Incentive Regulation with Benchmarking in the Electricity Distribution Industry

Abstract

This dissertation investigates two broad management accounting questions in the context of electric utility industry: How do regulators for electricity industry use the information generated from accounting systems to make pricing decisions? What are the economic consequences of these decisions? In Chapter 2, I review regulatory reforms and discuss existing issues of using DEA models for efficiency benchmarking in four aspects. Suggestions are given for improving the use of DEA models based on the review and discussion. In Chapter 3, I empirically investigate the effect of incentive regulation with DEA benchmarking on operational efficiency using a panel of electricity distribution firms in Brazil. In Chapter 4, I examine the effect of restructuring and retail competition on cost reduction using a sample of US investor-owned electric utilities. The effects of privatization, industrial restructuring, incentive regulation and benchmarking are effectively disentangled from one another using the research setting in Brazil and US electricity industry. In Chapter 5, I combine the idea of activity based costing and data envelopment analysis to further develop a detailed benchmarking model for incentive regulation.