Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorAnderson, Ronald
dc.creatorWang, Shuai
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-05T16:09:59Z
dc.date.available2020-11-05T16:09:59Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/3783
dc.description.abstractRecent literature provide widespread and robust evidence on the impact of corporate governance. Ownership structure and management characteristics are among the center of the debate. Empirical studies report conflicting evidence regarding the information environment of public family-controlled firms. We use staggered exogenous shocks to the information environment to test whether family control influences corporate disclosure. After an exogenous decrease in the information environment, we find that family firms provide greater, more informative, and more rapidly produced disclosures than their nonfamily peer firms. Family control increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure by 190% relative to nonfamily firms after a negative information shock. These disclosure increases occur across founder-, descendant-, and externally- led family firms, suggesting families possess strong incentives to protect the firm’s information environment. Beyond ownership structure, I examine the relation of CEO overconfidence on compensation incentive. My findings suggest that the cost-reduction hypothesis applies when firms offer higher incentive to overconfident CEOs to exploit their positively biased views of firm performance; risk-reduction hypothesis dominates when CEOs are extremely overconfident, where firms offer reduced compensation convexity to lower CEO’s excessive risk-taking incentive. Extremely overconfident CEOs receive less convex compensation than moderately overconfident CEOs and this relation amplifies with history of value-destroying acquisition and better corporate governance.
dc.format.extent96 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectFinance
dc.titleEssays on Corporate Governance
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberNaveen, Lalitha
dc.contributor.committeememberMao, Connie X.
dc.contributor.committeememberLi, Yuanzhi
dc.contributor.committeememberBalsam, Steven
dc.description.departmentBusiness Administration/Finance
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3765
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreePh.D.
refterms.dateFOA2020-11-05T16:09:59Z


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Wang_temple_0225E_12967.pdf
Size:
1.300Mb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record