AMERICAN EXCEPTION: HEGEMONY AND THE TRIPARTITE STATE

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to explain the uncanny continuity of hegemonic US foreign policy across presidential administrations and the breakdown of the rule of law as evidenced by unadjudicated state and elite criminality. It finds that a nebulous deep state predominates over politics and society. This deep state is comprised of institutions that advance the interests of the politico-economic elite through nexuses connecting the overworld of the corporate rich, the underworld of organized crime, and mediating national security organizations. To investigate the evolution of the state, the tripartite state construct is elucidated. It is a synthesis and expansion of three extant approaches—dual state theory, theories of the power elite, and the deep politics framework which explores the impactful forces and institutions whose influence is typically repressed rather than acknowledged in mainstream discourse. The tripartite state is comprised of the democratic or public state, the security state, and the deep state. A key contention herein is that the deep state developed alongside postwar US exceptionism—the institutionalized abrogation of the rule of law, ostensibly on the basis of “national security.” Theories of hegemony and empire are analyzed and critiqued and refined. To wit: the post-World War II US empire has been sustained by hegemonic institutions which rely on various degrees of consent and coercion—both in a dyadic sense but increasingly through structural dominance following the collapse of Bretton Woods. Rival hypotheses related to the state and US foreign policy are analyzed and critiqued. To explore the concept of a deep state within a nominal democracy, open democratic modes of power are contrasted with top-down or dark power. Through process tracing, the historical evolution of the US state is delineated, charting the means by which US imperial hegemony was reproduced. Presidential administrations and the Watergate scandal serve as case studies of sorts, illustrating the deep state’s role in the general thrust of postwar US politics—imperial hegemony over the international system. Finally, various deep state institutions are examined along with a discussion of generalizability, applications, and implications of the foregoing scholarship.
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CHAPTER 1

EMPIRE, HEGEMONY, AND THE STATE

The Research Question

Within the social sciences, it is a conventional practice to frame research in terms of a research question or questions. This may be more or less useful depending on the field of inquiry and the phenomena in question. The following is an attempt to distill into a few questions what this dissertation seeks to address: Why does US foreign policy display such continuity across administrations? Why has American democracy—most specifically the rule of law—declined inversely with the rise of US global dominance? To some extent, this formulation of the research questions is an artificial construct. The scope of this dissertation is broader than most of the mid-range theories that predominate in the social sciences at present. If comparison might be useful, *American Exception: Hegemony and the Tripartite State* is influenced and inspired by works like *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills (1956) and *Democracy Incorporated* by Sheldon Wolin (2008).

Democracy as a concept has been greatly contested in political science. In a broad normative sense, a country is democratic to the extent that the general public rather than the elite controls the political system. Institutionally, a democracy is characterized by the rule of law, political rights, free and fair elections, and accountability (Linz and Stepan 1996). Within the American social sciences, most seminal 20th century scholars and theorists of American democracy have focused on US domestic politics and US society. This would include political scientists like Dahl and Lindblom (1953) as well as sociologists like C. Wright Mills (1956). One of the central concerns of this dissertation is the relationship between expansive foreign policy and democratic decline. One of the few American political scientists to focus squarely on this issue was Lasswell (1941). His neglected “garrison state” construct is worth revisiting and reassessing given the subsequent rise of US global dominance and democratic decline.
There are three larger realms in which democratic decay is most evident. The first – and a central one for the purposes of this dissertation – is the diminishment of the rule of law. The second pertains to the drastic rise in inequality. The third is the decline in American nationalism. The diminishment of the rule of law relates to the rule of law as one of the chief institutional criteria which define democracy. The other two aspects – inequality and the decline of nationalism – pertain to the broad normative conception of democracy. These are germane to the present discussion because they are aspects that relate directly to one of the central dynamics examined herein – the impact of America’s post-World War II global orientation upon American politics and society.

The diminishment of the rule of law can be dramatically illustrated by the following separate but interrelated trends: high criminality or unadjudicated crimes committed by top government officials and political insiders, elite criminality or crimes committed by socioeconomic elites, and finally the abasement of constitutionally guaranteed political rights. High criminality would include the “October surprise” of 1968, the crimes associated with Watergate, the sprawling high crime spree that is truncated by the term “Iran-Contra,” and stolen presidential elections in 2000 (deHaven-Smith 2005) and possibly 2004 (Miller 2005). Deserving to be included in the realm of high criminality are innumerable US foreign policy practices including aggressive war and the overthrow of foreign governments which would on their face appear to clearly violate the UN Charter. The UN Charter outlaws aggression and even the threat of aggression against other states. The US Senate ratified the UN Charter and since the supremacy clause of the US Constitution deems ratified treaties to be “supreme Law of the Land,” US leaders have violated the “supreme Law of the Land” innumerable times, judicial abdication notwithstanding. Socioeconomic elite criminality is most clearly exemplified by the myriad unadjudicated crimes related to the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The violation of political rights is evident in the McCarthy era, the FBI’s COINTEL programs, media
manipulation, mass surveillance regimes, suppression of political movements, torture regimes, warrantless detention, and assassination programs. While the violation of democratic political rights does entail the commission of crimes by government officials, the institutionalized nature of these transgressions makes them distinct from the aforementioned high crimes. It is worth noting that there is considerable overlap between the diminishment of the rule of law and the deterioration of the other institutional components of democracy. Specifically, elections have been less than “free and fair.” Political rights have been infringed upon. Accountability is diminished as a result of state secrecy and the selective application of the rule of law which together preclude meaningful accountability in crucial areas.

Economic inequality in America has risen to levels not observed since before the Great Depression. This is an anti-democratic trend because it is logical that a political system controlled by the general public rather than elites would not be characterized by ever-rising levels of socioeconomic stratification. Additionally, America has also seen rising levels of political inequality. In the 1950’s, C. Wright Mills (1956) observed that democracy was in terminal decline as a tripartite American power structure had consolidated its hegemony over society. More recently, political scientists have been able to establish quantitatively that the general public has virtually no political influence relative to elites (Gilens and Page 2014). While both the middle and lower levels of the socioeconomic hierarchy have little influence on the political system, the lower strata of society are subject to an array of institutions that diminish their ability to enjoy “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” such as could be expected in an advanced democratic country. These institutions include police surveillance and repression, mass incarceration, substandard public education, inadequate social services, widespread unemployment and underemployment, and predatory business practices.

The third realm in which America’s undemocratic trajectory can be discerned relates to the decline of nationalism in many tangible respects. In this context, nationalism refers to the
pursuit of policies which strengthen and enrich the country’s collective economy and population. One would expect nationalism to be expressed in a democratic system since it would not behoove campaigning politicians to advocate for policies which would be deleterious to the nation as a whole. Yet, in a number of issue areas, officials have acted in ways that were harmful to the general interest. American governments have pursued policies that facilitated deindustrialization resulting in reduced domestic production and consumption on the part of workers whose jobs have been offshored. Additionally, the state of America’s physical infrastructure has declined dramatically. This is striking in a country with considerable latent productive industrial capacity. The domestic economy also suffers from a trend toward historically high levels of private and public debt. This creates an unproductive, feudalizing dynamic which benefits a rentier class at the expense of the general population’s economic security and living standards. A related trend is privatization – the transformation of the public domain (education, utilities, prisons, etc.) into avenues for rent extraction. Here again, a rentier class benefits at the expense of the public at large. These neoliberal trends collectively are the opposite of what progressive political economists predicted would result from democracy and economic development (Hudson 2012).

It is crucial to note that this democratic decline has been coterminous with American unipolarity or global hegemony. At the very least, the US was the hegemon of the global capitalist world during the Cold War and has been the unchallenged global hegemon since the fall of the Soviet Union. American political thinkers from the Founding Fathers to contemporary scholars like Chalmers Johnson (2000; 2004; 2006) have asserted that empire is not compatible with democracy. Such analysis in and of itself is not novel. The focus here is upon the forces that drive the pursuit of global dominance and which have altered the structure of the state. An understanding of the resultant structures is essential. Specifically, the evolution of the tripartite state should be understood both in terms of its continuity with the past as well as its relatively novel features.
The Tripartite State

The *tripartite state* is a theoretical construct designed to illuminate the nature of power and the state in America. Fundamentally, it synthesizes and expands upon three extant approaches to understanding the state and US society. Regarding the state, the theories of the *dual state* or *double government* are given considerable weight. C. Wright Mills’ theories of the tripartite structure of American power also inform the tripartite state construct. In effect, the three components of the tripartite state are very much analogous to the “big three” institutions that comprise Mills’ American power structure—big business, the military, and the political directorate. Finally, the theory utilizes and adapts Peter Dale Scott’s *deep politics* approach which seeks to discern the powerful forces and actors whose decisive influence is repressed or diminished in public discourse.

The tripartite state is comprised of three elements—the public or democratic state, the security state, and the deep state. The public state consists of those institutions that we learn about in high school civics classes and study in political science—the visible and formally organized institutions that comprise our elected federal, state, and local governments as well as the civil service bureaucracies associated with them. The *security state* is comprised of those institutions in charge of maintaining “security” domestically and internationally. Notable security state organizations include the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The deep state is a more nebulous entity. Previously, I sparsely defined the deep state as “an obscured, dominant, supra-national source of antidemocratic power” (Good 2015/2018, 19). The *New York Times* defined the deep state as “a hard-to-perceive level of government or super-control that exists regardless of elections and that may thwart popular movements or radical change.” Describing the essence of what he means by the term *deep state*, Peter Dale Scott describes it as “a power not derived from the constitution but outside and above it,” that is “more
powerful than the public state” (Scott 2015, 3). The institutions that exercise undemocratic power over state and society collectively comprise the deep state. The deep state is an outgrowth of the overworld of private wealth and it includes most notably the institutions that advance overworld interests through the nexuses connecting the overworld, the underworld, and the national security organizations that mediate between them. They have diminished US democracy to such an extent that it is justified to describe ours as a deep state system and to speak of the tripartite state. A central contention herein is that the tripartite state developed alongside postwar American exceptionism—“the institutionalization of the interminable state of exception” which has entailed “the institutionalization of securitized supra-sovereignty or Lockean ‘prerogative’ although not to a fixed or determinate source” (Good 2015, 16).

The tripartite state emerged from long extant forces in US society. The public state existed prior to independence in the form of colonial assemblies and later the Continental Congress. Likewise, there were elements of a security state dating at least back to the continental army and Washington’s network of spies in the War for Independence. Early in US history, the security state was more securely tethered to the public state and was used relatively sparingly—for example—against Barbary Pirates and American Indians and to promote expansion as in Andrew Jackson’s attack on Spanish Florida or Polk’s Mexican-American War. The cases of Florida and Texas are especially relevant since no official authorization was given to Andrew Jackson or the Texas rebels respectively, yet their legally dubious actions seem clearly to have emerged from deep political forces in the US. Andrew Jackson’s negation the Indian treaties and Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeus corpus are other examples of the illegal and/or unconstitutional exercises of prerogative power which were dwarfed by the exceptionism that emerged after World War II.

From the founding of the United States to World War II, the US could be described as having a deep political system in tandem with the more visible political system. The overworld of
private wealth often conjoined with an underworld political economy and some of the most lucrative trades occupied a realm between legality and criminality. Most notably, examples include the slave trade, the opium trade, and later the fruit and sugar industries. These often-transnational enterprises could become powerful and even decisive in shaping economic fortunes and political outcomes. Domestically, the various political machines were the most obvious institutions wherein deep political forces reigned and provided a nexus between overworld and underworld forces of the US and of various localities. It may be accurate to conceive of political machines as the organizations which—in miniature—provide the best historical analogy to the current hypertrophied American deep state.

The period following the Civil War saw the US emerge as an industrialized economic behemoth with economic interests quickly expanding beyond its borders. The deep political power of private wealth was ascendant but accompanied by modest political reforms which were responses to mobilized democratic elements of civil society. At the turn of the century, with manifest destiny and the closing of the frontier finally achieved, the US began to project its power globally. It is noteworthy that Henry Cabot Lodge, the man perhaps most responsible for steering the US into the Spanish-American War, was descended from Boston Brahmins who had made vast fortunes in the opium trade. Similarly, deep political forces were likely decisive in the US decision to unofficially abandon neutrality early in World War I and later to formally enter the war. In particular, the US entry seems to have been a function of the relationship between Britain and the pinnacle of the US financial elite, JP Morgan specifically. Had Germany not surrendered—an outcome very much in doubt after Brest-Litovsk—the US, with JP Morgan as its broker, stood to lose billions after extending vast amounts of credit to the Allies. Morgan influence went beyond US entry and victory in the war. At Versailles, illustrious financier Bernard Baruch complained that Morgan men had been in control of the proceedings (Stone and
Kuznick 2012, 37). As per the treaty’s terms, harsh reparations were foisted on Germany which in turn enabled the Allies to repay the US.

Despite its considerable power at the close of World War I, the US did not at that time seek the mantle of global hegemony. It wasn’t until the onset of World War II that deep forces in US society sought to reorient American posture toward the international realm. New institutions and new epistemologies needed to be created to manage international and domestic politics. The postwar national security state and America’s sense-making institutions collectively shaped the US-led world order and the “postwar liberal consensus” that sought and legitimized US global dominance. Anticommunism allowed for the securitization of politics. As even America’s founders observed, the securitization that necessarily accompanies wars is toxic or even fatal for democratic/republican institutions.

The Cold War achieved the securitization of politics on a scale theretofore unseen in US history and was deemed—or understood to be—a twilight struggle against an implacable, amoral adversary bent on world domination. National security organizations are by design undemocratic. Hierarchy, secrecy, and expediency are structural features necessitated by the imperatives of “security.” They are authoritarian responses to real, imagined, or fabricated threats—especially existential ones. The postwar national security state did not arise from an attack against the US. It was created ostensibly to combat Soviet Communism and the supposed threat it posed to the US and the world. However, the organizational structure of the national security state was created by elites with deep connections to the overworld of private wealth. In particular, the CIA was the brainchild of men like Allen Dulles (Good 2015, 15). Along with his brother, future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles was a longtime employee of the Wall Street law firm Sullivan and Cromwell whose clients included the world’s largest multinational corporations. Given this history, it is not difficult to grasp why so much of US foreign policy has consisted of intervening to make countries as suitable as possible for the maximization of corporate profit. The
previous seven decades provide innumerable examples that demonstrate the extent to which overt and covert US interventions in foreign countries were often instigated by—and for the benefit of—the overworld of corporate wealth. These interventions have involved every expedient manner of violence and lawbreaking. Foreign wars and covert operations are illegal under the UN Charter. Again, having ratified the treaty, US officials violate US law by contravening the charter which the Constitution deems to be “the supreme law of the land.”

It has often been argued that Cold War anticommunism was to blame for the excesses of US foreign policy during the era. This would entail conceiving of anticommunism as an outlook and set of practices opposed to the spread of Soviet or Chinese-style communism. Such practices could be described as regrettable but necessary departures from American ideas of fair play, undertaken to confront an existential threat. Were such an understanding accurate, the state of exception to the rule of law would have ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. Such has not been the case. In 1996, a House Intelligence Committee report stated that CIA officials had revealed that the operations arm of the CIA “is the only part of the [Intelligence Community], indeed of the government, where hundreds of employees on a daily basis are directed to break extremely serious laws in countries around the world.” A conservative estimate “is that several hundred times every day, [Directorate of Operations] officers engage in highly illegal activities” (Kelly 2002, 311). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently reaffirmed this, stating, “I was the CIA director. We lied, we cheated, we stole.”

There are serious problems that an exceptionalist (i.e., lawless) security state presents to a liberal democracy. The rule of law is obviously abrogated. Secrecy confounds public sense-making and deliberation since the public cannot evaluate policies and governmental actions that
are obscured or misrepresented through various ersatz cover stories. These very weighty issues are likely not the most problematic aspect of US exceptionism. One provocative question examined herein involves the extent to which these criminogenic political institutions and practices have been confined to the realm of foreign policy. Has the US been able to hermetically seal state-sanctioned lawlessness and thereby maintain the rule of law domestically even while exceptionism prevails in foreign relations? Drawing from the work of Lance deHaven-Smith (2006) and others, the answer appears to be no; there are enough documented and suspected state crimes against democracy (SCADs) to assert that at best public sovereignty has been compromised. A more alarming interpretation would be that SCADs and related dynamics have collectively comprised a rolling coup d’etat that has drastically weakened American democracy. Progressive elements of the US state and society have been marginalized while US dominance has been pursued internationally, typically with various measures of subversion, violence, expropriation, and exploitation.

Some of these documented and suspected interventions include: the assassination of President Kennedy, the FBI’s COINTELPRO programs against the antiwar; civil rights; and black power movements, the assassination of Malcolm X, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the assassination of Martin Luther King, the assassination of Robert Kennedy, Nixon’s 1968 “October Surprise,” the collection of crimes known collectively as “Watergate,” the 1980 October Surprise, the Iran-Contra affair, the September 11, 2001 terror attacks (deHaven-Smith 2006, 338) followed by the anthrax attacks (Boyle 2005), and the “stolen” presidential elections of 2000 (deHaven-Smith 2005) and 2004 (Miller 2005). Another significant pattern of criminality that touches upon many of the foregoing intrigues is the nexus between the intelligence agencies and the international drug traffic. While the evidentiary support for each of these suspected or documented SCADs differs, they each have their serious and reputable proponents, even as the prevailing discourse dismisses such suspicions as “conspiracy theory”—a term that has come to
connote unseriousness and which is applied in such a way as to encourage the \textit{a priori} rejection of critical theories and the acceptance of state-sanctioned narratives. DeHaven-Smith (2013) examined this issue and found that the term “conspiracy theory,” was seldom used in public discourse until the aftermath of the John Kennedy assassination. He points to a CIA document distributed to the agency’s media assets requesting their assistance in dismissing and marginalizing “conspiracy theorists” as unreliable, irrational, and/or venal. Thus, there has been what could be described as the “conspiracy theory conspiracy” wherein state actors intervene in civil society to help create a prevailing common sense wherein reasonable suspicions of high criminality are reflexively dismissed and stigmatized by our sense-making institutions.

The collective impact of SCADs is impossible to quantify precisely. Addressing many of the same anomalies as deHaven-Smith, Peter Dale Scott (2015) describes some of the key phenomena as \textit{structural deep events} (117), history-shaping episodes that impact “…the whole fabric of society, with consequences that enlarge covert government.” Rather than ever being properly investigated and/or adjudicated, structural deep events “are subsequently covered up by systematic falsifications in media and internal government records” (121). Every civilization reaches a level of complexity at which point milieus and institutions emerge which wield power yet remain submerged or not fully revealed or acknowledged by the society as a whole. In the US, this dynamic is described by Scott (1993) as America’s \textit{deep political system}. An argument made in this dissertation is that these SCADs or deep events have indeed altered the course of American history and transformed the US political system from its earlier form—an evolving coexistence and accommodation between constitutional democracy and a deep political system. Interventions from the deep political system have transformed the American state and US society and given rise to the \textit{tripartite state}, or a \textit{deep state system} wherein \textit{exceptionism} allows for the supra-sovereignty of undemocratic forces. Specifically, the overworld of corporate wealth has created and altered institutions to most effectively manage international and domestic politics to the
effect that empire and hegemony—and thus exceptionism—are sacrosanct imperatives even as their overdetermining impacts are rarely acknowledged or debated candidly by the demos.

The rise of the *tripartite state* has greatly weakened American democracy in the most fundamental sense if a polity is taken to be more or less democratic to the extent that sovereignty rests with the public rather than elites. The decline of US democracy has given rise to three crises to which the deep state system cannot adequately respond. The first crisis is the ever-present risk of nuclear *omnicide*—the extinction of humanity, by humanity. The second is the crisis of global climate change. The third is the crisis of inequality wherein a tiny minority owns most of the world’s wealth while globally tens of thousands of people die daily from lack of adequate access to food, potable water, and/or basic healthcare (e.g. Phillips 2018, 31). Without drastic moves toward progressive and democratic structural reform, it is difficult to conceive of ways in which any of these crises can be resolved or ameliorated. With these sobering exigencies in mind, the theory of the tripartite state seeks to delineate and illuminate current sociopolitical realities in historical context.

**Hegemony and Empire**

The theoretical foundations of this dissertation are eclectic. Theories pertaining to hegemony, imperialism, the dual state, and administrative prerogative are examined and critiqued. The concept of hegemony is crucial in the realms of international and American politics respectively. Theorists who address hegemony differ most significantly across a dimension that places the emphasis either on coercive dominance or upon consensual leadership (Good 2018). Mearsheimer, the “offensive realist,” emphasizes dominance (2003). Sullivan (2008) focuses on the coercive aspect of US foreign policy. Kindleberger (1973) and other hegemonic stability theorists assert that the international system can only function smoothly when there is a hegemonic state that provides public goods internationally. Strange’s concept of structural power serves to bridge the gap between coercion and consent (1994). Structural power allows the
powerful country to determine the rules of the international political economy by which others must play. Through the use of structural power, countries can constrain and control other actors without the application of overt force (Strange 1994). As a historical materialist, Cox (1981) describes hegemonic world order established by dominance over three realms: material, ideational, and institutional. Arrighi and Silver (1999) similarly see hegemony as not simply dominance. Instead, the hegemon’s power is amplified by virtue of the fact that it is perceived by relevant others as leading in a way that is beneficial for itself and others.

While hegemony and imperialism are related concepts, it is important to highlight the theoretical and connotative differences and similarities. Imperialism can be a term that is used pejoratively to emphasize the international exercise of power that is unaccountable or illegitimate (Connelly 2006). Theories of empire and imperialism are intertwined with theories pertaining to hegemony. Maier (2006) asserts that there is little substantial conceptual difference between theories of hegemony and empire; the terms can be used almost synonymously (62-64). Or there can be subtle distinction. Doyle (1986) defines empire as “effective control, whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society” (30). By contrast, he defines hegemony as an international order in which the dominant state controls “much or all of the external, but little or none of the internal, policy of other states” (Doyle 1986, 12). Ikenberry (2011) writes about hegemony and world order from a historical institutionalist perspective. He makes explicit distinction between empire and liberal hegemony as two ideal types of hierarchical world order. Empire is described as rule in which control is exerted over subordinate states through direct or indirect means; sovereignty is controlled by the imperial state. Control is maintained through networks of elites in the center and periphery states (Ikenberry 2011, 66-68).

Ikenberry (2011) lists three general features of liberal hegemonic order which differentiate it from empire. First, the hegemon establishes rules and institutions which are arrived at through negotiations. The hegemon sponsors the systems and acts within its rules.
Second, the hegemon provides international “public goods” in exchange for the cooperation of the other states. Even without taxing the other states, the hegemon still benefits overall by providing public goods for the system. Third, the liberal hegemonic order creates and maintains channels and networks that allow states to informally influence the governance of the international system (Ikenberry 2011, 71-72). Ikenberry (2011) believes that that the postwar era of American dominance was liberal hegemonic in character. After the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, “the American-led hierarchical order began to take on imperial characteristics” (Ikenberry 2011, 225).

Historical materialists provide definitions of imperialism that may explain much of the history of great power politics and its respective imperial actors. Hobson (1902) famously described imperialism as stemming from underconsumption and capital accumulation in capitalist nations. Lenin (1917) expanded on Hobson’s thesis with an additional emphasis on the pivotal role of finance capital. Schumpeter (1951) argued that although imperialism had some materialist motivations, its causes were also sociological and atavistic in nature. Capitalism, as opposed to being inherently imperialistic, would gradually lead to further rationalization of society and thereby curtail humanity’s imperialist tendencies (Schumpeter 1951). In the 1960’s, dependency theory emerged to describe imperialist dynamics which accounted for the political and economic disparities in the developing world (Frank 1966). This was a challenge to the dominant modernization paradigm which posited that countries were merely at differing stages of development or modernization (Rostow 1960).

Following the decline of dependency theory, imperialism became a less commonly deployed concept in political theory. One exception to this trend was Parenti (1995) who in the 1990’s provided a usefully broad definition of imperialism as “the process whereby the dominant politico-economic interests of one nation expropriate for their own enrichment the land, labor, raw materials, and markets of another people” (1). Nominally “post-Marxist” scholars Hardt and
Negri (2000) described empire without imperialism – an agentless postmodern world order characterized by a novel globalized sovereignty which had effectively ended state sovereignty. Given subsequent history, Hardt and Negri were at best premature in declaring the insignificance of the nation-state. In the early 21st century, more scholars began to revisit the concept of imperialism. This rediscovery was due to the increasing evidence of structural inequalities throughout the global system as well as American military adventurism and unilateralism after 2001 (Pitts 2010). Materialist conceptions of empire became more common. Harvey (2003) acknowledges that “imperialism” is a term that can be used for polemical rather than analytical purposes (26). In discussing capitalist imperialism, he describes empire as “a distinctly political project on the part of actors whose power is based in command of a territory and a capacity to mobilize its human and natural resources towards political, economic and military ends” (Harvey 2003, 26). The “project” is the assertion of the imperial state’s interests in the larger world (Harvey 2003, 26).

Theoretically, the stronger case is that hegemony and empire are not opposing ends on a continuum, but that the concepts are characterized more by overlap. This point is crucial to understanding the US-dominated world order established after World War II. To reiterate, Ikenberry claims that prior to 2001, the US was “liberal hegemonic” and after 2001, it took on imperial characteristics. Similarly, Doyle asserts that hegemonies do not control the internal politics of sovereign states. Any assertion that the postwar US was hegemonic fails to conform to Doyle’s definition given the numerous cases in which the US did intervene to dramatically impact the internal politics of sovereign states. Similarly, Ikenberry’s (2011) assertion of America’s liberal hegemony ignores the repeated US violations of state sovereignty during this era which did serve to forge an international order characterized by hierarchical relationships maintained to a considerable degree by elite networks in the hegemonic and subordinate states (see Blum 2004, Kinzer 2005, Sullivan 2008 for numerous examples). Even so, no dominant power can rule
wholly or even mostly by coercion. The consensual aspects connoted by hegemony are essential. Therefore, it can be said that any empire must constantly endeavor to maintain its hegemony. In the case of the US-led world order, several points emerge. The US was in an historically unprecedented position of power after World War II. Capitalizing on its structural power, the US dominated the material, ideational, and institutional arenas of the world order which emerged. The US-led world order has been preserved and extended with varying degrees of consent along with covert or overt coercion, but always with the strategic goal of maintaining American hegemony (Good 2015). That the US has striven for imperial hegemony—i.e. hegemony in the pursuit of empire—is a foundational assumption of this work. The forces that compel the US to seek hegemony are of key significance.

**Alternative Foreign Policy Explanations/Approaches**

Within history and the social sciences, there are a number of approaches and paradigms that have been developed to understand and explain international politics and foreign policy. The political science subfield of international relations (IR) has produced two dominant sets of approaches: international systemic and decision-making analysis. The first focuses, obviously, on the structure of the international system. These analysts often repurpose models and insights from economics in order to emphasize the rational preferences and strategies of actors whose decisions are influenced by the structural constraints and opportunities of the international system. The second broad approach entails the analysis of decision-making processes. Its practitioners deploy insights from psychology and social psychology to delineate the impediments to rationality (Holsti 2004). The international systemic approaches are discussed here, while the decision-making analysis approaches—along with subdiscipline of Foreign Policy Analysis—are discussed in a subsequent chapter.

The international systemic approaches can be grouped on the basis of the international system model deployed by analysts, three of which are particularly relevant to this discussion:
realism, liberalism (which Holsti terms “global society”), and Marxism (Holsti 2004). The oldest and most well-known is realism. In both its classical and modern variants, realists are most concerned with issues of war and peace. States are the central actors and they operate rationally within an anarchic international system to maximize security, power, and the national interest. Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948) in the postwar era borrowed from Thucydides by incorporating analysis from the systemic, internal (domestic politics), and individual realms to explain international politics and history. Neorealists, beginning with Waltz (1979) shifted the focus more exclusively on an anarchic international system in which states act to help themselves achieve security and will not subordinate their interests to those of other states. Neorealism eventually split, beginning with Mearsheimer’s (2001) “offensive realism” revision wherein states (specifically great powers) seek to maximize power rather than security.

The second subset of systemic approaches can be characterized as liberal or neoliberal. They possess a shared emphasis on mitigating the inordinate attention that realism places on war and upon states (conceived as unitary actors) as the chief subject of inquiry (Holsti 2004, 62). Contra realism, international organizations, domestic and transnational civil society organizations, and various other non-state entities are also actors in liberal IR. Issues like welfare, economic development, and the environment warrant attention. They can give rise to institutions that foster international cooperation, even though state leaders may be motivated by self-interest rather than altruism. Most notably deriving from Kant’s democratic peace theory, liberalism in IR—more often than realism—analyzes states’ domestic politics to explain foreign policy. Beginning in the 1970’s, scholars like Krasner (1976) and Kindleberger (1973) produced works on the cooperative, stabilizing aspects of hegemony that subsequently informed the founders of what would become neoliberal institutionalism in IR, most notably Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (e.g., 1977). The neoliberalism of Keohane and Nye maintains that states and societies are
connected through various channels and institutions that have eclipsed the Westphalian system of states.

Realism and liberalism essentially dominate mainstream IR. Their practitioners disagree on various issues, perhaps most significantly on the nature of international institutions and whether they have real agency or are simply constructs that serve to advance states’ interests. At various times, one or the other may have seemed to have the upper hand, so to speak. The end of the Cold War was seen by many as weakening the case for realism’s explanatory power. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) could be analyzed persuasively by both approaches. The GWOT-era’s interstate wars and military alliance politics are the wheelhouse of realism. The significance of non-state actors, transnational networks, and international institutions provided fertile ground for liberal IR scholars. With the present US turn toward what the Pentagon terms “great power competition,” it seems that realism presently has increased salience. However, the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperative Council, and other emerging institutions are being created in order to transition a multipolar world order that may gradually cause the US to recede as the global hegemon. Ironically, it is these “revisionist” powers that advocate for the observance of international law. American officials, meanwhile, have asserted that the US “will not accept policies or actions that threaten or undermine the rules-based international order,” even as the US (often aided by allies) continues to routinely conduct foreign policy in violation of international and domestic law.

The third subset of IR’s systemic approaches is Marxism. Most notable are dependency theory (e.g., Frank 1967) and Wallerstein’s world systems theory (2011). They share a central focus on exploitation and inequality of the world capitalist system. The powerful core nations dominate the periphery, i.e., the “developing world,” the “Third World,” or the “Global South.” Elites in the periphery benefit from their connections with the core and thus subordinate national interests to their elite class interests. Dependency theory emerged from the failure of
modernization theory to explain lingering underdevelopment in the global south, especially Latin America. It fell in prominence in part due to the success of the East Asian “tiger” nations: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Additionally, the debt crises of the 1980’s allowed high finance to require nations to abandon dependency theory’s recommended policy prescriptions of protectionism, nationalization of key industries, and import substitution industrialization.

Latin America’s halting political and economic progress of the 60’s ground to a halt and was reversed beginning with the Johnson administration. Effectively, JFK’s liberal Alliance for Progress policies were replaced by LBJ’s “Mann doctrine” which established that Latin American governments would be treated on the basis of their conformity to US interests, i.e., US business interests. A wave of praetorianism followed whereby the US supported military regimes that crushed progressive political forces. Eventually, the third world debt crisis and subsequent “structural adjustments” precluded thereafter any form of statist development strategies. At that point, democracy was no longer a threat and the US began “democracy promotion,” since structural constraints no longer allowed for democracy to be extended beyond the procedural and into the economic realm. Through debt and the dominance of international finance, Latin America had been made “safe for democracy.” Scholars (e.g., Muller 1985; Sanchez 2003) have found that—rather than domestic factors—US policy under Johnson and Nixon was responsible for the rise of military regimes. Understandably, the scholars attribute this to the exigencies of the Cold War. However, the intervening years have made the Cold War explanation less tenable. The 21st century “pink tide” in Latin America brought progressive governments to power in several countries. The US response is illuminating. The US opposed and attempted to undermine governments in the region, especially Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Brazil. The rollback of the “pink tide” under Obama and Trump administrations belies assertions that previous policies can be explained merely by reference to US fears of the Soviet-led international
communist conspiracy. This supports the contention that dependency theory’s obsolescence or theoretical deficiencies have been overstated.

The realist, liberal, and Marxist traditions in IR can all make useful contributions to understanding international politics and specifically the hegemonic continuity of US foreign policy. While realists are understood to conceive of the state as a unitary actor, this is often overstated. Some of the most interesting realist works examine domestic political processes to discern how and why nations abandon more sober realist prescriptions and instead pursue harmful policies. For example, Jack Snyder’s *Myths of Empire* (1991) details how domestic politics led to the disastrous policies pursued by Germany and Japan. Similar analyses have been applied to the US case, but more typically by historians as detailed in a later section. In 2007, the eminent realists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*. It can be argued that the authors were actually deploying a *deep politics* approach to their analysis of US foreign policy. Lobbies are a significant component of America’s deep political system. As Walt and Mearsheimer point out, part of the Israel Lobby’s success stems from the fact that its power had been seldom acknowledged or elaborated upon in the mainstream of academic and public discourse. Though the authors predictably received considerable opprobrium and shrill denunciations from pro-Israel partisans and the corporate media, the works stands as an example to those who would seek to better inform political debates by bringing suppressed or unacknowledged facts to light.

The liberal tradition offers a tighter focus either on domestic determinants of foreign policy or on the workings of international institutions. The weaknesses of most of the mainstream analyses perhaps stems from a reluctance to engage candidly with the lawlessness and violence to which US foreign policy habitually resorts. Additionally, there seems to be a taboo against materialism. Whether this stems from anticommunism or post-Cold War triumphalism or the influence of capitalist-endowed foundations is an open question. The result is that the zeitgeist of
the approaches often obscures the anti-democratic totalizing effects of the corporate overworld upon foreign policy, international organizations, and global civil society. In particular, certain foreign policy phenomena are undertheorized. These include the use of “democracy promotion” to pursue undemocratic goals (i.e., to establish governments that adopt policies that benefit a small economic elite) or the weaponization of human rights (e.g., Western security services funding the so-called “White Helmets” in Syria to deploy as propaganda assets in another illegal regime change campaign). In short, the mainstream of the liberal tradition in IR—like American political science in general—is too credulous about official narratives, too sanguine about the autonomy of international institutions, and too reluctant to apply materialist analysis when it is warranted. In particular, the mainstream does not acknowledge the extent to which militarism, covert/paramilitary violence, state lawlessness in foreign policy, and exploitative international institutions are all of a piece—the global capitalist system over which the US has reigned hegemonic. The explanatory power and empirical strength of materialist perspectives are wholly disproportionate to the miniscule space they occupy in in the prevailing, ostensibly pluralist, discourse.

Ole Holsti’s (2004) effective survey of IR perspectives on foreign policy nevertheless reveals the extent to which critical scholarship such as this dissertation are anathema to American political scientists. He states, accurately, that realism will continue to be of use to diplomatic historians: “Those who focus on security issues can hardly neglect [realism’s] central premises and concepts.” Likewise, liberal IR approaches “…will be helpful to historians with an interest in the evolution of the international system and with the growing disjuncture between demands on states and their ability to meet them.” However, and on the other hand, “It is much less clear that [Marxism] will provide useful new insights to historians. If one has trouble accepting certain assumptions [e.g.,] that there has been and is today a ‘world capitalist system’ […] then the kinds of analyses that follow are likely to seem flawed” (88). To wit [and to paraphrase]: realism and
liberalism in IR are useful and vital approaches, but Marxism is markedly less so; there may not even be a world capitalist system anyway, so the tradition is of dubious utility.

Holsti (2004) also demonstrates in passing the political scientist’s aversion to the prospect of high criminality in the US. In his otherwise trenchant critique of postmodernism, he states that, “[I]f one rejects the feasibility of research standards because they necessarily ‘privilege,’ some theories or methodologies, does that not also rule out judgements of works by Holocaust deniers or of conspiracy buffs who write, for example, about the Kennedy assassination […]?” (82). This formulation seems on some level to equate critics of the Warren Commission with Holocaust deniers. It would be noteworthy if the statement simply reflected a political scientist’s deference to official narratives, however, the most recent and most extensive official investigation of the Kennedy assassination ruled the president’s death to have been the result of a “probable conspiracy.” Additionally, Robert Kennedy himself came to believe the CIA and its allies had killed his brother but felt powerless to act on this knowledge without control of the presidency itself. Jackie Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and various world leaders did not believe the theory of the two lone nuts. Public acceptance of the Warren Commission fell into the single digits in the mid-1970’s (Olmsted 1996, 99). The Commission’s theory of the assassination was that a ‘lone nut’ killed the president and was soon killed by another ‘lone nut.’ This explanation steadily lost credibility with the public following the Warren Report’s initial release. Revelations of intelligence community abuses in the wake of Watergate further diminished its acceptance, as did the first public broadcasting of the video of the assassination in which the president appears to have been killed by a bullet coming from the wrong direction relative to the alleged position of the alleged assassin. It is telling that while neither the public or elites found the Warren Report credible, America’s liberal sense-making institutions—the media and academia—have largely defended it. In using these examples to point out the aversion of American political science to Marxism and the possibility of Western state crimes, I am not suggesting that one should instead
expect from scholars the wholesale adoption of historical materialism and the subjection of every official narrative to reflexive forensic examination. Rather, the point is that there are normative conventions against approaches that utilize holistic critiques of (A) capitalism, (B) imperialism, and/or (C) the lawfulness of the state. Such taboos may serve to preclude or limit scholarship with considerable explanatory and predictive power. If it turned out that the political power of economic elites was the overdetermining variable that lay at the heart of some of social science’s most persistent problematics, the a priori rejection or marginalization of thusly informed approaches greatly handicaps the discipline. Analyses generated by such critical perspectives need not be demonstrably proven in total; intellectual pluralism should allow for a multiplicity of viable and tenable approaches. The paucity of diversity begs one to question whether the political hegemony of economic elites has, through various mechanisms, somehow influenced the character of academic discourse—political science and economics in particular—by influencing each discipline’s respective Overton window or spectrum of acceptable critique.

**Diplomatic History**

Outside of political science, history offers a vast amount of scholarship pertaining to the global role of the US. World War I gave rise to the first generation of US diplomatic historians. Their efforts quickly led to the creation of two schools or approaches within the field, nationalist and progressive (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 1). Over time, these early approaches evolved into two traditions which can be termed orthodox and progressive, respectively. Exemplified by Samuel Flagg Bemis (1936), the nationalist approach emphasized the continuity of American foreign policy. Its practitioners offered a triumphalist account of the rise of US power and the diplomatic tradition that emerged from core principles such as those embodied in the Monroe Doctrine (e.g., Perkins 1927). In general, the nationalist school focused on state-to-state diplomacy and policymaking elites while de-emphasizing the domestic determinants of US foreign policy (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 1). Led by Charles Beard (e.g., Beard and Beard 1939), the progressive
approach sought to elucidate the worldviews of US officials as well as the economic, political, and regional influences on their policymaking. Because these influences changed over time, the progressive approach emphasized change and conflict over continuity and consensus (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 2).

The rise of fascism, the Holocaust, the dropping of the bomb, and the Cold War eventually came to disillusions intellectuals and even the formerly triumphalist nationalist historians like Bemis and Perkins. Their critiques tended to attribute bad policymaking to public opinion and excessive partisanship. Pessimism became a hallmark of the leading historians who wrote about US foreign policy in the 1950’s and 1960’s—realists like George Kennan (1951) and Hans Morgenthau (1970). Like the earlier nationalists, realist historians focused on the state, policymaking elites, and the application of state power to advance the nation’s interests. They also followed the nationalists in deemphasizing the domestic determinants of foreign policy while blaming bad policies on public opinion, political partisanship, and idealism. The antidote, the realists argued, was a professional elite who could use their disinterested expertise to devise rational diplomatic strategies. The realists were appealing to government officials owing to their celebration of elitism and power, their tendency to write prescriptively about geopolitics and grand strategy, and their disinterest in the domestic sources of US foreign policy. Their analyses served to rationalize open-ended international commitments, the further acquisition of power, and techniques of containment (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 2-3).

The progressive tradition of Charles Beard was eventually rekindled in the 1960’s and 1970’s by William Appleman Williams (1959) and other revisionists. Returning to an emphasis on the domestic sources of US foreign policy, the revisionists focused on US ideology and the US liberal capitalist economic system. After the closing of the frontier, US leaders pursued overseas expansion in response to political and economic crises. American imperialism qualitatively changed from being a continental enterprise legitimized by manifest destiny to a militarized
maritime endeavor founded on the liberal commercial principles of John Hay’s Open Door. American leaders, the revisionists argued, had betrayed the country’s core principles in creating an overseas empire. Unlike the realists, they blamed the US for the outbreak of the Cold War. Furthermore, the revisionists harshly critiqued US policy toward the developing world. Like James Beard, they sought to illuminate the influence of non-state actors—big business and finance in particular. They reemphasized the significance of ideas in the history of US foreign policy, depicting American policymakers as rational actors seeking to effect political outcomes on the basis of coherent, though misguided, conception of the national interest (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 4-5).

The revisionists eventually came to be criticized by more orthodox American historians, most notably John Lewis Gaddis (1983). On somewhat predictable bases, the critics deemed that the revisionist school was too economically deterministic, paid too little attention to competing domestic political groups, and failed to acknowledge either the reasonable national security priorities of policymakers or the impact of other states’ actions on US foreign policy.

“Postrevisionist” historiography returned to a realist focus on the state, policy elites and geopolitical grand strategy while emphasizing notions like national security, the national interest, and power politics (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 5). The postrevisionists treated economics as one instrument of geopolitical grand strategy, not the determining cause of American foreign policy. Relative to the revisionists, they were much more sanguine about early Cold War foreign policy. If there was such a thing as an American empire, it came by invitation from overseas rather than from forces within the American political economy. Any “US empire” was a defensive and consensual enterprise, established in response to the Cold War which the Soviet Union started (Hogan and Paterson 2004, 5). The chief weakness of the postrevisionist approach was that it did not actually provide what it advertised: a synthesis of the extant historiography. This was most
succinctly captured by Warren Kimball who surmised “that postrevisionism is, at best, […] orthodoxy plus archives” (Gardner et al. 1983, 198).

Perhaps postrevisionism, and thus orthodoxy, reached its apex with Leffler’s (1992) “national security approach.” The key concept, national security, is defined as “the protection of core values from external threats” (Leffler 2004, 124). As Cummings (1993) points out, Leffler agrees with many of the revisionists’ key findings: US officials distorted Soviet actions, opportunistically inflated the Soviet threat, wanted to reform rather than destroy Western colonialism, misconstrued nationalist revolutions in the Third World, and utilized any manner of fascist or retrograde Anticommunist dictator (562). Therefore, Leffler’s national security approach is an actual synthesis of sorts, unlike Gaddis’ postrevisionism which essentially sought to nullify and/or delegitimize revisionism. However, as with Gaddis, Leffler sees economics as subservient to national security, not the other way around as the revisionists would have it. For this reason, Leffler’s national security approach can fairly be described as a rearguard defense of orthodoxy by placing causal determinants on realist rather than economic bases.

The progressive tradition in diplomatic history—especially revisionism, also called the Wisconsin School or New Left—offers a much more useful approach to understanding US foreign policy, the world order it created, and the era of imperial decline we are experiencing currently. Indeed, an examination of the devastating US policies toward places like Honduras, Libya, and Venezuela demonstrates that US still pursues hegemony in part by targeting governments that enact progressive economic policies. More than any other third world countries, Libya and Venezuela measurably reduced material deprivation through state intervention in the economy. With the Soviet Union long defunct, US policy cannot be explained by recourse to the “global communist conspiracy.” The policies can be easily explained (and predicted) by the Wisconsin School’s approach which posits that since the closing of the frontier, the US has sought and maintained an empire of “free trade” (read: “free investment”). Twenty-first century
Libya and Venezuela transgressed in the manner of Mossedegh, Arbenz, Lumumba, Allende, Sukarno and others: they used resource rents to fund social programs to help the masses of poor people in their countries. Likewise, the materialist historiography could also best explain the “puzzle” of NATO’s post-Cold War persistence: it is the militarized coalition that protects the economic and geopolitical interests of the US and its European client states, especially against defiant socialist states like Serbia and Libya—and now against Russian and/or Chinese influence. Just as Vietnam served to elevate William Appleman Williams’ stature, the increasingly farcical history of the Global War on Terror should serve to enhance the legitimacy of materialist left historiography. By “farcical” I refer to the chronology wherein the US and its client states created the Mujahideen and al Qaeda jihadi networks and deployed them against the Soviets in the 1980’s and in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, and Chechnya in the 1990’s (Good 2015). In 2001, elements of these networks attacked the US, thereby providing pretexts for the establishment of massive surveillance regimes and disastrous, dubious wars in strategically significant countries. And finally, through obscure mechanisms, these strange paramilitary jihadi forces ended up being armed, funded, and deployed in US regime change campaigns in Libya and Syria during the Obama administration.

The orthodox approach cannot adequately explain these dynamics. Leffler’s national security approach could only do so if empire itself is taken as the sacrosanct core value to be protected from external threats. Such was essentially the argument put forward by the neoconservative Project for a New American Century. Admittedly, one cannot prove definitively that such ideas are borne of material causes. Perhaps interrogating potentially analogous ideas could provide some insight. Was American white supremacist ideology in the antebellum South a cause or a consequence of the persistence of slavery? Was the divine right of kings a cause or a consequence of feudalism? Was manifest destiny a cause or a consequence of western expansion? What about the White Man’s Burden or American exceptionalism? Obviously, the point here is
that power structures give rise to legitimizing myths—not the other way around. This was recognized and illustrated as far back as the “myth of the metals” example of the “noble lie” offered by Plato who, it should be acknowledged, was not a dialectical materialist discoursing on base and superstructure. All this is not say that legitimizing myths cannot become so salient as to “take on a life of their own;” merely it is to say that such should not confuse the myths’ origins and utility.

To arrive at the assumption that wealthy and powerful elites seek to dominate politico-economic systems in order to further aggrandize their wealth and power does require an inferential leap of sorts. This entails assuming that politico-economic elites derive satisfaction from their status—a social circumstance at which they or their ancestors arrived intentionally and which they seek to maintain or improve. As C. Wright Mills (1956) pointed out, elites of power are constrained or empowered by their respective historical circumstances. By virtue of postwar America’s historically unprecedented economic and military strength—in absolute and relative terms—no politico-economic stratum has ever had the power of the postwar US elite. As with the elites of any great power, they sought hegemony over as much of human society as was feasible. In the exceptional US case, this allowed for the establishment of a unipolar world order whose institutions allowed for the amassing of vast fortunes. US hegemony, or what Dan Ellsberg calls the “covert empire,” also dramatically altered and distorted American institutions—in particular the rule of law and democracy. The Wisconsin School historians were particularly adroit at developing a historiography that provides a deep understanding of how these circumstances came to be.

Despite the acuity of New Left historiography, its practitioners have come to be somewhat marginal within the discipline. Buzzanjo (1999) summarizes: “The New Left […] has virtually disappeared from the landscape of diplomatic history, swept away by an ideological counterrevolution from the right and an abandonment from today’s so-called left” (576). The “so
called left” is a reference to the postmodern, culturalist, and social historians who have eclipsed materialists in the field. Throughout the 1990’s, only around 10 percent of *Diplomatic History* articles focused on economic aspects of US foreign policy, and by Buzzanco’s reading, only one of those articles could be described “as having a leftist cast” (577). In the second edition of the ubiquitous *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Hogan and Paterson 2004), only three of the fifteen chapters on methods and theories focus on economic matters—dependency theory, world systems theory, and corporatism respectively. Given the explanatory power of materialist historiography at this moment of imperial decline and political paralysis in the face of multiple crises, perhaps the decline of materialism in diplomatic history is, by and large, an example of winners getting to write the history.

That stated, the New Left historians—and the progressive historiographical tradition more generally—inform the deep politics approach applied herein. Charles Beard himself was an earlier exemplar of the deep politics approach, even if he obviously did not name it as such. His methodology sought to uncover the often-obscure domestic political forces that guided US policymakers. Beard famously formulated his own version of what later became known as the “conspiracy theory of the 14th Amendment” in which he suggested that, at the behest of vested interests, the 14th amendment had been written to provide a basis for subsequent judicial rulings that established corporate personhood (1914, 55-59). His last book (1948) argued that Roosevelt and his administration had done tremendous damage to US democracy by manipulating events to allow for American entry into World War II. Decades later, William Appleman Williams and his scholarly descendants likewise cast a critical eye toward US policymaking elites whose public pronouncements belied the powerful economic constituencies that determined policy.

Historian Bruce Cumings rejects the label “revisionist,” but nonetheless comes from the Wisconsin School tradition and emphasizes the subterranean determinants of history. Historical cases illustrate this point. For example, many of the most powerful Americans in the mid-20th
century like Dean Acheson and John McCloy were not given to candidly discussing the core interests and motivations behind the policies they advocated, sometimes referring to such things as “imponderables” (Cumings 1993, 544-545). McCloy himself was known to be “a Rockefeller man” (Bird 1992, 387-388). The most notable realists of the Cold War were men with very powerful patrons. Like McCloy, Kissinger was also a Rockefeller man. Prior to campaigning for Nelson Rockefeller’s 1968 presidential run, Kissinger had been his assistant. Rockefeller also commissioned him to write a book for the Council on Foreign Relations on limited warfare (Scott 2007, 32). Kissinger married an aide to Rockefeller, owned a Georgetown mansion thanks to Rockefeller loans and gifts, and used a palatial Rockefeller-owned bomb shelter to store his secret papers when things looked grim for the Nixon administration (Hougan 1978, 435-436). Zbigniew Brzezinski was also a Rockefeller man. George Kennan’s patron was Dean Acheson. Cumings (1993) argues that the realist Kennan never really understood his boss, the Wall Street internationalist (564). Kennan, Kissinger, Brzezinski—each was a “realpolitik engineer for an architecture never fully articulated” (565). It is not difficult to grasp the utility of such realists. They formulate and execute grand strategy on the basis of a “national interest” which is unsurprisingly quite congruent with the personal interests of their patrons and the class they represent. Even when addressing the implications of causal determinants that are known to be largely obscured, the revisionists outperform the orthodox (including “postrevisionist”) histories.

The reason for this is best summed up by Lloyd Gardner (1970):

> Early books on the origins of the Cold War were little more than annotated collective memoirs of Americans who participated in that transition period. The historian’s facts and conclusions had already been chosen for him before he began. Scholars personally involved in the Cold War devoted themselves to producing “White Papers” on Russian violations of their agreements with the West. The object was to see how big a list of these misdeeds one could put together. If the President said that the Soviet Union had violated forty-seven pacts and treaties, the State Department scurried around to draw up a list to conform to the accusation, and Cold War historians all too often come following after (301).
This dynamic explains why Gaddis’ “postrevisionism” has been described as “orthodoxy plus archives” (Gardner et al. 1983, 198) and why “it can border on court history” (Buzzanco 581, 1999).

The New Left historiography also has informed important understandings about the broad contours of the US power structure. Klare (1981) first introduced the idea of two powerful factions with the foreign-policymaking elite: the militarist Prussians (including oil and arms makers) and the internationally commercial traders (including high finance and other transnational firms). Peter Dale Scott (2007) also uses these terms and elaborates on the varying degrees of compatibility and tension between the two groups. Today these two broad groups could be called “neoconservatives” and “neoliberals.” Both extend back in US history. The Cold War ancestors of the neoconservatives were the advocates of “rollback” like Paul Nitze and Henry “Scoop” Jackson. The neoliberals’ Cold War antecedent was the “liberal internationalism” of men like George Ball. The groups today existing as neoconservatives and neoliberals have benefited enormously from US hegemony. The firms that comprise their core constituencies are the largest in the world.

The revisionists deserve credit for delineating these aspects of US elite sociology. The deep politics approach goes even further. Peter Dale Scott (2007) has illuminated how elements of these two factions have intruded in US politics in history-making ways that have typically been suppressed or marginalized. In one sense, the issue is whether America’s liberal institutions have been able to quarantine the lawlessness of hegemonic foreign policy in such a way as to preserve the domestic rule of law and the integrity of the democratic US political system. In finding that America’s liberal institutions have failed in this regard, concepts like exceptionism and the tripartite state are developed and elaborated upon in historical context. Such radical scholarship can be valuable in part for its potential contribution to understanding the political pathologies that
to date have precluded reasoned responses to multiple social and political crises—namely climate change, the nuclear “doomsday machine,” and staggering levels of economic inequality.

**The State, Exceptionism, and Political Science**

In political science terms, the central puzzle of this dissertation is the continuity of US foreign policy, a grand strategy of imperial hegemony. In a liberal constitutional democracy, such a course would be untenable were the rule of law to be strictly adhered to. Therefore, central to this puzzle are two additional variables with steady trajectories over the same historical era: the institutionalized abrogation of the rule of law and the decline of democratic governance.

Chronologically delineated in Chapter 4, the course was set most decisively with the outbreak of World War II. The cycle repeats across decades and presidential administrations to reproduce the hegemonic postwar US political order. At the point of origin, antecedent factors gave rise to what become the imperial hegemonic general thrust. These include US power in absolute and relative terms, the cohesion of US elites, and the opportunities and contingencies of the given historical moment. In the context of these antecedent factors, the political response is formulated: elites mobilize to formulate the advancement of their respective and collective interests. Their formulations must accommodate and/or overcome countervailing democratic pressures, especially those that are progressive and/or nationalist in character. The resultant grand strategy synthesis is the outcome of the balance of relevant political forces. Subsequently, officials and elites implement policy and pursue institutional and structural change as needed. The creation, transformation, and cooptation of institutions is a power elite project. The outcome for political, economic, and social institutions is more or less contested according to the cohesiveness of the elite and the countervailing democratic pressures that can be brought to bear. Alterations are path dependent, impacting the state, civil society, the economy, and liberal institutions like the media, academia and electoral politics. Key consequences demonstrate the path dependency inherent in the cycle. Financial accumulation produces change in the overworld of corporate
wealth and thus of the power elite as well. These are key components of the resulting outcomes which comprise the new set of antecedent circumstances to which the power elite will respond. Figure 1 below illustrates this basic cycle:

Figure 1: Hegemonic reproduction in US postwar politics

Because of the power of the executive branch, it is most fruitful to look at presidential administrations as case studies. The cycle repeats and imperial hegemony gets reproduced. In its broad outlines, this could be an anodyne historical institutionalist rendering of postwar US politics with Millsian elite theory influences. What is novel here are the proposed mechanisms. Decisively, this includes parapolitical exceptionist interventions borne of the securitization of politics and obscured by overarching state secrecy. The purportedly existential threat of the global communist conspiracy allowed for the creation of the postwar national security state. The securitization of politics, a power elite project, transformed the state and state/society relations. Unprecedented state secrecy gave the power elite vastly expanded realms in which to pursue desired political ends. Its dimensions and details obscured by state secrecy, exceptionism—the institutionalized abrogation of the rule of law—allowed for the state to decisively influence politics in a top-down, authoritarian manner while practices of plausible deniability preserved a degree of democratic legitimacy. Parapolitical practices became institutionalized. Sovereignty in the Schmittian sense—the power to decide the exception—migrated to an increasingly opaque
realm: the organs of national security and the emerging deep state. Thusly was the state gradually transformed.

The creation of the national security state was undertaken in pursuit of imperial hegemony along lines laid out by elite planning that began prior to US entry into World War II. Its fateful departures from preexisting US institutions were explained away with reference to its communist antithesis. Internationally and domestically, deep political forces used exceptionism to neutralize opposition to imperial hegemony and the political dominance of the overworld. It is well established that such unconstitutional practices have been utilized domestically in various forms. Perhaps most well-known are the FBI’s “red scare” spectacle, collectively and misleadingly known as “McCarthyism.” The FBI’s infamous COINTELPRO operations against black power, antiwar, and other activists are also noteworthy. These are state crimes against democracy (SCADs) and a central contention here is that these actions have been a key mechanism to maintain the trajectory of US imperial hegemony and to manage all major course corrections in a top-down fashion. Considerable evidence indicates that pivotal events in US political history such as the Kennedy assassinations, the King assassination, and Watergate have been—or included—unadjudicated SCADs originating from the largely opaque US deep state. Though we likely don’t know the half of it, similar covert US interventions in international politics are even more well-documented in the historical record. These violate ratified treaties and, thusly, the US Constitution. Even setting aside the disputed SCADs, exceptionism has no constitutional basis and therefore warrants a reconsideration of the nature of the American state. The theory and empirical evidence mustered herein represent such an effort.

**A Note on Exceptionism**

The institutionalized abrogation of the rule of law, here termed exceptionism, has been a key mechanism of subverting US democracy and reproducing US predominance and imperial hegemony over the global capitalist system. Said Henry Kissinger, “The illegal we do
immediately, the unconstitutional takes a little longer.” The most obvious ways in which the illegal and unconstitutional have been routinized involves the United Nations Charter—specifically Article 2(4) which states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Written with considerable input from US postwar planners, the Charter establishes that the use of force is illegal without UN Security Council authorization except in cases of self-defense. Article VI, section 2 of the US Constitution states that “all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.” In 1967, in response to the US bombing of North Vietnam, a number of distinguished American legal scholars wrote that the US was violating the UN Charter and

…because these actions violate the supreme law of the land, the question as to which branch of the Government may authorize them, or whether one branch of the Government may delegate to another branch legal powers to authorize them, becomes irrelevant. No branch of Government is permitted directly or indirectly (by delegation) to violate the Constitution (Fried and Falk 2004, 16).

This very straightforward logic renders innumerable US foreign policies illegal under international and domestic law. Notable overt examples include US aggression against Cuba, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Grenada, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the recent assassination of Qasem Soleimani. Numerous US covert operations also clearly constitute the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” These include US-orchestrated regime change operations against Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Congo, South Vietnam, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, Haiti, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Haiti again, Ukraine, and (in all likelihood) Bolivia.

Exceptionism also abounds domestically. The US government has exercised supralegal prerogative in such a way as to repeatedly violate the US Constitution, including its prohibitions against “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,” and “against unreasonable searches and seizures, [without] Warrants [issued] upon
probable cause.” According to Senate investigation, domestic programs that have violated these strictures in the Bill of Rights include the FBI’s COINTELPRO, the FBI’s campaign “to ‘neutralize [Martin Luther King] as an effective civil rights leader,’” the CIA’s mail opening program which the FBI and CIA heads declared illegal in 1970 even as it continued, the NSA collection of millions of cables sent by private citizens, widespread wiretapping and bugging without warrant, the collection and dissemination of purely political or personal information obtained through electronic surveillance, hundreds (during the 1960’s alone) of warrantless CIA/FBI break-ins which often involved theft and bugging, and the widespread use of informants to infiltrate and surveil “peaceful, law-abiding groups.”

The FBI’s exceptionism was succinctly expressed by the official who ran the Bureau’s Intelligence Division for ten years. He testified that,

…never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: “Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral.” We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatic.9

Analogous or perhaps even more egregious/widespread abuses have occurred in the 21st century. The US ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1994. Besides outlawing torture, the CAT requires signatories to “ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.”10 This indicates that not only are Bush administration officials guilty under CAT provisions, subsequent US administrations are also guilty for failing to prosecute the guilty parties and for obscuring the details of the crimes behind a wall of state secrecy.

The presidency of Donald Trump brings exceptionism into high relief. The assassination of Qassem Soleimani was a criminal act on multiple levels. Since Soleimani was an Iranian official in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, the assassination is a violation of the UN Charter. Besides violating the post-Watergate prohibition against assassination, the act violated
the War Powers Act. Arguing that the assassination “justifies a third article of impeachment,” law professor Bruce Ackerman points out that the War Power Act requires the president “in every possible instance [to] consult with Congress” before using force in “situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Trump neglected to consult with the Speaker of the House as the act stipulates even though the president did take time to confer with his advisors and leading Republicans. The president ignored the statutory demand that he provide the requisite “constitutional and legislative authority” for his action. Additionally, the War Powers Act requires the president to either (A) demonstrate that he had preexisting congressional authorization or (B) convince Congress to grant such authorization.¹¹

Arguably, the Soleimani assassination and the Trump impeachment fiasco writ large confirm exceptionism and much of the central arguments herein. To wit: In 2014, the Obama administration backed the overthrow of Ukraine’s elected government. There were no legal repercussions whatsoever for this violation of the UN Charter. In 2020, Trump illegally assassinated Qassem Soleimani with impunity. Notably, President Trump was impeached, not for the murder of Soleimani, but on the basis of two other alleged acts: he threatened not to send US weaponry to the government the US illegally installed in Ukraine and he encouraged said Ukrainian government to investigate the dubious and lucrative activities of former Vice President Joe Biden, his son Hunter Biden, and a Ukrainian gas company. The above would appear to confirm that US officials are able to “get away with murder” in the furtherance of imperial hegemony. However, it is reasonable to conclude that US officials do risk legal sanction should they impede imperial hegemonic policies like arming Ukraine or threaten to make other members of the elite subject to the rule of law.

Original Contribution

This dissertation seeks to make an original contribution by drawing from and building upon power elite theory (Mills 1956), dual state theory (Morgenthau 1955; Tunander 2009; Scott 2007;
Glennon 2015), and SCAD theory (deHaven-Smith 2006). More specifically, exceptionism is identified as a crucial and overlooked mechanism in the reproduction of US imperial hegemony. A tripartite theory of the state is constructed to account for anomalies that are not congruent with (1) a Weberian conception of the state, (2) various critical dual state theories, or (3) the SCAD theory literature which did not attempt to formulate a theory of the state or address state criminality as an institutionalized phenomenon or theorize the relationship between economic elites and the state.

As discussed in greater detail in chapter 2, power elite theorist C. Wright Mills and his descendants like Domhoff (1967) and Phillips (2018) focus on the overdetermining political power wielded by those like-minded, increasingly interchangeable elites who occupy the command posts at leading organizations within the realms of politics, the military, and big business. In writing *The Power Elite*, Mills was heavily influenced by the Franz Neumann’s *Behemoth: The Structure and Function of National Socialism* (1944) which showed how Germany’s exceptionalist state arose from the highly concentrated politico-economic power bequeathed German elites by virtue of the cartel system.\(^{12}\) Mills observed that US elites were similarly unified and similarly dominant politico-economically. By virtue of US predominance, they were “commanders of power unequaled in human history” (Mills 1956, 361).

Mills was ambivalent about the role of conspiratorial elites and he did not assert criminalization of the state. He opposed the “conspiracy theory of history.” However, he described a power structure in which a highly cohesive power elite could formulate plans in secret and then see them carried out so as to aggrandize their wealth and power while furthering their hegemony over US society and the postwar international scene. Mills’ caution was understandable because he died in 1962. The first major CIA expose was 1964 (Wise and Ross 1964). It was not until 1975 that the government declassified NSC 68, the document that most explicitly called for the privately incorporated permanent war economy described by Mills in
1956. Many more revelations would come out in the 1970’s but clearly, Mills could not have fathomed the depths of US covert operations or the extent to which these entities mediated between the criminal underworld and the “corporate rich” he described. Domhoff, perhaps Mills most well-known descendent, takes a categorical stance on the question of conspiratorial state crimes. He states this flatly in an essay titled, “There Are No Conspiracies.” He substantiates this with reference to the implausibility of a number of implausible grand conspiracy theories. While refuting various notions of compact, omnipotent conspiratorial cabals, Domhoff does not address the possibility argued herein—that state criminality and parapolitical institutions are one key aspect of the way that society is governed by the elite-dominated institutions that Domhoff elucidates.

Also included in the second chapter, dual state theory is examined and critiqued. Thinkers as far back as John Locke have imperfectly tried to resolve the problem of the emergency in the context of republican/liberal political institutions. Carl Schmitt (1985) famously wrote that true sovereignty lies with the party which decides “the exception”—the instance in which the law negates itself. This leads to the conclusion that alongside the liberal democratic state, there lies an authoritarian security state: the dual state elucidated by Morgenthau (1955), Tunander (2009), and Scott (2007). The exception to constitutional mandates can be seen throughout the US historical record. Notable examples include the Alien and Sedition Acts under President Adams, and Lincoln’s suspension of habeus corpus. Woodrow Wilson presided over the Espionage and Sedition Acts as well as the Palmer Raids, ironically buttressing his status as an exemplar of American Exceptionalism. The most recent and extensive political science rendering of the dual state is from Michael Glennon (2015). Using the less provocative term double government, Glennon painstakingly details and substantiates the autonomy of the national security state. While the strength of his work belies conventional pluralistic theories of the American state, he fails to situate this autonomy within a critique of state-society relations and/or
the US power structure. By elaborating a dualistic Weberian state, Glennon fails to account for the overdetermining power of the corporate rich upon the general thrust of postwar US foreign policy—the pursuit and maintenance of imperial hegemony. His scholarship adroitly illustrates how the US justice system is demonstrably incapable of checking the national security state. However, he does not explore the evidence or the implications of covert securitized lawlessness in US domestic politics.

The duality of the state underwent a categorical transformation at the outset of the Cold War. The exception was institutionalized through reference to the “twilight struggle” against the global communist conspiracy—an emergency without end. In government documents—notably NSC 68 and NSC 10/2—officials asserted and authorized the use of all means that “serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design.”

National security state officials secretly authorized the practice of formulating and executing covert operations to be carried out with plausible deniability. Since these operations were not typically acknowledged even after the fact, the clandestine apparatus has confounded any realistic notion of democratic sense-making. Policies, events, and outcomes gave way to a series of cover stories and limited hangouts. Mills (1956) wrote that the power elite were “crackpot realists” who had “replaced the responsible interpretation of events with the disguise of events by a maze of public relations” (356). With no operational knowledge of the clandestine services, Mills did not know the half of it.

In chapter 3, the limits of dual state theory are addressed and reformulated through reference to theories of deep politics—“all those political practices and arrangements, deliberate or not, which are usually repressed rather than acknowledged” (Scott 1993, 7). In the governance of human civilizations, two types of power can be discerned: top-down, coercive power and power that operates through consent derived from persuasion and argument. Throughout US history, America’s democratic constitutional system existed alongside a deep political system. This means that governance occurred with institutionalized accommodation of “decision-making
and enforcement procedures outside as well as inside those publicly sanctioned by law and society,” and “collusive secrecy and law-breaking” (Scott 1993 xi-xii). Of particular significance are the extraconstitutional impacts of the overworld of politico-economic elites, the underworld of organized crime, and the institutions that mediate between them.

The process by which America’s deep political system evolved into the tripartite state is chronicled in Chapter 4. World War II and the Cold War served to formally institutionalize sub rosa what had theretofore been informal arrangements of America’s deep political system. Most notably, the overworld of corporate wealth orchestrated US plans for entering World War II and the postwar imperial hegemonic project through the Wall Street-dominated Council of Foreign Relations’ War and Peace Studies Project. To assist the war effort, the US created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—an Eastern establishment-dominated precursor to the CIA. Its operations foreshadowed the postwar deep state by utilizing the services of “the Syndicate”—the underworld organization headed by Meyer Lansky and Charles “Lucky” Luciano, the latter of whom was released from prison at the request of the former.

Incorporating elements from across the globe, the Cold War national security state conjured a covert netherworld allowing for the history-making application of dark power—the expanding, overworld directed deep state. Over years and across administrations, it came to be supranational and beyond the control of the office of presidency—the nominal US head of state. As US hegemony over the international capitalist system proceeded, its overworld beneficiaries accumulated more wealth and power. The organic links between the corporate rich and the covert netherworld of the national security state gave rise to the hypertrophied US deep state. The growing fecklessness of the US public state and of US liberal institutions was inversely proportional to the rise of deep state power. It is argued in Chapter 4 that eventually it came to pass that no longer was the US best described as having a deep political system whose accommodations could influence state behavior. Rather, deep political forces could covertly
assert sovereignty in the Schmittian sense. This is to say that the US came to have a tripartite state system in which the overworld-directed deep state came to dominate over the public state and the security state. Deep political forces consolidated this with Reagan and since then the open political logic of the public state has diminished considerably. Consequently, the US came to have a deep state system in which exceptionist dark power is a key component of overworld hegemony over the American political economy and US society. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide historical evidence and further theoretical elaboration. In offering this explanation of the continuity of US imperial hegemonic foreign policy, the empirical and theoretical insights of the deep politics approach and SCAD theory are applied to formulate a theory of the exceptionist tripartite state.

On Methodology

In a larger sense, this work embraces the attitude and approach toward methodology articulated by C. Wright Mills, who wrote the following in a response to criticism of *The Power Elite* (1956):

>T]here are many literary and journalistic people who distribute larger images of the social structure in which we live. By refusing to comment on these images, much less to take them in hand, [social scientists] allow, as it were, these literary types to create and to sustain all the images that guide and all the myths that obfuscate—as the case may be—our view of social reality. […] We’ve tried to use what we found useful of newer research techniques, but we’ve refused to give up the larger problems because of any initial dogma about method. Above all, we’ve refused to become silly about transferring the models of physical proof into the social studies. We’ve kept the problem, whatever it is, foremost in mind and we’ve felt […] that we’d just have to work out the best methods we could as we went along trying to solve the problem (2008, 142-143).

In practice, this means that methodology and theory deployed herein are drawn eclectically from social scientific and historical scholarship, first and foremost, on the basis of their utility toward illuminating the nature of the problem.

Although quantitative evidence in the form social statistics and data is utilized when appropriate, the bulk of the empirical evidence for this dissertation is taken from historical narratives within secondary sources. This is a challenging enterprise since many of the most
significant issues and relevant episodes are those that are the most incomplete and obscured from historians and the public. This conundrum is explicitly addressed by the deep politics approach which differentiates between archival historiography and deep historiography. Archival history is produced by archival historians who draw from government records. Deep history entails the creation of a “chronology of events concerning which the public records are often either falsified or nonexistent” (Scott 2007, 267). Since this dissertation deals with deep political phenomena in conjunction with well-known historical events, both historiographical approaches are employed herein. Likewise, both approaches are found within the secondary sources which provide the bulk of the empirical data.

In evaluating the credibility of historical sources, the issue of selection bias is unavoidable. A social scientist is likely to select sources that conform to his theoretical framework. Lustick (1996) states that historiographical patterns must be placed at the center of the approach taken by social scientists to evaluate their sources. Even with such methodological practices in mind, there are significant challenges to accumulating historical evidence by which to evaluate the theory of the tripartite state. A central concern pertains to the study of parapolitics in general. Parapolitics is “a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished” (Scott 1972, 171). Any study pertaining to parapolitics faces unique challenges. Many of the most relevant actors actively strive to obscure their activities and thereby falsify contemporaneous journalistic accounts and the historical record. Qualitative social science draws considerably from documentary evidence in the form of official documents, journalistic accounts, and individual memoirs. Additionally, social scientists avail themselves of secondary sources based on those materials. Primary sources may be incorrect owing to many factors. Secondary sources often offer conflicting analyses and at any rate they must be based upon primary or other secondary sources which may be unreliable in various ways. Any evaluation of these narrative sources is arrived at through highly subjective processes (Gibbs 2012, 103).
These challenges affect historically focused social science in general and parapolitical research in particular. In order to best address these issues, Gibbs (2012) advocates a “critical reading approach” (114). Using techniques similar to those used by intelligence analysts, one can study US foreign policy and arrive at sound conclusions even in the face of systemic biases and state secrecy. Gibbs cites the example of Kremlinologists who studied the Soviet Union with considerable success during the Cold War (2012, 114). Such an approach is very difficult as it requires considerable erudition and research skills. The researcher must discern historical truth using an almost forensic methodology.

Some social scientists have made the case that qualitative methodology should produce research that is replicable in ways that mirror quantitative research (King 1995; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Gibbs (2012) puts forward an opposing view. He asserts that qualitative methods employ a unique logic of inquiry which does not allow for replication in a strict sense. This does not negate the benefits of using qualitative methods (Gibbs 2012, 102). Even without strict replicability, theories can still be evaluated according to criteria including simplicity, internal consistency, and the degree to which its predictions are in accordance with the empirical record (Gibbs 2012, 115). While acknowledging that strict replicability is not feasible or desirable for qualitative social inquiry, it is still a priority to provide clear and precise citations so that the interpretations and empirical evidence can be more easily evaluated. Such efforts notwithstanding, the limitations of this methodology are worth stating candidly. Given that much of the history under discussion involves the parapolitical, it is not possible to assert that any account of such matters is unimpeachable or the definitive theory. One cannot have absolute confidence about assessments when information is decidedly incomplete owing to state secrecy and covert operations rendered plausibly deniable by contrived cover stories. In historiographical and social scientific terms, one must satisfice.
CHAPTER 2

TRIPARTITE STRUCTURES OF POWER AND STATE

The Dual State or “Double Government”? A defining feature of the US-dominated world order has been the crucial role of the national security state which emerged after World War II. Various theorists have assessed the nature of the liberal democratic state when it is mobilized in response to dire assessments of security threats. Carl Schmitt (1985) referred to such a situation as a “state of exception” in which legal norms must be discarded due to a “danger to the existence of the state” (5). For Schmitt (1985), true sovereignty rested with the entity that decided when the state of exception existed: “Sovereign is he who decides the exception” (5). Observing the rise of the postwar US national security state, Morgenthau (1955) identified the emergence of illiberal institutional forms within the US government. As “security” took precedence over all other concerns, a dual state emerged. Power may nominally rest with those holding legal authority, but the security forces hold at the very least veto power over decisions (Morgenthau 1955, 12). Tunander (2009) asserts that the dual state consists of a “democratic state” operating according to legal prescriptions and a “security state” which is more authoritarian and which exercises sovereignty most directly in cases of emergency. Collectively, this scholarship represents dual state theory. The tripartite state construct is a revision of dual state theory. Tunander’s conception of the dual state is valuable in terms of demarcating the democratic state and the security/deep state. Tunander (2009) uses the terms security state, sovereign, and deep state more or less interchangeably. His is a radical critique of the liberal democratic state.

While Tunander’s work has much to recommend it, it has failed to gain much traction in the mainstream of academia. A more prominent scholar, Michael J. Glennon, recently made what is essentially an argument for the dual state in National Security and Double Government (2015). Unlike Tunander, Glennon is focused on governance carried out by institutions whose structures
Glennon does not use the term *dual state* but his notion of *double government* is largely analogous. His theory of double government builds upon the work of Walter Bagehot (1966), a 19th century British political commentator and editor of *The Economist*. Bagehot argued that power in Britain had initially rested with the monarchy. Over time, a dual set of governing institutions emerged. The crown and the House of Lords comprised the “dignified” institutions, described as such because their traditional pomp and circumstance and their links to history served to excite and inspire the general public. Over time, the second and newer set of “efficient” institutions came to do the actual governing. These were the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet (Bagehot 1966; Glennon 2015, 5).

Together, the “dignified” and “efficient” governing institutions comprised a “disguised republic” that obscured what was a dramatic shift of power. The power of the efficient institutions was disguised by virtue of the fact that the dignified institutions continued to perform some governing functions while also continuing to perform according to longstanding ceremonial and ritualistic traditions. In so doing, the disguised republic was able to avert a crisis of legitimacy that would have arisen were the public to grasp the extent to which the dignified institutions were functioning as a façade which existed to generate the public’s acceptance of decisions made by experts (Glennon 2015, 5). The structural duality is a modern analog of Plato’s “Noble Lie” which Plato obliquely asserts is necessary to protect the republic from the excesses of democracy by promoting deference to the authority of the guardian class (Glennon 2015, 6).

Glennon (2015) sees a similar dynamic at work in the US. Power initially resided in dignified institutions: the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary. Over time, a second set of “efficient” institutions emerged to maintain national security. America’s “efficient” institution is better described as a network comprised of hundreds of executive officials presiding in the leadership positions of “the military, intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement departments
and agencies” engaged in the provision of international and internal security (Glennon 2015, 6). Much of the public incorrectly believes that America’s “dignified,” constitutionally established institutions exercise power. The efficient institutions promote this false perception, since the dignified institutions provide legitimacy for the national security decisions conceived and executed by the efficient institutions (Glennon 2015, 6-7).

Glennon (2015) states that national security policy-making is not only removed from the public eye, but that it is also removed from constitutional restrictions (7). Thusly does Glennon indirectly make the claim that national security policy operates in a heretofore interminable state of exception. The United States has progressed beyond an “imperial presidency.” A bifurcated system of double government has emerged – what others refer to as the dual state. It is a system in which the US president does not exercise much substantive influence over the broad thrust of American national security policy (Glennon 2015, 7). Contrasting the British and American cases, Glennon states that unlike Bagehot’s Britain, the transfer of power away from constitutionally established institutions has not been the result of intentional efforts. On this crucial point, Glennon posits a stochastic explanation of sorts by omitting crucial history and by failing to interrogate the sociological context of the elites who acted to create the institutions which became the national security state. Among other historical episodes, Glennon ignores the years of lobbying efforts by Wall Street-connected lawyers which led to the creation of the CIA following the disbanding of the wartime CIA precursor, the Office of Special Services.

On the other hand, the evolutionary catalysts for the transformation have been similar in the British and US cases. The weakness of the electoral system was borne of the weakness of electorates lacking in political wherewithal. This necessitated resort to the maintenance of what Bagehot described as “the theatrical show” or the “wonderful spectacle” (Glennon 2015, 7-8). Meanwhile in the US, vast swaths of the population live in poverty and/or are unable to either read well or show a proficiency of historical/political knowledge (Glennon 2015, 8).
Additionally, the public can never have access to all of the secret information to which the network of national security officials is privy. Therefore, the network perceives transparency and public approval as unnecessary or undesirable when it comes to statecraft.

In America, the “dignified” institutions are those delineated in the US Constitution. Since James Madison bears considerable responsibility for America’s constitutional design, Glennon uses the term Madisonian to describe America’s “dignified” institutions – the visible and legitimate face of government (Glennon 2015, 11). The constitution divided national security power among the three branches of government. This was in accordance to the theory that a separation of powers would cause the three branches to compete over power and encroachments upon their power, thereby creating some kind of equilibrium that would preclude the rise of any centralized, authoritarian power. This balance was not to be achieved through institutional design alone. It could be maintained only in the presence of “civic virtue – an informed and engaged electorate” (Glennon 2015, 12).

For much of American history, it was the dignified Madisonian institutions which by and large exercised the power to govern. The modern institutional form of America’s “efficient” institutions emerged in the aftermath of World War II, most decisively when President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947. This legislation centralized control of the military under a newly created Secretary of Defense, established the CIA, set up a new Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created the National Security Council. Truman eventually would establish the National Security Agency as well. Given the lasting import of these acts, Glennon uses the term Trumanite to describe America’s “efficient” governing institution which is a network consisting of the hundreds of executive branch officials who make national security policy (Glennon 2015, 12-13).

The emerging national security state was justified by perceived geopolitical realities. Liberals believed that tradition had to give ground to the new reality of a totalitarian adversary capable of swiftly executing dictates of the state. The new perceived reality was that of an
interminable state of imminent war (Glennon 2015, 13). Some conservatives worried about skyrocketing defense budgets and threats posed to democratic institutions by a newly securitized set of federal bureaucracies (Glennon 2015, 14). Truman and others worried that the security services like the FBI and CIA could become an American “gestapo” (Glennon 2015, 14-15). By 1949, the Hoover Commission had found that the Joint Chiefs were functioning as “virtually a law unto themselves,” and that “centralized civilian control scarcely exist[ed]” in particular departments within the military bureaucracy (Glennon 2015, 15).

In his memoir *The Doomsday Machine*, Daniel Ellsberg offers a chilling illustration of the US military’s autonomy. While working in the Pentagon with a high security clearance, Ellsberg became aware of a document known as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The president and secretary of defense did not know about the content or the existence of the JSCP (Ellsberg 2017, 90). The Joint Chiefs of Staff had actually written up a set of practices designed to keep the defense secretary from inquiring about the JSCP which was in fact the general war plan. Specifically, a written directive stated that “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or the capital letters JSCP, should never appear in correspondence between the JCS and any agency of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,” and any JCS documents forwarded to the secretary of defense were to be retyped to remove any reference to the JSCP (Ellsberg 2017, 92). The key element of the JSCP was that in the event of “armed conflict” (i.e., anything beyond a small skirmish), “the basic military objective of the U.S. armed forces is the defeat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc” (Ellsberg 2017, 94). It took a considerable amount of delicate maneuvering for Ellsberg to successfully bring this matter to the civilian leadership. Subsequently, he was charged with drafting a seemingly more sensible set of guidelines for general nuclear war (Ellsberg 2017, 128). This episode demonstrates that the security state can create or perpetuate policy independent of civilian oversight or even cognizance. Such policies may pertain to the gravest possible matters. In the case of the JSCP, the policy was a plan for a military response that if triggered, would have
likely destroyed human civilization. A conflict in Berlin would have initiated “general war,” entailing the complete destruction of the Soviet Union and China by nuclear weapons. Though this was unknown at the time, the subsequent fires would have created an enormous shroud of smoke and ash which would have led to nuclear winter. This would have destroyed all harvests for years, causing the deaths of almost the entire human population (Ellsberg 2017). Civilian leaders only discovered and changed this policy due to the extraordinary intervention of Ellsberg. To succeed, Ellsberg had to overcome compartmentalization, state secrecy, and systematized obfuscation.

Since the Cold War began, the national security state has ballooned, expanding to dimensions that Truman would not likely have imagined. A 2011 (Priest and Arkin) study was able to identify forty-six departments and agencies within the federal government that were working on classified national security matters. Additionally, there were around 2,000 private companies at 10,000 US locations engaged in this work (Priest and Arkin 2011; Glennon 2015, 16). Their budgets and the size of their workforces are classified, but clearly they are huge – millions of employees and a combined annual outlay of nearly $1 trillion. Presidents and other members of the Madisonian institutions have very little ability to control the Trumanite network. Out of 668,000 civilian Defense Department employees, only 247 are politically appointed. Therefore, hundreds of national security policymakers are drawn from the national security bureaucracies to oversee and manage those bureaucracies. These include some of the president’s top personal assistants as well as the high-ranking staff members of the extremely powerful National Security Council (Glennon 2015, 16).

Glennon describes the Trumanites as being different from “the best and the brightest” of decades past, in that they do not owe their positions to wealth, pedigree, or an aristocratic education. They rise in the Trumanite bureaucracies because they are “smart, hard-working, and reliable,” which makes them “unlikely to embarrass their superiors” (Glennon 2015, 17). The
Trumanites are efficient in comparison to Madisonians. They can act quickly and are expert summarizers, since their superiors have very little time and need predigested information and ideas. Although they believe in American exceptionalism, they are not ideologues. Rather, they strive to be rationalists – sober, responsible, neither too creative nor too predictable, and, most importantly, never naïve. Given that national security is their charge, it is unsurprising that Trumanites must always appear to be tough (Glennon 2015, 17-18).

Glennon (2015) quotes C. Wright Mills (1956, 222) who wrote, “[T]his cast of mind defines reality as basically military” (18). Thus, the incentive structures within the Trumanite network encourage members to support wars in order to protect their professional and political credibility (Glennon 2015, 19). With security defined in military rather than diplomatic terms, the costs of national security’s overprotection can be externalized, while the costs of underprotection must be internalized by the network. This creates powerful incentives to exaggerate actual threats and to create imaginary threats (Glennon 2015, 19). It should be noted—though Glennon does not—that even underprotection may not redound to the disadvantage of the Trumanite network. The cost of “underprotection” in the wake of 9/11 manifested in no firings of responsible officials but, rather, in immensely higher budgets for the relevant entities. The Madisonian institutions bear the costs of these dynamics, most clearly in the form of bloated defense budgets. The current US defense budget is 50 percent higher than that of an average year during the Cold War (Glennon 2015, 21). The chief driver for the rise of Trumanite power has been the persistent existence of emergency, i.e., a situation in which a threat may emerge at any moment requiring an immediate response from the security services who cannot afford to first consult the Madisonian institutions (Glennon 2015, 21). Glennon finds that the unending perception of threats, crises, and emergency have been the driving catalyst behind the rise of America’s double government (Glennon 2015, 22).
During this era, the Trumanite network has been held together by the same things that, according to Bagehot, held Britain’s efficient institutions together. Specifically, these are: loyalty, collective responsibility, and most significantly, secrecy. The Trumanites’ work at rarified locations within the offices of powerful institutions like the Pentagon or CIA headquarters. They cannot speak about their work with friends or family members. Officials with access to classified information must sign nondisclosure agreements which require them to submit anything they write to prepublication review if it pertains to their work (Glennon 2015, 22). Since information is power in the network, Trumanites are “both information gluttons and information misers” (Glennon 2015, 23). Glennon cites the case of the Pentagon spy ring that stole secrets from Nixon’s National Security Council and passed them on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Glennon 2015, 23). Tellingly, the Nixon administration acted to halt hearings on the crime despite being its victim (Glennon 2015, 147). This episode illustrates the information miserliness of the Trumanite NSC as well as the Pentagon’s information lust. It also reveals the fecklessness of the Madisonian institutions when confronted with Trumanite crimes.

Collective responsibility binds the Trumanite network together by allowing it to obscure the identity of “the deciders” of crucial decisions. The most important or sensitive decisions are often not put into writing. The shield of secrecy makes the network resistant to consequences of bad policies because as long as the entire “national security team” is responsible, no one is. Among other things, this allows the Trumanites to ignore laws. For example, the US continued to supply military aid to Egypt after a 2013 military coup, despite unambiguous statutes prohibiting such actions (Glennon 2015, 23). When asked by reporters to identify the parties responsible for the decision, US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki demurred, stating, “This was agreed to by the national security team. Beyond that, I’m not going to – I don’t have anything” (Glennon 2015, 24).
Although the Trumanite network is cohesive, it is not monolithic. It is amorphous, leaderless, and it lacks a formal structure. But while its members’ worldviews may differ marginally, they do not differ at the core. Quoting Mills (1956, 190), the military mindset consists of an “intensified desire, too deeply rooted to examine, to conform to type, to be indistinguishable, not to reveal loss of composure to inferiors, and above all, not to presume the right to upset the arrangements of the chain of command” (Glennon 2015, 24). Since the Trumanites operate in the shadow of the military, the network’s mindset is quite similar. The spectrum of opinion is exceedingly narrow (Glennon 2015, 24).

In addition to the military cast of mind, other factors also help to account for the remarkable continuity in US foreign policy. The US government has institutional interests that endure across administrations. Trumanites’ highest norm is stability, which makes preserving the status quo their ultimate objective. The status quo advances US power as well as the careers of bureaucrats within Trumanite organizations. Being overburdened with administrivia and the management of various crises, Trumanites are unable to reassess the securitized cosmology which undergirds policy (Glennon 2015, 25). Advancement is typically the result of carrying out policies decided upon by superiors. Since loyalty is so prized, reconsiderations of flawed policies are rare. Thus, policy in the Trumanite realm is very much path dependent. The trajectory of future policy tends to align greatly with the trajectory of policy in the past (Glennon 2015, 26-27). Career bureaucrats, as Harry Truman observed, “look upon elected officials as just temporary occupants,” and this is especially true within the Trumanite network (Glennon 2015, 28).

In terms of foreign policy, the Trumanite network is not only consistent, it is also autonomous. This autonomy has been maintained by two straightforward conditions. Firstly, the Madisonian institutions appear to be in control of US national security. Secondly, the Madisonian institutions are not actually in charge (Glennon 2015, 28). Since the Trumanites’ power flows from the legitimacy of the Madisonian institutions and the Madisonian institutions’ legitimacy
depends upon the perception that democratically elected leaders are in charge, both institutions have strong incentives to foster the illusion of Madisonian control (Glennon 2015, 29-30). The maintenance of this illusion rests upon five elements: “historical pedigree, ritual, intelligibility, mystery, and harmony.” Collectively, these attributes create in the public a sense of duty to obey and respect the authority of the government (Glennon 2015, 30). Pedigree refers to the prestige enjoyed by Madisonians by virtue of their lineage which is traced all the way back to America’s still-revered Founding Fathers. Pedigree is reified by rituals like the presidential inauguration which trace back to the early days in our history as a republic. Intelligibility enhances Madisonian legitimacy because everyone can understand that the three branches of government exist and that they have knowable functions (Glennon 2015, 30-31). At the same time, Madisonians benefit from a sense of mystery inspired by the remove at which the government conducts its affairs (Glennon 2015, 32). Finally, the illusion of Madisonian control persists in part due to the appearance of harmony between Trumanite and Madisonian institutions. Trumanites are not to be seen publicly resisting Madisonians’ policies; Madisonians have little incentive to highlight dissonance or the autonomy of the Trumanites (Glennon 2015, 32-34).

On the whole, the US public fails to recognize that Madisonian institutions do not substantially formulate much of US national security policy. Exceptions to the general rule of double government serve to keep the public generally unaware. Counterexamples must be present in order to maintain the illusion that the uncanny degree of policy continuity has a human and not systemic explanation. The public needs to be able to believe that if they would but elect the right people, the policies would change (Glennon 2015, 36). The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government do occasionally overrule the Trumanites. This does not occur frequently enough to imperil double government, but it does bolster the illusion of Madisonian governance (Glennon 2015, 37). Existing in a state of entropy, the Madisonian institutions do not possess the requisite power to remedy their own fecklessness. Instead they are, as Bagehot wrote,
“a disguise.” They exercise power “more in form than in substance,” and therefore the ostensibly Madisonian system has not self-corrected as it was designed to do (Glennon 2015, 39).

Alexander Hamilton referred to the judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch of the government. Today also, the courts most clearly fail to imperil the rise and continuation of double government (Glennon 2015, 39). Prior to being nominated and confirmed, appointees to the federal judiciary have been vetted by some of the same people whose cases they will eventually hear: members of the Trumanite network and their White House and Justice Department associates. Before an individual is nominated, he or she is carefully investigated for dependability. The effect of this is that appointees function as trusted allies of the Trumanite network when it comes to matters of national security (Glennon 2015, 40). It is often the case that judicial nominees are former national security officials who have participated in matters similar to those whose lawfulness they will eventually adjudicate. For example, Chief Justice William Rehnquist served in Nixon’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), where he was a direct participant in operations that entailed the domestic surveillance of political groups by the military (Glennon 2015, 40). Later, as a Supreme Court Justice, his was the decisive vote in a case pertaining to Army surveillance of domestic political groups. Rehnquist’s vote very likely prevented his prior questionable activities from being discovered (Glennon 2015, 41). Similarly, Justice Antonin Scalia had previously served as an Assistant Attorney General for the OLC. In this position Scalia met with DCI William Colby and other officials to decide which classified documents should be handed over to Congress. Additionally, and according to Scalia himself, he was responsible for approving all covert actions for a time (Glennon 2015, 41). Justice Samuel Alito was formerly a captain in Signal Corp of the US Army which is charged with handling the military’s secret communication systems. He later went on to work in the OLC where he endeavored to enlarge the president’s ability to influence or alter the law (Glennon 2015, 42). Chief Justice John Roberts clerked for Justice Rehnquist. He later served in in the Reagan administration’s White House
Office of General Counsel where he penned a presidential letter responding to Arthur Goldberg, a retired Supreme Court Justice. Goldberg had written a letter questioning the constitutionality of the US invasion of Grenada. The Roberts-written response asserted that the president had “inherent authority in international affairs” to use the military to defend US interests (Glennon 2015, 42). As Chief Justice, Roberts voted to affirm the constitutionality of the military tribunal system devised by the Bush administration (Glennon 2015, 42).

It can be argued that these judges are appointed, not because of their links to the Trumanite network, but because they have a judicial philosophy which conforms to the president’s desire for a powerful executive branch (Glennon 2015, 43). Whatever the reasons might be, the result is the same: they are dependable defenders of the Trumanite network (Glennon 2015, 44). Typically, legal challenges to the Trumanites are dismissed through the invocation of various precedents, couched in obscure legal esoterica (Glennon 2015, 46). Although the courts long ago devised the “non-delegation doctrine” forbidding Congress from delegating legislative power to administrative agencies, this doctrine has never been applied to strike down a single delegation of Trumanite authority in the realm of national security policy. Instead, judges endeavor to cite “implied” congressional authorization for Trumanite initiatives (Glennon 2015, 47). The Trumanites also hold what Glennon describes as “the ultimate trump card” – the 1936 Supreme Court decision which established “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations – a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress” (Glennon 2015, 47). Thus, Trumanite power is without Constitutional basis; it resides in the reality of external sovereignty – America’s membership in the international community, which grants extraconstitutional authority upon those officials who must exercise it (Glennon 2015, 47-48). The courts’ incursions into Trumanite territory are generally insignificant and serve to preserve the illusion of Madison governance (Glennon 2015, 48). Thus, Nixon’s infamous
dictum – “[W]hen the president does it, that means it is not illegal” – would appear to be true in the realm of national security policy and to apply not just to the president, but to the national security state as a whole.

As with the judiciary, the apparent power of Congress exceeds its actual impact on national security policy (Glennon 2015, 49). Members of Congress must be generalists. They must be knowledgeable about economic policy, social policy, and foreign policy. Trumanites have an insurmountable informational advantage relative to members of Congress. Therefore, Trumanite threat assessments are assumed to be correct whether the threats are posed by the targets of drone strikes, Iraqi WMD, or North Vietnamese torpedoes in the Gulf of Tonkin. Members of Congress live in fear of endangering their careers by casting a vote that could be linked to any future national security disaster (Glennon 2015, 50).

Glennon finds that the lack of civic virtue is at the heart of Congress’ abdication of its Constitutional authority. Madison’s grand design was for a self-equilibrating system with a separation of powers. Elected as they are by an ignorant and disengaged public, the chief ambition of legislators is to be reelected. Under such circumstances, there is little incentive for Congresspersons to resist infringements upon Congressional authority (Glennon 2015, 51). One consequence is that Trumanites often end up writing the national security bills introduced by members of Congress. Trumanites can oppose or approve of amendments and alterations during the legislative process. They hover near floor debates, ready to provide friendly members with information to support their positions and arguments. The net result of all this influence is that while Congress appears to make the laws, the Trumanite network creates or strongly influences virtually everything significant that national security legislation is based upon (Glennon 2015, 51).

Conversely, the Trumanite network does not allow for Congress to substantially influence Trumanite practices or decision-making (Glennon 2015, 51). The courts bear some responsibility
for Congressional impotence. The Supreme Court invalidated the “legislative veto” procedure in 1983. The practice had enabled Congress to disallow Trumanite weapons sales, military plans, and other defense measures. The court found the practice unconstitutional because it allowed Congress to check executive actions without providing the possible remedy of a presidential veto. It was later proposed that the Senate Intelligence Committee be granted the authority to approve or disapprove proposed covert actions. This was vetoed by President and former DCI George H. W. Bush on the grounds that such legislative controls had previously been invalidated by the Court (Glennon 2015, 52; 173).

While the Constitution delegates to Congress the responsibility of declaring war, recent US wars have been fought without Congressional approval in Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Libya. Thusly has this crucial Constitutionally designated power been stripped from Congress (Glennon 2015, 48). Additionally, Congress is unable to effectively conduct oversight of the intelligence community. In theory, effective oversight is provided by two intelligence oversight committees – one in each house. Defenders of the process can state that it works, but there is little to no evidence to support or disprove such statements. Information that would allow the public to evaluate the committees’ efficacy is rarely available to other members of Congress, and even less accessible for the general public. The intelligence community resists even Congress’ feeble attempts at providing oversight (Glennon 2015, 52). In 1984, DCI William Casey stated that “The business of Congress is to stay out of my business” (Glennon 2015, 52). The more significant and problematic a policy is, the less likely it is that the CIA will inform even the oversight committees. For example, the CIA began its infamous detention and interrogation program in 2002. Only in September of 2006 were the committee members briefed, excepting the Chairman and Vice Chairman who had been briefed previously. Even then, the members were briefed only hours before the program was disclosed to the general public by President Bush (Glennon 2015, 52-53).
Obstructionism by the intelligence community can take the form of deceptive behavior and statements. Even when agencies’ activities are accurately reported, it still may not be possible to provide meaningful scrutiny, since information given to the committees is often “wildly over-classified” (according to Senator Sheldon Whitehouse) and/or obscure which prevents members from asking too many questions about programs of which they know only vague details. If committee members inquire too aggressively, they may be illegally monitored by the Agency as was reported by Senator Diane Feinstein (Glennon 2015, 53, 176). It is unclear why the CIA would bother with such surveillance given that committee members are not allowed to convey classified information to nonmember Congresspersons, even when the respective activities are illegal. They are also forbidden from speaking out publicly on such matters. Given that such is the case, it is not surprising that the oversight committees were generally silent about most of the Bush administration’s most controversial and apparently unlawful policies (Glennon 2015, 54).

The difficulties facing committee members who want to conduct actual oversight are typically irrelevant anyway because most committee members are what Loch Johnson described as “ostriches” or “cheerleaders.” An ostrich does not want to know about intelligence activities and like former committee member Barry Goldwater, may not even believe that they are Congress’ business (Glennon 2015, 54). A cheerleader like Diane Feinstein approaches the process with the intention of showing her unwavering devotion to the intelligence community. Ostriches and cheerleaders today far outnumber “skeptics” and “guardians.” A skeptic is uncertain of the benefits of our massive intelligence bureaucracy and, like Daniel Patrick Moynihan, may even wonder if its continued existence is justified on its historical merits. A guardian, Frank Church most famously, is not content to simply respond to crises; he seeks to prevent operational fiascos and intelligence failures from occurring (Glennon 2015, 55).

Congress, according to Glennon does not provide adequate oversight because doing so does not serve members’ core interest – the maximization of their re-election chances. Citing
political scientists Amy Zegart and Julie Quinn (2010), he identifies three reasons why such is the case. First, voters do not vote on the basis of intelligence issues. The collective effects of the US intelligence community are not acutely felt by most citizens (Glennon 2015, 56). Second, any constituency that would be especially concerned with intelligence matters is too geographically dispersed to be significant for any individual member of Congress. Third, relative to other areas of policy, interest groups concerned with intelligence are weak and few in number. One reason for this is that state secrecy prevents even the few relevant groups from knowing enough details about the activities of the intelligence community to hold intelligence agencies accountable (Glennon 2015, 57).

Some scholars, including Arthur Schlesinger (1973) and Chalmers Johnson (2006, 14-18), have argued that the issue is one of an “imperial presidency.” Glennon asserts that this is not the case. Although the Trumanites work for the president who could in theory order a complete reversal of national security policy, he would be very unlikely to do so because the consequences would deter him from such a course of action. The media and government officials maintain an illusion of presidential responsibility by speaking of “Obama’s” decisions or policies, but truly top-down decisions which reverse fundamental policies are very rare (Glennon 2015, 58). When a president issues an “order,” it is typically an order that originated with the Trumanites. This is often accomplished by entangling a president who must then negotiate with the military. As Kennedy aide Ted Sorensen wrote, “Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions – particularly in foreign affairs […] [T]he basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made” (Glennon 2015, 58-59). Justice Douglas, who was also a friend of the Kennedy family, spoke of the relationship between President Kennedy and the generals: “I slowly realized that the military were so strong in our society that probably no President could stand against them” (Glennon 2015, 59). Historian and Kennedy advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. stated that the Kennedy administration had been at war with “the National Security People” (Mellen 2013, 162).
This would seem to be at odds with the thesis of Schlesinger’s own book *The Imperial Presidency* (1973) which argued that the US Presidency had far outgrown the limits and intentions outlined in the US Constitution.

The “National Security People” would include the CIA, whose influence has expanded. A recent example is described in a Senate Intelligence Committee report which found that in order to justify “extreme interrogation,” (i.e. torture) the agency “blatantly misled President George W. Bush, the White House, the Justice Department, and the Congressional intelligence committees about the efficacy of its methods” (Glennon 2015, 59). On many occasions, Trumanites have acted without presidential approval. A presidential aide testified in 1975 that the administration “didn’t know half” of the legally questionable things that the intelligence agencies did. Recently, the CIA failed to inform the White House of the existence of videotapes documenting the waterboarding of detainees on the basis that the agency had determined that the White House did not “need to know” (Glennon 2015, 59). Sometimes, Trumanites create presidential “directives” which they direct at themselves. Presidents endorse such policies after the fact to avoid looking like spectators (Glennon 2015, 60).

Glennon provides several recent examples illustrating presidential fecklessness in the face of Trumanite power. The Trumanites prevailed in efforts to persuade President Obama to continue the drone assassination program and not to discuss the broader ramifications of the policy. In the Situation Room, there were four unanimous voices representing the Pentagon and the intelligence community. All four, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, were holdovers from the Bush administration (Glennon 2015, 61-62). When Obama was considering lowering the US presence in Afghanistan, an NSC staff member suggested that if the president were to pursue such a course, he could be provoking the resignations of the commander of all allied forces in Afghanistan, the CENTCOM Commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and possibly the Secretary of Defense (Glennon 2015, 64). When deciding on the troop
levels to be deployed in Afghanistan, the military presented President Obama with three options – the option they preferred, along with two unreasonable alternatives. Eventually, the military added a fourth option largely indistinguishable from their preferred option. Said President Obama, “You guys just presented me [with] four options, two of which are not realistic […] So what’s my option? […] You have essentially given me one option” (Glennon 2015, 64).

Glennon’s most detailed example is a case study of NSA surveillance. President Obama, the former constitutional law professor, continued two NSA programs which appear to be clearly unconstitutional. The first program involved collection of phone records of tens of millions of Verizon customers and mass collection of internet communications. The second act allowed the NSA to collect internet users’ information from Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and other companies on the Internet (Glennon 2015, 68). After the first program’s existence was reported by The Guardian, US officials issued non-denials and asserted that the three branches of the US government participate in activities of that sort. The NSA asserted that it had the statutory authority to carry out such surveillance, but its legal interpretation was classified. A member of the Senate Intelligence Committee said the government’s theory drew from the PATRIOT Act and that it held that the government’s authority to draw personal information from third parties was “essentially limitless.” The senator was prohibited from discussing the details of the legal interpretation. Thus, for all practical purposes, Congress and the public were unaware that surveillance of this scale was authorized or if there were any checks in place (Glennon 2015, 69).

Before the leaks became public, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was questioned by Senator Ron Wyden who inquired as to whether the NSA had been collecting any sort of data from millions or hundreds of millions of US citizens. He responded, falsely, “No, sir.” After Snowden’s revelations, Clapper admitted making false statements, calling his response “the least untruthful” statement that he could make. Two weeks later he revised his explanation by suggesting that he was confused about the question (Glennon 2015, 70). Senator Feinstein had
been presiding when Clapper gave his original, possibly felonious response to Senator Wyden. She said nothing. President Obama and other members of the administration knew or should have known that Clapper’s statement was false, yet they also remained silent for months until leaks finally revealed Clapper’s perfidy (Glennon 2015, 71). The NSA also repeatedly misled the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) regarding the scope of its data collection programs. The FISC had previously approved the NSA’s collection of telephone data, but only after the NSA had inaccurately described the scope and scale of its activities. The court concluded that the required standard for querying was violated so routinely that the oversight was essentially ineffectual (Glennon 2015, 71-72). The NSA surveillance program highlights some crucial points. The Trumanite network has tremendous power when it comes to formulating and enacting national security policy. The Madisonian branches are often either kept in the dark, co-opted, or powerless. They have shown themselves to be unable to take the initiative in the creation of policy, unable to provide effective oversight, and unable or unwilling to censure the Trumanites’ unlawful trespasses.

**Double Government vs. Political Science**

The Glennon version of dual state theory – *double government* – explains state behavior by positing the existence of a second institution (a network) that actually formulates and executes policy independently from the constitutionally delineated branches of government. Dovetailing with some of the approaches discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, Glennon contrasts his *double government* theory with what he identifies as some of the more common political science approaches that seek to explain state behavior. The first approach is the *rational actor model*. This model maintains that if the information, deliberative situation, decision-making context are the same, a rational policymaker will rationally choose the same option, as the other options are irrational. The rational actor model has “thin” and “thick” variants (Glennon 2015, 74). The thinnest conception – “comprehensive rationality” – maintains that in a given situation
there is but one rational option and any policy decision is explainable with reference to the
deciders’ wish to attain the maximum value of the chief preference that underpins the policy.
“Thicker” variants like the “bounded rationality” approach incorporate multicausality and
variables affecting cognition (Glennon 2015, 74; Allison and Zelikow 1999, 19-20).

The rational actor model is applied by practitioners of various approaches in political
science. Liberalism in international relations uses a variant of the rational actor model.
Specifically, theorists of democratic peace assert that a state’s regime type shapes its objectives,
belief systems, and foreign policy preferences. After being classified as democratic or not
democratic, states are then analyzed as unitary actors (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 36). Classical
realists like Hans Morgenthau (1970) start from two assumptions that are congruent with the
rational actor model, specifically: (1) states are the chief unitary actors in the international sphere;
and (2) states are rational utility maximizers. To these, classical realists add two further
assumptions: (3) the international system is anarchical, and (4) the chief goals of states are
security and power (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 27-28). Neorealism refines the core assumptions
of classical realism by aspiring to be more “scientific” and by placing greater emphasis on
systemic variables, especially anarchy (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 30). Waltz’s (1979)
neorealism or “structural realism” focuses on anarchy and states which differ primarily by their
aggregate power relative to other states. With relative power being the decisive variable, anarchy
is predicted to create a marked tendency toward systemic balance, a balance which when
disrupted will eventually be restored in some way (Waltz 1979; Allison and Zelikow 1999, 31).

International institutionalism also employs the rational actor model by accepting realist
assumptions of anarchy and of the state as a rational unitary actor. To this realist foundation they
add an emphasis on international institutions as major causal variables (Allison and Zelikow
1999, 33). International institutions have grown in number and importance since the end of World
War II. The institutions are significant because they affect the availability of information and
transaction costs for cooperation among the unitary rational actors, i.e., nation-states. Keohane (1984), the most prominent of the institutionalists, recognizes the limitations of institutionalist theory. He asserts that since the theory treats the objectives pursued by states as exogenous, institutionalism and neorealism should be supplemented by a more comprehensive theory of the state—a theory which could address the origins of the interests, objectives, norms, and perceptions which influence state behavior (Keohane 1984; Allison and Zelikow 1999, 34-35). This is also a valid criticism of Glennon’s theory of double government which tripartite state theory can address, as argued herein.

The rational actor model has some fairly well-known flaws and weakness. Glennon (2015) focuses on five. First, it cannot determine which values or preferences the state ought to seek to maximize. Why does any value have a “rational” hierarchical superiority over any other value? Second, the model cannot with any degree of certainty demonstrate which objective is or was the most valued in any decision-making process (Glennon 2015, 75). Third, the government—being a massive collection of organizations and individuals—is not an individual with human emotions, mental processes, and purposes (Glennon 2015, 76). Fourth, the model entails a cost-benefit analysis without being able to determine which variables are to be weighed and how much weight each is to be accorded (Glennon 2015, 77). Finally, even were the other weaknesses accounted for, human rationality is hampered by cognitive weaknesses and distortions. There are well-known cognitive deficiencies which do not stem from human emotion. These include “bandwagon bias,” “choice supportive bias,” “disconfirmation bias,” and “projection bias” (Glennon 2015, 78).

The second political science approach cited by Glennon to explain state behavior is the “government politics model.” This model is characterized as including “virtually everything that the rational actor model excludes” (Glennon 2015, 80). This model was first formulated by Graham Allison in his 1971 examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis entitled Essence of
Decision. The book was rewritten in 1999 with new coauthor Phillip Zelikow, following the declassification of much relevant documentation from the crisis. According to this model, government behavior is not the result of a unitary state and it is not simply an organizational output. Rather, the model maintains that government behavior is the result of bargaining games. There are numerous players whose attention is divided among many domestic and international problems. The players do not act according to a single array of strategic objectives. There are various competing conceptions of interests and objectives on individual, organizational, and national levels. Thus, decisions are the result of the give and take of various intranational bargaining games (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 255). Glennon argues that this model is not excessively parsimonious. Its weakness is lies in the opposite direction; it identifies so many variables as to make it impossible to identify the variable “but for which the policy result would not have occurred” (Glennon 2015, 80). He acknowledges that for every national security decision, “innumerable people shape the final outcome.” Without further simplification, causes cannot be isolated and explanation is impossible (Glennon 2015, 81).

In order to isolate the actual causes of US foreign policy decisions, Glennon turns to the organizational behavior model (Glennon 2015, 81). This model understands government behavior as the output of organizations rather than the product of deliberate choices (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 143). The basic tenets of the model parallel the central elements of Bagehot’s—and thus Glennon’s—approach. Unlike the rational actor model, it does not present an overly parsimonious, unicausal theory. Unlike the government politics model, it does not attempt to incorporate everything under the sun. Instead, the organizational behavior model elaborates upon the shared characteristics that influence the behavior of organizations such as those which participate in formulating and executing America’s national security policy (Glennon 2015, 81).

Glennon identifies several key aspects of organizational behavior theory which are particularly germane to his depiction of the Trumanite network. The membership, culture, and
purposes of an organization shape its practices and capabilities (Glennon 2015, 81-82). An organization’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) channel members into carrying out an organization’s purposes. These routines define the responses to common contingencies. Unforeseen contingencies are nevertheless analogized to whatever common contingency is most relevant. These SOPs produce consistent expectations and stability, but they can also make organization static and inflexible (Glennon 2015, 82-83). An organization’s SOPs are formed on the basis of the likely consequences that they should engender. This is determined by some manner of risk assessment derived from the organization’s files and/or from the memories of its members. Typically, dramatic failures are most feared since they threaten an organization with cataclysmic change. Therefore, organizations are averse to uncertainty and risky ventures. They prefer outputs with predictable but tolerable costs as opposed to riskier ventures that might deliver greater benefits. In political science terms, they “satisfice.” The aversion to risk can allow inertia to carry programs beyond the point of loss (Glennon 2015, 83-84).

If an organization’s benefits are higher than its costs, the organization can expect higher budgets, better personnel, and greater responsibilities. This grants an organization more power which leads to greater capabilities which leads to more power and so on. Likewise, individuals within organizations seek greater power (Glennon 2015, 84). Information flows enhance organization capabilities by reducing uncertainty. For this reason, data is not shared with the competition. This gives rise to secrecy, prevarication, and exclusivity. Data is gathered at the lower layers, filtered and reinterpreted at the intermediate layers, before arriving at the decision-making levels. This makes information subject to “abbreviation, modification, and cognitive distortion (such as groupthink)” (Glennon 2015, 84-85). Thus, the informational filters can damage the organization’s efforts to preserve its culture and efficacy. Overall, organizational outputs serve to constrain leaders by forcing them to address problems by choosing from a narrow range of options. The lower layers identify emerging problems, and since steps are taken
to deal with problems prior to leaders directing a response, leaders’ decisions often appear to be unavailing. Collectively, all of these organizational tendencies give rise to preferences that remain consistent and stable. This tends to be the case regardless of changes in personnel or even leadership (Glennon 2015, 85).

All of the foregoing organizational traits are relevant to the Trumanite network. Glennon’s significant departure from the organizational behavior model is that he is not speaking of a discrete organization, but rather a network straddling numerous organizations. Nor is the Trumanite network best described as an “institution,” as Bagehot conceptualized Britain’s “efficient” government. The network lacks the procedural formality implied by the term “institution,” especially in the formal sense of the term (Glennon 2015, 85). The Trumanite structure is better characterized as a network for six reasons identified by Glennon. First, its boundaries are nebulous. Second, the structure as a whole has no clearly delineated formal authority to govern. Third, the network collectively has no formalized routines, standard operating procedures, or decision-making guidelines. Fourth, though organizations and individuals may specialize, there is no defined division of labor. Fifth, if a node cannot function properly, an adjustment will be made. Decision-making power will bypass the blocked node. Sixth, a network does not have stable, formally identifiable leadership. In the Trumanite case, power and responsibility can shift according to a vast array of factors (Glennon 2015, 86).

Although the Trumanite network differs from an organization in the ways listed above, it shares one important trait with an organization: its members each work within an organization. Therefore, the behavior of the members very much conforms to the expected behavior within the organizations in which they reside (Glennon 2015, 86-87). Within the intelligence community and the Pentagon, powerful norms hold sway. Members are expected to show loyalty to extant policy, to forgo embarrassing other network members to the public, and to demonstrate conformity by espousing commonly held assumptions and values. For these and other reasons,
the Trumanite network has been and continues to be susceptible to “groupthink.” This social psychology term refers to the stunted thinking that can prevail inside a very cohesive group. Members suppress dissenting voices and even thoughts in order to achieve and maintain consensus and unwavering loyalty to common mores. Groupthink leads members to downplay the possibility of failure and of personal responsibility for actions and outcomes. The benefits of alternative policies are dismissed or given scant attention. The status quo is all too often depicted as being the self-evidently rational choice (Glennon 2015, 87). While the Trumanite network suffers from the pathologies of an organization, it has been able to maintain its power by maintaining a network structure. Were the various organizations ever consolidated into one agency, it would have been too visible to operate efficiently and survive in a political culture in which the government’s legitimacy rests upon the prestige of the Madisonian institutions (Glennon 2015, 87-88).

This extensive review of Glennon’s theory of double government serves a few purposes in this dissertation. First, his elaboration of double government effectively illustrates the extent to which the Madisonian institutions (otherwise herein referred to as the public state) have largely abdicated—or been divested of—meaningful control and oversight of US foreign policy. Second, Glennon does indeed identify many of the dynamics that most strongly determine the behavior of the Trumanite network (otherwise referred to as the security state by this author). Third, and most importantly, the omissions and oversights in Glennon’s theory are central to the theory of the tripartite state. There are several questions that Glennon either does not answer or does not answer very clearly. In so doing, Glennon implicitly treats these issues as exogenous to his framework. These questions include: What are the unchanging objectives of US foreign policy? When, how, and by whom were they formulated? How unchanging have they been and what accounts for the variation that does exist? What are the foundational assumptions of the political class in the US? How did these assumptions arise? What social forces gave rise to the creation of
the security state? How did these forces influence its development thereafter? Glennon fails to consider whether powerful societal interests or considerations drove and were served by past policies, resulting in all the more influential and thereby even more able to drive policy. This could describe the arms, aerospace, and resource extraction industries as well as high finance—all of which benefit enormously from US hegemony. In fact, the Trumanite bureaucrats are lesser partners among the US elite which dominates the state, “as seen most clearly in the speed with which they are fired if they disagree with the eager civilian militarists from the corporate community and associated think tanks” (Domhoff 2007).

**Foreign Policy Analysis**

In sum, Glennon offers an adroit critique of political science approaches to understanding the national security state. The above critiques of rational actor models and the governmental politics models are relevant to assessing the merits of the growing IR subdiscipline of foreign policy analysis (FPA). In this literature, multiple approaches or levels of analysis prevail. Relevant to this discussion are the FPA approaches that focus respectively on the individual decisionmaker, group decision-making, culture and identity, and domestic political contestation (Hudson and Day 2020, 35).

In the US case, a focus on the psychology of leaders may provide plausible explanations for the odd individual policy decision. The approach could provide, say, reasonable descriptions of the idiosyncratic proclivities like those that contributed to Woodrow Wilson’s failure to get the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. However, from the beginning of US history, the continuity of US foreign policy belies any explanation that places considerable importance on the personality of this or that leader. The English colonists desired more land in the West even as this led to conflicts with Britain as evidenced by the British reaction to King Philip’s War or Bacon’s rebellion. Perhaps as much or more than mercantilist exploitation and British despotism, the American elite revolted to be free of English restrictions (real and prophesied) on Western
expansion and slave holding (see Horne 2014). From independence onward, the trend was imperial expansion across the continent as presided over by figures as diverse as Thomas Jefferson (Louisiana Purchase), James Monroe (Spanish Florida), John Tyler (annexation of Texas), and James Polk (the Mexican Session). Having achieved “manifest destiny,” the US kept going West—all the way to Japan where President Fillmore famously sent Commodore Matthew Perry. Lincoln’s Secretary of State William Seward conceived of a Pacific empire, much of which the US would acquire, especially with the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the acquisitions of the Spanish-American War.

Without attempting to address each major foreign policy decision of each administration, the general trend of imperialist forces overcoming progressive or isolationist opposition belies resort to psychological explanations. However, two caveats could apply to US leaders in the 20th and 21st centuries. The first is that the two progressive presidents who seemed most opposed to colonialism and neocolonialism—FDR and JFK—came from wealthy families. This suggests that during the New Deal and Bretton Woods eras, there were more opportunities for the US electoral process to produce leaders less beholden to the constituencies that propel imperial hegemony. Their elite socialization likely had some impact on their respective psychologies and their abilities to navigate rarefied sociological circles. The other way in which psychology may impact presidential leadership lies in the psychology of the politician who ascends from more humble origins. Specifically, leaders like Truman, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Obama may—despite obvious differences—share overriding similarities which must have been brought to bear on their respective psychologies. To rise so precipitously these politicians must have shared, above all, a will to cooptation. This is not to state that psychology is the decisive variable. Rather, it suggests that in a nominally democratic, technologically advanced empire, the system’s elites may confer success, prestige, and patronage on the basis of psychological traits rather than those traits somehow determining the trajectory of the system.
Recent US history highlights the general weakness of psychology-based explanations of US foreign policy continuity. Few would disagree that US presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump are possessed of considerably distinct psychologies. As such their adherence to imperial hegemonic adventurism is illuminating. In 2001, retired General Wesley Clark learned that the US was planning to attack and overthrow the governments of seven countries including Iraq, Libya, and Syria. When the Iraq War stalled, it appeared that this neoconservative campaign of conquest would have to be abandoned. Surprisingly, the campaign was resumed by President Barack Obama, disillusioning some of those who believed that the Nobel Peace Prize-winning president would deliver on his purported agenda of “change.” On humanitarian grounds that were eventually discredited, the US under Obama led a NATO coalition that overthrew the government of Libya, plunging what had been the most prosperous country in Africa into years of violent chaos and lawlessness. In Syria, the CIA under Obama launched Operation Timber Sycamore, a major covert proxy military operation to overthrow the Syrian government. Refuting the misleadingly depiction of Syria as a “civil war,” Jeffrey Sachs was one of the few dissenting public figures to speak to the issue. In a 2018 appearance on MSNBC, Sachs explained that “we have made a proxy war in Syria. It’s killed 500,000 people, displaced 10 million […] This war continues because we to this day back rebels that are trying to overthrow a government contrary to international law, contrary to the UN charter” (Stone and Kuznick 2019, 648-649). The US role in the conflict has not yet ended. After running as antiwar candidate who wanted to end America’s “forever wars,” President Trump reversed his decision to withdraw the US troops illegally occupying Syria, instead opting to occupy Syrian oil fields. Confessing to the war crime of pillage, Trump told journalist Laura Ingraham, “I left troops to take the oil. I took the oil. The only troops I have are taking the oil.”

While Trump’s manner of explaining his policy may be novel, the policy of attacking Syria predates him and reached its deadliest levels under Obama. An even longer look at the
region suggests that a psychological diagnosis of the foreign policy establishment itself may be warranted. In the 1980’s, the US armed both sides in the Iran-Iraq War which killed over a million people. The first Gulf War under G. H. W. Bush was one of the most lopsided military routes in world history. The subsequent sanctions regime placed on Iraq killed over a million people, including over 500,000 children. When US Secretary of State Madeline Albright was asked about 500,000 dead Iraqi children, she famously stated that “we think the price is worth it.” With the sanctions’ ostensible justification of Iraqi WMD now cast in disrepute, it is worth investigating what “it” was that Albright considered to be worth the price. A strong hypothesis can be derived from a story in the San Francisco Chronicle of February 22, 1998. Headlined “Iraq’s Oil Poses Threat to the West,” the article reported that if Iraqi oil were allowed on the international petroleum market, “it would devalue British North Sea oil, undermine American oil production and—much more important—it would destroy the huge profits which the United States [presumably the US oil industry] stands to gain from its massive investment in Caucasian oil production, especially in Azerbaijan” (Parenti 2007, 309-310). In sum, imperial hegemonic foreign policy in the Gulf since the 1980’s indicates that US policymakers consistently demonstrate the psychological traits associated with antisocial personality disorder—commonly referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy. Such persons are able to pursue objectives without being impeded by empathy which is either absent or attenuated. If such a diagnosis seems an inappropriate way to analyze the imperial hegemonic foreign policy establishment consensus, perhaps reference to C. Wright Mills (1956) would be more relevant from a social science perspective:

[W]hen institutions are corrupting, many of the men who live and work in them are necessarily corrupted. In the corporate era, economic relations become impersonal—and the executive feels less personal responsibility. Within the corporate worlds of business, war-making and politics, the private conscience is attenuated—and the higher immorality is institutionalized. It is not merely a question of a corrupt administration in corporation, army, or state; it is a feature of the corporate rich, as a capitalist stratum, deeply intertwined with the politics of the military state (343).
Cultural/national identity explanations are another FPA approach that may produce internally consistent theories of this or that foreign policy. Huntington (1993) famously predicted that cultural factors would lead to US conflict with China and the Islamic world. On the surface, this could seem apt in light of subsequent history. However, examined critically, the cultural aspects are less determining. Specifically, the culture and historic trajectory of the Muslim world has been greatly influenced by the West. The Islamist terror phenomenon derives from over a century of Western imperial meddling, most notably by Britain and the US. For example, the British supported the Wahabist Saudi royal family and created (through the Suez Canal Company) the Muslim Brotherhood specifically to combat nationalism in Egypt (Dreyfuss 51). After World War II, the most popular statesmen across the Middle East were secular nationalists—Mossadegh and Nasser. Not coincidentally, both governments also suffered paramilitary violence from Western-backed Islamist terror organizations. Additionally, both Iran and Egypt were ultimately undone by Anglo-US imperialism—the CIA’s Operation Ajax and Israel’s Six Day War, respectively. Other Middle Eastern states targeted by the US include secular governments in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Additionally, the US infamously backed the Mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan with Saudi assistance that later became al Qaeda. Led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the paramilitary terror organization was deployed by the West in Bosnia, Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Libya before 2001 (Good 2015). During the Obama administration, al Qaeda was used to affect regime change—successfully in Libya and unsuccessfully in Syria. The key point is that the Western use—and subsequent demonization—of Sunni Islamist terror can lend itself to Clash-of-Civilizations-style cultural explanations for international political phenomena. However, this can only occur in the context of widespread historical disinformation that could fairly be described as state gaslighting.

Just as the cultural explanation for the Middle East thinly obscures oily material determinants, Huntington’s cultural explanation for China is similarly deficient. China’s pre-
modern apexes occurred during the Han and Tang dynasties when the Silk Road was most active, allowing China to thrive at the center of a vast commercial network. With China’s recent resurgence, Chinese national strategists are seeking to integrate Eurasia anew through the Belt and Road Initiative. This is exactly the scenario fearfully forecast by Huntington’s Trilateralist comrade Zbigniew Brzezinski in *The Grand Chessboard* (1997). This strategy had obvious merits for the Chinese pursuit of the national interest, as well as corresponding demerits from the perspective of the mandarins of hegemonic US foreign policy. Grasping the ways in which this could lead to conflict with Western interests hardly requires reference to the Chinese vagaries of Confucianism or Daoism.

None of this is to say that culture is not worthy of deep study by social scientists. However, it is remiss to treat culture as a wholly independent force. In the last years of his life, Mills (2008) sought to undertake a study of “the cultural apparatus,” which he defined as:

…all the organizations and milieu in which artistic, intellectual, and scientific work goes on, and by which entertainment and information are produced and distributed. […] Inside this apparatus, standing between men and events, the images, meanings, slogans that define the world in which men live are organized and compared, maintained and revised, lost and cherished, hidden, debunked, celebrated (204).

Crucially, Mills (2008) highlighted the decisive link between power and culture by stating, “We cannot examine merely the individual workman and his choices; the cultural apparatus as a whole is established and used by dominant institutional orders” (205). Since “the prestige of culture transforms power into spellbinding authority,” the cultural apparatus of every nation tends “to become a close adjunct of national authority and a leading agency of nationalist propaganda” (206). As with much else, Mills was more correct than could have been known at the time.

Seeking funding for a larger proposed study on *The Cultural Apparatus*, his request was rejected by the Ford Foundation who feared it would be “another Power Elite,” i.e. another radical critique of US elites and their global impact (Parmar 2012, 261). Decades later, it emerged that the Ford Foundation had been a major conduit for CIA funds dispersed to affect the
influence/manipulation of culture (Saunders 2000). This is to say that in the Cold War US, the cultural apparatus functioned in way that rendered it even more of a top-down instrument of power than what Mills was describing. In the case of the US foreign policy establishment, culture is not the determining factor. Rather, it is another crucial venue for technocratically reproducing hegemony.

FPA fares a little better with the domestic politics approach to understanding foreign policy decisions. Unfortunately, the zeitgeist of the subdiscipline suffers from one of the main deficiencies of US political science in general—aversions to both elite theory and materialism. The history detailed in chapter 4 highlights just how rarefied were the decision-making circles that decided on an imperial hegemonic postwar US foreign policy. The politico-economic dominance of the imperial coalition was largely unfettered by any countervailing political force that could have redirected the US toward a cooperative nationalist/internationalist posture. The presidents and serious presidential candidates who betrayed any inclination of a more progressive foreign policy were all notably prevented from doing so—Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, John Kennedy, and Robert Kennedy.

Intriguingly, FPA practitioners Hudson and Day (2020) examine the domestic factors that influenced Kennedy first to send special forces to Vietnam and later to try and withdraw from the country—but only after being safely reelected. The authors then point out that Kennedy “probably would have been reelected, but he was assassinated instead” (167). Unmentioned is the possibility that the decidedly deadly institutions that would go on to prosecute the Vietnam War might value the imperial project over adherence to democracy and the rule of law. In other words, might not JFK’s departure from the imperial consensus have been related to his abrupt departure from the presidency? Such an interpretation suggests that at crucial points, foreign policy is formulated and executed by an elite of power operating under such secrecy that conventional approaches to studying key policy decisions may often be determinately blinkered.
On the whole, FPA is an important subdiscipline with the worthy aim of illuminating the means and ends of the human decisionmakers who formulate and execute foreign policy. In this way its practitioners are following Mills’ (2008) directive that a master task of intellectuals is “…to investigate the causes of war, and among them to locate the decisions and defaults of elite circles” (2). The psychological, group decisionmaking, cultural, and domestic political approaches can all produce useful scholarship. Unfortunately, mainstream FPA has a considerable aversion to materialism and elite theory. For this study, therefore, mainstream FPA scholarship is only as useful as the extent to which US foreign policy is neither elitist nor driven by material considerations.

C. Wright Mills and The Power Elite

It is puzzling that while Glennon cites C. Wright Mills for his canny description of the military mindset, he fails to take into account the chief insight of Mills’ magnum opus, The Power Elite (1956). Mills’ thesis is that decision-making—and thus real power—had migrated into ever loftier and increasingly opaque circles during the 20th century, rendering democracy an impotent façade. Mills focused upon the “big three” American institutions: the government, the military, and big business. He noted that individuals in the top positions in any of these hierarchies often migrated between top positions in the other two. Thus, the leadership of these institutions formed a cohesive power elite which determined the conventional wisdom, assumptions, and objectives of the political class. The power elite assumed control over processes of deliberation and decision-making. As US hegemony spread across the globe, the power elite created the institutions necessary to effectively administrate the empire or “hegemonic project” if one prefers.

Glennon’s double government theory offers an insightful examination of the substance of two of Mills’ “big three” institutions – the government and the military. He convincingly demonstrates that US foreign policy is not under the control of democratically elected officials
who are by and large passive agents, feckless vis-à-vis the “main drift.” The chief shortcoming of Glennon’s framework is that it omits the power of big business – the corporate rich. This oversight may represent more than just the omission of a significant variable; it likely represents the omission of the overdetermining variable. According to the theory presented herein, the sustained and often coordinated influence of the corporate rich (i.e., the overworld) best explains the pathological inertia and continuity of US foreign policy and the seemingly inexorable rightward, criminogenic, and anti-nationalist shift of politics in the US and of politics in nations under the sway of US hegemony. This has resulted in the emergence of a tripartite state that has operated in a discursive but continuous state of exception in the pursuit and maintenance of US hegemony. C. Wright Mills was the social scientist who most effectively elucidated these trends at an early date. It is worth revisiting The Power Elite (Mills 1956) in order to reassess the most crucial trends he identified as well as their implications for society and politics in the intervening years.

Mills was concerned with the momentous history-making power that US elites had recently exercised. In the preceding decades, small circles of US elites had decided to effect US entry into World War II, to drop atomic bombs on Japan, to intervene in Korea, and to defeat Admiral Radford’s proposal to intervene at Dienbienphu (Mills 1956, 22, 24). Intuitively, many people, “feel that they live in a time of big decisions; they know that they are not making any.” Observers feel that at the center of it all, “making decisions or failing to make them, there must be an elite of power” (Mills 1956, 5). Many other people who follow events through the accounts of nominal decision makers may come to believe that there is no cohesive elite whose power is decisively consequential (Mills 1956, 5). Mills took both perspectives into account to formulate a conception of the power of the American elite. The means of power are the hierarchies of the government, the corporation, and the military. The command posts of modern society reside at the summits of the big three hierarchies. They wield history-making power unprecedented in
human history (Mills 1956, 5). As the big three domains became larger and more centralized, their activities have become more consequential and traffic between domains has increased (Mills 1956, 7). As a result, the top positions across hierarchies became increasingly interchangeable (Mills 1956, 10).

Mills thus defined the *power elite* as “those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences. In so far as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them” (Mills 1956, 18). Three major keys are identified as crucial to understanding the power elite. First, is the common psychology of the elites among their cohort. They have similar education and background, their lifestyles are similar, they have similar social standing, and they intermingle easily. The interchangeability in the command posts across the big three hierarchies serves to further contribute to the shared psychology of the members of the power elite (Mills 1956, 19).

The second key to understanding the power elite involves the structure and mechanics of the big three institutional hierarchies. The larger these bureaucratic domains are, the more power afforded to their respective elites. If the hierarchies were diffuse and disconnected, the elites within each would be scattered and disconnected. If the hierarchies are interconnected to a considerable degree and if their interests often coincide, their elites would form a more cohesive set. In Mills’ America, there were “several important structural coincidences of interest between these institutional domains,” the most salient being “the development of a permanent war establishment by a privately incorporated economy inside a political vacuum” (Mills 1956, 19). The third aspect of the power elite identified by Mills involves the unity achieved by instances of direct coordination. This was not to assert that coordination is complete or constant. Nor was it to say that willful cooperation is the chief basis for the unity of the power elite or that the emergence of the power elite represented the realization of explicit plans. It was to say that the
aggrandizement and centralization of power within and across the big three hierarchies has presented opportunities to men who in the pursuit of their respective interests, came to grasp that they could better realize their interests by working in formal and informal ways with other members of the power elite. They have done so, and at times (e.g. during wartime, which became essentially interminable) such coordination has been quite decisive (Mills 1956, 19-20).

By focusing on the powerful synergy between the command posts of the big three hierarchies, Mills cast his view between two ideal types. The first views history as “drift.” The older version of this was “fate,” or “The Unseen Hand” (Mills 1956, 21). Imagine the tale of Oedipus as a mythical depiction of history conceived as such. The updated sociological version of “drift” holds that since decisions are innumerable and individually inconsequential, they collectively accrue to effect an outcome no one could have intended or controlled (Mills 1956, 21). Mills surmised that this “view that all is blind drift is largely a fatalist projection of one’s own impotence, [or] a salve of one’s guilt” (Mills 1956, 27). The problem with such a view is that not all eras are equally adrift. What if the circle of decision-makers narrows, and if the means of decision-making are centralized, and if the consequences of the decisions are tremendous? In such an era, history-making power may reside within knowable—or at least extant—circles of actors (Mills 1956, 27).

Mills’ other flawed ideal type conceives of history as “conspiracy.” Such a view holds that history unfolds according to the designs of an identifiable set of villainous or heroic actors. It is a hasty projection and diversion from the more difficult effort to grasp how a shifting social structure affords opportunities to elites and to coalitions of elites who then capitalize or fail to capitalize on them. Wrote Mills, “To accept either view – of all history as conspiracy or all history as drift – is to relax the effort to understand the facts of power and the ways of the powerful” (Mills 1956, 27).
As stated above, Mills did not conceive of every historical epoch as equally fateful. Nor did he see America’s power elite as a static configuration throughout US history. While the power system in the US has changed throughout its history, its basic legitimations have never been challenged. Changes in the power structure have been brought about by relative shifts in the positions of the political, economic, and military institutions. By Mills’ reckoning, the US power elite had gone through four distinct eras and was in its fifth (Mills 1956, 269). The first epoch spanned from the Revolution through the presidency of John Adams. The relevant aspect of this era is that the “social life, economic institutions, military establishment, and political order coincided” (Mills 1956, 269-270). High politicians were key economic figures who also were esteemed figures in local society. The status of politicians did not stem solely from their official positions, though prestige of politicians was high (Mills 1956, 270). The early nineteenth century was the second era. Jefferson’s political philosophies were largely accepted, but Hamilton’s economic principles came to predominate. The age of the yeoman farmer was exaggerated, but there was a broadening of the economic order which served to transform the elite into a plurality of loosely affiliated, loosely overlapping top groups (Mills 1956, 270). Economic actors were ascendant over political power, but both politics and the economy were decentralized. This era of “romantic pluralism” lasted through the Civil War (Mills 1956, 271).

The third epoch marked the beginning of the dominance of corporate economic power. Corporate supremacy was consolidated in 1886 when the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded protection to corporations. The center of initiative was transferred from the government to the corporation. It was an age of straightforward corruption, of bought up judges and Senators. The military was subordinated to the political system which was dominated by the economic system. Corporate interests were immensely powerful, with Morgan interests holding an aggregate capitalization in excess of $22 billion – an amount over three times larger than all the reported property in New England. Federal and state governments
were so limited in their ability to regulate that the governments were essentially regulated by the
moneyed interests themselves. The brief and limited political shifts of the Progressive Era
foreshadowed the power structure that would emerge in the New Deal (Mills 1956, 271-272).

The New Deal was the fourth epoch, and while it did not reverse the relationship between
politics and the economy, it did create competing centers of power within governmental and
corporate spheres. Economic elites initially opposed the expansion of government powers, though
they eventually came to control and use New Deal institutions for their own benefit. That said,
this era represented the first time in the US that social policy and issues related to the poor
became major pillars of reformist politics. Farm, labor, and big business groups operated within
an enlarged government in which officials functioned in ways that were clearly political (Mills
1956, 272-273). The backdrop to this was the faltering capitalist system and the necessity of
“reducing the staggering and ominous army of the unemployed” (Mills 1956, 273). The political
leadership responded to the balance of pressure groups as it proceeded to craft policy going from
one minor crisis to the next. Most crucially, the balancing act performed by the Roosevelt
administration did not impact the foundational pillars of America’s capitalist economy. FDR’s
policies subsidized its defaults and his rhetoric chastened politically the “economic royalists.”
The new welfare state dealt with the crisis of the Great Depression by crafting policies that
helped most segments of the population (Mills 1956, 273-274). The emerging state would change
further, from a welfare state to a “new state of corporate commissars” (Mills 1956, 274).

This fifth epoch of the American power structure began with US entry into World War II.
The ascendance of the power elite during this epoch resulted from (and exacerbated) a political
decline. This deterioration curtailed meaningful politics, a politics which would consist of public
discussion of distinct alternatives carried out by nationally responsible and politically coherent
parties existing alongside independent organizations that connected lower and middle strata of
power to the higher levels of decision. This meant that US democracy was more a formality than
a description of the social structure, and even those formal democratic mechanics were weak. In the fifth epoch, business-government interpenetration increased dramatically. The power of the executive branch, including its regulatory agencies, expanded considerably, but not as any sort of autonomous bureaucracy. Instead, its ascendance also meant the ascendance of the corporate man as an eminent political actor (Mills 1956, 274-275). The New Deal enlarged the state and some corporate chieftains did join the political directorate at that time. During World War II they came to dominate it, most famously with the so called “dollar-a-year men” who moved to direct the economy toward wartime production during the war and the postwar era. Both of these eras were characterized by what was essentially an interminable war economy. As such, the military man rose to decisive political relevance in this era. The perception of the great threat empowered the armed forces and the men, materiel, money, and power at their command. Political and economic decisions came to be evaluated according to a militarized conception of reality. One historical fact has played a major role in these shifts in the American power structure: since 1939, the object of elites’ attention shifted away from domestic issues and toward international issues. In the 1930’s, the chief issue was the economic slump. In the 1940’s and 50’s, the chief issues centered around war. The US government was shaped and formed by the balancing of domestic conflicts. It had no suitable democratic institutions for addressing international problems of immense scope. In this political vacuum, the ascendance of the power elite came to pass (Mills 1956, 275).

The fifth epoch of the American power structure brought to prominence Mills’ power elite by virtue of structural facts about the economy: its foundation was permanent war; its prevailing mode of organization was the private corporation (Mills 1956, 275-276). Thusly did American capitalism largely become military capitalism. The most significant link between the big corporation and the state was based in the coincidence of interests that existed between the military and the firm, as perceived by the warlords and the corporate chieftains. Among the elite collectively, the overlapping interests of the warlords and the corporate rich strengthened each
and further subordinated the political leaders. The corporate chieftains and the warlords, not the politicians, managed the war effort. The political vacuum of the fifth epoch was created in part by the absence of any effectively institutionalized civil service vested with integrity, proficiency, and independence from monied interests (Mills 1956, 276). Based on historical evidence, it appears that the US power structure entered a 6th epoch following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international economic order.

Mills uses the term power elite rather than ruling class. Ruling class is a politico-economic term and may be more or less apt in different eras, e.g., America’s Gilded Age. The straightforward Marxist view posits that the economic man is ultimately the holder of power. The liberal perspective places the political man at the center of power. Some in Mills’ time would have viewed the warlords as essentially dictators. For Mills, each of these is an oversimplification. Economic determinism should be broadened to account for military determinism and political determinism to better account for elite decisions and defaults. The most powerful agents in each of these three domains had considerable autonomy, but only as coalitions could they formulate and execute the most fateful decisions (Mills 1956, 277).

A democratic society requires an engaged and lucid public whose members engage and deliberate with each other and possess some sense of agency that is not delusional. Mills saw the lower levels of power moving further away from the public ideal toward a mass society. Mass communications, metropolitan segregation, and the decline of voluntary associations were all contributing to the degeneration of an American set of publics and the transformation of society into a mass that “is sovereign only in the most formal and rhetorical sense” (Mills 1956, 324). The middle levels of power include unions, small property owners, white-collar groups, and “party politicians of the sovereign localities.” They collectively reside over a “semi-organized stalemate” in which they might vaguely impede the power elite, but without decisively impacting important decisions (Mills 1956, 268). Meanwhile at the top, the power elite seemed ever more
unified and often purposefully coordinated. Further adding to the magnitude of the challenges to democracy posed by the power elite is the fact that unlike the middle levels of power and the mass society, the power elite are possessed of profound class consciousness; “nowhere is it organized as effectively as among the power elite” (Mills 1956, 283). While there are factions within the power elite, and while there are conflicts over policy and individual ambitions, these are all less salient than “the internal discipline and the community of interests that bind the power elite together, even across the boundaries of nations at war” (Mills 1956, 283). Mills (1956, 408) refers the reader to James Stewart Martin’s (2016) book *All Honorable Men* which dealt with Wall Street’s prewar connections to the German cartel system and their successful postwar efforts to thwart the dismantling of the system after the war. Over subsequent decades, more information came out which revealed the extent to which the US preserved and rehabilitated the Nazi power elite, including top scientists (Bower 1987) and war criminals like Reinhard Gehlen (Simpson 2014), Karl Wolff (Talbot 2015), and Klaus Barbie (Bird 1992). Here again, Mills highlights something historically significant which only became more evident over time – the affinity between the Nazi power elite and power elite of the emerging US empire.

The liberal institutions that might have insulated democratic society against the ascendance of the power elite proved to be not up to the task. Some early observers thought that modern means of communication would engage and invigorate the primary public. Instead those means have served to inculcate widespread psychological illiteracy (Mills 1956, 311): a *common sense* based on mass media stereotypes, a uniformity of opinion masked by superficial differences which mainly serve to exacerbate confirmation bias (Mills 1956, 313), a distortion of self-images through the conjuring of an invented and sustained pseudo-world, and distraction from broader sources of individuals’ tensions, anxieties, subconscious resentments, and vague hopes (Mills 1956, 314). Unfortunately, the media are more than just a cause of America’s transformation into a mass society; they are among the most significant expanded means of elite power (Mills 1956,
Media manipulation is especially problematic because while there is concentrated and willful power at the top of American society, authority does not reside there. Small groups of men make decisions for which they need to gain acceptance or resignation from people they do not necessarily rule formally. Therefore, elites must try to manipulate people into accepting or supporting the decisions and opinions, or at least rejecting alternatives (Mills 1956, 317). Utilized for this purpose, is the propagandist—the public relations man alongside or just below the elite (Mills 1956, 315).

American education has not served to impede the rise of the power elite. According to Mills, the chief goal of US public education originally was political: to make citizens wise and thus more enlightened judges of public affairs. Over time, the function of education became economic, i.e., training people for jobs to help them and society economically. The political content has been reduced to the inculcation of nationalist loyalties (Mills 1956, 317-318). The liberal education was supposed to create self-educating and self-cultivating people. A knowledgeable person can turn his personal struggles into social issues and grasp how these issues pertain to his community and how his community relates to the broader issues. The knowledgeable person understands that what he perceives as his individual problems are quite often shared by others. They are not problems that can be effectively addressed by a single person, but only by changes to some level of social structure (Mills 1956, 318). Writes Mills, “It is the task of the liberal institution, as of the liberally educated man, continually to translate troubles into issues and issues into the terms of their human meaning for the individual” (1956, 319). Educational institutions had failed at this, instead becoming politically craven institutions offering at best upward mobility. Rather than promoting intellectualism and cultural enrichment, they are purveyors of “the trivia of vocational tricks and adjustment to life – meaning the slack life of the masses” (Mills 1956, 319-320).
This left, for Mills, the intellectual as the last line of defense against the ascendance of the power elite. Unfortunately, scholars were in default, succumbing to a “conservative mood,” borne of “living in a material boom, a nationalist celebration, a political vacuum.” He charged that they have given up of the overriding goal of Western humanism: “the presumptuous control by reason of man’s fate” (Mills 1956, 326). Given America’s history in which the bourgeois have predominated from the beginning, neither Burke nor Locke could serve as ideological fountainheads. Instead, the much more pedestrian Horatio Alger seems to be the source of American ideology, such as it is (Mills 1956, 329). While this is stated almost in passing in The Power Elite, this is yet another example of Mills’ prescience which would be borne out in later years. In Mills’ time the mood of intellectuals was conservative, but conservative talk was typically eschewed in favor of liberal rhetoric. To satisfy this contradiction, intellectuals typically refused to acknowledge and confront the top of the existing power structure, and they refused to imagine anything better (Mills 1956, 331). This intellectual default occurred as American liberalism collapsed politically. The politics of the thirties was destroyed by the “petty right,” “political primitives” situated in the middle levels of power who exploited Anti-Communism to impugn the New Deal and the officials who formulated it (Mills 1956, 332). They greatly damaged the Foreign Service and normalized secret police proceedings into the governmental process. Liberalism was revealed as “decayed and frightened,” left “defending itself from the insecure and ruthless fury of political gangsters” (Mills 1956, 333).

**Romantic pluralism** or the **theory of balance** allows the liberal intellectual to sustain the conservative mood. It made it unnecessary for the intellectual of the conservative mood to address the legitimacy of the power structure, for if all actors are in democratically-mediated balance against all else, each is virtually impotent and no higher circle or superintended institutional arrangements are responsible for events or history-making decisions. Intellectually, the conservative mood was a rehash of classical liberalism in the decidedly unclassical 20th
century. Liberalism’s “unseen hand” replaces classical conservatism’s “providence.” Innumerable transactions in the magic market lead to some outcome which should be allowed to unfold. From such a perspective, it follows that there is no elite of power that even needed defending or explicit justification (Mills 1956, 336-337). The dominance of these seemingly liberal perspectives served to buttress the power elite who were in essence sophisticated conservatives who quietly achieved power in a victory that is generally unacknowledged and undebated. The default of the intellectual of the conservative mood meant that there was little scholarly pushback against “the divorce of knowledge from power,” “of mind from reality” (Mills 1956, 338). Able to command without an ideology that they must defend, the power elite embody “the American system of organized irresponsibility” (Mills 1956, 338). The power elite can thus manipulate without even attempting to justify. Mills described the power elite’s mindlessness as “the true higher immorality of our time” (Mills 1956, 342).

Elsewhere, Mills defined the higher immorality as “the general weakening of older values and the organization of irresponsibility” (1956, 345). This is not a case of corrupt men in honorable institutions. If institutions are themselves corrupting, the men who people them are corrupted as a matter of course. The higher immorality has become a systematic characteristic of the elite in America; its widespread acceptance is a key aspect of the mass society (Mills 1956, 343). In the absence of any firm prevailing morality, people in the mass are increasingly vulnerable to being manipulated and distracted by celebrity. They often derive vicarious pleasure from the power of the corporate rich, the libertine peccadillos of the celebrities, and the maudlin personal lives of the super-rich (Mills 1956, 345).

The acquisition of money was the one value that had not been diminished. Money as a value grew while other values became less salient. As such, men became all the more unscrupulous in pursuit of easy wealth (Mills 1956, 346). Society at the top and middle was widely believed to be a of network of clever rackets. In a society where big money is the
definition of success, failure on those terms becomes the deadly sin (Mills 1956, 347). Such a society will aggrandize “the sharp operator and the shady deal” (Mills 1956, 347). Within the big three hierarchies, the men at the top are men who have succeeded and who as a result may dispense with the patronage of success. That is to say that the men of the higher circles judge and bestow the criteria of success onto others (Mills 1956, 347). From this, three facts about the higher circles can be adduced. The first fact is that success up to and within the higher circles is predicated upon self-co-optation. The second is that the hierarchies of success are not one monolithic entity, but rather a complicated array of cliques, sometimes related, sometimes adversarial. The third fact is that ambitious younger persons must convey an image of success to those in power who would select the successful. These facts created a shift in the virtues that enabled one to succeed. Diligence, integrity, and asceticism gave way to “the effective personality.” Charm, self-confidence, the ability to affect empathy – these traits could enable one to be an effective public relations man for himself “to the sole end of individual success in the corporate way of life” (Mills 1956, 348). Under these conditions, starting life poor and becoming wealthy did not indicate virtue. Only if the ways of gaining wealth required virtue or led to virtue would success imply virtue. When the system is characterized by cooptation from higher levels, one’s success merely reveals the principles of the men who get to anoint the successful (Mills 1956, 349).

Not only was there an immorality of accomplishment in America; the elite had increasingly become less learned and less culturally enlightened. There had been a time in US history when the elites of power and culture coincided (Mills 1956, 350). At the midpoint of the twentieth century, elites in the US could not be considered culturally elite or even “cultivated men of sensibility” (Mills 1956, 351). Inside the higher circles, there was no unity between knowledge and power. When learned men came in contact with powerful circles, they did so as hired men (Mills 1956, 351). Thus, they were outsiders of a sort. Like the power elite in general, they owed
their status not to virtue—intellectual acumen *per se*—but to their capacity for cooptation.

Writing in the 1950’s, the power elite was an essentially, perhaps exclusively, male-dominated affair. Mills’ default use of the term “men” when referring to the powerful seems slightly outdated. Today, there are hired female intellectuals and officials who move in circles of power, Samantha Power being a prime example. She is a liberal academic of a sort. As the powerful did in Mills’ time, Power legitimates conservative policies with liberal rhetoric. In her official positions, she advocates the frequent use of US military power – typically against the same targets favored by the superficially different neoconservatives. Thus, Power is wholly compatible with the *higher immorality* of the US power elite in the 21st century.

Mills also elaborated on two key aspects which operate in conjunction and are too often neglected in the social sciences: the role of power in the formation of institutions and the corrosive effects of state secrecy. Structural trends within institutions are identified as opportunities by the occupants of the commanding positions. Coordination among the big three was established and then grew into various going concerns that new personnel readily accepted and perpetuated. For its purposes, the power elite typically found it easier to operate between and within existing organizations rather than establishing formal organizations comprised of its members. But where there has not been adequate organizational machinery in place, they invented and utilized such machinery as the situation called for. As an example, Mills cited the creation of the National Security Council which came about because there was no formal organization to adequately balance military and political influences upon important decisions (Mills 1956, 293).

Such organizations exercise enormous prerogative powers in a nominal or formal democracy. In the permanent war economy, they are aided by an attendant aspect: the assumption that national security necessarily depends upon secret plans and goals. History making events that could reveal much about the logic and workings of the power elite may be hidden from the public
under a cloak of secrecy. With widespread state secrecy concealing their deliberations and actions, the power elite are able to disguise their operations, their motivations, and the further consolidation of their power. Given the foregoing, Mills suspects “that the power elite is not altogether surfaced.” Following this point, Mills seems to protest a little too much. He states somewhat contradictorily that, “There is nothing hidden about it, although its activities are not publicized,” and that, “There is nothing conspiratorial about it, although its decisions are often publicly unknown and its mode of operation manipulative rather than explicit” (Mills 1956, 294). While this can be stated about the elite as a collective, Mills does not acknowledge an important implication of his analysis: the structural processes he has elaborated have, in conjunction with organizational secrecy, given rise to organizations comprised of members of the power elite in which conspiracy is essentially institutionalized. To some extent, his caution is understandable. Many of the historic events which most dramatically support his theoretical framework were unknown to Mills due to the very practices of secrecy that he elucidated.

Mills asserted that the elite don’t believe in the existence of a tiny secretive elite who preside over a mass society. They did not conceptualize it in such terms. However, the people were necessarily confused and like children, they needed to allow the grown-ups to conduct foreign policy, formulate grand strategy, and carry out executive action. Obviously, some people are going to be running things; most people don’t care much anyway and regardless, they are too ignorant (Mills 1956, 294). Among these decision makers, crackpot realism – an insular, myopic mindset and worldview – prevails. The mindlessness of the power elite is a vacuum into which platitude and dogma have been thrust (Mills 1956, 356). By “mindlessness,” Mills is referring to “the divorce of knowledge from power, of sensibilities from men of power, [and] the divorce of mind from reality” (1956, 338). Mills’ judgement rings prophetic to those who today look aghast at humanity’s inability to respond to global warming, to stop the policy of endless regime change.
campaigns, or to dismantle the nuclear “doomsday machine” (Ellsberg 2017) that threatens humanity with extinction.

Platitude and dogma are so widely accepted as to legitimate leaders; no countervailing worldview is able to prevail against the paranoid ersatz cosmology of crackpot realism. Capitalism is depicted as utopian. Nuanced understandings of events are supplanted by the fog of propaganda. Democratic reverence for public debate has been shunted aside by ideas and practices of psychological warfare. Erudition has been replaced by the “sound” judgement. Forbearance and foresight have given way to the “executive stance” (Mills 1956, 356). The crackpot realists are men who adhere rigidly to the dominant general principles. They focus unwaveringly on “the next step.” This makes them opportunistic devotees to the main drift. Mills’ formulated an equation in which US foreign policy equaled “the frenzied next step plus the altogether general principle” (1959, 89-90). In his follow up to The Power Elite, Mills (1959) argued that the hegemony of crackpot realism in the circles of power was leading to war (90). Three years after Mills published The Causes of World War Three (1959), the factors identified by Mills nearly did cause a nuclear war. His prophesied World War III did not come to pass, despite his predictions being largely prescient in their particulars.

**Tripartite State in Comparative Theoretical Perspective**

Mainstream social science and even most of the extant critical social science do not take seriously the possibility that anti-democratic forces could empower networks of individuals to act in ways that illegally manipulate and subvert democratic institutions and democracy as a whole. Also unexamined is the possibility that the institutionalization of such dynamics could fundamentally alter the nature of the liberal democratic state. The dual state theorists seek to explain how the securitization of politics diminishes democratic sovereignty. On the one hand, the dual state theorists offer a critique whose validity is implicitly accepted to some degree when the “national security state” is discussed (e.g. Priest & Arkin 2011). Typically, commenters and
theorists do not hash out the implications of the existence of such a state. Lasswell (1941) was one of the most noteworthy political scientists to address the issue of democratic decline coterminous with the rise of militarization. His *garrison state* construct is useful both for its predictive accuracy and its inaccuracy. In a state of perpetual militarism, Lasswell theorized that elites would become increasingly focused upon the manipulation of symbols for propaganda purposes. Internal violence would be aimed at unskilled laborers and anti-elitist elements. The ruling elite would seek to restrain productive technology in order to minimize consumption and living standards (Lasswell 1941). “Mystic democracy” would persist but such “is not […] democracy at all, because […] authority and control are highly concentrated” (Lasswell 1941, 462). These aspects did come to pass to varying degrees as the US established global dominance beginning with its entry into World War II. However, Lasswell incorrectly predicted that the military man—“the specialist on violence”—would assume a dominant position in the social hierarchy over the businessman (1941, 455). In light of subsequent history, the opposite is the easier case to make. Nevertheless, Lasswell is noteworthy for elaborating upon the anti-democratizing effects of militarism.

Mills’ (1956) *power elite* theory perhaps comes the closest to offering a framework for understanding and explaining the sociology of the tripartite state. Mills’ went against prevailing (and subsequent) trends in social science by focusing partly upon the existence of agency in a complex and advanced society and political system. He explicitly rejected views “of all history as conspiracy or all history as drift” (Mills 1956, 27). Although Mills did not address the question of state criminality at length, he identified the “higher immorality” of the emergent political order (1956). The intertwining of the elites in the business, military, and political spheres led to the institutionalization of the higher immorality and the atrophy of private conscience in those men who hold power. The institutions themselves were corrupting. So salient was this feature of society’s elite strata that Mills described it as “structural immorality” (Mills 1956, 343). Unlike
Habermas and the pluralists, Mills surmised that state secrecy and the triumph of propaganda allowed the elite to game and beguile the population. “Responsible interpretation of events” was replaced by “the disguise of events,” abetted by a “maze of public relations” (Mills 1956, 356). Thusly did Mills identify a political system that was assuming ever more “holographic” qualities as the state came to be defined by its “enemies” – or rather by the interminable, omnipresent yet ethereal specter of allegedly existential crises in conspiratorial form (Witt and deHaven-Smith 2008).

Writing before the activities of the intelligence community became known, Mills nonetheless surmised that when the institutional machinery to effect political outcomes is lacking, the elite will invent such machinery and control it. An important instance of this phenomenon involves the State Department’s War and Peace Studies Project which was carried out prior to US entry into World War II (Shoup and Minter 2004). The study was conducted in large part by the Wall Street-dominated Council on Foreign Relations and financed by the Rockefeller Foundation – an entity which itself represented an enormous accumulation of wealth acquired via Standard Oil’s longtime monopoly control of the US petroleum industry. The War and Peace Studies Project in essence mapped out the plans for creating a US-dominated postwar world order and the institutions which would be needed to maintain it. The UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the US national security state all conformed considerably to these prescriptions. In The Power Elite, Mills cited the creation of the National Security Council as a case in which the power elite brought a new governing institution into being (1956, 293). Had Mills been privy to the relevant historical data, he could have cited the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization created by the same legislative act that created the National Security Council. The Central Intelligence Agency was an even more elite-engineered and elite-dominated organization. In its operation, it most greatly exemplified all of the anti-democratic trends that Mills identified in his thesis (Good 2015). While Mills did not specifically address the possibility of structurally
impactful high criminality, it was arguably alluded to by way of reference to the illegitimacy of the rich and powerful, the racket-like ways in which they made their fortunes, the ubiquity of state secrecy, the fabrication of propaganda in lieu of realism, and the higher immorality that characterized the culture at the pinnacle of the national power structure.

Opposing Mills’ conception of a coherent, decisive, and self-interested power elite was pluralism, a perspective with a much more sanguine view of the American political system. Written at the high tide of liberalism, Dahl (1961) described America’s democratic political system as one in which the government served as a mediator between various interest groups that collectively represented the whole of society. In such a rendering, there was no democratic decline that needed to be explained. Lindblom’s (1977) revised explication of pluralism viewed America’s anti-democratic trajectory as a function of a lopsided competition of ideas in which big business dominated politics and indoctrinated the public by exercising an overdetermining influence on political and economic life. Even Lindblom’s revised, rearguard version of pluralism is problematic. At what point would the influence of the overworld of private wealth be considered so overdetermining that pluralism would cease to be a viable perspective to explain the US power structure? Additionally, pluralists do not address the issue of structurally impactful high criminality. Pluralism would seem to presuppose that the rule of law generally prevails and that the state is open, transparent, and democratic – various scandals notwithstanding.

The critical theory of Habermas focused on the contradictions between capitalism and the intersubjective norms of communication. Like Lindblom, Habermas was writing in the 1970’s. He argued that capitalism persisted despite the essential accuracy of Marx’s predictions (Habermas 1973). The contradictions between the realities of advanced capitalism and the norms of democratic societies led to legitimation crises in which political and economic institutions suffered from diminishing respect from the public. Such crises are resolved through the power of linguistic intersubjectivity or universal communicative norms (Habermas 1973). Unexplored are
the possibilities and implications of elites who manipulate fundamental aspects of political reality and its perception (deHaven-Smith 2012).

Postmodernist critiques have highlighted the authoritarian aspects of institutions in liberal societies, but in so doing removed actual authoritarians from the frame of analysis (Preparata 2011, deHaven-Smith 2012). Foucault’s (2001) theories of “governmentality” traced the modern form of government bureaucracies to the synchronous development of social scientific methods such as demography which allow for the management of populations. Foucault (1970) explored and elaborated upon the connections between power and science or human systems of knowledge. It was implicitly assumed that the connections stemmed from structural forces coterminous with the rise in complexity of human civilizations. Adhering to such a perspective ignores the intentional development and deployment of “technologies of the self” (deHaven-Smith 2012). For example, America’s “Global War on Terror” did not organically emerge as an international system of rendition, detention, and torture regimes. Such a system was organized and approved by the highest levels of government and was informed by the technical expertise of the psychology profession (Mayer 2008; deHaven-Smith 2012). Additionally, the torture and interrogation techniques were based upon preexisting knowledge acquired by scientists working in the 1950’s and 1960’s on projects undertaken to determine the best practices for brainwashing prisoners and establishing “mind control” over human subjects (Marks 1979, deHaven-Smith 2012).

Relative to these other theoretical approaches, tripartite state theory provides a historically informed synthesis of dual state theories and Mills’ elite-focused power structure theories. In so doing, it can better address certain historical puzzles and paradoxes. Democratic traditions and institutions became stronger overall in the US throughout the first seven decades of the 20th century. This represents the power of the democratic – or public – state, an institution that is desirable according to normative notions of progress derived from the Enlightenment. The
security state that emerged following World War II was informed by logics of secrecy, hierarchy, and authoritarianism – all anathema to Enlightenment trends. The US national security state was designed to bring about and defend a vision of world order formulated by a stratum of elites which had lost some of its hegemony over society following the Gilded Age and Great Depression. Perhaps the most salient anti-democratic aspect of this project has been the degree to which political economy is no longer subject to democratic deliberation. The neoliberal/neoconservative bipartisan consensus so greatly narrows the spectrum of contestable policy debate that relevant public discourse is largely relegated to cultural issues with little to no bearing upon issues of justice which animated the democratic struggles of previous eras. The notion of a supranational deep state component of a tripartite state provides a theoretical construct with which to address the overdetermining power wielded by elites whose interests dominate the security state, the public state, the economy, and thus society at large. The political transformation of the US and of the international system has not occurred solely by legitimate or transparent means. There is considerable documentation of anti-democratic and criminal foreign policy practices which have strengthened US hegemony and conferred ever more wealth and power upon the elites whose collective interests animate the sovereign tripartite state. Additionally, there are numerous cases of documented and suspected illegitimate interventions into US domestic politics. Subsequent chapters of this dissertation muster empirical evidence within case studies and historical explication (i.e., process tracing) to construct a theoretically informed narrative elaborating on the rise of the tripartite state and its implications.

A Note on Structure and Agency

Questions of structure vs. agency loom large in the social sciences. As discussed above, Mills (1956) identified this in his formulations of two ideal type approaches to understanding history, society, and politics: all of history as “drift” or all of history as “conspiracy.” To posit a compact group of omnipotent conspirators directing history is not something that can be plausibly
substantiated. Likewise, the *hyperstructuralism* of some critical scholars—e.g. Noam Chomsky (Parenti 1996, 188)—also evinces a stultifying myopia. In short, the notion put forward by Mills and herein is that structure vs. agency is a false dichotomy. It is not a question of class *or* conspiracy which reproduces and manages overworld hegemony. Rather, it is class *and* conspiracy. As Michael Parenti (1996) states,

> The alternative is to believe that the powerful and the privileged are somnambulists, who move about oblivious to questions of power and privilege; that they always tell us the truth and have nothing to hide even when they hide so much; that although most of us ordinary people might consciously try to pursue our own interests, wealthy elites do not; that when those at the top employ force and violence around the world it is only for the laudable reasons they profess; that when they arm, train, and finance covert actions in numerous countries, and then fail to acknowledge their role in such deeds, it is because of oversight or forgetfulness or perhaps modesty; and that it is merely a coincidence how the policies of the national security state so consistently serve the interests of the transnational corporations and the capital-accumulation system throughout the world (174-175).

Argued herein, elite representatives of the overworld of corporate wealth transformed the American state. This did not occur through automatic or natural processes. The corporate rich do represent the pinnacle of a class structure, but like the British Empire their hegemony did not arise from “a fit of absent-mindedness.” Elites have agency, the nature of which is determined in considerable part by the structure of state and society. The postwar US power elite were buttressed by vast material capabilities that they could efficiently mobilize through bureaucratic corporate organizations. “Commanders of power unequaled in human history,” (Mills 1956, 361) they set out to establish imperial hegemony over the new international political economy. It entailed large-scale planning for the creation and maintenance of the institutions to enable such an undertaking. While the initial architects of US hegemony allowed for some New Deal-inspired progressive institutional aspects, the elite planning of the 1970’s—in the aftermath of the tumultuous and violent 1960’s—reveals a power elite determined to make use of its agency by imposing what came to be referred to as neoliberalism. This totalizing project has—not accidentally—served to weaken democracy by greatly reducing the space in which any
democratic counter-elite could emerge. Carried out through covert and overt means, these efforts furthered the rise of the US deep state system, an historically unprecedented expression of \textit{structural power}, rightfully understood as agency of the highest order.
CHAPTER 3

DEEP STATE, DARK POWER, AND THE EXCEPTION

A Conceptually Distinct Deep State

The work of C. Wright Mills points the way toward addressing the shortcomings of dual state theories. Glennon makes reference to Mills’ work, but only when discussing the military mindset or the military metaphysic in which reality in total is defined and perceived through a martial lens. Glennon does not address the immense power of the corporate elite, even though these men often had much to do with the creation of the modern US national security state. Later, this dissertation examines some of the myriad ways in which policy has been formulated and even executed by elites outside of the democratic state and/or the formally organized security state. In Glennon’s explication on the fecklessness of the Madisonian institutions, he is essentially acknowledging the same political vacuum noted by Mills. However, for Glennon, the inertia and the lack of accountability is attributed to the internal organizational characteristics and the power of the Trumanite network. Like the realist IR scholars or the orthodox historians, there is no deep interrogation of the origins of geopolitical grand strategy or its beneficiaries outside of the government. In fact, Glennon spends very little space detailing what the static thrust of US foreign policy really is.

While Glennon sees two centers of power – the security and political spheres – he has omitted Mill’s third: the corporate rich or the overworld of private wealth. The overworld wields influence and power over unofficial entities and the organizations that comprise Glennon’s double government. Collectively exerting great influence over governance and history making, these institutions comprise the deep state. Elsewhere I have defined the deep state as “an obscured, dominant, supra-national source of antidemocratic power” (Good [2015] 2018). I would clarify this with the observation that the institutions that comprise the deep state are not uniformly obscured. Some are formally organized and transparent to varying degrees, e.g., the
Council on Foreign Relations. Other entities like the Safari Club or the Bilderberg group are known to exist or to have existed, but they are largely opaque. The mainstream media must be considered part of the deep state. Its assumptions, biases, priorities, and defaults are very much a function of the interests of a numerically small corporate elite whose interests the media necessarily serves regardless of any particular outlet’s position on what is the (often narrow) prevailing spectrum of perspective.

While the term *deep state* has become ubiquitous in the Age of Trump, as yet it has no widely accepted definition. The term originally derives from Turkey where it described “a closed network said to be more powerful than the public state” (Scott 2007, 267). The deep state of Turkey availed itself of false flag terror orchestrated by the security apparatus with links to organized crime (Scott 2007, 267). The Turkish deep state originated from networks originally established by NATO’s Operation Gladio in order to maintain stay-behind paramilitary forces that could become an insurgency following a communist takeover (Jenkins 2008). The Turkish example was a narrower conception of the deep state than those that would follow, but it did point to state power existing outside of the public state and the formal security services. Collectively, the formally organized state did not exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence since the deep state had deemed extra-legal violence acceptable even if not explicitly “legitimate” (a potentially subjective adjective). The *New York Times* in 2013 asserted that “deep state” was an important new term and defined it as “A hard-to-perceive level of government or super-control that exists regardless of elections and that may thwart popular movements or radical change. Some have said that Egypt is being manipulated by its deep state.” This is a useful definition, as it emphasizes the anti-democratic and opaque character of the deep state.

In 2014, an experienced government insider penned an essay on the deep state which he described as operating “according to its own compass heading regardless of who is formally in power.” In his formulation, Mike Lofgren included parts of the formally organized government
as well as ostensibly private organizations like Booz Allen Hamilton and the politically active wealth of Wall Street. Lofgren eventually added to this essay with a book (2016) on the deep state in which he defined it as:

…a hybrid association of key elements of government and parts of top-level finance and industry that is effectively able to govern the United States with only limited reference to the consent of the governed as normally expressed through elections (5).

Lofgren identifies the deep state as “the big story of our time.” He describes it as the thread that connects the GWOT to the militarizing of US foreign policy. It connects both financialization and deindustrialization to the ascendant US plutocracy. This all occurs within a context of paralyzing political dysfunction (Lofgren 2016, 5). By Lofgren’s reckoning, the deep state was conceived at the moment that the US attained nuclear weapons. He adds that America’s postwar position of unprecedented global power led to the intellectual corruption of the US political class (Lofgren 2016, 49-50). It will be shown in a later chapter that the deep political forces identified by Lofgren were powerful enough at an earlier date to act decisively in planning US entry into World War II and even the subsequent postwar US-led world order.

Lofgren’s assessment of the deep state is a slightly sanitized conceptualization in comparison to the earlier, ongoing, and more provocative scholarship of Peter Dale Scott. Despite Scott’s prolific work on the subject, Lofgren fails to cite him or make reference to his work. This may be due to the fact that Scott, unlike Lofgren, explores and emphasizes the criminal intrigues of the deep state. After detailing some complex history involving Adnan Khashoggi, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, and the Safari Club, Scott (2010) describes them:

…as part of a supranational deep state, whose organic links to the CIA may have helped consolidate it. It is clear however that decisions taken at this level by the Safari Club and BCCI were in no way guided by the political determinations of those elected to power in Washington . . . [and were instead] expressly created to overcome restraints established by political decisions in Washington (30).

Scott is the most prolific and erudite deep state theorist. His conception evolved from what he had earlier termed parapolitics and then deep politics. Scott defined parapolitics as “a
system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished” (1972, 171). He applied this to the study of historical events such as the CIA’s covert operations or the forces and actors that moved the US into war in Vietnam (Scott 1972). Deep politics refers to “all those political practices and arrangements, deliberate or not, that are usually repressed in public discourse rather than acknowledged” (Scott 1993, 7). Examples include the recurrence of US foreign policy intrigues involving petroleum and narcotics traffic or the legal immunity of organized crime in Chicago for much of the twentieth century (Scott 2010, 8). These were theoretical approaches that sought to address forces with sub rosa history-making power. It wasn’t until relatively recently that Scott began referring to a US deep state (2007, xvi). This is likely due to the difficulty of conceptualizing the nature of obscured power in complex societies. Lofgren describes the state as an iceberg. The visible part is the political system that we are taught about in civics courses and in political science courses. It is theoretically controlled by elections. The larger, submerged part of the iceberg is the deep state. It moves according to its own inertia regardless of who nominally holds power. Lofgren, like Scott, sees the deep state as a hybrid of private and governmental institutions. He also sees the overworld as an overdetermining factor in terms of controlling the deep state. “Wall Street,” Lofgren writes, “may be the ultimate owner of the Deep State and its strategies, if for no other reason than that it has the money to reward government operatives with a second career that is lucrative […] beyond the dreams of a salaried government employee.”

Scott, however, considers the iceberg metaphor to be too concrete or structurally specific. Scott asserts that the deep state is less structural and more systemic. Though difficult to define explicitly, it is “as real and powerful as a weather system” (Scott 2010, 14). Indeed Scott (2010) states that he uses the term deep state to refer to what he had previously described as a “deep political system” (13), a system “which habitually resorts to decision-making and enforcement procedures outside as well as inside those publicly sanctioned by law and society” (Scott 1993,
A key systemic feature of the deep state is that the largely unregulated overworld-deep state milieu not only exerts enough influence to dominate politics, but it also engages in “antisocial lawbreaking and sometimes murderous malfeasance” (Scott 2010, 14).

Scott’s research does indeed show that he was justified in using the term “deep political system.” Political decisions of history-making significance have been made and enforced by institutions both outside and inside those that are legally proscribed. Scott describes the deep state as the locus of accumulated extralegal powers within and without the government. It is comprised of covert agencies and their allies in media, overworld, and underworld circles. In his more recent work, Scott states explicitly that he now uses the term deep state roughly to refer what he previously had described as the deep political system (Scott 2015, 145). There is much to suggest that the “deepness” is indeed systemic as all major political institutions necessarily exist in a world shaped by top-down power. However, when Scott describes the Khashoggi-BCCI-Safari Club milieu as “part of a supranational deep state” (2015, 30), he is speaking about something structural. He acknowledges this problem in an endnote where he states that previously he had wished to dissociate the idea of the “deep state” from connotations of formal organization. He therefore wrote about the American deep state as “a milieu both inside and outside government with the power to steer the history of the public state and sometimes redirect it” (Scott 2015, 199-200: n. 63). In this endnote he acknowledges that indeed there are also “extragovernmental structural components in the deep state system.”

The idea of a deep state system accords well with tripartite state theory. I wrote in 2015 that:

Conceptually, the tripartite state is usefully if imperfectly imagined as a Venn diagram with significant overlap. An examination of the current political system suggests that the independent realm of the democratic state is small indeed. At present there is not much observable democratic autonomy or agency vis-à-vis the overdetermining wealth and power of the deep state (Good 2015, 20).
The power of the deep state is such that it is not hyperbolic to refer to the prevailing order as the “deep state system.” The deep state has impacted the public and security states in such a way as to prevail throughout them and to usurp constitutionally allocated power. Thus, its power can be described as systemic. The Venn diagram depiction discussed above was conceived as a way to render the structure of the tripartite state. However, with only a minor modification, it could be a systemic model. Specifically, a circle representing civil society is added to the diagram, also with considerable overlap.

**Dark Power**

No social order can rely solely or even primarily on coercion. The transaction costs are too great. Every domestic and international order rests upon a mixture of coercion and consent. Democratic social orders owe their legitimacy to concepts of popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Hegemony in authoritarian social orders is maintained on the basis of top-down power, legitimized in various ways. Theories of hegemony in the international realm can be categorized along a continuum between consent and coercion (Good 2015). Similarly, these two points can represent opposing modes of power within circumscribed political orders, i.e., nation-states. Hannah Arendt (1993) described them as two mindsets that can be found in every society (Scott 2015, 3). An open society operating according to the rule of law conceives of power as “persuasion through arguments.” The opposite is “coercion by force.” As with Thucydides, Arendt traced these to the Greeks who used persuasion in domestic politics while using force in foreign affairs (Arendt 1993, 93). Historically speaking, it is difficult to find examples of societies wherein there exists a clean bifurcation between modes of power operant in domestic and international spheres respectively. While Arendt and others like Karl Popper (2013) spoke of persuasion and deliberation as prevailing forces in open constitutional societies, Samuel Huntington (1981) advocated for coercive, top-down power as being necessary for a cohesive society (Scott 2015, 3). Wrote Huntington, “Power remains strong when it remains in the dark;
exposed to sunlight it begins to evaporate” (Huntington 1981, 75). Peter Dale Scott describes this as dark power – “power not derived from the constitution but outside and above it” (2015, 3).

The conflict between these two modes of power can be observed in the work of Plato. In The Republic, Plato calls (obliquely) for the top-down rule by the wise, legitimated by instrumental noble lies. In The Laws, Plato argued for something closer to persuasion wherein Magnesia – a hypothetical city – would be governed on the basis of painstakingly formulated laws. However, even in formulating the constitution of Magnesia, Plato returned to advocating for a form of rule by the wise. This occurs in the later sections of The Laws wherein Plato proposes the creation of a nocturnal council comprised of elites. The nocturnal council would be nominally responsible only for moderating the views of atheists and handling foreign travelers who may have been exposed to exotic and/or dangerous notions during their travels. Beyond this, the powers of the council are vaguely defined. Plato died before the work could be completed.

The vagueness of the council’s power has led scholars to disagree about Plato’s meaning. Most scholars have adhered to an informal view of the council – that it would operate in an informal, perhaps advisory role to those who execute the state’s laws (Morrow 1993). Others have argued that the council was to play an institutional (or instrumental) role. Argued Barker (1951), “The nocturnal council is the perfect guardians of the Republic turned collegiate and set to control, in ways that are never explained, a system of political machinery into which they are never fitted (349).” Klosko (1988) takes the position that in the end, Plato could not discard the idea of rule by the wise. He needed to insert some mechanism to allow for the wise to wield power. At one point in The Laws, the members of the nocturnal council are referred to as the “real guardians of the laws.” Plato also states that if such a “divine council” is created “then the state must be entrusted to it” (Klosko 1988, 76).

Whether one favors the informal or institutional interpretation of the nocturnal council, either could be analogous to elements of the American deep state. The Wall Street-financed
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) could be a modern analog to the nocturnal council. Its power may have diminished since its heyday which stretched from before World War II up to the Vietnam War. However, it still retains significant influence while serving as an incubator and clearinghouse for Establishment prescriptions and conventional wisdom. In 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke to the CFR, stating “It’s good to have an outpost of the Council right here down the street from the State Department. […] This will mean I won’t have as far to go to be told what we should be doing and how we should think about the future.” This illustrates that the CFR—like the nocturnal council in Barker’s interpretation above—has the power to exert influence “in ways that are never explained, [in] a system of political machinery into which [it is] never fitted.”

The institutional interpretation of the nocturnal council is laden with graver implications. If the council members are collectively supposed to act as the “real guardians of the laws” to which “the state must be entrusted” then the council would presumably have the capacity to formulate and execute policy in an extraconstitutional, top-down fashion. This would largely negate the basis for the legitimacy of the Magnesian state, i.e., the rule of law. However, it is not clear that it would be recognized as such since the council could intervene in subtle or and/or covert ways that would not necessarily be perceived by the population at large. Thus, by allowing for “wise” ruling class figures to subtly exert control over a system ostensibly regulated by a just set of laws, the elite of Magnesia could have their cake and eat it too, as it were. There is no evidence to suspect that the US deep state contains anything as compact and centralized as a formally organized nocturnal council. There have been, however, certain entities and networks that have functioned or may have functioned as supralegal or extraconstitutional loci of deep state power. Scott (2015) hypothesizes that at certain fateful junctures, the Doomsday Project has served as such an entity.
The CIA has more infamously functioned as an instrument of dark power and as an element of the deep state. At times the agency has worked in opposition to the president and thus in ways that run counter to what would be expected of an organization within a hierarchical security state, nominally under the control of the executive branch. Wrote former President Harry Truman one month after the Kennedy assassination,

For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our difficulties in several explosive areas.\(^\text{24}\)

Truman’s op-ed piece was titled “Limit CIA Role To Intelligence.” He claimed in the piece, with some justification, that the CIA had gone far beyond its intended purpose, which was to collate and analyze intelligence coming from various sources. While Truman’s recommendation was and remains reasonable, it is somewhat problematic because the CIA even under Truman was quickly used to conduct covert operations. Truman’s CIA infamously intervened in the Greek civil war and Italian election rigging. The interference in the Italian election was of a magnitude that dwarfs the alleged Russian intervention into the 2016 US election. Regardless, Truman’s 1963 editorial was ignored by the media and quickly forgotten. Subsequently, the CIA under Johnson would reverse several Kennedy era policies in crucial third world countries, most notably Brazil, Congo, and Indonesia. Following the partial exposure of the high criminality of the Nixon administration, the CIA was investigated by Congress in the 1970’s. Temporarily chastened, the deep state went into a remission of sorts, receding under Carter with sensitive operations handled off the books or by unaccountable entities such as the Safari Club or the World Anti-Communist League. When Reagan came into power – probably with the decisive intervention of the deep state – the CIA was able to resume its former active role. This culminated in Iran-Contra which again brought the CIA under scrutiny from which it would emerge largely unscathed.

Those political struggles represent the conflict between open persuasive power and coercive top-down power. The security state represented the battleground on which the public
state clashed with the deep state. Although the public state has at times achieved apparent victories, these have proven fleeting and the general thrust of the state’s activities persevere unimpeded, specifically the drives to global dominance and to the dominance of wealth over society at large. As with Magnesia, US elites benefit from the legitimacy conferred by the ostensibly open constitutional order while a deep state collectively functions as a nocturnal council to whom the city (i.e., the nation-state) is in effect entrusted. In this way, US politico-economic elites enjoy the benefits of living in a society with a considerable – if declining – degree of democratic legitimacy while simultaneously retaining unacknowledged authoritarian agency. This is accomplished in part through a subset of the politically elite class,

…high ranking officials who are privy to state secrets, who decide what the public may and may not know, and who plan and authorize covert operations, foreign and domestic surveillance, and other espionage and intelligence activities (deHaven-Smith 2013, 48).

Drawing upon Plato and C. Wright Mills, deHaven-Smith terms this class the Guardian Elite. They bear responsibility “for protecting the society from enemies foreign and domestic,” enemies which they themselves must identify (deHaven-Smith 2013, 48-49).

In postwar US history, such figures are typically either drawn from the ranks of America’s upper classes, or they capitalize on the connections between the security state and the overworld of private wealth to attain lucrative opportunities later in life. For a recent example, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper was an executive at Booz Allen, a private intelligence firm that is dependent on government contracts for nearly all of its revenue (Lofgren 2016, 36). Famously, the Dulles brothers John Foster and Allen were from an elite political family; both their uncle and their grandfather had each served as US Secretary of State. Before serving in the Eisenhower administration as Secretary of State and DCI, the brothers were lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell, one of the most illustrious Wall Street law firms. At Sullivan & Cromwell the Dulles brothers did business with the most powerful US corporate interests and with international concerns including, notoriously, figures in Nazi Germany. It would take
volumes to document the ties between the mandarins of US national security and corporate America, but suffice it to state that the US Guardian Elite are very much of and for the overworld of private wealth. Since the end of World War II, the US Guardian Elite have functioned most decisively as executors of dark power. They have operated with huge budgets, under a cloak of state secrecy, and without meaningful oversight or legal restraints. Insufficient scholarly attention has been paid to the Guardian Elite as a class.

**Exceptionism and the State**

The contrast between dark and persuasive modes of power was evident in Athens as Thucydides observed. Open, persuasive power operated domestically while dark, coercive power was deployed in foreign policy. The distinction has been relevant in American politics as well. From the beginning, the English colonists and the early United States had comparatively open, democratic methods of handling affairs with themselves in comparison to the violent coercion deployed against “others,” including Indians, African slaves, Mexicans, Japanese, and Hawaiians. Suffice it to say that modern democracy did not eliminate the contradiction between open, persuasive, constitutional power and dark, coercive, top-down power. What has changed is the degree of candor regarding the conflict. During the Peloponnesian war, the Athenian emissary famously stated, “The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must.” Typically today, leaders eschew such bluntness. If they don’t, it can be scandalous, such when Hillary Clinton mirthfully quipped “We came; we saw; he died!” to an interviewer in reference to the recent death of Muammar Gaddafi. The Libyan head of state had been captured by US-sponsored militants who proceeded to video tape his torture and mutilation before murdering him and uploading the video to the internet.

Given the convention of cloaking hegemonic policy with liberal rhetoric, Clinton committed an unusual *faux pas* when she chose to paraphrase imperialist *par excellence* Julius Caesar. Sociologist C. Wright Mills observed back in the 1950’s that liberal rhetoric was
constantly used in the service of conservative politics. To an even greater degree, such is the case today. Prior to the Iraq War, neoconservatives used liberal rhetoric to justify an illegal war. “For bureaucratic reasons,” Iraqi WMD were “settled on” as the war’s central justification according to Paul Wolfowitz. However, liberal rhetoric was deployed by liberal and neoconservative supporters of the war. In light of this, it is noteworthy that some of these neoconservatives, Paul Wolfowitz for example, were acolytes of Leo Strauss, a neoconservative theorist who believed that great philosophers had to speak and write esoterically since the truth was too dangerous for the uninitiated. Thus, Strauss would likely have approved of official obfuscation to promote the Iraq War. Such are the noble lies needed to maintain some semblance of social harmony while “the strong do what they will.”

In his own writing, Leo Strauss (1965) was more straightforward:

> Are the maxims of foreign policy essentially different from the maxims on which gangs of robbers act? Can they be different? Are cities not compelled to use force and fraud to take away from other cities what belongs to the latter, if they are to prosper? Do they not come into being by usurping a part of the earth’s surface which by nature belongs equally to all others? (106).

Obviously, it would be even more straightforward to present these ideas in the form of declarative statements, but at times Strauss preferred to deploy a quasi-Socratic form to his philosophizing. Perhaps this was an homage to the esoteric style of the philosophers he regarded as his intellectual peers, namely Plato and Socrates. Alternatively, perhaps Strauss preferred a fig leaf of ambiguity given that he was advocating a foreign policy approach that was illiberal in the extreme while living in a society where liberal rhetoric was de rigueur.

The reflexive couching of hegemonic foreign policy in liberal terms is the signature affectation of the US empire. It is necessary not just for international PR purposes, but because the means and ends of US foreign policy are so much at odds with America’s national myths. Public figures must pantomime acceptance of these myths in their public pronouncements. For example, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haas recently tweeted:
International order for 4 centuries has been based on non-interference in the internal affairs of others and respect for sovereignty. Russia has violated this norm by seizing Crimea and by interfering in the 2016 US election. We must deal w Putin’s Russia as the rogue state it is.

Haas makes this statement despite almost certainly knowing that no country has interfered more than the US in other countries’ elections and that such interference – along with more violent subversions of democracy – has been a defining characteristic of the US-led postwar world order.

Every political entity is constituted emotionally and morally through typically mythical narratives about its origins, history, and values. Together those narratives form a common biography which serves as a foundation for the group’s intersubjectively shared common identity (Habermas 1973, cf. deHaven-Smith 2013, 58). A state’s constitutive collective identity reduces its diplomatic mendacity and its brutality in war because it entails a moral code. Violence and duplicity are also constrained by internationally accepted meta-norms that have emerged from the commonalities among the constitutive moral codes of other states within the world order (deHaven-Smith 2013, 58). Given that imperialism requires an amorality like that articulated above in Thucydides and by Strauss, there is conflict between an empire’s amoral foreign policy and its constitutive ostensible moral code. Imperialist realpolitik must also conflict with global meta-norms. This is becoming more challenging as the increasingly interconnected world is ever more of aware of global inequities. Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski described the approaching moment as “the global political awakening,” stating that,

For the first time in history almost all of humanity is politically activated, politically conscious and politically interactive. Global activism is generating a surge in the quest for cultural respect and economic opportunity in a world scarred by memories of colonial or imperial domination.

In a liberal democracy, not only are liberal norms salient, they are codified, making the rule of law another potential impediment to the imperatives of global dominance. In order to manage affairs of state in this context, a subset of the political class must manage affairs of state, DeHaven-Smith’s (2013) Guardian Elite. This class is comprised of “high-ranking officials who
are privy to state secrets, who decide what the public may and may not know, and who plan and authorize covert operations, foreign and domestic surveillance, and other espionage and intelligence activities” (DeHaven-Smith 2013, 48). The Guardian Elite polices—largely in secret—the political class and the mass public (48-49). They serve to allow the state to overcome three potential impediments to the exigencies of hegemony – America’s moral code, global meta-norms, and the rule of law. Their amoral ethos and class consciousness allow them to be unbound from the American moral code and the norms of global society (DeHaven-Smith 2013 59).

Exceptionism—the institutionalized suspension of legal restraints—protects them from facing legal consequences stemming from their illicit clandestine activities (Good 2015). Exceptionism has its roots in the contradictions within liberalism, contradictions that trace back to its philosophical roots and the origins of the state.

Max Weber’s classic definition of the state maintains that it is the organization which maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a particular territory. Charles Tilly (1985) demonstrated that in the history of the rise of the modern state, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence is problematized by the fact that the organizations from which the modern state evolved resembled nothing so much as protection rackets. It was through war-making that these protection-racketeering, nascent states evolved. “War made the state, and the state made war,” wrote Tilly (1975, 42). Thusly, the modern state emerged from institutionalized illegitimate violence, and in such a way as to allow societies to more effectively organize violence internally and externally against other societies. The modern state has sanctioned and participated in various economies of violence, including the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the Opium Wars, and overt imperialism like colonialism. Liberals could dismiss these “as vestiges of pre-modern, absolutist political forms” (Good 2015, 3). If such a dismissal were warranted, liberal democracy should gradually abolish these lawless aspects as public sovereignty and the rule of law are strengthened (Good 2015, 3).
In the latter years of colonial America, the colonists were especially aggrieved by the crown’s prerogative powers. Eschewing absolutist doctrines, the political philosopher John Locke is typically cited as the thinker who most influenced the Framers of the US Constitution. Locke’s political philosophy is widely understood as placing sovereignty in the public through its role in selecting representatives and making a government. The legislature, therefore, is best able to protect life, liberty, and property while safeguarding against the arbitrary exercise of power. However, Locke (2002) contradicted his own central premise by arguing that “the Executive Power” confers the authority to act decisively in the public interest (74). He asserted that “accidents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm” (74). Locke even used the term “prerogative” to describe this discretionary power, which he admits in passing is “arbitrary power” (74).

Locke essentially ignored the fact that the prevention of arbitrary power is the guiding principle of his prescribed constitution (Neocleous 2007, 135). He most strikingly abandoned his liberal path in the instance of the “emergency,” where he obliquely invokes raison d’etat. This is, of course, the concept offered to legitimate essentially all acts of state carried out in power contests between states – the doctrine that evolved from the “interest of state” into the “security of state,” and its well-known contemporary form: “national security” (Neocleous 2007, 137). With these arguments, Locke placed security highest of all, just like Hobbes – the man considered to be his antithesis. Locke (2002) at least quibbled over the implications, asking “But who shall judge when this power is made right use of?” (77). He answered that if the legislature is unable to check the prerogatives of an executive, “[T]here can be no judge on earth” (77). In such an instance, a ruler is using a power that was never his, since people cannot consent to the rule of those who would harm them. Under such circumstances, the people are to make an “appeal to heaven” at the opportune moment (Locke 2002, 77), which is to say that the people have the right to revolt. However, in the absence of overtly tyrannical rule, Locke and Hobbes are in general
agreement regarding legal restraints to prerogative powers effecting existential security. By not delineating the boundaries of prerogative power, Locke liberalized and thus legitimized what is essentially a foundation for absolutism (Neocleous 2007, 139-140).

While Locke deemphasized the incompatible absolutist elements of his liberal theorizing, Carl Schmitt harkened back to Hobbes by focusing precisely on the absolutism of existential security. Schmitt is best known for his dictum, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (1985, 5). The “state of exception” cannot be “codified in the existing legal order” because it is “a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state” (Schmitt 1985, 6). The state of exception is so perilous that “it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law” (Schmitt 1985, 6). Public sovereignty is essentially an illusion because true sovereignty resides with whoever decides when a state of exception exists and when it has passed. The most that a liberal constitution can hope to establish is the personage of sovereign party (Schmitt 1985, 7). The sovereign also determines when the situation is “normal,” and only under normal circumstances can laws and the adherence to laws exist. As a less punchy corollary to his dictum, Schmitt wrote, “[H]e is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists” (1985, 13). Constitutionalist liberals can at most regulate the exception as precisely as possible, an endeavor tantamount to codifying the circumstances that entail the law’s negation of itself (Schmitt 1985, 14).

Schmitt was a 20th century descendent of Thomas Hobbes, articulating a dark and illiberal conception of state power. Responding to this illiberal dynamic, other thinkers characterized the securitization of politics as a dangerous development. If unchecked, securitization would lead to increasingly authoritarian government, even as superficial democratic trappings remained (Lasswell 1950, Scott 2007, Wolin 2008). Morgenthau (1955) identified the emergence of illiberal institutions in the US government, as control shifted toward the exigencies of “security.” Morgenthau wrote that this change, “has occurred in all modern totalitarian states and has given
rise to a phenomenon which has been aptly called the *dual state*” (1955, 12). In such a state, authority is ostensibly held by those legally empowered officeholders. In reality, Morgenthau posits that a Schmittian dynamic is in effect where “by virtue of their power over life and death, the agents of the secret police—coordinated to, but independent from the official makers of decision—at the very least exert an effective veto over decisions” (1955, 12).

Ola Tunander (2009) describes a dual state with a deeper schism between the lawfully operating “democratic state” and the more autocratic “security state” whose sovereignty becomes apparent in a state of emergency. Beyond the mere capacity to veto the democratic state, the security state operates to effect the “fine-tuning of democracy” (Tunander 2009, 57). Such interventions are accomplished through logics that are outside liberal renderings of politics, termed *parapolitics*. As discussed previously, *parapolitics* is “a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished” (Scott 1972, 171). For Tunander, liberalism’s refusal to interrogate the duality of the state represents a serious theoretical deficiency. The problem is not that liberalism values freedoms, rights, and the rule of law; the problem is that liberalism insists that freedoms, rights, and the rule of law define Western political systems (Tunander 2009). According to Tunander, this myopia has made liberal political science into “an ideology of the ‘sovereign,’ because indisputable evidence for the existence of the ‘sovereign’ […] is brushed away as pure fantasy or ‘conspiracy’” (2009, 68). Carl Schmitt is typically viewed as an apologist or – even more critically – as a philosophical midwife for the infamous exceptional state that emerged from the Weimar Republic. Tunander (2009) depicts him as something different – a theorist examining the submerged, authoritarian security state that functions in tandem with the public state (Good 2015, 6).

From liberalism’s beginning there has been a contradiction between the liberal ideal of public sovereignty under the rule of law and the dictates of that which the state defines as “security.” This actually extends further back in Western civilization as can be seen with Plato,
who could never neatly reconcile the rule of law versus the rule of “the wise.” This contradiction is analogous to Athenian politics where domestically there was some form of rule by persuasion and consent, while internationally dark power (coercive, top-down) prevailed. By the 20th century, state behavior had in theory been legally circumscribed. In practice, raison d’etat could justify state exemption from legal restraint. Schmitt’s theory of the sovereign was meant to apply to a state facing an existential crisis. Such a crisis could serve to legitimize the exceptional state—the state unbound by legal restraints. Schmitt could be understandably categorized as an illiberal philosopher since he attempted to delineate the circumstances under which the state negates the state’s laws and constitutional rights. He argued that the state had the right or even the obligation to negate the very institutions that define liberalism. In Schmitt’s Germany, the decidedly illiberal Nazi state emerged from circumstances and actions described and prescribed by Schmitt himself.

US exceptionism emerged at the high point of American liberalism. No nation in world history was as wealthy and powerful relative to the rest of the world as was the US at the end of World War II. And yet, the liberal ideal of public sovereignty proved illusory. If sovereignty rests with the party that decides both “the exception” and the “normal” situation, sovereignty shifted gradually from the public to the deep state via the deep state’s dominance over the security and public states. Charles Tilly (1975; 1985) found that it was states’ relations with other states which forced the evolution of pre-modern polities into modern nation-states. Similarly, in the postwar era, the full US commitment to global hegemony inexorably transformed the character of the American state. The US evolved from being a constitutional democracy heavily influenced by deep political forces, into the exceptionist, behemoth, tripartite state.

Prior to the late 19th century, the US—like ancient Athens—was domestically governed largely through various means of persuasion, compromise, and consent (among the relevant parties). When it came to expansion and dealing with political “others,” coercive top-down power prevailed. Beginning most decisively with the closing of the frontier at the end of the 19th century,
US elites began creating an overseas empire in earnest. Institutions were created which grew such that by the dawn of World War II, the US was poised to assume the mantle of global capitalist hegemon. The general character and institutional framework of the postwar world order was crafted by deep political forces starting prior to America’s entry into the war. These processes led inexorably to the transformation of the American state and the de facto abrogation of the rule of law – *exceptionism*, legitimized by myths of American exceptionalism.
CHAPTER 4

THE RISE OF THE DEEP STATE SYSTEM

Less than two weeks after Germany invaded Poland and two years before Pearl Harbor, the Wall Street-dominated Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) would begin strategic planning that entailed US entry into the war, US victory in the war, and the establishment and maintenance of US hegemony after the war. The CFR planning was called the War and Peace Studies Project. It was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and carried out under the nominal auspices of the State Department. The project called for the US to act as the hegemon of a vast capitalist imperium, ensuring the predominance of the US and its junior partners over global resources and markets (Shoup and Minter 2004).

Presenting this vision to the US public was CFR member and media tycoon Henry Luce. His essay “The American Century” laid out the case for the CFR’s vision without attributing it to the organization or its plutocratic backers. Most of Luce’s argument was presented in banal and altruistic terms, the odd, excessively candid passage notwithstanding:

Our thinking of world trade today is on ridiculously small terms. For example, we think of Asia as being worth only a few hundred millions a year to us. Actually, in the decades to come Asia will be worth to us exactly zero - or else it will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year. And the latter are the terms we must think in, or else confess a pitiful impotence.28

The CFR/Luce vision for American empire was met with some resistance. Most famously, it was opposed by Roosevelt’s vice president Henry Wallace whose “Century of the Common Man” speech was a direct rebuttal to Luce. The showdown between Luce and Wallace represents a seminal conflict between progressive, democratic elements and the forces which would become the postwar exceptionist deep state. With the benefit of hindsight, the victory of the Luce faction seems overdetermined. The defeat of Wallace’s vision was prefigured to some degree when a conspiracy of political elites orchestrated “Pauley’s coup,” removing Wallace—against the wishes of an ailing FDR—from the 1944 Democratic ticket and replacing him with...
the much more pliable Harry S. Truman. It has been argued that, “The attainment of the nuclear weapon was almost certainly the deep state’s moment of conception” (Lofgren 2016, 49). It may be more accurate to describe this as its birth after being conceived by the War and Peace Studies Project, but all metaphors are imperfect.

At the end of World War II, the US was the only undamaged great power. It had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and by far the greatest industrial capacity and largest gold reserves. No country in world history has ever been as secure and unassailable as the US at that historical moment. By contrast, the Soviet Union had lost 26,600,000 people and suffered the destruction of many of its largest cities. Nevertheless, the US did nothing to compensate its former ally for bearing most of the burden when it came to defeating Nazi Germany. Instead, the US quickly settled upon the Soviet Union as a new existential foe. Those who advocated coexistence and peaceful competition with the Soviets—like Henry Wallace—were pilloried by conservatives and the emerging Cold War liberals who were considerably more bellicose than FDR and other prominent New Dealers.

To prosecute World War II, the US had created a large military bureaucracy. This was done with considerable influence from the corporate overworld and it would eventually give rise to the globe-dominating postwar US deep state. These security state institutions were conceived and midwifed with considerable and decisive input from the overworld of private wealth. Such was the case in a number of fateful instances in which top-down power was brought to bear in the making of history during this period—namely the War and Peace Studies Project, the “Pauley coup,” the dropping of the atomic bombs, and the National Security Act of 1947.

President Truman signed the National Security Act in 1947, creating much of the original structure of the US national security state, specifically the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In particular, it was the CIA which was willed into being through the efforts and influence of the upper strata of the US corporate rich.
The CIA was conceived through the efforts of a number of Wall Street lawyers. Notably, it was a Wall Street lawyer who penned the “elastic clause” in the National Security Act which came to be interpreted as giving the CIA authority to carry out all manner of illegal covert operations—“other duties”—from that point forward. Very early on, CIA elements began establishing illicit self-funding operations that utilized the drug trade. Specifically, the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) collaborated with opium-trafficking Kuomintang (KMT) officers in Burma and Thailand, ostensibly so the proceeds could fund the KMT’s hopelessly doomed effort to retake mainland China (McCoy 2007, Scott 2010). A transnational commercial intelligence firm known as the World Commerce Corporation (WCC) was involved in laying the groundwork for these efforts. The WCC was staffed by former British and US intelligence officers including the former head of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, Wall Street lawyer William Donovan. WCC’s financial backing came from overworld figures like Nelson Rockefeller, John McCloy, and Richard Mellon (Scott 2010, 55). Also involved was Paul Helliwell, a CIA man and OSS veteran with close connections to Meyer Lansky. The whole episode illustrates the deep state nexus between the overworld of private wealth, the underworld of organized crime, and the intelligence outfits—state and private—that mediate between them. State secrecy, a globe-sprawling national security state, and the operant perception that the US faced an existential threat in communism—all these elements conspired to transform the character of the American state and contributed to the rise of the exceptionist deep state.

McCarthyism and the HUAC hearings of the early Cold War represented further consolidation of deep state power. In so doing, the Red Scare infamously relied upon very questionable personages and constitutionally dubious methods. Multiple purposes were served. The radical left was neutralized, securitized anti-communist elements were empowered, and formerly effectual democratic voices within the elite were dispatched. In particular, the prosecution of Harry Dexter White seems to have been part of a power struggle to destroy
Rooseveltian forces that were open to a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union and that were seeking to hold accountable conservative, Nazi-collaborating persons and institutions like Thomas McKittrick and the Bank for International Settlements (Scott and Good 2019).

Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ascendency to the presidency was another milestone in the rise of the American deep state. Backed by vast sums of corporate—especially oil—money, the Eisenhower administration proceeded to devote US power toward achieving the CFR/Luce vision of American empire and thus to extinguish remaining possibilities that a “century of the common man” might unfold. This was most clearly illustrated by Eisenhower’s appointment of the Dulles brothers to head the State Department and the CIA. The two brothers had had previously been lawyers from Sullivan and Cromwell, the illustrious Wall Street law firm whose clients included the top US and Western multinational corporations. Thusly did the Wall Street overworld enjoy the deepest ties to the state department and to the CIA—and thereby to the pinnacle of US foreign policy decision making.

When DCI Allen Dulles was asked by a reporter what the CIA was, he answered, “the State Department for unfriendly countries” (Kinzer 2013, 164). The “unfriendly” countries would include Iran, Guatemala, Egypt, Syria, and Indonesia. In these places, the CIA and its agents carried out all manner of covert operations, up to and including assassinations and the overthrowing of governments. While the full history of almost all of these episodes has remained at least partly submerged, it was during the Eisenhower administration that C. Wright Mills wrote The Power Elite (1956). Even without the bulk of the historical evidence which supported his thesis, he was able to make the case that democratic sovereignty had become a façade and that control lay in the hands of an increasingly interchangeable elite of power that predominated at the top of the organizations which dominated big business, the federal government, and the military. At the end his presidency, Eisenhower delivered—in the passive voice—a warning about the
The military-industrial complex, an undemocratic element of the deep state that had at the very least metastasized during his administration.

Taking the presidency after Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy’s administration represented a serious challenge to the forces that comprise the American deep state. For the purposes of this work, it is most illuminating to examine the ways in which JFK’s policies diverged from those of administrations which preceded and succeeded him, Eisenhower and Johnson respectively. Though he has in the past often been characterized as a dedicated “cold warrior,” Kennedy had a very different approach to Third World nationalism, Cuba, the USSR, and Southeast Asia. He resisted advice from his military commanders to start hot wars in Cuba, Laos, Berlin, and Vietnam. He pursued back channel diplomacy with Cuba and the Soviet Union with the goal of potentially normalizing relations. He ordered—but did not live to carry out or perhaps reverse—a complete withdrawal from Vietnam. About five months before his death, JFK gave his famous “Peace Speech” at American University in which he essentially called for an end to the Cold War.

The president’s assassination reversed these policies. Almost immediately after taking office, LBJ issued an order effectively reversing JFK’s withdrawal plans by allowing for the escalated military actions against North Vietnam which led to the dubious Gulf of Tonkin incident that provided the pretext for the Vietnam War. Johnson also reversed Kennedy’s policies in the Third World and never sought to maintain or reestablish détente negotiations with Cuba or the USSR. At President Kennedy’s funeral, Deputy Soviet Premier Anastas Mikoyan met Jacqueline Kennedy on the receiving line. According to Dean Rusk, she told the Soviet official, “My husband’s dead. Now peace is up to you” (Stone and Kuznick 2012, 326).

Owing to a plethora of problems and seemingly impossible contrivances, the public and elites never accepted the government’s original explanation of the Kennedy assassination and the subsequent assassination of the alleged assassin. By 1976, a Gallup poll revealed that only 11%
of the public believed the Warren Commission theory that Oswald alone killed President Kennedy.\textsuperscript{29} Public incredulity ultimately led to the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) investigation (discussed later in greater detail) which ultimately concluded that the president’s death was the result of a “probable conspiracy,” while leaving conspirators unidentified. In 2018, G. Robert Blakey—the chief counsel and staff director of the HSCA—was among the signatories of statement asserting that the assassination of John Kennedy was essentially a state crime, whose cover-up was facilitated by the media and elements of government.\textsuperscript{30}

Such a conclusion could be arrived at thanks to the decades-long efforts of a small but intrepid group of scholars and researchers who examined the assassination from a critical perspective. In particular, the work of two particular scholars is utilized herein. Lance deHaven-Smith describes the John F. Kennedy assassination as a \textit{state crime against democracy} (SCAD). Such acts are defined as “concerted actions or inactions by government insiders intended to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty” (deHaven-Smith 2010, 796). Peter Dale Scott describes the assassination as a \textit{structural deep event}. These are events “which violate the American social structure, have a major impact on American society, repeatedly involve lawbreaking or violence, and in many cases proceed from an unknown dark force” (Scott 2015, 110). While deHaven-Smith and Scott never collaborated, Scott conceded to me that the SCAD construct has merit, but should be amended to signify that the JFK assassination and cover-up represented a DSCAD, or a \textit{deep state crime against democracy}. Rather than exhaustively relitigating the details of the assassination, that analysis is essentially accepted herein. For his part, deHaven-Smith conceded to me that SCAD theory lacked an explicit theory of the state. In addition to providing such a theoretical rendering, it is one of the aims of this work to reconcile and refine the formulations of these two scholars and thereby elucidate the revelatory and complementary nature of their theories.
On the eve of the JFK assassination, the political future of Lyndon Baines Johnson was imperiled. His protégé and bagman Bobby Baker was under investigation by the Kennedy Justice Department for myriad crimes including tax evasion, fraud, and the procuring of congressional votes through sexual favors. The scandal came to a point at which JFK himself discussed the affair with his secretary and—on the day before he left for Dallas—reportedly told her that Lyndon Johnson would not be on the ticket in 1964 (Scott 1993, 220). With the assassination of JFK and LBJ’s ascendancy to the presidency, the Bobby Baker investigation was dropped. With Johnson’s dramatic Dallas reprieve and his eventual retirement from politics, LBJ’s presidency illustrates the history-making power of the American deep state. On November 24, 1963—the same day that Lee Harvey Oswald was assassinated—Johnson agreed to authorize the military to carry out covert operations against North Vietnam. These operations were codenamed OPLAN34A and were formally authorized in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273. Signed by President Johnson on November 26, 1963, NSAM 273 essentially marked an escalation and a thus a reversal of JFK’s plan for de-escalation and withdrawal which had been made official in Kennedy’s NSAM 263 of October 1963. The covert operations authorized by LBJ days after Kennedy’s assassination led directly to the Gulf of Tonkin incident which was eventually used to gain congressional authorization to prosecute the Vietnam War.

After winning a landslide reelection in 1964, Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to introduce massive numbers of ground troops into Vietnam, thereby taking the step that Kennedy had always resisted. In Latin America, JFK’s progressive—if flawed—Alliance for Progress was supplanted by the Mann Doctrine whereby Latin American governments would be judged for their promotion of US interests rather than their own national interests (Stone and Kuznick, 2012, 344). Johnson reversed other Kennedy policies in the Third World. Nationalist governments in Ghana, Brazil, and Indonesia were overthrown after having been supported or at least engaged by the Kennedy administration. The consequences were especially dire in Indonesia.
where a bizarre abortive coup was followed by the massacre of 500,000 to 2,000,000 nominally communist and/or ethnic Chinese Sukarno supporters. The carnage unfolded with considerable US assistance and encouragement.

Lyndon Johnson himself came to suspect the CIA was somehow involved in the Kennedy assassination (Wilford 2008, 246). Likewise, Robert Kennedy and Jackie Kennedy believed that JFK was killed by domestic right-wing forces and they sent an emissary to deliver a message to that effect to the Soviets (Naftali and Fursenko 1997, 344-345). Eventually, Robert Kennedy arrived at the conclusion that his brother had been killed by elements of the CIA, organized crime, and right-wing Cuban exiles. According to RFK’s confidants, he planned to reopen the investigation into the assassination once he attained the presidency (Talbot 2007). These plans were derailed when RFK was assassinated on June 5, 1968 after winning the California Democratic primary. Again in the RFK case, the official explanation clashes with evidence compiled by critics. Most notably, Sirhan Sirhan is essentially exonerated by the autopsy which indicates that he could not have fired the fatal shot. Additionally, there were more bullet holes in the pantry than Sirhan’s gun could have held. The extra shots are also apparently captured on an audio recording discovered decades later. One ballistics expert determined that the three bullets found on the scene did not match with Sirhan’s pistol. The government never did make a ballistics match between the bullets and Sirhan’s gun. A bullet taken by the coroner from RFK’s neck simply vanished. 33 Regardless of the identity of its authors, the RFK assassination paved the way for Richard Nixon to ascend to the presidency.

As with the presidency of John Kennedy, the Nixon administration presided over a time characterized by great rifts in the US public and among the elite. The Vietnam War and the political assassinations of the 1960’s—especially those of the Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King Jr.—damaged America’s image domestically and internationally. The panic of US elites seemed to hit its apex in 1968. Wrote one insider decades later:
I remembered my own encounter with the fear and trembling of what was still known as “The Establishment,” four years later and 100 miles to the north at the July encampment of San Francisco’s Bohemian Club. […] In the summer of 1968 the misgivings were indistinguishable from panic. Martin Luther King had been assassinated; so had Robert Kennedy, and everywhere that anybody looked the country’s institutional infrastructure, also its laws, customs, best-loved truths, and fairy tales, seemed to be collapsing into anarchy and chaos—black people rioting in the streets of Los Angeles and Detroit, American soldiers killing their officers in Vietnam, longhaired hippies stoned on drugs or drowned in the bathtubs of Bel Air, shorthaired feminists playing with explosives instead of dolls, the Scottsdale and Pasadena sheriffs’ posses preparing their palomino ponies to stand firm in the face of an urban mob.34

The Establishment consensus fractured first and foremost over Vietnam. Wall Street-aligned forces including Treasury officials and government economic advisors came to have deep misgivings about the war’s continuation. Officials from outfits such as Citibank, Bankers Trust Company, Solomon Brothers and Goldman Sachs began making statements about the detrimental effects that war spending was having on the global economy and upon the Bretton Woods system as a whole (Buzzanco 1999, 593-595). At the same time, a minority of hawkish CFR members—most notably Paul Nitze—were determined to maintain US military primacy above all. In 1974, Nitze publicly appeared in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee where he attacked Nixon and Kissinger for pursuing their “myth of détente” (Scott 2007, 31).

In the pivotal year of 1968, a number of significant crimes involving political elites had decisive historical impact. The MLK and RFK assassinations eliminated the most powerful reformist actors among the world of social activists and political leaders, respectively. Additionally, after having run a campaign promising “Peace with Honor” in Vietnam, Nixon won the presidency in part through the commission of an arguably treasonous crime which dishonorably forestalled peace—the sabotage of the Paris Peace Accords of 1968.35

Presiding over a divided nation and a divided elite, Nixon pursued a middle course and limited input from much of the Washington bureaucracy while managing foreign policy from the White House (Scott 2007, 31). He also ran a surprisingly reformist liberal domestic policy. For his efforts, Nixon won the enmity of two powerful factions of the US establishment and deep
state—the corporate rich and the hawkish militarists. Borrowing from Michael Klare, Peter Dale Scott terms these groups “traders” and “Prussians,” respectively (Scott 2007, 31). Vietnamization, détente with the Soviets, and recognition of the People’s Republic of China greatly distressed militarist hardliners. This was dramatically evidenced by the “Moorer-Radford affair” in which high ranking military officers were caught running a spy ring to obtain information about Nixon policies they opposed. In addition to the financial problems caused by continuing the Vietnam War, the “traders” were opposed to Nixon’s activist policies like the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, the creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, price controls, and protectionist trade policies.

Meanwhile, right-wing forces were mobilizing in response to the legitimacy crisis that had peaked in 1968. In 1971, corporate lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell penned his infamous “Confidential Memorandum: Attack on the American Free Enterprise System,” more commonly known as the “Powell Memorandum” or “Powell Memo.” Perhaps more accurately described as a response to the possibility that the corporate rich might lose their hegemony over society, the Powell Memo was initially addressed to a massive business lobby, the US Chamber of Commerce. Wrote Powell in the memo, “Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in the political power available only through united action and national organizations.” With its calls for sustained, organized activism to move US politics in a more pro-business direction, the Powell Memo is often credited for inspiring or at least explaining the forces that gave rise to the New Right in America. It can also be read as a something of a manifesto of the American deep state. The political activism of the 1960’s challenged the hegemony of the superficially liberal power elite delineated by C. Wright Mills in the mid-1950’s. The reactive rise in right-wing activism stemmed from elements that had theretofore been enjoying a something close to a de facto
monopoly on power in US society. When progressive activism threatened the power elite’s monopoly on power, the response—besides a slew of assassinations including (in all probability) the Kennedy brothers, Malcolm X, MLK, and Fred Hampton—was a massive surge in right-wing activism which fundamentally altered US political and social institutions.

Another elite response to the fallout from the Vietnam War and consequent end of Bretton Woods was a notable change in the nature of US hegemony. As Robert Buzzanco wrote, “The Bretton Woods system and military Keynesianism—which had driven economic growth in the Cold War—had been dealt a serious blow by the Vietnam War, and the United States would henceforth have to negotiate its hegemony and economic influence with Western Europe and Japan” (1999, 595). The most noteworthy establishment response to this came in the form of David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission, an international organization comprised of compatible business elites, political figures, and intellectuals from North America (US and Canada), Western Europe, and Japan. The most concise formulation of the Trilateralist perspective can be found in *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (1975) by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, wherein the authors bemoan “an excess of democracy” (113). The book argues that:

…the effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system (114).

The Trilateralists were in essence arguing that the decline in esteem for elites and elite institutions was in fact “a crisis of democracy” rather than a democratic response to undemocratic, top-down governance. While differing in tone and content from the Powell Memo, the Trilateralists overlapped considerably with the nascent New Right in their fear and disdain for the progressive
currents of the 1960’s. It is noteworthy that the Trilateralist perspective came to dominate the Democratic Party during the Carter, Clinton, and Obama administrations. Thus, the Trilateralists—perhaps best described as the left-wing of America’s right-wing American political class—came to dominate the “left” of the US political system, i.e., the Democratic Party.

Suffice it to say, Richard Nixon presided over a period in which the deep state was very much divided. Though Watergate looms as the proximate cause of his undoing, the prevailing narrative of the scandal increasingly appears to be mythical. DeHaven-Smith points to Nixon’s confirmed and suspected crimes as SCADS, including the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, the Watergate break-in, and the attempted assassination of George Wallace (2006, 337). Such a characterization is accurate as far as it goes, but when reexamined (see Chapter Five), the Watergate mythology obscures a deep event or a rolling coup of sorts.

By this rendering, Watergate was another structural deep event that served as a crucible in the history of the consolidation of the American deep state system. While the two leaders would seem to be diametrically opposite in the US political system, there are striking parallels between the political fates of both John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Both presidents failed to accommodate the antecedents of today’s neoconservative and neoliberal factions of the deep state. Kennedy had outraged the militarist “Prussian” faction of the political establishment by refusing to commit the US to fighting wars during the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the crisis in Laos, the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in Vietnam where Kennedy had formalized a protracted (for political reasons) withdrawal process after initially boosting the US presence in the country. Kennedy also established back-channel talks with Castro and Khrushchev about improving US-Cuban relations and ending the Cold War, respectively. Nixon earned the enmity of these same forces by seeking détente and arms control with the Soviet Union, recognizing China, pursuing “Vietnamization” and the eventual end of the war, and by calling for the removal of US troops from South Korea.
Kennedy’s policies also aggrieved the “traders,” those representing the interests of Corporate America and transnational capital more generally. In his standoff with US Steel, Kennedy brought the power of the government to bear on the country’s largest corporation, forcing its executives to back down on a price increase that nullified an agreement previously reached between the company, labor unions, and the federal government. Henry Luce’s *Fortune* magazine observed that a theory circulating in the corporate world maintained that the US Steel chairman “was acting as a ‘business statesman’ rather than as a businessman,” and that Kennedy’s policies were threatening “jawbone control” of industry prices. The editorial concluded that it was in the national interest for US Steel to find “a way to break through the bland ‘harmony’ that has recently prevailed between government and business” (Gibson 1994, 15-16).

As sociologist Donald Gibson (1994) describes it, Kennedy’s economic policies were threatening to the established order wherein government policy served—or at least did not disrupt—“the privately organized hierarchy” whose elites, especially those affiliated with Morgan interests, have long been involved with the British establishment. These Anglo-US elites share a worldview “rooted in inherited wealth and titles and organized in the modern world around control of finance and raw materials” (75). It was in the realm of foreign policy that Kennedy most alarmed the corporate rich. His policies toward crucial Third World countries differed markedly from both Eisenhower and Johnson. These included the poor, resource-rich countries of Indonesia, Brazil, Congo, Iran, and the Dominican Republic. In Italy, Kennedy supported opening up the political system to accommodate the considerable political aspirations of the Italian left. Even before the assassination in Dallas, the CIA’s William Harvey in Rome set about launching a campaign to reverse Kennedy’s policy (Talbot 2015, 467-468). CIA officer Mark Wyatt believed Harvey himself was involved in the JFK assassination after Harvey’s response on the day of the
shooting and his unexplained trip to Dallas earlier in the month. In violation of the JFK Records Act, William Harvey’s CIA travel records are still withheld to this day (Talbot 2015, 476).

Nixon also pursued policies anathema to the “traders,” including the aforementioned establishment of price controls, creation of the EPA and OSHA, and protectionist trade policies. He sought to expand the food stamp program, and his administration established the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program to guarantee an income for America’s elderly and disabled. In all, the Nixon administration presided over considerable increases in benefits provided by Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. The head of Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers, Herb Stein, stated that during the Nixon years, “Probably more new regulation was imposed on the economy than in any other presidency since the New Deal.”

In addition to the above policies which alienated the main power blocs of the US deep state, Kennedy and Nixon took measures that produced antipathy and paranoia in two crucial deep state institutions: the CIA and its colleagues in organized crime. Kennedy and Nixon famously fired two legendary CIA chiefs, Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, respectively. The two men were as Establishment as one could get. From an elite family, Dulles had been an attorney for Wall Street’s Sullivan and Cromwell law firm before serving as an OSS officer and later providing crucial assistance in the effort to create the CIA itself (Talbot 145-146). Richard McGarrah Helms was the grandson of Gates W. McGarrah, the first president of the Bank for International Settlements—the Nazi-connected bank which Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully to eliminate, and which now functions as the hub of the world’s central banking system (Gibson 1994, 71-72). As a teenager, Helms attended an elite Swiss boarding school with, among others, the Shah of Iran (Homayounvash 2017, 59). Nixon never trusted the patrician Helms and made the decision to fire him after being re-elected in 1972.

The Kennedys antagonized organized crime more than any previous administration, with Robert Kennedy leading campaigns against the criminal organizations that Hoover’s FBI had
long ignored in favor of going after other favored targets like leftists and civil rights leaders. Whereas the Kennedys clashed with figures like Teamster boss Jimmy Hoffa, Nixon actually pardoned Hoffa. However, Nixon would eventually earn the enmity of his Far Eastern, syndicate-connected, former backers from Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. They were aggrieved by the Nixon-Kissinger pursuit of détente and by the “War on Drugs” which did impact the Asian heroin trade. In sum, the demise of Kennedy and Nixon presidencies are best explained with reference to deep political institutions that opposed the policies and strategies pursued by the two administrations. Such an analysis illuminates much more than those conventional accounts that focus on the proximate terminal causes—the bullets in Dallas and the fallout from a botched break-in at the Watergate Hotel.

More than is often recognized, the 1970’s were a cataclysmic decade in US history and therefore in world history. Since the end of World War II, the US had presided over the international capitalist system by virtue of its de facto control of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the dollar’s status as the system’s gold-backed reserve currency. The dollar was largely stable until the US ran up enormous balance-of-payments deficits caused by Vietnam War spending. Starting in the mid-1960s, European and Asian central banks began accumulating dollars in vast quantities. It soon became clear to US leaders that if the US were to adhere to the (US-crafted) Bretton Woods agreement, the national treasury would quickly exhaust its gold reserves. In response, the US under Johnson suspended informally the dollar’s convertibility to gold in 1968. President Nixon formally closed the gold window in 1971, bringing an end to the Bretton Woods era (Hudson 203, 306-308; Good 2015, 9).

It appears that the closing of the gold window was the culmination of a series of ad hoc responses to monetary crises faced by US policymakers. US officials knew that their decision was a power move to address US problems in such a way as to harm other countries’ interests. This was famously and most succinctly expressed at the time by US Treasury Secretary John Connolly
who told G-10 attendees in Rome that “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” That said, the implications of the change were not fully understood at the time. Michael Hudson was the first economist to accurately assess the fundamental change after the Nixon Shock. Hudson first published *Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire* in 1972. In it, he explained how the US, by ending gold convertibility, forced the rest of the world to hold US Treasury bills as the basis for their cash reserves. Other countries recycled the dollars they acquired by buying US Treasury securities, thereby financing US budget deficits. In effect, the new global financial system obliged other countries to pay for US military spending whether they wanted to or not. In the mid-1970’s, the Pentagon paid a considerable sum for Hudson to explain to them just how the country was now enjoying this free financial ride (Hudson 2015, vi).

Hudson had these insights thanks to his own acumen and his unique background. After earning his PhD, he worked for Chase Manhattan as the balance-of-payments economist for their economic research department. In that position, Hudson was tasked with predicting the balance of payments for Chile, Brazil, and Argentina to determine if they could take on additional debt such that the maximum amount of each country’s economic surplus could be paid to US banks as debt service. Hudson also developed an accounting process to examine the US oil industry’s balance of payments. His final task at Chase was to estimate the value of criminal proceeds flowing into Swiss banks and other hideouts. According to Hudson, the US State Department had requested that Chase and other US banks create branches in the Caribbean to attract “hot money” from drug dealers, embezzlers, and such. This was a desperate measure undertaken to offset the exploding US balance-of-payments deficit, which Hudson discovered to be completely due to military spending (Hudson 2015, iii–iv).

After his illuminating experiences at Chase Manhattan, Hudson joined the New School economics department where discovered the inadequacy of the discipline. International trade theory, he determined, was “the silliest” of the economics subdisciplines since it ignored military
spending, gunboats, “errors and omissions” (i.e., “hot money”), capital flight, the various forms of smuggling, and the endemic “transfer pricing” tax avoidance scams. According to Hudson, these blind spots are necessary in order “to steer trade theory toward the perverse and destructive conclusion that any country can pay any amount of debt, simply by lowering wages enough to pay creditors” (Hudson 2015, iv).

Academic monetary theory, he discovered, is even more blinkered. Friedman’s “Chicago School” only factors in wages and commodity prices to the analysis of money supply, ignoring the impact of asset prices—specifically stocks, bonds, and real estate. Here again, the effect is to create a fictitious cosmology—“the reverse of how the world actually works”—to the benefit of predatory, rentier financial interests. His analysis led him to advocate for Third World debt cancellation. However, even leftist US economists at the time did not accept the centrality of debt service. It took another decade for Hudson to be proven right when Mexico in 1982 set off the “debt bomb” in Latin America by defaulting on its foreign debt (Hudson 2015, iv-v). Hudson was also the economist who perhaps most accurately predicted the subprime collapse. His research and historical role in illuminating iniquities of the global financial system provide perhaps the most comprehensive critique of the post-Bretton Woods system and the economic polarization wrought by overdetermining US structural power. Additionally, by highlighting the poverty of the hegemonic economics theories, Hudson’s work suggests that the academy is itself an agent of structural power by virtue of economists’ de rigeur myopia when it comes to debt and rent (e.g. Hudson 2017).

The period around the time that Bretton Woods was scuttled witnessed one of the great assertions of structural power in world history. The Nixon administration refused to accept the Bretton Woods stricture that the US remain in surplus. This was argued to be justified on the basis that the deficits were caused not by US military profligacy, but by mercantilist European and Japanese practices that sought to challenge US industry (Gowan 1999, 18). Since the new
dollar standard so greatly weakened Western Europe and Japan vis-à-vis the US, they opposed Nixon’s moves. To manage this hostility, an IMF conference of monetary reform was convened. At meetings held between 1972 and 1974, participants deliberated about a proposed new system in which IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s) would serve as the anchor for the international monetary system, subordinating the dollar and other currencies. In retrospect, it is clear that the US had no intention on following through on the consensus reached at the conference. Rather, the conference was a means to stall the participating states while the US manipulated events elsewhere (Gowan 1999, 20).

With the closing of the gold window as the first step, the Nixon administration took the next step toward establishing the unipolar post-Bretton Woods system. This entailed working to ensure that financial relations would no longer be controlled by states’ central banks, but would instead be centered in the realm of private financial entities. The US accomplished this in large part by exploiting US dominance over the international petroleum market. Although commonly believed to be related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Yom Kippur War specifically, the unprecedented 1973 spike in oil prices was orchestrated by the US to serve as economic statecraft against Western Europe and Japan. The Nixon administration had been making plans to effect an OPEC price increase since 1971. Beginning in 1972, the US had been formulating plans for recycling the concomitant flood of petrodollars through private US banks. Nixon’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia stated that the motivation behind the policies was to deal a severe blow to Japanese and European economies, rather than to establish a new financial world order Gowan 1999, 21). With his administration’s antipathy toward Western European and Japanese interests and his “Nixon shock” nationalistic trade policies, President Nixon was antagonizing the “trader” or neoliberal faction of the US power structure. This group was most clearly embodied in the personage of David Rockefeller who opposed barriers to “free trade” and whose Trilateral Commission was founded in July of 1973 to bring together elites the US, Western Europe, and
Japan in order to facilitate capitalist cooperation between these three leading financial centers. Nixon’s failure to accommodate these elements contributed ultimately to his downfall.

While it may seem implausible that the US could have orchestrated the OPEC crisis, there is much evidence to support such a conclusion. For starters, all the key Middle Eastern actors in the affair—Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran—were US allies. Given the disparity in power, it would be more precise to describe them as client states. Client states do not harm the interests of their patron state. This is basically their defining characteristic. Additionally, it is clear that the oil crisis served to benefit enormously two pillars of the US power structure: oil and finance. US responsibility for the price spike was confirmed decades later by Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister at the time. He stated that he was “100 per cent sure that the Americans were behind the increase in the price of oil,” adding that the Shah of Iran said to him, “Why are you against the increase in the price of oil? That is what they want? Ask Henry Kissinger—he is the one who wants a higher price.” Yamani added that documentation of these plans had emerged in papers detailing a secret meeting on a Swedish island where US and British officials outlined plans to orchestrate a four-fold increase in the price of oil.\textsuperscript{42}

Yamani was referring to the 1973 Bilderberg meetings held in Saltjoebaden, Sweden. While he may be overstating the degree to which the meeting minutes reveal “orchestration” of the price increase, they do include discussion of a paper presented to the group which made reference to Yamani’s analysis of the changing oil markets, including Yamani’s recommendation that oil majors and producing countries “prevent competition […] to avoid a drop in prices and revenues [and to] maintain thereby price stability, and even secure an immediate increase in world crude oil prices.”\textsuperscript{43} Participants also prophetically discussed the implications of OPEC on the global financial and monetary systems as well as the need for the US—“the most important political, economic, and military power of the Free World,”—to “continue to dominate the international oil scene […] because of the world balance of power.”\textsuperscript{44} One noteworthy aspect of
the conference is that it focused in large part about how to create ways for the US, Europe, Japan, the oil majors, and OPEC to devise strategies for dealing with oil price increases, even as Nixon sought to effect the oil price increase to economically weaken Japan and Europe. In July of 1973, Zbigniew Brzezinski organized the formation of David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission in order to bring together US, European, and Japanese elites for purposes of strategic coordination. Brzezinski had attended the May 1973 Bilderberg meeting. The Bilderberg and Trilateral Commission activities of 1973 further suggest that Nixon had lost the support of the “traders,”—i.e., the transnational capitalist class—and that he had lost control of policy to some degree as a consequence of the rolling Watergate scandal.

Eventually, the oil price rise to a huge accumulation of petrodollars by OPEC countries. Other governments had wanted these funds recycled through the IMF. Owing to US dominance in the Persian Gulf region, it was instead decided that the Atlantic world’s banks (led by American firms, naturally) would be the conduits for petrodollar recycling (Gowan 1999, 21). To facilitate this, the US proceeded to use its power to abolish “financial repression”—the system of capital controls put in place by Bretton Woods (Gowan 1999, 21-22). Given that the untethered dollar was the new form of global reserves, “liberating” international financial markets preserved US financial dominance. The basis of US hegemony shifted from diadic power relationships to a structural, market-based type of power (Gowan 1999, 23). The system was shored up throughout the decade by secret deals struck between Saudi Arabia and US Treasury secretaries whereby the Saudis would use their petrodollars to purchase US Treasury bills at special auctions (Spiro 1999, 107). Additionally, US and Saudi officials arrived at a deal in which the kingdom agreed to extend its practice of requiring US dollars as payment for oil sales (Spiro 1999, 124).

The post-Bretton Woods system bequeathed to the US an historically novel kind of empire borne of structural dominance. Peter Gowan describes the post-Bretton Woods system as the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR). The two pillars of the system are, logically, the dollar
and the financial markets (23-24). With the gold-backed dollar replaced by the
petrodollar/treasury bill standard (Good 2015, 9), the US was able to enjoy unprecedented
seigniorage benefits. To sum, the US is unfettered by the balance-of-payments imperatives that
constrain other countries. The US can fund its gargantuan military colossus without worrying
about budget deficits since there is no foreign exchange constraint. US multinationals can buy up
other firms around the world, engage heavily in foreign direct investment, and direct large
amounts of funds into securities and/or portfolio investments without consequences that would
otherwise stem from massive accumulation of the country’s currency in foreign central banks. US
importers and exporters are less affected by exchange rate fluctuations, and current account
(trade) deficits can be sustained indefinitely since they can be covered by US dollars (Gowan

As Gowan (1999) explains, the dominance of Wall Street in the post Bretton Woods
regime had four key consequences. Central banks were superseded by (Anglo-American) private
banks in the realm of international finance. Public supervision of international finance was greatly
weakened. Countries’ currencies and financial systems—especially in the global south—were
much more vulnerable to being destabilized by activities in US financial markets (26). Finally,
within developed countries, powerful competitive pressures in the banking systems broke down
state barriers that prevented deeper linkages between international and domestic financial
systems, causing the latter to be less well-controlled by their home countries. In crises, this
allowed the US to open up the economies of respective states and restructure them according to
US interests (26, 29-30).

The end of Bretton Woods and the establishment of the DWSR was a major victory for
the maturing American deep state. Vietnam had led to a deep political conflict wherein the
commercially-minded traders/neoliberals came to oppose the Prussian military profligacy which
threatened to destroy the international capitalist order the US had forged and maintained since the
end of World War II. The Nixon administration, with considerable input from the Rockefeller overworld, midwifed the DWSR even though its final form jettisoned the democratic nationalist aspects that Nixon himself favored. Nixon was, in part, collateral damage from this conflict. What emerged was a new system that eventually reconciled the conflicts between the neoliberal traders andneoconservative Prussians. The Pentagon and Wall Street acquired a theretofore historically unprecedented source of structural power and financial largess.

The deep political fallout from the conflict would play itself out through the rest of the decade. Shortly after becoming head of the CIA, James Schlesinger learned about CIA involvement in the crimes of Watergate burglars James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. In response, he ordered agency employees to report any CIA activities that exceeded the agency’s authority. Undertaken as a Watergate counter-offensive against the CIA, the resulting compilation became the CIA’s “family jewels” files. In December of 1974, some of the files’ explosive contents reached the public when Seymour Hersh reported that the CIA had been violating its charter by carrying out domestic intelligence operations against antiwar activists and other dissidents. In response to the article, President Ford held a meeting with Defense Secretary and ex-DCI James Schlesinger along with some other officials. At the meeting, Ford asked “Was the CIA involved in Watergate?” The reply—almost certainly from Schlesinger—was partially redacted but he did state that “There is a layer in the Agency [beyond] which you can never find out what is going on.” The next day, Helms would offer a similar assessment: “I don’t know everything which went on in the Agency; maybe no one really does.” In response, Ford tried to get ahead of the scandals by appointing the “blue-ribbon” Rockefeller Commission. Thus began 1975, the “year of intelligence.”

Though the president had been warned that the commission should not be seen as a “kept” committee formed to “whitewash the problem,” Ford stacked the committee with a majority of right-wing, establishment figures including Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,
Douglas Dillon, Ronald Reagan and Lyman Lemnitzer (Olmsted 1996, 49-50). From early on, the committee would face setbacks that kept it from defusing the crisis facing the US intelligence community. Watergate had led to what turned out to be a very brief historical moment in which the media sought to uncover and report on intelligence abuses, i.e., state criminality. In February, the *CBS Evening News* aired a report informing viewers that President Ford had “reportedly warned associates that if current investigations go too far, they could uncover several assassinations of foreign officials in which the CIA was involved” (Olmsted 1996, 59). As a result of the report about his warning, President Ford would have to deal with just the scenario he was trying to prevent. Over the next few months, various front-page stories exposed new abuses, including the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro, plots against Lumumba; Ngo Dinh Diem; and Rafael Trujillo, as well as alleged operations to assassinate Sukarno and Duvalier (Olmsted 1996, 66).

Before the bizarre events that made him America’s only unelected president, Ford’s most historically significant accomplishment had been his service on the Warren Commission. In that capacity, he infamously rewrote the passage describing Kennedy’s wounds in such a way as to erroneously move the “magic bullet’s” point of entry from the president’s back up to his neck, thereby making the report’s “single bullet theory” somewhat less untenable. It is ironic, then, that the Rockefeller Commission only took up the issue of assassinations because of Ford’s gaffe. Rockefeller responded to the controversy by suggesting, apparently in earnest, that the commissioners restrict their assassination inquiry to the issue of Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. This was too much even for Ronald Reagan, and the commissioners overruled their chairman. Although the commission did carry out an investigation into CIA assassination plots, they were stymied in key respects. The CIA dragged its feet rather than providing the relevant documents. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wanted to suppress the report on assassinations. Deputy assistant to the president Richard Cheney took the lead in
“editing” the report. Cheney’s revisions included withholding the section on assassinations and editing the report to obscure the backstory of how Ford’s revelation had forced the commission to take up the issue in the first place. Additionally, Cheney changed language that described CIA abuses as “unlawful” to instead being merely beyond the CIA’s statutory authority. The report did concede that the agency’s drug experiments were “illegal.”

In addition to the revelations listed above, the US public in March of 1975 also saw the video of President Kennedy’s assassination for the first time when Robert Groden and Dick Gregory screened the film on Geraldo Rivera’s television show. Abraham Zapruder had filmed the president’s death and subsequently sold the film to C.D. Jackson, a Time-Life executive. In addition to his career in the Luce media empire, Jackson had been a propagandist for the US government—a specialist in “psychological warfare” during World War II. While working for Luce in the early 1950’s, Jackson was paid by the CIA to coauthor a study that recommended reorganizing the US intelligence agencies. He also used Time-Life to provide cover for CIA agents. After Jackson’s purchase of the Zapruder Film, Time-Life kept it from the public until a bootleg copy made from the film provided to New Orleans DA Jim Garrison was finally shown on national television. The film had a tremendous impact on public opinion. Much of the public in 1975 concluded what CIA director John McCone had surmised in 1963 upon seeing the film: it showed the president being hit by gunfire apparently coming from two directions.

The John Kennedy assassination would subsequently be taken up by the Church Committee, the Senate’s post-Watergate investigation into intelligence abuses. In its final report, the Church Committee found that the FBI and CIA investigations were “deficient” and that key facts which could have significantly impacted the investigation were withheld from the Warren Commission and even the investigators working for the CIA and FBI. In particular, the CIA’s operations that plotted Castro’s assassination should have been investigated. The committee’s final report stated that they could not explain why the FBI/CIA let the deficient investigation
Proceed, nor why they then allowed the Warren Commission to arrive at its conclusion without having all the key facts. On these matters, the report concludes, “[T]he possibility exists that senior [FBI/CIA officials] made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information.”

As with the Rockefeller Commission, the White House tasked deputy assistant to the president Richard Cheney with responding to congressional investigators. His work led to the CIA adopting accommodation procedures designed explicitly to keep the agency’s most important records away from the committee. Despite these challenges, the committee did expose widespread abuses, including the FBI’s notorious COINTELPRO operations, massive surveillance of dissidents by the CIA; FBI; military intelligence; and the theretofore largely anonymous National Security Agency. The committee’s report included details of the political use of the IRS and what was to that date the most complete account of CIA covert operations against Chilean democracy (Olmsted 1996, 109). There were additional revelations such as the development of very potent, deadly poisons derived from shellfish toxin and cobra venom. It was also exposed that the agency had created an electric dart gun that fired silently, as well as darts which could shoot poison into a target and subsequently be undetectable during a typical autopsy or physical examination. A former CIA employee named Mary Embree reported that the CIA had developed a projectile made of frozen poison that could be shot into a target. The dart would melt, the target would suffer a heart attack, and there would be only a small inconspicuous mark left behind on the body of the deceased heart attack victim. Despite these and other details about assassinations, including the Castro plots, the final report did not find the CIA directly responsible for a single assassination (Olmsted 1996, 107).

The House conducted a separate intelligence investigation in the form of the Pike Committee. Early on, the committee nearly triggered a constitutional crisis over whether Congress had the right to investigate any elements of the executive branch. Unlike the Church
Committee, the Pike Committee members refused to sign any CIA-style secrecy agreements. Pike also refused to allow the CIA to only brief the committee chair and/or co-chair on matters deemed sensitive by the agency. In the end, the committee was able to establish a process whereby the House of Representatives could declassify information in its possession.56 The committee’s final report was suppressed thanks to the efforts of the CIA’s allies in Congress. However, someone had leaked the report to journalist Daniel Schorr who—after the report was suppressed—gave it to the Village Voice who then published it in February of 1976. Relative to the Church Committee, the report contained less sensational revelations of CIA abuses, but its conclusions and recommendations were more sweeping. The report’s opening line spelled it out: “If this Committee’s recent experience is any test, intelligence agencies that are to be controlled by Congressional lawmaking are, today, beyond the lawmaker’s scrutiny.” The committee called for the creation of a permanent House intelligence committee, the prohibition of direct or indirect assassination plots and of paramilitary operations during peacetime. Other recommendations included disclosure of the existence of the NSA, legislation to allow for civilian control of that agency, and the creation of a true director of the intelligence community to oversee and coordinate intelligence sharing and activities among the agencies. Perhaps most significantly, the report called for an end to the CIA practice of enlisting elements of civil society (journalists, religious groups, academia) in its propaganda and spying operations.57

Ultimately, neither congressional investigation was able to impact the lawlessness of the intelligence agencies. After Watergate, the media returned to its traditional subservient position vis-à-vis the state. The Washington Post was emblematic of this reversion to form, stating in an unsigned editorial that by demanding an unfettered investigation, the committee had trespassed upon “the President’s prerogative to conduct foreign policy” (Olmsted 1996, 139). In a passage that seems ironic given the role of the media and the intelligence agencies in the age of Trump, the Post argued that the committee had erred by not discreetly acquiring the needed materials that
“would not be forthcoming in the context of a hostile political confrontation.” Congress needed to preserve “[t]he legitimate powers of the office of the Presidency,” including “the confidentiality of the presidential decision-making process and the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy.”

The Church and Pike committees differed in their conclusions. After finding no evidence of presidential authorization of plots to assassinate foreign heads of state, Frank Church famously declared that the CIA “may have been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage.” Pike’s and his committee’s conclusion was quite different. At one hearing, Otis Pike said that the CIA “was no rogue elephant,” and the final report stated that the available evidence suggested that the agency “has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs” (Olmsted 1996, 142). Pike knew this conclusion was a threatening one. With Watergate, the public was confronted with a situation in which “their president had been a bad person. [Now] they are asked to believe that their country has been evil.” The problem was the presidency and the abuse of power it facilitated through the use of the executive branch’s secret tools (Olmsted 1996, 143).

While both Church and Pike committees arrived at grim conclusions that went unheeded, neither report was able to adequately surmise what had gone wrong and why. Judging by the experiences Kennedy and Nixon—two presidents who had clashed with the Pentagon and the intelligence community—it was insufficient to attribute the problems chiefly to the presidency. Likewise, given the discernible continuity of CIA activities, it would be mistaken to characterize the agency as “rogue.” Rather, the CIA and the presidency were both subject to deep political pressures. Created by the Wall Street overworld and invaluable to its creators, the CIA acted decisively to pursue US hegemony and act on the basis of a conception of the national interest that was congruent—if not identical—to the class interests of the overworld of corporate wealth. The presidency was also forced to accommodate such forces, but with the added imperative for the president to act as a democratic statesman seeking the approval of the American electorate.
Then as now, politicians and the media could not diagnose the problems. The failure can be attributed to the mythical Cold War superstructure in which empire could not be honestly acknowledged or grappled with in part because the imperial project had been legitimized by mythical references to the empire’s antithesis and the empire’s “defensive” strategy—communism and containment, respectively. Contra liberal democratic myths about public sovereignty and the rule of law, the exceptionist hegemonic imperative was driven by the pinnacle of wealth and power in American society. In this context, the state’s crimes or “abuses” at home and abroad are much easier to comprehend, as are the media’s otherwise inexplicable 1970’s vacillations between being the public’s watchdog and being the lapdog of official Washington, so to speak.

The often-overlooked political watershed event of the mid-1970’s happened near the end of the so-called “year of intelligence.” The November 1975 “Halloween Massacre” was the denouement of Watergate as structural deep event. The “massacre” consisted of a number of major personnel changes in Ford’s administration. Kissinger was replaced by Brent Scowcroft as National Security Advisor, though Kissinger remained as Secretary of State. William Colby was replaced by George H.W. Bush as DCI. Donald Rumsfeld replaced Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Rumsfeld’s protégé Dick Cheney replaced Rumsfeld as Chief of Staff. Finally, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was dropped from the 1976 ticket. At the time, Rockefeller and Kissinger believed that Rumsfeld was behind the shake-up. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the end result of the shake-up was an administration that had moved so far to the right that it irreparably changed both political parties. The Republicans purged, essentially, the “liberal” Rockefeller wing of the party and became predominately neoconservative, a shift that was crystallized with Reagan’s election. The Democrats became, gradually, a neoliberal party and the new home to Rockefeller Republicans; the next Democratic presidential nominee was the Rockefeller-backed Jimmy Carter. Progressive political forces—greatly weakened by previous
deep events like the coup against Henry Wallace, McCarthyism, and the political assassinations of the 1960’s—were left with no real influence in the economic or foreign policy realms. The rightward shift in the two major American parties would become evident over the following presidential administrations. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—regardless of their Cold War foreign policies—were the last liberal presidents.

The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) could be fairly characterized as the last significant example of public state resistance to the emerging deep state during the pivotal 1970’s. The origins of the HSCA lay in the Church Committee’s investigations, specifically Book V of the final report, “The Investigation of the Assassination of President J.F.K.: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies,” more commonly known as the Schweiker-Hart Report. While the report’s previously mentioned conclusions focused on the deeply flawed CIA and FBI investigations of the John Kennedy assassination, the incendiary statements of its lead committee member had even greater impact. Senator Schweiker told the Village Voice in 1975, “We do know Oswald had intelligence connections. Everywhere you look with him, there are fingerprints of intelligence.” Indeed, Schweiker had discovered so many indications of Oswald’s ties to intelligence that it actually shocked the Republican Senator. How was it possible that CIA had no records of Oswald’s defection to the Soviet Union given that the marine had monitored U-2 spy flights at the CIA’s biggest and most secret base in Atsugi, Japan? How could Oswald have afforded a $1500 voyage to Moscow at a time when he had but $203 in the bank? How did he obtain a visa in two weeks when the standard was a six-week wait? On the way to Russia, how did Oswald go from London to Helsinki when there weren’t any commercial flights scheduled for that time? Why was there a Minox spy camera found in Oswald’s possessions? And lastly, why didn’t the CIA question Oswald when he came back from the Soviet Union? Schweiker was also particularly upset to discover that Warren Commissioner and former DCI Allen Dulles had withheld information of the CIA-mafia Castro assassination plots from the commission (Fonzi
1993, 31-32). After the Church Committee had convened and the HSCA investigation was underway, Schweiker told a BBC documentary crew that,

The Warren Commission has in fact collapsed like a house of cards and I believe it was set up at the time to feed pablum to the American people for reasons not yet known, and one of the biggest cover-ups in the history of our country occurred at that time.61

Owing to the cumulative effort of Warren Commission critics (including Senator Schweiker), the revelations of the Watergate era, and the public showing of the Zapruder Film, an overwhelming majority of Americans had come to believe that the President Kennedy’s death was the result of a conspiracy. In 1976, Gallup reported that 81% believed others were involved and 8% were unsure (Olmsted 1996, 99). On September 17, 1976, House Resolution 1540 established a Select Committee that would “conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy…” (Fonzi 1993, 5).

The Church Committee’s JFK investigation and the HSCA each faced serious and insurmountable obstacles. The CIA undermined both bodies in various ways. Additionally, the JFK investigators encountered a virtual necropolis of key witnesses who expired at inopportune times. One week before Chicago godfather Sam Giancana was to testify to the Church Committee about the CIA-mafia assassination plots, he was shot to death in his home. CIA officer John Witten—chief of the Mexico clandestine service desk in 1963—told the HSCA in 1978 that he suspected that CIA officer William Harvey had killed Giancana.62 John Roselli also died of decidedly unnatural causes. Roselli had been the source of the original stories of the CIA-mafia plots. He supplied reporter Jack Anderson with several versions of the CIA-mafia tale. In one version, members of the “Trafficante mob” sent to kill Castro were captured, brainwashed, and sent home to assassinate JFK. Roselli testified before the Church Committee multiple times. The HSCA wanted to ascertain why Roselli had pushed the Castro-did-it theories of Dallas, but this was impossible because he disappeared in July of 1976. In August, his dismembered body was found in a steel drum off the coast of Miami. While it appeared to on the surface to be a clear
mob hit, the Dade County coroner found evidence suggesting that he may have been drugged and immobilized before being asphyxiated (Fonzi 1993, 375). Weeks before he was scheduled to testify to the HSCA, William Sullivan was killed. The number three man at the FBI in 1963, Sullivan was shot dead by a young hunter who claimed to have mistaken him for a deer. Robert Novak was a friend of Sullivan’s and in a 2007 memoir, Novak wrote that Sullivan had told him, “[S]omeday [Novak] probably would read about his death in some kind of accident, but not to believe it. It would be murder.”

Lee Oswald’s “best friend,” George de Mohrenschildt also died around this time under strange circumstances. On March 29 on 1977, HSCA investigator Gaeton Fonzi went to the Manalapan, Florida home where de Mohrenschildt was staying. Fonzi left a business card listing the HSCA and his name with de Mohrenschildt’s daughter. Hours later, Fonzi received a phone call informing him that de Mohrenschildt had killed himself with a shotgun and that Fonzi’s card was found on his person (Fonzi 1993, 189-192). The White Russian de Mohrenschildt—sometimes called “the Baron” due to his aristocratic background (DiEugenio 2012, 152)—had been a globetrotting petroleum engineer, socialite, and CIA intelligence asset (Fonzi 1993, 50-51). Right before his death, de Mohrenschildt told journalist Edward Epstein that he had only befriended Oswald at the request of Dallas CIA station chief J. Walton Moore. After receiving Oswald’s Ft. Worth address from one of Moore’s associates, de Mohrenschildt contacted Moore to request that in exchange for his help with Oswald, he be given State Department help securing a Haitian oil exploration deal. De Mohrenschildt soon received the assistance and he did reach out to Oswald in what appears to have been a quid pro quo arrangement. Affirming this explanation of the otherwise inexplicable friendship between the hapless ex-Marine and “the Baron,” de Mohrenschildt stated, “I would have never contacted Oswald in million years if Moore had not sanctioned it” (DiEugenio 2012, 153). The HSCA report on de Mohrenschildt contains an unpublished manuscript that de Mohrenschildt was writing about Oswald, entitled “I AM A
PATSY! I AM A PATSY!” It opens with the following sentence: “I am a patsy! I am a patsy! These last words of my friend, Lee Harvey Oswald still ring in my ears and make me think of the terrible injustice inflicted on the memory of this ‘supposed assassin.’”

In addition to the untimely deaths, the HSCA had other problems from the outset. Richard Sprague, the First Assistant District Attorney in Philadelphia, was chosen as the HSCA’s chief counsel. In Philadelphia, he had a record of 69 convictions out of 70 homicide prosecutions. Sprague intended to treat the case as if it were a homicide investigation. The attacks against him began almost immediately. He took flak in the press from Congressmen who objected to what they perceived to be the no-holds-barred approach that he was going to apply. Early on, in dismay he said, “I don’t understand it. I’ve never been in a situation like this before, where I’m getting criticized for things I might do.” He added, “It’s nonsense, but I don’t know why it’s happening” (Fonzi 1993, 176-177). In January of 1977, before the new Congress had even convened, the New York Times ran a major story with the headline, “Counsel in Assassination Inquiry Often Target of Criticism.” HSCA investigator Gaeton Fonzi described the piece as “an incredibly crude journalistic hatchet job,” but stated that it “had the effect of a well-placed torpedo [that] almost blew up the Assassinations Committee” (Fonzi 1993, 179). After many battles during which the committee’s existence was threatened by Congressional refusal to fund its operations, Sprague relented to pressure and resigned in order to keep the entire HSCA from expiring. His resignation occurred on the same day as de Mohrenschildt’s death and the two events collectively produced a victory for the HSCA in that they led to Congressional support to (stingily) fund the committee’s work going forward (Fonzi 1993, 194; 432).

In a 1977 interview, Sprague told a reporter that, “Congress had never intended to conduct a thoroughgoing investigation in the first place.” Referring to the HSCA’s investigation of the MLK assassination, Sprague said that the HSCA was “a way of appeasing the Black Caucus.” Sprague complained that between dealing with hostile Congressmen and the belligerent
press, he had spent “point zero one percent” actually examining the evidence. Asked how he would approach the investigation if he could do it all over again, Sprague said he would start by focusing on “Oswald's ties to the Central Intelligence Agency.” That said, Sprague also told Gaeton Fonzi that when he looked back on it all, it was clear that “the problems began only after I ran up against the CIA.” In particular, Sprague found numerous inconsistencies with Oswald’s visit to Mexico City, including a highly credible report of his appearance at the Dallas home of Silvia Odio when he was supposed to have been in Mexico City. Additionally, Sprague came across an FBI memo that referred to an individual—identified as Lee Harvey Oswald—photographed and recorded visiting the Russian Embassy in Mexico City. According to the memo, FBI Special Agents who knew Oswald from Dallas, “are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald” (Fonzi 1993, 196-197). Additionally, the November 23rd date of the memo belied the CIA’s assertion that the recording of Oswald had been “routinely destroyed” in October. When Sprague tried to press the CIA for information on the matter, the agency responded by offering to cooperate only if he agreed to sign a CIA Secrecy Agreement. He refused, and indicated that he would obtain the CIA’s records through subpoena. This led to the first Congressional attempt to block the HSCA’s reconstitution. One of the committee’s antagonists was Illinois Congressman Robert Michael who complained that with the mandate that was being considered, “that Committee could begin a whole new investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency!” (Fonzi 1993, 197-198).

Following Sprague’s resignation, Retired Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg considered accepting the position of the HSCA’s chief counsel. He was willing to replace Sprague on the condition that he be assured full CIA cooperation. After Goldberg explained this over the phone to Stansfield Turner, Carter’s new CIA chief, the phone went silent. Goldberg restated his position, to which Turner replied, “I thought my silence was my answer” (Mellen 2013, 345). Eventually, an organized crime expert named G. Robert Blakey was selected to
replace Sprague as HSCA chief counsel. It would appear that he was a more acceptable choice because his organized crime expertise made him likely to attribute any evidence of conspiracy to the mob and unlikely to posit that the assassination was a state crime. The HSCA final report concluded that JFK and MLK were killed by Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray, respectively, but that in both cases there were likely unknown conspirators—which is to say that the committee found that each assassination was probably the result of a conspiracy. The report asserted that the committee found no evidence that any government agency was involved in either assassination. For JFK, the possible conspirators were individuals within organized crime and the anti-Castro Cuban community, but not any of the actual organizations therein.66 True to form, Blakey soon after published a mob-did-it book with the spoiler-containing title, The Plot to Kill the President: Organized Crime Assassinated JFK - The Definitive Story (Blakey and Billings 1981).

While exonerating the state, the HSCA verdict was still disconcerting to the establishment press. Responding to the HSCA conclusion that there was a second shooter (who missed the president according to the report), a Washington Post editorial floated a novel hypothesis:

Could it have been some other malcontent who Mr. Oswald met casually? Could not as much as three or four societal outcasts with no ties to any one organization have developed in some spontaneous way a common determination to express their alienation in the killing of President Kennedy? It is possible that two persons acting independently attempted to shoot the President at the very same time (Parenti 1996, 159).

This was a truly bizarre suggestion, but it does reveal the lengths to which the establishment media can be relied upon to defend against legitimacy crises that threaten the prevailing order.

Over time, and as with the Warren Commission, staff members of the HSCA would publicly dissent from the final report’s exoneration of the state. These dissenters included Richard Sprague, Robert Tannenbaum, Edwin Lopez, Dan Hardway, and Gaeton Fonzi. Most notably,
HSCA chief counsel G. Robert Blakey eventually was among the signatories to a statement attesting that:

In the four decades since [the HSCA conclusion of a conspiracy behind the JFK assassination], a massive amount of evidence compiled by journalists, historians and independent researchers confirms this conclusion. This growing body of evidence strongly indicates that the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy was organized at high levels of the U.S. power structure, and was implemented by top elements of the U.S. national security apparatus using, among others, figures in the criminal underworld to help carry out the crime and cover-up.67

Much of Blakey’s disillusionment stemmed from revelations pertaining to the HSCA-CIA liaison, George Joannides. In 1963, Joannides had been serving as the deputy director for psychological warfare at JMWAVE, the CIA’s Miami station. He had been the CIA officer in charge of the anti-Castro Cuban organization the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil (DRE). The DRE was the group which had multiple contacts with Oswald the Marxist agitator before the assassination.68

As with Allen Dulles on the Warren Commission, the HSCA had in Joannides a person in a key position within the investigation who himself should have been treated as a suspect or at least as an important witness. This was but one factor that led to the failure of the HSCA to satisfactorily resolve the mystery of the JFK assassination, a key event in the history of the American deep state.

In 1977, Jimmy Carter was sworn in as the 39th President of the United States. Carter’s improbable rise can be attributed largely to his association with David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission. In 1973, Carter was selected by leading establishment figures to serve as a southern Democrat to join the new organization. Carter was selected over Florida governor Reuben Askew because, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter “had opened trade offices for the state of Georgia in Brussels and Tokyo [which] seemed to fit perfectly in the concept of the Trilateral” (Shoup 1980, 201). The Carter campaign followed the advice of Trilateral figures who would go on to hold important positions in his administration. As far back as 1973, Brzezinski had argued that the Democratic nominee in 1976 would need to “emphasize work, the family, religion, and,
increasingly, patriotism, if he has any desire to be elected” (Shoup 1980, 203). Samuel Huntington wrote in the Trilateral Commission tome *The Crisis of Democracy* that “the ‘outsider’ in politics, or the candidate who could make himself or herself appear to be an outsider, had the inside road to political office” (Shoup 1980, 203; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975, 96).

While this accounts for Carter’s strategy, it does not explain his meteoric rise. For this, the establishment press must be given considerable credit. As late as late January 1976, Carter was the favorite of only 4% of voters, according to a Gallup Poll. By the second week of March he was only one percent behind the leading candidate, Hubert Humphrey. Only very favorable media coverage could account for such an historically unprecedented rise. National media figures like Joseph Kraft and Tom Wicker noted in mid-January 1976 that Carter was, as Kraft put it, “the media candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination” (Shoup 1980, 206-207). It helped that the national media largely omitted reference to Carter’s overworld sponsors. According to Project Censored, this “virtual blackout of information available to the public through the mass media concerning the relationships between Jimmy Carter, David Rockefeller, and the Trilateral Commission” qualified it as “the best-censored news story of 1976” (Chomsky 2003, 136-137).

If few commentators remarked upon the contradiction between Carter’s elitist backing and the media image of him as a “moral” “political outsider,” one notable exception was Christopher Lydon who in 1977 wrote that there were a few clues that Carter was in fact a Rockefeller Republican:

One was *Time* magazine, which gave Carter early prominence with a flattering cover portrait in 1971. Through 1975, *Time’s* advertising in other magazines for its own campaign coverage looked more like an ad for Jimmy Carter: a half-page picture presented the candidate in a Kennedyesque rocking chair under the caption: “His basic strategy consists of handshaking and street-cornering his way into familiarity.” Through 1976 and into 1977, *Time’s* hagiographers were hard to separate from the Carter promotional staff. […] I couldn’t remember the weekly news magazine extending itself that way in the past except for the more eastern and international (or Rockefeller) wing of the Republican party—for Willkie in 1940, Eisenhower in 1952, and Scranton in 1964.70
About the Trilateral Commission he observed that,

The Trilateral Commission was David Rockefeller’s brain child, a somewhat more energetic young cousin of the elite Bilderberg Conferences […] The commission was conceived in 1972 as a private vehicle for planning the industrial world’s course out of the international monetary crisis [and] into a new stability of banking relationships among the First World and of trading agreements with the Third World. Presumably the much greater value of Trilateral membership was the private reassurance it conveyed that David Rockefeller had deemed him a promising student and had gotten his education under way. The Trilateral Commission’s executive director, Zbigniew Brzezinski, became quite literally Jimmy Carter’s tutor, and now, of course, directs the White House foreign policy staff, as Henry Kissinger did in the first Nixon term. How could [Rockefeller] have guessed that his Trilateralists would staff all major policy posts in the new government—including, as if by a miracle, the vice presidency and the presidency?

What Lydon could not have surmised was that the Carter presidency was not a one-off event, but that the Democratic Party—in the aftermath of Bretton Woods and Watergate—had been realigned by overworld forces in such a way as to render it the neoliberal-dominated party in mild opposition to the neoconservative-dominated Republican Party that would soon deliver the “Reagan Revolution.” The vaguely progressive, liberal wing of the Democratic Party was consigned to a political wilderness from which it has not returned.

As president, Carter tried to put a greater emphasis on human rights and on a more moral foreign policy. Taking office in the wake of the “Year of Intelligence” and with the HSCA just convening, Carter sought to reign in the intelligence community. He fired George Bush as DCI and replaced him with Stansfield Turner, an admiral who graduated from the naval academy with Carter. Turner would eventually fire important deep state operatives at the CIA, “old boys” who he thought were roadblocks to reform. Among the fired officers were Ted Shackley, Ray Clines, and Ed Wilson. This would have some notable consequences.

Ultimately, Carter’s presidency was undone by deep political forces. Like Kennedy and Nixon, Carter could not reconcile his political position with the accommodations demanded by the neoconservatives or even the neoliberals like his Trilateral patrons. It wasn’t that Carter chose to spurn these constituencies. To the contrary, Carter pursued Reaganism before Reagan. This
was in accordance with the post-Watergate rolling political coup that realigned both parties 

further to the right by making the GOP the party of Reagan and essentially transforming the 

Democrats into the party of rebranded Rockefeller Republicans. Deregulation, which began 

modestly under Ford, accelerated under Carter at the trucking, airline, and train industries were 
deregulated. Regarding banking and finance, Canova (1995) summarizes:

[T]he similarities between the Carter and Reagan administrations far outweigh 
the differences. Both presidents accepted basic free-market premises that were 
often at odds with market realities. The result was a bipartisan dismantling of the 
New Deal regulatory regime in banking and finance and a relaxation of the 
regulatory discipline that had contained market interest rates during the period 
after World War II (1309).

This is to say that Carter ushered in the age of financial deregulation and Federal Reserve-
centered monetarist hegemony. The latter transpired with Carter’s selection of Paul Volcker to 
chair the Federal Reserve. The former was most notably accomplished by Carter’s signing of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). This act 
increased insurance of deposits from $40,000 to $100,000, removed restrictions on thrift 
institutions (thus beginning the deregulation of savings and loan associations), and called for 
gradual elimination of interest rate caps on deposit accounts (Sherman 2009, 1).

Carter also pursued policies agreeable to neoconservatives. After previously calling for 
$5-7 billion in military spending cuts, Carter in 1980 urged Congress to begin increasing the 
Pentagon budget to the tune of $100 billion over the following five years. Said Carter at the time, 
“Our forces must be increased if they are to contain Soviet aggression.” He argued at the time that 
the budget proposals would “meet the increased threat resulting from events in Afghanistan.”

Notably, it was a Carter policy that had served to provoke the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in the first place. At the time, the Soviets justified the invasion in part by asserting 
that they were fighting against enemies secretly funded by US operations. Though US officials 
denied this at the time, the accusation was much later confirmed in a memoir by Robert Gates and
by Carter’s National Security Adviser himself, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who told an interviewer in 1998:

[T]he reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.72

The induced Soviet invasion served to justify another of Carter’s gifts to the Prussian community, the so-called “Carter Doctrine” wherein the president declared that any threat to US interests in the Persian Gulf would be met with military force.

Eventually for Carter, as with Kennedy and Nixon, deep political forces would prove his undoing. His focus on human rights was perceived as having led to the fall of two client regimes in Nicaragua and Iran. His much sought-after Salt II treaty never made it through the Senate despite Carter’s various concessions like DIDMCA and the military spending hikes. The Camp David accords earned Carter the antipathy of Israelis and Saudis alike, harming Carter with powerful domestic constituencies like CIA Arabists and AIPAC’s friends and beneficiaries in Congress. Elements of both the CIA and Israel were in alliance with Republican operatives working to defeat Carter by delaying the release of the hostages (Scott 2007, 90). The hostage crisis itself only came about because Carter had bowed to a Rockefeller overworld crusade to pressure Carter to admit the ailing Shah to the United States. Rockefeller financed and organized “Project Alpha,” the code name given to the lobbying campaign. Sensing the perilousness of such a course, Carter tried to resist. Prior to a meeting with Rockefeller, Carter wrote in his diary that the purpose for the meeting was “…to try to induce me to let the Shah come into our country. Rockefeller, Kissinger, and Brzezinski seem to be adopting this as a joint project” (Bird 1992, 644-645). After months spent resisting the lobby, Carter snapped at Brzezinski and Vice President Mondale, cutting them short with the words, “Fuck the Shah. I’m not going to welcome him here when he has other places to go where he’ll be safe” (Bird 1992, 648). Carter finally
relented following the defection of the last of his key advisors, Cyrus Vance, to the Project Alpha side. After reluctantly agreeing to admit the Shah, the president turned to everyone in attendance and prophetically asked, “What are you guys going to advise me to do if they overrun our embassy and take our people hostage?” (Bird 1992, 652).

Not even Carter’s disastrous acquiescence to his former patron could cement his support from the Rockefeller overworld. In June of 1980, David Rockefeller criticized Carter to the World Affairs Council, saying that Carter had subordinated America’s “vital interests” by privileging “worthy but fuzzily defined moral issues—such as human rights and the proliferation of nuclear technologies.” Pressing the cause of human rights may be “only proper” for the US, but “…it should be prudent since our interference may be capable of toppling regimes whose substitutes are unknown” (Scott 2007, 90). Three months later, Rockefeller and Project Alpha veteran Joseph Reed went to Arlington to see Bill Casey at his Reagan campaign headquarters. At the time, Carter was making progress toward resolving the hostage crisis. Indications are that Rockefeller was meeting with Casey to forestall an “October Surprise”—the dramatic release of the hostages which might rescue Carter’s presidency on the eve of the election. That the Rockefeller-Reed visit was in regard to an October Surprise received confirmation in the form of sworn testimony from CIA officer Charles Cogan. Cogan was present when Reed visited William Casey early in 1981 and reportedly made remarks about how “we did something about Carter’s October Surprise.” In a less official setting, Cogan explained to an investigator that Reed’s words to Casey were, “We fucked Carter’s October Surprise” (Scott 2007, 91).

It was during Carter’s presidency that the contours of a supra-national deep state can most clearly be discerned. In response to the post-Watergate intelligence investigations and Stansfield Turner’s housecleaning of the CIA’s most nefarious operations officers, a new intelligence network was relied upon to do the things the CIA couldn’t do at that historical moment. Discussed further in chapter six, the Safari Club brought together the intelligence
services of Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. In addition to those foreign intelligence agencies, the Safari Club relied on current and former CIA officers, some of whom had been forced to leave the CIA during Watergate or its long aftermath. These would include Richard Helms, Ed Wilson, Tom Clines, and Ted Shackley (Trento 2005, 105, 314). The most common account of the Safari Club maintains that it was created by French intelligence officer Count Alexandre de Marenches in response to the post-Watergate scrutiny of intelligence operations. Other researchers argue that it began earlier, in the mid-1970’s as a search for new proxies following the debacle that was US-South African intervention into the Angolan civil war (Scott 2015, 26). According to retired CIA officer Robert Crowley, it was Clark Clifford who approached Kamal Adham to request “that the Saudis consider setting up an informal intelligence network outside the United States during the investigations” (Trento 2005, 101). Joseph Trento wrote that it was Watergate and the firing of James Angleton that prompted the Safari Club to start working with ex-DCI Richard Helms who was then US Ambassador to Iran. Near the end of his life, James Angleton said that,

“Colby destroyed counterintelligence. But because Colby was seen by Shackley and Helms as having betrayed the CIA to Congress, they simply began working with outsiders like Adham and Saudi Arabia. The traditional CIA answering to the president was an empty vessel having little more than technical capability” (Trento 2005, 61).

Trento claims that the Safari Club needed a banking network to fund its operations and for that purpose Kamal Adham—with CIA chief George Bush’s “official blessing”—set about transforming the Bank of Credit and Commerce International into a global money-laundering operation. Bush himself reportedly created an account at the Paris branch of BCCI while he was the head of the CIA (Trento 2005, 194). Kevin Phillips echoed some of these points, writing that upon becoming CIA chief “in January 1976, Bush cemented strong relations with the intelligence services of both Saudi Arabia and the shah of Iran. He worked closely with Kamal Adham, the
head of Saudi intelligence, brother-in-law of King Faisal and an early BCCI insider” (Scott 2015, 27). 

In 1977, according to Joseph Trento, CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations Ted Shackley viewed Carter’s recent election as a threat to CIA operators like himself. His solution was to act quickly to further privatize intelligence operations by making sure that the Safari Club would have access to resources theretofore controlled by CIA’s Directorate of Operations. He accomplished this by using Tom Clines to take control of Wilson’s sprawling business operations and then taking Wilson out of the picture by drawing prosecutorial attention to “a former agent gone bad.” Former CIA employee Shirley Brill was present with Shackley, Clines, and Wilson during this period. She had been there when the men made their plans, tampered with secret classified documents, made key payoffs, and ultimately betrayed Ed Wilson. She later surmised that it was Shackley and Clines who were the CIA officers who had gone off the reservation (Trento 2005, 113-117). Speaking about Wilson’s case, Shackley biographer David Corn—a journalist not unfriendly to the CIA—conceded that, “They framed a guilty man. I think [Wilson is] a terrible fellow who got what he deserved, but they did frame him.”

After an eventful career in operations, Shackley in 1976 had risen to one of the highest clandestine jobs—associate deputy director for operations—thanks to his relationship with new DCI George Bush. This cemented his loyalty to Bush and made him a potential future candidate for the top CIA post. According to notes from Reagan foreign policy adviser Richard Allen, Bush called him in October of 1980 requesting that Allen pass any information on Carter’s hostage negotiations to Bush’s ally Ted Shackley, then operating in the realm of privatized intelligence operations. According to the indefatigable journalist and historian Robert Parry, CIA-connected individuals on the Reagan campaign like Shackley and Bush executed a successful plot whereby the Iranians held off the release of the hostages until after the election. According to Parry, the French spook, Pinay Circle member, and Safari Club organizer Alexandre de Marenches arranged
a Paris meeting for William Casey—Marenches’ fellow Knight of Malta and Reagan’s campaign manager. Casey was also a Wall Street lawyer, a former OSS/CIA officer, and future DCI. In Paris, Casey met with Iranian and Israeli agents, promising to deliver arms that Iran needed in the war against Iraq (Parry 1993; Scott 2015, 27-28). In the end, the hostages were in fact released after the 1980 election. More precisely, the American captives were famously freed minutes after Reagan’s inauguration. Within days, arms began flowing from Israel to Iran.

Over the years, many participants, insiders, and researchers have in various ways affirmed that Carter’s hostage negotiations were sabotaged in what Peter Dale Scott (2007) terms “the Republican Countersurprise” (99). These include Gary Sick (1991)—the Iran desk officer of Carter’s National Security Council, Reagan campaign staffer and later administration analyst Barbara Honnegar (1989), Safari Club organizer Alexandre deMarenches (via his biographer David Andelman), President Kennedy’s press secretary Pierre Salinger (Scott 2007, 106), Abolhassan Bani-Sadr—Iran’s first president after the 1979 revolution, CIA senior operations officer Duane “Dewey” Clarridge, and Israeli Intelligence officer Ari Ben-Menashe (1992). According to Menashe, longtime CIA officer and Booz-Allen Hamilton spook-in-residence Miles Copeland was present at a Georgetown meeting with Israeli intelligence officers. Attendees included David Kimche, chief of Mossad’s foreign relations department, Tevel. According to Kimche, Israel opposed Carter’s reelection because it was feared that in a second term, Carter would force Israel out of the occupied territories and establish a Palestinian state. As for Copeland, he told Robert Parry that any anti-Carter operation would have been undertaken by “the CIA within the CIA,” which Parry takes to mean “the inner-most circle of powerful intelligence figures who felt they understood the strategic needs of the United States better than its elected leaders.” Copeland explained the opposition of the senior spooks to the president. Jimmy Carter “was not a stupid man,” said Copeland. Worse, added Copeland in disgust and amazement, “He was a principled man… a Utopian. He believed, honestly, that you must do the
right thing and take your chance on the consequences. He told me that. He literally believed that.”

Added Copeland, “There were many of us myself along with Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, Archie Roosevelt in the CIA at the time we believed very strongly that we were showing a kind of weakness, which people in Iran and elsewhere in the world hold in great contempt.”

Thanks largely to Robert Parry’s tireless efforts, the veracity of allegations charging the possibly treasonous sabotage of Carter’s Iranian hostage negotiations has been well-established even if, true to form, the corporate media and the government continue to obfuscate this significant chapter of history. Besides the Iran hostage crisis, Carter’s defeat is often attributed in large part to the 1979-1980 oil shock which caused large gas price increases and long gas station lines. The gas shortage is commonly blamed on Iran’s political tribulations. However, there is considerable evidence that US oil majors and Saudi Arabia were responsible for the shock. As detailed above, the Saudi decline in oil production should be viewed in the context the Safari Club, BCCI milieu in which Saudis were key figures (Scott 2015, 28-29). As for the role of oil companies, petroleum industry analyst Robert Sherrill wrote that “America was importing more oil in January and February [of 1979], during the Iranian shutdown than it had during the same period in 1978.” This indicates the Iranian shutdown was merely an excuse that oil importers used to slash the amount of gas they sold to US retailers. Wrote Sherrill, “A CIA study showed that during [the height of the crisis], US companies exported more oil than they had in those glut years 1977 and 1978” (Sherrill 1983, 435-437; Scott 2015, 28).

The Reagan Revolution: Consolidation of the Deep State

In the election of 1980, Jimmy Carter became the first incumbent president to lose a reelection bid since Herbert Hoover. His meteoric, corporate media-fueled rise—from relative obscurity, to floundering presidential candidate, to frontrunner, to US President—is best understood as a triumph of deep state stage management of US politics. Despite his various concessions to
America’s neoliberal and neoconservative establishments, Carter in the end could not maintain the support of his neoliberal elite patrons, losing what Peter Dale Scott (2007) called “the Rockefeller ‘Mandate from Heaven’” (90). As president, Carter had to deal with a number of serious historical problems, many of which derived from the same deep political forces that first elevated, then destroyed his presidency. He obliquely or inadvertently alluded to this in his July 15, 1979 speech “Crisis of Confidence,” the so-called “malaise speech.”

These changes did not happen overnight. They’ve come upon us gradually over the last generation, years that were filled with shocks and tragedy. We were sure that ours was a nation of the ballot, not the bullet, until the murders of John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. We were taught that our armies were always invincible and our causes were always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. We respected the presidency as a place of honor until the shock of Watergate.\footnote{80}

There is overwhelming evidence indicating that the political assassinations of the 1960’s were not the product of “lone nuts,” but rather plausibly deniable covert operations with prearranged cover stories and designated patsies. In the case of JFK, it didn’t even matter that the designated patsies were not cooperative. Oswald became arguably the first JFK conspiracy theorist when he said, “I’m just a patsy,” i.e., that he had been set up as the fall guy for the assassination of the president. Oswald, the most important prisoner in US history, was soon killed by Jack Ruby in a room full of policemen. Ruby—the second “lone nut”—eventually sought and was granted a new trial. He spoke to the press, saying that he had been put in his woeful position by men of power. He also claimed he was being poisoned and then proceeded to die prior to his trial. The assassinations of Malcom X, RFK, and MLK followed thereafter. So did the Vietnam War, a conflict that JFK had worked to extricate the US from in a lamentably deniable way owing to political calculations. Watergate exposed the criminality of the Nixon administration, demonstrating the reality of state criminality in a nominally democratic, open society. The fallout of Watergate led to the most significant exposure of US intelligence agency abuses. If examined objectively, the post-Watergate revelations demonstrate that Nixon and his underlings were, as
criminals, bungling and amateurish in comparison to the intelligence agencies who had been carrying out similar but more systematic and egregious crimes for decades. Furthermore, critical examination of Watergate by numerous researchers indicates that the scandal was instigated and capitalized upon by right-wing, anti-Nixon elements of America’s deep political system.

The public state responded to these crises with various investigations of the national security state, but these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in reforming the system. The deep political system obscured responsibility and subverted accountability in large part through the dominance of corporate wealth over the national media and over electoral politics. The deep political dominance of the overworld of corporate wealth has been mediated by the national security state and its deep-seated connections to the underworld of organized crime. By 1968, these deep political interventions had created a democratic backlash as evidenced by the social unrest and protests in the US and around the world. At the time, the precariousness of US overworld hegemony was resolved by the MLK and RFK assassinations, as well as Nixon’s election. But these were no doubt stressful times for an establishment whose response was perhaps best articulated in the Powell Memorandum and the Trilateral Commission’s *Crisis of Democracy*. Both works demonstrate how the corporate rich and their intellectual legmen had essentially come to the conclusion that America’s liberal institutions needed to be better managed by the wealthy. Furthermore, and crucially, the widespread economic security of the middle-class came to be seen as destabilizing.

The end of Bretton Woods was a pivotal moment in the history of the US deep state. The 1960’s and 1970’s saw something of a civil war within America’s deep political system. The systemically destabilizing effects of Vietnam War spending created a conflict between “Prussians” and “traders,” i.e., neoconservatives and neoliberals. The subsequent Petrodollar/US Treasury Bill standard replaced the Bretton Woods gold standard and formed one of the two pillars of the subsequent *Dollar-Wall Street Regime*. This system gave the US the
Rumpelstiltskinian power to create credit that the rest of the world would have to treat as being “as good as gold.” Only a small number of economists and insiders recognized this at the time and in subsequent years. This historically unprecedented power led to the reconciling of the neoliberal and neoconservative interests by facilitating US dominance of world trade and endless deficits for military spending. In the process, labor and manufacturing were jettisoned from political power. The aftermath of Watergate and the Vietnam War created a period of vulnerability for the deep state vis-à-vis the public state’s brief attempts to probe the depths of the national security state. In the end, a decade that seemed like a setback for the deep state instead culminated with its consolidation. Deep political forces brought Carter to the presidency, only to destroy it through orchestrated oil crises, the historic record-high interest rates of Carter’s Rockefeller-recommended Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and finally the deep state subversion of Carter’s Iran hostage negotiations. The national media, previously the handmaiden to Carter’s improbable ascension, endlessly covered the Iranian drama, most famously with *Nightline*, a news program begun in response to the hostage crisis which covered the story every weeknight on network television.

With the election of the right-wing Ronald Reagan, the public state was largely vanquished, reduced to the largely symbolic status which it maintains to this day. The Wall Street-Dollar Regime imposed the austere Washington Consensus on the rest of the world. Meanwhile US profligacy soared to levels unprecedented in peacetime, even while median wages, savings, and general economic security plummeted. The efforts to reign in clandestine politics in the post-Watergate 1970’s only served to further institutionalize the organized irresponsibility of the covert operations netherworld. The embryonic deep state had seminal parapolitical institutions including banks (e.g. Castle Bank and Nugan Hand) or privatized paramilitary/intelligence outfits like the World Commerce Corporation and the various Anti-Communist Leagues. The late 1970’s saw more powerful iterations, most notably the BCCI-
Safari Club milieu which brought together right-wing Republicans, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and networks of wayward and disaffected spooks. With Reagan’s victory, many of these players were brought in from the cold, so to speak. Quite a few would surface in the Iran-Contra scandal, a conspiracy cluster comprised of multiple intertwined illegal policies. It is difficult to sum up the state criminality that Iran-Contra represented. A broader view of the policies and players suggests it would be more appropriate, if less pithy, to refer to the October Surprise-Iran-Contra-Cocaine-BCCI-Mujahideen-Heroin meta-conspiracy.

While carrying out these exceptionist parapolitical operations in the furtherance of deep state grand strategy, the Reagan administration also presided over further planning of the Doomsday Project or Continuity of Government operations. The contours of these operations would remain obscure and largely in stasis until the events of September 11, 2001. At that point, certain emergency measures were enacted, empowering the federal government with exceptionist powers, the extent of which the public is still unaware. For all the reasons above—and for the massive, ongoing, and heretofore irreversible transfer of wealth and power to the superrich—the election of Ronald Reagan was a milestone. It represents the end of a contentious period in which the public state coexisted uneasily with the national security state as components of a visible political system which operated in tandem with a deep political system. Reagan’s election marked the ascension of deep political forces to a position of hegemony and arguably sovereignty, consolidating and institutionalizing these forces such that the US could be described as having a deep state system. Practically speaking, what emerged was an exceptionist tripartite state comprised of a feckless public state, a sprawling security state, and the anti-democratic deep state institutions to which they are subordinated.
CHAPTER 5

WATERGATE

Watergate is a singularly bizarre episode in US history. It is arguably the only instance in which high criminality was aggressively investigated by government officials propelled forward by the vigorous efforts of the national media. In the end, the disgraced President Nixon was spared from prosecution thereby precluding, likely for all time, any definitive account of what exactly Watergate was. This chapter is an attempt to understand and explain Watergate by applying the political insights of tripartite state theory in the context of exceptionism. Of key significance are the various aspects of the events which belie the myth that Watergate demonstrated the strength of our liberal institutions like the “free press” and constitutional rule of law.

Many of the key Watergate figures and events deserve to be reconsidered in light of the critical scholarship produced in the intervening decades. One important figure, Bob Woodward, today seems less of a plucky cub reporter and—in at least some sense—more of an intelligence operative. He had previously been a mentee of Admiral Robert Welander and later Communications Duty Officer to then-Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Thomas Moorer. In 1970, the anti-détente Admiral Moorer authorized Admiral Welander to spy on the National Security Council—the aforementioned Moorer-Radford affair. According to Admiral Welander, Woodward knew of the spy ring at least eight months before someone else broke the story in the national media. It is hard to overstate the antipathy that the right-wing militarists had toward President Nixon. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt described the administration as “inimical to the security of the United States.” The admiral eventually left the White House because he came to understand that “its own officials and experts reflected Henry Kissinger’s world view: that the dynamics of history are on the side of the Soviet Union; that before long the USSR will be the only superpower on earth and that the duty of policy-makers, therefore, is at all costs to conceal from the people their probable fate…”
In the Watergate mythology, Woodward’s top source “Deep Throat” is something of a conscientious insider, unhappy with the immoral lawlessness of the presidency. In fact, “Deep Throat” was a composite character—chiefly FBI officer Mark Felt. Rather than being a model of scrupulous rectitude, Felt presided over some of the FBI’s most criminal and morally dubious endeavors, specifically the infamous COINTELPRO operations of the 1960’s.85

The infamous “Plumbers” were also of a decidedly right-wing bent relative to President Nixon. Involved in the Watergate break-in were anti-Castro Cubans, “retired” CIA officers, and persons with prior histories of working as CIA agents. The Plumbers’ first operation was a to break into the Beverly Hills office of Lewis J. Fielding, psychiatrist to Pentagon Papers’ leaker Daniel Ellsberg. Using CIA equipment, E. Howard Hunt went with G. Gordon Liddy prior to the break-in and took a number of photographs outside the office. These images included photographs of Dr. Fielding’s car in its reserved parking space, of Liddy in the rear car park of the doctor’s office, and of the building where Fielding lived (O’Sullivan 2018, 108-110). Though Hunt was supposedly not working for the CIA anymore, he had enlisted the help of the CIA’s Technical Services Division for this task. The CIA obtained copies of the photos. In conversation with Daniel Ellsberg and Peter Dale Scott, both men agreed that the CIA obtained and held those photos to have power or a potential source of leverage over the presidency.86

In terms of the Plumbers themselves, James McCord—the chief architect of the Watergate break-in—is of particular interest. Historian/journalist Jim Hougan (1984) concluded that McCord so clearly botched the Watergate break-in that he must have intended for it to fail. Likewise, Peter Dale Scott stated flatly that the break-in “was surely set up to be disclosed” (2007, 47). A cursory look at the Watergate narrative would have McCord as a hapless bungler turned whistleblower, but according to no less an authority than James Angleton, “McCord was an operator, not merely a technician” (Hougan 1984, 18). With that in mind, it was McCord’s inexplicable incompetence at the Watergate that led to the Plumbers’ arrest. On the day of June
16th, McCord went into the Watergate while the doors were unlocked, and he placed a strip of tape across the door’s latch so that it could not be locked thereafter. When the Plumbers arrived hours later, they found the door shut and the tape removed. The absence of the tape meant that the method had been discovered. Everyone but McCord wanted to postpone the break-in. He ordered Eugenio Martinez to pick open the door, during which time McCord went elsewhere for some unexplained reason. The Cubans left the door taped open for McCord believing that as one of the world’s top intelligence operatives, McCord would have the wherewithal to cover his tracks by removing the tape. After McCord returned from his mysterious five-minute absence, Martinez had the presence of mind to ask him if he had remembered to remove the tape. McCord answered that he had done so even though he had not. Soon after, the security guard who had initially found and removed the tape returned to the door. Finding it taped again, he called the police, leading to the arrest of the Plumbers (Oglesby 1976, 293-294).

McCord’s background is relevant. For a time, McCord—as a colonel in the Air Force Reserve—worked as part of the Wartime Information Security Program (WISP), part of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (Hougan 1984, 16). This was a component of what Peter Dale Scott (2015) calls “the Doomsday Project” which eventually morphed into “Continuity of Government” planning and organizing. The function of WISP was to formulate and activate contingency plans in the event of a declaration by either the President or the Secretary of Defense that a state of “national emergency” existed. In such an event, WISP would exercise censorship over the media, mail, and telecommunications. Additionally, civilian “security risks” like antiwar activists, union leaders, and assorted radicals would be detained and held in military facilities (Hougan 1984, 16).

McCord also worked on important CIA matters. When Allen Dulles introduced an Air Force colonel to McCord, he told the officer, “This man is the best man we have” (Baker 2009, 199). While working in the CIA’s Security Office, McCord led a CIA counterintelligence
operation against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a CIA operation (illegally) carried out in the US without the permission of the FBI (Newman 2008, 95). There is much evidence that McCord never severed his ties to the CIA despite his “retirement” in 1970. A former McCord subordinate from the CIA and later at the White House stated that the Secret Service had been “infiltrated” by McCord and the CIA from the beginning of Nixon’s presidency. He asserted that “you had these guys from the [CIA’s McCord-run] Office of Security working in the White House under Secret Service cover” (Hougan 1984, 58). Additionally, McCord visited CIA headquarters in Langley the week before the infamous Watergate burglary (Hougan 1984, 213).

Politically, McCord was a hard-rightist and as such did not approve of the Nixon White House. In the aftermath of Watergate, McCord issued the McCord Washington Newsletter—a sparsely circulated series of newsletters in which he elaborated a strange, John Birch-esque conspiracy theory positing that the Rockefellers were grasping for total control of the organs of US national security and were using Henry Kissinger and the Council on Foreign Relations to advance their nefarious ends (Hougan 1984, 24). McCord also expressed dismay at Nixon’s moves against the CIA, including the firing of DCI Helms, stating that “…freedom itself was never so imperiled. Nazi Germany rose and fell under exactly the same philosophy of governmental operation.” In his memoir, McCord wrote of Watergate, “…the whole future of the nation was at stake. If the Administration could get away with this […], it would certainly stop at nothing thereafter. The precedent […] would be beyond belief, beyond recovery, and a disaster beyond any possible reversal” (Hougan 1984, 22-23).

In addition to the spying, militarist generals and the catastrophically clumsy, CIA-connected Plumbers, there were other deep personages in the White House that served to undermine and ultimately undo Nixon. John Dean, arguably the central Watergate character, was at a minimum one of the most damaging of the Nixon officials who turned against the administration. Like James McCord, Dean had previously worked in the realm of COG
operations as the associate deputy attorney general (Scott 2015, 118). Yet, as explosive as Dean’s Watergate testimony was, Nixon still might have survived were it not for the exposure of the White House taping system. That ultimately fatal revelation was made by Alexander Butterfield, the presidential deputy assistant in charge of supervising the White House taping system. In 1975, Daniel Schorr of CBS News reported that Butterfield was the CIA’s “man in the White House.” This was denied by Butterfield, the CIA, and the person (E. Howard Hunt) who reportedly informed Schorr’s source (L. Fletcher Prouty) of Butterfield’s CIA status. The report was soon deemed by the press to be unsubstantiated (Olmsted 1996, 77-78). However, in an Inspector-General report, the CIA admitted to a “practice of detailing CIA employees to the White House and various government agencies” and that the CIA had agents in “intimate components of the Office of the President” (Haldeman 1978, 109). Haldeman and Nixon’s personal secretary Rose Mary Woods both suspected that Butterfield was a CIA man. This is partly due to a dispute over how Butterfield came to work for the White House. Butterfield stated that Haldeman approached him initially while Haldeman maintained that Butterfield wrote a letter requesting to join the White House staff. Additionally, Haldeman came to see Butterfield’s Air Force retirement as unnecessary and suspicious. He suspected that it was required per the protocol regarding the CIA’s cover arrangements with the Air Force (Hougan 1984, 59; Haldeman 1978, 204-205). Around the time of his explosive testimony, Butterfield said that he had been hoping that he wouldn’t be questioned about the tapes. Later, he privately admitted that he wanted committee members to ask about the recording system (Stone and Kuznick, 2010, 390).

Nixon had a strained relationship with the CIA since the early days of his administration. A few days after taking office, Nixon ordered Ehrlichman to obtain from DCI Richard Helms files pertaining to the tumultuous period leading up to the Kennedy administration’s end. After six months, the agency had produced nothing. Said Ehrlichman, “Those bastards in Langley are holding back something […] Imagine that. The Commander-in-Chief wants to see a document
and the spooks say he can’t have it. […] From the way they’re protecting it, it must be pure dynamite” (Baker 2009, 181). On June 23, 1972—six days after the arrest of the Watergate burglars—Nixon instructed Haldeman to speak with CIA officials in order to request that they persuade the FBI that the break-in was a CIA operation and that the Bureau should stop the investigation. Though this move led ultimately to Nixon’s resignation, the assessment was not on its face dishonest or unreasonable in the context of Cold War executive prerogative. On the infamous “smoking gun tape,” Nixon evinced no knowledge as to why the burglars had chosen the DNC headquarters. Haldeman stated, “the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that’s what it is. This is CIA.” Nixon concurred: “Of course, this is a, this is a Hunt [operation that if exposed] will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there’s a hell of a lot of things and that we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves.” Nixon told Haldeman that he should inform the CIA that “the President believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again.”

When Haldeman made the request to the CIA, they initially stonewalled him. Then he played the president’s “trump card,” stating that, “The President asked me to tell you this entire affair may be connected to the Bay of Pigs, and if it opens up, the Bay of Pigs may be blown…” A dramatic response followed from DCI Helms who shouted, “The Bay of Pigs had nothing to do with this. I have no concern about the Bay of Pigs.” After a moment of tense silence, Haldeman reminded Helms that he was merely conveying the president’s message. Helms settled down and subsequently agreed to help the Nixon White House. Helms instructed his deputy Vernon Walters to “remind Mr. Gray of the agreement between the FBI and the CIA that if they run into or expose one another’s ‘assets,’ they will not interfere with each other” (Haldeman 1978, 37-38). Haldeman eventually concluded that “in all of those Nixon references to the Bay of Pigs, he was actually referring to the Kennedy assassination” (1978, 39). Given that Nixon had been the action
officer for the planning of the Bay of Pigs operation and that the fallout from the operation had already resulted in the firing of three top CIA officials including DCI Allen Dulles, it is unclear what other explanation could explain Nixon’s deployment of “the whole Bay of Pigs thing.”

As CIA officers, McCord and Hunt were both veterans of the Bay of Pigs operation. During Watergate, McCord testified that he never knew Hunt before joining the Nixon White House, but this was easily disproven. Their relationship dated to well before the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It has long been alleged that Hunt was in Dallas on the day of JFK’s assassination.\(^88\) According to a close associate, James McCord admitted to being in Dallas on November 22, 1963 (O'Sullivan 2018, 405). Another odd JFK assassination angle to Watergate was James McCord’s hiring of Bud Fensterwald as his legal counsel. Fensterwald was most notable for running the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, a legal advocacy group working to reinvestigate the assassinations of the Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King (Hougan 1984, 303-304). This raises the possibility that at different moments and with different results, both Nixon and anti-Nixon forces used the prospect of Kennedy assassination revelations to influence the course of Watergate.

One of the earliest critics of the prevailing Watergate myth was Peter Dale Scott. He began immediately looking into the connections between Dallas and Watergate because when the burglars were arrested, Scott had already been investigating several of the theretofore largely unknown burglars in the course of his research into the Kennedy assassination. For example, Watergate burglar and Bay of Pigs veteran Frank Sturgis came to be suspected of involvement in the JFK assassination. In 1977, the San Francisco Chronicle reported, “Frank Sturgis said yesterday the CIA planned the break-in because high officials felt the then-president was becoming too powerful and was overly interested in the assassination of President Kennedy.”\(^89\) Sturgis himself was involved in a post-assassination conspiracy to falsely depict Oswald as part of a Miami-based, communist Cuban conspiracy to kill the president. At the same time that the
FBI was receiving two forged letters describing such a plot, a Miami journalist named James Buchanan was publishing reports attributed to Frank Sturgis that Oswald had been in Miami where he met with Cuban intelligence agents. Buchanan’s brother Jerry contributed to this effort by also publishing reports placing Oswald in Miami in 1963. The sources for the Buchanans’ stories were both Miami anti-Castro groups: the CIA-sponsored Student revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and International Anti-Communist Brigade. The Buchanans themselves were both members of the latter group which was led by Bay of Pigs veteran Frank Sturgis. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy administration cracked down on Cuban raids launched from the US. In September of 1963, the New York Times reported that six individuals were issued “strong warnings” for their anti-Castro operations. Frank Sturgis was identified as one of the six.90

One possibility that emerges from these events is that anti-Communist militants were trying to plant evidence of Oswald as part of a communist Cuban plot to provide a pretext allowing the US to invade Cuba. A more sophisticated variant of this theory posits that the clumsy efforts were meant to be exposed; the FBI quickly ascertained that the two letters—from ostensibly different sources—were produced by the same typewriter, and the FBI’s painstaking compendium of Oswald’s movements showed that he had not been in Miami at the times indicated by the letters and reports. Thusly, the anti-Castro Cubans could have been enlisted in the Dallas operation, but their goal of a dangerous, potentially nuclear war with Cuba could be thwarted while subsequently justifying a massive official refutation of any Dallas conspiracy.91

As complicated as this might seem, it is known that Warren and other key officials did agree to the “two lone nuts” theory of the assassination well before there was any basis for such a conclusion. As PBS reported in 2013:

[Earl Warren] said that Johnson felt the argument that Khrushchev and Castro had killed Kennedy might mean nuclear war. Warren said he responded, “Well, Mr. President, if in your opinion it is that bad, surely my personal views don’t count.” So as the FBI record indicates, President Johnson, Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, and FBI Director Hoover accepted that they would have to
be in line with a lone-assassin scenario, a decision that was made no later than Sunday, two days after the assassination.\textsuperscript{92}

In light of these revelations, the Miami-based plot to clumsily frame Castro would have been either overkill (since the no-conspiracy theory was already accepted), or a sop to the anti-Castro Cubans who would not—could not—be given the invasion of Cuba they were promised.

On December 28, 1972 McCord sent a prophetic message to the White House’s Jack Caulfield stating that, “If Helms goes, and if the WG operation is laid at CIA’s [feet], where it does not belong, every tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert. The whole matter is at the precipice right now” (O’Sullivan 2018, 270). Despite being employed by the Nixon White House, McCord’s loyalty to the intelligence community—and to Helms in particular—seems apparent. McCord described White House attempts to blame CIA personnel for the break-in as “imply[ing] the deepest corruption and perversion of the criminal justice system in recent history” (O’Sullivan 2012, 272). In contrast to his dire assessment of the Nixon administration, McCord kept on his office wall a photograph of Richard Helms presenting him an award (O’Sullivan 2018, 202). On the photograph was inscribed, “To Jim/ With deep appreciation” (emphasis in the original) (Hougan 1984, 22). Following his arrest, McCord wrote a letter to Helms stating that he would not allow the CIA to be blamed for the Watergate break-in: “Rest assured that I will not be a patsy to this latest ploy. They will have to dream up a better one than this…” (O’Sullivan 2018, 241). The CIA was later criticized harshly for failing to inform the FBI of the existence of McCord’s letters (O’Sullivan 2018, 307).

Although Helms’ initially acquiesced to Nixon’s request for CIA help in neutralizing the FBI’s investigation of Watergate, such was not the case for long. Within days of the “whole Bay of Pigs thing” confrontation, Helms informed the White House and the FBI that CIA had nothing to fear from a thorough investigation (Locker 2016, 179). This likely contributed to Nixon’s firing of DCI Helms—the move that McCord warned would cause “every tree in the forest [to] fall.” But after winning a landslide re-election victory over George McGovern, Nixon felt he had
a mandate to make long-desired reforms. On November 20 of 1972, Nixon fired Helms. As consolation of a sort, he offered Helms the Iranian ambassadorship. As discussed in the previous chapter, this was a move that would have fateful consequences post-Nixon. With his second term resoundingly secured, Nixon set about to aggressively reform the CIA. This was, after all, the agency that had resisted the president’s demands to tailor intelligence assessments according to policy and whose director had refused to assist in the Watergate cover up. The new DCI, James Schlesinger, had previously helped Nixon pressure the agency by producing a 1971 study calling for the reorganization of the intelligence community. As director, Schlesinger fired over a thousand agents, including much of the top leadership (Locker 2016, 188-189).

In response to revelations that CIA veterans Hunt and McCord had received agency assistance with their CREEP “dirty tricks,” DCI Schlesinger issued a May 9, 1973 directive calling for the compilation of what came to be known as the CIA’s “family jewels.” Drafted by deputy director for operations William Colby, Schlesinger’s directive ordered senior CIA officers to immediately report on any conceivably unauthorized past or ongoing CIA activities. By the time William Colby had been named as Schlesinger’s successor, he had accumulated a 693-page notebook of memos. With his massive downsizing of CIA personnel and his creation of the “family jewels,” Schlesinger served as Nixon’s instrument against the CIA and in so doing became the most unpopular DCI in the agency’s history (Moran 2019).

In the end, Nixon failed in his attempt to exert control over the CIA, an effort that was one element of broader campaigns to defuse Watergate and to bring more presidential control over the federal government. On the surface, Watergate demonstrates the historical fact of conspiratorial high criminality in the US. Within the scope the scandal, there are innumerable (thanks to Ford’s pardon) criminal conspiracies. In this sense, Watergate validates deHaven-Smith’s SCAD theory as well as the generic liberal perspective that views Nixon’s resignation as validation of American norms relating to justice and the constitutional rule of law. However, the
critical scholarship has done much to complicate, even as it affirms, deHaven-Smith’s SCAD interpretation of Watergate. The liberal myth of Watergate is largely untenable.

Woodward’s close connections with hawkish, anti-Nixon military intelligence circles are highly suspicious, given that in short order he changed career to become a journalist and proceeded to break the proverbial “story of the century” which led to the downfall of Nixon and the reversal of many of his policies. Additionally, another deep state actor who proved instrumental to Nixon’s removal—Mark Felt aka “Deep Throat”—was hardly the scrupulous, concerned public servant depicted in All the President’s Men. Rather, Felt was the man who supervised the notorious COINTELPRO operations in the sixties. Jim Hougan adroitly sums it up: with Felt having been “convicted for ‘conspiring to injure and oppress citizens of the United States,’ [and] having authorized numerous black-bag jobs and warrantless searches at the Bureau, he seems an unlikely person to be so deeply shocked by the break-in at the Watergate.”94

Furthermore, the Post itself is not an entity with a plausible history of speaking truth to power or exposing state crimes. When the Washington Post Company purchased Newsweek, Post publisher Philip Graham was informed by CIA officials that the agency had a practice of using the outlet for cover purposes. This disclosure does not likely represent the beginning of the company’s relationship to the CIA. According to a former CIA deputy director, it was common knowledge within the agency that “Graham was somebody you could get help from. […] Frank Wisner dealt with him.”95 In fact, Graham—according to Carl Bernstein—was “probably Wisner’s closest friend.”96 This is noteworthy because as deputy director of the CIA from 1950 to 1965, Wisner was not only CIA’s top architect of “black ops,” but the creator of the CIA’s propaganda apparatus. He termed this CIA disinformation machine, “the Mighty Wurlitzer” and he ran it with the help of numerous journalists and media outlets.97 Likewise, Phil Graham’s successor—his widowed wife Katherine Graham—is a much more ambiguous figure than the heroine depicted in All the President’s Men and more recently in Steven Spielberg’s The Post. She was listed in a
1965 CIA memo as one of the journalists who had met with CIA officer Ray Cline as part of Cline’s efforts to use the media to improve the agency’s image.⁹⁸

Post-Watergate history reveals the Watergate-era coverage to be a very strange aberration. On the whole, the prestige media—including the Post—took a post-Watergate approach that tended to re-legitimize the US government after Nixon’s resignation. This can be seen in the US media’s unfavorable coverage of the post-Watergate congressional investigations of the intelligence community which included the Pike Committee, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (see esp. Olmsted 1996).

In the 1980’s, matters deteriorated further. At the Washington Post-owned Newsweek, journalist Robert Parry was discouraged from further investigating Iran-Contra. A superior told him that “we don’t want another Watergate.” Parry was also prevented from covering the Contra-cocaine angle. After Senator John Kerry advanced the story with an April 1989 Senate report, Newsweek described the Senator dismissively as “a randy conspiracy buff.”⁹⁹ In 1988, Katherine Graham spoke at CIA headquarters, asserting that “We live in a dirty and dangerous world,” and that there were “some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn’t.” Though she offered some defense of the “free press,” she also stated that “official secrecy is necessary to preserve liberty,” and that the government should “discipline employees who violate security regulations” (Covert 2017, 277). Also in the 1980’s, Bob Woodward enjoyed a special connection with Reagan’s notorious DCI William Casey, a relationship Woodward described as “a partnership over secrets,” adding that “we were both obsessed with secrets” (Wilford 2008, 226).

The Washington Post was also one of the chief newspapers that attacked the work of Gary Webb in the 1990’s. Webb’s articles revealed the CIA protection of Contra cocaine traffickers whose profligate operations fueled the Los Angeles crack epidemic that began in the 1980’s.¹⁰⁰ Though a CIA Inspector General report would later confirm and expand upon Webb’s central allegations, his career and life were essentially ruined by the counterattack of the CIA and
its media allies like the Washington Post. For historical and methodological purposes, the CIA eventually created a report detailing the way this unfolded. The agency’s “Managing a Nightmare” report even presented some of the back story detailing how CIA propagandists utilized mainstream journalists who proceeded to do the agency's bidding, launching an overwhelming counterattack against Webb that greatly diminished him and depicted the Contra-cocaine scandal as a fanciful conspiracy theory.\textsuperscript{101}

The Post would go on to promote the militarism of the GWOT as well as subsequent wars and regime change campaigns, most notably in its op-ed page which offers readers a spectrum of perspectives ranging from pro-war “liberal interventionist” to pro-war neoconservative. At present, the Post is owned by the world’s richest man, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos. Amazon has a $600 million contract with the CIA,\textsuperscript{102} which would appear to deepen the already problematic ties that the paper has historically maintained with the agency. And—perhaps as a subtle nod to George Orwell—the Washington Post in 2017 began deploying the phrase “Democracy Dies in Darkness” as its tagline.

In light of all this, how then should Watergate be interpreted? Scott’s characterization of Watergate as a deep event is most apt. In a similar vein, the event could be described as part of a deep state civil war of sorts. Despite his backing by conservative forces in US society, Nixon pursued several policies that exercised key constituencies of America’s deep political system, most broadly understood as the Prussian/neoconservative and trader/neoliberal portions of the US elite. The Prussians were bitterly opposed to détente and to rapprochement with China. They also became increasingly alarmed that Kissinger was an agent of the internationalist David Rockefeller and as such was prepared to sacrifice American primacy for control of international trade. The traders, on the other hand, did not approve of Nixon’s liberal economic policies such as the creation of the EPA, the creation of OSHA, price controls, and tariffs. It was Nixon’s “economic nationalism” in response to the collapse of Bretton Woods that led to the resignation
of C. Fred Bergsten, Kissinger’s assistant for International Economic Affairs (Frieden 1980, 66). Bergsten went on to join forces with other representatives of transnational capital in order to promote cooperation between centers of transnational capital and to return the US to a “free trade” orientation. These efforts would soon culminate in the 1973 Rockefeller/Brzezinski establishment of the Trilateral Commission (Frieden 1980, 68-69). As Frieden (1980) notes, “[I]nvolved or not in Nixon’s demise, the international financiers sighed with relief when Richard Nixon made his stumbling feverish exit” (69).

For all the books that have been written on Watergate, mysteries persist. One of the chief unresolved questions involves the Watergate break-in itself. Why were the Plumbers ordered to break into the DNC headquarters? Spencer Oliver, the DNC official whose phone was successfully tapped by the plumbers, offers a relatively pedestrian theory: he was a target of the Plumbers’ conspiratorial mischief due to his own efforts to conspire against the pending McGovern nomination—a nomination favored by CREEP, since McGovern was seen as the weakest potential opponent in the general election (O’Sullivan 2018, 392-393).

A more salacious revisionist theory is that the break-ins were related to a D.C. prostitution ring. The “call-girl theory” was first suggested by Anthony Lukas in 1976. Jim Hougan greatly expanded on the theory with his 1984 book Secret Agenda. Authors Len Colodny and Robert Getlin built upon Hougan’s work with Silent Coup (1991). Generally speaking, the theory posits that the break-ins to the Democratic National Committee Offices were carried out in order to gain intelligence pertaining to a call-girl operation. The prostitution ring was based in the nearby Columbia Plaza and it used the office of Maxie Wells—the secretary to DNC official Spencer Oliver. Two mysteries related to Watergate have helped fuel the revisionist accounts. The first has been mentioned already; no one has ever explained who ordered the second break-in and why. The second mystery pertains to the fact that Watergate burglar Eugenio Martinez was arrested with the key Maxie Wells’ desk in his possession. This fact was unknown until
discovered by Hougan (1984) who included it in *Secret Agenda*. Martinez has always suspected that James McCord set up the burglars that night. During executive session testimony in 1973, he expressly stated that he doubted he would live much longer. Instead, he was the only one of the burglars who received a pardon. At the age of ninety-six, he was asked by Shane O’Sullivan (2018) why he had the key that night. He laughed as he gave his response: “I don’t remember and I don’t want to remember. I want to be consistent with what I said before. I don’t want it to come out, I’m sorry” (405-406).

The “call girl theory” is a Byzantine subject, further complicated by competing, contradictory accounts from different sources, many of whom are convicted felons and/or otherwise less than reputable. Nevertheless, critical scholars have collectively created a coherent revisionist account that ultimately raises more questions than can be answered definitively. The story began on April 6th, 1972. On that day, the FBI raided the apartment and law offices of a Washington D.C. lawyer named Phillip Bailley. The FBI search was pursuant to alleged acts that violated the Mann Act, a law which prohibited interstate transport of persons for immoral purposes. One of the complainants was University of Maryland student who alleged that Bailley had plied her with wine and marijuana before taking “pornographic” pictures of her. Bailley later threatened to have the photos sent to university authorities and to the woman’s parents unless she agreed to provide sexual services to Bailley’s political and business associates. This led to her having sex with more than a dozen men at one of Bailley’s parties in suburban Maryland. Her complaint stated that one of the men told her he had paid $20 to Bailley for the experience. Bailley offered something resembling a defense: “We pulled a train on her, [but] there wasn’t any blackmail or money involved. It was just a party” (Hougan 1984, 112).

The Plumbers’ first Watergate break-in occurred on May 29, 1972. The phone line in the DNC headquarters that was supposed to be wiretapped was special in that it did not go through the central switchboard. It was a line used to call the Columbia Plaza call-girl operation run by
Heidi Rikan (Scott 1993, 236). The Columbia Plaza line was already being tapped by Lou Russell, a stringer for reporter Jack Anderson who also worked for James McCord and for McCord’s attorney Bernard Fensterwald (Scott 1993, 236). Fensterwald, as mentioned previously, was also the lawyer who ran the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CtIA). Russell would regale Fensterwald and CtIA staffer Bob Smith with stories about salacious conversations between DNC politicians and Columbia Plaza prostitutes (Hougan 1984, 118).

On June 9, 1972, Phillip Bailley was indicted by a Washington grand jury. The Washington Star ran a story about the indictment with headline “Capitol Hill Call-Girl Ring Uncovered” (Scott 1993, 240). The Star reported that US attorney John Rudy’s investigation placed a D.C. attorney at the head of a high-priced prostitution enterprise. The FBI had found that the operation involved “at least one White House secretary” and that “a White House lawyer was a client” (O’Sullivan 2018, 179). The article elicited a speedy response from White House lawyer John Dean. In the space of an hour, he arranged for a chauffeured limousine to deliver the prosecutor John Rudy to the White House where Dean photocopied Phillip Bailley’s address book (Scott 1993, 240). Within the book, Dean recognized the name of a female lawyer working in the Office of Emergency Preparedness and she was subsequently forced to resign (O’Sullivan 2018, 180). According to John Rudy, the book also contained the names of Dean’s girlfriend (and future wife) Maureen Biner, as well as “Cathy Dieter” an apparent alias for Biner’s friend Heidi Rikan (O’Sullivan 2018, 180). “Cathy Dieter’s” Columbia Plaza apartment had been leased in the name of Bailley’s ex-girlfriend (the fired lawyer), reportedly without her knowledge. The Deans dispute Heidi Rikan’s identity as the “Cathy Dieter” involved in Bailley’s operation. They do acknowledge that Rikan was a “close friend” and Maureen Dean’s bridesmaid (O’Sullivan 2018, 378). In the 1980’s Rikan confided in her longtime maid, admitting “I was a call girl at the White House.” Her close friend Josephine Alvarez and Rikan’s sister Kathie both confirmed that Heidi had used “Kathie Dieter” as an alias (O’Sullivan 2018, 378). After Rikan died in 1990, her sister
found a “little black book” among her effects. Her phone contacts included both of the Deans, including the number of John’s White House office and their unlisted home phone number. Also included were the names of Nixon officials Jeb Magruder, Maurice Stans, and Fred LaRue as well as Senator Lowell Weicker and Sam Dash—the chief counsel of the Senate Watergate Committee. Significantly, the book also contained the names of organized crime figure Joe Nesline and Irving Davidson, office-mate of Jack Anderson and D.C. lobbyist for both Jimmy Hoffa and mob boss Carlos Marcello (O’Sullivan 2018, 379). Joe Nesline “kept” Rikan as a girlfriend. She allegedly used her friendship with Dean to intercede on behalf of Jimmy Hoffa prior to Nixon’s December 1971 pardon of the Teamster president (O’Sullivan 2018, 378).

Nesline was the top underworld figure in Washington, associated at the time with Meyer Lansky and other leading mob bosses in sex-club ventures in Hamburg and Amsterdam. In other words, Nesline and his associates were at the pinnacle of prostitution, narcotics, and gambling operations that provided the basis for the political influence of the underworld (Scott 1993, 239).

The infamous second Watergate break-in occurred in the early morning hours of July 17, 1972. Again, it is still disputed as to who ordered it and why. As Hougan (1984) puts it, “All the circumstantial evidence suggests that concerns about the Bailley case led to the [second break-in]” (173). It was on June 9 that Magruder declared that another DNC expedition might be in the offing. June 9 had also been the day that the Bailley story broke, leading to Dean’s hasty White House summons of John Rudy. The next working day, Monday, June 12, Magruder met with again with Liddy, demanding another break-in, this time saying that he was expecting to acquire scandalous information (Hougan 1984, 174). Magruder had initially stated that Liddy and Mitchell had ordered the second break-in. He eventually claimed that it was John Dean who ordered the job (O’Sullivan 2018, 373). Jim Hougan, G. Gordon Liddy and the authors of Silent Coup (Colodny and Gettlin 1991) all believe that Dean ordered the second break-in after learning about the link between the DNC and the Columbia Plaza sex ring.104
In a deposition, US attorney John Rudy stated that his informant “Cathy Dieter” (presumably Heidi Rikan) had mentioned that (bugged DNC official) Spencer Oliver “either knew of or had been involved in some way with the Columbia Plaza operation” (O’Sullivan 2018, 376). Rudy began looking for possible links between the Columbia Plaza sex-ring and the DNC, but his investigation was soon “iced” by his superior, Harold Titus. Rudy stated that he was told that the investigation might be “construed or interpreted as being politically motivated.” The affair was “a political timebomb… very politically sensitive because of the Watergate break-in.” Rudy also referred to strange goings-on at the Columbia Plaza, pointing to various parties who complicated things: “[There were] too many people involved… people were bugging the buggers, tape recording buggers.” He added, “I believe there were [court ordered] phone taps. There were people [doing] illegal taps… There were perhaps other agencies involved in some type of intelligence operations. I mean, it was a ball of wax” (O’Sullivan 2018, 377).

In spring 1973, Republicans on the Democrat-majority Ervin committee realized that Lou Russell had been playing a significant if mysterious role in the whole affair. Russell was the McCord/CRP-employed figure who had been listening to the DNC/Columbia Plaza conversations. On May 9, the committee placed Russell under subpoena. On May 18, after refusing to comply with the subpoena, Russell had a massive heart attack. Hours later, McCord began testifying publicly before the Ervin committee. Russell told his daughter that he thought that he had been poisoned, that someone had broken into his apartment and “switched pills on me” (Hougan 1984, 306). This seems paranoid, but it occurred at a pivotal time: Russell had played some part in the Watergate break-in, had very likely placed false evidence at DNC headquarters in September, and he had been helping McCord’s defense. He had helped McCord to switch attorneys, the switch that brought in Bernard Fensterwald and was marked by McCord’s assertion that, “We’re going after the President” (Hougan 1984, 307). Russell wasn’t the only person at that time who voiced concerns that matters were becoming dire and possibly deadly.
Nixon had threatened Dean with prison if he exposed unnamed “national security activities.” Days before Russell’s heart attack very late on the night of May 16th/17th, Deep Throat told Woodward that “Everyone’s life is in danger.” Woodward later conveyed Throat’s message to Bradlee and Bernstein: “The covert activities involve the whole of the US intelligence community and are incredible. […] The cover-up had little to do with Watergate, but was mainly to protect the covert operations” (Hougan 1984, 307).

After his cardiac episode which he believed to be the result of poisoning, Lou Russell seemed to have a change of heart. Though still McCord’s employee, he received a retainer from John Leon, a friend who was working on a Republican counter-investigation of Watergate. Leon had surmised that Watergate was some kind of a setup, that prostitution rings were at the heart of the matter, and that the arrests of the Plumbers resulted from a tip-off to police. Russell, now Leon’s employee, was the man with the first-hand knowledge of the affair. On July 2, before Russell could be of use to Leon, he died after another heart attack. Knowing about his friend’s belief that he had been poisoned, Leon was frightened and despondent over his friend’s death. He soon realized that the only option left for the Republicans was to go after Carmine Bellino, the chief prosecutor of the Ervin committee. Leon wanted to prove that Russell had been spying on CRP for the Democrats and that he had tipped off the police and Bellino about the break-in (Hougan 1984, 310). Even with Russell dead, Leon and others had first-hand knowledge of Bellino’s involvement in similar matters. According to sworn affidavits Bellino had overseen illegal surveillance of Nixon’s 1960 campaign. Methods deployed included the use of bugging and other eavesdropping devices. After collecting this evidence, a statement was crafted and a press conference featuring John Leon was announced for July 13. On the day the event was scheduled, John Leon suffered a heart attack. He died before the press conference could be convened. On that same day, presidential appointments secretary Alexander Butterfield offered
Senate testimony revealing the existence of the White House taping system (Hougan 1984, 310-312).

Combined with Nixon’s decision not to destroy the tapes, the Butterfield revelation sealed Nixon’s fate. Chief of Staff Alexander Haig and Fred Buzhardt persuaded Nixon not to destroy the tapes. In June of 1974, Haig ordered an Army Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) investigation into Nixon’s mob ties and to his smuggling of gold into Vietnam. He received the report in late July. It is unknown whether Haig informed either Nixon or Gerald Ford about the report or its contents. The chief CIC investigator Russell Bintliff is convinced that Haig confronted both men with the report and that consequentially, Nixon’s resignation followed. This can’t be confirmed because Haig always refused to discuss the issue (Hougan 1984, 312-313). A recently published book (Locker 2019) shows that Haig was not only instrumental in Nixon’s resignation; he had also been part of the anti-détente spy-ring at the heart of the Moorer-Radford affair. Haig obscured his own role and prevented further investigation or public exposure of the spy-ring in various ways, principally by working through his old West Point friend Fred Buzhardt and with Bob Woodward who the reader may recall had previously served as an intelligence officer under some of the very same spying, anti-détente officers. Back in 1969 and 1970, part of Woodward’s job in the Pentagon was to brief Alexander Haig.\textsuperscript{105} With the foregoing in mind, it is significant that a military officer previously involved in an anti-détente Pentagon spy-ring aimed at the presidency would go on to serve as Nixon’s chief of staff. In that role, Haig prevented further exposure of the illegal and possibly treasonous spy-ring, utilized military intelligence to investigate the president’s theretofore unsubstantiated underworld connections and activities, encouraged Nixon to make the politically suicidal decision not to destroy the White House tapes, and orchestrated the apparent denouement of Watergate—Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s ascension.
Despite decades of investigation by scholars and researchers, Watergate—like the Kennedy assassinations—remains shrouded in mystery to this day. “Watergate” originally referred to the actual break-in at the Watergate Hotel. The term eventually evolved, coming to encompass a swath of additional crimes committed by the ostensibly retired CIA officer E. Howard Hunt and/or his crew of right-wing Cuban exiles. By the time Nixon resigned in August of 1974, “Watergate” came to also include the White House efforts to cover-up the Plumbers’ activities as well as Nixon’s abuse of executive power writ large. Nixon’s “Watergate” culpability in the second and third iterations has been well documented (Scott and Good 2019, 50). However, as stated previously, the authorship and aims of the break-ins remain disputed and obscure. As Tim Weiner confirms in *Legacy of Ashes* (2007), “…no one really knows if Richard Nixon authorized the break-in” (371).

Likewise, the ill-fated second break-in has been attributed to various motives and actors. The orthodox Woodward/Bernstein account depicts the break-in as a bungled crime committed on Nixon’s behalf. Others like H.R. Haldeman (1978) and Jim Hougan (1984) suggest, with varying degrees of specificity, that the second break-in was a deliberately botched affair of CIA design, intended “to draw attention to Nixon’s illegal activities and political aspirations” (Scott and Good 2019, 50). The theory posited here builds on a third alternative explanation offered by Peter Dale Scott: “the break-in was the work of a well-organized anti-détente cadre transcending any one agency, including elements close to organized crime.” If correct, “the aim of the break-in, as well as the clear result, was to gain power over both Nixon and also the traditional CIA” (Scott and Good 2019, 50).

One key aspect of Nixon’s political aspirations was his administration’s efforts to situate control of the federal bureaucracy more firmly in the White House. These efforts were carried out in order to give the president more power to pursue policies which could otherwise be stymied by various bureaucratic elements. In particular, détente and the “war on drugs” created fear and
paranoia not merely in the public and security state bureaucracies, but among the deep political constituencies that provided political succor to the bureaucracies in question. US exceptionism is also key to understanding Watergate, since the crimes of the Nixon administration were decidedly minor relative to the various scandals and state crimes that have been documented and/or suspected, e.g., the political assassinations of the 1960’s, the Gulf of Tonkin incident/resolution, MKULTRA testing on US citizens, CIA/KMT complicity in the heroin traffic, the October surprises of 1968 and 1980 (admittedly Nixon was the bad actor in 1968, but this had no impact on the publicly understood reasons for his resignation), Iran-Contra-cocaine, Iraqi WMD, and torture.

The early Nixon-Hoover conflict over the Huston Plan illustrates how Nixon threatened the deep state by threatening the turf and/or autonomy of the security state, the FBI in this instance. The Huston Plan mobilized the CIA, FBI, and military intelligence to increase electronic surveillance of individuals deemed to be “domestic security threats.” The operation involved intercepting mail and allowed for “surreptitious entry,” i.e., burglaries or “black-bag jobs.” The plan was rescinded after Hoover protested. His objection was not based on moral, legal, or ethical principles. Rather, Hoover considered the plan a trespass on the FBI’s domain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also strongly opposed Nixon’s policies, specifically the efforts to pursue détente as discussed earlier. This opposition led to the arguably treasonous spy-ring which was never adjudicated. Nixon’s also faced resistance to his efforts to restructure the CIA and bring it more firmly under presidential control. The CIA assisted and was briefed on many of the Plumbers’ illegal activities. Both the firing of Helms and Schlesinger’s order to compile the “family jewels” must be understood as part of Nixon’s efforts to control the CIA and bring its power to bear in defusing Watergate. As McCord predicted, firing Helms would be disastrous for Nixon: “[E]very tree in the forest will fall. It will be a scorched desert.”
As with Nixon’s pursuit of détente and his efforts to restructure the CIA, the “war on drugs” also led to bureaucratic paranoia and deep state intrigue. Enforcement of drug laws at the national level had been carried out largely by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics until a serious corruption scandal at the agency’s New York office led to the organization’s dissolution in the late 1960’s. In the early 1970’s, Nixon announced a “war on drugs” to be waged especially against Asian heroin (McCoy 2003, 19). The first target of the campaign was the Turkish opium which had been supplying Corsican heroin labs—the infamous French Connection. But after a series of notable seizures and arrests in 1970 and 1971, US officials came to recognize the threat posed by East Asian heroin (Scott and Good 2019, 67). Most spectacularly, the Laotian ambassador to France, Prince Sopsaisana, was found to be travelling with a suitcase containing 60 kilograms of premium Laotian heroin. The heroin was likely destined for New York where it would be worth around $13 million. The Prince, who was also an active member of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League, was not arrested. Reports later received by US officials stated that Sopsaisana’s enterprise had been bankrolled by General Vang Pao, the leader of the CIA’s secret army of Hmong tribesmen. The heroin had been at Long Tieng in a laboratory within the CIA’s command center for covert operations in the region (McCoy 2007, 283-285).

In the aftermath of this event, Nixon and the CIA took measures to distance US officials from these operations by recalling or reassigning implicated CIA officers like Tom Clines and Ted Shackley, and by pressuring Laos to outlaw opium (Scott and Good 2019, 67). Notably, the New York Times even overcame its studied reticence regarding CIA-drug matters. In June of 1971, the paper published a story based on a leaked CIA report detailing Golden Triangle heroin operations. Though not explicitly stated, the refineries in question were in areas under the control of paramilitary groups that were deeply involved in US covert operations, some going back as far as 1950 (McCoy 2007, 288). A month later, the Nixon administration announced it would crack down on Southeast Asian leaders involved in the Golden Triangle heroin traffic (Scott and Good
Around this time, history PhD candidate Alfred McCoy was working on what would become his magnum opus, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (McCoy and Read 1972). McCoy writes that he was contacted by DEA agent and ex-CIA officer Tom Tripodi who later visited McCoy to look over his text, eventually reviewing whole chapters and providing corrections and additional anecdotes (McCoy 2003, xix). Tripodi was actually with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) at the time since the DEA hadn’t been created yet; McCoy probably lists him as DEA to minimize confusion. Journalist and historian Doug Valentine wrote that Tripodi insists that he gave McCoy considerable help, while McCoy asserts that it was minimal (Valentine 2009, 125). The takeaway here is that the BNDD did provide support for McCoy’s work, demonstrating the conflict between CIA-drug operations and other agencies involved in Nixon’s “war on drugs.”

A major problem for Nixon was that his détente policies and his anti-drug policies were anathema to key groups with which Nixon was associated. E. Howard Hunt and other Plumbers (especially the Cubans) were not only against détente; many had also been involved in the drug traffic in various ways. Hunt—along with Paul Helliwell, a future CIA officer and attorney for a Lansky bank—was a veteran of the OSS base in Kunming, China. The Kunming OSS made payments to its agents in opium. As an OPC officer, Helliwell orchestrated the CIA’s purchase of Civil Air Transport, the airline that became CIA/KMT-owned Air America. Lansky would eventually establish a Mexico-US drug connection that utilized KMT-connected Chinese living in Mexico. Stationed in Mexico in the mid-1950’s, Hunt set about creating a Latin American branch of the KMT’s embryonic World Anti-Communist League. The Latin American branch brought together a group of ultra-rightists who soon came to agitate for the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala. WACL members have been involved or suspected in numerous drug trafficking episodes, most notoriously in the 1980 Bolivian “cocaine coup” during which the WACL installed a ruling junta and helped a major drug trafficker get his cousin appointed Minister of the
Interior (Scott 2009, 179-181). Besides Hunt, other close associates of the Cuban Watergate burglars were arrested during Nixon’s anti-drug campaign (Scott and Good 2019, 69).

The other entity that should be considered here is the China Lobby, more accurately described as the Far Eastern Lobby since it came to include more than just the Taiwanese KMT. Nixon’s envoy to sabotage the 1968 Paris Peace Talks was Anna Chennault, a key figure in the opium-corrupted China Lobby. Her husband was Claire Chennault, the US officer whose World War II fleet of airplanes later became the Civil Air Transport and then Air America. The Atlantic Monthly reported in 1976 that Anna Chennault had also raised illegal Nixon campaign contributions from across the far east. These sources apparently included South Vietnamese officials who wanted the money from the US war effort to continue pouring into the country (Scott and Good 2019, 73). Several of Nixon’s policies undoubtedly would have been seen as betrayals by the Far Eastern Lobby, specifically: recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, Vietnamization along with the Paris Peace Talks, the planned withdrawal of American forces from South Korea, and the war on drugs.

With all this as foreground, there are clues to suggest that the intentionally bungled Watergate break-in was one episode in an unfolding struggle over détente and the international drug traffic. Beyond McCord’s conspicuously bad tradecraft, the Plumbers took other measures that made their operation and capture highly radioactive for the administration. The first link connecting the break-in to the CRP was a $25,000 Kenneth Dahlberg cashier’s check deposited into the bank account of burglar Bernard Barker’s Miami real estate firm, Ameritas. The check was discovered by an investigator for Richard E. Gerstein, the Dade County District Attorney. Gerstein told Carl Bernstein about the check. Dahlberg was soon identified as a CRP fund-raiser who had laundered funds into a cashier’s check to be deposited into CRP accounts. But the check was not deposited thusly. Instead, Liddy passed the check on to Hunt, who then deposited it in the account of Barker’s firm. As a result, the funds were not anonymous and untraceable, but were
instead the opposite—a trail leading from the burglars to the CRP. “Trail” may not be the most apt metaphor; better to describe it as a highway (Scott and Good 2019, 52).

Gerstein, the Dade County DA whose office leaked the information about the Gerstein check to Bernstein, was described by the chief of the Miami Strike Force as undoubtably “a knowing handmaiden of organized crime in Dade County” (Scott and Good 2019, 73; Block 1991, 227). Declassified FBI reports describe Gerstein’s protection of a Lansky associate and his receipt of payoffs from mob-connected industries. An FBI informant alleged that Gerstein regularly lunched with Santo Trafficante (Scott and Good 2019, 73).

Additionally, the burglars had cash in their possession and in their hotel rooms. Their money was in mint, sequentially-numbered hundred-dollar bills which were also easily traceable to CRP accounts (Scott and Good 2019, 52; Emery 1994, 111-112, 148, 162, 188). Within days, the bills led investigators to the Miami bank account of Bernard Barker where the money had been given “in exchange for four Mexican checks traceable to the Finance Committee for the Re-election of the President” (Scott and Good 2019, 55-56; Lukas 1976, 190, 229). Richard Helms—elsewhere convicted for lying to Congress about the CIA’s Chilean operations—testified that the FBI’s investigation into the Mexican checks and the Bernard Barker account was of no concern to the CIA: “The question comes up, when the President talked about getting into CIA operations in Mexico…people keep asking me, what did he have in mind. The answer is, I don’t know what he had in mind” (Scott and Good 2019, 56). However, documents released in 1998 show that the CIA had been concerned about the FBI’s investigation into the Mexican checks. Additionally, John Ehrlichman testified that the CIA’s “General Walters would not say that the CIA had no concern on the question of Mexican operations” (Scott and Good 2019, 56-57). The embarrassment of the CIA is the likely explanation for Helms order that the FBI investigators “confine themselves to the personalities already arrested or directly under suspicion.” This belies those accounts of Watergate which maintain that the CIA refused to intervene in the FBI’s
Watergate investigation. The Helms order to the FBI was only in effect for two weeks, but a lot can be swept away in that time. The CIA’s initial response to Watergate indicates that the agency was unprepared and exposed by aspects of the affair (Scott and Good 2019, 57-59).

Operation Eagle was an early and revealing episode in Nixon’s nascent war on drugs. Starting in 1970, Operation Eagle pursued anti-Castro Cubans moving drugs from Latin America to the Florida-based Trafficante organization. Dozens were arrested and many of them turned out to be members of Operation 40, a CIA paramilitary organization originally created to carry out assassinations and other terrorist operations which were to follow the Bay of Pigs invasion. When it was discovered that CIA assets were smuggling drugs in the US, the CIA began placing officers alongside mid-level BNDD (DEA-precursor) agents in order to protect the agency’s assets from being exposed and to help recruit them as BNDD informants. Operation 40 was discontinued in 1970 after one of its planes crashed in Southern California with large amounts of heroin and cocaine on board. Shortly thereafter, Operation 40 member Juan Restoy was arrested in Miami along with Bay of Pigs veteran Alonso Pujol as part of an Operation Eagle drug bust. Cuban Watergate burglar Bernard Barker was a close associate of Guillermo Pujol, Alonso’s brother. Barker’s Ameritas firm employed Felipe de Diego, one of the Plumbers and an Operation 40 veteran. Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis also identified himself as part of Operation 40 (Scott and Good 2019, 69-70). Like McCord, Sturgis, and Hunt, Barker also may have been involved in the John Kennedy assassination. On the day of the murder, a Dallas deputy sheriff in Dealey Plaza named Seymour Weitzman, along with officer Joe Smith, ran over to the grassy knoll after hearing the gunshots. After officer Smith pulled his pistol on a man behind the fence, the man produced credentials indicating that he was with the Secret Service. It eventually emerged that there were no Secret Service agents in the area who did not travel with the motorcade, thus the man behind the fence was wielding false credentials. In 1975, journalist Michael Canfield spoke to the retired Weitzman. Because of speculation that Watergate burglars Hunt and Sturgis had
been in Dealey Plaza, Canfield showed him photos of Sturgis and Barker. Weitzman immediately pointed to the picture of Barker and stated that he was willing “to make a tape recorded statement for official investigators.” Another Dealey Plaza witness named Malcolm Summers also eventually identified Barker as the man with a gun that he had seen on the grassy knoll moments after the shooting (Waldron 2012, 293-295). Though the well-documented presence of Secret Service impersonators points to—or perhaps confirms—a conspiracy in Dallas, the Bernard Barker angle is provocative but unproven.

In Richard Nixon’s memoirs, he recounts how Haldeman told him less than two weeks after the break-in that the entire affair was so absurd that John Dean had not ruled out the possibility that they were grappling with some kind of double agent who intentionally botched the operation. Otherwise, it just made no sense (Nixon 1978, 643-644). Writing in the December 1973 issue of *Ramparts* magazine, Peter Dale Scott argued that “the Watergate cover-up almost succeeded—not despite the exotic records of the defendants, but precisely because of them.” Subsequent revelations would cause him to revise his appraisal of Watergate, but at that early date, with Nixon still ensconced in the White House, Scott was correct to note that “what makes [the disparate Miami intrigues] so dangerous and what links the scandal of Watergate to the assassination in Dallas, is the increasingly ominous symbiosis between U.S. intelligence networks and the forces of organized crime.”

A number of factors combined to make the bizarre Watergate caper explosive enough to not only take down a presidency, but also to lead to the largest and most damaging series of intelligence community revelations in US history. The Watergate break-in risked exposing the already surveilled Columbia Plaza sex-ring connected on some level to the DNC and to the DC crime boss and Lansky associate Joe Nesline. The operation bears the hallmarks of previous and subsequent scandals that collectively point to an institutionalized practice of using sexual blackmail for political purposes. Prior to Watergate, J. Edgar Hoover is known to have used
sexual blackmail for various purposes. The Bobby Baker scandal, which prior to Dallas appeared poised to end Lyndon Johnson’s political career, also had a significant sex angle. According to an ex-CIA officer, there was also a significant intelligence-related sexual blackmail component in the so-called “Koreagate” scandal of the 1970’s (Hougan 1984, 120).

In the 1980’s, the Washington Times ran a story on a man named Craig Spence,

…an enigmatic figure who threw glittery parties for key officials of the Reagan and Bush administrations, media stars and top military officers, bugged the gatherings to compromise guests, provided cocaine, blackmailed some associates and spent up to $20,000 a month on male prostitutes, according to friends, acquaintances and records. The 48-year-old D.C. power broker has been linked to a homosexual prostitution ring currently under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Its clients included several top government and business officials from Washington and abroad.111

The article reported that a Chinese businessman who knew Spence described him as an odd fellow who often bragged that he worked for the CIA, on one occasion even saying that he needed to disappear for a time “because he had an important CIA assignment.” Spence also told the man that he was worried the CIA would “doublecross him,” murder him, and “make it look like a suicide.”112 Shortly before Spence’s alleged suicide, he identified George H.W. Bush’s National Security Advisor Donald Gregg (previously of the CIA) as his key White House contact. He also told Washington Times reporters that “All this stuff you’ve uncovered […] is insignificant compared to other things I’ve done. But I’m not going to tell you those things, and somehow the world will carry on.”113

More recently, mysterious billionaire Jeffrey Epstein was exposed for his role in running a sex-ring which included the trafficking of underage girls for powerful men. He escaped prosecution in 2007 after an extraordinary plea deal. The U.S. attorney in Miami who signed off on the deal, Alexander Acosta, was later interviewed before his nomination to be Trump’s labor secretary. Asked about Epstein, Acosta explained that he was only a participant in one meeting about the case. About this meeting, Acosta said that he “was told Epstein ‘belonged to intelligence’ and to leave it alone.”114 Thanks to the efforts of courageous victims and a relentless
journalist in Miami, Epstein was eventually arrested again in 2019. Before a trial could be held—a trial that could have potentially exposed criminal intelligence practices as well as the grim predilections of very powerful men—Epstein died in an alleged suicide. Perhaps no “mysterious suicide” has ever been predicted by more people.

Considering the Columbia Plaza sex-ring, the Koreagate scandal, the Craig Spence operation, and the Epstein case, a pattern emerges. Multiple, discursive intelligence-connected sexual blackmail operations have been partially exposed yet never adjudicated, often due to untimely deaths which preclude any kind of reckoning. The Watergate sex-ring angle fits this pattern. Likewise, the inculpatory soiling of funds through Bernard Barker’s drug-connected Ameritas served to needlessly implicate the CRP and the Plumbers when the funds could have more easily been effectively laundered. Additionally, the composition of the Watergate burglars’ team could hardly have been more radioactive. Hunt, Sturgis, McCord, and Barker were each, in all likelihood, Bay of Pigs veterans. They have each been implicated in the JFK assassination, with various degrees of supporting evidence. Nixon himself seemed to grasp as much, apparently thinking that this would help him if one accepts Haldeman’s interpretation of what Nixon was referring to when he sent Haldeman to warn Helms about “the Bay of Pigs thing.” As Nixon said on the “smoking gun” tape, “[T]his is a… Hunt [operation] that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there’s a hell of a lot of things and that we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves.”

Of Watergate, Nixon famously said, “I gave [my enemies] a sword, and they stuck it in and they twisted it with relish.” Perhaps the key figure in terms of weaponizing Watergate against Nixon was James McCord. Prior to Watergate, he had been involved in some of the most sensitive intelligence operations of the Cold War. After MKULTRA scientist Frank Olson fell ten stories to his death in 1953, it was the CIA’s James McCord of the Office of Security who was
called in to make sure that no details would emerge regarding agency involvement. Decades after Olson’s death, an exhumation revealed to a forensic pathologist that Olson had a hematoma above his left eye not caused by the fall, an injury suggesting that “Dr Olson was struck a stunning blow to the head by some person or instrument prior to his exiting through the window.”

Seymour Hersh eventually learned what happened to Olson through a highly placed source in the CIA. Essentially, Olson was deemed a security risk and liquidated. The New York Review of Books described the agency protocol identified by Hersh as “the execution of internal dissidents by the CIA’s ‘Office of Security.’” These recent revelations stemming from the Frank Olson case seem to confirm E. Howard Hunt’s 1975 admission that the CIA had an assassination team tasked with liquidating security risks like suspected double-agents or CIA employees.

Under McCord’s supervision, the CIA’s Office of Security launched its illegal domestic counterintelligence operation against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (Newman 2008, 96). Lee Harvey Oswald’s bizarre attempts to ostensibly establish an FPCC chapter in New Orleans were so inept that they only make sense if understood as a counterintelligence operation of the kind McCord was conducting. To wit: Oswald moved to New Orleans, found office space in the building occupied by ex-FBI ultra-rightist Guy Banister and the militant CIA-sponsored anti-Castro Cuban Revolutionary Council (Newman 2008, 289). From this sensitive location, Oswald established a non-sanctioned “chapter” of the FPCC consisting of himself and his alias “Alec Hidel.” He proceeded to get arrested in a scuffle with CIA-sponsored Cubans, and then further discredited the FPCC by participating in a broadcast radio debate during which he acknowledged that he had defected to the Soviet Union. That Oswald was involved in a counterintelligence operation seems obvious; it is only because of the grim implications that such an assessment is controversial. The historical consequence of all this was considerable. His New Orleans
misadventures, along with his Soviet defection, served to create the Oswald “legend”—i.e., that he was a Communist malcontent.

Lastly, James McCord was involved in high level planning for the “Doomsday Project” or “Continuity of Government,” in which he helped plan for the implementation of authoritarian measures (censorship, preventive detention, and mass surveillance) in the event of a “national emergency” declared by either the president or the Secretary of Defense (Hougan 1984, 16). In sum, McCord had first-hand knowledge of many of the most sensitive “national security” operations, all of which represent exceptionism—both in their supralegal dimensions and by virtue of the fact that their details are to this day obscured by state secrecy. McCord’s ostentatious bungling of the Watergate break-in, his threat/prophecy of the doom that would follow should Helms be fired and the CIA blamed for Watergate, his refusal to stay quiet in return for money and executive clemency, his letter to Judge Sirica, his bizarre memoir casting Nixon as a Hitler-type figure in a Bircheresque anti-Rockefeller conspiracy theory—all of these anecdotes strongly indicate that McCord was a pivotal figure in a plot to weaken and ultimately bring down the Nixon presidency. It is not plausible that McCord would have been charged with handling so many of the most sensitive national security operations if he were as inept as the James McCord who planned and performed the second Watergate break-in. Likewise, the idea that he was somehow scandalized by Nixon’s lawbreaking is belied by the fact that he willingly performed even more blatantly illegal duties for the CIA. Such would include McCord’s role as the clean-up man following Frank Olson’s apparently extrajudicial execution by defenestration, as well as his work establishing protocol for a transition to a decidedly illiberal form of authoritarian governance.

In short, James McCord operated in a realm of deep state exceptionism. His high position in the CIA’s Office of Security entailed exercising exceptionist prerogative in order to conceal exceptionism in general. That is to say that the execution of Frank Olson and the subsequent
cover-up were deemed necessary to protect “national security,” but the threat that Olson represented was that he would reveal the criminal horrors of the CIA’s mind control and biological weapons programs. McCord’s involvement in the illegal domestic counterintelligence operations against the FPCC and his key role in the Olson murder strongly suggest that in the highly compartmentalized CIA where sensitive information is held on a need-to-know basis, the Office of Security would be one of those entities where officers would need to know of the most sensitive operations throughout the intelligence community in order to be aware of the persons and operations who could pose the greatest potential risks to “security.” The historical record suggests that the prevailing mindset maintains that some of the most serious security risks are those posed to liberal democracy’s rule-of-law myths. By this reckoning, “security” entails protecting the cultivated perception that the national security state does not represent the institutionalization of supralegal despotism in a society nominally governed by the rule of law and a sovereign public.

While détente seems to have been the decisive issue motivating Haig and the other anti-détente “Prussians” who figured in Watergate, the perceived threat represented by Nixon’s efforts to restructure the national security state is illuminating. In so doing, Nixon was trying to exercise his constitutionally prescribed duty to conduct diplomacy. His departure from the deep state’s Cold War orthodoxies, the CRP’s White House assumption of exceptionist prerogative, and Nixon’s moves to radically restructure the national security state created a conflict that was in part a battle over sovereignty in the Schmittian sense. If “he is sovereign who decides the exception,” Nixon was to discover that he was not sovereign. McCord represented those deep state forces that exercised considerable sovereignty. Given his position, it is wholly appropriate—perhaps even a prerequisite—that he held the fanatical, Bircher-esque views of the existential threat to the American way posed by communism and thus by those who would seek a *modus vivendi* with communist governments. Cold War exceptionism, to the extent that it was obliquely
acknowledged or grimly tolerated by the public, demanded for its legitimation an implacable Manichean antithesis bent on global domination. In such an existential struggle, all questions of morality, legality, and transparency would necessarily be irrelevant save for public relations purposes.

Watergate had threads leading to the most legally dubious US national security operations. These include sexual blackmail, state complicity in drug trafficking, assassinations of US officials like Frank Olson and John Kennedy, operational plans to establish more overtly dictatorial governance, and longstanding institutionalized partnerships with organized crime syndicates. These are operations whose details are to this day controversial, obscured, unadjudicated, and likely still ongoing. Even when Nixon tasked his handpicked DCI James Schlesinger with bringing the CIA to heel by compiling the “Family Jewels” files of the agency’s worst crimes, the aforementioned operations were shielded from disclosure. Instead, it was the arrested Plumbers who, in the standoff over Watergate, had the power to unleash the most explosive revelations about the US government. These were secrets whose exposure would have falsified the country’s foundational myths, potentially destroying the legitimacy of the US government and US hegemony. In this context, Deep Throat’s aforementioned cryptic and apocalyptic message that “Everyone’s life is in danger” can be understood. As recounted by Woodward, Throat said, “The covert activities involve the whole U.S. intelligence community and are incredible… The cover-up had little to do with Watergate, but was mainly to protect the covert operations” (Hougan 1984, 307; Bernstein and Woodward 1974, 317, 348-349).

The assemblage of the Plumbers Unit created a felonious criminal conspiracy comprised of individuals who were participants in—or were tied to—an impossibly scandalous variety of clandestine intrigues. As the former chief of the CIA’s security office, these intrigues were exactly the sort of matters that McCord would have been charged with protecting from disclosure. Instead, McCord did the opposite. Rather than preventing or dissolving this highly combustible
unit, he appears to have intentionally bungled the second Watergate break-in. This led to the arrest of the Plumbers which risked an unprecedented exposure of extremely sensitive state secrets—a risk that grew immeasurably by McCord’s refusal to assist in the cover-up. The theory offered here is that the Plumbers were deployed in such a way as to gain leverage over Nixon through their exploits like the excessively and dammingly well-documented burgling of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office. The disastrous second Watergate break-in made matters more precarious. Nixon’s partial grasp of the situation’s sensitivity led him to understandably believe that it would help ensure a cover-up. As DCI, Richard Helms seemed caught off-guard by some aspects of the unfolding drama. He was eventually fired and the affair ended up bringing the agency to the lowest point in its history. The post-Watergate Congressional intelligence investigations represented the most significant series of intelligence community revelations that the US has experienced. For these and other reasons, Watergate is not comprehensible via any theory that posits it as purely a CIA plot. Much of the deep state’s operational wherewithal may have resided at the CIA, but these exceptionist prerogatives are ultimately backstopped by the prevailing power structure, the pinnacle of the politico-economic elite.

Hypotheses that emerge from this theory entail the role of the Doomsday Project. Do Doomsday/COG provisions allow for supralegal covert actions to be carried out domestically in the name of national security? Do such provisions deem US hegemony, in some respect, to be a core element of national security—an element whose perpetuation must be safeguarded? Would exposure of the most egregious state crimes be considered the kind of threat to national security that would necessitate exceptionist measures? This is another way of asking whether American exceptionism extends to authorizing actions undertaken to maintain the concealment of exceptionism from US and global publics. Could such secret provisions explain McCord’s role (as well as the CIA’s) in Frank Olsen’s apparent summary execution? Could such provisions also explain in part the historically unique manner in which the press and the national security
bureaucracy coalesced against Nixon? Might such policies help to illuminate other strange events such as the suspicious recent deaths of Michael Hastings or Jeffrey Epstein? Of course such matters are academic in the vernacular sense without the dramatic weakening of US state secrecy.

Admittedly, this look at Watergate cannot be brought to a definitive conclusion. Exactly how the various intrigues were planned and by which entities cannot be ascertained. What can be concluded—and what does merit further investigation—is that Nixon’s administration alone was held to account for its crimes which on the whole represent a small fraction of US postwar state criminality. Regardless of one’s preferred explanation of Watergate, the historical evidence does demonstrate that Nixon attempted to depart from US neoconservative and neoliberal policy prescriptions and was subsequently removed from office. Imperial hegemony was reproduced and revised in the turbulent wake of Bretton Woods. Subsequent history demonstrates that Nixon’s foreign and domestic policies were reversed by his successors. As with Kennedy, Nixon was undone by his failure to either counter or accommodate powerful factions of the American deep state. And as with Carter, Nixon’s efforts at statesmanship caused him to lose the neoliberal backing he had previously enjoyed, something similar to Carter losing the “Rockefeller ‘Mandate of Heaven.’” With no countervailing overworld support, Nixon could not withstand the assault of Prussian/neoconservative forces, the intelligence bureaucracies with their underworld allies, the national media, and Nixon’s liberal Democratic political enemies. Such a theory goes further toward explaining the paradox of how an apparent defeat for right-wing forces (Nixon’s resignation) served to usher in a political realignment that moved both major parties significantly rightward. Watergate was a structural deep event that contributed significantly to the destruction of the American liberalism of the New Deal, World War II, and Bretton Woods eras.
CHAPTER 6

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEEP STATE

The deep state—the overworld-dominated institutions within and without the government—is not comprised entirely of invisible components. An institution like the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is a visible, partially transparent component of the deep state. It is a nominally non-governmental entity funded by Wall Street in order to cultivate and utilize foreign policy “expertise.” The tailormade expertise and policy prescriptions of the CFR logically and demonstrably serve the interests of the Wall Street overworld which funds the organization. As previously discussed, the CFR has had considerable impact on US policies including US entry into World War II, the creation of the postwar US-led world order, and subsequent US foreign policy during the Cold War and beyond. The Trilateral Commission is a transnational component of the deep state. It was founded by overworld eminence David Rockefeller, a man who was also a towering figure in the Council on Foreign Relations. The Trilateral Commission was comprised initially of political, business, and academic elites from the US, Western Europe, and Japan. The organization provided much of the personnel of the Carter administration and in retrospect clearly appears to have been at the forefront of moving the Democratic party in a neoliberal direction. The Trilateral Commission is largely transparent, perhaps excessively so with its publication The Crisis of Democracy—a volume containing the writings of ostensibly “liberal” academics bemoaning the emancipatory political movements of the 1960’s and calling for a renewed focus on the “indoctrination of the young,” among other things (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975, 162).

The Safari Club was a supranational deep state organization. It was run in part by the CIA-connected Saudi arms magnate Adnan Khashoggi and comprised of intelligence officials from France, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Israel, and Morocco. According to Saudi Prince Turki Al Faisal, the former head of Saudi intelligence:
In 1976, after the Watergate matters took place here, your intelligence community was literally tied up by Congress. It could not do anything. It could not send spies, it could not write reports, and it could not pay money. In order to compensate for that, a group of countries got together in the hope of fighting communism and established what was called the Safari Club. The Safari Club included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Iran … so, the Kingdom, with these countries, helped in some way, I believe, to keep the world safe when the United States was not able to do that. That, I think, is a secret that many of you don’t know.\(^{119}\)

This organization provides an illuminating example of deep state power. The US has had considerable sway over foreign intelligence agencies, including those that went on to comprise the Safari Club. For example, the CIA created Savak in Iran following the 1953 coup. Likewise, after the US-backed coup which overthrew Brazilian democracy in 1964, the CIA established a client Brazilian intelligence agency, the National Information Service (SNI) (Gribbin 1979, 20). When the US acted to effect the overthrow of Salvador Allende in 1973, it was the Brazilian state which took on a considerable portion of the operational duties (Harmer 2011). After Chilean democracy was overthrown, the CIA created a client Chilean intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA). These Southern Cone intelligence agencies functioned essentially as CIA franchises, carrying out Operation Condor in which tens of thousands of South American leftists, labor leaders, and religious clergy were assassinated, tortured, disappeared, or forced into exile. The creation and subsequent use of client intelligence services has been a common CIA practice. The obscuring of responsibility—in addition to the state secrecy already enjoyed by the CIA—makes these entities a crucial component of the deep state. Following Watergate revelations, the American public state acted to curtail the legally dubious practices of the CIA. In response, a supranational deep state availed itself of client intelligence services and private organizations to fill the vacuum, constructed as they were by the same overworld forces that created and animated the CIA.

One obscure but enduring characteristic of Western deep politics and American deep state is the presence of organized crime. The history of collaboration between US elites and
organized crime networks is long and somewhat hidden. There are numerous documented incidents of close collaboration or interpenetration between organized crime and US/Anglo political elites. In the early 19th century, US businessmen capitalized on the sale of opium in China. Corrupt institutions emerged to administrate this illicit commerce which was illegal under Chinese law. The opium trade was the most lucrative aspect of the “China trade,” and served to finance significant portions of early US industrialization. These economic relationships had considerable long-range impacts on US politics, history, and the conception of the national interest. The prospect of trading with Asia was one of the motivations for seizing California from Mexico. The ensuing Pacific focus led shortly thereafter to Commodore Perry forcibly opening up Japan. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the US overthrew and annexed Hawaii, seized the Philippines, and declared the “Open Door” policy, a policy doctrine originally intended to apply to China but also an apt and succinct creed for US hegemony.

In Central America, US fruit companies came to dominate the political economy of whole societies. They did this with considerable assistance from organized crime who could use muscle to suppress dock workers or labor in general. This combination of business and organized crime dominated the region and even brought down entire governments. The addition of US military power to the equation gave rise to the term “banana republic.” Here again, a criminogenic economic realm would become so powerful as to corrupt and alter the national interest, giving rise to the “Banana Wars” fought all over Central America between the end of the Spanish-American War and the beginning of FDR’s “Good Neighbor” policy.

The deep state’s modern institutionalization of the overworld/underworld nexus was facilitated by the security bureaucracy that emerged to prosecute World War II. Most notable was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime intelligence organization which was the precursor to the CIA. The OSS’ Operation Underworld brought together the patrician elites who comprised the OSS and organized crime figures. Most infamously, these included Meyer Lansky
and Lucky Luciano who was released from prison on Lansky’s insistence. Like the fruit companies discussed earlier, the US government wanted to use the mob’s expertise in suppressing radical longshoreman to guarantee that the logistically crucial waterfront areas would be pacified. This was more consequential than other stated aims of Operation Underworld, namely the apprehending of Nazi spies and saboteurs (Valentine 2004, 40).

In Asia, the OSS helped to broker a peaceful alliance between Thai and KMT forces in the opium rich Shan states of Burma, with fateful historical consequences (Scott 2010, 68-70). After the war, the OSS was disbanded, but the former OSS chief and a former chief of British intelligence formed something of a private alternative. This outfit was called the World Commerce Corporation (WCC) and it had backing from powerful overworld figures like Nelson Rockefeller (Scott 2010, 27). Through the activities of Kunming OSS chief and Wall Street lawyer Paul Heliwell (also Meyer Lansky’s lawyer), WCC figures were able to reestablish the KMT/Thai opium production in Burma (Scott 2010, 70-71). In the 1950’s, under the auspices of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), this same milieu would bleed into Operation Paper – a self-sustaining (through drug trafficking) KMT effort to retake the Chinese mainland. Only the drug trafficking aspect of the operation was successful (Scott 2010). Later, many of the same figures, practices, and arrangements would be reconstituted during the secret war in Laos where the CIA/KMT Air America airline utilized heroin trafficking to fund an anti-communist military force (McCoy 1991; 2003).

After the brief post-Watergate lull in CIA adventurism, these practices were revamped during the Reagan administration under DCI William Casey, the last surviving member of the “Old Boys” from the OSS and early CIA days. In order to fund the anti-Communist terrorist/paramilitary contras, the CIA and DEA turned a blind eye (in the most charitable assessment) to the Contra cocaine trafficking which helped fuel the crack epidemic of the 1980’s and 90’s (Webb 1998). Around the same time, the CIA’s Operation Cyclone used Pakistani and
Saudi intelligence to support the Mujahedeen—or Arab-Afghans—in a war against the Soviets. The largest recipient by far of these CIA funds was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a radically reactionary Islamist who became one of the world’s largest heroin traffickers during this time (McCoy 2003, 475).

The intelligence agencies’ partnership with drug trafficking organizations was not merely a Cold War peccadillo. In the early 1990’s, the US—with no Cold War pretext—deployed similar measures in the former Soviet Union. The Bush administration sought to have a pipeline built which would transport Baku oil to Turkey. Around this time a front company from Atlanta named MEGA Oil appeared. In Azerbaijan, MEGA Oil created a proprietary airline that secretly flew al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to Azerbaijan. Afghan heroin also flowed through Baku and into Chechnya with the support of the Pakistani ISI (Scott 2003, 164). These operations led eventually to a 1993 military coup that overthrew Abulfaz Elchibey, Azerbaijan’s elected president. His replacement was the US-friendly Heidar Aliyev. Turkish intelligence ascertained that the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (comprised of BP and Amoco) were behind the coup. MEGA Oil never found oil and it would appear that it was not created to do so. Rather, MEGA Oil served to lay the operational groundwork for an Azerbaijani shift that moved the country firmly into the US/Anglo camp, both as a source of petroleum profits and as a hub for the transportation of jihadis and heroin. While there is evidence that big oil was behind the coup in 1993, it is unknown to this author what persons or organizations were ultimately behind the creation of MEGA Oil.

It is important to note that one of the founders of MEGA oil was Richard Secord (Scott 2007, 163), a veteran of both Iran-Contra and the “secret war” in Laos (Secord 1992). Secord was already formally retired by the time of his Iran-Contra involvement. He eventually pled guilty of lying to Congress about the $2 million he had personally received during the operation. The overlapping personnel and the repeated modi operandi demonstrate that these operations are
institutionalized deep state practices bringing together elements of the security state, the criminal underworld, and the overworld of the corporate rich. An exception to the rule of law generally applies to those practices carried out in furtherance of US hegemony. Thus, again, the national interest appears to be defined as being largely synonymous with the interests of the overworld of private wealth.

Besides arms and commodities industries, drug traffic and the state-implicated drug traffic must also be considered a significant element of the Dollar Wall Street Regime. The extent of this may be impossible to quantify, but occasionally facts surface which illuminate this aspect of the global economy. In 2009, The Guardian reported that the top official at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, said that he saw evidence that organized crime profits were “the only liquid investment capital” going into a number of banks which nearly collapsed during the 2008 financial crisis and that most of the $352 billion of drug trafficking profits were consequently absorbed by the economic system.\(^\text{125}\) Said Costa, “Inter-bank loans were funded by money that originated from the drugs trade and other illegal activities... There were signs that some banks were rescued that way.”\(^\text{126}\) According to the Guardian article, Costa’s statements, “will raise questions about crime’s influence on the economic system at times of crisis.”\(^\text{127}\) Such anecdotes indicate that the flow of drug money into the banking system is a systemic feature of the global economy that is most noticeable when “normal” financial activity stops or is curtailed drastically. To the extent that such is the case, it suggests that the underworld often functions as a subsidiary of the overworld.

The underworld and the security state also have a history of collaborating to organize political assassinations. In 1955, the CIA’s drug-trafficking KMT allies attempted to assassinate Zhou Enlai who was on his way to Sukarno’s Bandung Conference. A saboteur put a bomb on the Kashmir Princess airliner. Zhou was tipped off and switched planes, but eleven passengers died when the bomb exploded (Tsang 1994). While Tsang (1994) concluded that the CIA was not
directly implicated, other evidence points to possible US involvement, including the escape of the saboteur on a plane owned by the CIA/KMT proprietary airline Civil Air Transport (later renamed Air America).\(^{128}\)

Perhaps the most infamous examples of intelligence-underworld collaboration were the Castro assassination plots in which the CIA enlisted Cuban exiles and top US organized crime figures to assassinate Fidel Castro. Castro survived the plots, but they may have been redirected successfully at President Kennedy. Robert Kennedy himself came to believe that such was the case (Kennedy 2018, 267-268). Senator Kennedy had planned to reinvestigate his brother’s assassination once he attained the presidency but before that could happen, he himself was assassinated (Talbot 2007).

In 1976, former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb on a Washington DC street. His murder had been ordered by DINA, Chile’s CIA-created intelligence unit. The plot was executed by DINA members and Cuban exiles in conjunction with assets from Operation Condor, the CIA’s outsourced supranational assassination apparatus. All of the parties involved were also engaged in drug trafficking (Scott 2010, 5). In 1990, a CIA anti-drug unit was exposed as having shipped into the US a ton of cocaine which was eventually sold on the street. The head of the unit was General Ramon Guillen Davila.\(^{129}\) DEA officials stated that the general confessed to establishing and profiting from the operation. Said one agent, “He cried, collapsed, admitted everything he had done … [Guillen] was trying to do exactly what Noriega did – no worse, no better.”\(^{130}\) The enterprise may have smuggled as much as 22 tons of cocaine into the US.\(^{131}\) In 2007, the retired General Guillen was arrested, along with his son, for conspiring to assassinate President Hugo Chavez.\(^{132}\) Guillen was able in 2007 to conspire to kill Chavez because he hadn’t been indicted for his drug smuggling. The US had determined that Venezuelan relations were too important to risk at that time in the 1990’s when the country was fighting against a rebellion being led by the same Hugo Chavez who Guillen would later plot to
Though no authors raise this possibility, the circumstances around Guillen’s drug smuggling operation and his oblique statements to the effect that he “was trying to do exactly what Noriega did,” raise another possibility. Was the CIA attempting to establish a self-financing anti-Chavista force in Venezuela in the apparently likely event that the Chavez rebellion became a protracted conflict? The CIA subversion of DEA efforts at the time would seem to belie the explanation that this was purely a misguided but sincere interdiction operation gone wrong. In Latin America, Operation Condor and the Contras were both financed in similar ways for similar ends. Further research could establish whether there is any additional empirical support for this hypothesis.

Intertwined with the nexus of intelligence and organized crime are various types of clandestine financial infrastructure. Collectively they represent another key component of the deep state. Former OSS officer, lawyer, and CIA officer Paul Helliwell was a key figure in the early establishment of the subterranean legal and financial institutions that would fund various operations around the world. After World War II, Helliwell facilitated the establishment of the two legal entities which revived the East Asian opium connection. The first was Civilian Air Transport (CAT) which was built out of General Claire Chennault’s World War II Flying Tigers outfit. It was Helliwell who arranged for CAT to be made into a CIA propriety (Scott 2003, 7). The second was Sea Supply Inc., a corporation set up to move arms to the KMT’s opium traffickers in Burma and Thailand (McCoy 2003, 168). Helliwell was counsel to Meyer Lansky’s Miami National Bank when KMT monies from the Burmese-Thai operation were coming in via Hong Kong and laundered through Lansky-connected property firms. Helliwell later established Castle Bank in the Bahamas, a company that laundered money on behalf of the CIA and organized crime (Scott 2003, 61). When the Justice Department was pursuing Castle Bank for tax evasion, the investigation was eventually quashed, ending what may have been the largest tax
evasion case in history. According to Jim Drinkhall in the *Washington Post*, the CIA successfully argued,

…that pursuit of the Castle Bank would endanger “national security.” This was involved because that bank, besides its possible use as a haven for tax evaders, was the conduit for millions of dollars earmarked by the CIA for the funding of clandestine operations against Cuba and for other covert intelligence operations directed at countries in Latin America and the Far East. A major tax evasion investigation of the bank probably would have endangered these CIA operations.\(^{133}\)

An official involved in the investigation claimed that Castle Bank was one of the channels used to finance anti-Cuban operations. Helliwell was reportedly one of the men in charge of financing the Bay of Pigs fiasco.\(^{134}\)

In addition to the Lansky-connected Miami National Bank represented by Paul Helliwell, Miami was the location of another notorious conduit for illicit monies, the World Finance Corporation. This institution was established in 1970 by Bay of Pigs veteran Guillermo Hernandez-Cartaya (Brewton 1992, 181). Twelve or more employees of World Finance had intelligence connections, including Walter Sterling Surrey, one of the founding directors. Surrey was an OSS officer described by one journalist as “a charter member of the old boy network of US intelligence” (Brewton 1992, 182). World Finance funded CORU, a Cuban exile terrorist outfit (Scott 2010, 37). CORU’s most notorious crime was its 1976 mid-flight bombing of a Cuban passenger plane which killed all 73 people aboard (Scott and Marshall 1998, 31). The two Cuban assassins of Orlando Letellier were provided by CORU and the organization had also carried out the earliest planning for the assassination (Scott 2010, 37). In the late 1970’s, World Finance came under federal investigation for drug trafficking, money laundering, arms trafficking, political corruption and links to terrorism. As with Castle Bank, it appears that the CIA was able to derail the World Finance investigation. With national security as the justification, US Attorney R. Jerome Sanford was denied access to the FBI’s CIA files pertaining

In 1973, Frank Nugan and Michael Hand – along with four Air America officials – established the Australian merchant bank, Nugan Hand (Nathan 1983, 182). In the Sydney bank’s early days, Michael Hand told some younger colleagues that “it was his ambition that Nugan Hand become banker for the CIA” (McCoy 1991, 465-66). In a short time, the bank expanded its capitalization of $1 million to $1 billion and opened offices in 22 countries (Nathan 1983, 182). One branch was in Chiang Mai, Thailand near the borders of Laos and Burma. On Australian television, the director of Nugan Hand’s Chiang Mai branch said that the bank served as a “laundry” for the (CIA-allied, Laotian) Hmong and other opium traders (Nathan 1983, 182). The same director stated that Nugan Hand transferred various sums of $50 to $60 million for the CIA and that the bank was also involved in arms sales to the Third World (Scott 2010, 167).

Australian investigators found that Nugan Hand had financed major drug deals and laundered drug money (Scott 2010, 166). The bank financed the first large-scale drug shipments into Australia. This occurred just as Nixon’s “War on Drugs” began effecting heroin traffic to the US (Scott 2003, 40-41). A pivotal moment for Nugan Hand came in June of 1976 when the bank was awarded a charter in the Cayman Islands. Eventually the Sydney police and journalist Jonathan Kwitny of the Wall Street Journal came to believe that there was a connection between the rise of Nugan Hand and the collapse of Castle Bank (McCoy 1991, 469). Nugan Hand began its Caribbean operations at the same time as Castle was closing down. With its Caribbean location and its hiring of “retired” CIA officers, Nugan Hand had a corporate structure strikingly similar to Castle. Kevin Mulcahy, a CIA agent who testified in the Edwin Wilson case, informed the National Times of Sydney “about the Agency’s use of Nugan Hand for shifting money for various covert operations around the globe” (McCoy 1991, 470).
Nugan Hand also played a role in the CIA-backed 1975 overthrow of Australia’s Labor government. Pertaining to a moment earlier in the crisis, a CIA contract employee told a newspaper that Michael Hand paid him to forge cables that were politically damaging to Labor officials. The cables, he said, were forged at the instruction of CIA officer Edwin Wilson (Nathan 1983, 177). A debate in the Australian parliament was scheduled for November 11, 1975 at which would be discussed CIA funding of Australian labor unions through Nugan Hand. The debate never took place. That morning, the Governor General—a largely symbolic official—dismissed the Labor prime minister using legally dubious powers never before asserted in the history of the Commonwealth (Sullivan 2008, 148-149). The Governor General had deep ties to US intelligence, dating back to the OSS and later to CIA fronts including the Asia Foundation and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (Nathan 1983, 176). When asked in 1981 about Nugan Hand’s collapse, CIA deputy director Bobby Inman stated that he was worried that any deeper investigation of the bank would expose various “dirty tricks” that had been played against Australia’s Labor government. (Nathan 1983, 177).

The Nugan Hand bank collapsed following the death of Frank Nugan in 1980. Nugan was found dead in his late model Mercedes Benz on a remote, unpaved road 90 miles north of his $1 million Sydney home (Nathan 1983, 170; McCoy 1991, 461). The business card of William Colby was found in Nugan’s pocket. Colby was employed as an advisor to Nugan Hand Limited on legal, political, and tax matters (Nathan 1983, 170). He was also a former director of the CIA and the man who had run the agency’s notorious Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War (Valentine 1990). With the assistance of an ex-CIA officer, Hand obtained a fake passport, put on a fake beard and mustache and then flew to Canada via Fiji before disappearing. An Australian intelligence document stated that Hand was working in Central America with the Contras in 1982. This is logical given that in the 1980’s a Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation into Iran-Contra found that many of the men under investigation were subjects in a
1983 Australian report on Nugan Hand by the Commonwealth-New South Wales Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking. Among the men involved with both Iran-Contra and Nugan Hand were Richard Secord, Theodore G. Shackley, Thomas G. Clines and Rafael Quintero. Hand, Shackley, Clines, and Secord were all involved in the heroin-riddled CIA operations in Laos in the late 1960’s.\textsuperscript{136}

In a strange postscript to the Nugan Hand story, Michael Hand was found alive and well in 2015 living in a small town in Idaho under name Michael Fuller. He had been earning a good living by selling tactical weapons to militaries around the world. Thus, one of the most wanted fugitives in Australian history was able to safely relocate to the United States and earn a decent living as a modest part of the military industrial complex. Australian author Peter Butt tracked Hand down, stating that “[T]he FBI could have dealt with Michael Hand long ago. A simple background check reveals Fuller's social security number is identical to the one allocated to Michael Hand in New York in 1960.” Butt added that “The fact that Hand has been allowed to live the free life in the United States suggests that he belongs to a protected species, most likely of the intelligence kind.”\textsuperscript{137} Though Michael Hand was one Australia’s most wanted fugitives for over thirty years, there is no indication that he will be facing extradition.

Following the collapse of Nugan Hand, the most notable deep state banking enterprise to emerge in the following era was the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Though founded around the same time as Nugan Hand, BCCI would outlast the Australian bank and play a prominent role in Iran-Contra intrigues. Discussed previously in chapter four, BCCI was at the center of a supranational parapolitical meta-conspiracy involving the 1980 “October Countersurprise,” the illegal sale of arms to Iran, the diversion of those funds to illegally arm the Contras, the facilitation (or at least toleration) of cocaine trafficking to finance the Contras, and the support of the heroin-financed Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. The upshot of these banking enterprises—Castle Bank, Nugan Hand, BCCI—is that they do not fit conceptually within a
state/non-state binary. Nor can they be thought of as simply components of what Glennon terms the Trumanite Network or what would otherwise be called the security state. The CIA routinely establishes proprietary firms. There is no reason that the agency could not establish a bank with international branches to move funds in and out of this or that country to fund this or that operation. If these were fully state-sanctioned operations, it would seem that there would be no reason why these enterprises should run afoul of authorities, but that happened in all three cases. On many occasions, the public state eventually detected criminal activity and then attempted to investigate under the auspices of state authority. Yet time and again, a full legal reckoning was eluded.

It may be that these enterprises have become passé given the de facto state of exception in which banks operate in the era of “too big to fail.” Two recent examples illustrate this point. Between 2004 and 2007, Wachovia was found to have failed to apply the legally required anti-laundering strictures to $378.4 billion transferred into dollar denominated accounts from Mexican currency exchange outlets. No Wachovia official was prosecuted. The bank was forced to forfeit $110 million in funds proven to be connected to drug trafficking and a $50 million fine for not monitoring funds used to transport 22 tons of cocaine. The total fine paid by Wachovia was less than 2% of its $12.3 billion profit in 2009. In 2012, a similarly ineffectual fine was levelled against HSBC after it had been found to have been providing financial services to drug dealers, al Qaeda, and Russian organized crime. Mexican branches had transferred $7 billion to accounts in New York in 2007 and 2008. ICE found that in those years, HSBC moved $881 million of drug money into US accounts on behalf of a Columbian cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel. For its crimes, the Justice Department forced HSBC to pay $1.9 billion in fines and forfeitures. This is probably less money than HSBC made from the transactions as evidenced by an internal email in which an executive lamented the loss of $2.6 billion in revenue from the accounts they were forced to close. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) has a uniquely
drug-centric history. It was founded in 1865 after the second Opium War. The peace treaty forced China to legalize the opium trade whereupon HSBC became the biggest commercial bank in quasi-colonial Qing China.\textsuperscript{141}

In addition to all of these banks, there are other financial conduits of the deep state. Following World War II, several significant channels were established. The Marshall Plan had a secret codicil that provided funds for covert operations to be carried out by the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). These monies were often channeled through foundations like Ford and Rockefeller with OPC personnel moving between intelligence and foundation positions (Pisani 1991). Five percent of Marshall Plan funds (around $685 million) were diverted to fund these operations which included creating false front organizations, propaganda campaigns, creating unlawful underground organizations, and infiltrating civil society, especially labor unions (Weiner 2008, 32-3; 40). Part of these funds went to support Nightingale, a Nazi-created guerilla army in Ukraine which during the war had carried out thousands of murders in pursuit of its ultranationalist goals (Stone and Kuznick 2012, 214). In addition, the US used $10 million of Axis money in the CIA’s first covert operation, the successful campaign to determine the outcome of Italy’s 1948 election (Scott 2015, 15).

Japan’s postwar political system was even more dramatically dominated through financing by deep political forces. During the second Sino-Japanese War, yakuza figure and ultrarightist Yoshio Kodama was made a commissioned officer. In wartime, he amassed a fortune by selling the gold, diamonds, and platinum that he had procured in China through the traffic of opium and liquor and through outright looting. He transferred vast quantities of stolen diamonds and platinum to an associate before going to prison at the end of the war as a Class A war criminal. Kodama was released in 1948 reportedly thanks to the intervention of the CIA. Kodama went on to become the CIA’s top asset in Japan. Funds from the sale of the aforementioned materiel (around $175 million) were used to establish and fund Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.
The right-wing LDP dominated Japanese politics for decades, making Japan into a de facto one-party state, firmly pro-US and anti-neutrality (Johnson, Schlei, and Schaller 2000, Johnson 2003). In postwar Japan, Kodama also used Yakuza gangs to crack down on labor unions and left-wing groups that opposed the US-Japan Security Pact (Johnson, Schlei, and Schaller 2000, 87).

Kodama has links to other deep state financial conduits. Kodama was a part of Golden Lily, an operation administered by Emperor Hirohito’s brother Price Chichibu. Golden Lily was the systematic looting of Japan’s overseas empire in Asia. A vast, not precisely known amount of this wealth was recovered by OSS officer Edward Lansdale in the Philippines after the war. It had been buried in hidden vaults by Japanese General Yamashita after the US had cut off the shipping lanes to Japan. Rather than reveal the existence of this vast amount of gold and other valuables, the US made a decision to obscure its existence and instead assert that Japan was financially wiped out after the war and thus unable to pay any reparations to members of victim nations including Bataan Death March veterans and/or their families. Subsequently, the proceeds were stored in bank accounts all over the world to be used to fund various covert operations (Johnson 2003, Seagrave and Seagrave 2003). The full story of Golden Lily—sometimes called Yamashita’s gold—has never been told. The fullest account comes from the book Gold Warriors by Sterling and Peggy Seagrave (2003). While the Seagraves are not trained academic historians, they compensated for this by including with their book three CD-ROMs containing the source material on which their narrative is based. This supporting material, combined with the experiences of former US Deputy Attorney Norbert Schlei were enough to convince renowned Japan scholar Chalmers Johnson of the veracity of the Seagraves’ central claims (Johnson 2003, see also Johnson, Schlei, and Schaller 2000).

Yoshio Kodama was also a key figure in another of the deep state’s financial institutions – the Lockheed system of payoffs to key political figures. Rather than having its agents handing
off suitcases full of cash, “the CIA used trusted American businessmen as go-betweens to deliver money to benefit its allies. Among these were executives from Lockheed, the company then building the U-2” (Weiner 2008, 137). Five months prior to the 1965 overthrow of Indonesian President Sukarno, Lockheed reallocated a stream of funds from a Sukarno backer to a Suharto supporter. These political payoffs were laundered as commissions from arms sales. Lockheed records offer no explanation for the change which incidentally put the company at risk of being sued for violating the terms of a contract (Scott 1985, 255-256). However, a memo that surfaced later from the Jakarta office of the Economic Counselor of the US Embassy said of the Lockheed switch, “[There were] some political considerations behind it” (Scott 1985, 255-56). Kodama and Sasakawa Ryoichi were also instrumental in the overthrow of Sukarno and both were recipients of—and conduits for—Lockheed payments (Scott 2010, 170). Eventually, the Lockheed system would become a major scandal in Japan, leading to the 1983 criminal conviction of former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka for taking $4.5 million in bribes from Lockheed.143 The scandal also brought an end to Kodama’s reign as the preeminent deep state fixer in Japan. Until the scandal broke in 1976, Kodama was unknown to the Japanese public. As for the $7 million in Lockheed bribes, the court’s verdict was suspended owing to Kodama’s poor health. He died in 1984.144 It is worth noting that the Lockheed role in both Indonesia and Japan was only exposed through the Church Committee investigation.145 This is another example of how the brief period following Watergate represented the most significant push-back from the public state against the national security state and deep state forces.

Lockheed is not the only private corporation to be involved in these sorts of intrigues involving arms sales and covert operations. In 1981, the US sold Boeing AWACS to Saudi Arabia for $8.5 billion. Reagan had to twist arms in the Senate to get the deal approved. Numerous sources reported that Reagan pushed the deal in exchange for a Saudi promise to fund the administration’s covert operations and thereby avoid congressional oversight. This was not a
direct kickback as with the Lockheed deals, rather the money went to other operations such as the funding of the Reagan’s two infamous drug-trafficking terrorist proxy forces—the Contras and the Mujahedeen (Marshall 1988). The Saudis were also involved in another significant arms deal scandal more recently. In 2004, Britain’s Serious Fraud Office began an investigation into revelations that Saudi royals were receiving enormous secret payments from Britain’s largest arms maker, BAE. The payments were essentially bribes to facilitate much larger arms sales to the kingdom. In 2006, Tony Blair prevailed upon the Attorney General to end the investigation. It later emerged that Blair had intervened in response to threats from Prince Bandar—the chief of the Saudi National Security Council and the son of the kingdom’s crown prince. Bandar was accused of receiving over 1$ billion from BAE. Previously secret files revealed how Bandar had flown to London in 2006 to deliver threats to the effect that further investigation could cause “another 7/7” and cost “British lives on British streets.”\footnote{146} The least sinister way to interpret this would be as a threat to withhold from Britain the Saudi intelligence on terror networks that the kingdom so diligently and earnestly compiles. However, given Bandar’s status as an \textit{éminence grise} of the deep state, his threats lend themselves to darker interpretations. It was Bandar who secured the AWACS deal and subsequently contributed over $30 million to fund the Contras.\footnote{147} It was Bandar who organized the USA-KSA plan to arm the Afghan Mujahedeen.\footnote{148} Bandar was also linked to 9/11 in different ways. Two unpublished phone numbers connected to Bandar were found in the phonebook of al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah. More troubling is the finding that in the years around 9/11, Prince Bandar and his wife gave tens of thousands of dollars to two Saudi families who lived on the same apartment block as two of the 9/11 hijackers. One of the men of these families, Omar al-Bayoumi, was suspected of being a covert Saudi agent. Al-Bayoumi greeted the hijackers upon their US arrival. He helped them get an apartment, helped them acquire social security cards, and helped them enroll in flight schools. The Basnans—the
other of the two families—had once held a party for “blind sheik” Omar Rahman, the Muslim cleric convicted for his role in the 1993 WTC bombing (Scott 2015, 75).

While none of this evidence proves that Bandar was wittingly funding 9/11 hijackers, it does highlight in several respects the powers of deep state actors to fund and carry out operations which are rarely investigated or adjudicated even when substantial evidence surfaces. A rule of thumb for criminal investigations is that they should “follow the money.” With apparently a different philosophy in mind, The 9/11 Commission Report stated that, “To date, the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the question is of little practical significance.” At any rate, Bandar and KSA never became fully estranged from al Qaeda and associated groups. In 2007, Seymour Hersh wrote that Bandar was leading the Saudi side of a change in US policy that would utilize Salafi militants to attack US and Saudi enemies in the Middle East. According to a US government consultant, “[Bandar’s and the Saudis’] message to us was ‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.”

This account could be dismissed as hearsay were it not for the fact that in subsequent years, US policy unfolded in just the way Bandar described, as al Qaeda and other Salafist types were unleashed in Libya and Syria with enormous support from the US and allies like Saudi Arabia.

As demonstrated above, these financial intrigues are obscure, widespread, and connected to various criminogenic operations involving a multinational cadre within and outside of the government. These financial channels can serve to fund nominally non-state organizations. Deep state, top-down power can be brought to bear by diverse non-state entities. In US history, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency was a private firm that, beginning on the mid-19th century, famously provided clients with a variety of services including strike-breaking, infiltration,
intelligence gathering, and counterintelligence. The Pinkertons often worked with the wealthy overworld of its day, in addition to receiving government contracts. Since World War II, numerous types of organizations have been created to carry out legitimate and illegitimate activities on behalf of the state and/or overworld actors. Some of these are descendants of the Pinkertons, so to speak—private intelligence or even paramilitary firms. These have included Wackenhut, Booz Allen, SAIC, Stratfor, and Blackwater. Officials in these companies may retain and utilize high security clearances. Other entities have been created by intelligence services but can eventually act with considerable autonomy. These include the various Anti-Communist Leagues established early in the Cold War.

In Europe, Operation Gladio created “stay behind” armies initially intended to resist Soviet occupation, but later used to carry out false flag terror as part of a “strategy of tension” designed to move countries politically to the right (Ganser 2005). In Italy, Gladio was connected to an even more obscure and infamous organization, the Propaganda Due (P2) Masonic Lodge. Historian Daniele Ganser wrote, “P2 was literally a state within the state and operated beyond any democratic controls” (2009, 257). The P2 lodge was comprised of powerful members of society including many drawn from the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government. There were members of the media, wealthy industrialists, the military officers, and officers of the Carabinieri paramilitary police (Ganser 2009, 260-261). According to a German journalist, the ex-OSS officer and high-ranking Freemason Frank Gigliotti recruited and financed the leader who established of the P2 lodge as an anti-Communist network (Ganser 2009, 266). It was apparently under the Nixon administration that US support for P2 most dramatically increased. Former CIA agent Richard Brennecke claimed that the US was financing P2 with as much as $10 million per month. He also stated that, “We have used the P2 to create tensions which led to the explosion of terrorism in Italy and other countries during the 1970’s” (Ganser 2009, 265). This would be a reference to the P2’s relationship to Gladio. In the 1990’s, an Italian parliament
investigation concluded that Gladio members had conspired with ultra-rightists to engage in covert operations including terrorist attacks that were then blamed on communists to damage them in elections (Ganser 2009, 269). In 2001, Italy’s former chief of counterintelligence, General Gianadelio Maletti, testified that after the Piazza Fontana bombing, Italian intelligence agents planted bomb components in the home of a leftist editor to blame him and the Italian left for the bombing (Ganser 2009, 270). While there have been a number of spectacular disclosures involving institutions like Gladio and P2, data on these entities remains sparse overall. In addition to the false flag terror of Italy’s strategy of tension, some have speculated that these entities could have been involved in various assassinations of political figures in Europe, including Aldo Moro, Olaf Palme, and Alfred Herrhausen.

Situated more firmly within the government—but with links to the private sector—the “Doomsday Project” is another significant if obscure component of the deep state. Also known as “Continuity of Government” (COG), the Doomsday Project began in the early days of the Cold War. Its initial purpose was to allow for the state’s continued existence following a nuclear war. The Pentagon began implementing its plans shortly thereafter, notably with the construction of the huge underground complexes at Raven Rock and Mount Weather.151 COG planning under Eisenhower began to generate a series of Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs) which could be issued by a president following the declaration of a national emergency (Scott 2015, 147). An FBI memo from 1958 revealed that one of the PEADs allowed the government to apprehend and detain “those dangerous alien enemies presently included in our security index” (Scott 2015, 148). This type of planning continued and accelerated during the tumultuous 1960’s. These plans eventually evolved into Operation Garden Plot which was issued shortly after the riots which followed the MLK assassination. Garden Plot allowed for two brigades to be at ready to quell unrest. The operation was discontinued after student protesters were shot at Kent State and Jackson State (Scott 2015, 148-149). However, the plans were resurrected during the Carter
administration by “Coordinator of Security” Samuel Huntington, a scholarly advocate of top-down (or “dark”) power (Scott 2015, 149). In 1978, Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski redesigned the COG system most notably by creating FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management System which provided the infrastructure needed for a government takeover in the event of a crisis (Scott 2015, 149).

Under the Reagan administration, COG planning was further ramped up as the “Doomsday Project.” Oliver North was working on this project which included provisions to surveil political dissidents and detain undocumented aliens in the event of an emergency. This plan was given the codename Rex 84 and it entailed Constitutional suspension under a number of pretexts which included an American invasion of Nicaragua (Scott 2007, 183). In addition to political opponents of Reagan’s Central American policies, the plan called for the surveillance of environmentalists, anti-nuke activists, and refugee advocates (Scott 2007, 183-184). The deep state quality of COG planning is demonstrated in part by the fact that some of the highest-level planning of this era was carried out by a parallel extra-governmental group. Operating outside of regular government channels, this group included the CEO of G.D. Searle & Co., Donald Rumsfeld and then Wyoming congressman Dick Cheney. Official responsibility for the program resided with Vice President George H.W. Bush under an entity with an anodyne title: the National Program Office. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver served as the National Security Council action officer (Scott 2007, 184).

Although the most sweeping suspension of the constitution was to be asserted in the event of a nuclear war, in 1988 Executive Order 12656 amended this to allow for constitutional suspension following “any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States” (Scott 2007, 186). In 1994, it was reported in The New York Times that the Doomsday Project was a relic of the Cold War and thus was to be closed that year.153 In
reality, only the nuclear aspect of COG planning had ended. During the Clinton administration, planning continued with a $200 million annual budget. Soviet nukes were replaced by terrorists. Additionally, the specialists of the “shadow government” in waiting were no longer a bipartisan group, but instead were mostly Republican hawks including Cheney and Rumsfeld (Scott 2007, 186). In May of 2001, the Rumsfeld-Cheney COG planning team was essentially reunited in George W. Bush’s administration as a terrorism task force. In this capacity, they presumably did a lot of planning (about which almost nothing is known) before a major terrorist attack resulted in the implementation of COG (Scott 2007, 186). Since the September 11, 2001 terror spectacle, COG provisions have been implemented and renewed without transparency or debate. At present, it is impossible to know the extent to which secret decrees have overridden the public legislation that enumerates and circumscribes governmental authority (Scott 2007, 40-41).

Peter Dale Scott sees COG as a crucial component of the deep state—one with considerable impact on the course of postwar American history. Specifically, Scott (2015) asserts that COG has been an operational factor in four structural deep events (117), historical events that “…are large enough to affect the whole fabric of society, with consequences that enlarge covert government, and are subsequently covered up by systematic falsifications in media and internal government records” (121). Scott’s four structural deep events are: the Kennedy assassination, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 9/11 (Scott 2015, 109). The import of these events is that they have served to facilitate key historical developments that have weakened and threatened democracy in the US. One of these negative developments is the transformation of the American economy into a plutonomy, an increasingly disparate hierarchy of haves and have-nots. Another development is the drastic rise of secretive, top-down state power in the US. A third is the rise of American militarism and the tendency to launch wars in remote parts of the globe (Scott 2015, 109-110).
Thus, Scott views COG as an element of the deep state which has played a significant historical role in allowing for the rise of deep state power relative to that of the public state. In particular, there are personnel overlaps between COG and structural deep events. These overlaps include Jack Crichton who was in Dallas in 1963 as an army intelligence officer and chief of intelligence for Dallas Civil Defense (Scott 2015, 118). James McCord of the CIA was involved in high level COG planning (Scott 2015, 117). McCord figured in aspects of the Kennedy assassination and later more infamously in Watergate. John Dean of Watergate fame had been a participant in COG activities as associate deputy attorney general (Scott 2015, 118). Oliver North was deeply involved in some of the most sensitive aspects of the Doomsday Project. He was also a key Iran-Contra figure, during which he carried out illegal operations using Flashboard, the top-secret communications network of the Doomsday Project (Scott 2015, 117-118). Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were key COG figures during the 1980’s and 1990’s. They are also important if obscure Watergate characters for their roles in the “Halloween Massacre” of 1975. As detailed in chapter four, the Halloween Massacre can be viewed as the denouement of Watergate, marking as it did a decisive—if poorly recognized—US political shift to the right under President Ford. Additionally, and more famously, Rumsfeld and Cheney were key 9/11 figures. Of this, Scott (2007) writes:

[Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s] behavior on 9/11 revives the question arising from their White House activity in the semiconspiratorial 1975 Halloween Massacre […]. The question in both events is whether Cheney and Rumsfeld could have contrived such a major change on their own within the White House, or whether they were acting in concert with other aspects of the deep state. That is a key question for 9/11 […] made even more urgent by [their] activities with respect to COG (235).

On the surface, these appear to be alarmist statements, pregnant with grim implications. However, a close reading of Scott’s work convincingly demonstrates that much important information about 9/11 has been covered up. Given the extraordinary levels of government secrecy involved, it is impossible to say what exactly is being covered up, but subsequent to Scott’s 2007 book on 9/11,
high officials began to speak of various cover-ups related to 9/11. For example, Senator Bob Graham stated in 2015, “One thing that irritates me is that the F.B.I. has gone beyond just covering up, trying to avoid disclosure, into what I call aggressive deception.”

Graham had previously co-chaired the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. John Farmer, the senior counsel of the 9/11 Commission, wrote, “At some level of the government, at some point in time [...] there was a decision not to tell the truth about what happened.”

While none of these critical insiders have placed a strong emphasis on COG operations and 9/11, that area remains part of the obscured story of 9/11. This and its relevance to prior cataclysmic events in recent US political history should be further scrutinized. As an institution in a nominally democratic state, the Doomsday Project has remained mostly opaque. This opacity has persisted, even as the passage of time has seemingly nullified the arguments that might be made for keeping COG and related communications secret. For example, historically relevant communications over secure networks were withheld from the Warren Commission, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, the Assassination Records Review Board, and the 9/11 Commission regarding the Kennedy assassination and 9/11 respectively (Scott 2015, 119). The Doomsday Project has had significant links to the private sector and has operated largely in the absence of meaningful congressional or other public state oversight. For these and other reasons, the Doomsday Project is a noteworthy component of the American deep state.

At times, getting lost in the minutiae of these various national security intrigues can obscure the larger ends toward which they collectively aim. Drawing from Halford Mackinder, historian Alfred McCoy (2017) points out that US postwar geopolitical primacy rested upon control of both axial ends of the world island—the Eurasian landmass. By controlling Western Europe (especially Germany) and East Asia (especially Japan), the US created a capitalist international order over which it reigned hegemonic. Trade and capital have flowed across two
oceans with the US as the center of gravity, providing the global reserve currency and an historically unprecedented network of military bases concentrated at strategically significant locations. While commonly understood as the postwar triumph of liberal democracy in the “free world,” the preponderance of covert operations suggests a less sanguine appraisal. In Europe and Japan, untold sums were spent to covertly manipulate political life. Japan was a de facto one-party state with war criminals in roles as CIA-linked power brokers and fixers. Similarly, wartime fascists and Nazis were spared from legal reckoning in order to wield tremendous power in Italy and Germany, specifically in the personage of Nazi—and then West German—intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen and the fascist head of P2, Licio Gelli. The establishment and operation of clandestine non-governmental organizations and networks further confounds historiography and political sense-making in our time. However, the record is clear enough to establish that such entities have played a significant historical role and that on balance their activities have consistently served to undermine democracy and the rule of law while bolstering the deep state’s drive for hegemony on its terms.

The foregoing examples offer a glimpse of the deep political nexus between the overworld of private wealth, US intelligence agencies, the intelligence agencies of client states, criminal organizations, financial institutions, large corporations, private intelligence outfits, and secret organizations designed for the clandestine manipulation of political life. Covert operations are given official sanction by the National Security Council. To my knowledge, the NSC has never approved off-the-books financing of, say, covert operations through the trafficking of narcotics. Yet there have been numerous instances where CIA-allied entities took advantage of financing through various drug connections. In Southeast Asia, this was institutionalized, occurring over decades with the knowledge of multiple officials. Yet no serious accounting ever took place, even when the reformist “Watergate Congress” was conducting investigations into the activities of US intelligence agencies. One possible explanation is that the CIA has been
operating as an independent entity—a “rogue elephant” as Senator Frank Church described it.
This is an explanation not too different from Glennon’s (2015) Trumanite network construct that
draws from the Organizational Politics Model. Such a theoretical framework conceives of a
hermetically sealed network in which the CIA is one node. This fails to take into account
nominally non-state entities like organized crime syndicates, private intelligence firms, and
networks of overworld rich. Additionally, as was shown in chapter four, during the pivotal 1970’s
when the US Congress acted to curtail the excesses of the intelligence agencies, various actors
associated with the deep state simply found ways to carry on by working through new or extant
organizations like the Safari Club, the Pinay Circle, or the World Anti-Communist League.

**Generalizability and Scope Conditions**

Political science in general, in particular the subdiscipline of comparative politics, seeks to offer
explanations and generalizations that apply to different political entities, typically nation-states.
This may presuppose that such units are of a type. This may be more or less realistic depending
on the character of the nation-states in question. The postwar US is a very unique case because of
its role as systemic hegemon. More than other developed nations, its trajectory has been
determined by domestic political forces that were not forced into subordination vis-à-vis other
great powers. Instead, other nations’ politics have been determined to greater or lesser degrees by
their relationships with the systemic hegemon. These other states may be allies, clients, rivals,
and/or enemies.

Nevertheless, aspects of the tripartite state theory contained herein can be more or less
applicable to other nation-states. Left out of the Glennon’s examination of British “double-
government” is the vague but real British notion of “the Establishment,” the entrenched ruling
class whose power does not stem from formal or transparent authority. Though its existence is
widely acknowledged, its power and workings nevertheless represent deep political power. Most
notable is the fact that many postwar US elites were Anglophiles who greatly admired the British
Empire. The structure and techniques of US intelligence services are most clearly descended from the British secret services. Like the British, the US became an economic world power through protectionist and mercantilist policies until the country had the economic strength to pursue and demand “free trade.” If British elites have tried to argue that their empire was acquired absent-mindedly, the US takes this a step further by denying empire. Just as the sun never set on the British empire, the sun never sets on the US empire of bases—whether or not this is discussed in mainstream discourse.

In Turkey, the “deep state” came to be widely perceived by the public and the political class. This is why the country’s political system served as the origin of the term itself. While in postwar Turkey there have been various elected governments and a formal security hierarchy, the Turkish deep state has repeatedly intervened to assert its sovereignty. For example, following years of terrorist attacks and assassinations, Turkish General Kenan Evren led a coup which installed him as President of Turkey in 1980. Much of the violence preceding the coup was carried out by the Grey Wolves, a paramilitary terror organization. The Grey Wolves were intertwined with Turkey’s Counter-Guerrilla, an element of the Turkish state that had engaged in domestic terrorism including a 1977 sniper assault on peaceful demonstrators that killed 38 and injured hundreds more (Ganser 2005, 236). Counter-Guerrilla was the Turkish branch of Gladio, the NATO and CIA operation that established secret armies ostensibly to resist a Soviet invasion but repurposed as parapolitical state actors. The significance of the US-Grey Wolves linkage is that they suggest that the postwar Turkish deep state was to a considerable extent a US deep state franchise of sorts.

Postwar Italy also has structures quite compatible with tripartite state theory. Nominally a democracy, Italy has been subjected to infamous episodes of parapolitical violence. The original CIA covert operation was the massive campaign to subvert the Italian elections of 1948. Most significant were Italy’s “Years of Lead” in which the security services and deep political elements
deployed the “strategy of tension” to utilize false flag terror to discredit the Left and thereby manipulate Italian politics. Discussed earlier in this chapter, the most notorious entity of the Italian deep state during this time was the P2 Masonic lodge which united ultra-rightists, business figures, security state officials, Gladio forces, and organized crime figures. This era of parapolitical violence reached an apex with the assassination of Prime Minister Aldo Moro who was kidnapped on the very day that he was to broker an historic compromise in the Italian parliament that would have allowed a power sharing compromise with the left. Allegedly murdered by the “Red Brigade,” Moro’s wife later revealed that a top US official had threatened to use “groups on the fringes” to kill the prime minister if he persisted with his compromise plan (Tunander 2009, 58). In a Rome court proceeding, Eleonora Moro testified, “[My husband] said that Kissinger had warned him heavily: either you stop courting the communists or you will pay dearly for it.”156 These and other episodes point to the heavy US presence in Italian politics, collectively suggesting that the country’s deep state is subordinated to the imperatives of the imperial hegemonic US deep state.

The Japanese state likewise shares similarities with the US tripartite state. The US-written constitution had features which established a public state with progressive programs such as land reform. However, the US also created institutions that allowed for minority rule to some extent. Rural areas were weighted disproportionately in elections, empowering conservative political forces. Most notably, the ruling center-right Liberal Democratic Party was a US deep state project from the outset. As detailed earlier in this chapter, antidemocratic political forces survived the war and occupation. Most notable is the preservation of the Japanese overworld-underworld relationship as represented in the personage Yoshio Kodama—the former Yakuza, ex-Imperial Admiral, CIA asset, Lockheed payout distributor who founded the LDP and provided it with a deep war chest from vast amounts of Japan’s wartime plunder. Postwar, the Japanese deep state was ultimately rehabilitated into a satellite of the US deep state.
Latin American cases provide useful confirmation of tripartite state theory. Bolivia had strengthened its democratic state during the presidency of Evo Morales. Just days before the 2019 elections, the *Washington Post* reported, “[I]t’s indisputable that Bolivians are healthier, wealthier, better educated, living longer and more equal than at any time in this South American nation’s history.” When Evo Morales won the election as polls had predicted, the US-dominated Organization of American States issued a press release alleging election fraud. Shortly thereafter, Bolivian security officials essentially forced Morales to resign, effecting a coup of sorts. The key coup plotting military officials had been trained by the US at Ft. Benning, Georgia, more well-known as the notorious School of the Americas. Two researchers from MIT’s Election Data and Science Lab eventually conducted a study of the election. They found that, “There is not any statistical evidence of fraud that we can find,” adding that, “the trends in the preliminary count, the lack of any big jump in support for Morales after the halt, and the size of Morales’s margin all appear legitimate.” Clearly the Bolivian public state was not sovereign. The security state was subservient to deep political forces backed by the US. The putschists’ extraconstitutional actions were aided and abetted by other deep state-dominated entities, most notably the OAS. By contrast, the Venezuelan democratic state has been targeted for regime change since the George W. Bush administration. The difference between Venezuela and Bolivia is that up to this point, the security state has defended the public state. Despite various crises brought on by US hybrid warfare and other economic problems, the various coup attempts have to date failed. The Bolivian and Venezuelan cases offer more support to the notion that the security state is often the pivotal and decisive institution when it comes to whether democratic or deep political forces prevail in a country.

In more authoritarian US client states, the tripartite state construct may be less applicable. Saudi Arabia obviously has no democratic state. The complete absence of democratic oversight, the oil reserves to dominate global markets, and the kingdom’s vast sums of petrodollars have
made it an ideal vehicle for US deep statecraft. Thusly, the kingdom and its security services are by and large pillars of the American deep state. Within Saudia Arabia, elite theory is still relevant as the various power struggles have played out between the royal family, foreign influences, and other prominent Saudis such as the assassinated Jamal Khashoggi—himself the nephew of the infamous deep state operator Adnan Khashoggi.

Russia, on the other hand, is a more complicated case. Following the disastrous Yeltsin presidency, the country was famously encumbered with a class of organized crime-linked oligarchs who constituted something of a deep state relative to Russia’s anemic public state. When Putin came to power, he famously made a deal with the oligarchs to the effect that their holdings would not be nationalized if they stayed out of politics. Given Putin’s approval ratings and Russia’s greatly improved social and economic indicators since he came to power, it could be argued that he represents something of a public statesman in terms of mitigating the immiserating dominance of the Yeltsin era oligarchs. Alternatively, the ersatz common sense that prevails in the West is that Putin may as well be a Russian Louis XIV, proclaiming “I am the deep state!” He is variously described as the richest man in Russia (if not the world), a despot guilty of every manner of criminal malfeasance, and/or a megalomaniac bent on world domination. Whatever the case, Russia has tripartite state elements and, as elsewhere, strengthening democratic forces would likely entail the employment of security state assets to reign in deep political institutions and personages.

While China lacks a democratic state, it is still a complex and historically crucial polity. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has functioned democratically in some aspects by pursuing policies that have benefitted the majority of the population in ways that theoretically mirror what would be predicted in a democracy, even while the opposite has often occurred in nominally democratic nation-states that have pursued neoliberalism. The Chinese security state defends the hegemony of the CCP. While China has famously pursued market reforms, the state still controls
key industries like oil and banking. Deep political forces may be emerging in the form of a billionnaire class in control of vast sums of private wealth. Can the CCP manage and constrain these forces or will Chinese elites increasingly identify more with the transnational corporate class and less with Chinese nationalist and/or socialist aims? The CCP’s reforms have been—relative to the Maoist era—arguably truer to Marxist thought which posits capitalist development of industry as a precondition for socialist institutions. Will China become more socialist over time? Does the Belt and Road Initiative represent the foundation of a Chinese drive for imperial hegemony or is country truly pursuing “win-win” diplomacy of the internationalist variety favored by US statesmen like Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Wallace, or John Kennedy? While China may never develop electoral democracy and a public state in the Western sense, the deep politics approach could provide important insights into China’s politics and historical development.

Conclusion

At the time of this writing, October of 2019, humanity is beset by crises to which its institutions cannot adequately respond. The US-led capitalist world order has presided over many technological and scientific advances, yet the hegemonic American state has been the decisive actor in managing human development in such a way as to preclude the application of Enlightenment principles toward systemic reform. America’s celebrated liberal institutions have failed the US and the rest of humanity existing within a world order that has been most decisively shaped and dominated by the US. This dissertation has sought in part to address the deficiencies of liberal social science in explaining and understanding the problems. Of particular concern is the high crime blindness of liberal political science which—as Tunander (2009) points out—“has been turned into an ideology of the [deep state], because undisputable evidence for [its existence] is brushed away as pure fantasy or ‘conspiracy’” (68). In this way, the modern social scientist has made manifest The Zhuangzi’s astute if decidedly pre-Enlightenment Daoist pronouncement:
“The sage is the sharpest tool of empire; he is not a means of bringing light to the empire” (Graham 2001, 208). This criticism applies to America’s chief sense-making institutions in general—academia and the media. It is exemplified in that the way that that the term “conspiracy theory” has been weaponized as per CIA recommendations going back to the agency’s efforts to control public discourse around the JFK assassination (deHaven-Smith 2013). At present, the “conspiracy theory” epithet has achieved new levels of absurdity. One recent essay by a philosophy professor attempts to define conspiracy theories by asserting that “‘conspiracy theories’ [are explanations that] subvert received opinion and are based on the idea that things aren’t as they seem.” Though muddled and vague in its argumentation, this seems to suggest both that “received opinion” is best not subverted and that things must generally be as they seem to be. There is no guidance as to how an observer might grapple with the well-documented existence of states’ parapolitical practices, specifically those “plausibly deniable” operations where accountability is deliberately obscured. The poverty of scholarly conspiraphobia is well-captured in the following statement: “The official account of 9/11 and the theory that the attacks were planned by the Bush administration are both theories about conspiracies but only the latter is a conspiracy theory.” Even without attempting to unpack or complicate the latter theory, this is an exercise in obscurantism. Both theories are “theories about a conspiracy” and thus both are “conspiracy theories.”

With the so-called “Russiagate” conspiracy theory having fizzled out, the role of the “conspiracy theory” charge has been clarified. As journalist Katie Halper observed while in conversation with a Russiagate skeptic, “[Y]ou guys are actually doing all the research and you guys are dismissed as conspiracy theorists, which is really ironic because you guys are skeptical of the conspiracy theory.” To wit, neoliberal Democrats and the corporate media expended much energy promoting an unsubstantiated conspiracy theory about Russia installing its asset Donald Trump as president. While irresponsibly promoting this dangerous conspiracy theory
about a nuclear-armed rival, the “Russiagate” proponents derisively dismissed the critics of their conspiracy theory as “conspiracy theorists.” This has been frustrating to observers who believe or hope that through discourse, symbolic language can illuminate social reality. At the very least it demonstrates that the weaponization of the term “conspiracy theory” has weakened its denotative utility by forcing the term to serve as blunt propaganda instrument with which to bludgeon critics of state-sanctioned narratives. What is obvious but rarely stated, is that any theory—conspiratorial or otherwise—should be evaluated in a disinterested fashion on the basis of its supporting evidence and logic.

The tripartite theory of the state and the concept of *exceptionism* have been developed herein to offer a means of understanding and explaining important phenomena that bear upon historical and political realities. These include unadjudicated elite criminality, the ceaseless US pursuit of global dominance, and the prevailing system’s inability to address the major crises posed by economic inequality; ecological destruction; and the threat of nuclear omnicide. The US pursuit of global dominance—or “empire”—is at the root of these problems. Through its defaults, liberal political science has in effect been shaped into “an ideology of the deep state.” In general, prevailing methodologies—typically evincing positivism and influenced by theories of pluralism—implicitly presuppose the rule of law, transparency, and a Weberian state. For these reasons, such methodologies are not suitable for interrogating polities characterized by elite criminality, widespread secrecy, and a cloaked illiberal state. As stated in the first chapter, the philosophy applied herein is that the problem should define the methodology, not vice versa.

Exceptionism was established early on in the Cold War. In 1948, “Plausibly deniable” CIA covert operations were authorized by NSC 10/2. In 1950, NSC 68 asserted that “The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such
measures.” These documents authorized and justified the establishment of a “state of exception,” in that they granted the authority to the state to covertly conspire to violate the law. Since the US Constitution’s supremacy clause establishes that ratified treaties are “the supreme law in the land” and the US-ratified UN Charter outlaws aggression or even the threat of aggression between states, CIA covert operations are carried out in a state of exception. Given that the authority for these operations has never been suspended and the operations have been a significant structural component of the US-led world order, the term exceptionism was coined to describe the historical fact of institutionalized state criminality.

The US, like any civilization, has always had its observable, formal political institutions as well as its deep or unacknowledged political institutions. US democracy was always bourgeois. The overworld of private wealth always had outsized political power regardless of the constitutional norms pertaining to equality under the law and such. Various underworld institutions have likewise always been accommodated by elements of the US social structure—notably the overworld and the state. Overworld, underworld, and state interacted and influenced each other in innumerable ways. Going back to the days of smuggling, the slave trade, “banana republics,” and opium traffic—transnational capital has always been a key arena where the blurriness of sovereignty and the weakness of legal stricture allowed deep political institutions to arise and thrive. When World War II broke out, the Anglophile Wall Street overworld—most notably represented by the Council on Foreign Relations—assessed the situation and determined to steer the US toward establishing a new capitalist world order over which it would reign hegemonic. The security state that emerged in World War II was never really decommissioned before being reconstituted as the Cold War national security state. In particular, the Wall Street overworld was decisive in not only creating the CIA, but also in cryptically—one could say “covertly”—authorizing covert operations by way of an oblique reference to “other duties” in the National Security Act of 1947.
Animated by deep political forces, the open, democratic constitutional republic or public state accommodated the new secretive, hierarchical security state. This gave rise to a dual state with the authoritarian security state heavily influenced by the exigencies of the overworld-driven pursuit of hegemony. That is to say that the dual state existed in tandem with America’s deep political system—the emerging deep state. After a number of traumatic events like the JFK assassination, the Vietnam War, the 1968 MLK and RFK assassinations, and Watergate, the public state sought to investigate and reform the security state. These efforts came to naught for a number of reasons. They were not able to reveal any of the state’s most explosive crimes. Perhaps most importantly, without a coherent critique of the deep political forces that animated the security state, its critics were unable to illuminate the source of the problem. Namely, the problem was the overworld dominance of the national security state, electoral politics, and the media. The power of the corporate rich had overdetermining influence upon American institutions. Reflexive anticommunism precluded the kind of analysis that would have been necessary for the public state to have successful in reasserting its constitutionally prescribed sovereignty.

Recognizing in some sense that deep political forces were destroying his presidency, Nixon battled the CIA. He fired Richard Helms and had his new DCI attempt to dig up as much dirt as possible to bring the CIA to heel. He ultimately failed, but as a consequence, deep political actors created new institutions to pursue overworld objectives in such a way as to be unaccountable to the US government. This led to the creation of a more organized supranational deep state dominated by the US-centered overworld but financed in part by unaccountable entities, especially oil-rich US client states in the middle East like Saudi Arabia and Iran, where Richard Helms was stationed. This oil-financed supranational deep state included the Safari Club, BCCI, intelligence services of US client states, networks of erstwhile spooks like Ted Shackley, and arms dealers like Adnan Khashoggi. These institutions arose specifically to circumvent the will of US elected officials and their appointed security state officials.
Deep political forces also politically damaged President Carter. Specifically, big oil and the Federal Reserve exploded oil prices and interest rates, respectively. A preponderance of evidence indicates that anti-Carter elements successfully conspired to prevent the president from successfully negotiating the release of the Iranian hostages, contributing to Carter’s defeat and Reagan’s victory. Under Reagan, the deep state elements were brought back in from the cold, so to speak. The Fed’s interest rates exploded Third World debt. When interest rates and gas prices were lowered dramatically, the US dominated the global economy anew. The economic turnaround was owed in no small part to the post-Bretton Woods dollar Wall Street regime and the military Keynesian spending bonanza it enabled. At this point, it can be stated that the tripartite state had been consolidated. The US had been a liberal democratic political system coexisting with a deep political system. The pursuit of dominance and the exceptionism of the security state eventually gave rise to a deep state system; deep political institutions have systematically crushed progressive elements, dominating the public and security states and therefore the domestic and international political economy. The Weberian model of the state is not operant in this case. The public state has no monopoly of the use of violence, but this is not because the US is a “failed state” in the conventional sense. The issue is not a failed state, but America’s hypertrophied deep state.

While these problems are considerable, they are not essentially novel or unique to the American experience. From the beginning, human civilization has been characterized by acute contradictions. All human advancements derive from the original sins of civilization, namely expropriation and exploitation. Without an exploited people toiling on expropriated land, there is no surplus to allow for material, intellectual, and technological progress. Thus far, civilization has proceeded on the basis of numerous social hierarchies legitimated by respective myths. These legitimating myths facilitate denial of various forms of expropriation and exploitation. In America, these have included “whiteness” vis-à-vis Indians and black slaves, manifest destiny,
scientific racism, social Darwinism, anti-Communism, anti-Terrorism, American exceptionalism, and more recently “humanitarian” interventionism.

Its famous hypocrisy notwithstanding, America was exceptional at its founding in terms of the Enlightenment principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Indeed, democracy may offer hope if humanity could somehow establish systems of governance that allow for the privileging of human needs over the interests of a tiny politico-economic elite of power. Unfortunately, the deep state system has turned the elected leader into something like a modern analog of the priest-king. Rather than controlling and managing institutions for the commonweal, our contemporary priest-kings must scramble to appease inscrutable forces that may as well be supernatural. These include the corporate media, the petroleum industry, high finance, the national security bureaucracies, and lobbies foreign and domestic.

The power of America’s deep political institutions provides the best explanation for many of the failed presidencies from Kennedy on. President Kennedy served less than one term, because he was so adept as to actually threaten America’s deep political system on multiple fronts. Johnson sought to accommodate deep political forces by waging the Vietnam War and unleashing the CIA in places where Kennedy had restrained the agency. While Richard Nixon was undoubtedly criminal, liberals were joined by the establishment press, various bureaucrats, powerful militarists, and commercial elites to bring about the president’s demise. Carter’s stagflation and the October Counter-surprise were insurmountable. Reagan’s scandals were more egregious than any previous president’s, yet he completed two terms and is still celebrated across what constitutes the US political spectrum. This can be seen in the form of President Obama’s praise for Reagan.\textsuperscript{164} By the time Bill Clinton took office, the systems had been well established. When the president-elect was given the talk about the economic birds and the bees, he dejectedly muttered, “You mean to tell me that the success of the economic program and my re-election
hinges on the Federal Reserve and a bunch of fucking bond traders?” His very modest New Deal-style reforms were a non-starter.

The brazen Bush era violations of the Constitution were given a pass owing to his administration’s pursuit of government of, by, and for the deep state. Only in 2007 when neoconservative forces were threatening an invasion of Iran did a rift emerge, perhaps best encapsulated by realist/neoliberal Zbigniew Brzezinski’s warning to Congress in the form of testimony describing a “plausible scenario for a military collision with Iran” that could involve “Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks, followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure, then by some provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the US blamed on Iran, culminating in a ‘defensive’ US military action against Iran that plunges a lonely America into a spreading and deepening quagmire eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Emphasis added).165 Bush’s successor Barrack Obama accommodated the deep state by consolidating the Bush-era security state expansion, by launching regime change operations in Libya and Syria, and by not prosecuting the criminals behind the financial crisis or the torture program. When asked by some progressive donors why he had failed to deliver the promised “change,” Obama reportedly replied, “Don’t you remember what happened to Dr. King?”166

The problem afflicting all elected officials, but presidents most acutely, is that the deep political system demands accommodations from leaders. It is safe to surmise that these accommodations typically entail subverting the public good in favor of various rent-seeking interests who then channel a portion of said extracted rent into various enterprises that safeguard or extend their privileged positions in the prevailing political economy. This is now so easily confirmed that two mainstream American political scientists recently concluded a major study finding that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence (Gilens and Page 2014). Structural
deep events or SCADs have been a rarely acknowledged driver of US political decline. Historian James DiEugenio (2012) points out, “[S]omething did go wrong in 1963. […] [I]n 1964, the year the Warren Report was issued, the percentage of people who said they trusted Washington to do the right thing most of the time was almost 80 percent. But in that year, a toboggan slide began which resulted in the dwindling of that figure to below 20 percent by 1993” (396). As of 2019, according to the Pew Research Center, “Only 17% of Americans today say they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right ‘just about always’ (3%) or ‘most of the time’ (14%).”

As Wolin (2009) argued, what has been established is inverted totalitarianism—created by demobilizing, rather than mobilizing, the great bulk of society. Wolin used the term managed democracy to describe the American political system. This analysis is compatible with the arguments presented herein, even if Wolin does not address endemic state criminality or the likelihood that the state has applied its clandestine arts to American democracy. In the Cold War, it became expedient to use the term totalitarian to describe states that allegedly had such power over society that no element of the society could pose any challenge to the state’s hegemony. This allowed Cold War US sense-making institutions to name and describe an aberrant, illegitimate form of government and attribute to Communism the same intrinsic pathology of the Nazi state. Since it collapsed relatively peacefully, it turned out that the Soviet Union was not totalitarian according to the tautological Cold War definition.

In fact, it is the American tripartite state that has taken on more totalitarian characteristics. Any class of politico-economic elites will seek to identify and subvert potential threats to the prevailing order. In the wake of the 1960’s democratic upsurge, the empire struck back, so to speak. The aforementioned Powell Memorandum is something of inverted totalitarian manifesto. He identifies all the problem areas facing the corporate rich: “the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sciences, and from
politicians.” He bemoans the “bewildering paradox” that is the “extent to which the enterprise system tolerates, if not participates in, its own destruction.” He points out that universities are funded by “tax funds generated largely from American business” as well as contributions from corporate America’s capital funds. Additionally, most media outlets “are owned and theoretically controlled by corporations which depend upon profits, and the enterprise system to survive.” Powell called for the corporate rich to devote money toward neutering civil society such that corporate hegemony could not be threatened by critics with the temerity to criticize the “free enterprise system” that affords them their material wherewithal. It is as though Powell was scolding the base for being insufficiently attentive to curating the superstructure.

Likewise, the Trilateral Crisis of Democracy bemoaned the paradox that postwar material security may have afforded citizens the wherewithal to agitate for progressive, democratic reforms. By pointing out how prosperity was weakening “governability,” Huntington et al were advocating—a la Wolin (2008)—for a more studiously managed democracy. The point here is not that either Powell or Huntington was an omnipotent, technocratic Svengali. Rather, they simply produced the most straightforward and candid expressions of the emerging overworld consensus that American liberalism had outlived its usefulness and needed to go. By 1981, these forces had succeeded with the “Reagan Revolution,” more aptly termed the Reagan Counterrevolution for its consolidation of the American deep state system.

As a result of the catastrophic success of the deep state counter-attack, the higher immorality identified by C. Wright Mills has become so entrenched that the political system cannot respond to the three crises facing Americans and the world: massive inequality, climate change, and the threat of nuclear omnicide. The extreme polarization of wealth has occurred in large part because of numerous deep state victories. After World War II, Anticommunism served as a pretext to police the Third World and overtly or covertly destroy progressive movements that sought to deviate from neocolonial dictates. The continuity—or even intensification—of these
policies following the collapse of the Soviet Union serves to belie claims that such policies were reasoned responses to the “global communist conspiracy.” As a result of the system economic polarization, 25,000 people die of starvation and malnutrition per day (Phillips 2018, 31). As Phillips (2018) points out, a 25% tax on the wealth of billionaires, “if efficiently distributed, would likely eliminate hunger in the world permanently” (32). Meanwhile, the major problem for the corporate rich is that they have accumulated so much wealth that it is difficult for them to find sufficient opportunities for investment. This leads capital to seek returns in financial speculation, military/war spending, and privatization of the public domain (Robinson 2014, Phillips 2018, 29).

All three of these predatory, rent-seeking avenues of moneymaking entail accompanying efforts to dominate politics and society in order to facilitate these types of economic activities. On the whole, the corporate media tends to abet or run interference for said domination. The Washington Post provided a darkly humorous example recently with its Orwellian “fact-check” of Bernie Sanders’ statement that “Three people in this country own more wealth than the bottom half of America.” The paper dismissed Sanders’ claim as “comparing apples to oranges” and “not especially meaningful” because “people in the bottom half have essentially no wealth.”

One remarkable aspect of US poverty and inequality stems from the structural fact of the petrodollar/US Treasury Bill standard. Forgetting for a moment the right-wing austerity cover story, Dick Cheney famously said, “Deficits don’t matter.” This is known to be the case by the small number of people who understand the dollar’s position in the global economy. It begs the questioning of why such serious solvable social problems persist in the US. For example, why does the US not have the world’s best physical and social infrastructure to provide material security for all its citizens? Why has the US not lavishly funded its public education system to allow everyone to contribute to the disinterested pursuit of human knowledge and to the solving of humanity’s problems? As stated above, the structural imposition of extreme economic inequality is not simply due to greed and zero-sum economic calculations by the corporate rich.
Rather, widespread economic security endangers the “security” of the corporate rich because—as with any ruling elite—security for this class is defined as hegemony over society. If this analysis is correct, the end of US unipolarity may bring unprecedented social turmoil to the country. Without the exorbitant privilege of the dollar-Wall Street regime, the US may find itself unable to function politically and/or adequately meet the material needs of the citizenry.

Climate change is an accelerating slow-motion crisis to which no rational policy response is forthcoming. The culpability of the oil companies is well known, but the deep state system collectively bears the greatest responsibility. Cleaner, publicly owned, localized energy solutions are called for. Such efforts would likely need to be financed by some combination of carbon taxes, wealth taxes, and/or credit creation. Unfortunately, all these rather obvious responses are anathema to US and global elites. The current system of dirty energy delivered over privately-owned infrastructure has not only been an enormous source of rent-extraction for the corporate rich. The control of the global petroleum trade has also been a pillar of US dominance over the global capitalist system. In 2018, ex-president Obama told an audience at Rice University’s Baker Institute that “suddenly America’s like the biggest oil producer and the biggest gas [producer:] that was me, people.”¹⁷¹ Joseph Nye points out that the fracking boom has given the US a geopolitical boost, in part by giving the US leverage over non-compliant oil producing countries like Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.¹⁷² As Philip K. Verleger points out, the fracking boom was a consequence of Federal Reserve quantitative easing (QE) policies, i.e., massive credit creation. Verleger argues that the Fed failed to predict that QE would lead to a fracking boom that would cause a price collapse.¹⁷³ The fracking boom’s impact on oil prices was amplified by Saudi overproduction, often alleged to have been a KSA strategy to undermine US energy producers by rendering new ventures unprofitable in a cheap oil market.¹⁷⁴ Alternatively, the historical record discussed herein suggests the possibility that the QE-fueled fracking boom and KSA overproduction were collectively part of a deep state effort to collapse oil prices to the detriment
of oil-producing nations targeted by the US, namely Russia, Venezuela, and Iran. Either way, the effect was to further boost oil consumption and produce less market incentives for the desperately needed transition to green energy. Any efforts to address climate change must acknowledge the deep political forces that collectively oppose reform.

The threat of nuclear omnicide is not new, but it presently is a problem that warrants increased attention for a number of reasons. Specifically, recent US moves have been alarming. President Trump made statements to the effect that he did not understand why the US had nuclear weapons if it couldn’t use them. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) expanded the role of nuclear weapons in the defense posture of the United States, allowing them to be used to respond to ill-defined “extreme circumstances,” like cyberattacks or attacks on US or allied nations’ infrastructure. This is especially troubling given that the 2018 National Defense Strategy deemed China and Russia to be the top security threats facing the US. This reorientation is happening after two decades of NATO expansion, obviously deemed threatening to nuclear-armed Russia. In the 21st century, the US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. A 2006 article in the Council on Foreign Relations’ official magazine argued that the US could launch a successful nuclear first strike against Russia or China. The Washington Post reported that this “sent heads spinning [in Moscow] with visions of Dr. Strangelove.” The US has a history of using nuclear bombs. This goes beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As Daniel Ellsberg (2017) documents, the US has repeatedly threatened nations with nuclear destruction, using nuclear weapons in the same way that a robber uses a gun. These and other sorts of imperial gambits may soon be unavailing for the hegemon. The end of US unipolarity seems to be inexorably nearing. No empire has gracefully retreated from its hegemony. The British may have eventually bowed to reality by giving up the British Empire, but the British ruling class preserved the great bulk of its interests under the postwar US-led world
order. It appears that the US has not prepared for a post-hegemonic era and this makes the nuclear issue all the more pressing.

Applications and Implications

The historically informed conception of an exceptionist tripartite state offers useful predictions and analysis of future and recent events. The scholarship herein suggests that we have been living through the incremental imposition of a novel kind of fascism or authoritarianism. The deep state was greatly empowered by the 2001 terror attacks and subsequent “global war on terror” (GWOT). To an unknown extent, COG measures have superseded the constitution and amplified exceptionism. As with the Cold War, the GWOT allows the US the ability to define itself by its antithesis. Such was predicted with eerie prescience in 1988 by the Italian philosopher Guy Debord, who wrote:

Such a perfect democracy constructs its own inconceivable foe, terrorism. Its wish is to be judged by its enemies rather than by its results. The story of terrorism is written by the state and it is therefore highly instructive. The spectators must certainly never know everything about terrorism, but they must always know enough to convince them that, compared to terrorism, everything else must be acceptable, or in any case more rational and democratic (24).

It is unsettling to know that Debord wrote Comments after living through Italy’s “Years of Lead” wherein deep state actors engaged in the “fine-tuning of democracy” through the use of false flag terror that marginalized the political left and strengthened the security state.

The bugbear of the GWOT, Osama bin Laden, reportedly sought to weaken US hegemony but in the process somehow committed strategic blunders. By so viciously attacking the two most visible symbols of the US Empire—the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—bin Laden legitimized the sites’ two corresponding deep state core constituencies, respectively neoliberalism and neoconservatism. Additionally, the presumably unlucky selection of the September 11 date meant that psychologically the attacks would come to be associated 911, America’s emergency number. In an uncanny sense, this further allowed for the attacks to rationalize the subsequent “state of emergency” which necessitated reifying and amplifying
exceptionism. Consequently, the state sought to achieve several exceptionist goals. These include the security state’s Quixotic quest for “total information awareness” to be achieved in part through massive data collection and warrantless surveillance. Torture and “extraordinary rendition” programs were created and utilized. Two long, legally dubious wars were launched. In sum, counterterrorism strengthened the already hypertrophied security state and thus, the American deep state.

If fascism is indeed capitalism in crisis, there’s plenty of cause for concern if one accepts the normative assessment that fascism is not desirable. That accepted, fraying US hegemony is cause for great concern. In 1997, Brzezinski asserted that “keep[ing] the barbarians from coming together” was a “grand imperative of imperial geostrategy” (40). The term “barbarians” refers to Russia and China, two countries that have indeed grown much closer in response to their grievances with the US-led world order. The election of Donald Trump has been an ominous development. Not only does Trump exhibit troubling, even fascistic tendencies, but he has elicited bellicose responses from the dominant corporate wing of the Democratic Party which increasingly responds to critics on both the left and Trumpian right by employing neo-McCarthyist rhetoric.

The US is launching an unprecedented assault of press freedom with its persecution of Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange. Among other sins, Wikileaks published DNC emails revealing DNC corruption in the ill-fated 2016 primaries. The revelations led to the resignation of the of the DNC chair. Assange has stated categorically that the emails were provided by a DNC insider. On the basis of redacted reports received from an anti-Russian cybersecurity firm, a handpicked group of US intelligence officials assessed that the emails were acquired by a Russian hacker. While Assange and Wikileaks have to date never published anything requiring a retraction, US intelligence agencies have often engaged in deceptive and/or criminal behavior. If Assange is telling the truth, Russiagate may be a deep event of sorts.
The decline of US hegemony occurring in the cyberage raises the possibility for novel forms of techno-authoritarianism. Silicon Valley monopolies like Google, Facebook, and Twitter operate on the basis of opaque and constantly revised algorithms that can determine what kind of content users are exposed to, what content they can effectively share, and who they share it with. Troublesome persons can be banned with no recourse under prevailing interpretations of free speech rights. The cyberage and/or the decline of US hegemony may also portend that future state crimes against democracy could be in the offing. Potential scenarios include election fraud by way of inauditable, paperless, electronic voting systems manufactured by politically connected corporate outfits. Deep political forces gave Italy its “Years of Lead” through the means of false-flag terror attacks. The American deep state may respond similarly in the US if the situation deems it expedient. As Brzezinski alluded to in 2007 regarding Iran, the state may manipulate intelligence and events to provide pretexts for foreign interventions. Both Libya and Syria were presented as democratic protest movements necessitating “humanitarian” intervention. In both cases, key episodes were incorrect and likely fabricated. In Libya, the US regime change campaign was justified by the false depiction of Ghaddafi as a criminal dictator who was planning to carry out a massacre of civilians, and who gave his soldiers Viagra so that they might do more raping of the populace.177

In Syria, the US and its allies have been similarly deceptive and lawless. Jeffrey Sachs summarizes, “While the Syrian War is often described as a civil war, it was in a fact a war of regime change led by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia under a U.S. presidential directive called Timber Sycamore.” This US-orchestrated operation has violently killed around 500,000 people and displaced more than 10,000,000 Syrians.178 One particularly cynical and oddly postmodern innovation of the Syrian War is the role played by the US and UK funded White Helmets. While the US and its allies have spent billions on the campaign to overthrow the Syrian government, the so-called “White Helmets” have received millions of dollars, ostensibly to save Syrian lives.
Founded by ex-British military officer and mercenary John Le Mesurier, the White Helmets are invariably lauded by the Western corporate media. A documentary on the group received an Oscar for Best Documentary Short. Critics like Max Blumenthal point to problems with the cultivated public perception of the White Helmets, including the group’s odd working relationship with al Qaeda-affiliated anti-government belligerents in Syria. Besides the laudatory Oscar-winning documentary, other efforts to have been taken to amplify the propaganda value of the White Helmets. These include an October 2016 effort by a PR company promoting the White Helmets to enlist the support of Pink Floyd front man Roger Waters by inviting him to an elaborate dinner party hosted by a Saudi-born billionaire named Hani Farsi.

Given the evidence accumulated by the critics of the White Helmets and the corporate media’s refusal to acknowledge the Western authorship of the Syrian War, it is reasonable to conclude that the White Helmets represent a devious deep state propaganda operation to legitimate the illegal overthrow of the Syrian government by al Qaeda-dominated proxy forces or through direct military intervention. Even for an experienced scholar of Western imperialism, this particular tactic is noteworthy. It would seem to be an egregious violation of Enlightenment ideals to mobilize a field unit for the production of “humanitarian” flavored propaganda to justify unambiguously illegal aggression against another state. In the current political climate, to make public statements to this effect is to invite accusations that one is a Russian asset or a purveyor of “Russian talking points.”

In the face of these grim historical trends, what are the prospects of reversing course? In conversation with Lance deHaven-Smith, he offered a novel suggestion: Use the state to uphold the law and prosecute the perpetrators of state crimes against democracy. Were it feasible, such would be quite an agreeable solution. Unfortunately, exceptionism and the weakness of the public state likely precludes such a course. Peter Dale Scott (2007) has advocated “visionary realism” or “realistic utopianism”—an effort built upon first strengthening civil society. As examples, he
cites the Polish Solidarity movement and the US civil rights movement (256-257). On the policy level, he proposes organizing to address income inequality, reform the US electoral process, reform drug laws, and end the doctrine of preemptive war. These are all urgently needed reforms, but the examples of movements he cites illustrate the magnitude of the problems faced by would-be reformers. Polish Solidarity was given decisive support from the CIA (Jones 2018). The US civil rights movement was backed by the top of the US establishment, including figures like John Foster Dulles (Dudziak 2000). In essence, Jim Crow was a detriment to the neocolonial US agenda in the Third World and so the key political actors and national media allied with various politicians and social movement leaders to end segregation. A somewhat disheartening but apt explanation would be that the US ended the gratuitously cruel and economically backward Jim Crow system in order to have a better image in the more economically and geopolitically significant decolonizing world.

Peter Phillips (2018) and Ralph Nader (2009) offer a solution that aspires to fit in the so-crazy-it-just-might-work mold; they make an appeal to the humanity and enlightened self-interest of politico-economic elites. It is true that no one really benefits if human civilization is destroyed or forced to endure unprecedented calamity. Media and other potentially counter-hegemonic liberal institutions are so impoverished that it is difficult to know the impact they might have if they were allowed to operate without first and foremost pleasing some particular faction of the corporate rich. To visualize the potential for truly independent media, imagine media outlets like *The Intercept* if *The Intercept* were not controlled by a deep state-connected tech oligarch.182

Perhaps a way forward could involve some kind of revelation that would expose the scope of the totalizing subversion of US democracy by deep political forces. The political assassinations of the 1960’s have that potential, but as such they are still obscured through what have to be described as ongoing disinformation operations even more than fifty years after the fact.183 Perhaps a whistleblower or a coalition of high-level officials could collaborate to
orchestrate just such a revelation. Another admittedly far-fetched possibility would involve using the electoral system to affect some sort of novel form of democratic state capture. This could allow societal forces to seize control of the state and use state power to assert and apply the rule of law throughout the various organs of the state, even going so far as to apply the rule of law to exceptionist deep state persons and entities.

However it is attempted, the role of the intellectual in these times should be to rekindle the Enlightenment and thereby illuminate the political dark age wrought by the exceptionist tripartite state. At present, the hegemony of the deep state has derailed the hopes articulated by Lord Acton that “all information is within reach, and every problem […] capable of solution” (Scott 2007, 17). The higher immorality animating the deep state system must be superseded. The master task of the 21st century scholar must be to reacquaint power and wisdom.
I use the term *supra-national* to indicate that the *deep state* exercises power above national boundaries. This applies not only to the nations targeted by US aggression, but also to US administrations in which the deep state intervened in opposition to a US President—the nominal head of the US state. As chronicled in Chapter 4, the Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter administrations were most decisively impacted by deep state operations.


Robert Gates was Bush’s DCI during the congressional October Surprise investigation. As such, he could stymie inquiries from that position if Lee Hamilton et al requested information about Gates’ or Bush’s or Donald Gregg’s activities in the Fall of 1980. Also, Gates was made Casey’s Chief of Staff in 1981. Casey was another central October Surprise character and Reagan’s campaign manager. See: Robert Parry, “Second Thoughts on October Surprise,” Consortium News, June 8, 2013, https://consortiumnews.com/2013/06/08/second-thoughts-on-october-surprise/.


Barrett, “A Wordnado of Words in 2013.”


61 Bleau.


255


Gary Aguilar et al., “A Joint Statement on the Kennedy, King, and Malcolm X Assassinations and Ongoing Cover-Ups.”


Lydon.


81 Hougan, “Strange Bedfellows.”


84 Hougan, “Strange Bedfellows.”

85 Hougan.


93 “The CIA’s Family Jewels.”

94 Hougan, “Strange Bedfellows.”

95 Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media.”

96 Bernstein.

97 Bernstein.


Hedges and Sepe.


Nixon and Haldeman, “The Smoking Gun Tape.”


Much of Wolin’s (2008) analysis of managed democracy and inverted totalitarianism is in accordance with this dissertation. To summarize, he describes US democracy as being managed by corporate power in anti-democratic fashion such that it has created a new form of totalitarianism. It is described as inverted because it neutralizes all countervailing political forces by demobilizing and depoliticizing the public rather than by actively mobilizing them as the famous totalitarian systems of the 20th century did. The most obvious differences between this work and Wolin’s is the emphasis here on the exceptionist deep state. By contrast, Wolin (2008) does not explore or elaborate on state criminality, even though his critical interrogation of the Hobbesian sovereign would not have precluded delving into such matters (74-75).


163 “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.”


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APPENDIX

KEY TERMS

depth events: mysterious events that involve violence and/or lawbreaking, are embedded in extant covert activities, serve to enlarge state secrecy, and are subsequently obscured systematically by the state and the media (Scott 2015, 1)

depth political system: a system in which governance entails habitual resort to “decision-making and enforcement procedures outside as well as inside those publicly sanctioned by law and society,” i.e., a system of governance that includes “collusive secrecy and law-breaking” (Scott 1993 xi-xii)

depth politics: “all those political practices and arrangements, deliberate or not, which are usually repressed rather than acknowledged” (Scott 1993, 7)

depth state: misappropriated in the Trump era, the term herein refers to the various institutions that collectively exercise undemocratic power over state and society. Pluralistic to varying degrees, the deep state is an outgrowth of the overworld of private wealth. It includes most notably the institutions that advance overworld interests through the nexuses connecting the overworld, the underworld, and the national security organizations that mediate between them. In 2015 I described the deep state as follows:

…an obscured, dominant, supra-national source of antidemocratic power. It is debatable whether this phenomenon has arisen due to (a) unique historical circumstances, (b) innate dynamics of capitalism, or (c) unresolved contradictions within human civilization. The Weberian state’s monopoly on violence does not stay confined to the democratic state or even the formal security state. There is sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that the U.S.-led
world order has entailed systemic violence which has undermined democratic sovereignty (19-20).

To these interventions, I would add relevant and valid variations:

**deep state (organizational):** supranational or supragovernmental structural components of the deep state system, e.g. the Adnan Khashoggi-centered “off-the-books” intelligence entities (most notably the Safari Club) which Peter Dale Scott (2015) described as:

…a supranational deep state, whose organic links to the CIA may have helped consolidate it… [D]ecisions taken at this level … were in no way guided by the political determinations of those elected to power in Washington [and were instead] expressly created to overcome restraints established by political decisions in Washington (30).

The “Doomsday Project” or Continuity of Government provisions are hypothesized here and in the work of Peter Dale Scott (e.g. 2007) as representing a supragovernmental deep state component whose opacity and overriding authority may have been utilized in key deep events such as the JFK assassination, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 9/11.

**deep state (systemic):** a system of governance in which deep state predominance has been institutionalized via the cooptation or subversion of state, civil society, and liberal institutions. In this broadest sense, elements of organized religion, the educational system, the corporate media (and much of the “independent” media) can be considered part of the deep state.

**dual state:** derived from Carl Schmitt (1985), the theory that alongside the democratic (or public) state, there exists a security state that is able to exercise supralegal prerogative powers in any instance it deems to be a “state of emergency” (Tunander 2009, 56)
Public state: the visible and formally organized institutions that comprise our elected federal, state, and local governments as well as the civil service bureaucracies associated with them.

Security state: those institutions in charge of maintaining “security” domestically and internationally—e.g. the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

State crimes against democracy (SCADs): “concerted actions or inactions by government insiders intended to manipulate democratic processes and undermine popular sovereignty” (deHaven-Smith 2010, 796)

Parapolitics: “a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished” (Scott 1972, 171)

Exceptionism: “the institutionalization of the interminable state of exception” and “of securitized supra-sovereignty or Lockean ‘prerogative’ although not to a fixed or determinate source” (Good 2015, 16)

Overworld: the upper strata of politically active wealth, comprised of the richest persons and their representatives (Scott 2007, 268)—i.e. an amalgamation of C. Wright Mills’ (1956) corporate rich and power elite

Tripartite state: a system of governance in which the sovereign state has come to be comprised of the democratic/public state, the security state, and the deep state

Underworld: organized crime entities; in a deep political system of governance, relevant state institutions and overworld interests interact with elements of the underworld through various modes of discursive accommodation.