Loading...
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection of Executive Compensation
Xian, Chunwei
Xian, Chunwei
Citations
Altmetric:
Genre
Thesis/Dissertation
Date
2010
Advisor
Committee member
Group
Department
Business Administration/Accounting
Permanent link to this record
Collections
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/3842
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the structure of incentive contracts in which adverse selection problems are more severe. Specifically, I examine the moderating effect of R&D intensity on the relative weights placed on signals of ability and on performance measures in executive compensation. Furthermore, I also investigate the determinants on the compensation of university presidents. I find that that more weight is placed on signals of ability in R&D intensive firms and less weight is placed on performance measures. I find that R&D intensive firms pay more to executives with technical work experience and/or relevant educational degrees. Additionally, in the context of university presidents, the positive association between organizational complexity and executive compensation is driven by the role of managerial ability rather than by effort. This result also suggests that considering measures of organizational complexity (such as firm size and diversification) as control variables in empirical studies of executive compensation is the appropriate means by which to account for the impact of organizational complexity.
Description
Citation
Citation to related work
Has part
ADA compliance
For Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu