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Kierkegaard and Feuerbach on the Nature of Christianity
Glass, Michael
Glass, Michael
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Thesis/Dissertation
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2023-12
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Philosophy
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http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/9520
Abstract
Søren Kierkegaard is often accused of being a fideist or irrationalist. This ispartially due to the fact that his writings allow for a wide range of possible
interpretations. The idea that he is dogmatic in his approach to Christianity has led to the
assumption that he was not concerned with rational disagreement. This interpretation
limits the scope of Kierkegaard’s work.
Ludwig Feuerbach is generally treated as a transitional figure between Hegel and
Marx. This has led to an underappreciation of his unique critiques of religion. He is
striking in particular for his deep knowledge and consistent use of Christian theology.
However, due to the influence of later thinkers, his contributions to the study of religion
are often underappreciated.
The extent to which Kierkegaard was aware of Feuerbach is not known with
certainty. There is no evidence that Feuerbach was aware of Kierkegaard at all. However,
it is apparent that Kierkegaard had some awareness of Feuerbach. I will further argue that
he rejected Feuerbach’s ideas. If Kierkegaard cannot, even in principle, provide a reason
for this rejection, this would be evidence in favor of the dogmatist reading of
Kierkegaard. Some interpreters have argued that Kierkegaard cannot give such a reason.
This has colored their interpretations of Kierkegaard’s Feuerbach reception.
Contrary to this, I argue that Kierkegaard can provide reasons to reject Feuerbach.
These are reasons which do not rely on the claim that Christian doctrines are in fact true.
While Kierkegaard did not explicitly describe such a response, the parts necessary for one
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are present in his writings. I argue that Feuerbach’s argument in The Essence of
Christianity relies on premises that assume the falsehood of Kierkegaardian Christianity.
In other words, Feuerbach’s attempt to critique Christianity cannot be an immanent one.
This Kierkegaardian argument holds whether or not Christianity’s claims are true. It
relies merely on a claim about what Christianity entails.
To establish this claim, my method is one of rational reconstruction. I consider
what arguments are present in Kierkegaard’s writings and compare them with the
arguments Feuerbach presents in The Essence of Christianity, a book that we know
Kierkegaard at least owned. In so doing, I show that Kierkegaard’s writings provide the
resources necessary to respond to Feuerbach’s arguments. These resources are provided
without relying on claiming that Christian dogmatic claims are true. This discussion
shows that Feuerbach's reliance on ideas like species being makes him a “speculative
thinker,” to use the Kierkegaardian terminology.
This demonstrates two things. First, Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity
does not rely on the mere assertion of dogma or irrationalism. Second, because of how
strict the Kierkegaardian approach must be, it demonstrates the strength of Feuerbach’s
arguments. Feuerbach’s arguments are devastating to most intellectualized forms of
Christianity. Kierkegaard’s continued Christianity after exposure to Feuerbach’s ideas
can only be defended based on a discontinuity between religious claims and claims of all
other kinds.
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