

# Analogy Otherwise: A Relational Reading of Racialization, Alliance Politics, and Revolutionary Love

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## P R E C I S

*This essay is a modified version of a talk I gave in the Fall of 2017 at the Biennial Conference of the Society of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion at Vanderbilt University Divinity School, Nashville, Tennessee. I spoke these words not long after white supremacists and neo-Nazis marched in Charlottesville, Virginia. The theme of the gathering was “Revolutionary Love.” I was invited to address this issue after I wrote a blog post raising questions about revolutionary love and the categories of race, religion, and ethnicity. Specifically, I wrote about these matters for scholars of religion engaged with the American Academy of Religion (AAR). Returning to these remarks in the Winter of 2020, the urgency of my concerns could not be any more relevant. What follows is, more or less, what I wrote then. My hope is that these reflections will resonate with some of the powerful words of a younger generation of scholars’ works on issues of religion, ethnicity, and race—versions of some of the papers that were presented at the association’s pre-conference biennial meeting at the AAR in San Diego, California, in November, 2019.*



**A**s racist, antisemitic, Islamophobic, xenophobic, sexist, and homophobic discourses have been given new license, it is more urgent than ever for those of us committed to social justice to find new ways to work together and to construct new strategies for teaching and learning. These

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\*The author dedicates this essay to the memory of Maria Lugones (1944–2020)

are all political enactments, and they are linked to any number of social and intellectual movements within and outside of the academy. The stakes are high, and, although there are seemingly any number of familiar repertoires to which we might appeal as we work on our many fronts to address these urgent and dangerous challenges, I want to offer a modest intervention—to think about the problems and possibilities posed to alliance-building by the seemingly obvious and ubiquitous deployment of analogy in these efforts. To make my case, I build on a critical text I regularly teach in my Judaism and Race class, a general education course at Temple University that fulfills a race requirement. I open the class with this problem in order to attempt to rethink how my students deploy analogies.

### The Problem with Analogies and Their Necessity

In a now-classic essay from the collection *Queer Theory and the Jewish Question*, Janet Jakobsen asked, “Queers are like Jews, aren’t they?”<sup>1</sup> The question occasions an extensive revisiting of the challenges and possibilities posed by this seemingly simple juxtaposition. One term is like another; are Queers like Jews? How might this analogy work, and what are some of its pitfalls?

In the essay, Jakobsen used analogy both to make her case and to undermine what we might consider its plain or simple meaning. Along the way, she collected a number of analogies used by many of us who were attempting to forge alliances on the left, the collected efforts to resist and transform historical legacies of oppression and their ongoing effects and iterations. She also identified the troubling deployment of analogies by those who are committed to the work of othering, those who use analogy to create robust networks of dangerous others in order to use them to perpetuate these forms of degradation and oppression. Jakobsen saw these oppositional political strategies as bound to the discourse of analogy.

Especially in the context of the United States, the appeal of analogy is its powerful utility in the realm of the law. Analogy creates legal equivalences between classes of people, often extending rights in this manner.

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<sup>1</sup>Janet R. Jakobsen, “Queers Are Like Jews, Aren’t They? Analogy and Alliance Politics,” in Daniel Boyarin, Daniel Itzkovitz, and Ann Pellegrini, eds., *Queer Theory and the Jewish Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 64–89.

Citing political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Jakobsen wrote about early feminist Mary Wollstonecraft's efforts to extend the Rights of Man [*sic*] to women. They explained that Wollstonecraft "displaced [the discourse of rights] from equality between citizens to the field of equality between the sexes,"<sup>2</sup> thus "positioning women's rights as like the rights of citizens (men) makes women equal to men, just as all citizens are equal to each other."<sup>3</sup> This is an all-too-familiar strategy. Jakobsen wrote further, "[t]he power of claiming equivalence is evident in the social movements—feminist, civil rights, international human rights—that have time and again been founded upon it. The logic of equivalence has allowed claims for equality and rights to circulate among movements."<sup>4</sup> This has been and continues to be a useful and urgent strategy, but there are limitations. Despite the possibility of legal redress, the law does not end and has not in and of itself ended social inequities or the hate and prejudice that continue even after rights are won. Racism persists; sexism continues. As Jakobsen pointedly reminded us, despite the circulation of this discourse among social movements, analogy has not "been effective in connecting these movements to each other."<sup>5</sup> It is this desire to connect that fuels my remarks here. I turn to Jakobsen in order to begin a conversation about how those of us engaged in any number of contemporary social movements might work better in alliance with each other.

Although I will follow Jakobsen in her critique of the work of producing equivalences among social movements through analogy, like Jakobsen, I am not rejecting these practices. We continue to need this tool. The question instead shifts: How might we better use analogies to create meaningful connections between social movements? How might we "promote solidarity by creating empathy across different experiences"<sup>6</sup>?

Turning to the work of political scientists Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman,<sup>7</sup> Jakobsen identified three interrelated problems posed by efforts to make these kinds of analogous connections between social movements,

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66, quoting Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985), p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> Jakobsen, "Queers Are Like Jews," p. 66.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> See Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman, "Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (and Other Isms)," in

specifically the relationship between sexual discrimination and racial discrimination:

First, even as the meaning of the first term in an analogy (e.g., *sexism*) depends on the second term to which it is analogized (*racism*), the analogy tends to make the first term the center of analysis while marginalizing (if including at all) any analysis of the second term. So, for example, if we say that sexism is like racism, we may go on to analyze sexism in great depth without necessarily giving much attention to racism except insofar as it sets up our analysis of sexism.<sup>8</sup>

Here, the analogy seems to presume a kind of supersessionist logic where we already know about racism, and, as if this problem has been solved, now we may use the logic of this solution to solve the next problem. What gets lost is precisely the ongoing challenges of racism.

The second interrelated problem posed by analogizing is that “by emphasizing the ways in which ‘oppressions’ are like one another, analogy can give the sense that it explains everything about any experience of oppression, such that, for example, the pain of particular experiences of sexism is lost to the ways in which it is like racism.” In this case, “the specificity of each experience is lost to a generalized sense of oppression in which all oppressions are (generally) like each other.”<sup>9</sup> Finally, the third problem that Jakobsen draws from Grillo and Wildman points to how “analogy tends to create two distinctive groups. . . . This move tends to elide the intersection between [sexism and racism], creating the now infamous conjunction ‘women and people of color,’ which erases the existence of women of color and simultaneously constitutes ‘women’ as ‘white.’”<sup>10</sup>

Like Jakobsen and Grillo and Waldman, I want to avoid these disturbing and destructive problems. Jakobsen’s essay then considers how analogies might work otherwise. It builds on the work of literary theorist Christina Crosby<sup>11</sup> to make its alternative case. As Jakobsen explained, “Because analogy is a form of metaphor, analogy accomplishes its work

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Adrien Katherine Wing, ed., *Critical Race Feminism: A Reader* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 44–50.

<sup>8</sup> Jakobsen, “Queers Are Like Jews,” p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 67–68.

<sup>11</sup> See Christina Crosby, “Language and Materialism,” *Cardoza Law Review* 15 (March, 1994): 1657–1670.

through the transfer of properties from one set of terms to another.”<sup>12</sup> Crosby turned to Charles Perelman’s theory to explain that “it is essential, for analogy to fulfill its argumentative role, that the first [term] be less known, in some respect, than the second . . . which must structure the analogy.”<sup>13</sup> Calling the first term “the object of the discourse the theme and the second, thanks to its effecting the [metaphoric] transfer [of meaning], the phore,”<sup>14</sup> we learn that in this structural relationship the phore, as the presumably known term, is important only in relation to what it tells us about the first term. Jakobsen summarized: “In other words, the first term is dependent on the second. The two terms are not simply equivalent and they cannot be interchanged. In fact, the ground of the analogy must be kept stable, in order to shift our understanding of the thème. It is because we supposedly know and understand racism and know how to act to prohibit it that our knowledge of sexism can shift.”<sup>15</sup>

Paying attention to this formal relationship, Jakobsen made her intervention, insisting on breaking with this formation and instead offering a relational rereading, which “shifts our thinking in at least two ways.”<sup>16</sup> First, we need to consider how sexism and racism are “both like and different” from each other, “and second, we must place this pairing in its context.”<sup>17</sup> For Jakobsen, relational reading is critical:

Unlike the relations of analogy where one term effectively elides or even replaces that to which it is analogized, in this conceptualization both terms remain present, and they may form an active relationship of complicity or alliance. . . . The valence of the terms *complicity* or *alliance* depends on whether this relation is configured as an accusation of conspiracy or a promise of positive action.<sup>18</sup>

While complicity in maintaining a hierarchical relationship between sexism and racism is always a risk, Jakobsen offered a way out of the problem

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<sup>12</sup> Jakobsen, “Queers Are Like Jews,” p. 69.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Christina Crosby, “Money and Death in Dickens and Marx” (unpublished manuscript), pp. 6–7, quoting Charles Perelman, “Analogie et Metaphore en Science, Poesie et Philosophie,” *Revue internationale de philosophie* vol. 87, no. 1 (1969), p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Jakobson, “Queers Are Like Jews,” p. 70.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

of analogy, a more contingent strategy for working together without losing sight of both the similarities and the differences between the two terms or movements at stake. Neither the theme nor the phore is stable; both are in motion, and both are actively a part of this relationship of similarities and differences. It is this work in which I think we are challenged to engage.

So, how do we think about African Americans and Jewish Americans together in ways that consider how anti-Black racism and Antisemitism—the experiences of these different and related communities—are both similar and different? How might we think about these communities together in order to build working alliances? In part, I want to use Jakobsen’s provocation—her model of a relational reading—to begin to get at some of the instabilities that inform what it means for me to teach my course on Jews and Race in the U.S., a land whose history, as Ta-Nehisi Coates has powerfully reminded us, is built on an abiding legacy of racial subjugation and oppression.<sup>19</sup>

In the space remaining, I want to gesture toward an enactment of some of what Jakobsen called for. I want to consider racialization in this contemporary moment where Black lives are especially at risk in the U.S. and to think about what it might mean to draw connections between African Americans and Jewish Americans in our complexity. I will pay particular attention to our respective histories and to the diversities within, between, and among our various communities. Then, I will begin to position myself in such an engagement, recognizing my profound privilege as well as some of the contingencies that are a part of this story. I also want to use these gestures toward contextualization as my way into the final portion of this essay, namely, my challenge to many of my Christian colleagues and friends at the Society of Race, Ethnicity, and Religion, to think more about the Christian terms of “revolutionary love” and what they might mean for those of us potential allies who are not Christian. How does that universalizing discourse, so infused by so much care, love, and respect, also efface some critical distinctions, the boundaries, and the differences among and between us? Finally, I will conclude with some reflections on purity and why we might want to resist its pervasive allures.

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<sup>19</sup> Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me* (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2015).

## Analogies to Racism Are Everywhere, Yet the Work Is More Urgent than Ever

I began by addressing racialization as it is so often presented through the logic of analogy. I did this because of how the radical Black/white politics of the U.S., the history of chattel slavery and Jim Crow, and the continuous iterations of these dynamics—the movements back and forth, one step forward, two steps back—continue to operate.<sup>20</sup> Racism has not been undone. We are not done with racism. The critique of analogy might be an aid in this urgent and radical rethinking of how to discuss and combat racism.

I will briefly flesh out from my quite modest position how it might look to address the terms of the analogy between African Americans and Jewish Americans relationally. I want to consider some of the complicated moving parts involved in beginning to perform a relational reading. To consider racism in the U.S., we need to think both about the complex and dynamic communities and individuals who live with this assault on a daily basis and about Antisemitism and Jewish difference.

Blackness is not one; it is complicated. Blackness, even from the context of the study of religion, cannot be reduced to only an account of “the Black Church” or even a range of Black Christian communities. As Judith Weisenfeld powerfully showed in her 2017 award-winning book, *A New World A-Coming*,<sup>21</sup> there are multiple expressions of Black spirituality and religion in the U.S., and, of course, there is also a full range of secular cultural expressions of Blackness, with and without religion/s, as well as any number of communities and positions. There are also all too many experiences of

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<sup>20</sup> Given the brevity of this essay and the need for specificity, as well as the cautions to which Jakobsen has pointed, I wanted to be quite clear about the abiding challenge of anti-Black racism in the U.S. context. This allowed me to begin to place Antisemitism and anti-Black racism in conversation with each other, focusing on their similarities and their differences. This also echoes the anti-Black and neo-Nazi discourses deployed by white supremacist protesters in the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. This is not to say that there are not many other forms of racism permeating contemporary U.S. culture, particularly in relation to the policing of borders and the vulnerability of Latinx, Muslim, and Asian people coming into the U.S. and living within its borders. Again, building on Jakobsen’s discussion of the radical Black/white divide in this country, I wanted to speak to some of the ripple effects of an abiding form of racism. At the end of the essay, I turn to the late Maria Lugones and feminist critical identity politics in order to broaden this discussion. I thank Byron Lee for pushing me on this issue in private email correspondence, in February, 2020.

<sup>21</sup> Judith Weisenfeld, *A New World A-Coming: Black Religion and Racial Identity during the Great Migration* (New York: New York University Press, 2017).

racism, and, as we have seen over these past few years, these horrors share in their similarities with, as well as in their internal differences from, each other.

Who am I to begin to consider these horrific matters? I must first position myself, to take account especially, but not only or exclusively, of my privilege in my Jewish position. I do this again to begin to make clear some of the complexity and the tensions that inform both terms in an effort to think about racism and Antisemitism together.

How do I position myself? My Ashkenazi Jewish grandparents were almost all immigrants: three of my four grandparents were lucky and got into the U.S. just in time. My paternal grandparents arrived as young adults just before the doors closed in 1924. Some of their extended family were not so fortunate, as the racist legislation that created quotas on “undesirable” or “lesser” Europeans, including Italians and Greeks, prohibited them from coming to the U.S. These exclusionary laws were the same laws that made it impossible for German, Central, and Eastern European Jews to enter the U.S., even as they tried to flee the Nazis. These are the laws that kept Anne Frank and her family out of this country.

On my maternal side, my grandmother came as a young child—an early dreamer—while my grandfather was among the first of his family to be born in the U.S. My paternal, Yiddish-speaking grandparents struggled. They were poor. They were considered alien and exotic, perhaps a bit dangerous in the middle-class neighborhood in Schenectady, New York, where they lived before the Depression, before they lost their home and virtually everything they had. They were then forced to live with extended family in rented flats in the poorest neighborhoods of Albany, New York, in order to survive.

My mother’s parents were educated in the U.S. and, along with many of their siblings, went to a pharmacy school, which enabled their entry into the middle class. Even having graduated in 1929 at the outset of the Depression, these grandparents were able to make it in America. My mother’s family definitely benefited from the promise of America. Their whiteness mattered. They had entry. A generation later, as a World War II veteran, my father went to college, the first and only person in his family to do so, because of the GI Bill. He was able to take advantage of these profound benefits, benefits that were not extended to African American veterans. This affirmative action plan for Euro-Americans profoundly shaped my



family's ability to accumulate wealth, even as African Americans were excluded from these same opportunities.

These are some of the ways that my own family benefited profoundly as Europeans, as white Americans, in the racist system of white supremacy that continues to shape power and to privilege certain communities in the U.S.

Of course, I do not speak for *all* Jews. Among and within Jewish communities, distinctions of race, ethnicity, culture, and language also shape who gets to be a "Jew." There are racism and ethnocentrism within Jewish communities as well. Black Jews and Hebrews in the U.S. and Israel, Arab- and Persian-speaking Jews, and Jews from North Africa, the Middle East, and the larger African continent do not share some of my own family's white privilege—even if they live within the U.S. Here, too, there is racism.

To make analogies between African Americans and Jewish Americans and between specific manifestations of Antisemitism and racism is to expose all of the ways these various historical legacies differ and occasionally overlap. It is *not* to assume that the issue of racism has been settled for any particular group but, rather, to see more clearly than ever the ubiquity of U.S. racism and its insidious ongoing effects. It is about making clear the degree to which Jews like me, dominant Ashkenazi Jews, have profoundly benefited from our access to white privilege. It is also about considering some of the historical moments when we made meaningful connections with African American communities—and those communities with us—as well as when we have not. To be clear, at this moment, the vulnerability of Black lives in this culture matters more than I can say.

Antisemitism, however, is also a part of the logic of alt-right white supremacist nationalism, and we need to address that within the larger logic of these movements. We need to keep front and center the pervasive racism that informs all of the dangerous and horrific enactments occurring now in the U.S.

The position for which I am advocating echoes my training and my earliest work in feminist literary and critical theory, including some of the powerful interventions of feminist identity politics—a politics articulated most forcefully by women of color, specifically African American women

such as those engaged in the Combahee River Collective.<sup>22</sup> The imbrication, the overlap among and between these discourses, is at the heart of the kind of feminist theoretical identity politics for which Teresa de Lauretis argued in her now-classic text, *Feminist Studies, Critical Studies*.<sup>23</sup> This critical identity politics was already about epistemic messiness; even in the 1980's, this politics was multiple and contradictory. It was not necessarily about intersections, pinpoints between rigid, clearly marked modes of identification; rather, it was about imbricated and fluid relationships. It was about fierce refusals to choose between multiple forms of identifications. These women were not interested in creating a hierarchy of oppressions; they were trying to recognize how their differences were interrelated and how, together, these differences inform the lives we live with each other.

How do we deal with differences, and how do we build alliances and work together? It is not easy. I offer one messy challenge before concluding with the problem of purity.

### Revolutionary Love?

Why is revolutionary Christian love so powerful for many radical Christians but a problem for those of us outside this “big tent” community? I think this is, in part, why I was invited to talk about my concerns about a kind of well-meaning, but also dangerous, form of appropriation, that I described as a problem at the American Academy of Religion in 2016.<sup>24</sup>

The brilliant lawyer and activist Michelle Alexander spoke at that AAR as part of then-AAR President Serene Jones's theme for the conference, “Revolutionary Love”—a decidedly Christian vision of social justice, albeit a profoundly progressive Christian vision. Clearly, none of this was done in malice. The intentions of those involved were, I believe, well-meaning. This

<sup>22</sup>The Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” in Anne C. Herrmann and Abigail J. Stewart, eds., *Theorizing Feminism: Parallel Trends in the Humanities and the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 29–37.

<sup>23</sup>Teresa de Lauretis, “Feminist Studies/Critical Studies: Issues, Terms, and Contexts,” in Teresa de Lauretis, ed., *Feminist Studies/Critical Studies*, *Theories of Contemporary Culture* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 1–19.

<sup>24</sup>Laura Levitt, “Revolutionary Love and the Colonization of a Critical Voice: An Outsider's Reflections,” *Religion Bulletin* (blog), November 29, 2016; available at <http://bulletin.equinoxpub.com/2016/11/revolutionary-love-and-the-colonization-of-a-critical-voice-an-outsiders-reflections/>.

is not about intentions. Nevertheless, what transpired at the AAR was a form of Christian social justice ministry powerfully enacted in Alexander's session that did not pay attention to the full range of the room's audience, the members of that academic organization.

As I walked into that grand ballroom, I did not know about Alexander's move to the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in New York or of her then-still-recent embrace of Christianity. I came to that session to hear more about her groundbreaking, urgent work on mass incarceration.

As I wrote in my blog post, perhaps I was naïve as I arrived at this major lunch hour session, but I was not prepared for how that brief, highly public event turned out. The dialogue format that placed Alexander in conversation with theologian and the Rev. Canon Kelly Brown Douglas, in retrospect, should have alerted me to the tenor of this conversation, but it did not. I was, after all, attending a large public event at the AAR's annual meeting, a plenary session of this decidedly nonsectarian academic organization. My public criticism of this session was precisely that this conversation—what ultimately became a Christian theological intervention—was made in this setting.

The powerful "Amen!" responses that the speakers elicited in that room are what concerned me. When the answer to the crisis of mass incarceration is proclaimed through the rhetoric of "church" and "Jesus," some of us—many of us who are not Christian—are no longer part of the conversation. Moreover, in that particular instance and setting, there was no conversation. It was a brief session, without even a question-and-answer period. My concern is that this was a powerful, well-intentioned, and thoughtful radical Christian political intervention. This happened just after the 2016 election, and it evoked all of the fear and despair that so many of us in the room were feeling. I understood all too well the urgency but not the answer—not that suggested universalizing vision.

For me, it was the juxtaposition of Alexander's proclamation of the problem, the "bankruptcy of American democracy," alongside her answer to this question—"the power of the Church, of Jesus's suffering on the cross," and ultimately a Christian vision of the brotherhood/sisterhood of humanity as "children of God"—that still concerns me. Again, my critique is *not* about intention but, rather, about what this very-well-meaning vision does to those of us who are interpolated and who are incorporated into this quite specific universal vision. What happens to our differences, to the

specificity and complexities that characterize the ways we live our lives? How do we not see ourselves in this Christian universalism?

This is not my revolution, and as much as I respect and admire the work of so many of my Christian friends and colleagues, I want to be sure that we do not lose sight of the boundaries and distinctions that mark our individual and collective subject positions. But, even in so doing, there are other dangers. Efforts to create and sustain boundaries can become brittle, and, because so many of us occupy multiple subject positions, we need also to consider and question the allure of too-clear distinctions. This is, as I will now suggest, the danger around discourses of purity.

### This Is Not about Purity, a Final Note

In a now-classic essay, the late feminist theorist Maria Lugones wrote eloquently about the dangers posed by the discourse, the language, the social formations, and the institutions and practices of purity. She wrote that the logic of purity demands a “world of precise, hard-edged schema.”<sup>25</sup> In “the conceptual world of purity,”<sup>26</sup> a world guided by a fundamental assumption that there is always “unity underlying multiplicity,”<sup>27</sup> we discover the following set of clustered concepts: “control, purity, unity, categorizing.”<sup>28</sup> Together, this network of terms and practices refuses the messy multiplicities I have tried to highlight and embrace in this essay, complexities on both sides of a relational analogy.

The complexities I have described are not “fragments” of a greater unified whole but, rather, a glimpse at complicated, mixed, lively living beings and communities. Multiplicity is both a micro reality within any single being and also already a living formative quality of collective experiences. It describes communities in their complexity. As Lugones reminded us, the logic of purity is not a living reality but an ahistorical logic that hides the very labor that constructs any form of unity.<sup>29</sup> What I have tried to suggest here is that the very act of creating—the labor of making connections and deploying more capacious analogies and creating alliances—offers us hope.

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<sup>25</sup> Maria Lugones, “Purity, Impurity, and Separation,” *Signs* 19 (Winter, 1994): 459.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 462.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 463.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 465.

Refusing the logic of purity is life-giving. To render purity impossible is to refuse to be a part of a network of “fictitious dichotomies,”<sup>30</sup> so I offer Lugones’s beautiful, powerful words, her vision of the impure lively, passionate worlds that so many of us inhabit and where we might come together and act together and separately, refusing any demands for unity. Claiming a different kind of separation, Lugones wrote of curdling as a practice, not something that happens but something we do: “I recommend the cultivation of this art as a practice of resistance into transformation from oppressions that are interlocked. It is a practice of festive resistance.”<sup>31</sup>

This bristling, lively, complex appreciation for the impurity of lived experience and of all forms of identification brings us full circle back to Jakobsen’s insistence on the instability of terms, individuals, and groups in any analogy. This is what I believe might help us to begin to work together better in this urgent moment, when so many of our lives are at stake.

### Postscript

Returning to these issues in 2020, in the continued occurrences of racist violence and well after the shootings at The Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (October, 2018), and the Chabad of Poway Synagogue in Poway, California (April, 2019), I am only more keenly aware of the fragility of so many of our lives and of the urgency of addressing racism—including Antisemitism—in the U.S. As scholars and activists committed to working together to combat racism and violence, let us return to the question that sparked my critique and analysis: How can we find ways to respect our differences and engage with each other more deeply and profoundly? I long for a kind of love and respect that resists any simple notion of unity.

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 467.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 478.

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