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    Budgetary Redistributive Instruments and Electoral Support

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    Genre
    Thesis/Dissertation
    Date
    2009
    Author
    Schmid, Patrick G.
    Advisor
    Goetz, Michael L.
    Rappoport, Paul S.
    Committee member
    Fardmanesh, Mohsen
    Department
    Economics
    Subject
    Economics, General
    Economics, Finance
    Political Science
    Budgetary
    Election
    Instruments
    Public Choice
    Redistribution
    Transfers
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/2323
    
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    DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/2305
    Abstract
    The goal of this dissertation was to model and test whether political parties once in power skew the federal budget in favor of their base. The theory includes the formation of a comprehensive theoretical model, which divided the budgetary instruments into two categories: monetary and political transfers. Using statistical tools, the dissertation examines the budgetary bias itself, the timing of its usage across the electoral cycle, and the substitutability of the instruments. The results found that political parties do bias budgetary funds towards their base. However, they tend to use tools, which are less visible to the opposition party and more evident to their base. The results confirmed that when parties use more of one type of transfer, they use less of the other. Finally, parties use alterations in total transfers to influence their base early in the election cycle, and move on to other means, such as platform alterations, as the next election draws closer.
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