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dc.contributor.advisorUrwin, Gregory J. W.
dc.creatorCatagnus Jr., Earl James
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-21T14:26:58Z
dc.date.available2020-10-21T14:26:58Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/923
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation explores the development of America’s infantry forces between 1918-1945. While doing so, it challenges and complicates the traditional narrative that highlights the fierceness of the rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. During the First World War, both commissioned and enlisted Marines attended U.S. Army schools and served within Army combat formations, which brought the two closer together than ever before. Both services became bonded by a common warfighting paradigm, or way of battle, that centered upon the infantry as the dominant combat arm. All other arms and services were subordinated to the needs and requirements of the infantry. Intelligent initiative, fire and maneuver by the smallest units, penetrating hostile defenses while bypassing strong points, and aggressive, not reckless, leadership were all salient characteristics of that shared infantry way of battle. After World War I, Army and Marine officers constructed similar intellectual proposals concerning the ways to fight the next war. Although there were differences in organizational culture, the two were more alike in their respective values systems than historians have realized. There was mutual admiration, and targeted attempts to replicate each other’s combat thinking and spirit. They prepared for battle by observing each other’s doctrine, and sharing each other’s conception of modern combat. When preparation turned to execution in World War II, they created solutions for battlefield problems that evolved from their near-identical way of battle. At the conclusion of the war, the common bonds between the Army and Marine Corps were all but forgotten. This, ultimately, led to increased friction during the Congressional defense unification battles in 1946.
dc.format.extent400 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectHistory, Military
dc.subjectMilitary Studies
dc.subjectInfantry
dc.subjectMarine Corps
dc.subjectTactics
dc.subjectWay of Battle
dc.subjectWay of War
dc.subjectWorld War II Tactics
dc.title"Getting Rid of the Line:" Toward an American Infantry Way of Battle, 1918-1945
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberLockenour, Jay
dc.contributor.committeememberBailey, Beth L.
dc.contributor.committeememberNenninger, Timothy K.
dc.description.departmentHistory
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/905
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreePh.D.
refterms.dateFOA2020-10-21T14:26:58Z


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