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dc.contributor.advisorPollack, Mark A., 1966-
dc.creatorDraguljic, Gorana
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-03T16:23:53Z
dc.date.available2020-11-03T16:23:53Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.other974919031
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/2802
dc.description.abstractWhat factors account for variation in institutional development in the direction of greater or lesser regime complexity? To answer this question, this dissertation develops a distributive historical theory that connects the micro-foundations of state choice to the macro-processes of institutional development. I argue that distributive conflict over the terms of cooperation in a regime provides dissatisfied states with incentives to pursue institutional change. Yet there are centripetal forces that can bias regime development towards the status quo. The ways in which these forces of change and stability interact result in variations of institutional development and regime complexity. From the distributive historical theory, I derive and test a set of hypotheses through cross-case analysis of the regimes constructed to address ozone depletion, the overfishing of global stocks, and climate change. Across the cases, I find that dissatisfied actors continuously contest the status quo institutional arrangements to gain distributive advantages. Still, regimes tend to develop in a strongly path-dependent manner because institutions are resistant to change and because the status quo beneficiaries employ strategies that blunt the impact of the dissatisfied actors’ actions.
dc.format.extent312 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectPolitical Science
dc.subjectInternational Relations
dc.subjectEnvironment
dc.subjectInstitutional Development
dc.subjectInternational Regimes
dc.subjectRegime Complexes
dc.titleThe Politics of Choice and Institutional Development in Global Environmental Regimes
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberFioretos, Karl Orfeo, 1966-
dc.contributor.committeememberBush, Sarah S.
dc.contributor.committeememberGraham, Erin
dc.description.departmentPolitical Science
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/2784
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreePh.D.
refterms.dateFOA2020-11-03T16:23:53Z


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