Lyndon Johnson and Eastern Europe

Abstract

Between 1963 and 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson struggled to take advantage of increasing instability in Eastern Europe. By negotiating Most Favored Nation trade treaties and using the Import-Export Bank of America to finance "deferred payment" trade arrangements, Johnson hoped to strengthen American and Eastern European relations. Where Johnson failed to arrange new trade agreements he opted for broadening diplomatic ties. Johnson believed advantages to this strategy included weakening Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw nations, generating a new influx of trade to stabilize the American balance of payments, and preventing Soviet expansion into third world nations. I argue that President Johnson was unsuccessful in Eastern Europe because certain segments of Congress would not support deeper ties with Communist nations. Congress' refusal to treat with the Warsaw Nations stemmed from two sources: a refusal to validate the Communist system and increasing American involvement in the Vietnam War. President Johnson promoted improved interactions, desiring stronger East- West ties and weaker Soviet control in the region. Congress endorsed the international isolation of Communist nations, aiming to cause economic collapse in the Communist governments.