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Budgetary Redistributive Instruments and Electoral Support
Schmid, Patrick G.
Schmid, Patrick G.
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Thesis/Dissertation
Date
2009
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Economics
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http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/2305
Abstract
The goal of this dissertation was to model and test whether political parties once in power skew the federal budget in favor of their base. The theory includes the formation of a comprehensive theoretical model, which divided the budgetary instruments into two categories: monetary and political transfers. Using statistical tools, the dissertation examines the budgetary bias itself, the timing of its usage across the electoral cycle, and the substitutability of the instruments. The results found that political parties do bias budgetary funds towards their base. However, they tend to use tools, which are less visible to the opposition party and more evident to their base. The results confirmed that when parties use more of one type of transfer, they use less of the other. Finally, parties use alterations in total transfers to influence their base early in the election cycle, and move on to other means, such as platform alterations, as the next election draws closer.
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