow it are indigenous or not. I just wonder whether it makes that much of a difference, whether we can't say that this *region* grows coca. And I would consider "region" very broadly, rather by the definition of just where indigenous people live**,** and recognize that as a heritage of a given sort of geography. And then, the more people, the better! Because it's a useful product, and if people can live off of it, then live off of it well, more power to them. Like I'm a little concerned we're in a very defensive mode. Rather than saying, wow, this is a great plant that grows on this land, let's appreciate it and use it as widely and as thoughtfully as possible. (15-11-20 DPA ~14:55)

This woman explicitly invoked the notion of coca as being associated with a region rather than a particular group of people. In this way, advocates of a coca market accessible to non-indigenous entrepreneurs thwart any discussion of difference or inequality between groups of people within that region. Furthermore, she boldly declared that “the land belongs to everyone,” pronouncing an ideal that does not apply in any reality, and especially not the

reality in Cauca, where land rights have been so brutally contested throughout the country's history.

She reiterated the elision of indigenous people from the region's history by asserting that the discussion of "who is indigenous and who is not" is not very relevant. This was in spite of the fact that the discussion was not explicitly about "who is indigenous and who is not," but about whether coca is the property of indigenous people. She responded by similarly shifting the association of coca to a region rather than an ethnic group. She also adopted a moralistic tone in which she admonished the prospect of indigenous people making a claim on coca by calling it "defensive," and asserting that her interlocutors should use this coca commodity "thoughtfully" and "appreciate it."

These speakers' circumvention of the particular history of indigenous people and coca pushes back on indigenous protectionist aspirations. With the exception of a non-indigenous campesino representative, throughout the meeting there was very little discussion of inequalities within the drug market, licit or illicit. After the meeting, the campesino advocate woman expressed her exasperation at the Piñacués' case against the founder of the non-indigenous coca company: "He is not a multinational, he is not the enemy!" In this respect, indigenous coca culture appeared as an attack on the

claims of non-indigenous people who had also been at a historical disadvantage in the drug commodity chain.

The Piñacués also invoke neoliberal entrepreneurial logic, but coca protectionism remains controversial

Fabiola Piñacué, the founder of Coca Nasa, has drawn extensively on an entrepreneurial identity and free market discourse. She has long claimed that coca is part of the cultural patrimony of indigenous people and that the prohibition of her sales of coca-based products is an attack on her rights to revive indigenous values through cultural entrepreneurship. In a colloquium on multiculturalism in Colombia, she proclaimed,

¿Por qué se habla del libre mercado cuando no existe la posibilidad de que unos nasas como nosotros desarrollemos la capacidad de innovar y de generar propuestas productivas y económicas viables, saludables para la humanidad? (Piñacué 2008:322)	Why do we talk about the free market when there doesn't exist the possibility that Nasas like ourselves develop the capacity to innovate and generate viable productive and economic proposals, healthy for humanity?

She appealed to the fundamental values that the woman from the meeting described above espoused when she insisted on the freedom of individual

choice; the only difference is that Fabiola insisted on inclusion for indigenous people.

For Fabiola, respect for indigenous rights was expressed through the ability of indigenous people to be included in the market. She made no allusion to other collective rights, but emphasized the market as an important vehicle for cultural preservation as she argued:

Cuando los nasa ven la hoja de coca en una tienda, en una cajita decorada, dicen "pero qué está pasando," dicen "volvamos a consumir la hoja porque nos estamos quedando sin nuestros elementos."… Esta ha sido una de las estrategias para empezar a conquistar y para que la gente reconozca lo que se está perdiendo. (Piñacué 2008:321)	When Nasa people see coca in a store, in a decorated box, they say, "but what is happening," they say, "let us go back to using coca because we are ending up without our own cultural elements."… This has been one of the strategies to start to resist and for people to recognize what is being lost.

By emphasizing the commercialization of coca as a prime strategy for upholding its cultural value for indigenous people, Fabiola's discourse is extensively shaped by neoliberal *and* multiculturalist ideologies. In the neoliberal political imagination, the entrepreneur is the primary agent of social change. Were it not for the illegality of coca, her discourse would echo that of an archetypal "ethnic entrepreneur." Under neoliberalism, the ethnic

entrepreneur is the figure of an indigenous person with competent market skills based on privileged local knowledge. This concept is a break from notions that indigenous lifeways are backwards and uncompetitive in market settings (DeHart 2010).

Although Piñacué's discourse reflects neoliberal notions about culture, her campaign for indigenous protectionism is still at odds with the neoliberal tenet of an open market. Various non-indigenous counterparts view her campaign for coca protectionism as a threat to their interests. At the VII International Coca Leaf Festival, held in Popayán, Colombia in 2016, the issue of indigenous rights to coca commercialization was a contentious one. Fabiola Piñacué incited the most controversy with the following statement:

Además, creo que hay pachamamisticos.[6] *Ya hay cocamamisticos. Estamos en la hora de defender la coca. Ya dicen que la coca no es mal, ahora la vamos a repartir, venga aquí y allá… Se llevaron el oro, el petróleo. Ahora vienen por la coca. Ya no es "la mata que mata." Ya van a llegar los multinacionales, los canadienses… La hoja de coca pertenece a los pueblos. Es de uso cultural, ancestral, es patrimonio de los pueblos. Que alguien quiera venir a hacer productos con la hoja de coca,*	Furthermore, I think that there are pacha-mama-mistics. Now there are coca-mama-mistics. Now we are in a time of defending coca. Now they say coca isn't bad, now we are going to share it here, and there and wherever… They took the gold, the oil, and now they are coming for the coca. Now it is not "the plant that kills." Now the multinationals are coming… The coca leaf belongs to the [indigenous] people. It is for the ancestral, cultural, and patrimonial use of the people. If someone wants

[6] "Pachamama" refers to "Mother Earth." Spiritual references to coca also use the term "mama coca."

que pena, ¡pídele permiso a los pueblos indígenas y punto! (16-08-12 ForoDeCoca ~**03:11:52)**	to come and make products with the coca leaf, I am sorry, but *ask permission of indigenous people, period!*

By comparing coca to oil and gold, both of which are exploited by transnational companies in Cauca, Fabiola's speech set coca in a historically extractionist relationship between indigenous communities and non-indigenous entrepreneurs. Here, she strategically used the discourses typically associated with more radical factions of the indigenous movement.

Fabiola's demand that non-indigenous entrepreneurs "ask permission of indigenous people" to make and sell coca products alluded to the right to prior consultation and rustled many feathers at the forum. A non-indigenous panelist later in the day echoed the previous argument of identifying coca with a region rather than with an ethnic group, and claimed that "Coca is Andean-Amazonian." On a more practical note, a policy activist asserted that a concerted position across the various interested groups would be crucial for establishing viable community-based models for commercialization. He warned, however, that prior consultation would create a tremendous political barrier; the Colombian Congress would not want to wrestle with it.

Coca culture may be expedient to market restructuring/redistribution - but this is unlikely

Following Fabiola's speech and promotion of coca commercialization, it still was not clear whether the Piñacués' campaign for coca protectionism would prevent all possibilities of non-indigenous participation in the coca market, which was one of the primary concerns of the participants at the Drug Policy Alliance meeting described above. For insight on this issue, I spoke with David Curtidor, Fabiola's husband. Like his wife, David is an outspoken, politically well-connected man who worked openly and behind the scenes for unique indigenous rights in legalized coca and marijuana markets. He was in many ways a walking encyclopedia on the subject, and enthusiastically supported his arguments by citing court sentences and article numbers of relevant laws and policies. In our conversation, I recalled the debate over indigenous rights to alternative coca commercialization that took place in the conference, and I pointedly asked him whether what they sought was to block non-indigenous people from the coca market. He responded:

No, no, no. Creo que hay posibilidades de hacerlo. Cual es el tema: Si la coca es de los pueblos indígenas, puede ser de todos. Pero si se queda con las multinacionales, no es de nadie. Eso es un poco la discusión. Yo puedo ir al territorio indígena, y hay campesinos,	No, no, no. I think that it can be done. The issue is this: If coca belongs to indigenous people, it could be for everyone. But if it is for the multinationals, then it is for no one. That is the argument. I can go to indigenous territory, and there are

hay negros, hay todas las comunidades. Pero en un, digamos, donde hay caña, hoy hay desiertos en el Valle, con caña. Allá no vive nadie. Han acabado la flora, la fauna. Han acabado la diversidad. Pero en territorios indígenas, tú encuentras flora, fauna, campesinos, negros. Entonces la discusión que deben entender estos compañeros es si la coca es de los pueblos indígenas puede ser de todos. Si es de multinacionales, es de nadie. Se la quedaron y ya. Ese es el tema. (16-08-07 [David] ~23:54)	campesinos, there are black people, there are all communities. But where, let's say, there is sugar cane, and today there are deserts in Valle, with sugar cane. No one lives there. They have killed the flora and fauna. They have killed diversity. But in indigenous territories, you find flora, fauna, campesinos, black people. So the argument that these people must understand is that if coca belongs to indigenous people, it can belong to everyone. If it belongs to the multinationals, then it belongs to no one. They have it and that's it. That is the issue.

In contrast to notions that indigenous proprietary rights in the coca and marijuana market threatens access for non-indigenous people, David asserted that non-indigenous access would be facilitated through indigenous protectionism. The threat is not non-indigenous campesinos, whose collective aspirations to commercialize coca he vocally supported, but non-indigenous capitalists.

The role of non-indigenous capitalists has already been made clear in the newly established marijuana market. Earlier this year, the Colombian government authorized the use and cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes and established a process of granting licenses for such purposes. The first of these licenses was granted to a Canadian cannabis company,

PharmaCielo, which is currently building a 1,500-acre marijuana farm just outside the Medellín International Airport. Licenses were also granted to Cannavida, another Canadian company, and to Labfarve-Ecomedics, which is Colombian. *The New York Times* captures the parallels between these companies and drug kingpins: "Businesses in Colombia like PharmaCielo believe they can establish a foothold in the drug industry, just as their illegal counterparts did in past years" (Kaplan 2016).

In Cauca, initiatives backed by Israeli and Colombian investors in various indigenous communities in the north suggest a more cooperative model. Indigenous leaders are urging the government to grant the licenses and declare that the seeds are the intellectual property of the growers, but this is likely an uphill battle.

For David, these realities were the pivotal point of struggle over coca protectionism. They demonstrated that the same market hierarchies that preceded coca and marijuana legalization and kept cultivators at the bottom — with less than 1% of the final profit — would take hold if the right to prior consultation was not implemented. He argued:

Entonces digamos eso no es un modelo que sirva a los comunidades. Las comunidades finalmente van a terminar siendo, en el mejor de los	[T]his is not a model that serves the communities. The communities are going to end up being, *in the best of cases,* suppliers of primary materials.

casos, van a ser suplidores de materias primas. Y en esos se van a quedar. Igual que el café. El café es una planta que jaloneaba la economía colombiana, supuestamente, pero los productores cafeteros no quedan con mas que 2-3% del negocio. Así es casi todos. De la cocaína lo mismo. No alcanza ni 1%. Ni lícito ni ilícito es negocio ser simplemente productor de la materia prima, cultivador. Lo que van a hacer es grandes haciendas, grandes sembrados de marihuana en condiciones controladas, en territorios campesinos donde lo único que aportan los campesinos es mano de obra barata. Eso es el estilo y futuro del tema de la marihuana. Y cualquier otra planta. Y digo la marihuana porque el negocio es enorme, enorme. No hay que abrirle opciones legales, ya esta. Salvo a los EEUU que no permite importación. No así lo mismo con la coca. Esa es la diferencia. **(16-08-07 [David] Skype entrevista ~28:32)**	And they will stay that way. The same with coffee. Coffee is a plant that moves the Colombian economy, supposedly, but coffee producers end up with no more than 2-3% of the final profit… Same with cocaine. Not even 1%. *Whether licit or illicit, it is not good business to be simply a producer of primary material,* or a cultivator. What they will do is make big haciendas, big plantations of marijuana in controlled conditions, in campesino territories where the only thing the campesinos contribute is cheap labor. That is the style and future of the marijuana issue. And any other plant. And I say marijuana now because the business, is enormous, enormous. You don't even need legal options, the business is already there. Except maybe in the U.S., where importation is prohibited. But it can't be that way with coca.

As David described it, the Piñacués' motives are not a matter of merely setting indigenous against non-indigenous market access. Echoing Fabiola's characterization of the extractionist economy, David presented the issue as a class struggle within capitalism common to licit *and* illicit drug markets in which he sees indigenous people at the forefront.

David articulates the possibility of an opening in a legalized coca market, albeit a very slim one. Indigenous protectionism in the coca markets would push back on a historically oppressive dynamic in which, formerly, indigenous people supplied various licit and illicit markets with their labor and raw materials from their territories; now, with these protections, they would have a direct say in how that market was organized. This would set a precedent for any historically economically oppressed group.

At the same time, the Piñacués' efforts seem nearly quixotic. Neither they nor any other indigenous entrepreneurs have the infrastructure to control production and distribution at all levels. Even if they did, the coca market would never be able compete with the cocaine market, so the growing of coca for the cocaine market will always be more profitable for indigenous growers.

Bolivia may be looked to for an example of full commodity chain control of coca as an alternative to cocaine. Bolivia's "social control" policy has been praised as a success story in the war on drugs. Indeed, illicit crop production has fallen dramatically since the institution of a legalized but highly regulated coca market in the country. However, the cocaine trade continues to operate, and to compete with, the legalized system of *catos*, or coca plots. Some farmers are becoming disillusioned with the comparatively smaller incomes

within the *cato* system, while land prices have inflated with the increased regulation of land titling (Grisaffi 2013).

The recognition of indigenous knowledge about coca and other substances as intellectual property of indigenous people provides the potential for some economic gains for indigenous communities. However, this may be the extent to which coca culture may be expedient to any redistribution within licit drug markets. Without a broader platform that aims to redistribute the wealth created by coca and its derivatives to primary agricultural producers, the political possibilities will be shaped by narrow, essentialist notions of culture, and thus limited to policies of limited economic inclusion for a small number of elite individuals.

PART III:
DRUG USE, MORAL PANIC, AND NOSTALGIA

CHAPTER 6

DRUGS, FAMILY, AND DELINQUENCY

Introducing La Terraza

Mercedes, the director of La Terraza, the prominent primary and secondary education program in Manzaná, introduced the series of workshops and focus groups that I would be facilitating at a meeting of community authorities and professors of La Terraza's adult education program. Mercedes's long dyed-blond hair, relatively fair skin, and refined appearance belied her indigenous family background. Her strong commitment to the indigenous community where she and her sisters grew up and her tireless advocacy for students, families, and professors at La Terraza earned her great respect from those who worked with her.

When I first pitched my request to conduct my research on the drug economy in Cauca with students in the adult education program, Mercedes eagerly agreed. However, she immediately requested that the project focus on drug use in the community. I agreed. The afternoon of that meeting, Mercedes emphasized that the focus of the workshop series would be on consumption. We would not be asking about "los cultivos," the coca and marijuana crops growing throughout the landscape, because, as she said, we already know that everyone is living off of it in some way. "Hasta la iglesia

está ganando plata de eso," she said. Even the Church is making money from it. "Pero," she went on, "estamos muy preocupados por el consumo de las multiples sustancias que están introduciendo en nuestra comunidad" (But we are very worried about the consumption of multiple substances that are being introduced into our community).

Talk about drug use and drug production in Cauca tended to occupy different domains of institutional concern. Drug production was in the discursive domain of the political: the cabildos, indigenous leaders, government policies. With its focus on controlling both the armed conflict and illicit activities in rural areas, the state bore down on indigenous authorities to answer for the community's participation in the drug trade. Drug production was also public - it was right out in the open, in the landscape, in the air, especially when passing truckloads of marijuana would infuse the air with its odor, or when households would burn off excess stalks after the buds had been harvested.

Drug use, by contrast, was far more private, as intimate places such as the home were the places where drug use took place and where its most immediate impact was felt. While it was a less pressing concern for governing authorities as one went further up the governing hierarchy, community leaders in the more socially oriented institutions took up the

issue. They included parents and heads of households, school teachers, and child welfare officials. In addition to protecting students potentially participating in drug production from prying researchers, Mercedes's request that I focus on drug use in my research workshops on "el consumo" was part of a burgeoning concern over drug use among youth in much of the region.

Although there was an institutional compartmentalization of these issues, there were ways in which these worlds overlapped in indigenous social life. For example, in an earlier period of my fieldwork I was told that the drug use and disobedience — terms that, as I will discuss, were more synonymous than discrete — among youth were the reasons that the authorities in one community had decided to carry out an eviction of cocaine laboratories from their resguardo.

In the following months, I carried out workshops and focus groups with students in the youth and adult high school program of La Terraza. I made it clear to all participants that the overall project was on all aspects of the drug economy, production and consumption, but that we would focus on consumption for their part of it. Camilo, my research assistant who was earning his master's degree in anthropology at a local university, helped to facilitate these workshops. Although not originally from Cauca, he had spent

the previous year working as a teacher in a Nasa *bachillerato*, or high school. His excellent rapport with the community of Nasa teachers, and his ability to laugh and joke effectively within the fraught social framework of indigenous life — a crucial skill for working with the Nasa in general — proved indispensable for carrying out these workshops.

Although drug use was not and is not the main focus of my research, Mercedes's request provided an opportunity to analyze how the community prioritized their concerns about the effects of the drug trade in the region, and the institutional forces that shaped these concerns. In the next two chapters, I describe how this concern over drug use was part of a larger moral panic over youth that was largely driven by new expectations of youth and parenthood in rural indigenous Cauca. These new expectations were based on urban liberal models of adolescence that consisted of removing young people from productive activity and placing them under supervision. In this chapter, I describe how these models were imported ideologically and structurally through Colombia's national child welfare institution, the Colombian Institute of Family Well-being (*Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familia*, ICBF).

In the following chapter, I describe how indigenous schools, in spite of their important role in the cultivation of indigenous autonomy and cultural

values, inadvertently became instrumental to the structural implementation of these urban liberal models of family life. Collaboration between school and ICBF officials enabled the enforcement of Foucauldian biopolitics by establishing new regimes of state vigilance over family relationships based on urban notions of youth delinquency. Furthermore, the introduction of age-graded schooling has disrupted the mode of agricultural production that formed the basis of past Nasa lifeways, and facilitates the shift to commodity consumerism. I also examine how the imposition of these new regimes of oversight over the family shape Nasa teachers' and comuneros' ideas about family relations in the past.

Stigma and the Moral Panic over Drugs and Youth

In the course of the workshops at La Terraza, along with interviews in other contexts, patterned attitudes about drugs began to emerge. In general, these attitudes held that drugs were bad and associated with deviance, especially among youth. Nasa comuneros wrestled with a dearth of information about drugs' physical and psychological effects, so it was not uncommon to hear things like smoking marijuana would kill someone. Stigma against drug use was high.

Catholic and evangelical churches reinforced community disapproval of drug use. Evangelical churches were known to be most effective in getting congregants, or *creyentes* as they are called, to stop using as well as producing drugs. Evangelical churches were known for being more adamant than the Catholic Church about condemning the use of all substances, even traditional use of coca and alcohol.

The weight of moral stigma around drug use constantly fell on the shoulders of young people and their parents. Furthermore, the problem of consumption was often presented as something "new" among the youth in the community today, as if older people did not use drugs in their youth or in the present. This was reiterated as we reflected on drug use at La Terraza, when one student said at the beginning of a workshop: "*Before* we didn't have this problem, but *now* we have to talk about it."

However, conversations with elder Nasa individuals suggested that previous generations of youth did experiment with drugs. In a workshop on drug prevention and community, Don Elías, an elder Nasa man, told a story of his youth:

Un día mientras trabajaba me herí. Un amigo me ofreció un porro de marihuana. Fui al médico, y me vio los ojos todos rojos. Me preguntó si estaba	One day while working, I hurt myself. A friend offered me a joint of marijuana. I went to the doctor, and he saw my eyes all red. He asked if I

fumando. Dije que sí. El médico me dijo que eso me hace daño al cerebro, y de ahí dejé de fumar esa pendejada. (FN 15-7-00 [Evernote])	had been smoking. I said yes. The doctor told me that that would damage my brain, and from there on I stopped smoking that silliness.

His story of experimentation with marijuana corroborated that of another elder, Don Gorro, who spent much of his younger years harvesting poppy resin for the heroin trade. "People said that if you smoke it, it does something to you. I tried, but nothing happened. I imagine you have to add some other chemical to feel the effect."

Drug crops had been produced in Cauca since the 1970s. The testimonies of Don Elías and Don Gorro demonstrate that drug use, or experimentation, was not unknown among older generations. Both of these men were in their 60s. Although Don Elías' doctor's recommendation to "stop smoking that silliness" indicated a general stigma against drug use, none of them recalled any scandal in the moments of their drug experimentation. And most important, their experiences do not reflect the common notion that drug use is a recent phenomenon that began with the current generation of youth.

If drug production and drug consumption were not new to indigenous Cauca in 2015, then what *was* new were the pervasive discourses of stigma

surrounding drug use, which I characterize as a moral panic. Stanley Cohen (1972), who coined the term, defines a moral panic as follows:

> A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricade as remanned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or... resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives.

The moral panic literature presents it as a primarily urban phenomenon that is primarily fueled by mass media. The panic over the "mods and rockers" that Cohen expounds on, as well as the muggings that Hall et al. (2013) examined, took place in British cities. The term is useful to describe Nasa comuneros' attitudes toward drug use because, even though the context of drug use in Cauca was very rural, the response to it echoed between various institutions with important roles in the community. These included schools, the cabildo, and the local child welfare office. Furthermore, as I show, the moral panic was informed by liberal institutions, in particular child welfare organizations, with roots in urban history.

The concern over drug use also had other characteristics of a moral panic. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) highlight disproportion and folk devils as key aspects of moral panics over a particular social issue. Disproportion refers to an exaggerated public perception of the threat compared to the reality of the threat itself. In Cauca, where statistics about drug use were not easily available, disproportion had less to do with statistics than with the perceived dangers of drugs compared to other, more tolerated practices such as alcohol consumption and acts of violence. Although these latter issues were also getting increasing institutional attention, they did not represent moral failure to the degree that drug use did.

Folk devils are archetypal figures of moral failure. Nasa comuneros frequently evoked such images of delinquent drug-using youth as exemplary of this moral lapse. As I describe later, these images were conjured from notions of urban delinquency.

Drug use was often framed as the result of undisciplined young people whose parents neglected their responsibilities. Parents did not teach their children, did not discipline them, or even did not love them properly. The discussion about drugs usually turned into a much bigger conversation about the relationship between parents and their children.

Finally, there were people such as Mercedes and several teachers at La Terraza who, even though they saw drug use as ultimately bad, sought to mitigate the effects of public stigma put on young people and their parents. They opposed the often harsh treatment of drug users by school and cabildo authorities. These progressive individuals in the community saw drug use as a result of falling away from traditional family structures and believed that moral stigma only kept users from leaving behind their delinquent ways and reintegrating with those structures. For them, education and the encouragement of familial affect were key steps to this reintegration.

In the rest of this chapter, I describe some of the moral panic discourses drawn from the workshops at La Terraza to review what comuneros believed about how, when, and where drugs were used in the community. I trace the moral panic notions of youth delinquency from the early 20th century. I also describe the role of ICBF in advancing these notions of youth and delinquency.

Drug use in Manzaná

Just how many people were using drugs, and how they were using them, was difficult to measure during the course of my fieldwork. According to the Municipal Health Secretary in Manzaná, there were 60 documented

cases of drug use in the whole municipality for 2014. Among a population of 10,000, this was significantly less than the 1% of Colombians who reportedly consumed drugs (Camacho, Gaviria, and Rodriguez 2011).

Qualitative reports belied these small official numbers. During workshops and focus groups, many participants admitted that someone in their family had used drugs. Documenting of drug use would only take place when teachers or desperate parents brought it to cabildo or municipal health officials. It is likely that a large portion of cases were never reported. According to one indigenous health coordinator, the stigma associated with drug use in the community was one of the key barriers to seeking intervention services. Whipping, or some form of shame in a public assembly, was not considered an unusual punishment for students caught smoking marijuana, and the shame associated with it would be enough for a family to avoid addressing the problem openly.

For drug users who sought clinical treatment, options were limited. Rehabilitation clinics were available in nearby cities, especially Santander and Popayán. Omaira, one of the teachers, had a cocaine-using son who agreed to treatment; she sent him to Popayán, where she attended classes with him regularly. Matriculation and travel were unaffordable for many other families. Most clinics required family participation, which added on to

the costs. Furthermore, health and cabildo officials complained that many who did have family members in treatment did not want to attend the classes that required their participation because they were irresponsible or fearful of being stigmatized by their neighbors.

Marijuana, cocaine, and glues were seen as the most concerning substances in the territory. Below, I summarize the concerns around each of these substances as expressed by workshop participants and other comuneros.

Cocaine. Cocaine was most recognized as a sobering drug for drunkenness from alcohol. One older woman noted, during a discussion about drug use in dance clubs: "Hay personas que toman dos o tres días y usted los ve bueno! … Ellos pueden consumir todo que quieran, osea consumen ese perico más que todo… y usted los ve bueno! Ve que toman, que van y consumen eso y al ratico, ya están bien! Y siguen tomando!" (There are people who drink [alcohol] for two or three days and you see them in good shape! They can consume all they want, I mean they use that *perico*[7] (cocaine) more than anything, and you see them looking good. And they keep drinking.")

[7] *Perico* in Colombia had different meanings in different contexts. In the southern part of the country near Cali, it referred to scrambled eggs prepared with chopped tomatoes and onions. In Bogotá, *perico* referred to a small cup of coffee without milk. Throughout the country, however, it had become another term for cocaine.

She went on to warn the other students: “El hijo de Doña [María] sufrió una sobredosis de eso. ¡Mire las consecuencias!” (Doña María's son suffered an overdose of that. See the consequences!") (15-05-02 Cic3Tall2 SitiosRiesgo, ~16:50)**.** Cocaine thus gained its notoriety in the party context as a drug that allowed people to continue drinking. In various workshops, students consistently described this quality of cocaine. They rarely alluded to as having stimulant properties in situations that did not involve drinking or partying. It was not usually presented as a social performance or labor enhancer, as it is at times in the United States, or as coca was among Nasa elders.

Unlike marijuana, cocaine was not prepared in growers’ homes. Cocaine dealing in the region would require a somewhat established, if rudimentary, local trafficking network between laboratories where it was produced and the immediately surrounding and nearby communities. Coca leaves can be made into coca paste with relatively simple and accessible chemicals in the home of anyone growing coca. The paste would then have to be sold and transported to a laboratory with more volatile and expensive chemicals in order to synthesize cocaine hydrochloride. Local cocaine trafficking would have to be based out of these laboratories. However, *basuco*, a substance often compared to crack, could be made from coca paste.

Because of the acute sensitivity around the issue of drug use and local trafficking, I did not inquire about the specific social structure of the local cocaine market in Manzaná.

Marijuana. Marijuana seemed to be caught up in a wave of moral panic amid increased discussion of the latest boom of marijuana cultivation. Unlike cocaine, marijuana was much more readily accessible, as it was a matter of harvesting and smoking the dried buds from any local plot. Using marijuana was more obvious because of the notoriously pungent smoke. While cocaine use could be more discreet, and was more associated with parties and away-from-school environments, marijuana was more associated with truancy.

The effects of marijuana were not well known among comuneros. It was not unusual for people to associate marijuana with dramatic effects like psychosis and death. One girl in the workshops also reported that a friend had told her, "It makes you want to steal," again reflecting the association between drug use and delinquency.

Glues and solvents. Glue sniffing was perhaps the most common drug use activity among primary school children and was becoming a great concern. Glues and solvents were often referred to as *solución,* or "Boxer," referring to the locally available brand name of liquid adhesives. Glue and

solvent sniffing has often been considered a particularly age-graded form of drug use, as these substances are often accessible to young children. One workshop participant noted that her daughter had told her that other students were emptying their pens and filling them with the glues so that they could sniff them unnoticed during class. Unlike cocaine and marijuana, their use could not be readily attributed to participation in the drug economy. Parents, school teachers, and child welfare officials were increasingly concerned with this practice among very young children.

The Workshops at La Terraza

The workshops that I carried out took place with the cooperation of teachers and permission of students in La Terraza's youth and adult education program. This program was established to provide the opportunity for people to attend and graduate from high school – the equivalent of a G.E.D. program in the U.S. Crucially, the program aimed to close the generation gap in the municipality's education, as 80% of the children in Manzaná were now attending school, while only a small percentage of adults had been formally educated past 3rd grade. Students in the program ranged from about 15 years old to adults in their 50s. The majority were young people in their late teens and early 20s. For each of the

three grade levels enrolled, classes ran about three to four days a week, from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m. Most of the teachers in the program taught full time in La Terraza's *primaria*, or primary school, working overtime in the program.

The workshops took place over the course of four months, once a week with all three of the enrolled cohorts. In accordance with the goals outlined by Mercedes and those of my research, the objectives were to analyze the reasons for drug use in the region, reduce stigma, and devise ways to prevent its spread. These workshops culminated in a day-long event entitled the "Taller Comunitario de Prevención de Consumo de Sustancias Psicoactivas" (Community Workshop on Prevention of Psychoactive Substance Use), open to the community, focused on prevention of drug use. The participants in this day-long event, which involved role plays, discussions, and festive activities, included local youth activists and indigenous health professionals as well as students and their families.

The workshop discussions, along with the community prevention activity, provided much insight into the ways that Nasa comuneros understood drug use in their community. Nearly everyone expressed some experience with drug use in their families, in spite of the very small reported numbers. The workshops, like the school where they took place, became a

place where people shared their experiences and reproduced fears, opinions, and blame discourses.

Although Nasa comuneros had some rudimentary understanding of drugs, very few had direct experience with drug use or familiarity with specific drugs' effects. They did not always distinguish between various forms of drug use. They usually referred to drug use with the phrase *meter vicio* (roughly, "to consume a vice"), or with the more administrative term *consumir*. They also did not always know the relationship between the drug plants that they were growing and specific drugs. For example, when I asked workshop participants what poppy was used for, they gave confused answers. More innocent ones did not even know how marijuana was used – some thought that it was snorted, like cocaine. Many believed that using it caused death.

Others had firsthand experience that they sometimes acknowledged in clandestine ways. Often there was at least one student, usually a young male, who responded readily to the discussion about drugs' effects, but not so much as to give himself away, in deference to school-based norms of respectability. Other students, however, would giggle and laugh in his direction to implicate his reputation. In relative disregard for these norms, a student in one instance took almost an hour of class time explaining the

"cooking" process of cocaine in great detail.[8] He was an older man in his 40s, not indigenous, from outside Cauca. He was tall, burly, very light skinned, and clearly had an intimidating effect on other students, who stayed notably silent during his presentation.

The introduction of drug use – like drug crop cultivation – was often attributed to *afuera*, or *gente de afuera*. This did not always mean people from outside the territory, as *el microtráfico*, or local trafficking within the territory, was undoubtedly taking hold; some people could identify individuals to me who would sell drugs at parties or even at local schools. Schools and *discotecas* (night clubs) were identified as the top sites of drug use. At schools, drugs were allegedly brought either by students who brought them from their parents' plots to share with their peers, or were pushed by people who were not students. In one instance, a participant told a story of a man who had demanded that students pay him 5,000 pesos (about $2 USD) if they did not buy drugs from him. Workshop participants also alluded to practices of cocaine use in the *discotecas* for stamina during long nights of drinking and dancing.

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[8] Cocaine production is usually divided into two phases: conversion of coca leaves to coca paste, and conversion of coca paste into cocaine. Some growers with access to the relatively cheap chemicals used to do this carry out the first phase of coca paste production in their houses. The second phase, referred to as the process of *cocinar*, or cooking, is significantly more complex and involves caustic and expensive chemicals, and therefore is usually carried out in cocaine laboratories.

There were contexts outside of indigenous territory that also exposed Nasa comuneros to drug use. Nearby urban centers such as Santander de Quilichao, Cali and Popayán were common points of exposure, though this was most often the case for individuals who were already marginalized in the community. This also contributed to the notions of drug use as an urban practice, and of cities as morally corrupt places. Sometimes people would pick up habits while they were working harvests in other parts of the region or the country. Camilo told the story of a Nasa elder who had told him that he had long been smoking *basuco* (coca paste mixed with a solvent), which he started doing with other migrant workers while working in Colombia's coffee region. Jails were another point of exposure.

The military also had a reputation for using drugs. As one young girl student adamantly pointed out, "Profe… los de verde por ahí, ¡esos son *los propios!"* (Prof… the green ones out there, they are *really the ones!*) (15-05-15 Cic5Tall3 SitiosRiesgo(1).wav). By "the green ones," she meant the Colombian military troops patrolling the municipality. Drug use was known to be common among the military. This was because, as one military official pointed out to me, many Colombian troops were drafted from poor urban neighborhoods where drug use was common. This, he complained, put them

at a disadvantage when fighting the FARC guerrillas, who were extremely strict about prohibiting drug use in their ranks.

Workshop participants occasionally made references to traditional uses of plants. For instance, in a discussion about coca as the plant source of cocaine, one young male student reported that his 102-year-old grandfather told him that they used to measure time by how long it took for a ball of coca to go bland in your mouth. Omaira, one of the teachers at La Terraza, described a time when she had taken *yagé,* known as ayahuasca in the U.S., a hallucinogenic potion prepared by indigenous shamans with vines from the Amazon forest. "Yagé must be a drug," she mused as she recalled her experience, unaware that it was outlawed in the U.S. and other countries. For the Amazonians, she instructed the students, *yagé* is like coca here (15-05-16 Cic3Tall3 MapasEmociones (1).wav ~10:56).

Despite the tensions and moral anxieties around the issues of drug crop cultivation, student participation was generally positive. There were certainly tense moments, but students and teachers expressed their appreciation for the opportunity to discuss this issue in a relatively non-judgmental space unmediated by cabildo and family welfare authorities. The contributions of Mercedes, Adriana, and teachers like Omaira were crucial

for the facilitation of discussions that analyzed what they saw as a social problem, and that laid the groundwork for community-based solutions. They also allowed for insights into blame discourses. I elaborate on this in the next section.

Stigma, Delinquency, and Discourses of Blame

Because of the shame associated with drug use, the topic triggered a series of blame discourses. One of these blame courses focused on coca and marijuana cultivators, and claimed that drug use among youth was a moral repercussion of drug crop cultivation. This judgmental attitude took increasing hold among those less reluctant to call out the relatively normalized practice of drug crop cultivation. Drawing from the political and social stigmatization of drug crop growers throughout Colombia, this association of drug use with cultivation contributed to an increasing moralism around cultivation itself within the community. This added to the stigma against cultivators, who saw themselves not as delinquents who would ever use drugs, but as people trying to make economic ends meet.

The question of what caused drug use among children nearly always provoked a discourse of blame that fell on parents. Because the delinquent youth reflected a moral unmooring from the family, a child caught using

drugs brought shame on his or her parents. This often turned to a discourse highlighting overall social decadence in which disobedient children talked back to their parents and authorities, and irresponsible parents left their very young children at home while they went to work, or even worse, to parties for days at a time. This expectation of extended parental oversight, in tandem with the prolonging of adolescence through schooling, contrasted with parenthood experiences in previous generations.

Urban notions of youth delinquency fueled the moral stigma around drug use

Camilo*: ¡Imaginémonos!... Que aquí están pasando tres muchachos y están echando humo, como locomotoras, ¿cuál será nuestra impresión?... ¿Qué será que nos pone a pensar eso?*	**Camilo**: Let's imagine!... That here walking by were three guys, and they're smoking [marijuana] like a steam engine? What would be our impression? What would that make us think?
Estudiante 1*: ¡Yo les tengo miedo!*	**Student** 1: I'm afraid of them!
Estudiante 2: *¡Eso, profe! Yo les tengo miedo cuando están haciendo eso no les puede decir nada. Porque ellos son muy bruscos. Y ellos tienen la fuerza, me han dicho.*	**Student** 2: Yes, teacher! I am afraid of them because when they are doing that you can't tell them anything. Because they are very rude. And they have strength, I have been told.
Camilo*: ¿Le da mas fuerza eso?*	**Camilo**: Does that stuff make you stronger?
Estudiante 2*: ¡Claro! Teníamos un sobrino que estaba en eso, y la mamá lo cogía y entre cuatro y él les ganaba y si estafaba y entre cuatro no lo*	**Student** 2: Of course! We had a nephew that was into all that, and his mother grabbed him, and despite four people, he overpowered them.

*podían domina**r** cuando consumía eso.*	Four people could not hold him down when he was taking that.
Camilo*: Y cuando vemos un borracho nos da miedo?*	**Camilo**: And when we see a drunk, are we afraid?
Estudiante 3*: ¡Risa!*	**Student** 3: It's funny! (class laughs)
(15-05-02 Cic3Tall2 SitiosRiesgo, ~36:05)	

The irony of the above exchange, in which students contrast their fear of drug users with their laughter at drunks, would not be lost on some more conscientious students and teachers. Stories and personal experiences abounded that attested to the relative dangers of drinking. These ranged from domestic abuse and bar fights to individuals' losing control of their motorcycles and slipping off the road and down the mountainside.[9] In contrast, stories about fatalities or violent outbursts as a result of drug use were much less prevalent, thus making the fear around them disproportionate. A long history of familiarity with alcohol was undoubtedly a major contributing factor to this disproportion. But the disproportionately fearful attitude toward drug use also reflected the attitudes of broader Colombian society toward drugs and alcohol.

People's fears about drug use were largely informed by notions of youth delinquency. It was nearly impossible to untether the idea of drug use from

[9] In the year prior to my fieldwork, this had happened to two of Camilo's Nasa students, both of whom were friends and died in this way a week apart.

notions of delinquency. This is likely because drug use so often co-presented with school truancy and other forms of "disobedience." Nasa comuneros nearly always attributed drug use to a social circle of "friends," so it was typically seen as a result of "falling in with the wrong crowd," as we would say in the U.S.

It was common to hear exaggerated notions of the effects of drugs, especially marijuana, during exchanges in our workshops like the one presented above. These near-mythic descriptions of individuals with superhuman strength while under the influence — folk devils, to borrow from the moral panic literature (Cohen 1972; Good and Ben-Yehuda 1994) - were prevalent in people's understanding of drugs' effects.

This folk-devil figure of the urban, drugged delinquent reveals the influence of urban-based liberal institutions. The figure of the urban delinquent is prominent in the Latin American moral imagination. It usually involves a male who lives his life *en la calle* (on the street) and engages in any number of criminal behaviors, from theft and murder to drug use. The *delincuente* becomes the manifestation of any moral transgression. Parents who reprimand their children for being out of the house at inappropriate times will compare their behavior with being "on the street," evoking the image of the *delincuente*.

The idea of the delinquent has its roots in the children's rights movements of the early 20th century. As many countries urbanized more and more, populations grew, as did the number of abandoned children. Churches and some state programs built and operated orphanages. At the same time, family households became the building block of the nation-state, which increasingly sought to oversee family caretaking arrangements (Guy 1998, 2000). Non-ideal family arrangements, especially children born out of wedlock, became targets of liberal state intervention. They were demeaned as social and spiritual failures. The *delincuente*, or street child, liable to harm others or himself, was the archetypal symbol of this failure.

In a kind of street-level eugenics, street children became targets of violent social cleansings. To this day in Colombia, paramilitary gangs carry out these social cleansings, or *limpiezas sociales,* in urban neighborhoods. They announce a curfew and then gun down those caught in the street after hours, often explicitly labeled as *delincuentes* in the notifying posters distributed throughout neighborhoods in advance. In rural towns, paramilitaries draw on this notion of the urban delinquent to target anyone they deem to be socially disposable, or opposing their authority, in territories that they seek to control.

Figure 4. A flyer from a paramilitary group. "We are in struggle we will not rest until we see our Society clean from common delinquency DEATH TO: vice-users, thieves, hustlers, robbers, snitches" Source: www.agendalterna.com

Right wing paramilitaries were not the only ones who sought to control delinquency. The FARC guerillas, who maintained encampments in the region, were extremely strict against drug use, especially in their ranks. This reflected a broader value in Communist regimes, which tend to be highly punitive against any form of intoxication save for drunkenness from alcohol. It was not uncommon for them to attempt to impose these strict prohibitions on nearby communities that they sought to control. At one point during my fieldwork, it was said that the FARC had distributed a list with the names of people they were warning to stop smoking marijuana. Observers likened this to the behavior of paramilitaries, who were more known for limpiezas sociales and public listings of target individuals than the FARC.

In spite of its urban roots, the specter of the youth delinquent was pervasive in discussions of drugs in the rural but bustling town of Manzaná. Drug users were “locos hablando solos en la calle” (crazy people talking to themselves in the street), or they were uncontrollable and could have superhuman strength, as described in the workshop above. Parents expressed fears of finding their children “bajo un puente” (under a bridge), referring to places where homeless people set up sleeping camps in major cities. Such children were different from other social transgressors such as drug traffickers. Their sin was being unmoored from familial and social moral oversight. More than any other factor, it was this fear of delinquency that guided most people's attitudes about drug use.

Figure 5. Workshop participants act out drug use in the Community Prevention Workshop. A banner in the background reads "La Yerba Que Mata" ("The Herb that Kills") with an image of a marijuana leaf.

Drug use provided a field of intervention for ICBF's liberal family models into familial relationships

Because the notion of the youth delinquent emerged in an urban context, its prevalence in a rural setting might seem counterintuitive. As in urban settings, the delinquent came to represent those children who stood outside of the ideal family model, and made "deviant behaviors" such as drug use more visible. The family model that formed the basis of these notions was imported primarily through Colombia's national child welfare institution, the ICBF.

The Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF) was established in northern Cauca in the 1970s. ICBF is a national state institution that manages the welfare of minors throughout the country, comparable to state and municipal child welfare services in the U.S. ICBF, like other child welfare agencies throughout the hemisphere, drew from the children's rights movement and family models imposed in cities throughout the world in the early 20th century (D. J. Guy 2000; Hecht 2002; Wadsworth and Marko 2001).

ICBF and indigenous education institutions have ostensibly opposing objectives concerning indigenous autonomy. ICBF is a national institution with objectives and ideologies that are set forth by the Colombian government. The organization has the power to intervene in family affairs and to remove children from homes deemed unfit. Indigenous schools, by contrast, are seen by many Nasa education activists as spaces where indigenous social and political objectives can be autonomously cultivated (PEBI 2004). However, the increasing number of schools in the region has provided ICBF much of the infrastructure that has enabled the socialization and bureaucratic enforcement of liberal ideas about youth and parenthood. Because ICBF collaborated with school directors and municipal authorities, they responded to child delinquency, parental abuse, and neglect and

developmental issues at the other end of a bureaucratic pipeline that often began with teachers in the classroom. In this way, teachers and school officials, if inadvertently, contributed to the propagation of state-instituted family models that were historically at odds with the family models of the Nasa. One of the ways that these models were imposed was through blame discourses that focused on youth and their parents.

ICBF officials and teachers regularly held meetings together to address issues of education and family governance. I observed one such meeting with the Comité de Convivencia Escolar, or Committee of School Life, which I attended on Mercedes's recommendation. Present were teachers and coordinators from various education institutions, the Municipal Health Secretary, and ICBF's local representative in Manzaná, the Comisaria de Familia (Family Commissary).

The Family Commissary was a young woman who worked closely with the council and local municipal government — nearly all members of which are indigenous — to advise and help to implement policies around family interventions. Her eagerness to be culturally sensitive, attending various cultural events and taking classes in Nasa Yuwe, belied ICBF's notoriety as an institution whose interventions erode parental autonomy and authority. In meetings with indigenous school and family welfare authorities,

she strove to be respectful of indigenous traditions, including the use of whipping (*fuete*) as a punishment for crimes and misbehaviors.

The attendees at the meeting addressed the topic of *consumo de sustancias psicoactivas (SPA)* among school students. This was often shortened to *consumo*, with no specific drug of concern mentioned. Institutional interventions in young people's drug use led to new debates in which teachers, ICBF officials, and parents batted responsibility for children's deviant behaviors between each other. The Commissary railed on the problem of parents who would not participate in the process of their children's recovery, especially when it involved showing up to classes in rehabilitation programs. And children, she pointed out with dismay, were catching on to these gaps in authority, as demonstrated by one of her cases, a girl who had been *consumiendo*:

Es una niña que desde muy niña le dio muchísima libertad. La mamá nunca estuvo con ella. No conoce tampoco el papá… Entonces ella manifestaba muchas cosas…no habla con la mamá sino con el director…Que ella sí, consumiera alcohol, y que se volaba, que se iba porque es muy buena estudiante, pero pero "Doctora, ¡déjeme ... que pase la locura de la adolescencia!" — porque ella misma sabe! Como han estado en sus cartas	She is a girl who, from the time she was very young, was given a lot of freedom. Her mother was never with her. She doesn't know her father either… She was saying many things… And she said things to the director that she did not say to her mother, that yes, she drank alcohol, she ran away, but she was a good student, but "*Doctora*, allow me to pass the madness of adolescence!" Because she herself knows, as this

psicológicas expulsado a psicológicos. "¡Yo estoy adolesciendo! ¡Estoy — me esta doliendo el cambio! … Entonces ellos son jóvenes que creen que le van a convencer la raya (?) a uno. Entonces le decía la mamá, usted nos está colocando a nosotros la responsabilidad de lo que era de usted. Que "Ay, quítele el celular a ella porque usted es autoridad y ella de pronto me pega." O sea, son cosas de que han perdido total autoridad, no han estado con sus hijos. (15-06-05 comite de convivencia escolar ~41:25)	has been in her psychological letters, "*I'm hurting! The change is hurting me!*" … So these are children who think they can turn the language on us. And so I told the mother, "You are putting responsibility on us that is yours," while she [the mother] says "Please, take away her cell phone, as you are an authority, because she might hit me." So they are things in which total authority has been lost, after they have not been with their children.

The Commissary went on to emphasize that her office was readily available to facilitate the paperwork process to file for resources for rehabilitation, but that she could not take on the disciplinary responsibilities that ought to be parents' domain. She was aghast at parents who could not exercise control over their children. The astuteness of the girl in question to manipulate the language of youth psychology in her favor was evidence of that. These institutional interventions in children's lives spread authority beyond the home to teachers and child welfare authorities. Ironically, these various authority figures complained about parents' not fulfilling the roles laid out by the institutions themselves.

The meeting also addressed other social problems. On a projector screen, the Commissary showed a document listing numerous crimes,

including truancy, sexual assault, and drug use. For nearly all the crimes, *fuete*, or whipping, was listed as an official punitive response. Each one was assigned a set number of lashes. Meeting participants also mulled over the age of childhood and adulthood. The Commissary acknowledged that the Nasa age of adulthood is fourteen, but a teacher advocated that the age be moved to twenty-five, considering that many parents now had children going to college and dependent on them until that age.

Conclusion

"So what is it that the Comité does, exactly?" I asked Mercedes on our motorcycle ride home after the meeting. "¡Nada!" she said scornfully from under her helmet. "They call us for meetings and just blab! At least we are doing *something!* But I thought it would be good for you to see this meeting." The *something* that she mentioned referred to the workshops and the event on prevention that we were in the middle of planning with La Terraza. In this comment, Mercedes evoked tensions with the increasingly bureaucratic formats of education policy enforced by ICBF and municipal officials.

Despite Mercedes's cynicism, it was evident that the Commissary's presence ensured that the responses to transgression would be

bureaucratically systematized. Enumerating whippings for crimes, and discussing what age constituted adulthood, were both responses to the logic of rationalizing family relations. The establishment of this collaboration between schools and ICBF to intervene into children's lives led to profound changes in the authoritative structure of the family. Drug use, considered a deviant behavior, presents a scenario through which state institutions can carry out biopolitical interventions.

Drug use among Nasa youth provided a field in which new liberal institutions could exercise governance over family practices according to liberal rationales. Through state-mandated education standards and collaboration with ICBF, indigenous schools inadvertently became institutions that implemented these logics. The attention that these institutions brought to family issues resonated deeply with many people who had experienced trauma in their lives. While recognizing the less than ideal nature of these past relationships, critics resented this new regime of vigilance and supervision. Although I have shown here how certain models have shaped Nasa comuneros' anxieties over drug use, there are also ways that they contested these impositions. As I discuss in the following chapter, the past became a crucial resource for them to do so.

CHAPTER 7

SCHOOLS AND NEW MODELS OF THE NASA FAMILY

Schooling, Adolescence and Autonomy

Since Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928), anthropology has highlighted the constructed nature of Western ideas of youth and childhood. Many debates have ensued about whether youth and adolescence are an objectively real aspect of human development. At the other extreme from biologized adolescence, French historian Philippe Ariès argued in his renowned book *Centuries of Childhood* (1962) that childhood is a completely modern category that had no historical cognate in medieval times.

In response to these debates, Durham (2004) proposes that youth be analytically categorized as a social shifter. She borrows the term "shifter" from linguistic anthropology, to refer to something that is dependent on context for meaning – examples include pronouns such as "you" and "we," which require context to know about whom one is speaking The notion of youth as a social shifter acknowledges variability of notions about youth and adulthood across different social and historical contexts. It sits between literature that has focused on the ways that youth is a modern (and implicitly, artificial) category and studies that take youth and other age categories for granted. Along these lines, I do not argue that current notions of youth in Cauca are simply an imposed Western social category where no

cognate previously existed. Rather, I trace how changes in the life course of Nasa people from past generations to the present suggest the bureaucratic and ideological importation of a particularly Western notion of youth. This has powerfully shaped the way that Nasa people understand and evaluate the presence of the drug economy in their territory.

Scholars tend to date the emergence of the bourgeois family model against which working class families would be measured to the mid-19th century. At this time, industrialization in the U.S. and Europe relocated the workplace away from the home, and the home became a place whose main function was the raising and nurturing of children (Lasch 1976). Under these new family ideals, children were not expected to work as soon as they were physically able, and the period of nurturing was extended, making the home a site of consumption rather than production. This extended childhood became the basis for notions of adolescence.

Adolescence, in its urban liberal form, is new in Cauca. In previous generations, most young people spent the ages of 13 to 18 years working, either in the home or traveling to nearby regions, and taking on adult forms of work to support themselves or their families. Today, the majority of them spend these years in classrooms. Mercedes boasted that 80% of school-age

children in the municipality of Manzaná were enrolled in an education program.

Adolescence is a period in an individual's life that is considered a "middle place" between childhood and adulthood, marked by prolonged dependency and supervision by adult figures. Throughout much of the industrialized world, this period is generally held to be from roughly twelve to twenty years of age. In much of the post-industrial world, adolescence has come to be naturalized in the social sciences as a biologically marked stage of human development. Psychologists regularly present evidence for the incomplete development of the brain during these years and for alleged correlations with inefficient decision making.[10]

This naturalization of adolescence in the human development model has also reinforced class boundaries. A lack of adolescence, marked by taking on adult responsibilities such as work and pregnancy, indicates inappropriate human development that may be pathologized in such ways that these adult behaviors are taken to be expressions of delinquency in themselves. This notion of adolescence as not-quite-adulthood has made it a delicate time period for young people who, if not properly guided, may

[10] Many authors of such work are interested in using these correlations to defend juvenile offenders from adult sentencing (e.g., Beckman 2004; Steinberg 2014).

participate in deviant behaviors. These deviant behaviors, in turn, represent failure of caregivers during this critical time period.

Schools have been instrumental in implementing new norms of childhood in the post-industrial world (Coleman 1961; Fasick 1994). Coleman (1961) has highlighted the ways in which secondary schools have segregated young people from the rest of the community into a controlled environment. However, schools' impact on rural communities has rarely been examined. Ethnographic work on rural youth has only grown in the last two decades. Geographers in particular have examined the impact of globalization on rural youth (Katz 2004; Panelli, Punch, and Robson 2007). While it has been associated with professionalization and upward mobility, its outcomes are not so clear for rural agricultural communities. Katz (2004) notes that while, on one hand, education represents social mobility and access to new forms of capital, on the other it contributes to a "deskilling" of rural youth, especially in the eyes of their parents, who do not see them as capable of carrying out crucial agricultural tasks. In Cauca, this deskilling is quickly becoming commonplace, as youth grow up with less and less knowledge about farming practices.

The role that schools have historically played in restructuring family relations is at odds with the ways that they have been upheld as crucial sites

for the preservation of indigenous culture (Castagno and Brayboy 2008; Murillo 2009; Sims 2005). The indigenous education system in Cauca has a unique history because it has its roots in community political education initiatives during the 1970s land recuperations of the agrarian movement (see Chapter 2; Bolaños et al. 2004). These initiatives were nearly all led and taught by indigenous activists involved in land recuperations throughout the region. Attendees were youth and adults of different ages, some of whom had attended formal schools that were then run by the Catholic Church. In addition to informing Nasa comuneros about current political struggles, the community schools empowered Nasa comuneros to push back against Catholic nuns' and priests' derisions of indigenous culture (Bolaños et al. 2004; Morales 2009).

The restructuring of these schools began in 1978 when the Colombian government passed Decree 1142, which subjected indigenous teachers to mandated professional criteria. Today, the indigenous school system is organized under the Community Education Program (*Programa de Educación Comunitaria*, PEC). PEC is a government-sponsored education initiative that allows indigenous and other ethnic communities to organize their own curricula, but requires that they formally submit these curricula to the government in order to qualify for state resources. Nearly every municipality

has a primary school, and the number of secondary schools, or *bachilleratos*, is growing. Today, most schools in Cauca follow an age-graded model paralleling that of schools in the rest of Colombia

The implementation of these government standards meant a definite break from the less bureaucratically structured and heavily political program of the community education initiatives of the 1970s. In this chapter, I follow anthropologists and education researchers who have analyzed how schools have served to reconfigure child subjects as well as bring family relations under bureaucratic supervision (Cole and Durham 2007; Peters, Besley, and Olssen 2009). I contend that the implementation of these standards in indigenous schools, along with the presence of child welfare institutions, have brought indigenous family relations into the field of state oversight, thus undermining schools' ability to be sites for the promotion of political and cultural autonomy.

I also describe the ambivalence of some Nasa educators around this liberal modernization of the family. On one hand, some educators saw formal education as a pathway out of pain and stigma that they had experienced in their youth, but on the other, they detested the alleged coddling of young people that they believed has enabled disobedience and delinquency. Memories of intimate family relations formed the backdrop for critique, or

justification, of intervention into family affairs. Critiques drew on dichotomizing idioms that set ICBF in a continuous historical narrative of colonial impositions of the world *de afuera* (from outside).

Escolarización and the Stigmatization of Agricultural Work

Yo digo a los estudiantes, "¡Mira tanto que estudiaba! Y si no estudiaba, ¿donde estaría?" Y me dicen "En la finca, profe."

I tell the students, "Look how much I have studied! And if I didn't study, where would I be?" And they say, "On the farm, teacher."
- Assistant Education Coordinator (FN 15-7-11 [Evernote])

In a casual meeting, a non-indigenous man from Popayán working as a teaching administrator in a village near La Terraza made the above comment. Here, he reiterated the cultural contrast between schooling and agricultural life. Working on the farm was presumably a mark of a lack of education. This clashed significantly with one of the key elements of Nasa identity: farming.

Rural youth have often been a population of concern for non-governmental agencies and development professionals. These concerns have especially focused on sustainability of agricultural life for young people (White 2011, 2012). At the same time, the United Nations and other liberal institutions have marked social inequalities between urban and rural communities in Latin America and the Caribbean as a primary concern. They

allege that these social inequalities are caused by a gap in formal education, and have consistently recommended the implementation of education programs for rural youth to make up for it (National Research Council (U.S.) et al. 2005; Unesco 1981).

Education has usually meant diverting the activities of youth from agricultural work to classroom learning. This conflicts with the needs of communities dependent on heavy-labor-dependent crops. Admassie (2003) acknowledges the conflict between schooling and the need for child labor in agricultural communities. However, the goal of many education programs is to minimize child labor in these communities. Because liberal notions of childhood hold that labor detracts from proper, consumer-based human development, this discouraging of agricultural child labor reinforces the class boundary in terms of which entire communities may be seen as delinquent.

Inés, a long time teacher in northern Cauca along with her husband, contested these class divisions that *escolarización*, or formal education, reaffirmed:

***Inés**: En la comunidad nos toca la escolarización sin pensar en qué clase de educación queríamos, sino igualito a la gente de la ciudad. O sea, no debería ser así porque nosotros vivimos otro contexto, otra realidad.*	**Inés:** In the community we have schooling without thinking about what type of education we want, rather just the same as the people of the city. I mean, it should not be that way because we live in another

Nos cambió la mentalidad a los padres, para decir "mijo, usted va a estudiar para ser alguien en la vida." Para mí eso fue que nos fue cambiando la mente, y el joven empezó a copiar. Entonces todo que es de la ciudad es bueno. Muchas cosas de la ciudad sirve, pero el joven cree que todo de la ciudad sirve. La moda, vestirse como ellos, bailar la misma música, hasta fumar, todo esas cosas. Yo pienso eso.	context, another reality. They changed the mentality of parents, to say, "Son, you are going to study to be someone in life." For me that was changed our minds, and the youth began to copy. So everything that is from the city is good. Many things from the city are helpful, but the youth thinks everything from the city is useful. The style, to dress like them, dance the same music, even smoking, all those things. That is what I think.
AZ: *Usted se diría en contra de la escolarización?*	**AZ**: Would you consider yourself opposed to schooling?
Inés*: Así como nos la metieron en las comunidades, si estaría en contra. Hay muchas cosas que nos sirvieron, como aprender a leer, más que todo, ¿no? Pero ¿meterte en la cabeza que vos tenes que estudiar pa que no le pongas la espalda al sol? O sea, eso fue como una estrategia de decirte vos tenes que negarte a lo que sos. Y eso por ejemplo a mi me duele. Eso, lo que digo, es como nosotros – nosotros queremos la escuela, pero no esa forma que está.* (15-07-10 [Inés] (1).m4a)	**Inés**: In the way that they put it to us in the communities, yes, I would be against it. There are many things that helped us, like learning to read, more than anything, right? But to put in your head that you have to study so that you don't have to put your back to the sun – see, that was like a strategy that you must deny who you are. And that for instance hurts me. That is, as I say, it is like how we feel – we want the school, but not in the form that it is.

Inés's reflection represents a distrustful ambivalence toward outside institutions. What troubled her was less the objective of schooling than how these institutions positioned themselves in relation to what she saw as a key facet of indigenous identity: agricultural work. On one hand, learning to read

and write was an obvious advantage. On the other, "scholarization" instilled notions that to "put your back to the sun," as a farmer would, was a point of shame. To her, this was to deny an essential identity, and worse, it created new social divisions between comuneros who attended school and those who did not.

CRIC traces the origins of its prominent bilingual schooling program, now organized under the Community Education Project (*Proyecto Educativo Comunitario*, PEC), to the days of land recuperations in the 1970s (Bolaños et al. 2004; Llano 2010). During this period, education initiatives were explicitly political and were geared toward the formation of radical leaders in the indigenous movement. They also issued a direct challenge to the conventional schooling at the time, which was usually run by harsh Catholic nuns and priests who verbally and sometimes physically abused their indigenous students. These community initiatives were not age-graded and were not subject to any formal criteria.

At different junctures throughout the 1970s, and in different parts of the region, schools transitioned from a place for political education of adults to a community-based program for children. Parents' expectations played an increasingly greater role in pedagogical objectives (Bolaños et al. 2004:46). CRIC included state support for bilingual education in its package of demands

to the state. This culminated in Decree 1142 of 1978, ordered by Colombia's Ministry of Education, which recognized the right to bilingual education and authorized state resources for the training of bilingual education teachers. However, the decree also mandated professional criteria for bilingual teachers. This began the process of formal state intervention in Cauca's indigenous education program, and a series of battles that continue to this day between the state and indigenous authorities over the indigenous demand for resources for autonomous education and the state's criteria for qualifying for those resources (Llano 2010).

Founders and supporters of the bilingual education program insist that this state recognition did not mean submission to the state, and emphasize that this recognition was the result of CRIC's pressure. In a book written by CRIC's founders, the authors state:

El avance de la propuesta educativa del CRIC influyó tanto en la construcción de la educación indígena en otras partes del país, como en el Estado, a quien se exigía que fuese más flexible en sus políticas educativas y apoyara la educación que los pueblos indígenas estaban construyendo. La misma fuerza de la organización indígena obligó al Estado a legislar reconociendo el derecho de los grupos étnicos a definir su propia educación.	The progress of CRIC's education proposal influenced the construction of indigenous education in other parts of the country and in the central State, which was required to be more flexible in its education policies and to support the education that indigenous communities were building. The very strength of the indigenous organization forced the state to recognize the right of ethnic

Tal es el caso del Decreto 1142 de 1978 – enumerado con otros decretos en los anexos. Pero el proyecto de educación propia no es producto de la legislación estatal: la legislación surge a partir de los planteamientos y experiencias de las comunidades organizadas. (Bolaños, et al. 2004:62)	groups to define their own education. Such is the case of Decree 1142 of 1978 – listed with other decrees in the appendices. But the project of indigenous education is not the product of state legislation: the legislation emerges from the foundations and experiences of the organized communities.

Yet regardless of the origins of this legislation, it still began a path of legitimated consolidation and state intervention in the indigenous education program. This path was likely convenient for state and local elites in a historical moment in which many indigenous education initiatives were channeled toward the formation of radical indigenous political leaders who sought a dramatic redistribution of land and resources in the region.

The successes of indigenous education in effectively creating a coherent sense of indigenous identity throughout the region, in funneling resources toward training committed teachers and education coordinators, and in the writing of books and other supporting materials, are undeniable. However, in spite of community autonomy and cultural preservation being among the founding principles of the bilingual education program, the transition to a liberal model of education that cascaded from the 1978 Decree eroded one of the primary aspects of Nasa cultural life: agriculture. This happened not only because of stigmatization of agricultural work, as Inés

described, but also because of the sheer fact that young people were taken away from productive activities that they would have been doing if not in school. In this way, the liberal education model delays adulthood for rural indigenous individuals and thus undermines the social organization of an agriculturally based community, contributing to its members' integration into the global capitalist economy as consumers of industrially produced agricultural goods.

In this context, the past becomes a contested field in which Nasa comuneros justify, or challenge, the role of schools and their liberal, modernizing objectives in their community. In the rest of this chapter, I describe past experiences of "adolescence" and compare them to current nostalgic constructions of the past. These constructions form the basis on which people evaluate the new family models that I described in the previous chapter.

The past: childhood was harsh!

In Cauca, as in other rural areas throughout the world, childhood and adolescence were dramatically different — and shorter — in earlier generations than today. Contributing to the household began as soon as a child was old enough to work the family plot or do household chores. Once

old enough to leave the home, it was not unusual for young people to be off working in other plots for wages.

Because childhood and adolescence were so short, and because few children attended school, the expectations of parents' roles in a child's life were significantly shorter-term and less premised on liberal models of parental discipline. Oversight of family relations was scarce beyond that associated with the Church and cultural institutions. Although ICBF had an office in northern Cauca since the 1970s, they had relatively little reach except in very dramatic cases. Schooling would provide them with the bureaucratic mechanism necessary to oversee much greater numbers of families in the region.

Education was rarely accessed in Cauca until the 1990s. Although local schools administered by the Church existed before this time, students attended them only intermittently. Conventional education was a grueling experience for most students. Many teachers employed harsh tactics that often involved physical punishment; this was especially true of Catholic nuns, who castigated indigenous students for speaking indigenous languages and engaging in cultural expression (Yule 2004). It was no surprise, then, that most elders with whom I spoke had not attended school past 3rd grade, if at all. Many of them cited this harsh treatment as a major reason they did not

continue their studies. Those from comparatively better-off families were pushed through primary education and *bachillerato* (high school), or were sent to Santander or other municipalities known for better schools.

Violence pervaded both private and public life. Domestic abuse was not uncommon, especially by men toward their wives. Children were regularly punished physically and verbally for misbehaving, being lazy, or working incorrectly. These experiences – nearly ubiquitous among the adults and elders with whom I spoke – left deep wounds. The early years of the conflict, in the 1970s and 1980s, exacerbated these tensions in the home as armed groups targeted indigenous leaders as well as community members. Armed groups seeking control of an area sometimes burned down indigenous houses, then often made of stalks. One woman in her 40s, who recalled her father with disdain for his poor treatment of her in her childhood, noted how he had to live much of his life hiding in the mountains from the guerrillas.

I began asking parents, now in their late 30s and 40s, about their childhood relationships with their parents. Strained family relationships played a major role in the decisions that these now-parents made in their adolescent years. Doña Marbella's story was illustrative of this. After a very difficult early life, she is now in her 40s in a relatively stable household,

earning her high school degree in the youth and adult program. She was one of nine children. She only attended school through second grade. Beyond subsistence farming, her family lived mostly on onion and coffee cash crops. Doña Marbella's younger years were marked by abuse. Although she never mentioned whether she was abused herself, she talked about how her father regularly beat her mother.

"He would come home, and what *didn't* he do to her! At night we had to run into the mountains with our blankets. We could not defend our mother because we were children. When they got tired of fighting and fell asleep we sneaked back in." Doña Marbella noted that the rest of her family was passive and did little to help the situation. She continued, relating her decision to leave her family to being unable to tolerate her household:

Yo sufrí hasta los 15 años viéndolo de golpear a mi mamá. La familia no nos decían nada. Lo veían golpear, era como ver así – como era un animal. Hasta los animales, le duele a uno ver que lo golpea. Pero mi mamá sufrió mucho. Yo de ver eso, salí y me fui, me fui a trabajar. Cuando yo cumplí los 18 fui a jornalear, empecé a jornalear y pues más que todo había cogida de coca. Me puse a jornalear a coger la coca, me pagan semanal 30.000 pesos,	I suffered 15 years watching my father beat my mother… The family didn't say anything to us. They watched him beat her, it was just like watching – like she was an animal. It hurts me even to see animals beaten. But my mother suffered so much. From seeing this, I got up and ran away, I went to work. When I turned 18 I went out to [work the harvests], and most of the work was in picking coca leaves, so I picked coca leaves.

que 30.000 pesos era plata. Un año no volví a la casa, jornar y jornar. (15-07-22 Dona marbella.wav ~3:56)	They paid me 30.000 pesos a week [currently about $10 USD], which was money at that time. I didn't return home for a year, I just worked and worked.

When she was 20, she began seeing a man who beat her regularly. "I had no advice from my mother, much less from my father," she said, when it came to being with men. She got pregnant by him, shortly after which he was killed – she did not say by whom, nor did she say it with any tone of regret.

As for many Nasa comuneros, the most impactful violent events in Marbella's life took place outside as much as inside the home. Marbella went on to talk about how her daughter joined the FARC guerrillas when she turned seventeen years old. Two years later, she was killed in an attack by the Colombian military. The FARC refused to return her daughter's remains, a bitter point for Marbella. She said between tears: "Me dijeron que le iban a enterrar por la montaña y ahí. Ya ahorita hago cuentas y son ocho años. Perdí mi hija mayor. No existe mi hija." (They told me they would bury her in the mountain. Now that I count it has been eight years. I lost my oldest daughter. My daughter doesn't exist.)

Later that afternoon, Marbella's husband arrived and volunteered to tell about his own harsh childhood. His father died when he was young, but his mother was very stern with him. She sent him to stay with extended family,

where he suffered harsh physical punishments and threats when he did not work hard enough on their farm. He tried to run away several times, and was punished as many times before succeeding. Like Marbella, he supported himself by picking coca leaves.

Experiences such as these were strikingly prevalent among Nasa comuneros with whom I spoke. These harsh realities of private life became the basis for the intervention by state-backed child welfare institutions that would bring family relationships under new regimes of supervision. As I discuss in the next section, these interventions compelled constructions of past family relations that served to justify or contest them.

Nostalgia

Julián vs. the imposition of children's rights

An interview with Julián, a devoted husband and father of two, and now an education coordinator in another municipality of northern Cauca, revealed contesting narratives of the past. Entertaining the notion of drug use as a novelty, I asked him why it is that, according to his understanding, people of his generation did not use drugs as much as the youth of today allegedly do:

Julián*: ¡Eso es una gran pregunta! ¿Por qué nosotros no? O como cuando era la generación de nosotros. Bueno, primero si uno experimentaba, ese sabía que el papá lo iba a castigar. Como le estaba diciendo que a nosotros las familias de un día nos faltaban la autoridad. Antes había mucha autoridad. O autoritarismo, pero ¡había!* **Andrea** (esposa, de la cocina*): ¡Dictadura!* **15-07-11 entrevista [Julian].wav (47:34) (~25:38)**	**Julián**: That's a good question! Why didn't we [experiment with drugs]? Or how was it in our generation. Well first if someone experimented with that, they knew that their father was going to punish them. As I was saying, one day we, the families, lost authority. Before there was a lot of authority. Or authoritarianism, but it was there! **Andrea** (wife, from the kitchen): *Dictatorship*!

This exchange represented the ambivalence with which people looked back on parent-child relations. Because drug use is considered "new," Julián, like many others in Cauca, drew on idyllic notions of family relations of the past to interpret drug use today. For Julián, young people did not use drugs in the past because parents regularly exercised control over their children's behaviors. Today, drug use is the result of a loss of paternal authority. This loss of authority is the result of outside forces, especially social media. When I asked him about what he thought of ICBF and schools, he responded with an impassioned lamentation in which he blamed both of these institutions for the loss of parental authority:

Julián: *Eso fueron los que nos dañaron todo nuestro proceso de formación.*	**Julián**: They were the ones who damaged our whole process of development.
AZ: *¿Cuales?*	**AZ**: Which ones?
Julián: *La escuela y Bienestar.*	**Julián**: Schools and Bienestar.
AZ*: ¡Ay no!*	**AZ:** Oh no!
Julián*: En serio, hoy la escuela y quizá la hicieron fue para eso, para empezar a dominar, como para sacarnos de todo esa riqueza que nosotros teníamos desde atrás, toda esa historia. Que yo digo que si no hubiera llegado la escuela quizás viviríamos como más tranquilos, trabajando, no habría tanta cosa. Y bienestar pues con toda la imposición que hacen, y empezar como a crearse esos derechos, que la del derecho del niño, que al niño no hay que pegarle, que el niño no se puede maltratar, que ah, eso trajo mucha dificultad. Vaya hoy en día a pegarle a un niño un fuete, un fuetazo. Aunque yo a mis hijos les digo yo los castigo y ellos saben que los castigo por algo. Cometieron alguna falta, pero hay niños que si el papá los castiga se van para Bienestar.*	**Julián:** Seriously, today the school - and maybe they made it for that reason - to begin to dominate, to take from us all of the riches we have had since before, all that history. I say that if the schools had never come, *maybe we would live more peacefully, working, and there wouldn't be so many things*. And Bienestar, with all the impositions they do, beginning to create these rights, the right of the child, you can't strike a child, you can't mistreat a child, this has all brought much difficulty. Whip a kid today — see, if I hit my kids, I tell them why, they know I did it for some reason, they did something wrong. But there are kids who if the father punishes them, they go to Bienestar.
AZ: ¿*Sí?*	**AZ**: Really?
Julián: *Claro y el papá se puede ir hasta pa la cárcel y los mayores dijeron eso no puede ser porque se*	**Julián**: Of course, and the father can even go to jail. And the elders say, this cannot be, authority has been lost.

perdió la autoridad, ahí eso se perdió la autoridad, porque vinieron nos impusieron todas esas normas, que los mayores ya tenían sus propias normas, eso se acabaron. Se están acabando. Y por eso hoy en día tanta dificultad con esos jóvenes. **(15-07-11 entrevista [Julian].wav ~43:56)**	Because they came and imposed all these norms, when the elders already had their own norms, and they are gone now. They are going away. For that reason there is so much difficulty with these youth.

Julián flipped the discourse of blame for drug use and youth disobedience on parents to these outside institutions – the media, schools, and ICBF. Needless to say, his views were somewhat ironic, given his role as a highly committed education coordinator. Julián's complaints echoed those of other elders – usually men – in the community. In our conversation, he was uncritical of the authoritarian family structures that he described, or what his wife more openly scoffed as "dictatorship." Whether the nature of that structure could be classified as authority or authoritarianism was less of a concern than parental autonomy, usurped by external disciplinary measures of ICBF ("The father can even go to jail"). This usurpation empowered young people to disrespect their parents and engage in drug use and other delinquent behaviors. The past represented a time of familial autonomy from these overbearing institutions.

Jason vs. lack of affect

I met Jason while teaching in Cerro Bajo, another municipality of northern Cauca. He was 21 years old, a teacher in the adult education program, with a bright smile, and wore a necklace with a small recorder pendant. Jason was a walking success story of the Álvaro Ulcué Youth Movement (Movimiento Juvenil Álvaro Ulcué, MJAU), a politically infused cultural resistance movement for young people in northern Cauca. When he was in high school, friends got him to start smoking marijuana, along with other activities that got him into trouble. The harsh treatment of adults and others in the community discouraged him from quitting pot and continuing his studies. Eventually a music teacher came into his life who began to teach him music, a passion he had at a younger age, and encouraged him to write. He smoked less and less. Finally, someone took him to an MJAU meeting where he learned about indigenous forms of political and cultural resistance. He decided that the marijuana lifestyle and its associated delinquencies were not for him. He spoke proudly of the MJAU, their mission and their history. Jason had graduated from MJAU's *capacitación*, or political education, program and was now an *animador* (animator), or facilitator, of the youth movement.

For Jason, *afecto* — a word generally meaning affection in intimate, family and friendly relationships — was the difference between using drugs and not. The love and positive affect from his music teacher and from MJAU were positive forces that moved him away from his transgressive lifestyle. He contrasted this with the treatment from the community. Before his music teacher came into his life:

Nunca me han hablado de buena manera. A los fuetazos y toda la cuestión. Me hablaban con crítica. Este señor con palabras amables, con un cariño hacía uno. Me brinda algo chevere, me da confianza. Me deja ejercicios. Me felicita, me abraza, bien bacano. Con el cariño, ya me sentía muy diferente. Esto no es lo mío. Ya me empecé a olvidar de esa cuestión. (16-08-06 [Jason] mjau.m4a ~17:56)	People never talked to me in a good way. With whips and the whole thing. They criticized me. This man spoke to me with kind words, with affection for me. He gave me something cool, he spoke to me with trust. He left me [music] exercises to do. He congratulated me, hugged me, told me I was doing well. With affection, I felt different. I decided that this [smoking] wasn't for me, and I started to forget about it.

He also drew a relationship between a lack of *afecto* in the home and a sense of vulnerability with other young people:

Por ejemplo en mi casa, nunca me decían un te quiero, nunca me decían "eres importante aquí en esta casa." Nunca me decían eso. Llegaba a la escuela, no me dijeron que hay las tareas. Tiraba los cuadernos. Viví una libertad, vivía suelto. Uno vivir suelto es donde llegan los amigos. Por falta	In my house, no one ever said an "I love you," no one ever said "you are important to us here." I came home from school and no one told me to do my homework. I just threw my notebooks. I lived freely, unhinged. Living that way is how the "friends" come in, because of the lack of love. If

de amor. Si te hacen sentir importante, vas a sentir importante. Si tú estás en la casa, pero ves un parcero que es elegante, quieres esto, entonces venga a darle, y en el medio de la traba, bacano, pana, te están dando algo de afecto. Tuve que estar donde están dando afecto. Creo que muchas cosas se dan es porque en al casa no hay afecto hacía los jóvenes. (16-08-06 [Jason] mjau.m4a ~23:46)	they make you feel important, you're going to feel important. If you're that way at home, you see an elegant friend you want this, and they say "come try this," and in the middle of the high they tell you "man, you're awesome, brother," and all that, they're giving you some kind of affection. I think these things happen because in the home there's no affection for kids.

Affect made a world of difference in Jason's young life. An accessible sense of purpose, given to him by his music teacher and MJAU, was crucial to reintegrating into a socially and personally healthier lifestyle, and away from his delinquent lifestyle. MJAU, with the food, activities, and most important, affect, became like a second home. Jason took his understanding of his experience a step further. For him, the poor treatment he received from his family and his community was the result of a temporally marked deterioration of social values:

En nuestra comunidad se está perdiendo lo que los mayores hablaban de la familia. Ya no hay dialogo, ya no hablamos. Ya nos convertimos en personas solas. El papá solo su trabajo, la mamá solo en su trabajo. Los hermanos en su estudio, lo que están haciendo. Y no pensamos de que todos unidos somos uno solo. Se olvidó el dialogo. (16-08-06 [Jason] mjau.m4a ~25.26)	In our community what is being *lost* is what the elders said of the family. *Now* there is no dialogue, *now* we don't talk to each other. The father only thinks of his work, the mother of her work. Brothers and sisters only think of their own studies and what they are doing. We don't think of ourselves as together as one. Dialogue has been *forgotten.*

Jason suggested that before, there was a time when dialogue marked family relations. The cause of this transition into "a time in which everyone lives freely" — "freely" here meaning unmoored from social relationships — was the drug economy, which brought in money. Money led to partying, which led to drunkenness and sex, which led to pregnancies and thus "families made in a rush." This indicated that "we are forgetting about feeling."

This temporal marker distinction between a past of harmonious family relations and a socially decadent present was a common narrative among Nasa activists. Young people repeated this in youth meetings. Anthropologists have found that nostalgia for an idyllic past with stronger social values is common in other indigenous communities (Hill 1998; Quintero 2002). Although certainly not unheard of in other contexts, in Cauca it was remarkable how often young people repeated this, in spite of widespread accounts of the harsh realities of childhood in past generations.

Jason's characterization of past family relationships gives the impression of an encouraging, non-violent home environment. However, stories of abuse-ridden childhoods among older adults counter idealistic notions about harmonious discipline and affective communication between

family members in earlier generations. Although Jason pointed out how alcohol led young people of his generation to "make families in a rush," Marbella indicated that she found herself pregnant and with an abusive partner because her parents rarely gave her advice on how to avoid them. Marbella's and many other stories show that the harsh treatment by the community and the lack of positive affect from his family that Jason experienced had precedents in previous generations. They also demonstrate that these harsh treatments were contested well before the interventions of ICBF and schools.

Disillusionment over the past: Mercedes and *mejores presas*

At La Terraza, Mercedes often organized events that represented the values that she wanted to instill in the community. As the education coordinator of La Terraza, she depended on the collaboration of teachers who shared her vision. In May of 2016, she and others organized a Mothers' Day event, held at one of the school buildings. The day's events featured music and drama presentations by students, teachers, parents, and friends of the school, along with a lunch of *arroz con pollo* (rice and pulled chicken) and cake. Her organizing efforts for events such as these, along with her

encouraging speeches to her teacher-collaborators working under her as well as their students, won her high respect.

After the Mothers' Day celebration, I sat eating dinner with Mercedes in her home. Between her work, her attentiveness to her husband, and her attentiveness to her son, whom she called regularly while he was away studying in Cali, Mercedes spent her days flitting from meeting to meeting, from 5:30 a.m. until after working hours, stopping briefly to cook lunch and dinner for her husband. On this night, I caught her in an especially self-reflective moment.

Hoy fue bonito porque más que todo cuando convocamos reunión a los padres es para regañarlos. Les dan muy duros a los niños. Muchos piensan que ser mamá o papá es darles una comidita y una ropita es lo único, pero les decimos que los niños son regalos de Dios, son como pajaritos que uno tiene en la casa, hay que cuidarlos. Los niños llegan con mucho hambre, dan como un chocolatico para el desayuno y ya, cuando ya es hora del refrigerio ya tienen hambre. Muchas mamás dan la mejor presa para el marido y sirve poquito a los niños. En cambio mi mamá siempre nos dio la comida primero a nosotras y después a mi papá – ¡pobrecito! No sé, sera que quiero que el resto del mundo sea así. (15-5-29 FN: niños y mejores presas [Evernote]	Today was a good day because whenever we call for a meeting of parents, it's to yell at them for something. They are so hard on their children. They think that being a mother or father is giving them a little food, some clothes, and that's it, but we tell them that children are gifts from God, that they are like little birds that you have in your house, you have to take care of them. Children come to school so hungry, after their parents just give them some hot chocolate and that's it, and by snack time, they are so hungry. Many mothers give the best piece of meat to their husband, and serve very little to their children. My mother, on the other hand, gave food to [my sisters and me] first, and afterward to my father - poor man! I don't know, it must be that I want the

	rest of the world to be like that.

Mercedes' mother, a non-indigenous woman who had long worked for ICBF, clearly instilled these liberal values in Mercedes and her sisters. Mercedes strongly believed in the empowerment of women and children. She and her sister Adriana, who openly identified as a feminist, regularly called attention to violence against women in the community and encouraged women to file charges against their abusers. They saw themselves as actively pushing back against a deeply ingrained patriarchy that included not only violence, but was also expressed in more mundane practices such as the ways that they fed their husbands and their children.

Unlike Julián and Jason, Mercedes did not idealize the past. These ongoing practices of violence from past generations into the present demanded intervention. The school provided the venue for it. Mercedes often took it upon herself, sometimes with little cabildo support, to organize events such as the Mothers' Day party that highlighted the positive roles of women and children in Nasa home and community life. The realities of violence in the lives of her students and teachers, for whom she cared deeply, eclipsed the reflections on schools as a liberal imposition voiced by Julián. Even if she might have agreed, the urgency of everyday life guided much of her actions and curriculum.

Education and the Drug Trade

Amid these discussions about authentic Nasa memories and older lifeways, and whether or not schools could sustain them, the drug trade mocked the enlightened promises of education. Teachers often told stories of students jeering at their faculty salaries in comparison to their own earnings from harvesting coca or marijuana. The gains in social capital could not make up for the lack of economic security and comfort, and students knew that it was not unusual for teachers to rent plots of their own to illicit crop growers, or to participate in harvests to make ends meet. For my own part, when considering the glut of unemployed youth in Colombia who had college educations, it was difficult to imagine what pathways to social mobility formal education could realistically offer to the majority of rural indigenous people.

Ironically, the drug trade provided the economic structure that allowed for the continuation of Nasa identity amid social and political turmoil. In the days before the prevalence of schools and ICBF, itinerant work on coca farms made up part of an escape route for troubled young people, such as Marbella and her husband, who ran away from their homes. This continues to this day. One student in La Terraza told me that she was hiding in Manzaná from her

mother and her mother's abusive husband several towns away. She supported herself largely through harvesting marijuana leaves, and she dreamed of going to medical school in Argentina.

Conclusion

There are many works on how indigenous schools are important sites for the cultivation of political autonomy and cultural values, and on the multiple ways that state interventions challenge these objectives. Here I have outlined how the urban liberal models of schooling, adolescence, and family relations also threaten to undermine the autonomy of the indigenous school system. In Cauca, this was enabled through collaboration between the local office of ICBF and school officials.

Memories of family relations in the past helped to legitimize, or challenge, these interventions. Similar to what Hill (1998) found in central Mexico, these interpretations of the past were divided along gender lines. Men such as Julián more readily expressed nostalgia for paternal authority. Women were much more inclined to acknowledge violence and non-idyllic family relations in the domestic sphere. This made them much more open to the advancement of different family models such as those promoted by ICBF, even if they were wary of ICBF's interventions. Women such as Mercedes and

Adriana saw themselves as agents of such models that empowered women and promoted "harmony" between men and women. Ultimately, however, both men's and women's memories of strained or violent family relations provided legitimizing narratives for the implementation of new family models.

CONCLUSION:
DRUGS, IDENTITY, AND AUTONOMY IN THE POST-CONFLICT ERA

In my approach to the issue of drug crop cultivation in indigenous communities, I have attempted to bring together two sets of literature. The first is the scholarly analyses of indigenous movements. The second is the literature on drug crop cultivation and its impact on indigenous communities. Much of this latter is produced in policy circles and builds on multiculturalist ideas about indigenous identity that are generally undisputed in the indigenous movement literature. I argue that in order to assess whether indigenous identity can be the basis of a "solution" to the "problem" of drug crop cultivation, a historical understanding of the peasant movements in Latin America is an important starting point.

In the 1960s, Colombia's agrarian reform movement oversaw one of the largest mass actions in the country's history. Thousands of people occupied land owned by wealthy landowners in an effort to shift the country away from its feudalistic social organization and win land rights for landless farmers. Cauca's indigenous communities, especially the Nasa, were avid participants in these actions. Their history as colonized adversaries to social elites and state forces long pre-dates the agrarian reform movement. Throughout the 20th century, from the days of Quintin Lame until the 1980s,

Nasa activists and political leaders aligned themselves with the movements of the popular left, sometimes as direct participants and sometimes under separate political entities.

Earlier anthropological analyses of indigenous movements have maintained that identity has been an effective platform for the demands of indigenous rights. This is set against the class-based ideologies of the popular left. While indigenous communities have negotiated and asserted their own notions of history and identity, states under multiculturalism have also created their own notions of identity. This state multiculturalist notion of identity, which usually draws on notions of timelessness and isolation from global processes, has become the criteria that indigenous communities are expected to fulfill in order to qualify for protection and resources from the state. As Muehlmann (2008) has shown, one of the consequences of this is the creation of new inequalities within and between indigenous communities. Such a critique of this notion of multiculturalist identity has yet to be applied to indigenous people and drug policy.

There is very little anthropological work on drug crop cultivation in indigenous communities. An exception is Farthing's work in Bolivia, in which she describes the effectiveness of the state's "coca control" policy, which creates a legal coca market, as an alternative to hawkish drug control policies

such as forced coca eradication favored by the United States. Much of the policy literature that has addressed the issue of drug crop cultivation in indigenous communities has interpreted it as a disruptive to indigenous cultural coherence (e.g. Perafán 1999). Cultural conservation has become a priority for liberal responses that many anthropologists, scholars, and policy workers have supported to this day.

As these chapters show, the Nasa indigenous community's experience with the drug trade reveals important limitations on the idea of cultural conservation as a response to the illicit drug economy. For example, many alternative development programs promote small- and medium-scale farming as a strategy for conserving indigenous lifeways and symbolic forms. Ironically, drug crop cultivation has done better than most alternative development programs in stabilizing small-scale farming among land-holding indigenous communities, temporarily staving off emigration to cities. However, this stabilization has been dependent on relatively cheaper costs of rural living and even artificial deflation, as in the case of *motos torcidas*. In even a best-case scenario in which violence and dispossession were not factors, drug crop profits would not always be able to meet the demands of a rising quality and cost of living due to the influx of global commodities. This would create more incentives for displacement via rural-to-urban migration

and itinerant agricultural labor to meet these rising costs. The sustainability of small- and medium-scale farming would decrease, while investment costs for larger-scale farming would be beyond the reach of indigenous communities, thus paving the way for large-scale industrial agriculture as the most effective mode of production for extracting profit from land.

Because the social and racial hierarchies of both licit and illicit agricultural markets remain intact, cultural conservation through the licit market, under what has been called "ethnic entrepreneurship," is also very limited. The demands for special rights in new drug markets are crucial for at least providing a legal basis for some redistribution to indigenous communities. However, there is very little guarantee that this redistribution will move beyond a small group of indigenous entrepreneurs to the vast majority of indigenous farmers.

Although various conditions have changed or improved, indigenous farmers face many of the same agrarian problems of the first half of the 20th century. The peasant movements continue to the present day in various forms, including Colombia's 2013 *paro agrario* (agrarian strike) and Brazil's *Movimento Sem Terra* (Landless Movement). By identifying the redistributive objectives of the peasant and popular movements that have sought to resolve

these agrarian problems, it is easier to trace when and how the state strategically uses identity to undermine these objectives.

This is not to advocate for dispensing with identity as an effective basis for organization. As the 20th-century anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia show, identity is a powerful weapon in the collective struggle against colonial and class oppression. What made it so potent in these contexts was not adherence to tribalisms of the past, but the unification of previously splintered communities in the current historical moment against a common colonial oppressor. Conversely, states and elites can use identity for their own ends: to fragment groups and prevent them from unifying and creating a common platform of demands. This is one of the key features of neoliberal multiculturalism.

As I have shown in this dissertation, drug policy and the drug trade have both contributed to the state's implementation of neoliberal multiculturalism, one of the effects of which is the subversion of political empowerment of exploited indigenous people. Drug policy serves as a convenient mechanism for reining in indigenous political authority. The indigenous political structure, as well as indigenous health, education, and other social services are dependent on resources from the Colombian state, and indigenous leaders are subject to the state's conditions for those

resources. This need to adhere to the state's drug policy to qualify for resources and political legitimacy in the eyes of the state undermines Nasa leaders' authority within their own community. Indigenous leaders rightfully point out the social problems brought on by drug crop cultivation. However, Nasa leaders' focus on comuneros' choice to grow drug crops as the cause of these problems puts them at odds with their constituencies, who have economic needs that they feel are best met through drug crop cultivation. In these ways, drug policy undermines the political leadership of a community that is historically known for challenging the state and local elites. This also shows that agents of illicit economies, such as drug traffickers, can serve the interests of states and capitalist entrepreneurs.

States and elites can also create and shape social institutions to implement policies that dramatically change a community's social life. Indigenous schools increasingly have to adhere to the Colombian government's policies and standards in order to qualify for resources. These policies and standards, which include age-graded schooling and the removal of young people from agricultural labor, institutionalize adolescence within the indigenous Cauca family model. Through collaborations with ICBF officials, indigenous schools also provide the infrastructure for the bureaucratic supervision of this restructuring of family relations. In addition

to battles over curriculum, certification, and hiring, this restructuring provides one more challenge to indigenous schools' objective of promoting cultural autonomy and political resistance. Furthermore, as schools adhere to urban models of class that eschew agricultural labor, they risk aligning with the drug trade's effect of creating a consumer economy that will economically marginalize Nasa individuals and families who continue to farm.

These same institutions also deploy identity narratives that justify these policies. These narratives often draw on aspects of the past that make them relevant to comuneros. As schools and social welfare institutions implement supervision of parent-child relationships, Nasa comuneros' nostalgic or painful memories of family relations in past generations can either legitimize or contest these interventions.

The increasing regulation of indigenous communities by the state, and the shift to a cash economy dependent on global commodities, make indigenous political and economic autonomy increasingly elusive. Drug legalization offers little hope either, as it does not guarantee profitable alternatives to drug crop cultivation, and may even take away the economic safety net that illicit crops have provided for indigenous communities in the past few decades. Identity narratives and alternative development programs

based on disappearing economic models such as small-scale farming offer little hope for responding to the inequities of the global economy. However, identity narratives that account for these realities, and that are constructed in collaboration with other marginalized groups, can be a potent tool for indigenous political empowerment.

Finally, the focus on how state-regulated institutions cultivate silence on political issues among Nasa comuneros is not intended to suggest that the project of depoliticization was anywhere near complete. Fortunately, the Nasa are extremely politically conscientious and critical of the intrusion by states and elites. Many indigenous leaders *and* comuneros are highly engaged, in various ways, with ideologies of the left, the state, popular resistance, history, and identity. Further examination of these engagements as Colombia's political landscape shifts with the demobilization of the FARC and other insurgent groups can help pave the way forward in Colombia's post-conflict era.

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