• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of TUScholarShareCommunitiesDateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsGenresThis CollectionDateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsGenres

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Help

    AboutPeoplePoliciesHelp for DepositorsData DepositFAQs

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    Paying for Civilization: The Origins of Public Tax Preferences in Seven Countries

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    Cryderman_temple_0225E_12407.pdf
    Size:
    1.640Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Genre
    Thesis/Dissertation
    Date
    2016
    Author
    Cryderman, John Phillip
    Advisor
    Deeg, Richard, 1961-
    Committee member
    Arceneaux, Kevin
    Kolodny, Robin, 1964-
    Kaufman, Robert L.
    Department
    Political Science
    Subject
    Political Science
    Anchoring
    Comparative Politics
    Preferences
    Public Opinion
    Taxation
    Permanent link to this record
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/1031
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/1013
    Abstract
    What is the individual’s preferred income tax rate? How much income tax progressivity do people want? How do individuals form these preferences? This dissertation answers these questions by leveraging the 1996 International Social Survey Program – Role of Government III survey and the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. When researchers ask individuals for their income tax preferences most respondents construct their preference on the spot using few cognitive resources. Individuals also want their income tax preference to be reasonable (i.e., the state can afford basic goods and services), so individuals anchor their preferences on existing state tax policy, their own income tax rate, and their previous responses when applicable. After individuals establish an anchoring point, they make adjustments based on ideological beliefs, level of trust, and self-interest; however, the effects of these adjustments are mediated by the institutional structure of the state. The results of the ordinary least regression models point to four conclusions. First, individuals behave as reasonable cognitive misers. They anchor their income tax preferences on the status quo, and their previous responses. This result explains cross-state differences in income tax preferences. Second, liberal individuals prefer progressive taxation in individualistic states (i.e., states with means-tested welfare states, majoritarian governments, and pluralist interest group systems), and flat taxes in cooperative regimes (i.e., states with expansive welfare states, consensus regimes, and corporatist interest group systems). Third, trusting individuals prefer flat taxes, and preferences for progressive taxation are a means to ensure tax evaders pay their fair share. Fourth, the effects of self-interest on tax preferences are limited, and only influence tax preferences on those earning one-times and eight-times the wages of a full-time unskilled worker.
    ADA compliance
    For Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu
    Collections
    Theses and Dissertations

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2023)  DuraSpace
    Temple University Libraries | 1900 N. 13th Street | Philadelphia, PA 19122
    (215) 204-8212 | scholarshare@temple.edu
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.