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dc.contributor.advisorKrishnan, Jagan
dc.creatorZhao, XIN
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-23T17:57:13Z
dc.date.available2021-08-23T17:57:13Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/6862
dc.description.abstractThis study examines the impact of U.S. states’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) on rival companies’ auditor choice. I posit that, in states where the IDD limits employee mobility among rival companies, the IDD adoption exogenously increases the costs of disclosing proprietary information through other channels. I find that on average peer companies do not show any changes in the probability of audit office sharing after the companies’ headquarter states adopt the IDD. I also find that companies with trade secrets respond to IDD adoption by avoiding audits conducted by the same audit office as their competitors’ audit office, supporting the proprietary cost hypothesis. The results are robust not only in various levels of auditor sharing but also after I incorporate factors including Mergers and Acquisitions, SOX, and differentiations of IDD adoption and rejection. Cross-sectional results related to Big N auditors suggest that peer companies with trade secrets that hire Big N auditors increase audit office sharing because Big N auditors’ higher levels of reputation, higher litigation costs, and deep pockets alleviate concerns of potential information leakage through audit office sharing in the post IDD adoption periods. My cross-sectional results related to audit committee experts show that peer companies with trade secrets respond to IDD adoption by engaging in more frequent audit office sharing when they have industry experts and accounting financial experts on audit committees. Supervisory financial expertise on audit committees of peer companies with trade secrets does not seem to affect the probability of audit office sharing after the IDD adoption. To my knowledge, this study is the first to document the causal effect of proprietary information costs on audit office choices of U.S. companies with trade secrets.
dc.format.extent91 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectAccounting
dc.subjectAudit office sharing
dc.subjectAuditor sharing
dc.subjectExpected costs of information disclosure
dc.subjectInevitable doctrine disclosure
dc.subjectPeer companies
dc.subjectTrade secrets law
dc.titleTHE IMPACT OF TRADE SECRETS LAW ON AUDITOR SHARING AMONG PEER COMPANIES
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberKrishnan, Jagan
dc.contributor.committeememberGao, Feng
dc.contributor.committeememberKrishnan, Jayanthi
dc.contributor.committeememberPark, Hyun Jong
dc.contributor.committeememberZhao, Zhigen
dc.description.departmentBusiness Administration/Accounting
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/6844
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreeD.B.A.
dc.identifier.proqst14583
dc.creator.orcid0000-0003-2521-5940
dc.date.updated2021-08-21T10:07:34Z
refterms.dateFOA2021-08-23T17:57:13Z
dc.identifier.filenameZhao_temple_0225E_14583.pdf


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