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dc.contributor.advisorBalsam, Steven
dc.creatorKwack, So Yean
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-27T15:14:02Z
dc.date.available2020-10-27T15:14:02Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.other965642648
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/1676
dc.description.abstractThe top management team is important to understand as the executives within the top management team would have long-term implications for a firm's investment, operating and financing decisions which would affect the firm value. As these executives may have pre-existing connections outside the current firm, they are likely to be affected by these connections within the top management team. In this dissertation, I draw upon the literature in sociology that discusses different mechanisms of connections; 1) better information transfer, 2) cohesion and better coordination, and 3) favorable treatment to see how the connections within the top management team affects different decisions for the firm using data from 1999 to 2013. First, I find that the executives with connections to the CEO are less likely to be forced out and those with social connections to the CEO enjoy less sensitivity of involuntary turnover to performance. Notably, I find that this is consistent with CEOs favorably treating the connected executives rather than CEOs keeping connected executives for the benefits. Second, I find that firms with greater percentage of executives with connections to the CEO have greater accruals earnings management and lower likelihood of detection of accounting manipulations. I also show that the connections have an effect only when the joint tenure between the CEO and the executives are short. Finally, I document that firms with more closely connected top management team issue management earnings forecasts in a more precise form and issue more frequent and accurate forecasts. I show that this matters more when the top management team’s external network size is small.
dc.format.extent165 pages
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTemple University. Libraries
dc.relation.ispartofTheses and Dissertations
dc.rightsIN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subjectAccounting
dc.subjectConnections
dc.subjectEarning Management
dc.subjectExecutive Turnover
dc.subjectManagement Earnings Forecasts
dc.subjectTop Management Team
dc.titleImpact of Connections Within the Top Management Team on Managerial Turnover, Earnings Management, and Voluntary Disclosure
dc.typeText
dc.type.genreThesis/Dissertation
dc.contributor.committeememberBasu, Sudipta
dc.contributor.committeememberGordon, Elizabeth A.
dc.contributor.committeememberNaveen, Lalitha
dc.contributor.committeememberRytchkov, Oleg
dc.description.departmentBusiness Administration/Accounting
dc.relation.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/1658
dc.ada.noteFor Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
dc.description.degreePh.D.
refterms.dateFOA2020-10-27T15:14:02Z


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