THE IMPACT OF PERCEIVED MORALITY, NORMALITY, AND AGENCY ON FREE WILL ATTRIBUTIONS

Abstract

Past research consistently shows that people widely believe human beings possess free will and share similar definitions of the concept. However, how individuals attribute free will to others varies significantly and depends on the context, though the factors that influence these evaluations remain unclear. This study explores the nuances of free will beliefs through two pilot studies and a main study. Pilot Study 1 analyzed free-response definitions of free will, identifying the most frequently cited elements as (1) ability to make a choice that was (2) consistent with one’s desires and (3) free of constraints. Pilot Study 2 utilized vignettes based on these definitions to investigate free will attributions, confirming the method’s effectiveness for future research. The main study aimed to test two theories: the motivated account, suggesting free will attributions increase with immoral actions, and the nom-violation account, proposing that nonconformist behaviors are seen as exercises of more free will, regardless of moral implications. Through a series of vignettes, the main study uncovered a complex pattern of free will attributions that both align with and challenge these theoretical perspectives. Initial vignettes explored the role of moral valence, revealing that both blameworthy and praiseworthy behaviors are attributed with more free will compared to neutral behaviors, thus contesting the idea that punitive desires solely underpin free will attributions. Further analysis indicated that there was relatively stronger support for the norm violation account, highlighting the significant role of perceived autonomy and desires on free will attributions. The main study expanded upon these frameworks by investigating the impact of behavioral expectations, uncovering that expected behaviors were often attributed with more free will than unexpected behaviors, particularly when unexpected actions could be attributed to situational pressures. These findings collectively offer a nuanced and contextually determined view of free will attributions, influenced by moral significance, norm deviation, and the core aspects of the folk concept of free will.