Loading...
In Defense of Moderate Empiricism
Hilt, David Benjamin
Hilt, David Benjamin
Citations
Altmetric:
Genre
Thesis/Dissertation
Date
2023-12
Advisor
Committee member
Group
Department
Philosophy
Subject
Permanent link to this record
Collections
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/9497
Abstract
There are two dominant approaches to theorizing the a priori in epistemology. Moderate rationalism, a kind of dogmatism, posits intellectual seeming’s, while moderate empiricism accounts for the a priori in terms of analyticity. Paul Boghossian has been a recent defender of moderate empiricism until recently. He has argued that there is no “internalistically” acceptable way for a moderate empiricist to account for all instances of a priori justified belief, so we must supplement the view with a form of moderate rationalism. Against this it is shown that dogmatism in general is problematic as a theory of justification, and that, when applied to cases of a priori justification it faces an insuperable difficulty, the non-accidental relation problem. It is argued that in order to account for the a priori we should defend moderate empiricism as the only plausible option. A positive proposal is offered at the end of the paper. The theory states that a priori warrant is a function of non-evidential factors that cause justified a priori belief.
Description
Citation
Citation to related work
Has part
ADA compliance
For Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu