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    THE IMPACT OF TRADE SECRETS LAW ON AUDITOR SHARING AMONG PEER COMPANIES

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    Genre
    Thesis/Dissertation
    Date
    2021
    Author
    Zhao, XIN cc
    Advisor
    Krishnan, Jagan
    Committee member
    Krishnan, Jagan
    Gao, Feng
    Krishnan, Jayanthi
    Park, Hyun Jong
    Zhao, Zhigen
    Department
    Business Administration/Accounting
    Subject
    Accounting
    Audit office sharing
    Auditor sharing
    Expected costs of information disclosure
    Inevitable doctrine disclosure
    Peer companies
    Trade secrets law
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/6862
    
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    DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/6844
    Abstract
    This study examines the impact of U.S. states’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) on rival companies’ auditor choice. I posit that, in states where the IDD limits employee mobility among rival companies, the IDD adoption exogenously increases the costs of disclosing proprietary information through other channels. I find that on average peer companies do not show any changes in the probability of audit office sharing after the companies’ headquarter states adopt the IDD. I also find that companies with trade secrets respond to IDD adoption by avoiding audits conducted by the same audit office as their competitors’ audit office, supporting the proprietary cost hypothesis. The results are robust not only in various levels of auditor sharing but also after I incorporate factors including Mergers and Acquisitions, SOX, and differentiations of IDD adoption and rejection. Cross-sectional results related to Big N auditors suggest that peer companies with trade secrets that hire Big N auditors increase audit office sharing because Big N auditors’ higher levels of reputation, higher litigation costs, and deep pockets alleviate concerns of potential information leakage through audit office sharing in the post IDD adoption periods. My cross-sectional results related to audit committee experts show that peer companies with trade secrets respond to IDD adoption by engaging in more frequent audit office sharing when they have industry experts and accounting financial experts on audit committees. Supervisory financial expertise on audit committees of peer companies with trade secrets does not seem to affect the probability of audit office sharing after the IDD adoption. To my knowledge, this study is the first to document the causal effect of proprietary information costs on audit office choices of U.S. companies with trade secrets.
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