

Rethinking Academia: A Gramscian Analysis of Samuel Huntington

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“Everything, as you see, depends on the way things are put, *Nominibus, molline licet mala.*” – Karl Marx

Introduction

In an article entitled “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form,” anthropologist Ann Stoler critiques colonial archives for their truth claims. She argues that colonial archives represent the past as seen through the lens of the colonizers and should therefore not be viewed as sources of knowledge, but as sources of knowledge production. Stoler, operating within a postmodern framework, states that “we are no longer studying things but the making of them.”¹ In this sense, Stoler recognizes that colonial archives represent a history of contested cultural terrain. A history not inhabited by only one culture or society, but recorded through the lens of a single viewpoint.

Stoler has identified an important truth in the way in which colonial archives should be viewed; as centers of knowledge production for the support and maintenance of the colonizers. They represent the truths, reflections, and interests of political and economic classes which considered themselves above those that they exploited. As Stoler suggests, colonial archives act as “monuments of states, as well as sites of state ethnography.”² That is, from Stoler’s perspective, colonial archives are not simply idle documents, but are instead sources of legitimization for the state and its practices. The ability for colonial archives to serve as legitimizing forces for the ruling class indeed transforms them, as Stoler claims, into “technologies of rule.”³

Numerous scholars have updated Stoler’s initial thesis to critique the current paradigms, or lenses, which obscure history in the service of State interests. In “Reversals,

Ironies, Hegemonies: Notes on the Contemporary Historiography of Modern China,” Arif Dirlik claims that paradigms are not simply prisms through which scholarship reflects upon history but “are also expressions of social ideologies, narrowly within professions but also, because professions may hardly be isolated from their broader social contexts, within the broader context of social relations.”⁴ Here Dirlik hints at a larger discussion of Gramscian class relations by asserting that paradigms are essential in articulating and rationalizing the interests of a specific class or social group. Put simply, the paradigms utilized by dominant social groups often work to manipulate, in this instance, present and historical events to rationalize and preserve their own hegemony.

To go beyond the use of paradigms and begin to work toward meaningful social science inquiry is, as Noam Chomsky argues, “to go beyond rhetorical flourishes and public pronouncements, and to investigate actual practice.”⁵ It not only means further critiquing or “reading against the grain” of primary sources, in Chomsky’s case the rhetoric inherent in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but a deeper critical analysis of one’s own course materials. It is to undertake the massively important activity of delineating the difference between baseless value judgments and worthy historical scholarship.

Building on the solid foundation laid by scholars such as Stoler, Chomsky, and Dirlik, and their critique of paradigms and relations of power, I argue that the scholarship of state-associated academics must be criticized for its tendency to reinforce (rationalize and preserve) the dominance of the capitalist mode of production; that its paradigms be exposed and effectively displaced by students in the fields of history and political science. In my attempt to highlight this inextricable linkage between the state and the academic

community I draw on the work of Samuel P. Huntington, Weatherhead professor of government at Harvard University. Motivation for this study emanates from the same concern which Stoler demonstrated in her article. There is a great need for students to be aware of the blurred line between knowledge and knowledge production, between policy analysis and policy advice for the enhancement and legitimization of the state apparatus. Students must no longer remain ignorant of the existence of a specific form of scholarship which serves the sole purpose of reinforcing, even extending the interests of a specific group or entity.

In engaging this subject I will show, in various ways, how an academic such as Huntington has participated in the process of knowledge production for the United States government. Specifically, I will show the role Huntington played, on numerous occasions, in providing the federal government with the theoretical thinking necessary to preserve both its legitimacy as well as its interests; domestically as well as globally. In the first section of the paper I draw on Gramsci's discussion of the *organic intellectual* in setting up the framework for analysis. In the second section of the paper I examine the differences between what Chomsky calls the "rhetorical flourishes" of mainstream scholarship and the "actual practice" of US domestic and foreign policy. In particular I focus on Huntington's political work for the Brazilian military dictatorship in 1972 and his theoretical work for the Trilateral Commission in 1975. Primary emphasis is placed upon the ways in which Huntington's work has served the imperialistic interests of the US government and the manner in which he has done so. In the third section of the paper, on Huntington's ties to numerous think tanks and monetary grant foundations, I draw on Stoler's discussion of the political agendas which directed the writing of archives in the

colonial period. In this section I show that modern day think tanks and foundation impose, through their funding of pre-approved research projects, political agendas which state-associated academics must fulfill in the production of their scholarship.

Before turning to my analysis, some notes on the methodology are in order. Specifically, the work of Samuel Huntington is viewed by the author of this paper as primary source material. Again, in the same vein as Stoler's critique, it is the content in the form, not the form itself, which holds the most relevance to this discussion. In other words, it is not simply the subject matter existent in Huntington's work which I am most interested in, but the assumptions, empty assertions, and value-laden judgments which Huntington employs in writing for the state. These flaws form the paradigms through which Huntington worked in rationalizing and preserving the hegemony of the US government. In researching Huntington's role as a state-associated intellectual, I benefited greatly from William I. Robinson's *Promoting Polyarchy* as well as a brief dialogue with Dr. Robinson via e-mail. As a final note to the reader, the evidence presented in regard to Huntington's involvement with the US government is by no means an exhaustive collection; it is only sufficient for the scope of this paper. Further research should consider the linkages of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the US policymaking community. It is the CEIP that funds the publication of Huntington's journal *Foreign Policy*. Also, Huntington should only be viewed as one of many intellectuals who work "part-time" for the state. Finally, I believe it is already quite understood that there is an urgent need to further research think tanks as well as other private organizations and the paper trails that oscillate between these entities, academics, and the state. Research in these areas should be of great use to those wishing to delve

deeper into the study of contemporary globalization and the ongoing neoliberal revolution.

Section I: Samuel Huntington as an Organic Intellectual

In this section I evaluate the dual nature of Huntington's intellectual activity through the lens of the organic intellectual, a concept first theorized by Antonio Gramsci during his imprisonment in Mussolini's Italy.⁶ One of Gramsci's most original contributions to political philosophy is his delineation of the intellectual. For Gramsci, all men are intellectuals in the capacity that they are capable of organizing the masses of their social group and expanding their existence beyond that of sub-altern status, or the dominated sector of society. Gramsci states that the "mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life."⁷ As man becomes the organizer of the class to which he belongs, he no longer exists simply as a laborer, but achieves the ability to make history.⁸ Gramsci terms this new political actor the organic intellectual. Further, it is the organic intellectual who is the driver of the social class he belongs to. It is the organic intellectual who is responsible for articulating and directing the sub-altern's movement into a position of hegemony, or social dominance.

In constructing this new intellectual, Gramsci needed to distinguish it from what he called the traditional intellectuals (doctors, priests, lawyers). For Gramsci, these intellectuals are identified by their "uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification."⁹ Although these professionals are a part of the inter-class structure of a given society, their very specialization conceals their class affiliations. In other words,

unlike the organic intellectual, the traditional intellectual does not necessarily represent the interests of a specific class or social group, but only a specialized activity. Gramsci argues that the “most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations.”¹⁰ If, as Gramsci argues, all men are intellectuals in the sense that they may direct their social class into position as the new dominant group, then it is imperative that their intellectual movement is studied from within the context of the specific social class to which they are aligned. The proletarian, for example, represents the factory laborer while the cleric represents the interests of the state. The combination of the two comprises a dialectical struggle over a single, yet contested social space.

If, as Gramsci argues, all given social spaces are essentially contested, that is they are constantly available for sociopolitical domination, then organic intellectuals of each specific class¹¹ must work to incorporate the traditional intellectuals into their movement. Gramsci argues that “there are historically formed specialized categories for the exercise of the intellectual function.”¹² That is, “specialized categories” become necessary and are realized as a specific social group elaborates, more sharply defines, and works to extend its goals. In this way the organic intellectuals are seen as forming the vanguard (in the Leninist sense)¹³ of the social group to which they belong. Along with the utilization of a social group’s existent organic intellectuals is the ability to absorb the traditional intellectuals. Gramsci states that “one of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer

‘ideologically’ the traditional intellectuals.”¹⁴ We can begin to see Huntington’s role in the maintenance and further articulation of the social, political, and cultural necessities of the dominant group; in this case the United States and its client states. For although Huntington’s position as professor initially fulfills the category of traditional intellectual, the empirical evidence will show that he has been “assimilated” and set into motion by the US government.

Although Gramsci begins his discussion on the intellectual by centering on the ability for the common laborer to rise up, articulate the goals for his class, and move to realize them, he also speaks to the proletariat’s common enemy: the capitalist government in the “democratic-bureaucratic”¹⁵ system. In this context, the organic intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies”¹⁶ charged with maintaining its hegemony over the sub-altern section of society. While an authoritarian government may find less use for the organic intellectuals, they are quite necessary for maintaining order and stability in the so-called freer society which exists in the democratic-bureaucratic system. According to Gramsci, these deputies work to fulfill two basic functions. The first is the development of the active consent of the masses. More precisely, it is the construction of a culture, within society, which is accepting of the goals and interests of the State. The second function is the development of the coercive arm of the State. That is, the facet of government which, as Gramsci puts it, “‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively.”¹⁷ An example of this portion of the organic intellectuals, of which Huntington does not belong, can be seen in the professionalization of the police force in 19th century US society.¹⁸

As Gramsci explains, this superstructure necessitates “a whole series of jobs of a manual and instrumental character (non-executive work, agents rather than officials or functionaries.”¹⁹ Thus, as we see, Huntington, in shedding the skin of traditional intellectual and evolving into the organic variety, becomes part of a whole division of labor dependent on the need of the State to have its actions rationalized in the face of the sub-altern masses. Before moving on to my discussion of the empirical evidence, I would like to speak briefly to the problems inherent in the works of organic intellectuals.

William I. Robinson, professor of sociology at the University of California Santa Barbara, states that the Gramscian concept of organic intellectuals further elucidates the relationship existent between the foreign policy enclave within the state and “mainstream US academia.”²⁰ Robinson positions the Gramscian organic intellectuals as experts in providing the political and theoretical thinking for the dominant class.²¹ However, one of the most urgent problems concerning the scholarly work of organic intellectuals, such as Huntington’s, is that objective, scientific research is often sacrificed in outlining the so-called “theoretical thinking” for the state. Robinson elaborates further by stating that “much of this literature is value-laden and steeped in implicit analytical and theoretical assumptions in such a way that the distinction between those who are writing from the outlook of a policymaker or power-holder, and those who are writing from the viewpoint of social science inquiry, often becomes confused.”²² This objective, scientific research of which I speak becomes victim to the paradigms employed by Huntington. They are employed specifically so as to obscure history, thereby deflecting blame away from the illegal acts of the State and effectively maintaining the legitimacy of the State. Huntington is not unique in his extension of these paradigms, explicitly discussed in the

following sections of my paper, but takes his place alongside all state-associated intellectuals who have been set into motion by the dominant classes.²³

Section II: Gauging Huntington's Influence: Brazil, Washington, and the Trilateral Commission

In providing empirical evidence for Huntington's role as organic intellectual I will begin with his work for the Medici government in Brazil in 1972. Huntington's main role in Brazil during this period consisted of providing Medici's military dictatorship advice on how to achieve a slow and controlled process of democratization to be exercised from the top down. His work in Brazil relates to his 1968 publication *Political Order in Changing Societies* which stresses the importance of political rather than strictly economic development. This emphasis on the importance of political development, specifically slow rather than rapid liberalization, derives from Huntington's fear that the "equality of participation is growing much more rapidly than the 'art of associating together.'"²⁴ While the vague notion of modernization is key to Huntington's argument, it is of the political rather than economic variety. In the following analysis I aim to set up a foundation for a comparison of Huntington's rhetoric and the reality of 1970's Brazil. Additionally, I intend to comment on the contradictions inherent in Huntington's conceptualization of democracy.

For Huntington, the art of associating together emanates not from the establishment of liberty, but from a rigid foundation of authority. In the slew of countries that he cites, most of which he considers "modernizing," "developing," or "undeveloped," there is not necessarily a lack of economic development, or even liberty. He asserts, however, that these regions are experiencing a dearth in authoritative,

sovereign government. Huntington claims that it was wrong, in the decades after World War II, for the US to assume “political stability would be the natural and inevitable result of the achievement of, first, economic development and then of social reform.”²⁵ This fault in US foreign policy in the mid-1960’s, he contends, “reflected this dogma.”²⁶ According to Huntington’s paradigm, it is not liberty which marks the democratic nature of a given region, for “men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order.”²⁷ The idea that liberty is only realized through institutionally-imposed order is the essence of Huntington’s prescription for liberalization through political modernization.

Democracy, in this sense, does not stress the vibrancy of liberty in the restraint of order, but instead it is authority that “has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.”²⁸ We may pause here to note the glittering generalities employed by Huntington in denoting the regions of the world to which he refers. The only specificity he implies is so-called “modernizing countries.” These countries lie within the larger regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They are countries with highly disparate social, historical, cultural, political, and economic trajectories, but are here simply relegated to the category of “modernizing.”²⁹

Huntington places primary importance on the creation and maintenance of strong political institutions; again, these are the only bastions of liberty for man. Huntington argues that “without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests.”³⁰ He moves a step further by adding that “the capacity to

create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.”³¹ The hegemony of the State is here referred to. This creation of public interests should be regarded as nothing short of the creation and direction of mass culture; and it does not develop from the bottom, but instead trickles down from the top. In outlining his highly institutionalized political system, Huntington refers to the office of the Presidency as a sort of sovereign within sovereignty. He argues that “the president’s power derives not from his representation of class, group, regional, or popular interests, but rather from the fact that he represents none of these.”³² He, instead, argues that “in contrast to the theory of representative government, under this concept governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but to the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups.”³³ The question then arises of what interests *are* being generated, and for whom? Huntington explains that the main role of “highly developed” political systems have “procedures to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of violence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system.”³⁴ We will see, however, how Huntington’s vision of democracy differed quite heavily from the reality of political discourse in 1970’s Brazil. The liberalization process produced a Brazilian government which remained open to the interests behind capital and relied on brute force to maintain regional order.

While any critique of Huntington’s political theory without factual bases for comparison might fall into the category of “value judgment,” the following discussion should illuminate the disparities between Huntington’s work and the realities which exist in Brazilian history. Overall, Huntington’s work argues that the best governments are

“modernized” ones. However, this process of political modernization involved, as L.S. Stavrianos shows, a violent penetration of already existing culture, politics, and values. In 1964, amidst praise of late President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, the popularly-elected Brazilian President João Goulart was toppled and replaced by a military dictatorship. In his book *Global Rift*, historian Stavrianos shows that declassified documents reveal US compliance with the coup. The US ambassador to Brazil at the time, Lincoln Gordon, was “in contact in August 1962, at the latest, with Carlos Lacerda and other plotters against Goulart.”³⁵ It may come as no surprise, then, that the dictatorship was met by the US with “all-out support.”³⁶ At this point we may revise Huntington’s thesis of why some governments fail to include CIA-led and US-backed political and military intervention. Before the coup, Goulart’s government was simultaneously connected with its populace and largely independent of foreign dictation. Indeed, as Stavrianos explains, it had responded to mass unrest by instituting a massive set of reforms including “agrarian reform, income redistribution, reliance on domestic capital, restriction of foreign investments, massive state intervention in the national economy, and pursuit of new markets in Latin America.”³⁷ It was precisely this list of political and economic restructuring which endangered the sovereignty of the Goulart Presidency. The roots of the coup did not originate from within Brazil, however, but stretched all the way to Washington. Professor Noam Chomsky states that “while the torturers and assassins were carrying out their work, Gordon hailed ‘the most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century’.”³⁸

Interestingly, although Huntington argues that coups d’etat originate from “weak political systems,” this simply was not the case in Brazil. As a matter of fact, the same

government which Huntington represented in his travels to Brazil, that of the US, was proven to be one of the perpetrators of covert action against the Goulart government. While Huntington's *Political Order* argues for strong, sovereign governments he is cited in a 1985 memorandum rationalizing the US government's use of covert action against nations who do embrace its interests. The unclassified memorandum from 1985 was sent by Bretton G. Sciaroni, then acting as counsel to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, to Lieutenant Colonel of the US Marine Corps Oliver North. The document, issued by Sciaroni during the US's involvement in Nicaraguan affairs, enumerates five instances in which covert action abroad is legitimized. Two of the five conclusions rest on the constitutionality of congressional and presidential authority regarding the legal nature of covert action. The final three conclusions are based solely on the opinions of government officials and selected policy advisers. In the discussion of whether or not the "overtness" of covert action leads to the illegality of covert action, Sciaroni contends that "there is no contradiction between covert operations and public knowledge of the covert program. There is only a contradiction between covert operations and public acknowledgement of the program."³⁹ Sciaroni ends by stating that, in order to protect the relationship between the US and the nation in question as well as any third parties involved, it would be useful to maintain a policy of "plausible denial."⁴⁰ This of course follows the line of thinking enacted during the White House's recognition of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua while it simultaneously funned aid to the Contras. It also resembles the work of the CIA and Lincoln Gordon in ousting the Goulart government.

Sciaroni cites Huntington in response to critics' accusations that covert action

violates a rule of non-intervention in other nation-states. In defending covert action Sciaroni states that “Samuel P. Huntington has observed that ‘this is a norm which is not observed by any government, it is one which, in a world of interdependence, is becoming increasingly obsolete.’”⁴¹ Sciaroni draws further reference from Huntington, stating that he “notes that efforts to influence the political processes in other societies is a legitimate thing to do.”⁴² Sciaroni places this last reference in relation to non-paramilitary intervention within other societies; that is, political and economic intervention. Huntington’s assertions in the Sciaroni document run in complete contradiction to the theories established in *Political Order*. In the book Huntington argues that failed states reflect politically backward governments; governments in need of modernization. What is striking is that Huntington’s list of so-called “undeveloped” governments includes, among others, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Indonesia. All three of these locales, however, fell into political disarray due to heavy intervention (military *and* economic) from the United States government. In this sense Brazil’s fate was no different.

There are a number of other discrepancies between Huntington’s political theories and the actual events which took place during his tutelage of Brazil’s Medici government. After the 1964 coup, the Brazilian economy saw an enormous rise in foreign investment from the United States. With the ousting of Goulart came the return of economic policies which were friendly to foreign, mainly United States, capital investments. Stavrianos shows that in 1972 the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the UN Development Program had given \$681.9 million in aid. This is in comparison to paltry numbers in the early 1960’s which declined steadily until 1964.⁴³ Lawrence Weschler, author of *A Miracle, A Universe*, claims that although Brazil did experience “phenomenal

growth” between 1968 and 1973, “the Brazilian Miracle, as it came to be called, benefited only the richest 10 percent of the population.”⁴⁴ By the end of 1978 Brazil had accrued \$40 billion in loans to the United States. Huntington’s process of slow liberalization, in combination with heavy foreign investment, led the country from a path towards economic reform to economic ruin. By 1980 President Joao Batista Figueiredo remarked that “his country ‘has nothing left over for development’.”⁴⁵

English political scientist Alan Hooper states that in a 1988 Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, Huntington was “fulsome in his praise for the Brazilian achievement” and that “his own contribution was coyly hinted at in his comment that political science had ‘played a modest role in this process’.”⁴⁶ While Brazil’s political institutions begun a period of restructuring following Huntington’s arrival, mass depoliticization and, what Hooper calls “democratic disenchantment,”⁴⁷ ensued. Hooper, along with sociologist William I. Robinson, argue that this mass disenchantment was systemic, owing largely to the policies enacted by the Brazilian government in the early 1970’s.⁴⁸ Stavrianos shows that by 1978 there was a surge of worker strikes in electrical firms, metal shops, and tire and heavy-equipment factories. Additionally, the Brazilian government was forced to deal with local businessmen “protesting against ‘denationalization’- an expression commonly used throughout Latin America to connote economic dominance by foreign multinationals.”⁴⁹

Police repression, in the form of rape and torture of ordinary Brazilians, did not cease until almost a decade after Huntington’s arrival. In an interview conducted by Weschler with Elio Gaspari, deputy director of the periodical *Veja*, Gaspari maintained that the systematic use of torture did not end until 1986.⁵⁰ Weschler shows the use of

torture only ended because of a breakdown in military command and not as part of Huntington's praised liberalization process. Instances of battalion commanders torturing their own soldiers and the use of rape for pleasure rather than "investigation" became common practice. Among the numerous examples that Weschler cites are the torture and subsequent killing of two soldiers suspected of using marijuana and security agents taking advantage of women who were promised the release of their family members in return for sexual favors.⁵¹ The coup of 1964, then, saw the toppling of a popularly-elected regime and the subsequent installation of a military dictatorship which stopped at nothing, not even the rape of its own citizens, in its attempt to attract foreign capital.

Huntington's so-called liberalization process also did very little to raise the level of political and economic standing of the popular classes in Brazil. On the contrary, I have argued here that political and economic discourse focused more on providing for the welfare of capitalism. While this fact may be crystal clear when discussing the initialization of a military regime after the fall of the Goulart government, we can also see that Huntington's prescription for "liberalization" only provided for democracy in name and not in practice. Unlike Huntington's theories in *Political Order*, the military rulers beginning with President Castello Branco were sovereign only in the sense that they were protected from the pressures of the people whom they governed. The so-called "political modernization" which Huntington prescribed provided the Brazilian government with the infrastructure necessary to privatize once-national industries at the expense of its laborers. Unfortunately, this "democratization shift," which William Robinson bespeaks of, has become vitally important to the construction and maintenance of the neoliberal economic

order.⁵² This trend, of course, has been rationalized through the seemingly timeless argument for political and economic modernization.

In a final examination of Huntington's influence in the policy making of the US government, I turn to a debate among policymakers and intellectuals alike which centered on the redefinition of the concept of democracy. Robinson has sketched out the background to this dispute and shows how debate over the definition of democracy began in the post-WWII period and would later serve two purposes. First, the debate would lead to a form of democracy which the US government would promote as a replacement of sorts to the increasingly outdated paradigm of authoritarian support in the Third World. Chile and our own case study Brazil were two labs where this paradigm shift was tested. It was believed that the paradigm shift would quell popular resistance in the underdeveloped regions and thus revitalize capital flows.⁵³ Second, the subsequent redefinition of the concept of democracy would also work to assist the rolling back of government interference in market activity during the beginning of the neoliberal turn in the late 1970's and it is this specific turn of which I will speak.⁵⁴ Robinson has termed this newest form of democracy "polyarchy." It refers to a form of rule in which a select few make decisions for the polity while the masses are relegated to participation in a regular voting cycle. The terms of the debate during the voting cycle are set from above and are simply voted on by the governed. This definition of democracy, however, hinges on the separation of political voice from decisions made in the economic sphere. As Robinson argues, democratization theory "separates the social and the economic from the political sphere, and then it turns around and connects the two by claiming an affinity between democracy and free-market capitalism!"⁵⁵ In other words, as the neoliberal

revolution began its demand for unrestrained free markets, the polyarchic form of democracy theorized a de-linking of politics and economics; thus allowing for the freer flow of capital in the emerging transnational state.⁵⁶ In this section I examine Huntington's role in developing the theoretical underpinnings for the polyarchic form of democracy.⁵⁷ In this section I argue that Huntington's thesis in the Trilateral Commission report, *The Crisis of Democracy*, played a dual role in preparing for the emergence of neoliberal policies. In the first instance I will show how Huntington links democracy with capitalism in order to argue for a sort of rolling back of the State. Secondly, I will show how Huntington obscures US history so as to rationalize the redefinition of democracy beginning in the 1970's.

In his section of the Trilateral report Huntington argues that in a democracy "excessive swings [to the left of the political spectrum] may produce too little authority."⁵⁸ For Huntington the mass movements of the 1960's, characterized by a general distrust for the United States government and the so-called democratic system it upheld, were merely a series of testaments to what he calls the "vitality" of democracy.⁵⁹ The problem here is that Huntington claims that the democratic surge of the 1960's produced a strain on the democratic system. Interestingly, Huntington measures this vitality of democracy in terms of the government's expenditures during the period in question. He shows that as the "democratic surge" expanded, from 1960 to 1970, the government's total expenditures grew from \$151 billion to \$333 billion.⁶⁰ These numbers, of course, must represent defense spending since the Vietnam conflict continued to grow in both human and monetary expenses. In order for Huntington to essentially argue for

“less democracy,” and thus the rolling back of government spending on the needs of its populace, he must toy with the definition of democracy itself.

Robinson shows that “Huntington unambiguously connects the economic and the political spheres: dispersed inequalities, private property, a free market, etc. are required for the maintenance of a ‘democratic’ political system.”⁶¹ As Robinson points out, Huntington’s discussion of democratization theory is inherently flawed. In the first instance, his version of democracy separates the political voice of the citizenry from economic decision-making while simultaneously basing the vitality of democracy upon economic circumstances; thus the linking of the democratic political process to notions of private property, free markets, etc. All of which are characteristics of capitalism. In this way Huntington is able to rationalize the type of government restraint necessary for the blossoming neoliberal model.

While Huntington’s redefinition of democracy works to allow for an easy of defense of capitalism, there is still the problem of arguing for a relaxation of state funding in the public sector. As stated above, Huntington argues that the over-extension of “democracy” during the 1960’s, embodied in the mass movements of the New Left and the Civil Rights activists, produced great strains on the viability of the democratic system as a whole.⁶² This cannot be the case though, and for two reasons. The first reason is simple: the majority of the movements during this period were grassroots-based and therefore demanded no funding from the US government or extra-governmental institutions. However, this argument only holds when one critiques Huntington’s linkage between “viable democracy” and “viable capitalism.” Measuring the political activity of a government in strictly economic terms does wonders in obscuring the true nature of the

political system as a whole. The second reason centers on the political philosophy of these movements. Unlike Huntington's arguments in the Trilateral report, these movements were not mere beacons of the "vitality" of democracy, but were outright challenges to the undemocratic nature of the US government.

Examples of these challenges abound and they are easy to miss when the history has been obscured for political ends. The Chicago riot of 1968 is good initial case. As the great historian Howard Zinn explains in his seminal *A People's History of the United States*, a group of radical leftists blew up a monument memorializing the police who died during the Haymarket Square bombing of 1886 in a political gesture against the atrocities committed by the US in Vietnam. We may continue to pick historic examples at random. In 1969 a group of Indians descended upon Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay. The move was in protest to the inhumane way in which the US government treated the indigenous peoples of North America. They produced a declaration which offered to buy the island "in exchange for glass beads and red cloth, the price paid Indians for Manhattan Island over three hundred years earlier."⁶³ They were forcibly removed by the government after six months of occupying the island. A further example can be found in the 1968 burning of bras, girdles, and curlers in protest against the choosing of Miss America. As Zinn points out, a group simply called Radical Women protested against larger themes of patriarchy within the US by claiming that the Miss America represented an "image that oppresses women."⁶⁴ We may also look to the entire Civil Rights movement beginning in the 1950's and the icons who represented it: the Black Panthers, Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokely Carmichael, and Malcolm X and the thousands of everyday people who withstood bullets, bombs, fire hoses, jail, and death to realize actual

democracy in their country. While Huntington may argue otherwise, in order to promote economic restraint in the 1970's, these movements were far from representative of the "vitality" of democracy in 1960's North America. In muting the voices and distorting the political praxis of these and other movements a trade-off is made. Free-market capitalism is here promoted at the expense of a rich and colorful history of activism and sacrifice.

So far, using Huntington as an example, I have shown the degree to which intellectuals matter to the state in its rule. Whether in the form of simple citations in sensitive memoranda such as those National Security documents analyzed above or in publications advocating a rolling back of the central tenets of democracy in both the core and underdeveloped states, intellectuals such as Samuel Huntington played a key role in the formulation and restructuring of patterns of power relations and the accumulation of capital. I shall now turn to the question of how private foundations and think tanks use intellectuals to advance these political agendas.

Section III: Huntington's Connection to Think Tanks and Foundations

Since the post-WWII period political think tanks—private organizations which conduct and publish reports on nearly anything which the extended policy making community deems as important topics of study— have risen in importance in influencing the behavior of the state. This section considers the myriad ways in which Huntington is linked to the state through various think tanks. Since these institutes provide most of the funding for research endeavors, they largely set and control the terms of research for the intellectual. In this respect the reader should be aware of the ways in which these institutes may restrict the ability for scholars to properly research the topics presented to them. Finally, it is in this respect that the reader should see precisely how knowledge

becomes transformed into knowledge production and how the existence of political agendas determines not only which subjects are approached, but how and when they are discussed. As Dirlik states, “paradigms do not just guide inquiry; they also control it, excluding alternative explanations and, therefore, those who favor or promote alternative explanations.”⁶⁵ The discussion will benefit from a brief description of the rise in importance of politically-oriented research institutes.

Political scientist James McGann traces the origins of public policy research institutes to the establishment of the Brookings Institution in 1919. According to McGann the Brookings Institute was the first of its type to direct all of its energies to the production of public policy research. McGann divides the subsequent upsurge of think tanks into four distinct categories beginning with the period between 1900-1929 and moving onward to the periods between 1930-59, 1960-75, and 1976-90.⁶⁶ Interestingly, McGann notes that each of these four periods witnessed some sort of major domestic or international event which led to some sort of addition or realignment among think tanks. McGann attributes the rise of each new generation to the specific event which occurred in the specific time period.

According to McGann the original president of the Brookings Institute, Robert Brookings, “set out to establish a center that would bring social scientists and policy makers together so that a ‘scientific approach’ might be applied to government management, budgeting, and spending.”⁶⁷ McGann states that by the end of the Second World War the United States had become deeply embroiled in the economics and politics of a wide spread of countries spanning from the core to the Third World. He cites George Fauriol in linking the post-war period to surge of think tanks with decidedly conservative

viewpoints. Some of these institutes include The Rand Corporation (1948), Foreign Policy Research Institute (1955), and The Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962). McGann shows that by the 1970's six interrelated events which led to widespread proliferation of think tanks. These trends include a major geographic shift toward the Washington, D.C. area, the emergence of highly specialized think tanks, the politicization of think tanks (McGann attributes this to the break-up of the liberal consensus), and to the "fragmentation" and "increasing complexity" of the political process in the US.⁶⁸ By 1992 McGann estimated that there were over one hundred existing public policy institutes.⁶⁹ He concludes his piece by stating that if the media represented the fourth arm of the government, "think tanks are certainly the fifth."⁷⁰

In tracing the linkages between Huntington and the extended policy making community—represented here by public research institutes—I will begin with the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. The AEI entered the policy research industry in the post-war period and is a product of the conservative surge which produced the Rand Corporation and others. Established in 1943, the AEI would become what the Christian Science Monitor would label the "headquarters of neoconservative thought."⁷¹ President George W. Bush is quoted in the same article as claiming in a speech to an audience at the AEI that "[the AEI] does such good work that my administration has borrowed 20 such minds."⁷²

In a speech for the AEI in 1998, Samuel Huntington claimed that he has been associated with the organization for years; going on to say that his biggest role at the AEI was as member of the Council of Academic Advisers, a position he still holds. As the AEI's website describes, Huntington's role as Academic Adviser is to inform the

president of the Institute on its “research agenda, publications, and appointments.”⁷³ This excerpt seems to indicate that Huntington actually possesses a fairly large degree of influence in the process of establishing research agendas. I would argue, however, that the ability of the AEI to attract funding for its numerous projects still depends largely on the nature of its research and the specific ends which it aims for. In other words, capital and its interests should be placed at the proverbial top of the food chain when discussing think tanks in terms of leadership and direction. Although Huntington claimed not to fit in perfectly at the AEI, presumably because of ideological differences, he lauded other members of the Institute for their “enlightened conservatism and responsible Republicanism.”⁷⁴ In the speech, Huntington was critical of the current administration but, knowing his audience well, argued a modest thesis: stating that the US should expect and embrace a multi-polar world in which a collection of the world’s powers would multi-laterally govern the rest of the globe. However, there is no discussion of radically transforming current political or economic policies.

In conjunction with his membership with the AEI, Huntington can be linked to many other influential think tanks in Washington. I will concentrate on his ties to the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Bradley Foundation, and the John M. Olin Foundation. While the Olin Foundation made major contributions to the construction of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard and did not directly fund any of Huntington’s research, both the Bradley Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation have supported the scholarship of Huntington in the past. It is important to note the difference between a think tank and a foundation. The former is an institute in which intellectuals research specified topics and produce reports on their findings while

the latter is an organization which provides the funding for both think tanks and universities to conduct said research projects.

The John M. Olin Foundation recently dissolved itself in 2005 due to the posthumous request of its founder, Mr. John Olin. The Foundation was established in 1953 by John Olin, president of a chemical and munitions plant which bore his name. According to a 2001 *New York Times* report the Foundation held \$ 90 million in assets.⁷⁵ Research has also shown that the Olin Foundation has funded such think tanks as the AEI, the Heritage Foundation, and the Manhattan Institute for Public Policy Research. According to its profile on the Media Transparency website, the Foundation “also [gave] large sums of money to promote conservative programs in the country’s most prestigious colleges and universities.”⁷⁶ Most germane to this discussion, however, is the fact that the Olin Foundation donated approximately \$4,719,832 million to Harvard University between the years 1985 and 1999.⁷⁷ The main goals of this funding were to support the John M. Olin Fellowship program in National Security Affairs and to establish the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard. The man who directed the construction of the Institute was Samuel Huntington. What is most interesting, and indeed most alarming, about this specific source of funding is that between the years 1995 and 1999 the Olin Foundation donated roughly \$2.5 million to support the *programs* of the Harvard-based Institute. This means that for four consecutive years the conservative Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard received no less than \$300,000 annually to support the Olin Foundation’s choice of, establishment of, and maintenance of scholarly projects. While the Foundation has not directly supported or commissioned any scholarly work by Huntington himself, I would argue its presence within the Olin Institute for

Strategic Studies is highly influential to the studies emanating from the Harvard-based Institute.

A recent publication of Huntington's, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004), ties him to both the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation began as the Allen-Bradley Foundation in 1942. The Foundation shared the name of the company owned by brothers Harry and Lynde Bradley. When the company was sold to Rockwell International in 1985 the Foundation's assets climbed drastically from \$14 \$290 million. It was at this point that the foundation changed its name and began operating at a national level; exercising its influence upon the federal governmental instead of strictly local politics as it had in the past. According to its profile on the Media Transparency website, the Smith Richardson Foundation (an organization in which Samuel Huntington is currently active as member of its Board of Governors) is financed by Vick's Vaporub and holds assets of approximately \$468 million. The Foundation became especially active in supporting the Conservative movement in 1973 when R. Randolph Richardson became its president.⁷⁸ Early funding of state-associated scholarship on behalf of the Smith Richardson Foundation includes the financial support of the work of Jude Wanniski and George Gilder; both scholars published some of the first books arguing the virtues of supply-side economics; the model upon which neoliberalism hinges.⁷⁹ One of the various institutes which receive Smith Richardson money is the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; the same Institute which Huntington acts as Academic Adviser. As the discussion progresses the reader should keep in mind just how involved Huntington is with these specific foundations and

think tanks.

Both the Smith Richardson and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundations have made significant contributions to Huntington's book *Who Are We?*. While the exact dollar amount donated by the Bradley Foundation is unknown, the Smith Richardson Foundation is listed as having given \$35,000 in 1999 to support a research project entitled "American National Identity and National Interests."⁸⁰ The project stipulated that "Huntington will research and write a book analyzing the changing nature of American national identity and the potential effects of the changes on the definition of US national interests."⁸¹ The resulting work, *Who Are We?*, reads like a treatise on the supposed superiority of the Anglo-Protestant values which make the United States a unique part of the Western world. Ironically, Huntington prefaces the book by stating that the work is "shaped by my own identities as a patriot and a scholar."⁸² Huntington goes on to state that as a patriot, he is "deeply concerned"⁸³ about the "strength and unity"⁸⁴ of America's core values of liberty, equality, law, and individual rights.

Like most of Huntington's scholarly work, *Who Are We?* is propped up by the central assumption that concepts of liberty, equality, and individual rights can only be found in their fullest and most elaborated forms within Western culture. The book, in this respect, echoes the statements found in his "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave." Focusing his attack on Mexican immigrants, Huntington positions Mexicans entering the US as potential threats to the core American cultural values which have produced the above conceptualizations of liberty, law, etc. Huntington argues that their ability or inability to assimilate to the cultural norms existent in America is pivotal to the strengthening or destruction of the US's Anglo-Protestant national identity. Huntington

goes so far as to attack a straw man in the person of Lionel Sosa, author of *The Americano Dream*. According to Huntington, Sosa ends his book by stating that there is a real “Americano” dream in the United States for Mexican immigrants. This epithet, seemingly a message of hope to disillusioned Mexicans in the US, is promptly refuted by Huntington. Huntington simply states: “[Sosa] is wrong. There is *no* Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English.”⁸⁵

The problem inherent in Huntington’s argument lies within his seemingly invaluable assumption that not only is culture and national identity central to the longevity of a nation-state in terms of its socioeconomic and political standing, but that the Anglo-Protestant axioms from which US-culture emanates are so far superior than other non-US or non-Western cultures that their existence cannot ever be altered or negated. Huntington’s exaltation of US cultural values vis-a-vis non-Western cultures is about as Eurocentric in both tone and content as one can be.

In the final analysis it seems as though Huntington fears that the cultural mores exhibited by Mexican immigrants in the US will somehow lead to the destruction of American institutions. Huntington seems to have forgotten his own structural-functional roots by claiming that US-style liberty, democracy, and individual rights are solely *cultural* elements subjected to the molding and transmutation of their country’s national culture. These concepts are instead embodied by both houses of Congress, the White House, and the laws inscribed in the United States Constitution and cannot simply fade away as if they were part of some fleeting cultural trend. Thus, even if the above concepts are, in fact, to be considered as cultural traits found only in the United States,

they are still in no danger of being blurred or negated by the entrance of immigrants who may or may not share the same cultural norms as citizens of the US.

What is important to conclude from this discussion is not whether Huntington himself decided on the research topic or if it was handed down to him by the Smith Richardson or Bradley Foundations, but that the funding the book received from the above right-wing think tanks helped to ensure and possibly even expedite its release. Works of this nature have the potential of receiving incredibly large amounts of funding from hundreds of think tanks which work closely with the federal government. The funding which emanates from these think tanks results in the production of a specific form of literature which not only overshadow and subordinate the importance of alternative scholarship, but also enhances the legitimacy and ruling power of the state, thus transforming this type of scholarship into exactly the type of technology of rule, as shown by Stoler, which the state has utilized in the past.

Conclusion

In this paper I have shown a number of ways in which Samuel Huntington has worked to provide the rationalization for various projects on the part of the US government. The purpose of this seemingly polemical paper was not simply to attack a single man or even an entire group of academics. The target which I aimed for in this discussion is much bigger and much more important. It is my hope that I have allowed the reader a glimpse of just one method which the state utilizes in permeating the annals of civil society in its never-ending search for the legitimization of its rule and the realization and of its own interests. Furthermore, one of the main themes I hope to have conveyed to the reader is that the state does not rely on force alone to realize its interests

and maintain order within the polity. Indeed the arm of the state is everywhere at once, able to gauge and even direct public opinion through its many outposts within the public sphere.

In the academic community, scholarship produced by organic intellectuals (who often enjoy a large portion of popularity in the university setting) makes up the bulk of the theoretical and empirical material studied by college students. The problem, then, lies directly in the texts which are assigned in the courses. Most of the material is penned by mainstream intellectuals; the only candidates for policy analysis for the state. Thus the books students receive, then, often emerge from a circle of academics whose common thread leads back, in some way or another, to the state policy making circle. It could be argued that if the arm of the state is in fact permeating university-level instruction, it is doing so while simultaneously displacing the works of authors who do not subscribe to the dominant ideology. In this sense the scholarly work of state-associated academics is not only a form of intellectual hegemony, but a clear and distinct form of intellectual imperialism.

The danger of this occurrence lies in the possibility that students become imbued with specific academic and political views which, by their very nature, restrict their ability to critically analyze the actions of the state. Knowledge production in the university setting quite literally teaches students of the social sciences not so much how to think, but precisely what to think. In conclusion, then, students not only of political science, but of history, anthropology, and sociology, to name a few disciplines, are urged not simply to read their materials, but to question them; to question not only their truth claims, but also the motivations of the authors who produced them. The main question,

then, is who the intended audience of a specific book is. Unfortunately, the discussion within this paper essentially argues that the critical analysis of one's own course materials is nothing short of an act of intellectual resistance against the ever-flexed arm of the state.

This paper serves as a call to students to rethink the power of state-centered ideology and the myriad ways in which it manifests itself. I dedicate it to my fellow students rather than professors or school administrators because any meaningful change, which will result from further awareness and criticism of the political agendas that lie behind most mainstream scholarship, must come from below. New generations of students and teachers must focus their work on producing meaningful critical analyses of their daily realities rather than simply internalizing and reproducing what has been handed down to them from the dominant class.

¹ Ann Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form," In *Archival Science* 2, 2002, 87-109.

² *Ibid.*, 85.

³ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴ Arif Dirlik, "Reversals, Ironies, Hegemonies: Notes on the Contemporary Historiography of Modern China," In *Modern China*, Vol. 22 No.3, July 1996, 244.

⁵ Noam Chomsky, *The Umbrella of US Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of US Policy*, New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999, 6.

⁶ Antonio Gramsci. *The Prison Notebooks*, ed. By Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1999. Writing largely during his imprisonment after 1926, Gramsci is most cited for his discussion of cultural hegemony as a means for state control of the governed. His elaboration of the role of organic intellectuals centers on their usefulness in advising the ruling class on how to maintain and extend its power.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁸ *Ibid.* Hoare and Smith interpret the term "dirigente" into "directive," when one moves beyond simple specialization and into a viable political actor.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹¹ Here I refer, as Gramsci would, to the proletariat and the bourgeois classes specifically.

¹² *Ibid.*, 10.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1. Unlike Lenin's conceptualization of the political vanguard, however, Gramsci's is based on decentralized, even grassroots mobilization.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 10. Note Gramsci's use of the term "struggle." This usage directly implies the contested nature of culture in any given society. It also relates to Gramsci's Marxist roots.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁸ Martha Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 13

²⁰ William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 41. Robinson's main argument involves a radical rethinking of international relations and world systems theory. Robinson's formulation of the neoliberal economic model, beginning in the early 1970's, involves an inextricable linkage between technological globalization and a paradigm shift, on the part of the US, toward support for more "democratic" regimes in the underdeveloped regions of the world. In the book, Robinson argues that the US government received much of its policy advice during the construction of the neoliberal model from academics as well as think tanks and privately run, international organizations such as the Trilateral Commission. A key part of Robinson's argument centers on a post-WWII debate over the concept of democracy. The polyarchic form, which Robinson claims has been adopted by the world's major powers in conjunction with the global elite class, allows for the state to roll back government interference in world markets without losing legitimacy in the face of the polity.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

²² *Ibid.*, 44.

²³ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*. Robinson implicates quite a few of these state-associated academics in his own work. Huntington is positioned along Michael Crozier, Michael Barone, Larry Diamond, Seymour Lipset, and countless others.

²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 3. Huntington produces a laundry list of countries which are supposedly in need of political modernization. Roughly 25 of them are named.

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- ³⁰ Ibid., 24.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Ibid., 28.
- ³³ Ibid., 27.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 21.
- ³⁵ L.S. Stavrianos, *Global Rift*, New York, William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1981, 690.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 691.
- ³⁸ Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003, 92.
- ³⁹ Bretton G. Sciaroni, "The Legal Basis for Covert Action," April 19th, 1985, in *Digital National Security Archive*, accessed 12 September, 2006.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 12.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Stavrianos, *Global Rift*, 691.
- ⁴⁴ Lawrence Weschler, *A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1990, 65.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ Alan Hooper, "The Crisis of Democracy. What Crisis? What Democracy?: The Case of Brazil or Saving the World by-and-for- Uncle Sam," *Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference*, 2000, 7.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 16.
- ⁴⁸ Hooper, "The Crisis of Democracy. What Crisis? What Democracy?: The Case of Brazil or Saving the World by-and-for- Uncle Sam," William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, and Robinson, "Polyarchy: Coercion's New Face in Latin America."
- ⁴⁹ Stavrianos, *Global Rift*, 693.
- ⁵⁰ Weschler, *A Miracle, A Universe*, 66.
- ⁵¹ Weschler, *A Miracle, A Universe*, 67.
- ⁵² William Robinson, "Polyarchy: Coercion's New Face in Latin America," In *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, November/December 2000, 42-55.
- ⁵³ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*. Robinson shows that the United States was forced to shift its support away from authoritarian governments and toward "democratic" regimes in the Third World. The form of democracy exported to the Third World, however, was designed so as to depoliticize the polity while simultaneously legitimating the "democratic process" within the specified region.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid. The polyarchic form of democracy, advocated by Huntington in the *Crisis of Democracy*, was also applied to the United States. Huntington tied the fumbling economy of the 1970's to the concept of democracy and ultimately claimed that democracy in the US had become "over-extended." The late 1970's and early 1980's subsequently witnessed a general rolling back of government interference in the marketplace. A notable example can be found in the 1981 firing of approximately 11,350 union members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization after they went on strike for better working conditions.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., 54.
- ⁵⁶ A complete discussion of this phenomenon can be found in, among other publications, William Robinson's *A Theory of Global Capitalism*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid. As Robinson explains, the monetary crisis which plagued the West in the early part of the 1970's, coupled with numerous acts of popular resistance in the Third World, led to the need for structural changes in maintaining asymmetrical power relations between the North and South. While a good deal of the literature on globalization describes the global hegemonic power of the US as declining at the beginning of the 1970's, many scholars argue that there began a new stage of capitalism in which a global elite, led under the auspices of the United States in conjunction with the world's other major powers emerged under the banner of free markets. Most important to note, however, is that the concepts behind the political restructuring emanated almost directly from the extended policy making community of the United States and Western Europe. This community includes intellectuals such as Huntington.

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- ⁵⁸ Samuel Huntington, Michael Crozier, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, New York: New York University Press, 1975, 63.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 64.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 68-69. Values correlate to the years 1960 and 1970 respectively. Huntington records government expenditures in 1965 as totaling \$205 billion.
- ⁶¹ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, 55.
- ⁶² Huntington, *The Crisis of Democracy*, 64.
- ⁶³ Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*, New York: HarperCollins, 2001, 528.
- ⁶⁴ Quoted in Zinn, 507. For more on patriarchy, state domination, and capital accumulation one might turn to Maria Mies' *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labor*, New York: Zed Books, 1998.
- ⁶⁵ Dirlik, "Reversals, Ironies, Hegemonies: Notes on the Contemporary Historiography of Modern China," 244.
- ⁶⁶ James McGann, "Academics to Ideologues: A Brief History of the Public Policy Research Industry," in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 4, (Dec., 1992), 733.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 736.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 739-40.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁷¹ "Empire Builders: Neoconservatives and their Blueprint for US Power," in *CSmonitor.com*, Accessed 16 October, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/neocon/spheresInfluence.html>.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*
- ⁷³ "Council of Academic Advisers," AEI.org, <<http://www.aei.org/about/filter..contentID.20038142214500076/default.asp>> (18 October 2006).
- ⁷⁴ Samuel Huntington, "Global Perspectives on War and Peace, Or Transiting a Uni-Multipolar World," a speech at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *Bradley Lecture Series*, 11 May, 1998, 1.
- ⁷⁵ Tamar Lewin, "Three Conservative Foundations Are in the Throes of Change," *New York Times on the Web*, 20 May, 2001. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/20/politics/20OLIN.html?ex=1164690000&en=8a7e75417e955bbc&ei=5070>> (10 October 2006)
- ⁷⁶ "John M. Olin Foundation Funder Profile," Mediatransparency.org, <<http://www.mediatransparency.org/funderprofile.php?funderID=7>> (12 October 2006).
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- ⁷⁸ "The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Funder Profile," Mediatransparency.org, <<http://www.mediatransparency.org/funderprofile.php?funderID=1>> (20 October 2006).
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁰ "Samuel P. Huntington Grant Search Results," Mediatransparency.org, <<http://www.mediatransparency.org/allinonesearchresults.php>> (20 October 2006).
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁸² Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004, xvi-xvii.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 256. Emphasis added.

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