GAZA: A CASE STUDY OF URBAN DESTRUCTION THROUGH MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

A Thesis
Submitted to
The Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfilment
of the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

By:
Nadiah N. Ahmad
May 2011

Thesis Approval:

Dr. Marilyn Silberfein, Thesis Advisor, Geography and Urban Studies
ABSTRACT

Nicholas Adams (1993) suggests that the destruction of the built environment and architecture of a city during war is an effective way of demoralizing and even eradicating the enemy. Goonewardena and Kipfer (2007) suggest that the built environment helps establish not only the common shared spaces in which individuals live their lives, but a sense of place and community identity. When buildings and public spaces are anthropomorphized, their destruction affects every aspect of a community. Urbicide as a tactic of urban warfare has changed the look and feel of many places such as the Balkans, Germany in World War II, and The Gaza Strip. The many faces of war have changed the landscape and homogeneity of the areas affected. Long-term, continual bombardment, precision attacks, and incursions by armies have in many cases all but destroyed the pre-existing physical environment. In its stead, is created a non-permanent built environment on the verge of destruction or change by non-civil forces. This investigation uses The Gaza Strip as a case study and looks into the impermanence of the built environment. The continual violence of change has greatly affected the resident Palestinian population. I will also examine how the temporary nature of the built environment and constant threats of change and destruction have affected everyday spaces. Although the population understands the potentially transitory nature of the structures, this does not deter them from rebuilding, when materials are available. Using data obtained from different nongovernmental organisations and aid agencies, this paper examines how repeated bombardment, precision attacks, and incursions reconfigure space, buildings and the functionality of
the built environment in The Gaza Strip. Changes in the form and functionality are conceptualized as continuous processes that produce constant rounds of rebuilding. The shape and composition of the built environment is evaluated after specific bombardments, attacks and incursions in order to assess the extent and form of rebuilding. The results show that each round of destruction is followed by differing degrees of reconstruction that again restructure the look of the built environment.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the many people who made this work possible. With the support of my husband and the patience and understanding of my daughter I would never have been able to finish. Thank you Dr. Silberfein for patiently holding my hand through the many many revisions of this paper and for helping me ensure that the paper kept its objectivity and purpose. And to Dr. Susan Lucas, who refused to let me give up on the subject and pushed and prodded me to give this research its due.

I would also like to express my appreciation to UNOSAT and the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights who were indispensable in providing accurate and important information that allowed this paper to retain its objectivity and direction. I would also like to thank Danielle Smith, a former advisor, who decided that I should pursue my goal of an advanced degree and gave me the courage to make it happen.

To my dad and mom, you taught me to see the world and understand opposing viewpoints, to read between the lines, and persevere despite much opposition. These lessons have been invaluable.

Finally, the paper and the effort I put behind it are dedicated to my little girl, Maya. Throughout her little life she has seen me working on this paper and watched it grow as I have watched her grow.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ...................................................................................... 1
   Definition and Discussion of Urban Landscape ................................................................. 3
   Anthropomorphic Nature of the Urban Environment .......................................................... 7
      Social Aspect of Buildings ................................................................................................. 7
   Objectives of Study ............................................................................................................... 8
   Urban Destruction as a Form of Planning ........................................................................... 9
   Acts of Exclusion and Warfare ............................................................................................. 11
      Targeting of Infrastructure ............................................................................................... 13
      Us vs. Them ...................................................................................................................... 14
   International Law ................................................................................................................. 15
   The State of Exception .......................................................................................................... 18
   Understanding Urbicide Through Historical Case Studies ............................................. 21
      Lidice ................................................................................................................................. 22
      Hamburg .......................................................................................................................... 23
      Jenin, West Bank, Palestine ............................................................................................. 25

2. GAZA AND THE MODERN HISTORY OF PALESTINE: .............................................................. 27
   Characteristics of Gaza ........................................................................................................ 40
   Gaza Borders ....................................................................................................................... 40
   Settlement Removal ........................................................................................................... 43
   Population Statistics .......................................................................................................... 44
   Living Conditions ................................................................................................................ 46
   Refugee Camps ..................................................................................................................... 47
   Economic Conditions ........................................................................................................... 49
   Tunnel Economics ............................................................................................................... 51

3. DESTRUCTION IN GAZA: 2008–2009 OFFENSIVE ................................................................. 54
   Events leading up to Operation Cast Lead ................................................................. 54
   Operation Cast Lead ........................................................................................................... 57
      White Phosphorous ........................................................................................................ 59
   State Agencies .................................................................................................................... 61
   Food and Industry ............................................................................................................... 62
   Water .................................................................................................................................... 67
   Reconstruction ..................................................................................................................... 68
   Removal of Ordnances ........................................................................................................ 70
   Materials ............................................................................................................................... 70
LIST OF TABLES

Table   Page  
Table 1: Population Growth by Gaza Strip Governorate, 1997-2007 ..................................45  
Table 2: 2007 Census Data For the Gaza Strip .............................................................................46  
Table 3: Total Damaged Factories and Businesses in Gaza (Palestinian Federation of  
Industries and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009) .................................................................63
### LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1: United Nations Partition Plan 1947 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2: Israel After the 1967 War</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3: Israel's Disengagement Plan for the West Bank (Koret Communications Limited, 2005b)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4: Israel's Disengagement Plan for the Gaza Strip (Koret Communications Limited, 2005a)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5: High Risk Zones in the Gaza Strip</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6: Check Points and Borders</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7: Map of the Area Formerly in Israeli Control (British Broadcast Company, unknown)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8: Population Centers of the Gaza Strip</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9: Operation Cast Lead 2008-2009</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10: Land and Greenhouse Destruction</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The landscape of destruction is a result of various causes including natural disasters, war, and modernization. In each case, the population tries to rebuild like a phoenix rising from the rubble. The inhabitants come together to recreate history through the rebuilding of urban space. This discussion does not view space in the Cartesian context; rather it is discussed as a relational concept that defines territory rather than an abstract location or idea (Brenner, 1999). In viewing space in the physical context we are better able to understand how it relates to the perceptions of destruction by the people residing within.

Destruction can be a positive force in an urban area; it allows for innovation and creativity in remaking a space and can allow for the improvement of infrastructure. The result may also bring a community together through their determination to remain in the ruined landscape. Urban destruction can, however remove the ability for a community to continue in the space. The inability to rebuild can stem from economic hardship, or a landscape so ruined it is beyond repair, or even the memory of the destruction of lives and livelihoods associated with the landscape.

The intentional destruction of communal space or individual living space during war is termed urbicide. While this is a composite of many accepted definitions in academia it is the most appropriate for this discussion. Although this term is rather new;
the historical context of urbicide can be traced back to the Romans. Urbicide in the framework of this paper is the calculated and aggressive act by one group to impoverish or intimidate another through the intentional destruction of space. Here, the Gaza Strip is used as an active case study in how urban destruction affects both the landscape and the perception of the community within.

Regardless of how the space is destroyed the composition of the people living in the area and their economic viability changes greatly. The loss of livelihoods can force communities to look elsewhere to survive. Through this change of the physical landscape, history can be rewritten and the "facts on the ground" reinforce that transformation.

Although urbicide has been linked with the term genocide, the two are not intrinsically connected. In war, urbicide can further the goals of genocide, but it does not necessitate that if there is urbicide there is genocide. The intentional and calculated destruction of the built environment has a meaning of its own. It can be used to control a weaker or minority population, a way to remove a population from the space, or it can be used as collective punishment.

The violence perpetrated on buildings is an attempt to destroy not only community will and cohesion but is also a destruction of individual wills (Coward, 2006). In addition, it serves to irrevocably change how people function (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2007); their day to day routines and their interactions with the space around them are altered in such a way that it is impossible to return to their previous condition.

This paper will look at the impact of urbicide in a variety of places with the
main focus directed on The Gaza Strip.

**Definition and Discussion of Urban Landscape**

In this discussion the terms urbicide and urban destruction will be used interchangeably. Urbicide has a variety of acceptable definitions, with the core agreement of the destruction of a communal space. In academia, there are a few different schools of thought as to its origin and the reasoning behind it. The first recorded use of the term is by Michael Moorcock in his fantasy fiction short story Dead God's Homecoming. He vividly and eloquently described urbicide in the following passage:

> Across a war-torn world rode Elric, his crimson eyes burning with a fierce anger at the sights of wanton destruction he witnessed. Although he had himself lived by his sword for many years and had committed acts of murder, robbery and urbicide, he disliked the senselessness of wars such as this, of men who killed one another for only the vaguest of reasons (Moorcock, 1963).

The definition changed over the succeeding years and re-emerged as part of warfare in the early 1990’s. The term is now associated almost exclusively with the act of war. As urbicide becomes a more accepted form of warfare within military circles, its effects are felt throughout larger regions of the world, the question of its roots and understanding its history will have a greater impact. The most common perspective of urbicide today is as an act of exclusion and warfare.
In academia there are a few scholars who have shaped our understanding of what the term urbicide encompasses today. Urbicide, as described by Stephen Graham, is the deliberate destruction of the urban environment as part of war (Graham, 2002). He does not consider urbicide as a by-product of war, but as a part of the intrinsic nature of war. The deliberate action of destruction is meant to breakdown the will of the people in a show of strength that cannot be contested. A striking example of destruction as warfare is demonstrated in the violence perpetrated on the Twin Towers and the pentagon during the September 11th attacks. Al Qaeda’s stated intent was to destroy the will of the people by striking at public icons of American identity through the destruction of an important American icon. The New York skyline that included the Twin Towers was an iconic vision that was recognised around the world. The towers were anthropomorphized from mere buildings into what many around the world recognised as part of the heart and soul of New York. Stephan Kipfer and Kanishka Goonewardena capture the essence of what the effects of urbicide mean to the community affected.

“The killing of cities is thus about the destruction of the physical built environment as well as the elimination of particular forms of social life Berman variously describes as “place to rest, home” social relations of community and neighbourliness, and, finally, the visibility of others and the presence of poor people.” Together, the destruction of built and social environments means the end of sensory experiences ("sights", "sounds") that may provide the affective foundations of socio-spatial identity ("home") and emancipation ("hope")”(Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2007).
The punctuation and grammar in the above quote is the original author's. The soci-identity that is associated with space and place is a powerful link that an individual or community uses to create a cohesive entity.

Martin Coward (Coward, 2006) suggests that urbicide in itself is a form of political violence. The hostility perpetrated on buildings is an attempt to destroy not only community will and cohesion but the destruction of individual wills (Coward, 2006). This school of thought states that urbicide is a direct and intentional weakening of the collective through destruction of commonality. Commonality of history, ideology, and space are what create a cohesive functioning urban environment. Without this cohesiveness to create a sense of homogeneity through social and physical goals, communities disintegrate. This idea seems to have come to the forefront during the recent wars in Bosnia.

Kipfer and Goonewardena define urbanity as the buildings that establish common shared spaces in which plural communities live their lives (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2007). This includes places of worship, as well as cultural, historical, and educational facilities. These common spaces create an identity tied to the area; an identity that is rooted in the communal histories that these buildings embody. Coward discusses how urban environments and the buildings that make up the urban landscape are anthropomorphized by the local community. The city takes on a personality all its own. It becomes a person that lives, breathes, and dies. The architectural landmarks are individuals with personality that can be harmed. Their memories are part of the individual's and collective memory; they are an important part of the relationship of the
individual’s connection to the community and to their association to the space they inhabit. Susan Sontag eloquently describes the destruction of the cityscape as the destruction of part of a person (Graham, 2004). This development of identity is important in the landscape of urbicide. The destruction of places would not be relevant or as insidious without the collective outrage it induces in the population at large.

"To be sure, a cityscape is not made of flesh. Still, sheared-off buildings are almost as eloquent as body parts... [T]his is what it’s like. This is what war does. War tears, war rends. War rips open, eviscerates. War scorches. War dismembers. War ruins (Sontag, 2003)."

One can image the inhabitants of the city mourn its ruin as if they mourn a family member. Like a family member or a close friend, the landscape cannot be brought back from the dead. Its scars cannot be erased. Its destruction and death can raise the question of morality and the intentions of the aggressor. Unlike a living being, the landscape can be reinvented and revitalised, but will lose the physical connection to the past that the buildings embodied. Unlike a person, the landscape can reconstruct or re-imagine itself anew. With the ability of a landscape to renew itself after destruction; Coward and Graham recognize that destruction of the inanimate is far less offensive than the obliteration of a living, breathing organism; thus, they have framed their discussions as an assault on the living city.
Anthropomorphic Nature of the Urban Environment

Social Aspect of Buildings

Sense of space is an important part of the relationship between the individual and the place of residence. The collective community memory is entrenched with how land is conceived. The older the buildings and the history of the town, city, monument, or even ruin, the more connected the physical is with the collective memory. The destruction of buildings can have a profound effect on the will of a community. The individual person can associate the destruction as a personal loss of history and memories. This is one of the main reasons that societies give buildings historical landmark status. It reminds the communities of the suffering, pride, and historical ties that bind them to the specific space.

Buildings are a physical timeline of collective history. The Hampton Court Palace and all its beauty remind us of the rule of King Henry VIII of England and his infamous wife Anne Boleyn. The internal strife that followed the building is evident in each room. People from around the world visit the palace to partake in its history and to attempt to understand the important impact of the time and space as well as the architectural aspects of the building.

Positive memories and memories of pain bind the communities to these structures and create a relationship with the landscape that is very personal. This is what prompted the discussion by many of what should happen to the site of the World
Trade Center. The ruin has become, to the eyes of many, sacred space. To rebuild on the land, even a garden or monument, changes the relationship of the event from direct memory of pain. The event would then be absorbed as a memory, part of the history of New York City no longer an active event. It is this reason, nine years after the fall of the twin towers, there is still a gaping hole where the buildings once stood.

This social relationship to buildings and the urban environment is part of what anthropomorphises the building for the community (Coward, 2006). The feeling of affinity to the structure is part of what encourages a community to care and tend for the space, the pride for their home and their homeland. That sense of space and the memory of the people and experiences within are so powerful that immigrant communities around the world can talk of returning to the homeland and can vividly describe the areas, even though some individuals may have never set foot on it.

**Objectives of Study**

In Israel, the political climate has facilitated the use of urbicide on the Palestinian people. It has allowed the army to further its political goals through the use of this type of warfare and has created a political process that has re-shaped Israel's relationship with the Palestinian people, especially those of The Gaza Strip.

The continual and persistent threat of additional destruction has changed the way the people of Gaza live, plan, and build for the future. The isolation of The Gaza
Strip and its continuous devastation have created a situation where there are limited ways in which the population can react to the destruction. Due to the blockade on building materials, the Palestinians have adapted by attempting to re-build with resources available that do not have to be imported from Israel or beyond.

Within the framework of urbicide, I will investigate the relationship between The Gaza Strip and Israel within current military discourse and International Law. I will attempt to understand the motive and policy behind the repeated destruction of a confined space that is no longer officially in Israel's control, and how Israel's policy mimics Agamben's discussion of a state of exception.

**Urban Destruction as a Form of Planning**

The first aspect of urbicide is part of what many see as urban renewal. Urban destruction has been a form of renewal for centuries. Creative destruction is seen as a manifestation of modernity itself (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2007) Graham (2004) states that “...place annihilation can be thought of as a kind of … planning history” (p. 171) It is the sinister side of urban planning rarely acknowledged or analyzed (Graham, 2004). The language used in many urban restructuring plans has a distinctly militaristic tone. James Scott discusses how Le Corbusier advocated the total destruction of city centers as prominent as Paris in his bid to modernize (Scott, 1998). The theory of modernism
rejects the past as backward and outdated and requires that the modern thinker or city annihilate all that is old in order to create a new, clean forward thinking urban space. Le Corbusier believed that in order for a city to become clean and healthy required that it shed its past and destroy its inheritance. This cleansing of the city was thought to be a positive move to create a better life for the inhabitants. The classic city was considered rotten and unhealthy and in need of renewal through destruction (Scott, 1998). The working class and their quarters needed to be removed to create the modern city.

The devastation visited on cities in Europe during the Second World War was described by Modernists as a perfect cleansing of old leading the way to modernization. Cities such as Hamburg were open slates for urban planners and architects, the old and "dingy" parts of the city having been destroyed. Through the creation of open airy areas with clean lines and modern conveniences, the working class would be lifted out of their dreary lives. Although, in actuality the improvements benefited the wealthier classes since the workers and lower classes were forced to move further away from their places of employment, often to areas that were of an even lower standard. The result of urbicide as a form of planning results in the gentrification of an area, the intentional relocating of an unwanted and usually unsightly population. The neighbourhoods characteristic feel were irrevocably changed through these modernisation schemes.

Total annihilation of urban places conflicts with the enlightened notions of progress and modernization touted by Modernists (Graham, 2004). Like warfare, the result was a policy of exclusion and a forced migration of the indigenous population to areas deemed acceptable to those in power. This migration and movement echoes the
policy of transfer inflicted on many during war. The negation of a normal urban existence in both physical and symbolic terms is beyond what modernists tout as necessary urbicide (Safier, 2001).

Yet the destruction of the old can in some cases repair damage done to the communities. Removing condemned buildings and destroying crack houses, can cleanse the area of the unwanted. It can allow its citizens to take back their landscape, reinvent the place, push a community toward cohesiveness, and imbue life into a dying space.

**Acts of Exclusion and Warfare**

Every action in war is part of a discourse between enemies, that serves to set the tone and type of warfare. Sara Fregonese states “The destructive, violent and politically motivated actions on specific urban built environments impacts on the modalities of conflict and the renegotiation of urban politics of identity” (p.317). Identity is linked to the land- the environment where people reside and build connections, physically, and mentally to the area around them. Memories and experiences create a link to the land and urban space that can last for generations. Those memories then become part of the landscape through the commemoration of important public and personal events that took place in the communal landscape. The demolition of public places serves to impede or prevent a group from their right to return to the land, while the deliberate
destruction of places of heritage and belonging, serves to physically remove land rights to a minority population. It attempts to increase the difficulty and decrease the will for a minority group to return to a certain area.

This deliberate change of the landscape is manifested in many different ways. Nicholas Adams writes that the destruction of the architecture in a city during war is an effort by the perpetrators to eradicate the people by destroying the architecture they hold as an important part of the community (Adams, 1993). In the most simplistic terms, it physically removes future claims to the land. There are no longer historical connections and with the destruction of current cultural and religious centers there will not be future historical landmarks. The area, as in modernization schemes, is swept clean. The land can be reborn or remade in the image of the conqueror an image of order, cleanliness, and belonging.

Adam Ramadan and Sari Hanafi portray the effects of the policy of exclusion as a promotion of the policy of transfer. The policy of transfer is part of exclusion in that it makes the lives of the inhabitants so unbearable it is preferable to “transfer” to somewhere else (Ramadan, 2009) (Hanafi, 2004). It also makes it difficult to survive due to the destruction of collective space often leaving the area devoid of the necessary infrastructure for an individual or community to function. Via acts of exclusion, urbicide serves to remove the heterogeneity of a certain space and promote homogeneity through the introduction of citizens and buildings that the aggressor deems acceptable (Coward, 2006). Collective punishment can be found within the policy of transfer. The destruction of public space punishes all.
Hewitt cites Lidice as a prime example of collective punishment within the context of place annihilation. He describes the thoroughness of the German forces in disguising the landscape and even rerouting the river to remove any aspects of the town as a reprisal to the inhabitants (Hewitt, 1983). The Allied Forces performed wholesale destructions of cities in Germany that in peacetime were cultural and historical centers (Hewitt, 1983). The collective punishment of cities has changed very little today. Graham cites the destruction of the city of Jenin, in the West Bank, in 1936 as collective punishment by the British government. This destruction was wrought on Jenin again in 2002 as wholesale punishment for families of suicide bombers (Graham, 2004). Graham and Hewitt describe in their research the continual use of collective punishment as an effective form of pressure on the community being punished.

**Targeting of Infrastructure**

Urbanization creates difficulties to planners of warfare. Narrow streets and cramped buildings facilitate guerrilla warfare rather than traditional warfare. It makes the tank useless, reduces the visibility of enemies and separates groups of soldiers. Rather than put soldiers in harm's way, military generals and specialists have changed their tactic to a cleaner more effective strategy. Paradoxically the cleaner mode of warfare for the aggressor has resulted in the messy loss of infrastructure and increased death rate for the oppressed. The destruction of infrastructure "disconnects" the community from the outside world. The incapacitation of electricity grids, mobile phone towers, and petroleum lines isolate the community and renders technology
useless. Electricity dependent infrastructure such as water treatment facilities and hospitals cannot function; therefore the death rate increases, in some cases dramatically. For a post-modernisation society this destruction is crippling. The community not only suffers the immediate devastation of isolation it also suffers for many years after.

Graham in an interview with Brigadier General Eitam of the Israeli Army quotes Eitam’s belief that buildings and therefore cities should be considered weapons of war (Graham, 2003). This change in military philosophy allows an army to defend its right to destroy any aspect of the urban landscape and defend their actions despite international treaties and laws. The United States targeted every important part of Iraq's infrastructure in a stated attempt to push the Iraqis back into the Stone Age (Graham, 2010).

Us vs. Them

The reality of war today has a direct impact on the ability of the aggressor to act with the will of the people. Since World War II, governments have set the stage for urban destruction by removing the human element. After 9/11, then President George Bush gave an infamous speech vocalising, for probably the first time, a common theme in these wars; the idea of Us versus Them. Bush is quoted as saying: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, 2001).

The governments led by George Bush, in the U.S., and Ariel Sharon, in Israel, embraced fully Samuel Huntington's ideas regarding his theory Clash of Civilizations
The Orientalist ideals enjoyed resurgence in the minds of most western countries. This environment fostered the institutionalisation of the "War on Terror," renamed the Long War years later, reinforcing the reality that this has no beginning or end. The ensuing War on Terror was fought in every neighbourhood in America. The Arab or Arab looking population had been put on notice. Within weeks, Sharon also endorsed the "War on Terror" associating different Palestinian factions as terrorists regardless of their histories or actions. The use of the word target and collateral damage successfully achieved the goal of dehumanization of the people who were killed in the attack. Without this, the destruction and loss of life would not be an acceptable avenue. He continued to use this verbiage in his speeches whenever Israeli forces eliminated a "target"(The Guardian Special Reports, 2004). The death and destruction of civilians, home, and space were ignored and relegated to the sidelines. The important "other" had been neutralised with little impact on the safety and lives of the Israeli Army.

**International Law**

The fourth Geneva Convention was part of a line of treaties relating to war going back to 1864. It was held with the sole purpose of addressing civilian rights during warfare. The importance and worth of the Geneva Convention and the successive
documents created lies in the power of the signatories to enforce and adhere to its codes of ethics. The idea behind these conventions and documents was to create a more civilised type of war. The result was seen as a common rule book to use during the game of war, and was supposed to provide an assurance of participating countries that they would conduct ethical warfare within the confines of the documents.

The convention was held a few years after the end of World War II, and sought to directly address treatment of civilians and civilian property during wartime. The recent atrocities of World War II enforced the need to set guidelines to prevent a reoccurrence of such destruction of life and property.

The articles of the Geneva Convention, expressly address the issues related to urbicide and prohibit these actions explicitly. Although it does not use the word directly, the actions that it considers illegal fall under the definition of urbicide. While the spirit of the Geneva Convention laws is clear, there were loopholes that could be exploited or deemed vague. Protocol I, written in 1977, was used to amend and define in detail Articles in the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention and Protocol I itemise actions that are perceived by the signatories as reprehensible. Though the term was not used, it can be seen that Protocol I was directly describing urbicide in all its facets. Specifically, articles 50 through 59 (see appendix A and B), were chosen to clarify and close some of these loopholes, thereby removing any doubt and all possibility of legally circumventing the spirit of the laws. One of the most notable changes to the Geneva Convention related to Article 147. This clarification detailed in Protocol I removed the words military necessity.
Art: 147 ...[Wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977).

By removing the words military necessity, countries could no longer use military operations as a cover for wanton destruction, without direct condemnation from participating signatories and the United Nations.

Protocol I also specifically prohibits the destruction of dual use facilities. Dual use facilities are defined here as places that are possibly being used as strategic points by the indigenous army. Article 53, from the Geneva Convention, prohibits specifically the destruction of places of worship, art, important and notable historical and communal spaces. Protocol I article 6 explicitly states: "Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1977)" Therefore, the destruction of houses and public buildings as a reprisal for the actions of a few falls within this statement. Since urbicide can be a result of reprisal, and includes the destruction of houses and public buildings, it can be understood that the Geneva Convention articles directly prohibit urbicide and Protocol I describes in detail.

Protocol III also known as, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons was created in 1980 in an attempt to further define and clarify the rules on warfare (See Appendix D). Protocol III addresses the use of incendiary weapons defined as:
Any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1980)

Although white phosphorous is not specifically banned, its use in densely populated areas and against a civilian population is strictly forbidden.

Acceptable use of white phosphorous is as an incendiary weapon or as an obscurant during battle and in a battlefield. Civilian population centers are never considered an open battlefield.

The State of Exception

The state of exception and homo sacer are very important theories that must be understood before we are able to look at the relationship between Gaza and Israel. In understanding the nature of the ideology behind their relationship we are able to begin to comprehend how and why Operation Cast Lead was conducted. In his book "State of Exception" Giorgio Agamben (Agamben, 2005) tells us that the definition of the state of exception is "the point of imbalance between public law and political fact." The government body that calls for the state of exception enables its rulers to act, in many instances, outside the law. By deeming it necessary to call a state of exception, governments seek to legitimise the illegitimate. Through the combination of military ideals with government, it gives the political entity powers that in a normal state would not be granted without limitations and great discussion. For this reason the state of
exception must be a temporary condition due its political nature that is outside of juridical law. When the state of exception begins to take on a permanent characteristic, the nature of the relationship with the population that is effected changes and a very serious ethical problem emerges. The people within this more permanent state of exception no longer fall into defined legal definitions of world citizens. In the United States a new term and type of person emerged, "Enemy Combatants" people who were no longer afforded the protection of local or international law. The concept of inalienable rights did not apply and the populace effected takes on the status of bare life or homo sacer. The state of exception has allowed self defined democratic nations to skirt their ideals and absorb as well as enact the practices of totalitarian governments (Agamben, 2005).

In this framework we can begin to understand the importance of the theory of homo sacer and how sovereignty and the state of exception affect it. According to Agamben:

“The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life - that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in this sphere (Agamben, 1998).”

Homo sacer is a life that has no meaning or worth, something rather than someone that can be killed with impunity. By designating a person or group homines sacri, their rights and life are no longer protected and they are outside the law. Through their removal from society the likelihood of their destruction and demise is increased. Those persons or groups that are designated homines sacri cannot be victims, to be a
victim one must have rights that can be violated. This removal from all safeguards and even recognised sympathy from the larger community is important. It has a great significance in the concept of urbicide in warfare, through the international communities’ tacit consent to destruction.

International consent can be garnered through explicit declarations, tacit agreement, or silent indifference. The international community as a whole puts worth on a person or country based on their ability to produce and work within a capitalistic framework. Aid and aid agencies, such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, work with countries in need through a capitalistic economic framework in the belief that economic aid through reform is a better use of international funds. Refugees, are generally not part of the economic framework, and can be seen as exiled or outside of the community law and not a part of accepted society. Their vulnerability and lack of protection can push them into the realm of *hominès sacri.* Although the Fourth Geneva Convention guarantees their protection under international law, this is easily sidestepped by governments. Refugee camps according to Michel Agiers are:

[C]reated in a situation of emergency as a protective device intended to provide for the physical, food and health safety of all kinds of survivors and fugitives from wars, at a minimum level and at a distance from the existing socio-economic areas, refugee camps agglomerate tens of thousands of inhabitants for periods that generally last far beyond the duration of the emergency (Agiers, 2002).

With this definition of refugee camps we can look more closely at a phenomenon called *camp-villes.* *Camp-villes* are the urbanisation of a refugee camp by building permanent structures and infrastructure in an otherwise temporary environment. They are the re-
creation of social, political, and community order in a space that is supposed to dissolve after the crisis resolves into permanent, if not durable, urban developments. Refugee camps by definition house those that are victims in an area that is outside war and traditional law. As stated earlier, people within these spaces are seen by outsiders as *hominès sacri*. They are subject to violation by all sides despite international law and the Geneva Convention. As a whole the international community does acknowledge illegal action against refugee camps. The people within the camps are not productive members or society therefore they do not warrant protection or attention in the international realm.

**Understanding Urbicide Through Historical Case Studies**

The following examples were chosen for many reasons. The examples show the range of reasons that urbicide was used; they also demonstrate the evolution of urbicide and the fact that there is not one specific way to conduct this type of destruction. The example of Lidice and Hamburg are both well documented and serve to show events that took place on both sides of World War II. It is meant to provide the reader with an understanding that urbicide is an often used tool of war, that both the Allied countries and the Third Reich used the method. The case of Jenin serves as a basis for Israel’s subsequent use of urbicide. It shows how the events of Jenin shape the military’s usage of urbicide in Gaza.
An infamous example of Nazi German use of urbicide was a direct reprisal for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. The town of Lidice, located 20 km west of Prague in the Czech Republic, was heavily punished for a citizen’s role in the assassination. It is rumoured that Hitler himself ordered the destruction. On June 9, 1942 the German SS (Schutzstaffel) officers descended on to the town. All adult males, regardless of religion, were executed, all women were sent to concentration camps, and the children were separated depending on whether they were determined to be suitable for “Germanization.”

The remaining children were sent first to a textile factory then to concentration camps and killed. The attempt at total obliteration of Lidice is evident in how the village was destroyed. Every building was ransacked for usable equipment then set on fire with plastic explosives and gasoline. The remains of the buildings were bulldozed and the rubble spread so that remains of the town were not visible. According to Hewitt, (1983) even a nearby river was rerouted to remove any visibility of the space that once had a village. The German destruction of Lidice was complete when they prevented the return of anyone to the space that once contained the town. Anyone who attempted to enter was shot.

The total annihilation of Lidice struck a cord with many on both sides of the war. After the war ended, the residents of Lidice that survived rebuilt the town beside the original site. The original site became a garden and a memorial to those who died. After the war, many people from around the world came together to help the town in its
rebuilding efforts.

This example of retaliation inflicted on a town is also a good description of how urbicide can be linked to genocide. This place annihilation echoes the destruction wrought on cities like Carthage by the Romans. The remaining examples of urbicide do not attempt to erase the past so thoroughly, but change the current landscape of the urban environment.

**Hamburg**

Hamburg is the second largest city in Germany. An important trade city since its beginning, it has had a good relationship with the English since the 13th century. It was a city open to anyone who had enough wealth for trade. Up until Operation Gomorrah of July 25-28 in 1943, Hamburg felt an affinity to the English and to the United States (Lowe, 2007). The attack on the city by the Allied forces came as a surprise and shock to the residents, who had thought themselves safe due to their long relationship with the Allied countries.

During World War II, Hamburg was considered an important industrial area for the Nazi army. Through its destruction a severe blow was dealt to the industrial capacity of the Nazi war machine. In choosing specific German cities, the intent was also to hurt the pride and reduce the morale of the general public. Part of the objective of the bombings in cities like Hamburg was uncontrolled fires and devastation. The bombings would come in two waves the first would aim at the old city. The increased density and larger amounts of inflammable material made the old city a logical point of
attack. The second wave of bombings prevented rescue work and solidified the fires that would rage, razing large areas of housing (Hewitt, 1983).

In order to ensure that the American public backed their leaders and troops, the government adjusted its media campaign to repackage the look of urbicide during these campaigns. The verbiage used when discussing the war in the media was meant to disassociate the American and British public with the death and devastation wrought upon the inhabitants of Hamburg. The stated goal within the United States Armed Forces (USAF) was to destroy German will through the annihilation of the old cities. The USAF, in conjunction with the RAF, carried out the raid labelled Operation Gomorrah.

In Hamburg the RAF used a new technology labelled “window.” Window confused the radar that controlled search lites and flak guns. It was deployed in Hamburg due to the heavy German fortification of the city, so that the possibility of destruction would be greater. The choice to raze the old city centers had many reasons, but one of the main reasons was the accuracy, or lack thereof, of the bombs. The density of the old cities ensured that the bombs would hit something. Another, more insidious reason, was that the old city would burn faster since buildings were close together, built of wood, and contained papers and other inflammable items. The Royal Air Force’s attacks were always in two stages, the second waves of bombs were dropped after a respite. This approach would maximise the damage since people could not respond to a second attack so close to the first. Finally, it also would make it next to impossible to put out the fires due to a lack of water.
The bombings created a firestorm causing 150 mph winds and temperatures up to 1,800° trapping many. The demolition of German cities was an order of magnitude greater than the destruction of Allied cities. The razing of these communities was thought to destroy the morale of the working class, Hitler’s base (Hewitt, 1983).

**Jenin, West Bank, Palestine**

In March 2002, the Israeli army abandoned policing and law enforcement tactics and adopted military measures generally used in armed conflict, including large-scale destruction of houses, land and other properties. The 2002 incursion into Jenin was a result of a suicide bombing in Netanya during Passover. In an assault, strikingly similar to Lidice, Israel conducted Operation Defensive shield (ODS). This shift brought to light ideas that were held by certain high ranking officers. Almost two years earlier, retired Brigadier General Effie Eitam is quoted through Ynet News saying:

> “We will have to do three things: Expel most of the Judea and Samaria (West Bank) Arabs from here. We cannot be with all these Arabs and we cannot give up the land, because we have already seen what they do there. Some of them may be able to stay under certain conditions, but most of them will have to go” (Weiss, 2006).

These conditions included the re-instatement of full military control by the Israeli (Reinhart, 2003). This vocalization of long-term goals by the Israeli army gives context to the ensuing destruction of ODS.

The operation began on March 29th and ended on April 15th, and marked a change in Israel's methodology of destruction, as an estimated 4,000 people became
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) systematically invaded six of the largest cities in the West Bank as well as all surrounding towns, villages, and refugee camps (United Nations Secretary General, 2002). (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Electricity cables, water pipes, sewage lines, and telephone wires were rendered unusable through soldier vandalism and army tactics. A large part of the damage in Jenin was caused by the intentional widening of the streets, allowing tanks and other military equipment access. This destruction caused irreparable damage to many buildings and caused many others to become uninhabitable and unsafe (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

During the operation in Jenin, Israel denied entry to all non-governmental organisations. These organisations generally are granted access to war zones in order to ease the suffering of the civilian populations caught in the middle. Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental agency, interviewed many residents of Jenin after the Israeli withdrawal attempting to glean information from the citizens to piece together the actual events. Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that according to witnesses the IDF’s armoured bulldozers destroyed their homes while civilians were still inside, particularly in the initial stages of the incursion (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

The operation in Jenin was widely seen as a success. This new direction and ideology that was adopted by the IDF drastically changed the understanding of how the army perceived Palestinians and their landscape (Graham, 2002) (Weizman, 2006).
CHAPTER 2
GAZA AND THE MODERN HISTORY OF PALESTINE:

During the First World War, British policy became very sympathetic to the Zionist movement and supported its quest for the creation of a Jewish State. In 1917, Lord Balfour wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild conveying the British Government's support in what has famously been called the Balfour Declaration. Over the next thirty years British Support waxed and waned, (see a timeline of events in appendix D). In 1939, The White Paper or MacDonald White Paper was released, a policy paper which stated an important change in the British Government's attitude to the creation of the State of Israel.

His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. (Laquer & Rubin, 2008)

The British government was no longer willing to create an Israeli state without the consent of the indigenous population. In February of 1947, The British Government handed over the Palestinian problem to the newly created United Nations. That November, the United Nations passed Resolution 181 (II), also known as the Partition plan, creating a two state solution. The United Nations Partition Plan for the creation of Israel and Palestine is demonstrated in an official UN map (see Figure 1).
The Palestinians and the surrounding states rejected the creation of two states insisting that there was no justification for the creation of a Jewish State on Arab lands. This new state of Israel encompassed approximately 77 percent of the area previously known as the Palestine Mandate. With increased hostile activity in the land, many fled their homes with the intention of returning after the cessation of violence. An official Palestinian state did not come into being, rather, Jordan and Egypt occupied parts of
Figure 1: United Nations Partition Plan 1947 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947)
Figure 2: Israel After the 1967 War
the land set aside for the Palestinian population. Israel retained the remainder of the territory, more than initially allocated by the UN Resolution. (See Appendix E for a timeline of the events from 1948-1967).

An uneasy peace ensued until the 1967 War, with Israel and its neighbours in a constant preparedness for war. Tensions continued to mount and the saber rattling concluded with the renewal of active hostility in the form of an Israeli pre-emptive strike that began the Six-Day War of June 5–10. Emboldened in their victory against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Israel occupied the remaining Palestinian land as well as the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), and the Golan Heights (Syria) (see figure 2). Although the Six Day War started as an attempt to regain land, it quickly became a show of power and muscle for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

From 1967 to 1970, Israel and Egypt continued hostile activities toward each other, using the Sinai Peninsula as their battleground. This conflict between Egypt and Israel became known as the War of Attrition. For the first time since Independence, Israel realised that while they held the occupied territories and the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula peace would always be tenuous. In 1973, another war took place, the Yom Kippur War, or October War, between Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq that changed the landscape of the Middle East again. This war began in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and on the Jewish Holiday of Yom Kippur, October 6 – October 26, 1973. The intent of the Yom Kippur War was to reclaim land lost to Israel during the Six Day War, but the war ended in a stalemate with both sides claiming victory.
Although this war started as an attempt to regain land, it quickly became a show of power and muscle for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The lack of a clear and decisive win shook up the Israeli psyche and made Israelis wary of their neighbors and for the first time since Independence, realise that while they held the occupied territories and the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula peace would always be tenuous. With this understanding in hand, Israel began negotiations with Egypt that resulted in the return of the Sinai Peninsula.

The first Intifada, uprising, 1987 to 1990, changed the relationship between the Palestinians and the Israelis (see Appendix F). In its role as occupier Israel was forced to realise that the new generation of Palestinians were not willing to submit to the occupation and were willing to stand up and resist the state of Israel. This Intifada was commonly called the children's uprising because the main instigators and active participants were young children throwing rocks. Its result was that Israeli government became conscious of the need to address the status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and formulate a public policy on the occupation of the lands.

Within Israel itself there were varying extremes of ideas on what to do regarding the occupied areas; these ranged from returning the land to the Palestinians to formally annexing the area. Within Palestinian society, the resistance movement strengthened the Palestinian social infrastructure. The question of identity and nationalism began to be voiced within the communities and the debate of integration, a two state solution, or independence actively changed the landscape within the Occupied Territories. The children’s rebellion surprised and dismayed Israel, whose policies became increasingly
repressive in both the West Bank and Gaza. Israel began to actively separate Gaza from the West Bank and its neighbours, ostensibly to improve the security of Israel, but in reality as a punishment to the Palestinian People.

On September 13, 1993 the Oslo Accords were signed between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Israeli government affirming the right for each to exist. Up until this point the PLO was considered to be a terrorist organisation by many countries around the world (See Appendix G). The details of the Accords were to be discussed in meetings, with a goal of a Palestinian state existing next to Israel. The Palestinian state was to be formed according to the 1967 Armistice Lines. In 1995, the Oslo Peace agreement was signed allowing Palestinians limited self-rule within certain guidelines. Again, as with the Accords, the details of this agreement were to be discussed at a later date. However, the relationship between Gaza and Israel continued to disintegrate over the next ten years due to hostile actions on both sides.

Since then, Israel has isolated the Palestinians. Israelis no longer see Palestinians working within Israel. Up until disengagement there were 100,000 Palestinians working within Israel proper. They intermingled and were able to coexist even though they had political differences and generally economic differences. This helped the Palestinian population remain self-supporting and allowed each side to see the humanity of the other; the economic relationship between the two fostered a grudging acceptance. It allowed both sides to feed and provide for their respective families while coexisting in the same space.
When discussing the right of Autonomy and the right of a Palestinian Sovereign country to exist, many international agencies and countries talk about the “Palestinian Problem”; possibly exacerbating the question of land rights and ownership through poor word choice that puts the Palestinians as the source of the on-going occupation of land. Figures 3 and 4 are unofficial maps created by Israel to illustrate what land and area Israel would relinquish to Palestinian control. Both of these maps demonstrate the hardships in which the new regulating Palestinian Authority would face. The light blue colour in figures 3 and 4 show areas that are in full Israeli control. In figure 4 the dark blue demonstrates the built up areas that constitute the settlements. In figure 4 the darker yellow colour shows densely populated areas. In addition to the problems of a fledgling nation, there is a much defined problem of space. In The West Bank the disjointed nature of the land that would be ceded to Palestinian control would make it impossible to function as a true independent state. This problem holds true for the Gaza Strip, for although Palestinian land is cohesive within the strip, the fact that it is bound on all sides and currently does not control air, or water space makes independence impossible. Israel has not allowed the Palestinians control over their own borders and has ensured that all entry and exit into the West Bank and Gaza is monitored and managed by the Israeli Defense Force. Although Palestinian passports have been issued since 1995 Israel still requires all Palestinians to obtain Israeli exit, entry, and residency permits.
Figure 3: Israel's Disengagement Plan for the West Bank (Koret Communications Limited, 2005b)
Figure 4: Israel's Disengagement Plan for the Gaza Strip (Koret Communications Limited, 2005a)
With Disengagement the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank began to personify the dreaded "other"; a scary and sinister being that was nothing like the forward thinking Israeli public. The extreme right wing of the Israeli government and eventually the Palestinian government began to demonize each other. In Israel this is demonstrated in the descriptions of Palestinian cities as "terrorist nests" "Cancerous tumor" by Generals in the Israeli army (Graham, 2002). This important and necessary change of verbiage and the usage of media by the Israeli government allowed the build up of resentment by the Israeli public and even vilification of the Palestinian people. Through the vilification of the Palestinian people the IDF would be allowed to carry out its missions with little if any public disapproval.

This is not the only place where that change has been seen. Armies around the world are changing their verbiage to allow for the vilification of the enemy. It is necessary when the "wars of today" are fought in an urban environment. No longer are wars orderly, where the two opposing sides meet in a battle field and assemble facing each other rank and file. It is now a distant war, where drones and missiles remove the actual destruction from both the eyes of the military personnel and the public at large. When there is combat, it is no longer the tidy face to face version of earlier times.

In this new adaptation of war, every citizen becomes an active soldier. There are no civilians. The memory of Vietnam where children were armed with grenades and in Africa and Indonesia where there are children's armies haunt the Western world. Old men, women and children are just as dangerous as the soldier or a "militant" with a Kalashnikov.
The Political Climate in Israel changed around the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001. Public confidence in the Peace Process had waned and the Israeli population began to feel that the Government of Ehud Barak did not effectively protect Israel’s security. A special election was held in early 2001 to elect a new prime minister of Israel after the Knesset drew a no confidence vote. In response to an interview question in 2001 a few weeks before he was elected Prime Minister in a special election, Ariel Sharon told the interviewer that for a Palestinian there is nothing more important than his/her house and therefore he will destroy rows of homes systematically as punishment. This changed previous policy on demolition, in the past the IDF concentrated on destroying individual houses rather than collective neighbourhoods or cities. Sharon stated:

Their worst curse is 'May your home be destroyed.' For them, there is nothing more important than their house. So, under me you will not see a child shot next to his father. It is better to level an entire village with bulldozers - row after row.'” (Hannah Kim, 2001).

His belief in the benefit of levelling Palestinian urban areas to the Israeli public earned him the nickname the Bulldozer.

Throughout the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza the Israeli army has taken many liberties with the Geneva Convention and Protocol I documents. This has resulted in censure by the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross and similar entities. Although the Israeli Army claims it follows the tenets of international law, it does not always follow the spirit of these documents. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, told his government "to examine the facilitating of an
international initiative to change the laws of war in keeping with the spread of terrorism throughout the world. (Roth, 2009)" Many Israeli lawmakers feel that the Geneva Convention and Protocol I tie the hands of governments as they try to win a war (Roth, 2009). In contrast the Israeli High Court of Justice rulings have generally pushed both politicians and the military to conform to international standards as is evidenced below:  

In particular, Israel‘s High Court of Justice has confirmed that in the ongoing armed conflict with Palestinian terrorist organisations, including Hamas, Israel must adhere to the rules and principles in (a) the Fourth Geneva Convention,\(^9\) (b) the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention (which reflect customary international law), and (c) the customary international law principles reflected in certain provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on 1949.\(^10\) Israel is not a party to the Additional Protocol I, but accepts that some of its provisions accurately reflect customary international law. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009)  

The Israeli Army and Defense Forces have often stated openly that reprisals for the actions of militant factions within the Palestinian community are an acceptable response. Operation Defensive Shield and Operation Cast Lead were both seen as retaliation on the collective population and used to dissuade militants without much success. The use of collective punishment on the Palestinians is supposed to appease the public and put pressure on the Palestinian Authority (PA) to change policy. Since the PA is unable to effectively reign in the militants due to repeated destruction of their policing forces it is not likely that this will happen anytime soon.
Characteristics of Gaza

Gaza Borders

Just 40km (25 miles) long and 10km wide, Gaza is home to more than 1.5 million Palestinians. Surrounding Gaza on the border with Israel there is a heavily fortified fence. There are four working checkpoints that allow the flow of goods, the most important of which is Kerem Shalom. Currently the only place people are allowed to enter Gaza is through the Rafah Crossing (see figure 6). Karni, an entry checkpoint, has been closed for years and is unlikely to open again soon (see Figure 5). In January of 2010, the Nahal Oz check point was closed due to the increased risk of attack. This crossing was primarily used to transport fuel from Israel to Gaza. "According to the Ha'aretz:

...since 2008 the IDF has prevented access to land up to 1,500 meters outside the Green Line, and to naval zones up to 4.5 kilometers from the shore. All in all the IDF restricts access to 17 percent of Gaza's territory. At sea, the fishermen are completely barred from 85 percent of the naval territory to which they are entitled under the Oslo Accords (Eldar, 2010).

There are some areas where the buffer zone is now 1.25 miles wide the increase in land, happening after the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009, (see Figure 5). HRW confirmed large scale destruction 2.5 km from the border. It is likely that this will become part of the border "Free Fire Zone" creating a "sterile" area (Human Rights Watch, 2010)(Human Rights Watch, 2010). With the expansion of the border region, many farmers have been unable to replant as they are unsure where the exact border is
located and the fact that the Soldiers shoot on site. A more thorough discussion of the economic impact of the borders will be discussed in the section title Economic Conditions. According to the Christian Science Monitor, 30 percent of Gaza's arable land has been annexed into the buffer zone.

![High Risk Zones in the Gaza Strip](image)

**Figure 5: High Risk Zones in the Gaza Strip**

Egypt began building a steel wall on the border between The Gaza Strip and itself, in December of 2009. It is slated to be completed by end of year 2010. This wall is being constructed with the help of United States Army Corp of
Engineers (Fraser, 2009). One of the reasons it is being constructed is to close down the tunnels. The Egyptian government believes the wall will be impenetrable. The wall itself is constructed of steel plates that will reach 18 meters below the surface. With the completion of this 10 kilometer long wall, Egypt would ensure that the Palestinians are wholly dependent on the whim of the Israelis.

Figure 6: Check Points and Borders
Settlement Removal

As part of the Peace Process, Israel agreed to relinquish control of lands within Gaza and the West Bank that were part of Israeli Settlements. In 2005, Israel began to dismantle settlements within Gaza. The area vacated by settlements constituted of approximately 20 percent of land within Gaza. All 21 settlements were disbanded and evacuated (see figure 7). The 8500 settlers were relocated, against their will, within Israel or to settlements in the West Bank. This created internal strife within Israel, because it was seen as relinquishing territory to the enemy. Although the confrontations between settlers and Gazans stopped, the release of tensions between Gaza and Israel did not happen. Much to the disappointment of Gazans and Israelis the two sides continued to have violent confrontations.

Once the settlements were evacuated the whole area was demolished resulting in 1.2 tons of rubble. The rubble was to be removed from the dismantled settlements with an estimated cost of 24.7 million dollars which was to be paid by Israel (United Nations Development Program, 2005). The rubble removal has not taken place; the blockade on goods to Gaza has prevented the necessary equipment from being acquired.
Population Statistics

The UN conducts census studies in the Occupied Territories every ten years. The latest collection of census data in the Gaza Strip began in 2007 and was not completed until 2008. The Gaza Strip has 1.5 million residents, 1 million of them are registered refugees with the United Nations. According to the UN: "It is estimated that 97.3 percent of the population in OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories) was counted"
while 2.7 percent were undercounted during the census (Ajluni, 2010). The population of the Gaza strip is increasing at a rate of 4.57 percent per year (see table 1). This translates to an increase of 298,649 people in The Gaza Strip in ten years. The population growth in the Gaza strip as a whole is unsustainable, when coupled with the fact that there is no relief from emigration. Table 1 describes the population distribution in the five different governates that comprise of the Gaza Strip. Data in Table 1 includes both the counted population and estimates of the uncounted.

Table 1: Population Growth by Gaza Strip Governorate, 1997-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza North</td>
<td>183,373</td>
<td>17.94%</td>
<td>270,246</td>
<td>86,873</td>
<td>47.38%</td>
<td>22.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>367,388</td>
<td>35.94%</td>
<td>496,411</td>
<td>129,023</td>
<td>35.12%</td>
<td>32.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir Al-Balah</td>
<td>147,877</td>
<td>14.47%</td>
<td>205,535</td>
<td>57,658</td>
<td>38.99%</td>
<td>14.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>200,704</td>
<td>19.63%</td>
<td>270,979</td>
<td>70,275</td>
<td>35.01%</td>
<td>17.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>122,865</td>
<td>12.02%</td>
<td>173,372</td>
<td>50,507</td>
<td>41.11%</td>
<td>12.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,022,207</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>1,416,54</td>
<td>394,336</td>
<td>38.58%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase of children under fourteen is 33.37 percent. Youth 15-24 increased 45.75 percent and working age people 15-64 increased by 44.78 percent (see table 2). These numbers are staggering considering the lack of resources available, and the total dependency of the Gaza Strip to UN support.
Table 2: 2007 Census Data For the Gaza Strip

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children (0-14)</td>
<td>502,904</td>
<td>670,739</td>
<td>33.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils (5-19)</td>
<td>409,229</td>
<td>568,784</td>
<td>38.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth (15-24)</td>
<td>191,786</td>
<td>279,528</td>
<td>45.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Age (15-64)</td>
<td>469,511</td>
<td>679,749</td>
<td>44.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired (65+)</td>
<td>28,982</td>
<td>36,793</td>
<td>26.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,001,397</td>
<td>1,387,281</td>
<td>38.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Living Conditions

The living conditions of the residents of Gaza have substantially deteriorated over the last 20 years. With the imposition of the Blockade in 2006, the lives of the Palestinians have worsened. Medical care within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is far inferior to that provided in Israel due to outdated equipment, the inability to service and improve the equipment, constant shortages of supplies, and most importantly the inability of doctors to improve or refine their skills. Doctors are frequently prohibited from attending conferences and symposia outside of their native area.

Since 2007, Gazans have not been allowed to rebuild their communities after an Israeli operation. The blockade imposed upon the Gaza Strip prohibited almost everything from entering except a few goods deemed acceptable. From January of this year (2010) until August, an average of 83 truckloads a day was entering Israel. This is far below the 400 to 500 truckloads that entered before the blockade (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010) (Lazaroff, 2010). Only 1.5 trucks a day enter with the necessary medical supplies for the region. The Israeli
government has not created a list to inform non governmental agencies or aid agencies what is and is not allowed. Instead the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) and GISHA, a non profit organisation, has each compiled one. The reason behind the lack of an official list is that there are inter-Israel politics governing what is allowed to enter the region and at what time. Therefore a makeshift list has been created by anecdotal evidence based on personal experience. (See Appendix C for a compilation of what is allowed).

The rule for items imported is not the same for non-governmental organizations, specifically United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). A good example is learning material for children; Israel’s policy does not allow this material to enter Gaza, unless it is for a UNRWA supported school (Gaza Gateway, 2010).

Refugee Camps

The Gaza Strip and the West Bank house many refugee camps that can be considered camp-villes, city camps. All of Gaza's camps fall into the category of camp-villes. The camps have in fact become permanent cities with an impermanent feel. These camps have changed over the course of the last fifty years, with the building of permanent structures. Up until recently Gaza and the West Bank served to house those displace by Israeli settlements. With the advent of closures and the enforcement of area visas that designate where and when a person could live in the area, the influx of
displaced Palestinians has ended. The growth of these areas is now due to natural increases.

There are eight refugee camps within Gaza's borders; (see figure 8) they are as follows: (1) Jabaliya, the poorest and largest, (2) Rafah Camp, (3) Shati Camp, (4) Khan Younis Camp, (5) Nuseirat camp, (6) Bureij camp, (7) Maghazi, and (8) Deir-al Balah. Most of these camps emerged during the creation of Israel and grew with each successive war. They are generally poorer than the surrounding population due to their impermanent status within the greater community of the Gaza Strip. People wait in the camps to return to a land and a life that many within the camps have never seen or experienced. The length of time that these camps have existed has created a sense of permanence in the built environment. The tents have transformed to semi-permanent housing then to true buildings and neighbourhoods with shops, schools, and etcetera.

The residents within these camps still refer to the villages and towns in Israel as their home. The people who live within these camps harbour a hope that they will return to their former villages. As such, they do not identify with Gaza as part of their permanent space even though they might be the third, fourth, or even fifth generation to live in the camp.
Economic Conditions

There has been a sustained economic crisis in the Palestinian territories due in large part to Israeli policy of closures and urban destruction. The Palestinian economy before the first Intifada was vibrant and self-sufficient. During the first three years of the Intifada, Gaza suffered a massive economic blow; the gross national product (GNP) of the area shrunk by 30 percent (Roy, 2007). The Palestinian economy experienced a significant further reduction in GNP due to Israeli closures of the border and the
revocation of Israeli work visas after the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. As each year passes, the strangle hold on the Palestinians in Gaza grows. After the election of Hamas, Israel closed the borders permanently and the Palestinian per capita income fell to 900 dollars a year a significant reduction from the $2,500 per capita income of just a decade ago. Currently, the per capita income of Gazans is less than 2 dollars a day (Stewart, 2010). According to the CIA World Factbook, 70 percent of Gazans lived under the poverty line (Central Intelligence Agency).

The economic pressures put on the population do not only consist of the blockade. The Israeli military has created a self-declared "buffer zone" that has been gradually growing. Currently the zone is extended 300 meters from the borders, encompassing 30 percent of arable land in Gaza. "Palestinian farmers indicate that their access is often restricted on an ad hoc basis in agricultural areas beyond 300 metres, at times as far as 1,000 metres from the border. In 2009, four Palestinians were killed and 11 injured in incidents when the Israeli army opened fire on farmers in the vicinity of the border."(Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan *, 2010).

This economic crisis and the increasing numbers in the population of working age Palestinians (mostly male), has put great strain on the society. In order for the
Palestinian economy to improve it is necessary to create a yearly average of 133,000 jobs. This would put the OPT in line with other countries in the region.

**Tunnel Economics**

Between the Rafah border and Egypt there are tunnels that were originally created to smuggle arms and explosives into the Gaza Strip. These tunnels were originally seen as illegal and illegitimate activities that brought trouble to the Palestinians. The number of tunnels varies greatly depending on the source, anywhere from 400 to over 2,000. The tunnel workers, operators, and owners were regarded by most Palestinians as criminals. This has changed drastically beginning in 2006 with the siege on Gaza. Since the banning of imports to Gaza, the tunnels have become a legitimate form of economic industry to the Palestinians. In the Rafah, the border tunnels are active sites of commerce with coffee shops and restaurants that provide well-earned relief to tunnel workers.

The Egyptian side of these tunnels does not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy; many of the tunnel openings are within private gardens and homes away from the eyes of the law. Journalist Ulrike Putz interviewed many tunnel workers and tunnel owners in an attempt to better understand how they are created.

"On the Palestinian side they are usually dug from ruined buildings or equipment sheds. From there, working parties of six men start digging their way towards the Egypt at a depth of 15 to 30 meters. A contact on the Egyptian side signals where the exit can be dug. It takes around six months to dig a tunnel. "It costs me $100,000 to get a ready-to-use tunnel, including bribes," says Abu Hisham."
Despite the cost to build these tunnels and the daily possibility of destruction, they are still very lucrative and generate an average of 30 to 40 million dollars a month (O'Loughlin, 2008). If the tunnels ceased to become lucrative they would either disappear or return to their original function as a source of arms and explosives.

With the closure of the borders and the increasing restriction of goods into Gaza the tunnel owners saw an opportunity to both help the Palestinian people and increase their wealth through the black market. Rafah's border tunnels have become the main source of import export in the Gaza Strip comprising of 90 percent of market activity. The products brought in vary greatly due to the fact that there is not an official list of banned items, as discussed earlier. The tunnel owners have boasted that anything can be brought through their tunnels, from donkeys to cars to even a bride. Alongside the tunnels there is even a pipeline that brings in petrol from Egypt that is siphoned off from an official pipeline (O'Loughlin, 2008) (Aroon, 2009).

Goods are brought in from Egypt and marked up to 150 percent over cost. In September 2008 Hamas officially recognised the tunnels as a legitimate source of business and began charging tunnel owners 10,000 shekels for an annual license. According to Tony O'Loughlin of the Guardian: "Rafah also requires the owners to pay 1,000 shekels for electricity and is now pressurising them to sign contracts promising to pay up to $40,000 to the families of tunnel workers killed on the job"(O'Loughlin, 2008).

Working in the tunnels is very dangerous and many have died. Egypt under pressure from the United States and Israel has repeatedly attempted to shut down the
tunnels through electrocution, flooding, and poison gas. Israel has bombed the tunnels multiple times over the years. The new border wall with Egypt, discussed earlier, has not proved to be impenetrable barrier. It has made the process more difficult but as one tunnel worker joked: The metal wall has brought work for the blacksmiths of Gaza,” he joked. “But to us, the wall means nothing” (Demirjian, 2010).

As part of Israel’s policy of exclusion and retribution Operation Cast Lead destroyed a majority of the tunnels and tunnel structures under the Philadelphic Corridor. Days after the operation ceased, Hamas seized control of all smuggling tunnels in an attempt to regain control of the area. Until Operation Cast Lead the tunnels were owned and operated by local clans (Shachtaman, 2009). The tunnels provide workers with a decent wage about 15 dollars per meter (Freeman, 2008).
Events leading up to Operation Cast Lead

Gaza’s political structure, like that of the US, is mainly a two party system. The two parties have their roots in the struggle for Palestinian independence; therefore they were originally seen, and acted, as terrorist groups. The first, and seemingly more liberal, is Fatah, the remnants of the PLO or Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Fatah is now a more mainstream political group with the majority of Palestinian leaders. If was headed up by Yasser Arafat up until his death. The second, and more conservative is Hamas. Hamas is a right wing political organization that has an active military component. It has tried to enter mainstream politics with some success. It is still very polarized. Hamas has yet to split totally away from the militant portion of its organisation. The main problem with Hamas is that in the recent past it openly disavowed Israel and sought to reclaim all former Palestinian lands. Although, Fatah’s origins held the same ideals it did not partake in the suicide bombings that were a trademark of Hamas.

As part of the move to a less militant and more mainstream political organization, Hamas changed its rhetoric in 2006 (Ravid, 2008b). It agreed to the idea of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, thereby acknowledging Israel indirectly.
This allowed Hamas to retain its political base and move to the mainstream political process.

The Fatah political party held power until 2006. In Palestinian politics 2006 saw a changing of the guard; Hamas won the election to the surprise of the international community. Immediately after the results of the election, Israel imposed a temporary blockade on Gaza citing fears of unrest and terrorism. In June of 2007 Hamas took control away from Fatah through a violent internal conflict, and took over the municipal duties within the Gaza Strip (see Appendix G for a timeline). Following this change of Power the Israeli security cabinet classified the Gaza Strip as a "Hostile Entity". Through this declaration Israel is allowed to take retaliatory actions against all residents of the area in response to the firing of rockets into Israel. This declaration effectively sanctions the blockade and any operations in Gaza.

On June 19th, 2008, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire brokered by Egypt (unknown, 2008) (Federman, 2008). This cease fire was largely adhered to on both sides with only a few transgressions by each. Part of the terms of the ceasefire was the lifting of the blockade on Gaza. During the ceasefire, Hamas followed protocol and arrested Palestinians who attempted to attack Israel in any way. This ceasefire was supposed to promote dialogue between the two sides on the subjects of the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit\(^1\) and the re-opening of the Rafah border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip (Sturke, 2008).

\(^1\) IDF soldier Gilad Shalit captured by Hamas June 26th, 2006
Israel broke the cease fire on November 4th, 2008 by assassinating six Hamas militants near the town of Deir Al-Balah (Amnesty International, 2008; Hari, 2008; McCarthy, 2008). In the course of the operation, Israel stated many reasons as to why it attacked. One stated goal was to destroy a tunnel being built that could possibly capture soldiers patrolling the border (McCarthy, 2008). The actual goal, as stated in many documents as well as public interviews with Israeli officials, was to cripple and directly punish the population. Deputy Prime Minister Eli Yishai demonstrated this goal, stating:

"[We] must set a price tag for every rocket fired at Israel, every tunnel dug and every act of smuggling... "Even if they fire at an open area or into the sea, we must damage their infrastructures and destroy 100 houses. That's when it will end." (Ben-Zur, 2009).

The date of November 4th 2008 was chosen to coincide with the election of a new president in the United States. Israel felt it needed to clean house in case the incoming American President was not as open to its security measures. Hamas responded to the attack with rocket and mortar fire into Israel and its settlements. Despite the rocket fire, Hamas requested and attempted to broker the reinstatement of the Cease Fire Agreement; the two sides were in negotiation when Operation Cast Lead began.

Unlike many previous operations, this assault was not a direct result of rocket attacks or the capture of a soldier. It rather appears that this operation was planned for some time. According to Ha'aretz, the military began planning the operation in June of 2008, slightly before the cease fire was put in place (Ravid, 2008a). The military in conjunction with Israeli officials decided to prepare for the attack and choose an exact
date for its execution later. The ceasefire was intended to let Israel intelligence gather. By gathering intelligence the hope was that the operation would be carried out with precision and that the targets would be easily identified, thereby limiting the loss of Israeli soldiers (Ravid, 2008a).

**Operation Cast Lead**

Operation Cast Lead began on the morning of December 27th 2008, and ended on January 18th 2009. Significant, and in some areas total, destruction was wrought on the Gaza Strip. The IDF enforced a total media blackout during the operation and prevented international aid personnel and journalists from entering the area. Unlike previous attacks the existence of twitter, Facebook (Face as the local population calls it), and other internet sites made it possible for the international community to get a glimpse into the siege. These photos and testimonies made during the siege played an important part into the international communities’ understanding of the attack.

In its aerial survey of the destruction created by Operation Cast Lead the UN noted 3814 different instances of destruction, (See figure 9). This included the destruction of 3,450 residential buildings and 2,789 houses (B’Tselem, 2009) as well as the damage of 2,870 housing units (Human Rights Watch, 2010). An estimated 1,390 Palestinians were killed during Operation Cast Lead. During the operation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was forced to sit on the side lines
watching the events. The ICRC members documented what they saw from the border through photography and interviews with IDF soldiers, stationed at the border, whenever possible. Ten days after the cessation of hostilities the ICRC was allowed to enter Gaza and assess the damage. Schools, hospitals and clinics, ministry buildings, homes, farmland, greenhouses, factories, warehouses and places of worship were damaged and destroyed. The extent of the destruction and the inability of the fire department and locals to put out the fires were due to the use of white phosphorous. Although this was not the first time Israel has used white phosphorous, this was the first time white phosphorous had been used on the Palestinian population.
White Phosphorous

White phosphorous is a chemical substance that is generally used as a smoke screen in warfare. It ignites and burns on contact with oxygen and creates dense white smoke that can last around seven minutes. According to HRW, in the battlefield white phosphorous can be used as an incendiary weapon and to force out enemies due to the excessive white smoke it produces. As mentioned previously, its use is not allowed in densely populated areas where civilians may be affected. The description of how it
detonates and the type of destruction makes it easy to comprehend why it is not used in a civilian setting. "When set to burst in mid-air, the 116 white phosphorus-coated felt wedges in a typical 155mm artillery shell can fall over an area up to 250 meters in diameter. In total, one airburst shell releases 12.74 pounds (5.78kg) of burning white phosphorus (Human Rights Watch, 2009)."

According to an investigation conducted by HRW white phosphorous was used throughout the offensive on a variety of targets. The majority of the targets hit contained civilians within the buildings. In both Khan Younis and Beit Lahiya houses were directly hit while people were still inside. White phosphorous shells struck residential homes, Al-Quds Hospital, UNRWA headquarters compound, warehouses, and an elementary school of UNRWA. The hospital buildings that were severely damaged during the air raid included the emergency treatment area, the main hospital building, including the operating rooms, the medicinal storage facilities, and a record and cultural heritage facility (Goldstone, 2009).

Similar to the style of attack used by the Allied Forces in World War II, the attacks on the Gaza Strip were meant to do as much damage as possible through fire. By using white phosphorous during its air strikes, the Israeli forces were able to ensure that the local population would not be able to put out the fire. The damages sustained to the UN Compound were substantial, four buildings were destroyed and an estimated 3.7 million dollars worth of medical supplies were lost. In the past, during Israeli offensives the UN would give the IDF GPS coordinates of UN buildings to prevent
accidental attacks on UN personnel and property. However, as UN compound and school were being shelled, the UN repeatedly called their contact and requested that the IDF desist. UN personnel were unable to stop the shelling and their facilities were hit. Israel maintains that its use of white phosphorous during the operation was within its legal rights according to international law. The majority of international bodies disagree with these findings.

State Agencies

Since Israel designated the Gaza Strip and all its residents part of "The Hostile Entity" all forms of infrastructure were considered acceptable targeting state agencies. Israel destroyed most of the civic infrastructure in Gaza, 19 municipal facilities were damaged, and 11 were totally destroyed with a total of 106 public buildings damaged. According to the Goldstone report the destruction of the ministries and the main prison was a direct attack on Hamas' mechanism for control that allowed the continued firing of rockets at communities in southern Israel (Goldstone, 2009). Deputy IDF Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Dan Harel stated in an interview in Hebrew and translated into English by Tova Dadon (2008) for Ynet news as saying that the whole Palestinian government would be attacked and that not a single government building would be left standing(Dadon, 2008). The Ministry of Culture, the Government Palace, the Archives building, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Civic Affairs, Ministry of Transportation, The Ministry of Youth and

---

2 owned by the Palestinian Society of the Red Crescent Society (PRCS) a division of the ICRC
Sports. In addition, 104 schools and 141 mosques sustained damage. The centers of worship are especially difficult to lose for a population, as they are usually a place of consolation during times of great stress. Their destruction is not surprising since Hamas militants tend to operate from them. The number of schools destroyed during the operation can leave little doubt of the intent to demoralise. The total obliteration of the American International School took many Gazans by surprise. It was one of the objects of pride within the strip. Many students from this school went onto universities of note such as Harvard, Yale, or Oxford.

**Food and Industry**

During the Operation agricultural land and food production were also hit. The agricultural industry sustained an estimated 40 million dollars in damage to infrastructure (United Nations Development Program, 2010). A loss of 324 factories resulted in the loss of 4,000 jobs sue to the destruction. This translated into loss of income and a subsequent inability to provide for about 24,000 people (Palestinian Federation of Industries and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009). The heaviest damages were sustained by Gaza’s most critical industries, as well as the ones that required large investments (see table 3). Some of the more notable factories and facilities that were lost are highlighted in the descriptions that follow.

The cement plant in Gaza, along with 4,000 tons of cement, was destroyed. Additionally the owner, Mr. Atta Abu Jubbah's house was targeted during the assault (Goldstone, 2009). It took the IDF four days to completely destroy the cement plant.
Air forces fired at the plant then ground forces came in and used mines and explosives on the silo. Then Helicopters launched rockets into the cement containers and finally bulldozers razed all four walls (Goldstone, 2009).

Table 3: Total Damaged Factories and Businesses in Gaza (Palestinian Federation of Industries and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Industries</th>
<th>Total Number of Businesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aluminum</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and Garments</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material and Engineering</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals and Cosmetics</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and Rubber</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and Carton</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicrafts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another important factory that was destroyed was the Al-Bader Flour mill. This was the last remaining flour mill in Gaza. It produced approximately 200 tons of flour per day with a storage capacity of 15,000 tons of wheat. Until its destruction it supplied almost 50 percent of the market need in the region (Palestinian Federation of Industries and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009). This particular business was owned by the Hamada brothers, who were one of a select number of companies that were...
allowed to conduct business with Israel. They were warned and attempted to avert the
destruction of their mill. It was struck on January 9th after much negotiation with the
IDF (Goldstone, 2009).

On December 30th, 2008, the Dalloul dairy plant in the Sabra neighbourhood
was hit and destroyed causing a loss of almost half a million dollars (Almeghari, 2010).
"We used to produce 300 kg of cheese daily in addition to yoghurt, low-fat milk and
other dairy products. Twelve employees, with 120 dependents, have lost their
livelihoods (Frykberg, 2010).” The loss of a large productive dairy factory affects the
population in many ways, including, the ability for Gazans to purchase products that
would help local economy. These basic foodstuffs are a nutritional requirement and its
destruction forces the population to rely on imported goods.

The following example, relates to the Al-Wadiyah group. This business is one
of a few that has survived since 1954. It owns the Sarayo Factory that produced a
sizeable amount of foodstuffs for the area including biscuits, frozen meat, tea, and
vegetable oil. The factories had employed 170 people. On January 15th, after the IDF
had controlled the area for several days, all three factories within the compound were
destroyed. There is evidence of artillery fire or tank fire and bulldozers. It is also
interesting to note that ramps were made, of foodstuffs, to allow the bulldozers to enter
the second floor (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The biscuit factory is not likely to be
repaired since the materials necessary to begin the process are difficult to attain and the
cost is prohibitive.
Finally, the Macca Cola plant was destroyed on January 15th, 2009. This plant was one of the few that were still operating at capacity, since the ingredients needed were attainable locally. As in the case of the other factories and plants that were destroyed that day, the fire blazed for two days and the owners and workers were not allowed into the area to stop the destruction. The repair costs of the factories at the plant are estimated at almost 2 million dollars with the factory currently operating at 10 percent (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

During the operation, 18 percent of cultivated land was razed and 8 percent of all livestock was destroyed (Hijazi, 2009). In the neighbourhood of Zeiytoun, in particular, armoured bulldozers destroyed land, crops, chickens and farm infrastructure including irrigation systems. Everything was levelled including trees, chicken coops, and an egg packaging plant. An estimated 100,000 chickens were killed and as a result 35 percent of the egg industry was lost (Goldstone, 2009).
Israel has released a report stating that this destruction was deemed "militarily necessary" referring back to the Geneva Convention article 147. As stated earlier, Israel is not a signatory to Protocol I and therefore does not legally need to adhere to its amendments of the Geneva Convention. It can easily be seen why the amendments were an important addition to international law. Below is the justification that was used for the destruction; the Gaza Operations Investigations Second Report is quoted below:

The investigation also determined that the decision to destroy the coops was consistent with the demands of the principle of
proportionality: there was a compelling military need for the area to be cleared for the safety of the IDF forces and for the success of IDF operations against the Hamas forces operating in the area (State of Israel, 2010).

The report continues to say that the coops blocked the line of sight for IDF posts and were in the 20-50 meter security zone that had been set up. In addition, the coops were not deemed necessary for survival or a livelihood; therefore it was a legal destruction. The report did state that practices would be revised in the future to prevent such occurrences (State of Israel, 2010).

**Water**

During the siege water was unavailable and raw sewage ran into the streets due to an electricity shortage. This shortage was due to the fact that Israel had stopped the import of industrial fuel, which is used solely to power the electrical plant. Al-Sheikh Ejlin water treatment plant was hit with a large missile in the northernmost wall of lagoon 3. This caused raw sewage to spill out onto neighbouring farm land. Mr. Jaoudat al-Dalou, chief of the plant, was informed of this and contacted both ICRC and the Palestinian Red Crescent (PRC) to gain access to the area to repair the breach. The IDF denied the request and subsequently 5.5 hectares (13.59 acres) of farmland was contaminated with the sewage travelling as far as 1.2 km (0.75 miles) (Goldstone, 2009).

In Jabaliya, one of the poorest refugee camps, the Namar Wells Group was hit and destroyed. The facility contained two wells a primary and a back up well, pumping machines, a generator, a fuel store related equipment and a reservoir chlorination unit.
This water facility was the pride of the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) (Goldstone, 2009). The facility was totally destroyed, and not a single wall was left standing after ten bombs had landed. The head of the CMWU attempted to get permission from the IDF to repair the breach and shut off the pipes, but permission was not granted. The destruction of the wells allowed clean drinking water to fill the streets for ten days, rendering the water unusable, until it was possible to shut off the adjoining pipes.

According to the Goldstone report, during the withdrawal of the Israeli forces there appears to be a decision to systematically demolish structures and infrastructure. This destruction included houses, water installations such as water tanks, general buildings, and agricultural land (Goldstone, 2009). Unlike, the destruction of the chicken coops, the military has been unable to explain this decision.

Reconstruction

Rebuilding in Gaza has been very difficult. Projects require Israeli Cabinet approval and although it is usually given, the materials may be held up at the crossing for an indefinite amount of time. It is estimated that it will cost around 1.5 billion dollars to rebuild Gaza. Procuring the sum, not just the pledge of money, is not the only problem in the process of reconstruction.
Israel has stalled, sometimes for years, the entry of goods that allow projects to move forward. While the goods sit in Ashdod the aid agencies are being charged for their storage thus eating into the money set aside for rebuilding and recovery (Usher, 2010). According to the Integrated Regional Information Networks, more commonly known as IRIN, the UN has 165 million dollars worth of projects that have been stalled, due to bureaucracy. The area needs 86,000 new housing units to adequately provide for the population. Most of the 3425 homes have not been rebuilt, resulting in the displacement of 20,000 people (United Nations Development Program, 2010). UNDP estimated 600,000 MT (661,380 tons) of rubble needed to be removed, as of March 2010, 325,350 tons of rubble were removed portions of that rubble were recycled and used in alternative ways (United Nations Development Program, 2010).

The munitions used that caused most of the destruction, after the fact, are an even bigger hindrance to reconstruction. During the campaign, the IDF used white phosphorous and DIME bombs extensively. DIME bombs release tungsten powder, which is a known carcinogen. White phosphorous, tungsten, and the release of untreated sewage create long-term issues for the food and agricultural sector. The environmental ramifications of the operation have yet to be fully assessed. A positive note to the destruction is that 20 tons of asbestos has been removed to date during the demolition and repair of buildings. It is not likely that this would have been done otherwise.
Removal of Ordnances

In addition to the rubble, there is a large amount of unexploded ordnances that need to be removed before rebuilding can begin. The high number of housing units destroyed and the type of destruction requires that United Nations Mine Action Team - Gaza Office (UNMAT-GO) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) personnel check each house for unexploded munitions. The unexploded munitions or ordnances (UXO) can range from DIME bombs (Dense inert Metal Explosive), to white phosphorous bombs. From January to July 2009, 31 munitions containing white phosphorous had been found and 120 pieces of unexploded ordnances. 28 percent of all munitions found contained white phosphorous (United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). While the UN is conducting the majority of these clean up operations, Hamas has deployed deminers to remove UXOs as well, leading some to suggest that the militant section of the group are re-using the materials for their own purposes (Human Rights Watch, 2010). This poses a problem for many organizations attempting to remove ordnances in order to facilitate rebuilding.

Materials

The destruction in Gaza requires massive amounts of materials to adequately rebuild the area. It is not likely that these materials will be available in the near future due to the blockade of goods and materials in place. The Israeli government does not believe that the release of these goods will be used solely for reconstruction. Its stance is that these goods are not necessary and could be used to make weapons. It is possible,
though not probable, that some of the materials could be appropriated for violent actions against Israel. The fact still remains that 660,000 truckloads of construction material are considered necessary to rebuild adequate housing alone. The sheer size of this effort can not be accomplished without Israeli support. These goods cannot enter into Gaza without Israel’s explicit approval.

Omar Shaban, a Gaza-based economist, estimated that Gaza needs 3 million tons of cement and 600,000 tons of steel just to rebuild the damage (Laub, 2010). In the wake of the siege it is unlikely that an adequate amount of materials will be brought into The Gaza Strip in a timely manner. Some materials are making their way into The Gaza Strip through the tunnels. The quality is generally sub par and the cost prohibitive to many. In spite of the cost and quality, materials from the tunnels are recreating the space within Gaza.

Even with the dire shortage of supplies Gaza has been able to repair 10 out of the 12 hospitals that were damaged and 33 out of the 40 primary healthcare facilities. The remaining two hospitals are beginning repairs. In addition, 78 percent of the water and sanitation facilities have been repaired bringing potable drinking water to many Gazans (United Nations Development Program, 2010).

The blockade on building materials has fuelled Palestinians ingenuity. In Gaza few things go to waste; a new industry has risen in the form of rubble crushing plants. The bombed out airport has become a thriving business for scavengers. Materials are being recycled to be used to repair and rebuild (Barzak, 2010). The rubble is then used for interlocks concrete blocks and "gravel" roads.
Within the Gaza Strip there are many people who are taking initiative and rebuilding despite the lack of materials. Many Gazans are going back to their roots and building houses that their ancestors built. In the video (American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), a proud Palestinian discusses the mudbrick house he built for his family. He felt he could no longer wait for the aid promised by different agencies to help him rebuild (American Near East Refugee Aid, 2009). These sturdy houses can last for a hundred years, but it is impractical for the whole of Gaza to build these types of structures.

There are official projects sanctioned by UNRWA, intend to build an estimated 120 mudbrick houses for dozens of homeless families. These houses are built with a cost of 10,000 dollars per house and can take approximately three months to build (United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, 2010).

These mud brick building are a success. They can be quite beautiful and with the problem of erratic electricity they are able to regulate heat rather efficiently. The result of the UN successes in rebuilding using mudbricks created a problem between aid agencies and Hamas. When Hamas realized the possibility of the mud bricks, they were confiscated. Eventually the supplies and the bricks were released after a few days of negotiations.

The Mavi Marmara

In June 2010, the Mavi Marmara, a freedom flotilla from Turkey, made international headlines. The Mavi Marmara was one of many flotillas that attempted to
bring much needed aid to the Gaza Strip. Israel tried to board and divert the flotilla to one of its ports in international waters; this proved disastrous when 19 people were killed. The flotilla had journalists on board and the events of the incident were broadcast on YouTube and various news agencies. This resulted in negative publicity for Israel and the international world turned an eye towards the blockade. Israel’s response and its attempt to control the negative publicity backfired. It found itself in a position that was unfavourable and decided to publicly ease the blockade. During the months of June, July, and August many more trucks laden with much needed supplies entered Gaza. The months of September and October have experienced a significant drop in products entering Gaza. Construction related materials are the only products that are still entering in large quantities (see appendix I) (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010). Even though there is an increased amount of materials it is still limited by the type allowed to enter.

**Repeated destruction**

Since the end of Operation Cast Lead, Israel has struck different parts of the Gaza Strip, with the most recent on the 9th and 10 of September. The reasons are largely the same as Operation Cast Lead, retribution and the “removal” of militant targets. The ideology of destruction continues in the face of reconstruction. Ground Arm Command GOC Northern Command Gadi Eisenkot unveiled the Dahiyah Doctrine, named the destruction of a Beirut neighbourhood in 2006, he said:

"We will wield disproportionate power against every village from which shots are fired on Israel, and cause immense damage and
destruction. From our perspective, these are military bases," he said. "This isn't a suggestion. This is a plan that has already been authorized (Amos, 2008)."

Therefore the next rocket fire attack could and would result in another Operation Cast Lead. The determined use of rocket fire by Hamas does little to alleviate the suffering of the Gazan population. It does nothing to bring a better solution. Yet it is impossible for anyone to assume that the Israeli government is not breaking International Law. The direct usage of the word "disproportionate" leaves little question. Articles 5 and 6 of the convention directly address this statement.
Urbicide as a form of warfare is a continuously evolving theory. First introduced to scholars by Marshall Berman in the late 1980s, the term has evolved to describe a wide variety of military actions. The various attacks perpetuated on The Gaza Strip by Israel are often described individually and collectively as urbicide. This comprehensive display of urbicide in one area is what makes The Gaza Strip a valid and interesting subject worthy of investigation.

It is evident through this investigation that the events that surrounded Operation Cast Lead are in fact urbicide. The markers of what defines urbicide, such as the policy of transfer, the policy of retribution, and retaliation are evident throughout the 22 days of the military operation. While Cast Lead is the most recent and visible destruction, urbicide in Gaza is an on-going event that has evolved into a unique and continual manifestation of devastation. Military operations have become commonplace and further incursions are certain to occur. The continual destruction, and the related threat of demolition, has become part of the Palestinian landscape. The destruction of Gaza, through urbicide, is one that both Palestinians and the international community have come to associate with the physical landscape of The Gaza Strip.

The world community has accepted, and a great portion of the international population believes, that urbicide is necessary to prevent attacks on Israel as well as wider ranging terrorist activities. Equally importantly, the pre-emptive destruction of
suspected, terrorist harbouring nations and communities is often considered necessary. This easy designation of whole communities as terrorists or “hostile entities” has facilitated a change in the interpretation of international law. It can now be argued that current international law; the Geneva Convention and the succeeding Protocols are no longer relevant to the War on Terror. Many countries, including the United States and Israel, have sought legal counsel before operations in order to try to follow the letter of the law rather than the spirit in which it was written. The result is that the War on Terror is restructuring how individual countries interact with each other.

It is this acceptance that the laws are antiquated or no longer relevant to “today’s wars” that has put the Palestinians in a permanent state of *hominès sacri*. Palestinians are not afforded any of the rights or luxuries Western nations now feel obliged to impart to the citizens of the international community. They are outside the safeguard of community and it is not believed to be necessary to protect or acknowledge either Palestinian rights of existence or by extension, the existence of the landscape which they inhabit. The state of *homo sacer* and the resulting violent and volatile relationship between the Palestinians and Israelis has evolved into one of coloniser and colonised. The attitude toward Gazans in mainstream Israel is one that echoes the historical relationships between the British Empire and India and the United States and Native Americans. This relationship is marked by a profound distaste for a group of people (Indians or Native Americans) seen as inferior and a threat to civilized society.

Operation Cast Lead is a good example of how urbicide can be used to retaliate, exclude, and exact retribution against a civilian population. Operation Cast Lead also
embodies the evolution of urbicide as discussed in the original studies of Lidice, Hamburg, and Jenin presented earlier and permits an examination of how this type of warfare represents various violations of international law. Looking at each article of the Geneva Convention and of Protocol I (see appendix J), one can see why each article was written, what it hoped to prevent and how Operation Cast Lead and related operations in The Gaza Strip violate the Geneva Convention and Protocol I. By reviewing each article separately, it is evident that the Geneva Convention and Protocol I were specifically written to prevent the type of destruction in both Jenin and The Gaza Strip. Each of the articles related to urbicide was violated in each of these specific instances.

It is impossible to relieve Israel of its culpability in these operations. While the Israeli military and politicians may be able to justify their actions, it is clear that the articles of international law were violated. The form, method, planning, and execution of Operation Cast Lead, show that the intent of this military action was in keeping with the spirit and intent of urbicide. The result of urbicide furthers certain Israeli political end goals. The military has continued this through the sustained destruction of infrastructure and the re-destruction of the built space that has occurred since Operation Cast Lead.

In this context, Gaza can be seen as a laboratory; a perfect setting for active experiments in military strategies by a nation (Israel) that views itself as being under constant threat of direct attack. It is a place where militaries can, and have, seen their theories of urbicide implemented and refined; the military strategies can be played out
on a people who cannot leave. This permanent laboratory has helped fuel the Israeli defense industry. There are many companies in Israel who tout the efficiency and effectiveness of control in Gaza and the West Bank as an example of success that can be bought through their companies in the form of drones, armoured bulldozers, et cetera. The industry that is based around these products sees urbicide in Gaza as a lucrative venue for the national economy.

During the year that this investigation spanned, there have been multiple instances of additional incursions and destruction for various stated reasons. A majority of those reasons refer back to the designation of the Gaza Strip as a “hostile entity.” As many of Israel’s military personnel have noted, it is accepted that Israel retaliate and respond with excessive force to any “action” in Gaza. The disproportionate forced used on the Palestinian people is evident through the targeted destruction of basic infrastructure, such as sewage plants and water wells, in retaliation for rockets or kidnappings.

The destruction of Gaza in Operation Cast Lead is part of an on-going process of urbicide; specifically, a form of the policy of exclusion and transfer. This part of the Israeli military doctrine is what makes the least sense as a political policy. Palestinians are not allowed to leave under the current blockade, despite the evident use of urbicide to attain this goal. It can be argued that urbicide has been adopted as a response to the firing of Qassam rockets by different political factions within Gaza; however, military documents and military leaders show that this is not the case. The true intent is transfer facilitated through urbicide.
There are those within the Israeli army, such as Brigadier General Effie Eitam, who believe the end goal is the death of all Palestinians and the return of Gaza to Israel. Although his policy is not shared by the majority of Israelis or the judicial and governing body of Israel, it does seem to have some credence within the upper echelon of Israeli military circles.

Therefore, the targeted destruction of the economic and civic sector of The Gaza Strip proves that these raids are not aimed at Hamas, or any specific terrorist entity. Rather it is a direct attack on the will of the people. After years of continuous destruction and isolation, most young Gazans would do anything to be allowed to leave. This is a textbook example of how economic pressure, in the form of the blockade, combined with siege and destruction, urbicide, pushes Gazans out of their home to "transfer" anywhere else. It is possible that the continual destruction of Gaza has a dual purpose: to impose hardship on the population and facilitate its transfer while allowing the Israeli government to claim arable land for itself. It is interesting to note that while Israel returned 20 percent of Gaza's land from settlements back to the Palestinian people they have continuously encroached on the land and are reclaiming it through different means. The political implications and meaning of this encroachment should be studied further.

The designation of the Palestinian people in The Gaza Strip as homines sacri has ensured that the urban setting will continue to be destroyed until the Palestinians are afforded the rights and protection through citizenship to a country that is internationally, and locally, by Israel, recognised. It is unlikely that this recognition will happen soon.
Without the designation of full citizenship to a community that is recognised internationally, the Palestinians’ future will continue to echo the many indigenous populations that have been forcibly removed off their land. To this end, the methods employed by the Israeli government and military are intended to gain land and reduce the living space of the Gazan residents. This is part of the policy of creating “facts on the ground” and furthering specific political goals within the Israeli government. The international body will not effectively improve the situation of the Palestinians until their status as refugees and by extension *hominis sacri* is changed. With that alteration, comes permanence and an ownership to the land that forces world recognition. A significant change like this will truly give the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank the right to self-determination. With the right to self-determination, comes the creation of permanent community.

The designation of The Gaza Strip as a “hostile entity” and the wholesale generalisation of the community as terrorists provide the Israeli government a way to legitimise the expansion of its Security zones. The appropriation of land for these security zones, offers a more acceptable way to claim Palestinian land in the international public's eye than settlements. They are also easier to defend against attack.

What is interesting and worthy of further investigation is the relationship that Israel has with The Gaza Strip after these operations. There is a systematic response within the Israeli government that is generated from these large scale operations into Palestinian lands. The military segment of the government seeks to justify its actions in
front of the international community through media "damage control." Then there is the humanitarian aid and, in past operations, direct help from the Israeli government to rebuild and restore "normal" life to Palestinians in the affected areas. If nothing else, this seems like a colossal waste of money. Almost two years after Cast Lead, an Israeli general has laid out a plan to help revive Gaza in an attempt to lessen Hamas’s strength. He noted that the current blockade of goods and the destruction of Gaza are strengthening Hamas’s hold on the region (Associated Press, 2010a). This presents several questions including: why destroy, when you intend to help rebuild and why rebuild, when you intend to re-destroy? This problem seems to stem from an internal Israeli struggle on the ethics, morality, and future relationship of Israel and Palestinians.

The continuous rebuilding of the Gaza Strip is an enormous monetary drain. Many aid agencies are unable and unwilling to put more money into Gaza as each time they invest, the Israeli forces destroy this investment. As the dairy farm showed us the Israeli government can and does destroy targets multiple times. The Gazan community cannot sustain such heavy costs. The will of the individual owners as well as the collective wearies and many are unwilling and sometimes economically unable to rebuild. In addition, with the continuous reclamation of land the farms in Gaza are becoming too small to be sustainable.

Before change can happen however, the Israeli people and the government need to come to an understanding of what the end goal encompasses. As it stands now the current military goals and ideals are clear. The policy of advancement and appropriation within the Gaza Strip is obvious. Israel has control of more land in the
Gaza Strip through “security zones” without the inconvenience of guarding settlers. So why does Israel not openly acknowledge its land grab, clear the air, and move forward? Both the West Bank and Gaza have resources that Israel is reluctant to let go. The West Bank holds an estimated 80 percent of the water Israel uses, and Gaza has within its maritime borders a large oilfield that has yet to be fully exploited. It would most likely be cheaper, easier, and less politically damaging in the long run, to acknowledge that it intends to absorb Palestinian land into Israel. While this is not a desired solution it is a de facto reality through the loss and denial of rights to the land. The absorption of the Palestinian population would change the makeup of the demographics of Israel, the implications of which are beyond the scope of this investigation. It is not likely that the Palestinians would be willing or eager to lose their hope of a recognized state, but the “facts on the ground” prove that Israel is reducing this possibility daily. The West Bank cannot govern the Gaza Strip effectively if Palestinians are not allowed freedom of movement. The amount of land that Palestinians control is getting smaller each day and the fact that it is not contiguous within the West Bank and that there is no actual interchange between Gaza and the West Bank make it impossible. This action, although extremely difficult in the short term, would provide a more peaceful solution than the current situation. The incorporation of Palestinian lands would allow Palestinians freedom of movement and the ability to begin to forge ahead.

Despite all these barriers to sustained community in an urban environment, the Palestinians in Gaza are moving forward. Whenever possible, people are rebuilding. The ingenuity and recreation of space in the form of mudbrick houses demonstrates the
will of Palestinians to endure, thus proving the failure of urbicide to achieve its goal. The tunnels provide the Palestinians with an avenue to international trade and direct interaction with the international world. In spite of the cost and quality, materials from the tunnels are recreating the space within Gaza. The first mall opened in July of 2010, with most of the materials rumoured to come from the tunnels (Associated Press, 2010b). The mall can be seen as a way for the population to forget the problems outside and enjoy cool air inside.

The dynamics of urbicide in this setting leave many questions unanswered that require investigation at a later date to fully understand the impact on the Palestinian people. It is necessary to examine the systematic destruction as the very nature of the space today. Through this destruction, the force of the Palestinian identity and their impact on the land is lessened; therefore, it can be argued, their desire to remain should lessen. This type of investigation would most likely require direct interviews with the Palestinian people within The Gaza Strip, in addition to additional data regarding the frequency and types of destruction to the landscape.

Further research into the dynamics of urbicide in the context of The Gaza Strip would also help answer whether the relationship of the Palestinian people and the rest of the world fostered the continuous destruction by anthropomorphizing the landscape into homo sacer. The transfer of the designation of homo sacer to the land should be investigated. The relationship to the land the Palestinian people have and the corresponding relationship of that land viewed by the Israeli military and politicians may give insight into how the cyclical destruction of The Gaza Strip can be stopped. It
would be necessary to determine whether the application of the term *homo sacer* can be applied to the land and the possible implications could feasibly explain how the Israeli military views The Gaza Strip. It is conceivable, through a more complete understanding of the Israeli military’s viewpoint of the land would enable a more detailed and comprehensive look into how urbicide is manifested in The Gaza Strip.


British Broadcast Company. (unknown). *The gaza strip*


Goonewardena, K., & Kipfer, S. (2007). Colonization and the new imperialism: On the meaning of urbicide today. Theory & Event, 10(2)


Hari, J. (2008, December 29th, 2008). The true story behind this war is not the one that Israel is telling. *The Independent*.


Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1947). In United Nations Secretary General (Ed.), *1947 UN partition plan*


Koret Communications Limited. (2005b). In Israel (Ed.), *Disengagement from northern samaria*. Israel:


Ravid, B. (2008a, December 27, 2008). Disinformation, secrecy and lies: How the gaza offensive came about. Ha'Arezt,

Ravid, B. (2008b, November 14, 2008). In 2006 letter to bush, haniyeh offered compromise with israel. Ha'Arezt,


Sturke, J. (2008). Hamas claims agreement with israel on gaza truce. The Guardian,

The Guardian Special Reports. (2004, March 22, 2004). Sharon vows to continue 'war on terror'. The Guardian,


Unknown. (2008, December 30th,). What can we do? the dilema that springs from a defiant refusal to compromise. The Economist,


APPENDIX A

4TH GENEVA CONVENTION

Art. 53. Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organisations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

Art. 55. To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

Art. 56. To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

Art. 147. Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Chapter II. Civilians and civilian population

Art 50. Definition of civilians and civilian population

1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.

2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.

3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.

Art 51. Protection of the civilian population

1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.

2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.

3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
   (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
   (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
   (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;

   and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects;

and

(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.

7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.

8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the obligation to take the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57.

Chapter III. Civilian objects

Art 52. General Protection of civilian objects

1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.

2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.

Art 53. Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant international instruments, it is prohibited:
(a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(b) to use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) to make such objects the object of reprisals.

Art 54. Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population

1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.

2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.

3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:
   (a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
   (b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.

4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.

5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control where required by imperative military necessity.

Art 55. Protection of the natural environment

1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.

Art 56. Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces

1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease:
   (a) for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
   (b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
   (c) for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.

3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law, including the protection of the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57. If the protection Ceases and any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of the dangerous forces.

4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisals.

5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected works or installations.

6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects
containing dangerous forces.

7. In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol [Article 17 of Amended Annex]. The absence of such marking in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article.

Chapter IV. Precautionary measures

Art 57. Precautions in attack

1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.

2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
   (a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
      (i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
      (ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects;
      (iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;

   (b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;

   (c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.

3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.

4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects.

5. No provision of this article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.

Art 58. Precautions against the effects of attacks

The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible:

(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.

Chapter V. Localities and zones under special protection

Art 59. Non-defended localities

1. It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities.
2. The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party.
   Such a locality shall fulfil the following conditions:
   (a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must have been evacuated;
   (b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments;
   (c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and
   (d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken.

3. The presence, in this locality, of persons specially protected under the Conventions and this Protocol, and of police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining law and order, is not contrary to the conditions laid down in paragraph 2.

4. The declaration made under paragraph 2 shall be addressed to the adverse Party and shall define and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits of the non-defended locality. The Party to the conflict to which the declaration is addressed shall acknowledge its receipt and shall treat the locality as a non-defended locality unless the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are not in fact fulfilled, in which event it shall immediately so
inform the Party making the declaration. Even if the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are not fulfilled, the locality shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.

5. The Parties to the conflict may agree on the establishment of non-defended localities even if such localities do not fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 2. The agreement should define and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits of the non-defended locality; if necessary, it may lay down the methods of supervision.

6. The Party which is in control of a locality governed by such an agreement shall mark it, so far as possible, by such signs as may be agreed upon with the other Party, which shall be displayed where they are clearly visible, especially on its perimeter and limits and on highways.

7. A locality loses its status as a non-defended locality when its ceases to fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 or in the agreement referred to in paragraph 5. In such an eventuality, the locality shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
LIST OF PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ITEMS INTO GAZA

Prohibited Items*

sage
 cardamom
cumin
coriander
ginger
jam
halva
vinegar
nutmeg
chocolate
fruit preserves
seeds and nuts
biscuits and sweets
potato chips
gas for soft drinks
dried fruit
fresh meat
plaster
tar
wood for construction
cement
iron
glucose
industrial salt
plastic/glass/metal containers
industrial margarine
tarpaulin sheets for huts

fabric (for clothing)
flavor and smell enhancers
fishing rods
various fishing nets
buoys
ropes for fishing
nylon nets for greenhouses
hatcheries and spare parts for hatcheries
spare parts for tractors
dairies for cowsheds
irrigation pipe systems
ropes to tie greenhouses
planters for saplings
heaters for chicken farms
musical instruments
size A4 paper
writing implements
notebooks
newspapers
small
razors
sewing machines and spare parts
heaters
horses
donkeys
chickens
chickens
chickens
List of Permitted Items

- flour
- sugar
- sweetener
- rice
- salt
- cooking oil
- semolina
- yeast
- pasta
- chickpeas
- beans
- kidney beans
- lentils
- peas
- Burgul wheat
- corn
- lupini beans
- powdered milk
- dairy products
- margarine
- hummus paste
- frozen meat, fish, and vegetables
- vitamins and oil for animal feed
- empty bags for flour
- medicine and medical equipment
- diapers
- feminine hygiene products
- toilet paper
- baby wipes
- shampoo & conditioner
- soap & liquid soap
- toothpaste
- laundry detergent
- fabric softener
- dish soap
- glass cleaner
- floor cleaning fluid
- cleaning liquid for bathroom use
- chlorine
- insecticide for household use
- coffee
- tea
- salami meat
- canned meat
- canned fish
- sponges for cleaning dishes
- sponges for washing
- mopping rags
- cleaning rags
- all canned food except canned fruit
- za'atar spice
- black pepper
- sesame
- powdered chicken stock
- blankets
- matches
- candles
- brooms
- mops
- dustpans
- trash cans
- aniseed
- chamomile
- cinnamon
- wastewater purification powder
- glass -200 trucks
- water coolers + heaters
- mineral water
- Tahini (sesame paste)
- hair brushes
- hair combs
- shoes
- clothes
- wood (for doors and window frames)
- aluminum
- soft plastic bags
- fruit
- vegetables
- hay
- fertilized eggs
- pesticides for agriculture
- soil for agriculture
particles for soil dilution  various kinds of agricultural seeds
chemical fertilizer  eggs (for eating)
plastic buckets  greenhouse nylon
plastic crates for fruits and vegetables  various kinds of veterinary medications
plastic chicken cages  and products
egg cartons  wheat
cartons for transporting chicks  barley
fiberglass and plastic trays for planting  animal feed

*This list is not official and does change regularly (GISHA, 2010)
*Some of these items are permitted if they are for the use of international organisations.
### APPENDIX D

#### POST WORLD WAR I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Year 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balfour Declaration</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel Commission stating a two state solution in light of Arab fears</td>
<td>24-Jul</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biltmore Program</td>
<td>11-May</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 181 (ii) passed Creating a Two State Solution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of the British Mandate of Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Paper Released</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Government Hands over the Palestinian Problem to the United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX E

### CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ITS EARLY HISTORY

**1948-1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14-May</th>
<th>24-Feb</th>
<th>23-Mar</th>
<th>3-Apr</th>
<th>29-Dec</th>
<th>31-Dec</th>
<th>6-May</th>
<th>5-Jun</th>
<th>11-Jun</th>
<th>22-Nov</th>
<th>6-Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Of Israel Declared</th>
<th>Armistice Agreement Signed with Lebanon</th>
<th>Suez War- Israel invades Egypt</th>
<th>Israel attacks Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian Airforce</th>
<th>Cease Fire agreed upon by Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Israel. UN Resolutions 235 and 236. Israel gained Control of the Gaza Strip, West Bank including Jerusalem, The Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights</th>
<th>War of Attrition with Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Armistice Agreement Signed with Egypt
- Armistice Agreement Signed With Jordan
- France and Britain invade Egypt
- Israel launches pre-emptive strike on Egypt and captures Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula
- UN Resolution 242 called for a lasting peace through the return of land gain in the 1967 war.
## APPENDIX F.

### EVENTS LEADING UPTO THE OSLO ACCORDS

**1973-1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6-Oct</th>
<th>8-Jan</th>
<th>3-May</th>
<th>11-Sep</th>
<th>26-Mar</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>6-Jun</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>8-Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- **Peace Agreement with Egypt**
- **Camp David Accords- Egypt**
- **Israel Returns Sinai Peninsula to Egypt**
- **PLO Withdraws from Lebanon and Moves to Tunisia**
- **First Intifada begins in Jabaliya Refugee Camp**

- **Yom Kippur War- Syria and Egypt Attack**
- **Peace Agreement with Syria**
- **Peace Treaty with Egypt**
- **Operation Peace For Galilee- Attack on Southern Lebanon**
- **Israel withdraws most of its troops from Lebanon- Security Zone created and maintained by Israel**
- **Taba- Sinai Peninsula Returned to Egypt**
# APPENDIX G

## TIMELINE OF EVENTS 1993-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declaration of Principles Signed with the PLO</th>
<th>Israeli -Palestinian Interim Agreement-Granting Autonomy to the West Bank and The Gaza Strip</th>
<th>Hamas wins Elections in Gaza</th>
<th>Second Lebanon War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **1993**: Gaza Jericho Agreement- Agreement on Preparatory transfer of Powers and Responsibility
- **1994**: Disengagement from the Gaza Strip- All settlements were abandoned
- **1995**: Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit captured
## APPENDIX H

### SIGNIFICANT EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND AFTER OPERATION CAST LEAD

#### 2007-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hamas takes over in Gaza</th>
<th>Hamas and Israel cease fire</th>
<th>Israel halts fuel deliveries to Gaza</th>
<th>the Free Gaza Movement's Yacht Dignity was attacked by an Israeli vessel in International Waters</th>
<th>Tel Al Hawa-Arial Attack</th>
<th>Israeli warplane launch missiles</th>
<th>Mavi Mara attacked in international waters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Hamas takes over in Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Hamas and Israel cease fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Israel halts fuel deliveries to Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Tel Al Hawa-Arial Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Israeli warplane launch missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mavi Mara attacked in international waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Operation Warm Winter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Israel breaks ceasefire agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Israel attacks Gaza and imposes a media blackout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Unilateral ceasefire imposed by Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Israel carries out retaliatory airstrikes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Israeli fighter jets attack several targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Israel attacks Gaza and destroys 3 tunnels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Israeli fighter jets attack several targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table and events are listed in chronological order from 2007 to 2010.
APPENDIX I
NUMBER OF TRUCKS ALLOWED IN 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Group</th>
<th>CROSSING</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Raw Materials</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Raw Materials</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal Feed</td>
<td>Karni Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal Feed</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal Feed</td>
<td>Sufa</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal Feed</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Karni Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/Stationary</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/Stationary</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Food Products</td>
<td>Karni Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Food Products</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>2033</td>
<td>1460.5</td>
<td>1221.5</td>
<td>1107.5</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>871.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Food Products Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1453</td>
<td>1633</td>
<td>2367</td>
<td>1770.5</td>
<td>1463.5</td>
<td>1448.5</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>1163.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hygiene/Cleaning Supplies</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hygiene/Cleaning Supplies</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NUMBER OF TRUCKS ALLOWED IN 2010 CONT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Group</th>
<th>CROSSING</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>industrial/Electrical Applications</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>179.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industrial/Electrical Applications Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>433</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>179.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Total</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies</td>
<td>Erez Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies Total</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Edible Consumables</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>404.5</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Edible Consumables Total</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>404.5</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging Applications</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging Applications Total</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehicles/Transporters</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehicles/Transporters Total</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT Total</td>
<td>Kerem Shalom</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3681</td>
<td>3510</td>
<td>5279</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td>2973</td>
<td>2653.5</td>
<td>2415.5</td>
<td>2546.5</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX J

GENEVA CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL I ARTICLES VIOLATED DURING CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Territory attacked</th>
<th>Date of Event</th>
<th>Pre-Planned</th>
<th>Pre- Geneva Convention</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>July 25, 1943- July 28, 1943</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidice</td>
<td>June 10th, 1942</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>April 3, 2002 to April 15, 2002</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>December 27, 2008 to January 21, 2009</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## GENEVA CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL I ARTICLES VIOLATED DURING CONFLICT

### CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Protocol I</th>
<th>Protocol I- Article 51.2 The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.</th>
<th>51.4 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;</th>
<th>51.4 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or</th>
<th>51.4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidice</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
51.5 Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: (a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Indiscriminate</th>
<th>Violated</th>
<th>Authoritative Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidice</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GENEVA CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL I ARTICLES VIOLATED DURING CONFLICT CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>52.2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage</th>
<th>52.3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.</th>
<th>Art 53. Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship: Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant international instruments, it is prohibited:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidice</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
<td>violated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>