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ORGANIZATIONAL FORM, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND TOP EXECUTIVE TURNOVER: EVIDENCE IN THE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Lin, Tzu Ting
Lin, Tzu Ting
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Thesis/Dissertation
Date
2011
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Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance
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http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/1723
Abstract
I investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover decision in the property-casualty insurance industry. The likelihoods of turnover and non-routine turnover are significantly and negatively associated to firm performance, and the outside succession dominates when non-routine turnover occurs. Further, the firm's magnitude of turnover-performance sensitivity depends on its quality of the corporate governance mechanisms which are determined by organizational form and ownership structure. The sensitivity of non-routine turnover to firm performance is lower in mutuals than publicly held non-family firms. Non-family-member CEOs in publicly listed family firms have the highest likelihoods of turnover and performance-turnover sensitivity among all types of companies. Manager-owned stock insurance companies have the lowest turnover rate and sensitivity of non-routine turnover to firm performance. Also incoming successors mainly come from the controlling family no matter what the turnover type is.
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