Essays on Corporate Governance of Financial and Non-Financial Firms

Abstract

Corporate governance of financial and non-financial firms is critical in modern corporations with diffuse stock ownership, which deals with the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Corporate governance has a profound impact on various corporate policy, and firm value in the end. This study examines the importance of corporate governance and its influences on various corporate policy and firm value and risks for both financial and non-financial firms. Chapter 1 investigates the association between the firm's liquidity level and liquidity mix on the one hand and CEO entrenchment on the other. CEO entrenchment may distort the firms' liquidity policy because managers and shareholders may have conflicting preferences between cash and lines of credit. Using lines of credit data from 1996 to 2008, we find five main results. First, entrenched CEOs hold more liquidity as measured by the sum of cash and lines of credit. Second, entrenched managers have a preference for cash over lines of credit because while cash gives them flexibility, lines of credit are accompanied with bank restrictions and monitoring. Third, entrenched CEOs also use more lines of credit because of the extra liquidity it provides, despite the associated bank monitoring. Fourth, entrenched CEOs in smaller and opaque firms tend to hold more liquidity. Five, entrenched CEO's preference for cash versus lines of credit is stronger for large and transparent firms, compared to small and opaque firms. These findings imply that firms should better align the interests of the entrenched managers with those of the shareholders in order to limit the excessive liquidity holding of firms when CEOs are entrenched and to thereby increase firms' profitability. Chapter 2 examines the relationship between bank holding company (BHC) performance, risk and "busy" board of directors, an overlooked dimension of corporate governance in the banking literature. Busy directors are defined as directors with three or more directorships. The sample covers the 2001-2010 period. We employ a simultaneous equation framework and estimate the models employing the three stage least square (3SLS) technique in order to account for endogeneity. Several interesting results are obtained. First, BHC performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA), Tobin's Q and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets is positively associated with busy directors. Second, BHC total risk (standard deviation of stock returns), market risk (market beta), idiosyncratic risk (standard errors of the CAPM model) credit risk (percentage of non-performing assets over total assets) and default risk (HigherZ-Score) are inversely related to it. Third, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors, in the sense of failing the meeting-attendance-criterion (75% attendance). Fourth, the benefits of having busy directors in terms of performance improvement strengthened but the benefits of risk reduction declined during the recent financial crisis These findings partially alleviate concerns that when directors become too busy with multiple directorships, they shirk their responsibilities. Major implications for investors, regulators, and firm managers are drawn. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of CEO entrenchment on the loan syndication structure. Over the past decade, syndicated loans have played an increasingly important role in corporate financing. Unlike a traditional bank loan with only a single creditor, a syndicated loan involves a group of lenders: a lead arranger and a number of participant lenders. The syndication process, therefore, generates an additional dimension of agency problem between the lead arranger and the participant lenders, besides the traditional agency cost of debt between the borrowing firm and the lender (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Several results are obtained about syndicated loans made to firms with more entrenched CEOs. First, in these loans the number of participant lenders and their share in the loan are smaller; the lead arranger retains a larger loan share. Second, these loans are more closely held resulting in a higher Herfindahl index of loan concentration. Third, foreign lenders are less involved in these loans. Specifically, the number of foreign lenders and the percentage of loans held by foreign lenders are both smaller. Our findings shed light on the two types of agency problems associated with the syndicated loans, and have great implication for the firms' shareholders, creditors and regulators.