Loading...
The Politics of Choice and Institutional Development in Global Environmental Regimes
Draguljic, Gorana
Draguljic, Gorana
Citations
Altmetric:
Genre
Thesis/Dissertation
Date
2016
Advisor
Committee member
Group
Department
Political Science
Permanent link to this record
Collections
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.34944/dspace/2784
Abstract
What factors account for variation in institutional development in the direction of greater or lesser regime complexity? To answer this question, this dissertation develops a distributive historical theory that connects the micro-foundations of state choice to the macro-processes of institutional development. I argue that distributive conflict over the terms of cooperation in a regime provides dissatisfied states with incentives to pursue institutional change. Yet there are centripetal forces that can bias regime development towards the status quo. The ways in which these forces of change and stability interact result in variations of institutional development and regime complexity. From the distributive historical theory, I derive and test a set of hypotheses through cross-case analysis of the regimes constructed to address ozone depletion, the overfishing of global stocks, and climate change. Across the cases, I find that dissatisfied actors continuously contest the status quo institutional arrangements to gain distributive advantages. Still, regimes tend to develop in a strongly path-dependent manner because institutions are resistant to change and because the status quo beneficiaries employ strategies that blunt the impact of the dissatisfied actors’ actions.
Description
Citation
Citation to related work
Has part
ADA compliance
For Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accommodation, including help with reading this content, please contact scholarshare@temple.edu