COMBATING HEGEMONIC FORCES, FROM THE CONTINENT TO THE BEAT: CONNECTING AFRICANA PHILOSOPHY TO CRITICAL HIP-HOP PEDAGOGY
Genre
Thesis/DissertationDate
2016Author
Roberts, DeChana M.Advisor
Johnson, AmariDepartment
African American StudiesSubject
African American StudiesPhilosophy
Education
African American Philosophy
African Philosophy
Critical Pedagogy
Culturally Relevant Pedagogy
Hip-hop
Philosophy For Children
Permanent link to this record
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/3479
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Show full item recordDOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3461Abstract
One of the most critical issues impeding African American liberation today is the American education system, which overwhelmingly and disproportionately, negatively impacts African American youth. In defiance of the hegemonic system, African American adolescents have created alternative modes of expressing their native African sensibilities, connecting them back to traditional ancestral philosophy; one of the resulting cultural productions is Hip-Hop. The proceeding pages will offer a critical analysis of literature on Philosophy for Children (PFC/PWC), Africana Philosophy, and the use of Hip-Hop as a pedagogical tool in the classroom (CHHP), in order to discover connections between these three elements. The results showed significant similarities in the PFC/PWC and CHHP programs, supporting the hypothesis to develop a program incorporating both practices in the classroom as an alternative to Eurocentric pedagogy. Additionally this project creates space for future consideration of the connections between traditional Africana philosophy as praxis and Hip-Hop performance.ADA compliance
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