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dc.contributor.advisorUrwin, Gregory J. W.
dc.creatorKlinek, Eric William
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-04T16:09:55Z
dc.date.available2020-11-04T16:09:55Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.other890207789
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/3127
dc.description.abstractMilitary historians have been debating the U.S. Army's World War II replacement system for decades, but no one has completed a detailed study of the War Department's policies and practice. Authors have focused primarily on how combat units overcame the system's limitations, but they have not conducted an in-depth examination of its creation, structure, and function. Nor did they question why infantry divisions had to devise their own replacement policies in the first place. The extant literature is too celebratory of the army and utilizes ultimate victory as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness. Such a myopic view has prevented these earlier studies from evaluating how the replacement system affected the overall course of the European war. This dissertation breaks new ground by presenting a comprehensive overview of the replacement system--from the War Department down to the squad, and from the last days of World War I through the post-World War II years. It will elucidate a process of failed administration and implementation at the highest levels of the War Department and army, but it will also relate a "grassroots" story of success at the divisional level and below. The War Department's managerial approach to the utilization of military manpower was both inefficient and wasteful. The army largely overlooked the impact of individuality, morale, psyche, experience, and training on a soldier's performance. Its insistence on rushing men to the line once combat operations began meant that it often neglected to train, orient, and equip replacements in a manner conducive to their favorable and effective integration into combat units. The GIs at the front, both veterans and replacements alike, suffered for this oversight.
dc.format.extent520 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectHistory, Military
dc.subjectArmy Ground Forces
dc.subjectEuropean Theater of Operations
dc.subjectInfantry Divisions
dc.subjectReplacement System
dc.subjectUnited States Army
dc.subjectWorld War II
dc.titleThe Army's Orphans: The United States Army Replacement System in the European Campaign, 1944-1945
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberLockenour, Jay
dc.contributor.committeememberBailey, Beth L.
dc.contributor.committeememberShowalter, Dennis
dc.description.departmentHistory
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3109
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreePh.D.
refterms.dateFOA2020-11-04T16:09:55Z


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