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dc.contributor.advisorGoetz, Michael L.
dc.contributor.advisorRappoport, Paul S.
dc.creatorSchmid, Patrick G.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-02T15:10:57Z
dc.date.available2020-11-02T15:10:57Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.other864884653
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/2323
dc.description.abstractThe goal of this dissertation was to model and test whether political parties once in power skew the federal budget in favor of their base. The theory includes the formation of a comprehensive theoretical model, which divided the budgetary instruments into two categories: monetary and political transfers. Using statistical tools, the dissertation examines the budgetary bias itself, the timing of its usage across the electoral cycle, and the substitutability of the instruments. The results found that political parties do bias budgetary funds towards their base. However, they tend to use tools, which are less visible to the opposition party and more evident to their base. The results confirmed that when parties use more of one type of transfer, they use less of the other. Finally, parties use alterations in total transfers to influence their base early in the election cycle, and move on to other means, such as platform alterations, as the next election draws closer.
dc.format.extent215 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectEconomics, General
dc.subjectEconomics, Finance
dc.subjectPolitical Science
dc.subjectBudgetary
dc.subjectElection
dc.subjectInstruments
dc.subjectPublic Choice
dc.subjectRedistribution
dc.subjectTransfers
dc.titleBudgetary Redistributive Instruments and Electoral Support
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberFardmanesh, Mohsen
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/2305
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreePh.D.
refterms.dateFOA2020-11-02T15:10:57Z


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