• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of TUScholarShareCommunitiesDateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsGenresThis CollectionDateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsGenres

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Help

    AboutPeoplePoliciesHelp for DepositorsData DepositFAQs

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    INFORMATION ASYMMETRY BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT IN SOME PERFORMANCE EVALUATION MODELS

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    TETDEDXLi-temple-0225E-14042.pdf
    Size:
    1.053Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Genre
    Thesis/Dissertation
    Date
    2020
    Author
    Li, Shaopeng
    Advisor
    Banker, Rajiv D.
    Committee member
    Wattal, Sunil
    Atasoy, Hilal
    Chang, Hsihui
    Department
    Business Administration/Accounting
    Subject
    Accounting
    Adverse Selection
    Clan Control
    Executive Compensation
    Moral Hazard
    Organization Control
    Other-regarding Preference
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/3197
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3179
    Abstract
    The research question on problems that involves information asymmetry has been drawing more and more attention since the past decades, and in particular, two of the pioneers Bengt Holmström and Oliver Hart) in this field won the Nobel Prize of Economics in 2016. With the emergence of information economics, accounting researchers started focusing on the information asymmetry problems, with a particular interest and emphasis on moral hazard problems, within the firm. In this essay, we intend to fill the blank in this area by investigating some specific information asymmetry problems in managerial accounting under the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection, or moral hazard and post-contract information asymmetry, respectively. The first study analyzes the expected value of information about an agent’s type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent’s risk aversion, two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem. However, the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection. The second study draws attention to the tradeoffs associated with relying on pre-contracting ability measures in the design of executive compensation schemes. We show that the more sensitive of the ability signal to ability the more weight should be placed optimally, and the more precise of the ability signal the more weight should be placed optimally, in accordance with the informativeness principal. We further prove that under a broad class of distributions a linear aggregation of multiple pieces of pre-contracting information is sufficient for contracting purposes without loss of generality. The third study investigates three mechanisms of organizational control: outcome control (contracting on the outcome), effort control (contracting on the signal of action), and clan control (employing an agent whose preferences are partially aligned with the principal’s goal through a socialization process). In doing so, we expand the standard agency framework by introducing the concept of other-regarding preference and clan control to provide new insights into organizational control design.
    ADA compliance
    For Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
    Collections
    Theses and Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2023)  DuraSpace
    Temple University Libraries | 1900 N. 13th Street | Philadelphia, PA 19122
    (215) 204-8212 | scholarshare@temple.edu
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.