Book Review: Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach
Genre
Book reviewDate
2014-05Author
deGuzman, Margaret M.Subject
International criminal courtInternational criminal law
Mens rea
Comparative criminal law
Criminal law
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http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/6934Metadata
Show full item recordDOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/6916Abstract
In The Concept of Mens Rea In International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach, Mohamed Badar makes an important contribution to the literature through a comprehensive review of mens rea law in many of the world’s national legal systems and at international criminal courts and tribunals. Professor Badar demonstrates that in all of these contexts, theorists, legislators, and judges have struggled mightily to identify the appropriate mental states to justify the infliction of punishment. He also illuminates the historical trajectory of the concept beginning as far back as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi.Citation
Margaret M. deGuzman, Book Review: Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: The Case for a Unified Approach, Rutgers Criminal Justice Books Reviews (May 2014).Available at: https://clcjbooks.rutgers.edu/books/the-concept-of-mens-rea/
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