PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE COURTS: HOW PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS AND JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD AFFECT CITIZENS' TRUST IN THE COURTS

Abstract

This dissertation examines two main questions. First, what are the sources of public trust in the state courts? Second, how do judicial elections condition citizens' perceptions of the courts? To examine these questions I consider theories of trust in the government. I argue that institutional performance affects citizens' trust in the state courts. I control for the effects of culture and trust in other institutions of government to isolate the effects of institutional performance. I argue that citizens' develop trust in the state courts based upon their perceptions about the ability of the courts to be responsive, impartial, and independent of the other branches of government. To verify these expectations, I examine historical data concerning judicial selection method reform and public opinion data collected by the Annenberg Public Policy Center in 2006. I test a path model that examines the effects of performance evaluations and institutional design on trust in the state courts. This model also examines the sources of citizens' evaluations of court performance. I find evidence supporting claims that court performance impacts trust in the courts. In particular, citizens' perceptions of the state courts as responsive, impartial, and independent of the other branches of government have meaningful impacts on trust in the courts. Additionally the analysis in this dissertation suggests that citizens' who reside in states with partisan judicial elections are slightly more supportive of the state courts than those who reside in appointment states. After establishing that institutional performance impacts citizens' trust in the state courts, I examine the sources of citizens' performance evaluations. I find that judicial selection method impacts citizens' performance evaluations of the courts. Specifically, partisan judicial elections decrease citizens' procedural support for the state courts. Those who reside in states with partisan judicial elections are less likely to agree that the courts follow the state constitution and state law. Interestingly, those who reside in merit selection states are more likely to agree that courts follow the state constitution and state law and, therefore, are more procedurally supportive of the state courts. Additionally, citizens' who reside in state with partisan judicial elections are more likely to perceive their courts as too mixed up in politics than those who reside in appointment states. Performance evaluations affect citizens' trust in the state courts. The positive effect of partisan judicial elections is mitigated by the negative effects these elections have on citizens' evaluations of court performance though not completely diminished. These results add to literature on trust in government by indicating that performance matters to trust and that institutional design meaningfully impacts how citizens' evaluate institutional performance.