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dc.creatorMandel, Gregory N.
dc.creatorFast, Anne A.
dc.creatorOlson, Kristina R.
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-05T19:44:31Z
dc.date.available2021-05-05T19:44:31Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationGregory N. Mandel, Anne A. Fast, & Kristina R. Olson, Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 915 (2016).
dc.identifier.citationAvailable at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2015/iss4/5/
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/6346
dc.descriptionThis article also appears in the Temple 10-Q: Temple's Business Law Magazine (Aug 2015), published by Temple University. James E. Beasley School of Law, available at: https://www2.law.temple.edu/10q/intellectual-property-laws-plagiarism-fallacy/
dc.description.abstractIntellectual property law is caught in a widespread debate over whether it should serve incentive or natural rights objectives, and what the best means for achieving those ends are. This article reports a series of experiments revealing that these debates are actually orthogonal to how most users and many creators understand intellectual property law. The most common perception of intellectual property among the American public is that intellectual property law is designed to prevent plagiarism. The plagiarism fallacy in intellectual property law is not an innocuous misperception. This fallacy likely helps explain pervasive illegal infringing activity on the Internet, common dismissal of copyright warnings, and other previously puzzling behavior. The received wisdom has been that the public is ethically dismissive or indifferent towards intellectual property rights. This research reveals instead that experts have failed to comprehend what the public’s conception of intellectual property law actually is. The studies reported here uncover several additional intellectual property law findings, including that (1) the majority of the American public views intellectual property rights as too broad and too strong, (2) knowledge of intellectual property law does not affect opinions about what the law should be, and (3) there are significant demographic and cultural divides concerning attitudes towards intellectual property rights. The findings as a whole raise central questions concerning the public legitimacy of intellectual property law and, consequently, its ability to function as intended.
dc.format.extent70 pages
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofFaculty/ Researcher Works
dc.relation.haspartBYU Law Review, Vol. 2015, Iss. 4 (2015)
dc.relation.isreferencedbyBYU Law Digital Commons © 2015
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.subjectIntellectual property law
dc.subjectLaw and society
dc.subjectPlagiarism
dc.subjectProperty--Personal and real
dc.subjectPsychiatry and psychology
dc.subjectAntitrust
dc.subjectBusiness and the law
dc.subjectIndustrial and intellectual property
dc.titleIntellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreJournal article
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/6328
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.schoolcollegeTemple University. James E. Beasley School of Law
dc.temple.creatorMandel, Gregory N.
refterms.dateFOA2021-05-05T19:44:31Z


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