• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of TUScholarShareCommunitiesDateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsGenresThis CollectionDateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsGenres

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Help

    AboutPeoplePoliciesHelp for DepositorsData DepositFAQs

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Matching Market for Skills

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    Delgado_temple_0225E_10128.pdf
    Size:
    1.046Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Genre
    Thesis/Dissertation
    Date
    2009
    Author
    Delgado, Lisa A.
    Advisor
    Diamantaras, Dimitrios
    Committee member
    Bognanno, Michael, 1962-
    Blackstone, Erwin A., 1942-
    Gilles, Robert P.
    Department
    Economics
    Subject
    Economics, Theory
    Algorithmic Game
    Correlated Equilibrium
    Game Theory
    Matching Market
    Nash Equilibrium
    Skills Market
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/1068
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/1050
    Abstract
    This dissertation builds a model of information exchange, where the information is skills. A two-sided matching market for skills is employed that includes two distinct sides, skilled and unskilled agents, and the matches that connect these agents. The unskilled agents wish to purchase skills from the skilled agents, who each possess one valuable and unique skill. Skilled agents may match with many unskilled agents, while each unskilled agent may match with only one skilled agent. Direct interaction is necessary between the agents to teach and learn the skill. Thus, there must be mutual consent for a match to occur and the skill to be exchanged. In this market for skills, a discrete, simultaneous move game is employed where all agents announce their strategies at once, every skilled agent announcing a price and every unskilled agent announcing the skill she wishes to purchase. First, both Nash equilibria and a correlated equilibrium are determined for an example of this skills market game. Next, comparative statics are employed on this discrete, simultaneous move game through computer simulations. Finally, a continuous, simultaneous move game is studied where all agents announce their strategies at once, every skilled agent announcing a price and every unskilled agent announcing a skill and price pair. For this game, an algorithm is developed that if used by all agents to determine their strategies leads to a strong Nash equilibrium for the game.
    ADA compliance
    For Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
    Collections
    Theses and Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2023)  DuraSpace
    Temple University Libraries | 1900 N. 13th Street | Philadelphia, PA 19122
    (215) 204-8212 | scholarshare@temple.edu
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.