INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. FIRMS

Abstract

This dissertation studies international acquisitions mainly in terms of their impact on firm competitiveness and CEO compensation. International acquisitions have been used extensively by multinational companies for internationalization purposes. They are the main drivers of foreign direct investment flow around the world. The large number of international acquisitions and the amount of money used for them make these acquisitions important corporate strategies to examine. This study explores from different perspectives the implications of international acquisitions for firms. In the first chapter, we assess the impact of international acquisitions on the competitiveness of companies. Competitiveness has been studied mostly at the country and industry levels; firm-level competitiveness has been understudied, and the impact the organizational choices of companies have on competitiveness have not been fully explored. This study attempts to fill this gap by examining the impact of international acquisitions on firm competitiveness. Building on the resource-based view, internalization theory, agency theory and managerial hubris we propose that international acquisitions enhance competitiveness. We also develop a competing hypothesis about the negative impact of IAs on competitiveness using agency view, integration issues, and information asymmetry perspective. We test our model with a sample of acquisitions between 1985 and 2007. We find that international acquisitions have a positive effect on firm competitiveness. We also find variations in the impact of international acquisitions across different dimensions of competitiveness and benchmarks. We also investigate factors that affect the success of international acquisitions. Our evidence suggests that the acquirer's resources and capabilities play a crucial role in the success of international acquisitions. In the second chapter, we explore the association between acquisitions and CEO compensation from two different perspectives. Agency theory, which assumes a conflict between shareholders' and executives' interests, predicts a positive impact of acquisitions on CEO compensation. In contrast, subscribers of stewardship theory question the assumption of a conflict of interest and propose that acquisitions have no impact on CEO compensation. We test the prediction of agency view with a sample of U.S. acquisitions for the period 1995 to 2007. Our results provide evidence for the agency view. Unlike prior studies, this study distinguishes between international and domestic acquisitions, and assesses their impact. We find that international acquisitions have less of a positive effect on CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Finally, we investigate some deal characteristics and show that the relatedness of the acquirer and the target influences post-acquisition CEO compensation. We provide an in-depth literature review of acquisition research in the third chapter. In addition to discussing the antecedents, outcomes, and success/failure factors of acquisitions in general, we focus on international acquisitions as well. We discuss the differences between international and domestic acquisitions and review the literature of international acquisitions as a mode of entry. More important, we identify theoretical and methodological gaps, unanswered questions, trends, and understudied areas in acquisition research. Building on these, we provide recommendations and directions for future acquisition research. Overall, this study examines the implications of international acquisitions for firms. Our findings indicate that international acquisition is an important phenomenon that influences the competitiveness of firms and governance through effects on CEO compensation. One of the major contributions of this study is to show that international acquisitions have different characteristics than domestic acquisitions. Our study also identifies issues that need to be resolved in acquisition research and propose ways to address those issues. Our study adds fresh insights to the literature on M&As, competitiveness, and CEO compensation.