TERROR IN THE HIGHLANDS:
COMMUNICATIVE VIOLENCE AND SENDERO LUMINOSO

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by
Everett Albert Vieira, III
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Examining Committee Members:
Hillel David Soifer, Advisory Chair, Department of Political Science
Sandra L. Suárez, Department of Political Science
Adam Ziegfeld, Department of Political Science
Angélica Durán-Martínez, External Member, University of Massachusetts - Lowell
ABSTRACT

My dissertation focuses on a subset of non-lethal violence, particularly the maiming and lasting scars of what I term “communicative violence.” I define communicative violence as non-lethal violence that leaves physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals until the victim’s death). This project builds a theory of communicative violence and offers empirical evidence from 15 months of field research conducted in Peru on the internal armed conflict with Sendero Luminoso from 1980-2000. I argue that a combination of cultural differences, lack of state capacity, and rugged terrain helps to explain the prevalence of communicative violence. A recent development in the study of civil wars is the explosion of micro-level research, which makes an empirical move toward subnational research designs. One of these developments revolves around the conceptual disaggregation of violence and conflict. While this vein of research is primarily focused on the patterns of homicidal violence, as distinct from the logic of conflict in general, the specific issue of communicative violence has gone largely unnoticed in the discipline. Thus, my project seeks to fill that void.
Para mis abuelitos maternos, Daniel y María Elena Vanzzini.
Gracias por sus excelentes ejemplos de trabajo arduo, perseverancia, y capacidad de superar.
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In particular, I cannot say enough about Hillel’s assistance throughout my graduate career. He was the professor I wanted to work with when I applied to Temple University and I wrote about that in my statement of objectives. After admission to the program, Hillel was the first faculty member I spoke with on the phone. Although I had not yet decided where I would pursue my graduate studies, Hillel took an hour out of his Friday afternoon to speak with me about our overlapping research interests and how we might work together. I enrolled in his seminars on the state and qualitative methods my first two semesters at Temple. He introduced me to the internal armed conflict in Peru, sent me on my first fieldwork trip there, and gave me an opportunity to co-author a paper with him. He has provided me with an abundance of advice - professionally and personally - and is a shining example of the scholar I aspire to be one day. This project would not have existed, let alone been completed, without Hillel. I am proud to call him my mentor and friend.

Temple University was my intellectual home. As such, in addition to my committee members, I was fortunate to be influenced by other wonderful faculty
who also provided guidance and support. Seminars with Vin Arceneaux, Richard Deeg, Orfeo Fioretos, Robin Kolodny, Mark A. Pollack, and Sean Yom, all challenged me to think critically and development my arguments - both orally and in writing. This project is better because of them.

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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

“Low voter turnout was a direct result of terrorist intimidation. Because voting was obligatory, and fingerprints were needed to verify votes, Sendero would cut off fingers as a form of intimidation. People were caught in between the state and Sendero.”

Interview, Academic and Elections Expert, Lima, June 2013

Violence, broadly defined as the deliberate infliction of harm against people (Kalyvas 2006, 19), is a fundamental component of social interaction and product of human society. Yet, not all violence is identical. Violence can take the form of social or mental anguish, without a belligerent ever coming into contact or physically touching the victim. This type of violence can include economic oppression, fighting words, and psychological torture, amongst others. Physical violence can manifest in many forms, such as homicide, desecration of corpses, rape, torture, beating, detention, kidnapping, hostage taking, forced disappearance, arson, or robbery (20). Violence also takes on different forms in various conflicts. “Patterns of killing, rape, and pillage are not the same across all armed groups, nor are strategies of violence consistent throughout every conflict” (Weinstein 2007, 199).

Background

In May 2013, I had the fortunate opportunity to travel to Peru for two months in order to conduct research on the legacies of the Shining Path conflict on Peruvian state institutions. In particular, I studied the state’s coercive apparatus, focusing on its institutional design and reformation, as well as counterinsurgency strategies and tactics. In addition, I conducted archival work on the 1989 municipal elections returns as a proxy for insurgent control. As political scientist born and raised in the United States, I was familiar with low voter turnout. However, what I saw in the Peruvian election returns was something I had never seen before. Polling
stations were completely cancelled and closed. At others, ballots were cast in such a way as to nullify the result (e.g., lines drawn for each candidate on the roster), or left completely blank altogether.

In order to investigate this phenomenon, I began to reach out to local Peruvian elections experts. In every conversation I had, I heard the same thing over and over again - the terrorists had organized an election boycott and threatened voters. While the threats included death, another intriguing storyline developed. In order to delegitimise the state’s authority, the terrorists threatened to cut off voters’ fingers. This penalty was directly tied to the indelible ink Peru used to prevent voter fraud. Once a voter cast her ballot, she would have to dip her finger in indelible ink to (1) prove she had voted (because voting was and is compulsory) and (2) ensure she could only vote once. This indelible ink would remain on a voter’s finger for an extended number of days, sometimes lasting a week or more, depending on how much the voter washed her/his hands. As such, the terrorists were able to easily identify civilians who had in fact defied their warnings and voted, merely by looking at their fingers and seeing the indelible ink.

Upon hearing about this form of physical, non-lethal violence that left physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals for the remainder of the victim’s life), I began to think about other subnational groups that had similar violence in their respective contexts. In Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was a terrorist group that used

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1 Author’s interviews with several Peruvians from 2013-7.
knee-capping\textsuperscript{2} as a form of punishment for those who cooperated with the British state or dealt drugs in their neighborhoods (Crawford 2010; O’Doherty 1993; Pressly 2009). In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has been known to amputate the hands, arms, and feet of its victims in order to prevent them from mining diamonds and voting in elections to support the state (Human Rights Watch 1999; Lupick 2012; Onishi 1999). In Afghanistan, the Taliban has cut off fingers in order to intimidate potential voters and prevent them from providing legitimacy to the state (“Afghan Election: Taliban ‘Removed Voters’ Fingers’” 2014; Boone 2009). And in India, similar threats of cutting off the fingers and hands of those voting in elections were made by Maoist guerrillas in India (Chamberlain 2009; Morris 2009).

These physically violent acts all involve the motivation of the culprit to physically harm noncombatants and combatants alike, yet fall short of terminating human life. However, each organization above, as well as others not listed here, did not refrain from lethal violence.

The economic resources (i.e., a gun and a bullet) to kneecap a person and fatally shoot them in the head are identical. And if it takes the same physical effort to carve up a living person’s body rather than slit a throat, why then do some organizations commit non-lethal violence over fatalities? Why leave living witnesses and enemies in the form of victims and bystanders, and potential enemies via future

\textsuperscript{2} “Knee-capping is a particularly vicious injury administered with a low velocity weapon aimed at the popliteal fossa (back of the knee) of the victim...Contrary to popular belief, the patella is rarely involved. Limb punishment shooting would be a more accurate term, especially as several victims have had this punishment extended to include both elbows and both ankles” (Barr and Mollan 1989, 740-1).
generations, when any such current and future threats can be disposed of with a fatality? In other words, what explains the use of non-lethal violence - particularly the maiming and lasting scars of what I term “communicative violence”? I argue that armed actors engage in this specific type of violence in order to communicate with different audiences, and that only the visible and lasting acts of communicative violence can communicate with audiences who do not know the victim and are not present at the moment of violence. I define communicative violence as non-lethal violence that leaves physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals until the victim’s death).³

The purpose of my project is to identify the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence during internal conflicts. This will enable other scholars to use this framework to identify and predict politically violent cases where communicative violence may be used, thus potentially mitigating future atrocities. The focus of this project is on subnational groups, such as terrorist organizations, militias, civil defense forces, and rebel groups. The focus on subnational groups is due to the fact that these sub-state organizations operate differently than states. While Kalyvas (2006) and others in the civil war literature claim that armed actors can be talked about generically, there are extreme differences between the two camps. For example, states tend to be better-funded, have international recognition and legitimacy, possess professional military organizations, and are larger in size. As a result, there is too great a gulf between them in order to compare them fairly, at least in this current project. However, an inclusion of the state coercive apparatus

³ Logic for this definition follows in “Chapter 2 - Concept and Theory” below.
into future studies of communicative violence would allow for not only a richer analysis, but also greater external validity.

Road Map

This dissertation unfolds as follows. In “Chapter 2 - Concept and Theory,” I outline my project’s theoretical contribution to the discipline and a conceptualization of communicative violence as a distinct subset of political violence. I situate this new concept within the broader classifications of violence in the terrorism, political violence, and civil war literature. I show how communicative violence can be classified as both selective and indiscriminate violence, further demonstrating the need for a study of communicative violence as its own category of violence. I also emphasize communication as the key aspect of communicative violence. I identify three deductive hypotheses based off of my theory of communicative violence and the logic for each. I also identify two inductive hypotheses based off of interviews and archival data, and the logic for each. I provide logic for why these hypotheses help to explain the use of communicative violence over other types of violence. I conclude by identifying the puzzle of explaining this variation in violence across and within conflicts by the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.

In “Chapter 3 - Context,” I present an overview of my case selection. In doing so, I highlight the benefits of conducting a subnational comparison in Peru. I provide a background on the Internal Armed Conflict in Peru, as well as a general overview of the subnational group under focus in this project, Sendero Luminoso. I then present a number of examples of variants of violence perpetrated by Sendero,
illustrating both the group’s strategic targeting and need for studying communicative violence. I conclude with a summary and discussion of the further need to study Peru.

In “Chapter 4 - Methods and Data,” I provide an overview of the methods I employed to gather data and evidence for my testable hypotheses. In doing so, I highlight the subnational comparison of matched pairs of cases used in this project. I provide background on the four districts studied in this project and the reasons for selecting each. I also expound the positives and negatives associated with using the Peruvian truth and reconciliation commission data (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación - CVR). I then justify the archival, interview, and ethnographic components of my 15 months of fieldwork, including a scoring of variables used. I explain Institutional Review Board (IRB) concerns and my training for conducting this research. I conclude with a discussion of my own personal experiences using these methods in the field.

In “Chapter 5 - Deductive Hypotheses and Evidence,” I begin to test deductive hypotheses about Sendero Luminoso’s use of communicative violence during the Internal Armed Conflict using district-level\(^4\) data in Ayacucho and Huancavelica. I conclude with a section on evidence to either reject or fail to reject my deductive hypotheses.

\(^4\) In Peru, there are three distinct categories of political units: Departamento/Región (Department/Region - equivalent to a state in the United States), Provincia (Province - akin to a county in the United States), and Distrito (District - a spatial unit that contains multiple small towns as well as some rural areas, similar to a large city with unincorporated areas outside the city limits in the United States). Below that are subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (e.g., centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caseríos).
In “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence,” I begin to test inductive hypotheses about Sendero Luminoso’s use of communicative violence during the Internal Armed Conflict using district-level data in Ayacucho and Huancavelica. I conclude with a section on evidence to either reject or fail to reject my inductive hypotheses.

Finally, in “Chapter 7 - Conclusion,” I identify the conceptual and theoretical contributions of this project to the political violence literature, include a summary of my findings, describe the virtues of the research methods I employed, discuss social and policy implications, and make suggestions for future research and exploration.
CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPT AND THEORY

“Penalties varied by the sin committed. Some were capital offenses; some were not. But penalties were definitely intended to send a message.”
Interview, Ex-Senderista, Ayacucho, September 2015

In this chapter, I provide a conceptualization of communicative violence as a distinct subset of political violence. The goal of this chapter is to situate this new concept within the broader classifications of violence in the terrorism, political violence, and civil war literature. I show how communicative violence can be classified as both selective and indiscriminate violence, further demonstrating the need for a study of communicative violence as its own category of violence. I emphasize communication as the key aspect of communicative violence. I identify three deductive hypotheses based off of my theory of communicative violence and the logic for each. I also identify two inductive hypotheses based off of interviews and archival data, and the logic for each. I provide logic for why these hypotheses help to explain the use of communicative violence over other types of violence. Finally, I conclude with a summary and identify the puzzle of explaining this variation in violence across and within conflicts by the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.

As will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation, I argue that together, the independent variables of culture, state capacity, and rugged terrain explain when combatants utilize communicative violence. While each of these variables is necessary, none of them are sufficient. Furthermore, context matters. The incidents of communicative violence analyzed in this project all occurred in 1985, the same year of a national presidential election in Peru. As will be shown in succeeding
chapters, evidence in the form newspaper reports, government resolutions, and interviews with both elections experts and victims all point to the acts of communicative violence in 1985 being committed precisely because of the election in order to intimidate civilians into not voting. As such, communicative violence as electoral violence in four Andean districts is the focus of this specific project under study.

*Conceptualizing Communicative Violence*

Communicative violence as a distinct subset of political violence is not studied as extensively as other forms of violence. This is not because it is not important, nor is it because it does not occur that often. After all, communicative violence has taken place in numerous locations throughout the world (e.g., Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, the United States, etc.) and across various time periods (e.g., 1882-1930, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). Because communicative violence is often subsumed under the umbrella categories of violence studied in the political violence literature, it is overlooked. Therefore, in this project, I propose a new way to approach variation in violence, which will add yet another valuable perspective to the literature.

Communicative violence, as I conceptualize it, involves more than a violent physical act. Communicative violence, as the name implies, has to contain some form of communication in its execution. Building off of the political violence literature, I propose my own definition of the concept. I define communicative violence as non-lethal violence that leaves physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals for the remainder of the victim's
life). While a fatality may have ripple effects amongst those closest to the victim, the effects may stop after some time. The ability to communicate to various audiences and in particular, an audience who is not present at the moment of violence and does not know the victim, is the most important aspect of my conceptualization of communicative violence.

Existing definitions of violence do not adequately address the idea of communicating with various audiences beyond the victim and her/his immediate group. It is easy to conceive of every violent act as symbolic and communicative in nature because if at least one person witnesses the violent act or is somehow made aware of it, it is thus communicated. However, this general aggregation of all violence does not allow for the study of a nuanced variation amongst different violent acts. To reiterate from above, not all violence is identical. Fatalities are not the same as non-fatalities, and wounds that heal and leave no lasting marks cannot communicate beyond the lifecycle of the healing wound. But non-lethal violence that leaves physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals until the victim’s death) can communicate until the victim is no longer on Earth. Because that act of communicative violence will remain on the victim, every person who that victim comes into contact with in the future will also see the legacy of the violence. My conceptualization of communicative violence thus provides another lens from which to analyze political violence.

A narrow focus on the physical aspect of violence is an analytical departure from existing definitions of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1977; 2004), and is how
my project contributes most to the literature. In order for a violent act to communicate with various audiences, it must rely upon the physiological ability of sight to perceive and thus process the consequences of the violent act. If someone is unable to see the consequence of communicative violence, the repercussion of the act ceases to exist. Being able to see the legacy effects of a violent act allows a human to receive a message even after the violent act has been committed, regardless of the intent or interpretation of the message.

If a person is not able to see the consequences of a violent act (e.g., a death), there is no way for the individual to receive the message; the fatality kills the line of communication between the perpetrator and victim. If the intended recipient is a victim of lethal violence, the line of communication, as well as the victim’s life, is terminated. And while a person can witness a death or see a dead body, these scenarios are typically fixed in space and time. In contrast, the opportunity to see someone with physical and visible marks is not fixed; the opportunity to see victims and be reminded time and time again is significantly impactful. It is possible to travel from town to town, month after month and year after year, and see someone with these markings. Watching someone die is shocking and clearly may leave memories, but seeing or running into a victim of communicative violence time and time again in the village or marketplace will bring constant reminders of the violence that occurred and the reasons why it occurred. The analytical importance of this focus on a subset of non-lethal violence is the contribution of a conceptual disaggregation of violence and conflict, one that moves beyond the focus on patterns of homicidal violence, as distinct from the logic of conflict in general.
Terrorism, Political Violence, and Civil War

Although an enormous amount of important scholarly work has been conducted on the topics of terrorism and political violence, the specific issue of communicative violence has gone largely unnoticed in the discipline. As mentioned above, communicative violence is often subsumed under the umbrella categories of violence studied in the political violence literature. Because it can be categorized as torture, sexual violence, symbolic violence, etc., communicative violence has not been analyzed as a distinct subset of political violence. Therefore, in this study I seek to stand on the shoulders of those scholars who have come before me in order to fill the void left heretofore unaddressed on the subject of communicative violence.

For this project, I focus on micro-level processes in order to explain the conditions under which armed actors use non-lethal communicative violence over lethal violence and non-lethal non-communicative violence. Taking a micro-level approach to the study of communicative violence will allow for a deep analysis of specific events, which may shed light on a given question or puzzle that may be missed at the macro-level. For instance, if one looks at the general trends of an organization from a macro-level, personal connections between individuals and localities, or the agency of an individual leader over her/his local cadre, can be missed.

By requiring a researcher to delve deeper into case studies via archival work, interviews, etc., a micro-level approach will allow for the observation of causal mechanisms whereas a macro-level approach such as large-N regression analysis does not. While producing new knowledge is possible by gathering new data at any
level, there is a greater chance of identifying something new that no other researcher has as of yet discovered because of the work required to gather and analyze data at the micro-level, thereby contributing to the literature of the discipline. It is this micro-level literature that I now turn to, where the distinction between indiscriminate violence and selective violence will be discussed.

While Kalyvas (2006) distinguishes between various types of violence, including indiscriminate versus selective violence, his categories do not fully explain when communicative violence is more likely to occur. Regarded as a seminal work in the civil war literature, Kalyvas differentiates between violence that seeks to exterminate or control a group, coercive violence (26), and violence that serves no instrumental purpose, expressive violence (24). Under the umbrella of coercive violence, Kalyvas argues when little to no information is known about a territory or population and control\(^5\) is low to nonexistent, armed groups will engage in indiscriminate violence.\(^6\) In addition, indiscriminate violence is cheap because it does not require the investment of learning about a community and gaining information about personnel and territory. Therefore, collective punishment is used to sanction an entire population in an effort to influence and/or alter the actions and behaviors of the intended targeted audience.

However, indiscriminate violence comes with potential major costs. Not only will it cause anger and resentment amongst the local population, but it may also

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\(^5\) Control is “the extent to which actors are able to establish exclusive rule on a territory” (Kalyvas 2006, 111).

\(^6\) “Indiscriminate violence is not necessarily gratuitous, wanton, or solely vengeful; rather, it often aims to deter people from collaborating with the rival actor by collectively sanctioning suspected collaborators and those related to them” (Kalyvas 2006, 150). Thus, the purpose of indiscriminate violence is to indirectly shape civilian behavior through association.
have blowback effects. Because of the lack of information about a territory or population, indiscriminate violence is typically late, often random, inconsistent, and disproportionate (155). As a result, indiscriminate violence contributes to “anger and the desire for revenge” (154). One of the most counterproductive effects of indiscriminate violence is that it often results in a blowback effect where reprisals lead to recruitment for insurgents (Kalyvas 2006, 151; Taylor 1998, 37). This “policy trap of terrorism” (Gupta 2008, 205) occurs when an incumbent’s heavy-handed response to violence injures or kills innocents along the way and thus reinforces support for an insurgency. A shining example of this blowback effect occurred on 30 January 1972, in Derry, Northern Ireland. British paratroopers opened fire on a peaceful march organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, where dozens were injured and 14 unarmed civilians were killed. This led to a recruitment boon for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which received several new volunteers eagerly filling its ranks and many others aiding it in any way they could (Vieira 2006, 36-7).

In contrast, specific and selective forms of violence are carried out when actors have information about, and control over, a population and the territory it occupies. Defectors who denounce rivals and collaborate with the violent armed combatants also aid this selective violence. But selective violence is more costly than indiscriminate violence. “Identifying, locating, and ‘neutralizing’ enemies and their civilian collaborators one by one requires a complex and costly infrastructure” (Kalyvas 2006, 165). Furthermore, the personal costs for informants associated with the possibility of being found out can deter potential collaboration. The adage,
“snitches get stitches,” is a helpful explanation here. Because civilians worry about their own personal safety, as well as that of their loved ones, they may not be willing to collaborate out of fear of retribution. This creates yet another level of complication and cost to selective violence.

With respect to expressive violence, it is often combined with “identity” or “sectarian” violence because the violence committed against people is based solely on who they are (24). Furthermore, victims’ testimonies have shed light on their interpretation of expressive violent acts, which highlights an important component of this type of violence: communication. Thus, it is “possible to overlay instrumental action on expressive action by imputing strategic behavior to leaders and expressive behavior to followers” (26). Again, while Kalyvas distinguishes between indiscriminate and selective violence, and when each type is likely to occur, his two categories do not explain when armed actors will use communicative violence.

Weinstein (2007), another influential scholar in the political violence literature, asserts a rebel group’s resources help explain the use of indiscriminate versus discriminate (selective)7 violence. Weinstein found that groups with access to natural resources or external funding (e.g., the RENAMO in Mozambique or Sendero-CRH in Peru) are more likely to use indiscriminate violence (7) because they attract opportunistic recruits who seek short-term gains from participation (consumers) (102). In contrast, those with little or no resources (e.g., the NRA in Uganda or Sendero-Nacional in Peru) are more likely to use selective violence due to their need to forge alliances and good relations with local populations. These

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7 While Weinstein (2007) uses the term “discriminate violence,” which is similar to Kalyvas’ (2006) “selective violence,” I choose to use Kalyvas’ language for consistency throughout this manuscript.
resource-poor organizations also attract and maintain ideological recruits with long-term expected future gains (investors). Weinstein contends groups with resources attract opportunistic recruits while groups that do without attract activist recruits.

*Communicative Violence as Both Selective and Indiscriminate Violence*

While communicative violence may be a subset of selective violence, it can also be classified under indiscriminate violence. It is easy to imagine a scenario where armed actors have extensive knowledge of a population and area, and are able to single out an individual for some offense against the group. The punishment for this individual, if communicative violence were used, would therefore be classified as an act of selective violence. However, if the armed actors do not have substantial information about a population or area and are not able to determine the specific individual who committed the act against the group, a proxy victim would be used in order to collectively punish the population. The same use of violence (i.e., a communicative violent act) in this scenario would therefore be classified as indiscriminate violence. Communicative violence can occur as selective or indiscriminate violence, and potentially as a form of expressive violence if the strategic behavior of sub-state combatant leaders seeks to communicate with one or more audiences. Because of this, Kalyvas’ (2006) classification and logic of violence in civil war does not adequately explain the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.

A similar criticism can be leveled against Weinstein’s (2007) argument as well. As seen above, a violent act can be classified as indiscriminate or selective
violence, but this does not preclude the act from also being classified as
communicative violence. As a result, groups with access to natural resources or
external funding and groups with little or no resources can both commit
communicative violence. Therefore, while Weinstein’s theory for when rebel groups
use either indiscriminate or selective violence may be convincing, it lacks the ability
to account for a nuanced subset of both types of violence. In other words, it does not
explain when a rebel group will use communicative violence.

To be fair, while neither of these two major works in the discipline attempts
to explain the conditions under which armed actors will be able to carry out acts of
communicative violence, the fact remains that the research question guiding this
project cannot be explained by either scholar - alone or combined. Kalyvas’ (2006)
coercive argument works with communicative acts of violence because controlling a
population and territory, as well as benefitting from local defectors/collaborators,
enables armed actors to selectively choose their targets. However, because
communicative violence can also occur as expressive violence, the Kalyvas
argument fails to explain when communicative violence will occur. If Kalyvas’
coercive argument is combined with Weinstein’s (2007) theory, we can imagine a
scenario where armed actors with control over a population and territory might
also have access to resources and funding, and would thereby be prone to using
indiscriminate violence. Thus, either individually or combined, these two scholars
cannot explain when armed actors will use communicative violence.
Communicative Violence as Communication

In order to communicate with an audience who is not present and does not know the victim, only communicative violence is sufficient to communicate the armed actor's message. Like McCormick and Giordano (2007), I argue that armed actors engage in a specific type of violence in order to communicate with different audiences because “different types of actions, against different types of targets, carried out under different circumstances, at different times will not only elicit different impressions on those who witness them, they will also influence the level of exposure these attacks can expect to receive in the first place” (312). Weinstein (2007) also supports the argument that violence takes on distinct forms in various contexts. “Patterns of killing, rape, and pillage are not the same across all armed groups, nor are strategies of violence consistent throughout every conflict” (199). Therefore, communicative acts of violence may be employed in order to signal and communicate with supporters (us), enemies (them), and those on the fence and/or outside the conflict. This communication, depending on the audience, can be used to reinforce a targeted population’s beliefs, alter a targeted audience’s beliefs and actions, or recruit a targeted population.

While McCormick and Giordano (2007) conceptualize symbolic violence for the specific purpose of recruitment and mobilization (the “us” group), there is an opening to extend their argument and apply it as an example of communicative violence as communication in general. Not only will the “us” audience receive the message, but the “them” audience will also receive the transmitted information because violence does not occur in a vacuum. Thus, employing communicative
violence will enable the violent act to carry on a legacy of its own through repeated receptions by various audiences across time and space.

As Durán-Martínez (2018) notes, “There can be different audiences for violence, and violence is always evident for direct victims, but visibility implies that brutality and the experience of violence transcends direct victims and is communicated to the general public” (47). This is a key component of communicative violence, which could accurately be considered a subset of “visible violence,” because the idea of visibility stresses the power of violence as communication (44). While the concept of communicative violence relies upon a logic of display, it should not be confused with what Fujii (2013) conceptualizes as “extra-lethal violence.” Fujii proposed a performative analytic framework whereby perpetrators force victims to dance and sing before killing them, strip body parts for souvenirs as trophies, mutilate corpses, etc. As will be shown below in regard to martyrdom, because these examples of extra-lethal violence include killings, by definition, communicative violence cannot be classified under the same umbrella term as extra-lethal violence.

In addition to communicating with members of their organization as a form of self-discipline or with potential recruits as an incentive or encouragement to join their organization, perpetrators of communicative violence may also use it to communicate with rival groups or the general public. Rival groups may take the form of another terrorist organization (e.g., the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] versus the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam [PLOTE], Hamas versus the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO], etc.) or the state(s) the armed
actors are fighting against (e.g., the IRA versus the United Kingdom, Hezbollah versus Lebanon and Israel, etc.)

Table 2.1 shows the type of violent acts necessary to communicate with a particular audience. With regard to the target audiences that perpetrators of communicative violence seek to communicate with, the *immediate* audience is the victim, the victim’s local community, and those present at the act of communicative violence. The *removed* audience is those who do not know the victim and are either present or not present for the act of communicative violence. For the removed audience not present at the moment of violence, only communicative violence will be able to communicate the armed actors’ message. The difference between communicative violence and any other type of violence for a removed audience not present at the moment of violence is huge. If the audience is not present at the moment of violence and does not know the victim, they will not be able to tell that the victim is carrying a message from an armed actor unless there is some sort of visible physical lasting legacy effect present.

**Table 2.1 - Types of Violence Needed to Communicate to Various Target Audiences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Audience</th>
<th>Relationship to Victim</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Knows</strong></td>
<td><strong>Does Not Know</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Any violent act</td>
<td>Any violent act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present</td>
<td>Any violent act</td>
<td><strong>Communicative violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For those present at the moment of violence and who know the victim, any kind of violent act will suffice for the armed actors to communicate with this audience. Whether one knows the victim or not, one will witness the violent act and receive a message of some kind, depending on the context and circumstances of the
violent act, particularly if they are familiar with the victim. For those present at the moment of violence but who do not know the victim, any violent act will suffice. Because they are able to witness the violent act firsthand (e.g., a murder, a beating, a head-shaving, etc.), the type of violent act does not matter; s/he will receive a message, regardless of content or intent (i.e., this person is receiving punishment for a specified or unspecified reason).

For those not present at the moment of violence but who know the victim, similar to those present at the moment of violence, any kind of violent act will communicate the armed actors’ desired message. For instance, a friend or loved one will see and/or hear about the act due to their social network and connection to the victim. It is easy to imagine a scenario where one’s parent, partner, child, etc. would return home with a wound of some sort and whether or not s/he can communicate, the violence will be communicated to, and received by, those not present at the moment of violence but who know the victim. And if a loved one did not return home, that would also communicate to and with those not present at the moment of violence but who know the victim. For example, the audience who knows the victim and expects them to come home would notice their absence due to a murder or forced disappearance.

However, for someone not present at the moment of violence and who does not know the victim, only communicative violence will be able to communicate the armed actors’ message. The lasting, visible, and physical mark(s) will create legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals until the victim’s death) when this audience views the victim in the context of the politically violent
circumstances (e.g., a civil war, an insurgency, etc.) An illustrative example of communicative violence in the context of politically violent circumstances occurred in Afghanistan in 2009. Taliban militants are well-known for their ruthless and often barbaric attacks, including beheadings. Like other militant organizations, the Taliban do not shy away from killing. However, in order to erode the credibility of the presidential election of 2009, the Taliban threatened to cut off any fingers stained with indelible ink that marks voters; and the Taliban followed through on their threats (“Afghan Election: Taliban ‘Removed Voters’ Fingers’” 2014; Boone 2009; Filkins 2009; Gall and Khapalwak 2009). Also in 2009, similar threats of cutting off the fingers and hands of those voting in the election were made by Maoist guerrillas in India (Chamberlain 2009; Morris 2009).

In contrast, a fatality not witnessed cannot communicate to an audience who does not know the victim because there is no way for the deceased to exist in society as a reminder and thereby communicate with the general population after s/he has been killed. As will be shown below, even if the armed actors publicize the violent act, similar to Islamic State beheadings posted on the Internet or other forms of news reporting, a fatality may have ripple effects amongst those closest to the victim, but the effects may stop after some time. Furthermore, bruises caused by a beating (depending on the severity of the beating) will eventually go away and a victim of sexual violence may have her/his wounds covered from normal public view (depending on the violence committed during the sexual violation), but lasting markings and scars visible to the public are a constant and visible reminder of an act
of communicative violence.\textsuperscript{8} Therefore, to communicate to the audience who is not present and does not know the victim, only communicative violence is sufficient to communicate the armed actor's message.

Violence as communication can be seen in Gambetta's (2009) work on communication techniques of criminals and terrorists. For Gambetta's objects of study in the underworld, there are no formal institutions of enforcement, accountability, or recourse. As a result, criminals use conventional and iconic signals, trademarks, and nicknames in order to build reputations and communicate with other criminals. The signs may be commonplace like scars or tattoos, but can become signals when the signaler takes steps to display them for consumption by other interested parties (xv). For example, a byproduct of unintended incarceration is that it establishes respect from one's peers, as well as terror. "It makes the ex-inmates both trusted (because it testifies to their bona fide criminality) and feared because they endured it" (110). This type of penal commitment goes beyond the conventional signal of tattoos or the wearing of colors or insignia of a criminal organization (e.g., the color red or incorporating the letter N for Norteños, a Hells Angels cut, etc.) The criminal record becomes branded and therefore associated with the individual for the rest of their life.

Torturing or maiming a victim brands an individual for life. Moreover, s/he serves as a constant reminder to the local community and anyone who comes in contact with her/him of the intention and brutality of the perpetrator of

\textsuperscript{8} This does not preclude acts of sexual violence from being categorized as communicative violence. However, it does preclude an automatic inclusion of all acts of sexual violence as communicative violence.
communicative violence. During an internal armed conflict, the assumption is that the local community knows the parties involved, who committed the act, and why. In other words, the local community will interpret the visible and lasting marks of communicative violence and be reminded of the victim’s punishment for going against a particular armed group. While this issue is complex, it is certainly plausible.

Geertz’s (1973) discussion of twitching versus winking is applicable. Regardless of whether or not someone is twitching or winking whilst contracting her/his right eyelid, the interpretation of blinking versus winking can only be done if someone sees the eyelid contracting. A straightforward killing of someone may have ripple effects amongst those closest to the victim, but the effects may stop after some time. While the issue of martyrdom (i.e., the veneration of a victim as a representation of a community) is valid, it relies on the assumption that a martyr would be created. The phrase, “out of sight, out of mind,” is a helpful explanation here. While different types of audiences may interpret acts of communicative violence differently, the fact remains that the physical and visible marks can be seen by audiences. Even if a twitch is interpreted as a wink, or vice versa, the violent act is still communicated, or at least has an opportunity to be communicated. In contrast, the legacy of martyrs requires an extra step of being venerated and remembered.

Blumer (1969) advances this claim by arguing humans act toward things based on meanings those things have for them in a communicative process of interpretation, and piece the meanings together (2). However, as Thomas (2003)
reminds us, most interaction contains multiple, generally conflicting meanings that do not always fit neatly into perfect interpretative boxes (51). As such, while an armed actor may seek to convey a specific message to a specific target, the message may not only be intercepted by someone else, but may also be misinterpreted - by the target and intercepting audience - from the original act’s meaning, speaking once again to Geertz’s (1973) twitching versus blinking. This matches with Gambetta’s (2009) argument that communication and the interpretation of said communication by various audiences is not always clear and consistent. Because of this, this project does not seek to explain the messages of communicative violence, although that research agenda would promise a rich and fascinating analysis. Rather, it acknowledges the fact that a message exists in the violent act, regardless of original intention, interpretation, or misinterpretation, and seeks to explain the conditions under which this type of violence occurs.

While it is impossible to climb inside the head of a violent perpetrator, I make the argument that it is the communication with at least one and perhaps multiple audiences that drives the decision to utilize signs, signals, and symbols. Although there are individuals who perpetrate violence for the purpose of enjoyment and pleasure, I consider them random noise in this project. While serial murderers and torturers may be members of sub-state organizations, they do not accurately reflect the command structure and systematic implementation of organizational policy the way the majority of terrorist, rebel, or militia members do. Variation in intensity and type of violence is not wholly irrational, but instead rational. “Criminals’ apparent irrational use of excessive violence that attracts law
enforcement attention can therefore be seen as a strategic decision” (Durán-Martínez 2018, 36). Thus, I draw heavily upon those who emphasize strategic communication (Durán-Martínez 2018; Gambetta 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007) to frame the theory of my project. Instances of communicative violence provide the byproduct of what Durán-Martínez (2018) conceptualizes as “visible violence,” forms of violence that are highly public but that can also include deaths, which is beyond the scope of this project. Communicative violence may also generate different reactions depending on the audience (McCormick and Giordano 2007) and/or context (Geertz 1973). Therefore, an opening or gap in the literature not yet explained suggests there is room for the question I ask in my project by identifying the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.

**Table 2.2 - Returns for the Complementary Municipal Elections of 1985 in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Votes Cast</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>% Population Voted</th>
<th># CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>8,297</td>
<td>11.73%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>7,349</td>
<td>23,226</td>
<td>31.64%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>3,193</td>
<td>5,623</td>
<td>56.78%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Infogob (2018)⁹

In particular, I look at Sendero’s communication of a specific message - “do not vote” - across four districts in Peru during 1985.¹⁰ As Table 2.2 demonstrates, incidents of communicative violence, identified based on the research I describe below, are associated with non-participation (despite mandatory voting) in local-

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⁹ Election data are drawn from http://www.infogob.com.pe/Localidad/Peru_procesos_electorales_uHzVUEHmgS0%3dzE, last accessed 6 July 2018.

¹⁰ I discuss the issue of case selection in “Chapter 3 - Context.”
level elections. Table 2.2 shows all four districts under study in this project, along with the total numbers of votes cast,\textsuperscript{11} total population, proportion of the total population who votes in the election, and total number of incidents of communicative violence in each district in 1985. No data available for the District of Acobamba makes it impossible to compare with its Huancavelica district counterpart in Churcampa. However, the data show that a much smaller proportion of the population in Chungui voted (11.73\%) compared to its Ayacucho district counterpart in San Miguel (31.64\%). The lower voter turnout in Chungui suggests that residents there received Sendero’s message to abstain from voting in the election compared to San Miguel, as evidenced by a nearly three to one margin. This evidence further bolsters my argument that the narrative of communicative violence was strategically employed by Sendero in order to affect voter turnout in 1985.\textsuperscript{12}

The core empirical exercise in this dissertation is an attempt to account for variation in the use of communicative violence across these four districts. In so doing, I explore the validity of a series of hypotheses (both deductive and inductive) to account for the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.

\textsuperscript{11} These data include both valid votes and invalid votes (i.e., blank votes and null votes).

\textsuperscript{12} Returns for the 1986 municipal elections are difficult to interpret as there were more votes cast (both valid and invalid) in both Acobamba and Churcampa (Infogob 2018).
Deductive Hypotheses

As seen above, Table 2.1 allows three deductive hypotheses to be derived based off of the theory of communicative violence. $H_1$ involves size and density of cities as a potential explanation of communicative violence; $H_2$ uses mobility of civilians as a potential explanation of communicative violence; and $H_3$ links cultural differences to incidence of communicative violence. Evidence for all three hypotheses will be presented in “Chapter 5 - Deductive Hypotheses and Evidence,” including data on both the dependent variable (presence of communicative violence) and independent variables (size and density of cities, population mobility, and cultural differences).

$H_1$: The larger the size of the population, the more likely it is that an individual will see the effects of a communicative act of violence. Therefore, communicative violence is more likely in large cities.

In a populous city, the number of individuals that people encounter in a given day is significantly larger than they would in a sparsely-populated town. Thus, I argue the chances of seeing someone who is a victim of communicative violence are greater in urban rather than rural areas. If the chances of seeing a victim of communicative violence are greater, and more of the people they see are people they do not know, the likelihood of that audience member transmitting that knowledge to her/his own population network is also greater, thereby perpetuating the original violent act’s intended communication. As such, I hypothesize acts of

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13 I include an explanation and defense for each of my hypotheses, along with the scoring of my independent and dependent variables, below each hypothesis. A more robust explanation of these methods is elaborated upon in “Chapter 4 - Methods and Data.”
communicative violence in large cities should be greater in frequency than acts of communicative violence in small towns or villages.

This hypothesis is tested through two different operationalizations of city size: population size and population density. In larger cities, media and communication are also important to consider as cities are likely to have more newspapers, more radio stations, etc. that can further help spread the “news.” While an urban versus rural distinction can be made through sheer population size (i.e., the number of people in a town or city), population density is different. For example, the 2016 population of New York County (Manhattan Borough), New York is about 1.6 million (United States Census Bureau 2017a), and the 2016 population for Phoenix (City), Arizona is also about 1.6 million (United States Census Bureau 2017b), which makes the two cities roughly the same in population size. However, New York’s land area is 22.83 square miles compared to Phoenix’s 516.7 square miles, thus making New York’s population over 22 times denser than Phoenix’s. As a result, the chances of a person seeing someone they do not know is likely greater in a more densely populated area. Thus, in the scenario above, the chances of a person seeing someone they do not know is likely greater in New York than in Phoenix. This comparison further supports my hypothesis that based on population density, the likelihood of individuals witnessing and experiencing acts of communicative violence increases as population size and density increase. I examine the effect of both population size and population density on the incidence of communicative violence below. Data for this hypothesis can be found in census records.
**H2:** The higher the rate of mobility of a population, the more likely it is that an act of communicative violence will be communicated to a wider audience. Therefore, communicative violence is more likely in areas with a highly transient population.

In both large cities and small towns, and even in the most remote areas, there is a central marketplace where merchants and vendors can buy, sell, and trade their wares with the local population. Because of this, these market towns see a high rate of population mobility due to those traveling in for short periods of time. Therefore, these transient individuals are likely to carry the newfound knowledge of an act of communicative violence with them back to their home communities and as they move from market town to market town. Because of this, acts of communicative violence in areas with a central marketplace should be greater than acts of communicative violence in areas without a central marketplace, assuming individuals come into contact with victims of communicative violence. While systematic data on locations of markets are not available for the remotest regions of Peru, locals in those areas of Ayacucho and Huancavelica confirmed they had to travel to district capitals in order to access the *mercados* in order to buy and sell goods.

Another way a city or town can be categorized as highly mobile is by looking at road and railway density. While Herbst (2000) studied road and railway density in Africa to determine the reach of the state, I argue the same unit of analysis can be used to determine how mobile a population is. The more roads and railways a community has, the more mobile its population can be. Therefore, acts of communicative violence in areas with a higher concentration of roads and railways should be greater than acts of communicative violence in areas with less road and
railway density, assuming individuals come into contact with victims of communicative violence. Data for this hypothesis can be found by using district capitals as proxies for market towns and maps for road/railway density.

While this proxy (i.e., roads) is potentially problematic due to the fact that it can be conflated with state capacity (as seen in “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence”), it is used here for two reasons. One, there are no other systematic data available for the mobility of a population. And two, in the context of H2 (versus H4), I am analyzing the movement of individual civilians to and from their home communities, not whether or not the state can exert its infrastructural capacity. Thus, when examined from this perspective, the proxy can be utilized for H2.

H3: The more culturally different the audience is from the armed actor, the less likely it is that the armed actors will be able to communicate via traditional modes of interaction. Therefore, communicative violence is likely in populations with different cultures than those of the armed actors.

Although racism may be a component of violent persecution, it is difficult to measure. However, language and literacy are good indicators of cultural differences. In rural Peru, for example, education served as a “coded language of race” inside the country (Heilman 2010, 97). In remote hinterlands, monolingual communities often do not speak the dominant language of the armed actors. Without a lingua franca to converse in, armed actors may resort to other methods in order to communicate with the culturally different population. For armed actors,

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14 This project does not claim to define “culture,” but it does rely upon Geertz’s (1973) interpretation of the concept: “it denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (89). As such, language is but one component of culture (i.e., the communication aspect) that can be measured and included as an indicator in this study.
this potentially creates an outsider versus insider strategy with respect to being able to communicate.

The outsiders (the armed actors) are unable to communicate with the insiders (the targeted population) via traditional modes of communication because they do not share the same culture or shared knowledge (e.g., language). In order to penetrate the insider sphere, the outsiders will have to find other ways to communicate, which may include communicative violence. Therefore, acts of communicative violence should be greater in areas with non-dominant monolingual communities rather than in areas where the population speaks the dominant language of the armed actors. Data for this hypothesis can be found in census records.

*Inductive Hypotheses*

While “Chapter 5 - Deductive Hypotheses and Evidence” will draw upon Table 2.1 to test three deductive hypotheses based off of the theory of communicative violence, this section identifies two inductive hypotheses based off of interviews and archival data in the field. Working inductively whilst in the field is commonplace and natural. “Interview respondents’ answers to well-crafted questions - and information they provide completely unprompted - can illuminate important causal factors, aiding scholars in generating or developing their arguments” (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 208). For example, in the preceding section, H₃ is informed by looking at the victims of various conflicts and how they are often “othered” by assailants. As a result, based on information
gleaned from my interviews and archival work over the course of 15 months in Peru, I developed two additional inductive hypotheses.

H₄ involves the absence of state presence (using a sliding scale) and how this absence contributes to communicative violence. H₅ demonstrates how ruggedness/remoteness contributes to communicative violence due to easy escape and camouflage by armed actors. Evidence for both hypotheses will be presented, including data on both the dependent variable (presence of communicative violence) and independent variables (state capacity and rugged terrain) in “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence.”

H₄: The greater the absence of state presence in a particular area, the more likely it is that armed actors will be able to conduct operations with impunity. Therefore, communicative violence is likely in locations with low state capacity.

This hypothesis is derived from interviews with former combatants and victims in the highlands of Ayacucho and Huancavelica. It is also grounded in Soifer’s (2008; 2012) measurement of state capacity, or what Mann (1984) calls “infrastructural power” (189). The study of state infrastructural power also speaks to spatial and social control (Soifer and vom Hau 2008, 226), which this hypothesis is directly related to. In his work, Soifer argues that for a state to have capacity, it must be able to perform all three of the following functions: administration of some very basic set of services, security provision, and extraction (2012, 591). Within each distinct dimension of state capacity, Soifer provides a basket of indicators to assess each dimension: security (violent crime rate, lynching rate, and private security per capita); administration (census administration, national

15 Italics in the original work.
identity card registration, and vaccination rates); and extraction (direct
taxes/indirect taxes, direct taxes per capita, and share of working population in
formal sector) (596). Thus, capabilities of the central state, territorial reach, and
effects of the state on society are three analytical approaches to infrastructural
government (Soifer 2008, 232).

If a state is unable to perform even one of the dimensions outlined above, it
can be classified as a weak state. In particular, the security dimension is important
to analyze in regard to a maiming and mutilating violent act such as communicative
violence. For example, if a state is unable to penetrate the hinterland, it will not be
able to extract from its people (Herbst 2000). This lack of reach by the state
contributes to state weakness, which further implies an inability to enforce law and
order. Therefore, acts of communicative violence should be greater in areas with
low state capacity rather than in communities where state capacity is high because a
weak state would be unable to prevent such violent acts from occurring with
impunity while a strong state would be able to protect its citizens, or be able to
bring belligerents to justice if such events were to occur. In addition to Soifer’s
indicators above, other proxies can be used to measure state capacity: roads and
access, health provision, and educational institutions. Data for this hypothesis can
be found in archival records of the Ministries of Transportation and
Communications, Health, and Education, the Peruvian National Police, and the
municipal governments of the districts in this study.
H₅: The more rugged and remote the terrain, the more difficult it is for the state to counter an insurgency. Therefore, communicative violence is likely in locations with a high level of rugged or remote terrain.

This hypothesis is derived from travel to and throughout the Andean highlands of Ayacucho and Huancavelica. It is also grounded in Nunn and Puga's (2012) study of geography and rugged terrain and its effects on the slave trade in Africa. In their work, Nunn and Puga found that while rugged terrain impedes trade and many productive activities, negatively affecting income globally, rugged terrain within Africa also provided protection to those being raided during the slave trades (20). Because the most common method of enslavement was via raids and kidnapping, the rugged terrain offered “protection to those being raided. It provided caves for hiding and the ability to watch the lowlands and incoming paths” (21).

It is this ability to run and hide that can be applied to my project. The more rugged the terrain and remote from the core capital, the more difficult it would be for state forces to reach and counter the Senderistas. Being able to escape capture and punishment allows combatants to operate without fear of enforcement by the state. As a result, assuming actors will behave differently when there is a lower chance of apprehension, having the ability to commit acts of communicative violence without fear of oversight by the state allows those actors to pursue violent paths unchecked. Furthermore, if state forces were able to reach the contested zones, the rugged terrain would afford protection and areas of refuge where Sendero could melt into the geography. Knowing a priori they have easily accessible escape routes, this incentivizes combatants to engage in brutal violence without fear of risking easy capture.
In addition to altitude and the terrain ruggedness index provided by Nunn and Puga, roads can be measured over time to determine access by the state, including level of refinement (e.g., paved versus dirt versus planned highways/accesses). Data for this hypothesis can be found in archival records of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and the National Geographic Institute. Furthermore, this hypothesis is unrelated to \( H_2 \) because although the latter states that even in the most remote areas, there is a central marketplace where merchants and vendors can buy, sell, and trade their wares with the local population, that central marketplace (1) functions autonomously from the state and (2) is centrally located between the hinterland communities.

**Logic**

Conceptualizing communicative violence requires an attention to narratives. Communicative violence, as the name implies, has to contain some form of communication in its execution, which means that those who see victims of communicative violence receive a message based on the victim’s visible markings. As such, in examining both the hypotheses and evidence for each in this chapter, it is important to consider the following two items.

First, during the year studied in this project (1985), national elections took place in Peru. As seen in national newspaper headlines in Figures 5.1-3, Sendero warned civilians not to vote in the election in order to delegitimize the state’s authority. The penalty for voting would be the cutting off of fingers. This penalty was directly tied to the indelible ink Peru used to prevent voter fraud. Once a voter cast her ballot, she would have to dip her finger in indelible ink to (1) prove she had
voted (because voting was and is compulsory) and (2) ensure she could only vote once. This indelible ink would remain on a voter’s finger for an extended number of days, sometimes lasting a week or more, depending on how much the voter washed her/his hands. As such, Sendero was able to easily identify civilians who had in fact defied their warnings and voted, merely by looking at their fingers and seeing the indelible ink.

Second, and related to H3 above, while this warning by Sendero made its way to cover stories and headlines in the two national newspapers (La República and El Comercio), this media was not consumed by civilians in the south central highlands during the Internal Armed Conflict. One, these national newspapers were not circulated in the remote communities. The lack of formal news, such as newspapers and television, were instead replaced with oral communication between civilians sharing stories and experiences from their communities while traveling and/or visiting central locations. And two, even if issues did make it to the hinterland, the likelihood of a Quechua-speaker who did not read Spanish being able to interpret the newspaper articles would be virtually impossible. However, word of these acts happening traveled from one rural village to the next. Furthermore, the lack of electricity in the remotest highland communities as recently as 2017, strongly indicates that television and radio were not media consumed in remote areas in 1985. Therefore, demonstrations of control via electrical blackouts would not have been an effective act of violence Sendero could have used in those areas because if a community does not have electricity, that electricity cannot be taken away. As a

16 Author’s interviews with several Peruvians from 2013-7.
result, oral transmission of the *narrative* of communicative violence was the only form of communication that could travel across space from community to community, regardless of technological or cultural differences.

To help bolster this narrative argument, consider the following. For reasons that will be discussed in “Chapter 4 - Methods and Data,” acts of communicative violence were not captured in the CVR, even though some instances were reported in national newspapers. And yet, for the next national election in 1990, the National Jury of Elections (*Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* - JNE)\(^{17}\) suspended the use of indelible ink in the emergency zones of the south central highlands through “Resolution No. 648-90-P/JNE” in order to “preserve the security of the citizens who live in the emergency zones” (*El Peruano* 1990, 83193). This directive was given because Sendero had threatened civilians not to vote or else risk losing a finger, precisely because they knew voting was compulsory. In spite of these threats and acts of electoral violence, the JNE did not cancel or even postpone the 1990 elections. Nor did the JNE release Peruvian citizens from their voting obligation. Rather, because the removed audience (i.e., the Peruvian state) received Sendero’s message of communicative violence in the prior national election (1985), the JNE implemented a workaround in response to Sendero’s communication. This JNE workaround is the “smoking gun” that shows (1) Sendero was clearly committing acts of communicative violence in order to intimidate civilians into not voting and

\(^{17}\) The JNE is an autonomous institution whose mission is to “contribute to the consolidation of the democratic system, guaranteeing the political rights of citizens, through the administration of electoral justice, control, custody and registration of political organizations and other legal functions, with transparency and impartiality” (JNE 2018). It oversees elections in order to guarantee respect for the popular will of the people.
(2) the Peruvian state was aware of this particular form of electoral violence because its suspension of the use of indelible ink in the emergency zones was a direct response to the specific threats and actions made by Sendero.

In short, although not widely captured through media outlets during or even after the Internal Armed Conflict, the narrative of communicative violence reached all the way to the commanding heights of the state. This was a tree that fell in the forest and the entire country heard it fall.

Conclusion

Employing the use of signs, which I interpret as physical and visible marks, and transforming them into signals (communication via their lasting legacy effects) allows me to build on Gambetta’s work on the mafia and yakuza and apply my new theory to terrorist, rebel, and militia organizations and their use of communicative violence in order to communicate with various audiences. Communicative violence involves physically violent acts with the motivation of the culprit to physically harm noncombatants and combatants alike. Furthermore, it leaves physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects, yet falls short of terminating human life. However, organizations that utilized communicative violence in internal conflicts (e.g., the IRA, RUF, Taliban, etc.) did not refrain from lethal violence, nor was all communicative violence the same. Therefore, my project seeks to explain this variation in communicative violence across and within conflicts by identifying the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.
CHAPTER 3 - CONTEXT

“Training in Sendero was the same as training in the army - the only difference was that we had bullets in the army. In both cases, we marched every day and were prepared for death. In Sendero, it was for Marx, Mao, and Guzmán. In the army, it was for the homeland, for democracy. There was no difference between Sendero and the armed forces.”

Interview, Ex-Senderista and Former Soldier, Ayacucho, July 2013

In this chapter, I present an overview of my case selection. In doing so, I highlight the benefits of conducting a subnational comparison in Peru. I provide a background on the Internal Armed Conflict in Peru, as well as a general overview of the subnational group under focus in this project, Sendero Luminoso. I then present a number of examples of variants of violence perpetrated by Sendero, illustrating both the group’s strategic targeting and need for studying communicative violence. I conclude with a summary and discussion of the further need to study Peru.

Subnational Comparison

A recent development in the study of civil wars is the explosion of “micro-level” research, which makes an empirical move toward subnational research designs (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 335). One area of research, which my project is related to, revolves around the conceptual disaggregation of violence and conflict (335-6). While this vein of research is primarily focused on the patterns of homicidal violence, as distinct from the logic of conflict in general, my project focuses on a subset of non-lethal violence, which I call communicative violence. This project will involve a subnational comparison of Peru. The subnational comparative method allows for three major contributions to a social scientist’s toolbox: research design, measurement, and theory-building (Snyder 2001, 103). First, because it increases the number of observations and helps for controlled comparisons, it
ameliorates some of the limitations of small-N research design. Because there may be observable implications at many levels of analysis, “what may appear to be a single-case study, or a study of only a few cases, may indeed contain many potential observations, at different levels of analysis, that are relevant to the theory being evaluated” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 208).

Second, this type of focus allows for an accurate coding of cases, which allows for more valid causal inferences. For example, cross-national research frequently depends on national-level means to code cases or misuses the best known place of a state by focusing on a particular region and then generalizing the state as a whole (Snyder 2001, 98-100). By analyzing a heterogeneous society at the subnational level, these two problems can be avoided by mitigating the potential risk of invalid coding of national cases. To this end, within Peru, I study two departments (i.e., Ayacucho and Huancavelica), three provinces (i.e., La Mar, Acobamba, and Churcampa), four districts (i.e., Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa), and various communities within those districts.

And third, the subnational comparative method enables researchers to deal with the variance of political and economic processes across states. Not unrelated to the second point above, using a regionally differentiated perspective that analyzes the range of diversity across subnational units in a state can be helpful for understanding how the political regime of a state works at the national level (100). Because variation can exist between urban and rural areas and between conservative and progressive divides, amongst others, it is important to study the various levels of processes within a state in order to better understand outcomes at
the national level. As will be discussed in “Chapter 4 - Methods and Data,” there was a divergence in the way the conflict was covered in the capital city of Lima versus the way it was covered in the highlands.

Because my project is focused on explaining variation in violence used by subnational groups, I choose to focus on one group during one internal armed conflict for three reasons. First, I am able to increase the number of observations by drilling down at the smallest unit of analysis for which data is available. Second, by accurately coding my cases, I am able to make more valid causal inferences about my findings. And third, focusing on one region of one state will allow me to control for variation across international contexts. Furthermore, utilizing a within-country comparison is congruent with other studies on similar topics of political violence. Scholars have studied violence and conflict at the subnational level in states and regions as varied as Burundi in Southeast Africa (MF Lynch 2013), El Salvador in Central America (Stanley 1996; Wood 2003), and Greece in Southern Europe (Kalyvas 2006).

Case Selection

Although communicative violence takes place in various locations throughout the world (e.g., Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, the United States, etc.) and across various periods of time (e.g., 1882-1930, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s), I focus on Peru from 1980-2000 for a number of reasons. Peru resides within the universe of cases that has experienced terrorism on the homeland and communicative violence by groups such as the Partido Comunista del Peru - Sendero Luminoso (Sendero) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru
(MRTA), which together accounted for a significant amount of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. As such, there is great potential for data collection and study. Data is also readily available via the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), the state’s truth and reconciliation commission, which includes nearly 17,000 observations.

**Figure 3.1 - Map of Peru**

![Map of Peru](source: Global Administrative Areas (2018))
As seen in Figure 3.1, Peru is located in the west portion of South America. It is bordered to the north by Ecuador and Colombia, to the east by Brazil and Bolivia, to the south by Chile, and to the west by the Pacific Ocean.

The Internal Armed Conflict in Peru

On 17 May 1980, in the small Andean village of Chuschi, in the Province of Cangallo in Ayacucho, five hooded men broke into the voter registration office, restrained the registrar, and burned both the voter registry and the ballot boxes (Gorriti 1999, 17). This sounded the alarm on what would come to be known as the Internal Armed Conflict\(^\text{18}\) in Peru from 1980-2000. The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso)\(^\text{19}\) claimed responsibility for the attack. In doing so, Sendero kicked off an insurgency that would result in the death or disappearance of at least 69,000 Peruvians (CVR - “Anexo 2: ¿Cuántos Peruanos Murieron? Estimación del Total de Víctimas Causadas por el Conflicto Armado Interno” 2003, 13). Figure 3.2 shows a heat map with the number of total incidents by department in Peru.

\(^{18}\) While the Correlates of War Project defines a civil war as an internal conflict in which active participants include both the national government and subnational groups with at least 1,000 battle-deaths in each calendar year of the war, Peruvians by and large do not use that term to describe the period of 1980-2000. Rather, concepts such as “epoch of terrorism,” “epoch of Sendero,” and “internal conflict” were more readily used and heard during my interviews in the field. As a result, in this project, I refer to the period under study as the “Internal Armed Conflict.”

\(^{19}\) In this dissertation, the Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso is referred to as Sendero.
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, a philosophy professor at the National University of Saint Christopher of Huamanga (Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga - UNSCH) in Ayacucho, founded the political party on a platform of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political ideology. Ironically, Sendero launched its armed campaign in 1980, just as Peru emerged from 12 years of military rule, which had followed a military coup by General Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado in 1968.
Guzmán, who had wished to exploit the military dictatorship and highlight the disparity in the country, considered this “democracy with an asterisk” (Mauceri 1997, 29) a farce, even before Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the president who had been ousted by Velasco in 1968, returned to power with the 1980 election (Burt 2007, 5).

The CVR breaks up the Internal Armed Conflict by time period (i.e., 1980-2, 1983-5, 1986-8, 1989-92, 1993-2000). In the first period (1980-2), Sendero went largely unchecked by the state. Local police were the primary responders to Sendero’s attacks on wealthy business and hacienda owners, as well as the victims of attacks themselves. President Belaúnde declared a “state of emergency” during the second period (1983-5) of the conflict. Although Sendero had actively engaged in violence since May 1980, a reticent Belaúnde had delayed deploying troops to Ayacucho due to fear of another military coup. Following the deployment of military forces to the south central highlands in late 1982, the Peruvian state engaged in a scorched earth campaign intended to eradicate the insurgency and instill in the minds of the population that they should support the military over Sendero (Jaskoski 2013, 42; Taylor 1998, 43). According to the former Minister of War, General Luis Cisneros: “If to kill two or three senderistas it is necessary to kill 80 innocents, then it does not matter ... The peasants have to decide where they wish to die: with Sendero or the armed forces” (Granados 1987, 27 and 33). As a result of this sentiment, the number of human rights violations committed by the military\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20} See Zech (2015) for an analysis of the state’s use of torture, which identifies the logics and motivations of its use by the Peruvian coercive apparatus.
spiked during this period of indiscriminate violence (Koc-Menard 2006, 336; Obando 1998, 196).

The third period (1986-8) was marked by the arrival of a new president, Alan García Pérez, who sought a more coherent counterinsurgency strategy than his predecessor, including a reformation and consolidation of the tripartite and often competing police forces (Soifer and Vieira 2019). However, violence on all sides continued to spread throughout the country. The fourth period (1989-92) saw Sendero go on the offensive. Sendero believed it had achieved a stage of “strategic equilibrium,” the second stage of Mao Zedong’s protracted revolutionary guerrilla warfare (Asencios 2016, 51). As a result, Sendero stepped up attacks and took the fight from the sierra to the capital city. Another new president, Alberto Fujimori, entered office in 1990. In addition to implementing draconian counterinsurgency measures, Fujimori’s autogolpe (self-coup) in April 1992, in which he closed Congress and suspended Peru’s constitution, served as a watershed moment during the conflict. The fifth period (1993-2000) was marked by a steady decline of Sendero violence throughout the country. Aided by the reformation of Peru’s national police force (PNP), Guzmán was captured in September 1992, and his capture dealt a “lethal blow” to Sendero (Asencios 2016, 52). However, even with Guzmán’s capture, Fujimori’s reforms brought a new round of authoritarianism to Peru.

*El Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso*

Composed of mainly educated mestizos forming the backbone of the organization (Degregori 2013, 235), Sendero was founded as a communist political
party as its official name implies. More specifically, Sendero can be placed within a Maoist school of thought. Sendero’s various propaganda outputs proclaimed “President Gonzalo”\(^2\) to be the “Fourth Sword of Marxism” after Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Starn 1995, 407). Guzmán considered himself to be the heir to Mao’s legacy. And even now, in prison, Guzmán believes communism continues to represent the future of humanity (Portocarrero 2012, 48).

Beyond a commitment to communism, however, Sendero also had a commitment to blood. Anyone who stood in Sendero’s way was considered the enemy and believed that “even if they were unarmed civilians - should be assassinated” (McClintock 1998, 68). However, Sendero was not bloodthirsty for the sake of cruelty. As one US embassy official noted:

> Sendero is brutal but not indiscriminate. It is not committing genocide. We are not witnessing pent-up rage exploding. Rather, we are seeing carefully designed and calculated terror. They target individuals in advance, then execute them in ways which have symbolic meaning. (Marks 1994, 214)

As the Fourth Sword of Marxism (Wheat 1990, 47), Guzmán exerted absolute control over Sendero. His brutal campaign against the Peruvian state, which began in Ayacucho at the UNSCH, necessitated violence. It was his contention, in the style of Mao, that revolutionary violence was a universal law and was needed to substitute one class for another (Arce Borja and Talavera Sánchez, 1988). But this violence was not only unidirectional. In addition to convincing Sendero militants that they had to kill in a systematic and depersonalized way, they were also supposed to be willing to give up their own lives. The act of giving up one’s life was

\(^{21}\) “President Gonzalo” was Guzmán’s *nom de guerre* during the Internal Armed Conflict.
expected of all members of Sendero and was known as “the quota” (del Pino H. 1998, 158; Gorriti 2005, 332). In this way, there was an absolute obedience to authority (Milgram 2009), even feverish. Interviews with two ex-Senderistas, from different parts of Ayacucho, confirmed this quota.

*How would you describe your thought process whilst in Sendero?*\(^{22}\)

Everyday I was prepared for death. We all were.

*How was violence justified?*\(^{23}\)

We had a vertical command structure. War is a dictatorship. All wars are dirty. My mother and uncle were killed. Well, that was a negative, but did it help to advance our cause? Always weigh the positives versus the negatives.

This acceptance of death was also present in an interview with another ex-Senderista who had been active in both Lima and Ayacucho.\(^{24}\) He informed me that although it was forbidden, he and a female comrade had fallen in love. But, in typical Sendero fashion, my interviewee never learned the true name of his partner - only her *nom de guerre*. As a result, after she had been killed in a confrontation with state security forces, he was unable to reunite with their daughter who had been kept in hiding by his partner’s parents. If this quota is how Sendero *had* to feel about their own lives, and those of their loved ones, it is little surprise that they were able to kill with such systematic and depersonalized precision.

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\(^{22}\) Author’s interview on 08JUL13 in Ayacucho.

\(^{23}\) Author’s interview on 15SEP15 in Ayacucho.

\(^{24}\) Author’s interview on 04NOV15 in Ayacucho.

\(^{25}\) In order to prevent any penetration by the state coercive apparatus, Sendero employed a tactic of total anonymity in the organization where Senderistas never knew the true identity of any of their comrades. Even if they wanted to, Senderistas would not be able to give up their companions during particularly painful interrogation techniques at the hands of the military or police.
Sendero Violence

As described in “Chapter 2 - Concept and Theory,” Weinstein (2007) argues that violence takes on distinct forms in various contexts. “Patterns of killing, rape, and pillage are not the same across all armed groups, nor are strategies of violence consistent throughout every conflict” (199). As a result, Sendero’s strategies of violence changed as the conflict unfolded. Because of this, I provide a variety of examples of Sendero violence in this section. These examples are not intended to be a gratuitous recounting of violence for the sake of perversion. Rather, they are presented to help inform the reader of the evolution of Sendero’s menu of violent strategies and tactics; a repertoire, which will be discussed in “Chapters 5 - Deductive Hypotheses and Evidence” and “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence,” that varied by situation and location whenever Sendero communicated with political and social actors (Degregori 2013, 235).

One of the most infamous acts of Sendero violence occurred the morning after the 1980 elections. Limeños awoke to dead dogs hanging from streetlights and utility poles in central Lima, denouncing “fascist dogs” (Ash 1985, 21; Gorriti 1999, 76). A short time later, more dogs appeared hanging in Ayacucho, also with placards. While the locals were unable to read the signs, they were still able to glean the Sendero message:

According to a popular legend dating back to the Incas, which Indians in the region who have never heard of Mao can easily recite, the dog is a companion who follows, or leads, his master to the grave. As so the peasants figured - as it turned out, correctly - that wherever a hanging dog appeared, someone was going to die, or be put to death. (Bennett 1984, 28)
This example of non-human Sendero violence not only violated cultural norms, but also was able to communicate with various audiences, despite a change of location and language.

Sendero was also known for its bombing attacks against populous coastal cities (Bennett 1983). Most well-known of these bombing attacks were those against electric towers, particularly in Lima. The attacks against the electric towers would essentially cut off power to all residents, resulting in blackouts of the capital. Sendero was able destroy the electric towers because of its previous looting of mining companies. By targeting mining companies in the sierra, Sendero was able to pillage vast stores of dynamite (Gorriti 1999). Sendero targeted individuals with bombs, as well. One journalist in Ayacucho showed me both the note that was delivered to his office at the radio station where he worked, as well as his former home that was bombed.26 Several Ayacuchanos also talked about burro bombas (donkey bombs), where dynamite strapped to a donkey would be detonated once the animal reached the central square of the town.

One of the most heinous acts of Sendero violence was recounted to me in an interview with a former member of the Peruvian Investigations Police [Policía Investigaciones del Perú - PIP] in Ayacucho.27 He told me about an attack in 1984, which involved the targeting of a member of the Civil Guard [Guardia Civil - GC], a different branch of the Peruvian police force at that time. A group of Senderistas appeared on the doorstep of the GC officer’s home, only to find his mother, his wife,

26 Author’s interview on 13AUG16 in Ayacucho.

27 Author’s interview on 26NOV15 in Ayacucho.
and their one-year-old child. Unable to locate the GC officer, Sendero decided to send him a message by assassinating his family. However, the brutal savagery Sendero employed went beyond a simple killing. Sendero placed a Gloria can of evaporated milk filled with dynamite into his wife’s vagina and detonated the improvised bomb, slit his mother’s throat, and burned his child alive.

Sendero also made it a point to target public officials - both elected and those aspiring to hold office. In 1987, Sendero assassinated Victor Raúl Yangali Castro, Mayor of Huanta, Ayacucho, by shooting him in his home in front of his family.28 His pregnant wife, Reneé, was also shot, but managed to survive after she was flown via helicopter to the departmental capital in Huamanga. Sendero later tried to kill Reneé as she recuperated in a military hospital in Lima, but was thwarted by military police.29 That same year, Sendero threatened the lives of mayoral candidates in Huanta, and many other communities throughout the country. One of those candidates, running on the Izquierda Unida (United Left) ticket, received a letter at his home from Sendero, which concluded with: “We know very well where you live and with whom you live. We know who you are with, where you are, and how you are. We know everything.”30 Out of fear for his life and that of his family, the Izquierda Unida candidate withdrew from the 1987 municipal elections.

While the CVR found that the overwhelming majority of cases of sexual violence (83%) were attributable to state forces and that 52% of sexually violent

28 Author’s interview with the victim’s daughter on 07NOV15 in Ayacucho.

29 Ibid.

30 Author’s interview on 01DEC15 in Ayacucho.
cases occurred in state-run detention facilities (Leiby 2009, 464), Sendero also participated in roughly 11% of all cases of reported rape (Wood 2006, 317; Wood 2009, 153). This included “forcing women to have abortions or marry or cohabit against their will as well as forcing both women and girls, including female members of armed opposition groups, into sexual slavery” (Amnesty International 2004, 7). Sendero also engaged in forced recruitment, including minors.

In addition to the variants of violence above, Sendero also committed acts of communicative violence. These acts of non-lethal violence that leave physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects (i.e., scars or physical ailments that can serve as signals for the remainder of the victim’s life) occurred in a number of different forms. Some acts of communicative violence occurred as electoral violence (e.g., cutting off the fingers of voters).\(^{31}\) In one instance, Sendero removed the fingers of a young girl, not yet old enough to vote, as a warning to would-be voters (“Senderistas Cortaron Dedos a Una Niña” 1985). Other acts occurred as punishment for various types of offenses. For example, men would have their ear cut off for gossiping or other offenses (González 2011, Painting 16 - Punishing the Stool Pigeons). Sendero also cut ears for those who did not listen to previous warnings about not serving food or drink to the military, and tongues for those who were *soplones* (snitches).\(^{32}\) Sendero also enforced anticorruption efforts as a form of vigilante justice (Burt 2007, 118).

\(^{31}\) See “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence” for a further discussion of this electoral violence.

\(^{32}\) Author’s interviews with a journalist on 11JUL16 and 16JUL16 in Ayacucho.
These various acts of violence all show Sendero’s willingness to commit atrocities, including violence against animals (e.g., dogs and donkeys), infrastructure (e.g., electric towers), the state (e.g., police and politicians), and innocent civilians (e.g., family members, women, and children). The examples show a willingness to kill, as well as a willingness to refrain from taking a life. And as mentioned above, Sendero’s violence was carefully designed and calculated. As a result, in this project, I seek to explain this variation in communicative violence across and within conflicts by identifying the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence.

Conclusion

Peru serves as a case that has not been studied as intensely as others (e.g., the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC] in Colombia, etc.) due to both the shorter duration of the conflict and the more recent availability of data (i.e., 2003). This allows me to contribute original research and key findings to the political violence literature. Furthermore, Peru serves as a case that should help make my findings generalizable outside of the country. As mentioned above, it resides within the universe of cases that has experienced terrorism on the homeland and communicative violence, so it can apply to other states that have experienced similar violence.

Peru also has a diverse geography and topography with three distinct regions (i.e., the coast, the mountains, and the jungle), which can account for both states that are landlocked and that have maritime access. With the population of its capital, Lima, around 9-10 million, the Andean corridor splitting the country down the
middle, and its vast areas of Amazonian rainforest and jungle, my findings in Peru can extend to states with large urban populations as well as to states with undeveloped land and populations. It also has a colonial past, which can help extend findings to other states with colonial histories.

Peru’s available data and diverse geography, as well as the continued unearthing of new acts of both communicative violence and non-communicative violence (as seen in “Chapter 4 - Methods and Data”) make it a fruitful case to study. A deep dive has revealed there are layers of the conflict that the state and media have underreported at best, and intentionally ignored at worst. In turn, this implies there is the potential for exploration of communicative violence via similar methods in other cases around the world.
CHAPTER 4 - METHODS AND DATA

“The CVR is a good first step, but it is not complete. We only had 24 months to complete the task - six months to prepare, 12 months in the field, and six months to analyze. One-hour interviews were summarized in three to four sentences, which were often completed by a third-party, resulting in a game of telephone. There are thousands of testimonies not yet processed. The conclusions of the CVR do not represent the richness of the investigations. The CVR is an important project for Peru, but it is only the first step.”

Interview, Member of the Coordinating Committee of the CVR, Lima, August 2017

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the methods I employed to gather data and evidence for my testable hypotheses. In doing so, I highlight the subnational comparison of matched pairs of cases used in this project. I then provide background on the four districts studied in this project and the reasons for selecting each. I also expound the positives and negatives associated with using the Peruvian truth and reconciliation commission data (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación - CVR). I then justify the archival, interview, and ethnographic components of my 15 months of fieldwork, including a scoring of variables used. I explain Institutional Review Board (IRB) concerns and my training for conducting this research. Finally, I conclude with a summary and discuss my own personal experiences using these methods in the field.

Matched Pairs of Cases

This project employs a subnational comparison of matched pairs of cases. Conducting a within-case analysis allows me to scrutinize and analyze the case at the most minute of levels. Rather than macro-level national data, I am able to look at subnational cases at departmental, provincial, and district levels. Because control and violence was a local phenomenon during the violence (i.e., it changed on the ground at varying speeds), I find variation between the cases. At the outset of this
project, I was prepared to use readily available data via the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), the state’s truth and reconciliation commission for the Internal Conflict of 1980-2000, which has a dataset that includes nearly 17,000 observations. Each of the nearly 17,000 observations in the CVR dataset contains information such as sex, age, marital status, religion, and language. In addition, it also identifies the department, province, and district where the incident occurred, the time period (i.e., 1980-2, 1983-5, 1986-8, 1989-92, 1993-2000), and the type of act (e.g., disappearance, sexual violence, torture, etc.)

I combed through the data to identify non-lethal observations. After doing this, I coded each of the non-lethal incidents as either communicative violence or non-communicative violence. Because I define communicative violence as non-lethal violence that is used to communicate with various target audiences - both the immediate and the removed - by leaving a physical and visible mark with lasting legacy effects, fatalities are not considered in my analysis. As a result, only non-lethal incidents can be coded as either communicative violence or non-communicative violence.

The CVR dataset allowed me to sort through all of the incidents by the alleged group responsible, so I focused on only those acts perpetrated by Sendero.33 There is also a category for the type of act (e.g., disappearances, detentions, torture, assassinations, etc.) As such, I used only those coded as torture. Within the torture

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33 According to the CVR, MRTA was responsible for 1.8% of the total number of human rights abuses committed during the internal armed conflict and 1.5% of the reported fatalities (Amnesty International 2004, 6-7). Due to MRTA's minimal role in the violence, I choose to focus my attention on Sendero.
category, there are 17 subcategories. Of the 17 subcategories, two stood out as filters for communicative violence: burns (T05) and cuts (T06). All other forms of torture (e.g., mock execution, psychological torture, forced nudity, etc.) were unlikely to leave physical and visible marks with lasting legacy effects. While severe beatings (T01), electric shocks (T03), and choking (T04) may be considered communicative violence, it is unknown to what extent these subcategories left lasting physical and visible marks. I took a random sample of 30 testimonies from each of the potential torture categories in the CVR annexes, read each in detail to determine if communicative violence was used, and then decided whether or not to include that torture subcategory as communicative violence.

Utilizing the CVR dataset, I was able to determine trends of violence during the Internal Armed Conflict. As seen in Figure 3.2, Ayacucho and Huancavelica were the two hardest hit departments (by number of total incidents). As a result, I decided to focus on these two departments in order to select my units of analysis. I selected matched pairs of cases for each hypothesis based on John Stuart Mill's "method of difference" or "most similar system design" (George and Bennett 2005, 153-60; Gerring 2001, 209-12; Goertz 2006, 180-1). As seen in Figure 4.1, in

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34 See Appendix A for a list of torture categories.

35 While it is true that a burn or a cut may be administered in a non-visible area in order to hide the violent act (e.g., the bottom of a foot, on the back, etc.), I code all burns and cuts as communicative violence because I make the assumption that armed actors are communicating via violence and therefore want various audiences to view the injury.

36 The CVR collected data in various regional offices throughout Peru. The CVR drew from almost 17,000 personal interviews with victims, their families, and other witnesses to create a violence database. The database contains variables that allow researchers to evaluate who did what to whom during the conflict. In my analysis, I filter the quantitative data to identify specific community incidents and to find individual testimonies recounting incident details. Through this process, I reviewed hundreds of original testimonies at the Defensoría del Pueblo in Lima during 15 months of fieldwork in Peru from 2013-7.
Ayacucho, I selected the neighboring districts of Chungui and San Miguel. And as seen in Figure 4.2, in Huancavelica, I selected the neighboring districts of Churcampa and Acobamba. In this way, I selected two pairs of cases that are similar along potentially explanatory variables but vary only on the key independent variable of the specific hypothesis under study in this project (i.e., population size and density, population mobility, cultural differences, state capacity, and rugged terrain) (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 304-6). I also control for other independent variables such as poverty, region, and coca growing. Poverty has been cited as a condition that favors insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). As such, by selecting cases that are economically similar, I am able to rule out poverty as an explanation for the use of communicative violence in a particular pair of cases. This data is available from the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI) (United Nations Development Programme 2017).
Figure 4.1 - Map of the Province of La Mar

Source: Global Administrative Areas (2018)
Evidence of communicative violence was found in both print media and oral testimonies. Due to the nature of the conflict and the violence experienced by journalists in particular, the documented cases of communicative violence in the media were relatively low as initially expected. Due to the availability of data
provided by the 1981 census\textsuperscript{37} at the district level, I chose to focus on that subnational unit of analysis in this project.\textsuperscript{38}

As discussed in “Chapter 3 - Context” and seen in Figure 3.2, the Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica were two of the hardest hit regions during the Internal Armed Conflict. Because of this, I selected neighboring pairs of adjoining districts in each department for comparison - one with incidents of communicative violence and one without. While the Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica were both affected by Sendero violence during the conflict, I was able to identify two pairs of districts after locating newspaper\textsuperscript{39} accounts of communicative violence in the Peruvian National Library (\textit{Biblioteca Nacional del Perú}). I also conducted interviews with experts on the region, including academics,\textsuperscript{40} politicians,\textsuperscript{41} journalists,\textsuperscript{42} and artists\textsuperscript{43} who worked with local NGOs and participated in the CVR process and separately confirmed the locations of communicative violence found in the newspaper archives. By triangulating these various sources across a period of four years (2013, 2015-7), I was able to select the four districts under study in this project.


\textsuperscript{38} The district level is the smallest subnational unit of analysis available in the 1981 Peruvian census.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{La República} (12APR85) and \textit{El Comercio} (13APR85).

\textsuperscript{40} Author’s interviews on 25JUN13, 11NOV15, 15NOV15, and 21NOV15.

\textsuperscript{41} Author’s interviews on 17NOV15, 23NOV15, 27NOV15, 11AUG16, 22JUN17, 24JUN17, 01JUL17, 28JUL17, 29JUL17, 30JUL17, and 31JUL17.

\textsuperscript{42} Author’s interviews on 15JUL16, 20JUL16, 02AUG16, and 13AUG16.

\textsuperscript{43} Author’s interviews on 12JUL17 and 13AUG17.
Finally, during my time in the field, I heard many of the same stories being told by multiple sources from various groups (i.e., Academic, Affected, Bureaucrat, CAD, Civilian, Journalist, Military, NGO, Police, Politician, Senderista, Teacher, Victim), which further reinforced the fact that communicative violence had occurred in some of the districts studied in this project. Of particular importance, and utilizing the vernacular of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), I maximized leverage through the observable implications of victims’ testimonies. As seen in Figures 4.3-5, I was able to interview victims of communicative violence. In turn, my interviewees were able to identify both the locations and dates (by year) where the violent acts took place, which assisted me with data collection.

**Figure 4.3 - Communicative Violence Victim #1**

Source: Author’s photo (2017)
Figure 4.4 - Communicative Violence Victim #2

Source: Author’s photo (2017)

Figure 4.5 - Communicative Violence Victim #3

Source: Author’s photo (2017)
In the Department of Ayacucho and Province of La Mar, I focused on the
districts of Chungui, where 20 incidents of communicative violence were present,
and San Miguel, where no incidents of communicative violence were present. In the
Department of Huancavelica and Province of Churcampa, I focused on the district
of Churcampa, where five incidents of communicative violence were present. In the
Department of Huancavelica and Province of Acobamba, I focused on the district of
Acobamba, where no incidents of communicative violence were present. Table 4.1
shows the four selected districts with their corresponding incidents of
communicative violence at a glance, including population, population density,
altitude, and distance from the departmental capital (measured in both linear
distance and travel time) ranked as High, Medium, or Low for each district, in
1985.

Table 4.1 - Communicative Violence in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
<th>Altitude</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th># CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>8,297</td>
<td>7.82/km²</td>
<td>3,499 m</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>23,226</td>
<td>25.72/km²</td>
<td>2,661 m</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>64.06/km²</td>
<td>2,940 m</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>5,623</td>
<td>39.78/km²</td>
<td>3,262 m</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1981 Peruvian census, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI - National Institute of Statistics and Informatics), author’s interview data (2013, 2015-7), and newspapers (La República and El Comercio)

44 Although Churcampa (the district) was elevated as the capital of the Province of Churcampa shortly before the acts of communicative violence took place in 1985, it appears as part of the Province of Tayacaja in the 1981 Peruvian census.

45 The population data is accurate as per the 1981 Peruvian census. The communicative violence data is accurate as per 1985.
As seen in Figure 4.1, both Chungui and San Miguel are districts in the Province of La Mar, which is located in the northeast portion of the Department of Ayacucho in the south central Andean highlands (see Figure 4.6). San Miguel is the capital of the Province of La Mar. Chungui is located southeast from San Miguel, and its name means “uninhabitable” or “deserted” in Quechua. In 1981, San Miguel had nearly three times the population size of Chungui. This population difference is largely due to the fact that San Miguel is the capital of the Province of La Mar and closer to Huamanga, the capital of the Department of Ayacucho, compared to Chungui.

San Miguel is over 800 meters lower in elevation than Chungui, and has more accessible roads (both paved and unpaved) than Chungui due to its status as a provincial capital. San Miguel also serves as an economic hub for the Province of La Mar, with all districts traveling to the provincial capital for larger markets, celebrations, and transportation outlets. While Chungui serves as a meeting point for subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (e.g., centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caserios) to engage in trade, it is dwarfed by the sheer size, reach, and influence of San Miguel.

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46 I use data from the 1981 Peruvian census to measure demographics for the year studied in this project (1985) because the next Peruvian census was not conducted until 1993.

47 A more robust discussion of roads is presented in “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence.”

48 Author's interviews with various locals in Anco, Chungui, San Miguel, and Tambo (all districts in the Province of La Mar) during the months of June and July 2017.
Thus, San Miguel was originally selected for this study because its various traits would lead one to hypothesize that it would have experienced acts of communicative violence due to its larger and denser population, as well as a higher mobile population due to its lower altitude, greater number of roads, and number of markets available for merchants and vendors to buy, sell, and trade their wares with the local population. Because of its smaller population, higher altitude, fewer roads,
and distance from the departmental capital, Chungui was originally selected for this study because its various traits would lead one to hypothesize that it would not have experienced acts of communicative violence.

**Figure 4.7 - Map of Huancavelica**

Source: Global Administrative Areas (2018)

As seen in Figure 4.7, Churcampa and Acobamba are districts in different Provinces (present-day Churcampa and Acobamba, respectively). They are both in the east portion of the Department of Huancavelica in the south central Andean
highlands and close to each other with Churcampa located northeast from Acobamba. Today, the districts of Churcampa and Acobamba both contain a town that serves as the capital of their provinces with the same name. In 1981, Acobamba had nearly 1.5 times the population size of Churcampa. This population difference is largely due to the fact that Acobamba had been a provincial capital for much longer than Churcampa, as well as closer to Huancavelica, the capital of the Department of Huancavelica. Acobamba is over 300 meters lower in elevation than Churcampa, and has more accessible roads (both paved and unpaved) than Churcampa; again, likely due its longer existence as a provincial capital. Both Acobamba and Churcampa serve as economic hubs for their respective provinces, with all districts traveling to provincial capitals for larger markets, celebrations, and transportation outlets.

However, due to its closer proximity to the department capital, larger population, and longer status as a provincial capital, Acobamba is a larger market town.

Thus, Acobamba was originally selected for this study because its various traits would lead one to hypothesize that it would have experienced acts communicative violence due to its larger population, as well as a higher mobile population due to its lower altitude, greater number of roads, and number of markets available for merchants and vendors to buy, sell, and trade their wares with the local population. Because of its smaller population, higher altitude, fewer roads, and distance from the departmental capital, Churcampa was originally selected for this study because its various traits would lead one to hypothesize that it would not have experienced acts of communicative violence.
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR)

As discussed above, I attempted to code the CVR dataset for acts of communicative violence (i.e., identified where acts of communicative violence occurred). Unfortunately, the CVR dataset did not yield any observations of communicative violence. While there are several instances of burns (T05) and cuts (T06) in the CVR dataset, they all resulted in fatalities. As such, those observations cannot be classified as communicative violence. However, in addition to the feedback and evaluation of the CVR by a member of its Coordinating Committee above, this is unsurprising given a number of factors.

First, the CVR was not based solely on media reports; it was based on a process of post-conflict data collection by a government-sponsored commission. This included interviews and public hearings with victims and those affected by the conflict. However, similar to media access in the 1980s and 1990s, the CVR did not reach all parts of the country affected by the violence - particularly those areas most remote and hardest hit. And even when the CVR was able to have a presence in those areas, it was ephemeral, sometimes only lasting one or two days.49 As such, it is well-known that “media are subject to selectivity, choosing only particular stories to report,” with a disproportionate focus on reporting large events, thereby undercounting the true number of violent observations (Hug 2003, 258). Therefore, as Geddes (1990) correctly points out in regard to selection bias, the cases you choose affect the answers you get.

49 Author’s interview with a member of the Coordinating Committee of the CVR on 09AUG17 in Lima.
Second, and not unrelated to the first, Lewis (2017) notes that even the 2006 codebook for the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a well-respected collaborative project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), acknowledges a bias in using media accounts against conflicts in earlier decades and less-developed parts of the world (1445). This difficulty is of significant note when political, urban, and other biases make it particularly difficult to capture the true devastation caused in civil wars, further underreporting casualties (Kalyvas 2006, 38-51). As will be discussed below, national newspapers did not extensively cover the conflict until the violence began to reach the capital in Lima.

And third, the Armed Internal Conflict in Peru was particularly dangerous for journalists. The most famous of atrocities committed against journalists during the Internal Armed Conflict is the massacre in Uchuraccay. On January 26, 1983, the villagers of Uchuraccay, in the highlands of Ayacucho, murdered eight journalists and their guide. The next year, on August 2, 1984, journalist Jaime Ayala Sulca was disappeared and never heard from again after entering a military base in Huanta, Ayacucho (Castillo 2015). On November 24, 1988, the Peruvian Army assassinated journalist Hugo Bustíos, also in Huanta, Ayacucho. These are but a few of the numerous cases involving murdered or disappeared media personnel in the Peruvian conflict. A number of journalists who were active in Ayacucho during the conflict informed me that several of their colleagues fled the region out of fear for

50 Author’s interview with the victim’s daughter on 26JUL17 in Ayacucho.
their lives and the lives of their family, both at the hands of Sendero as well as the state.\textsuperscript{51} It is thus no surprise that underreporting of violence would take place in emergency zones where journalists feared to enter. Therefore, as Lustick (1996) argues, one must be cautious in accepting the dominant historiographical trend as fact rather than as a narrative or even protagonist in research analysis.

The areas where insurgent groups are most likely to form, in minimally-monitored and low-institutionalized territories, are also the places where datasets are least likely to capture observations of violent acts (Lewis 2017, 1425). Where Sendero formed and where it committed violence are two different things, so this does not account for missing observations in rural Peru. While I gained traction from the CVR by identifying overall patterns and areas in the country most affected by violence as seen in Figure 3.2 (i.e., in the central Andean highlands), I chose not to rely on the CVR dataset as the sole source of data for my research. For the reasons outlined above, including the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, I conducted 15 months of fieldwork from 2013-7, in addition to utilizing the CVR dataset. In the words of Scott (1998), it is important to distinguish between “facts on paper from facts on the ground” (49). Even in an age where instant communication across great distances is common, many kinds of new data can only be acquired through up-close, on-the-ground study. By identifying data within its own setting, scholars can benefit from serendipity, grasp nuances, clarify causal processes, and confront gaps between concepts and reality (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015). Fieldwork is often “the only source of adequate description of social, economic, or political

\textsuperscript{51} Author’s interviews with journalists on 15-6JUL16 in Ayacucho.
processes that are not evident in documents or data already gathered” (Wood 2007, 124). Thus, fieldwork generates data that are useful for formulating or re-formulating a research question through testing hypotheses, identifying causal mechanisms, and building theory (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 205-10).

Archival Work

As part of the fieldwork portion of my project, I conducted archival research in order to gather data for each of my hypotheses. Locations have included: the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación), the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud), and the Ministry of Transport and Communications (Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones - MTC), the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional - IGN), the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - INEI), the Office of the Public Defender (Defensoría del Pueblo - where the CVR archives are housed), the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas), the Historical Archives of the National Police of Peru (División Patrimonio Histórico Policial), the Counter-Terrorist Directorate of the National Police of Peru (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo de la Policía Nacional del Perú - DIRCOTE), the Institute of Peruvian Studies (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos - where I was an affiliated researcher), multiple libraries at the Catholic University of Peru (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - PUCP), a private library affiliated with the National University of Saint Christopher of Huamanga (Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga - UNSCH) in Ayacucho (Casa Matteo Ricci), and the National Library of Peru (Biblioteca Nacional del Perú - BNP).
Table 4.2 - Newspaper Coding of *El Diario de Marka*, *La República*, and *El Comercio*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>El Diario de Marka</em></td>
<td>1981-3, 1985, and 1987-9</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La República</em></td>
<td>1983, 1985, and 1989</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>El Comercio</em></td>
<td>1983, 1985, and 1989</td>
<td>738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>Seven (7) calendar years</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,980</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to providing a more well-rounded and informed understanding of the Internal Armed Conflict and Peru in general, reading periodicals and government documents from the 1980s and 1990s allowed me to code for instances of communicative violence - acts not found in the CVR dataset - and gather data and evidence for variables in order to reject or fail to reject my five hypotheses. Table 4.2 shows the three major newspapers I read and coded for communicative violence, including the number of issues for each newspaper. A total of 1,980 issues from three different and opposing major Peruvian newspapers (*El Diario de Marka*, *La República*, and *El Comercio*) were coded for communicative violence (as either present or not present) in order to triangulate data sources and avoid selection bias.

*El Diario de Marka* was a left-wing publication that served as a mouthpiece for Sendero during the 1980s. Because of this, I began reading that newspaper first, starting with the years 1981-2. After finding no instances of communicative violence in that timeframe, I turned to election years (i.e., 1983 and 1985) due to the potential for electoral violence, which logically could include communicative violence. No evidence of communicative violence was found in 1983 or 1985. Issues from 1987-9 were difficult to locate - even at the national archives - due to the Peruvian state associating anyone purchasing or reading the newspaper with
terrorism. As a result, only 14 issues total across those three calendar years were read and coded.

I took a similar approach of focusing on election years with *La República* and *El Comercio*, avoiding the early period of the conflict based on my experience with *El Diario de Marka*. *La República* and *El Comercio* are considered the two most important and widely-read national newspapers in Peru. While neither newspaper is associated with a particular political ideology, *La República* is a bit more left-leaning than *El Comercio*, similar to a comparison of *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* in the United States, respectively. No evidence of communicative violence was found in either newspaper in 1983 or 1989, both municipal elections. However, evidence of communicative violence was found in both newspapers in 1985, with each newspaper reporting communicative violence as a form of electoral violence (i.e., cutting off fingers for voting) before and during the 1985 national election in separate locations of the country (i.e., Ayacucho and Huancavelica). As a result, I was able to measure my dependent variable (i.e., presence or absence of communicative violence) by both location and date. This is another example of why I chose not to rely on the CVR dataset. The articles in *La República* and *El Comercio* were cover stories - headlines covering the violence in the south central highlands appearing in newspapers with a national circulation, not a local regional paper with low readership - and yet these incidents were not included in the CVR findings.

In regard to the scoring of my independent variables, data and evidence were collected from various government institutions. Census data from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática*...
- INEI) were used to determine population size and density ($H_1$), population mobility ($H_2$), and cultural differences measured as mother tongue ($H_3$). Evidence for state capacity ($H_4$) was found at six different government institutions. Data on roads were found at the Ministry of Transport and Communications (*Ministerio de Transportes y Comunicaciones* - MTC) and the National Geographic Institute (*Instituto Geográfico Nacional* - IGN). Data on public schools were found at the Ministry of Education (*Ministerio de Educación*). Data on public health facilities were found at the Ministry of Health (*Ministerio de Salud*). And data on police stations were found at the Historical Archives of the National Police of Peru (*División Patrimonio Histórico Policial*) and the Counter-Terrorist Directorate of the National Police of Peru (*Dirección Contra el Terrorismo de la Policía Nacional del Perú* - DIRCOTE). As will be elaborated upon in “Chapter 5 - Deductive Hypotheses and Evidence” and “Chapter 6 - Inductive Hypotheses and Evidence,” evidence from these sources allowed me to reject both $H_1$ and $H_2$, and fail to reject $H_3$, $H_4$, and $H_5$.

*Interviews and Ethnographic Methods*

In addition to the extensive in-depth archival work mentioned above, I conducted unstructured interviews with both elites and non-elites. Of my 142 logged interviews, $^{52}$ 72 were with Peruvian academics, journalists, NGO personnel, and government officials. Ordinary-language interviewing (OLI) can be used to answer questions and confirm hunches, as well as open up new avenues of investigation (Goldstein 2002; Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015; Leech 2002). Questions about their knowledge of, and experience with, communicative violence

$^{52}$ See Appendix B for a complete breakdown of all interviews conducted by year, category, location, etc. from 2013-7.
were asked. By allowing interviewees to tell their stories in their own words, I
generated data, tested hypotheses, and enhanced validity and reliability of measures
(JF Lynch 2013, 31).

One key elite interview occurred whilst interviewing the director of a non-
governmental organization (NGO) in Ayacucho.\textsuperscript{53} He informed me of a dataset of
victims, separate from the CVR findings, called the Unique Victims Registry
(Registro Único de Víctimas - RUV). As mentioned above, the CVR did not reach all
parts of the country affected by the violence - particularly those areas most remote
and hardest hit. And even when the CVR was able to have a presence in those areas,
it only lasted one or two days. As a result, many victims of the Internal Armed
Conflict were not able to bear witness and be counted by their government. This led
to the formation of a new registry of victims (the RUV), which as of August 2016,
had over 226,000 victims registered.\textsuperscript{54} Because the RUV is an ongoing process to
register victims and assist with the disbursement of reparations, detailed data are
not publicly available. However, I was able to secure aggregate data at the
departmental level for Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Huánuco.\textsuperscript{55} In the Department
of Ayacucho alone, there are 17,306 cases of torture recorded. This count dwarfs the
fewer than 17,000 total observations captured in the CVR dataset, which is yet
another example of why I chose not to rely on the CVR dataset.

\textsuperscript{53} Author's interview on 19JUL16 in Ayacucho.

\textsuperscript{54} Author's interview with the National Coordinator of the RUV on 05AUG16 in Lima.

\textsuperscript{55} Before settling on Ayacucho and Huancavelica as departments to study my two matched pairs of
cases, I had also considered the Departments of Huánuco and Junín.
The first set of interviews was arranged prior to my travel to Peru. However, I spent substantial time in the field in order to build rapport with my contacts and to allow for time to snowball further contacts from various networks over the course of 15 months across four separate fieldwork trips (i.e., two months in 2013, seven months in 2015, and three months each in both 2016 and 2017) (Leech 2002, 665-6). In turn, this investment of time laid the foundation for my subsequent interviews to take place more rapidly and with an even broader audience. Personal relationships and connections forged during those four years led to additional contacts and other interviewees, as well as more detailed and fruitful findings during follow-up interviews.

In addition to the elite interviews, I also conducted 70 interviews with former armed combatants, their victims, and those affected by the violence, after receiving IRB approval. One interview with a former civilian defense member shined a light on the inadequacies of the CVR. In my first week interviewing in Ayacucho, I met over a dozen individuals who were either affected by the violence (i.e., had a loved one tortured, murdered, disappeared, etc.) or were a victim of the violence themselves. I tried to verify the names of the individuals I met in Ayacucho in the CVR dataset, but was unable to locate any of them. This is important because it supplements the data found (and not found) in the CVR. I was able to ask

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57 Author's interview in November 2015 in Ayacucho.

58 A number of civilian self-defense forces (Comités de Autodefensa - CADs) maintained their own proprietary registries of victims. These registries included pertinent personal information, such as photos, name, date of birth, location, etc., as well as information about the violence, including location of the violent act, perpetrator, etc. Not a single victim in the CAD’s registry appeared in the CVR dataset.
both victims and combatants alike about the intention behind the acts of communicative violence, as well as the factors surrounding its occurrence, helping to inform my inductive hypotheses.

Fujii identifies and analyzes five types of meta-data when conducting interviews in post-conflict settings: rumors, inventions, denials, evasions, and silences (2010, 231). As such, I documented and assessed what interview subjects revealed, but also remained cognizant of what they did not (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 316). How respondents describe the past sometimes depends on the present context. To understand the phenomenon of intense violence, one must spend extended time in these communities. During interviews with civilians who lived in the communities where violence was experienced, I was able to piece together complicated narratives of insurgent violence in Ayacucho and Huancavelica. These narratives thus provide a source of data and play an important part in causal explanation.

Due to the remoteness of the highland communities and their lack of technological resources (e.g., Internet connections that would allow for video chat, etc.), the intimate nature of my interviews could only be done in person. Although intention may have not been communicated to the victim, s/he and her/his family were still able to communicate their interpretation of the violence. This information was used to support and reword my theory on communicative violence. These interviews are not without precedent. Straus (2004; 2006) in Rwanda, Theidon

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59 Ayacucho and Huancavelica are two neighboring departments in the south-central Andean highlands that were hard hit during the internal conflict. Both departments were considered Zonas de Emergencia, under military command, and faced high levels of Sendero violence throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
(2013) in Peru, and Wood (2003) in El Salvador are only a few of the leading scholars in the political violence literature who have conducted interviews and ethnographies in former war-torn states.

In order to gain access to various close-knit communities who were often particularly wary of outsiders, I chose a participant-observation approach by offering to teach English lessons to groups of children in exchange for interviews with village elders. The idea was that I would provide a service to the community as a form of my appreciation for them spending time and recounting their experiences with me. This also avoided any possible awkward exchanges of cash or other gift payments. My first experience with this tactic was in Uchuraccay, a remote village in the Province of Huanta in the Department of Ayacucho. After delivering several English lessons on numbers, colors, salutations, and even slang, I was granted access to community elders who had lived in the village during the 1980s. Although they were reticent upon my first arrival, they opened up and spoke at length with me after observing my interactions with the children. While interviewees may have viewed me as a six-foot tall, glasses-wearing, light-skinned gringo with a US passport and funny accent in 2013, they eventually came to greet me as someone who was concerned with more than merely extracting information from them.

While this may sound like an unusual method to secure interviews, consider the

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60 While I certainly paid for several coffees, lunches, and dinners for interviewees, and would often bring bread or candies to the homes where I conducted interviews, I never gave any individual - interviewee, interlocutor, or otherwise - a direct cash payment for a number of reasons. One, I was concerned about the potential of jealousy (i.e., some people might be paid while others might not). Two, I did not have a sizeable budget to be able to pay for informants. And three, because gifts of food and drink are seen as a sign of respect and friendship in the Andes, I decided to accept and replicate the local social norm.
following observation by Kimberly Theidon, an anthropologist who also conducted fieldwork in the south central highlands in Huanta, Ayacucho:

Frankly, there is no “observation” when people are at war and you arrive asking them about it. You are, whether you wish to be or not, a participant. When terror weaves its way through a community, words are no longer mere information. Words become weapons and posing a question must mean you plan to do something with the response. (Theidon 2013, 12-3).

In this way, by immersing myself in the local communities that I lived in and studied, I was able to build working relationships with locals over the course of four years in the field. And by interviewing individuals from various strata in Peruvian society, I was able to triangulate data sources in order to avoid selection bias.

*Institutional Review Board (IRB) Concerns and Research Training*

At the core of every Institutional Review Board (IRB) is the obligation of beneficence, and one that I seriously take to heart. In particular, researchers who study violence must take extra precautions with their human subjects in order to do no harm while maximizing possible benefits and minimizing possible harms (United States Department of Health & Human Services 1979). Furthermore, conducting research in a post-conflict setting requires researchers to become “aware of differences in power, social status, and privilege between the researcher and interviewee” (Fujii 2018, 16). While not all researchers go into the field with equal budgets and skillsets, many enjoy privileges unavailable to their interviewees. For these reasons, I took every precaution possible when recruiting and interviewing human subjects.

As mentioned above, I began my interviews with elites (e.g., NGO workers, academics, and government officials) in order to develop a more refined sense of the
timeline of the conflict. I then began to interview civilians and former combatants. If former combatants who operated in a community were residing in that community, I requested that civilians meet me elsewhere, in order to avoid the possibility of former combatants knowing who spoke to me (if, for example, they saw me walking into the home of an interviewee). Often, I did not believe there were risks to civilians if former combatants saw them talking with me; however, this measure was an extra precaution to protect my civilian interviewees.

My recruitment procedures varied depending on whether the subjects were professionals who might give me insight or civilians and rebels recounting what they witnessed or experienced. When the subjects belonged to the first group, I either asked to be introduced by an acquaintance or called/mailed them to make an appointment. Within the second group, I proceeded differently depending on the situation. If any of my professional acquaintances knew someone in the case site, I started with that person. If not, I started with a local leader or village elder. In some cases, I began with anyone willing to speak with me. I continued to identify subjects by snowballing. When I became aware that a certain segment of the population was not represented or under-represented in my sample, I sought out interviewees from that group (i.e., the coercive apparatus of the state).

I continue to protect my human subjects’ confidentiality. I do not reveal the identity of my interviewees, with the exception of public officials who gave me explicit permission to identify them. As seen in footnotes throughout this project, I continue to only identify interviews by location and date, and the location is listed at the departmental level (i.e., not province or district) in order to provide another
layer of anonymity. And in order to provide guidance for the reader, I provide broad and general descriptions of interviewees (e.g., journalist, academic, community leader, etc.) that do not risk her/his identity (Durán-Martínez 2018, 28-31).

To further protect my interviewees, I keep my data secure and maintain the respondents’ confidentiality. Depending on what proved easiest and was approved by my respondent, I record interviews via a digital Dictaphone and took notes by hand. I was able to simultaneously interpret the Spanish spoken by my respondent into English. As such, I took notes in English, as English is not widely spoken in Peru. I continue to keep subjects’ names in a separate location from the content of the interview. I created a key, maintained in an encrypted file on my computer, whereby names are matched to codes. The codes, rather than the names, were taken with me into the field. At times, because I asked subjects for the names of other potential interviewees, I had to write down subjects’ names out of necessity whilst in the field. Following the method of Elisabeth Jean Wood, a Professor at Yale University who worked during the civil war in El Salvador, I wrote the names in a separate notebook from the notebook in which I transcribed the interview. In this separate notebook, I had non-sensitive notes and newspaper clippings. I embedded the names amidst all the other information in such a way as to make their existence non-obvious. Once I was back in the capital city of Lima, I added those names to the key and destroyed the paper copy of the names.

While in the field, I kept my notes with me at all times. When back in the capital, I kept paper notes in a secure location in my locked apartment. I transcribed my notes onto my computer as soon as possible after interviews. The computer on
which the notes are kept is password-protected, and the files are encrypted. Even if my computer is stolen, no one will be able to access my notes. (However, my computer was unlikely to be stolen, as whenever it was not with me, it was locked via a computer lock to an immovable object in my apartment). I also backed up my notes to a two-terabyte external hard drive that was secure and password-protected. I utilize FileVault 2, which instead of just encrypting the user’s home folder, it also employs a technique called “whole disk encryption” (or “full disk encryption”) which encrypts the entire Mac system volume. Because transcriptions cannot capture various aspects of hand-taken notes, such as maps or drawing by interviewees, I have also maintained my paper notes. Whilst in-country, they remained in a locked location in my apartment, which had a security guard on site 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

I believe the primary risk to my subjects was the potential for emotional stress from recounting their experiences. Because of this, I emphasized that interviews were voluntary and could be ended at any time. If the respondent appeared to be under stress during the interview, as occurs often when discussing conflict and violence, I reiterated the interview was voluntary and could be ended at any time. If the interviewee wished to continue, I made sure that s/he knew that the topic under discussion could be skipped. I never asked a subject to recount violence that s/he physically experienced or committed. Before starting interviews in any location, I endeavored to find an NGO or church with a local presence (in the village or neighborhood; I already had an in-country NGO referral) to which to refer any subject who might have seemed to be in particular distress. I also made sure not to
accept every interview that was offered. This was done in order to not traumatize individuals whose testimonies would not be relevant to my project. However, as will be discussed in the next section below, this did not stop respondents from disclosing their experiences as victims of trauma without prompting from me.

In keeping with the obligation of beneficence and maximizing possible benefits, one possible benefit to participants was telling their story. Some individuals experienced psychological relief upon being able to share their stories with a neutral and sympathetic listener. Some believed in the importance of telling the truth about Peru’s conflict and wanted more people internationally to understand what occurred in Peru. For example, there is widespread disagreement as to what actually occurred during the conflict (i.e., a civil war, an internal conflict, or a period of terrorism). As mentioned above, subjects were not monetarily compensated for their time, but if we spoke in a location that served food or drink, I paid for the subject. I also, as was culturally appropriate, brought food or other small necessities to subjects with whom I spoke more than once and brought food or small necessities to the communities in which I worked as a whole.

I obtained consent by reading a standard consent form. Consent for all participants took place before any interview began. I sought verbal, rather than written, consent, because in the unlikely event that written forms were to be confiscated or stolen, confidentiality would be breached and potentially pose risks to my participants. The consent form assured the subject that their responses were confidential. I emphasized that the subject could stop the interview at any time or

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61 See Appendix C for my consent form.
decline to discuss any particular topic. Participants were made aware that if they felt uncomfortable participating, they could opt out at any time. I was sure that the subject was aware that there were no direct benefits for her/him. Because I encountered illiterate human subjects in Peru, it was important that my consent form be straightforward and non-legalistic. Other than English, conversations with subjects or representatives occurred mainly in Spanish, with a few occurring in Quechua. In order to ensure consent was fully conveyed and understood, I translated my consent form into Spanish and Quechua, and had it verified by both native Spanish and Quechua speakers, and a local academic in Peru to ensure it complied and adhered to both linguistic and cultural norms. I gave each subject my contact information, which included a local number that could be dialed from anywhere in the country (i.e., not a long-distance call), should they have questions or concerns following the interview.

I did not use deception, but I was slightly indirect about my purposes initially. As a stranger to the community, in order to allow subjects to feel comfortable speaking with me, it was important not to start discussing violence at the outset. I thus introduced my project in more general terms, describing how I wanted to understand the history of their community during the 1980s and 1990s. As Peru has emerged from a state of civil war over the last 15-20 years, subjects implicitly understood that the civil war would be a significant part of the conversation and I did not expect that they would think that they had been misled about the point of the interview when the topic arose. Rather, the conversations followed a natural flow; less sensitive topics were discussed before sensitive topics
were broached.\textsuperscript{62} If, when the topic arose, the subject seemed at all uncomfortable, I reemphasized that participation was voluntary and could be stopped at any time, and that s/he could refuse to answer any question.

In order to prepare for these interviews, I received training at the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR) during summer 2014. Amongst other seminars, I enrolled and participated in the “Designing Fieldwork,” “Ethnographic Methods,” and “Archival Research and Elite Interviews” modules. I also received training in the “Qualitative Methods and the Study of Civil War” seminar at the Research School on Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) during spring 2015.

As a heritage speaker of Spanish, I already possessed proficiency in the language before going to Peru. However, with immersion in a Spanish-speaking society over extended periods of time, I was able to refine my Spanish language skills. In addition, I enrolled in conversational Quechua classes and received tutoring from Ayacuchanos whilst in Peru. I took on this new language for two reasons. First, while my Quechua language abilities would be considered beginner/basic, they allowed me to identify nuances during interviews and in the communities where I stayed. Although much was lost in translation, I was able to identify moments during interviews where I pushed for further clarification - something a researcher with no Quechua skills would not be able to do. And second, I found that by taking the initiative to learn even the most basic Quechua words and phrases, it allowed me to make inroads into otherwise closed communities. Locals

\textsuperscript{62} See Appendix D for sample questions asked.
appreciated my efforts to learn their language and customs, which granted me access to interviews I would not have otherwise been able to secure.

**Conclusion**

By utilizing a mixed methods approach in this project, descriptive statistical work via the CVR dataset and mapping, and qualitative methods via interviews and archival work, I was able to improve the agreement of theories and empirical studies with social reality and gain a more distinct and refined understanding of the causes and consequences of communicative violence (Thaler 2017). Furthermore, I was able to maximize leverage by increasing the number of observable implications of my hypotheses to seek confirmation of those implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 29-31).

The concern of researchers “going native” when conducting ethnography is certainly a possible critique for one who uses the methods I employed above. On occasion, I provided victims with the contact information necessary for registering with the RUV, and also assisted local NGOs in Ayacucho with a memory project. However, other than becoming a rabid supporter of the Peruvian national football team, I can confidently say that I was able to maintain a professional distance from my research subjects. While I forged relationships and built a rapport with several Peruvians over the course of four extended trips to the field that offered valuable insights, I consistently maintained objectivity. While it may be a clichéd tautology, violence is violence - regardless of who perpetrates it. As a result, any preconceived

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63 I consulted with a group of local NGOs in Ayacucho to help setup a *Camino de la Memoria* - a walking tour with plaques and monuments denoting important events during the Internal Armed Conflict.
notions I may have had about the Internal Armed Conflict were nullified by the reflexivity I employed in the field. Regardless of how likeable or unlikeable my interviewees may have been, they were all people deserving of dignity and respect, which is how I treated each and every one of them (Fujii 2018).

During my trips to the field, I experienced several concerns with safety. The phrase, “mil ojos y mil oídos” (a thousand eyes and a thousand ears) was one I heard quite often in my travels in the Andes. It is a reference to Sendero’s ability to see and hear about anything and everything in its sphere of influence. For example, in June 2017, whilst traveling from Huanta to San Miguel in Ayacucho, a roughly three-hour, two-stop journey, mil ojos y mil oídos informed contacts in La Mar that a gringo was en route. I was met at the bus stop in San Miguel by several serious, gruff-looking men who wanted to see my “documents” and demanded to know why I was there. I informed them I was a graduate student writing a thesis on the historical events of Ayacucho, showed them my passport and university ID, and was able to provide the names of local contacts I had in the area. After a tense few minutes, which felt like hours, I came to find out that those men were members of the local civilian self-defense group who had heard about a possible CIA/DEA agent investigating the drug trade in the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro - VRAEM). I was then informed that several individuals had taken notice of my presence during my travels, that word was already passed.

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64 The VRAEM is one of the major coca-growing areas in Peru. In Ayacucho, the Province of Huanta borders against the confluence of all three rivers (the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro), while the Province of La Mar to the south borders against the Apurímac River. In hindsight, it is possible to conceive that a US citizen traveling through this area and talking about terrorism might be confused with possible drug interdiction - efforts that would threaten the livelihood of local residents who depend on the drug trade for survival.
along to contacts in and beyond my final destination, and that it was advisable for me not to continue on to the *selva* (jungle) because my safety could not be guaranteed. This is but one instance of the distrust I encountered whilst traveling in the Andes. However, during that event and others, I utilized common sense and listened to what my gut told me. In turn, this helped me to determine both areas and individuals to avoid.

As mentioned above, I received research training at IQMR and PRIO prior to my final three trips (totaling 13 months) to the field. However, I was unaware of any training available to prepare me for the types of horror stories I listened to - both solicited and unsolicited. While the focus of this study is on a specific form of political violence, I was told stories of victimization unrelated to my project, often by women who themselves were victims of sexual violence. This unsolicited information put me in a difficult position as a researcher. Should I listen as they recounted their experiences and sobbed uncontrollably, or cut them off and inform them I could not listen anymore because their testimonies were not pertinent to my project? I chose to listen because I did not want to convey any message that did not validate their lived experiences. However, as Cronin-Furman and Lake (2018) argue, “Without professional training, retraumatization or other adverse consequences can result for even the most thoughtful and sensitive of researchers” (3). In spite of this, I comforted these interviewees as well as I could and provided them with resources to the best of my ability.

Numbness to violence and pain, rather than developing a “thick skin,” is the best way to describe the process I employed in the field. That ability allowed me to
compartmentalize the atrocities I learned about until I could decompress on my own. This is an ongoing process as it is still difficult to listen to testimonies, review field notes, and think about the experiences victims had to endure during the conflict. But it is precisely because of those horrific experiences that I have moved forward with this project. In my experience, every scholar who studies political violence has a normative commitment to the cessation and prevention of violence. As a result, I feel an obligation to shine a light on this dark chapter in Peru’s history in the hope that it never happens again - in Peru or anywhere else.
“We were caught between two fires. Because we were Ayacuchanos, the military thought we were terrorists. And for the same racist reason, Sendero did not value our lives.”
Interview, Quechua Victim, Ayacucho, June 2017

In this chapter, I begin to test deductive hypotheses about Sendero Luminoso’s use of communicative violence during the Internal Armed Conflict using district-level data in Ayacucho and Huancavelica. Finally, I include a section on evidence to either reject or fail to reject my deductive hypotheses.

Evidence

$H_1$: The larger the size of the population, the more likely it is that an individual will see the effects of a communicative act of violence. Therefore, communicative violence is more likely in large cities.

Overall in my analysis, and as seen in Table 4.1, I found hypotheses $H_1$ and $H_2$ are unsupported and therefore rejected based on a comparison of the four districts studied in this project. In regard to $H_1$ specifically, the most likely case in the entire country failed to support this hypothesis. While news and rumors of communicative acts of violence reached the capital city of Lima, mainly via two major national newspaper cover stories and oral traditions and narratives, there were no reported cases occurring within the country’s capital city. Lima was the most likely location for communicative violence to occur based on the logic of $H_1$, with its large population of nearly 5 million, high population density, and mobility of its population due to both paved roads and sheer number of vehicles.

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$^{65}$ In Peru, there are three distinct categories of political units: Departamento/Región (Department/Region - equivalent to a state in the United States), Provincia (Province - akin to a county in the United States), and Distrito (District - a spatial unit that contains multiple small towns as well as some rural areas, similar to a large city with unincorporated areas outside the city limits in the United States). Below that are subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (e.g., centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caseríos).
Of the four districts under study in this project, the districts with larger populations in each matched departmental pair (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba) did not have any incidents of communicative violence. Rather, the inverse was true; the districts with smaller populations in each matched departmental pair (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa) saw incidents of communicative violence. The same findings also hold true across all four districts with respect to population density. As seen in Table 4.1, the districts with higher population density in each matched departmental pair (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba) did not have any incidents of communicative violence. In contrast, the districts with lower population density in each matched departmental pair (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa) saw incidents of communicative violence.

In fact, although the acts of communicative violence occurred within the smaller districts (because the district level is the smallest subnational unit of analysis available in the 1981 Peruvian census), the acts took place outside of the population centers and in the subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (e.g., centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caserios) where the population was both smaller and less dense, further demonstrating the need to reject H₁.

**H₂:** The higher the rate of mobility of a population, the more likely it is that an act of communicative violence will be communicated to a wider audience. Therefore, communicative violence is more likely in areas with a highly transient population.

In regard to H₂, similar to H₁ above, although rumors made it to district capitals, there are no documented or even oral accounts of communicative violence occurring in the market towns. Rather, testimonies stated communicative violence
occurred, or was rumored to have occurred, “en las alturas” - outside of the district capital,\textsuperscript{66} which is consistent with what different Senderistas informed me (i.e., punishment depended on crime, person, and place).\textsuperscript{67} Even if civilians were victims of communicative violence in transit to or from market towns, communicative violence only took place outside of the district capitals and never in the market towns themselves.

District capitals also served as the location of polling stations for elections. Because voting is compulsory in Peru, civilians from the hinterlands were required to travel to and from the district capitals to cast their ballots. In 1985, when all 25 acts of communicative violence studied in this project were committed, a national/presidential election was held. While the intent of committing communicative violence may have been to instill fear in both the victims and others who became aware of the violent acts in order to persuade civilians to abstain from voting (as seen in archival evidence of communicative violence in Figures 5.1-3), the acts of communicative violence did not take place in the district capitals. Rather, they occurred in the subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (i.e., centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caseríos). Therefore, H\textsubscript{2} must also be rejected.

\textsuperscript{66} Author’s interviews on 17NOV15, 19-23NOV15, 25-7NOV15, 07JUL16, 11-3JUL16, 15-9JUL16, 02AUG16, 10AUG16, 12-3AUG16, 15AUG16, 09JUN17, 20JUN17, 22-4JUN17, 30JUN17, 02JUL17, 28-31JUL17, and 01AUG17.

\textsuperscript{67} Author’s interviews on 15SEP15, 07NOV15, and 19JUL16.
Figure 5.1 - Archival Evidence of Communicative Violence #1

Source: *La República* (12 April 1985)
Figure 5.2 - Archival Evidence of Communicative Violence #2

Source: La República (12 April 1985)
Figure 5.3 - Archival Evidence of Communicative Violence #3

Source: *El Comercio* (13 April 1985)
H₃: The more culturally different the audience is from the armed actor, the less likely it is that the armed actors will be able to communicate via traditional modes of interaction. Therefore, communicative violence is likely in populations with different cultures than those of the armed actors.

Evidence for H₃ supports this hypothesis. Using mother tongue as an indicator to define ethnicity in Peru, Sendero was comprised of mainly educated whites and mestizos, with less than a third of their ranks filled by indigenous people with Quechua as their mother tongue (Portugal 2008, 23-4). At least 75% of all killed or disappeared victims were native Quechua speakers (Degregori 2013, 282). And according to all known accounts of the violence in the conflict, an overwhelming majority of the victims of human rights abuses and violations apart from death and disappearance during the conflict were indigenous peoples and peasants, particularly Quechua-speakers. Furthermore, districts and communities suffering from communicative violence had higher levels of Quechua-speaking populations than their neighboring communities and districts that did not experience communicative violence. As such, I fail to reject this hypothesis due to evidence of Quechua communities singled out as victims of communicative violence. No white or mestizo victims of communicative violence have been found.

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68 Similar to English, Spanish, or any other language, there are several dialects of Quechua with noticeable differences depending on the location. For example, Quechua-speakers in Bolivia may use the word unu for water, whereas Quechua-speakers in Peru may use yaku. (Similar to the word “soda” in the western portion of the United States and “pop” in the Midwest.) However, there is a strong overlap across all of the dialects, similar to the Spanish language spoken in Mexico, Puerto Rico, Colombia, etc. Regardless of dialect, Spanish-speakers are largely able to communicate with and understand one another. The same holds true for Quechua-speakers.

69 According to Article 48 of the 1993 Political Constitution of Peru, “The official languages of the State are Spanish and, wherever they predominate, Quechua, Aymara, and other native tongues, in accordance with the law” (Congreso de la República 2009, 18). However, the dominant language spoken throughout Peru is Spanish, as seen in all available Peruvian censuses.
Table 5.1 shows the ethnic breakdown by language for the Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica in 1981. Table 5.2 shows the same ethnic breakdown by language for the four selected districts studied in this project in 1981, along with a notation marking which department each district belongs to.

Table 5.1 shows both Ayacucho and Huancavelica have majority Quechua populations, with Ayacucho having a slightly more indigenous population than Huancavelica. If H₃ is correct, I would expect there to be a higher number of incidents of communicative violence to have occurred in Ayacucho than in Huancavelica because of this larger Quechua population. The evidence in Table 4.1 supports this expectation as there were more acts of communicative violence committed in Chungui (Ayacucho) than in Churcampa (Huancavelica). However, this may be explained by the fact that as seen in “Chapter 3 - Context,” Ayacucho was the base of operations for Sendero Luminoso and, according to the CVR (2003), experienced more violence than any other department during the conflict.

**Table 5.1 - Ethnicity (Language) in the Two Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica in 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Quechua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho (1)</td>
<td>11.15%</td>
<td>88.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica (2)</td>
<td>17.54%</td>
<td>81.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1981 Peruvian census

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70 In the words of Abimael Guzmán, “Ayacucho is the cradle [of the conflict]” (CVR 2003 - Volume 1, 63).
Table 5.2 - Ethnicity (Language) in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa in 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District (Department)</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Quechua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui (1)</td>
<td>8.14%</td>
<td>91.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel (1)</td>
<td>4.72%</td>
<td>94.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba (2)</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>78.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa (2)</td>
<td>14.72%</td>
<td>84.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1981 Peruvian census

I analyze the ethnic differences at the district level in order to determine whether or not this independent variable is associated with higher incidents of communicative violence. Table 5.2 shows the paired districts from each department have slightly higher levels of Quechua speakers than their departmental scores, with the exception of Acobamba, which is slightly lower than the Huancavelica score. For the Department of Huancavelica, the districts of Acobamba and Churcampa both uphold $H_3$. One can see that in the district with a higher Quechua-speaking population (Churcampa - 84.32%), five acts of communicative violence were present. In the district with a lower Quechua-speaking population (Acobamba - 78.99%), no acts of communicative violence were present. While the difference between Churcampa and Acobamba’s Quechua-speaking percentages is not that large, a trend supporting this hypothesis is present. However, according to the 1981 Peruvian census, the opposite is true for Ayacucho.

As per the census, San Miguel had a slightly higher Quechua-speaking population (94.92%) compared to Chungui (91.22%). However, San Miguel saw no acts of communicative violence whereas Chungui had 20 such incidents. It would appear that this district-level data requires $H_3$ to be rejected. But a closer look at the
level of measurement is needed before this hypothesis is rejected. As mentioned above, the district level is the smallest subnational unit of analysis available in the 1981 Peruvian census. But also mentioned above is the fact that communicative violence only took place outside of the district capitals and never in the market towns. It is in those centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caserios where acts of communicative violence occurred. In Churcampa, the acts of communicative violence did not take place in the district capital. Rather, they took place outside of the city on the route from one district (Locroja) to another (Churcampa). Similar to Churcampa, in Chungui, the acts of communicative violence also did not take place in the district capital. Instead, they took place in smaller communities such as Jotopuquito and Churca.

The overwhelming percentage of Quechua speakers compared to Spanish speakers in the smaller communities is lost when the entire district is compiled under one measure because the smaller communities where communicative violence took place are measured within the district level data of the 1981 Peruvian census. To help bring this into clearer focus, consider the following. According to the 2007 Peruvian census, and as seen in Table 5.3, the percentage of individuals in Huancavelica who cite Quechua as the language with which they learned to speak shrunk from 81.84% in 1981, to 64.03% in 2007, a delta of 17.81%. In Ayacucho, those who cite Quechua as the language with which they learned to speak shrunk from 88.41% in 1981, to 63.05% in 2007, an even steeper decrease of 25.36%. This trend of a decreasing proportion of Quechua speakers over time in two departments

with large indigenous populations implies those same departments had larger proportions of Quechua-speaking individuals prior to the 1981 census, particularly during the time when Sendero was educating indigenous communities through its *escuelas populares*, gaining intimate knowledge of the communities it had infiltrated, and establishing control.

**Table 5.3 - Ethnicity (Language) in the Two Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica in 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>Quechua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayacucho (1)</td>
<td>36.57%</td>
<td>63.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica (2)</td>
<td>35.67%</td>
<td>64.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2007 Peruvian census

In fieldwork trips to Ayacucho and Huancavelica in 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017, I visited over 100 communities, across the entire spectrum from provincial and district capitals, to small *anexos* and *caserios* over the course of 15 total months. In the larger communities, I was able to speak Spanish during meetings and interviews without any trouble. But when I ventured out into the hinterlands of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, I almost always had to hire a Quechua interpreter in order to communicate with the locals. If the Peruvian censuses from 1981 to 2007 show a trend of a decreasing percentage of Quechua speakers in Ayacucho and Huancavelica during that 26-year span, and some six to 10 years after the most recent census I still had to hire a Quechua interpreter because there were no other Spanish speakers to be found in those smaller communities, it stands to reason that the 1981 census scores at the district level highly skew what the true ethnic

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72 Author’s Quechua language abilities would be considered beginner/basic.
breakdown was at that time, particularly in the remote communities where communicative violence occurred.

A number of scholars have written about both the remoteness and isolation of various indigenous communities in the southern highlands before and during the early part of the Internal Armed Conflict. As discussed in “Chapter 3 - Context,” the massacre of eight journalists and their guide in Uchuraccay (in the Province of Huanta, Department of Ayacucho) is one of the most infamous examples of a “primitive community” engaging in a lynching due to confusion, altitude, and remoteness from civilization (Gorriti 1983, 23). La Serna (2012) studied two other communities in Ayacucho, Huaychao (in the Province of Huanta) and Chuschi (in the Province of Cangallo). Both of these communities were isolated and populated by Quechua-speaking peasants, particularly before the initiation of the armed struggle (2-6). González (2011) also studied the Internal Armed Conflict in Ayacucho, and in particular, the community of Sarhua (in the Province of Víctor Fajardo). Amongst many other atrocities, Sarhua also experienced acts of communicative violence. But it is of note here for both its remoteness and status as a legally recognized peasant community (26-7). The takeaway from the list of scholarship above is direct evidence about how remote areas in the southern highlands were Quechua-speaking in the early 1980s, which further supports my own experiences in these areas from 2013-7.

73 In January 1983, Huaychao was site of a peasant rebellion against Sendero, where eight Senderistas were killed. It was this attack that the eight journalists and their guide were investigating when they were also killed roughly a week later.
In addition to the census data presented above, when asked about the relationship between ethnicity and violence, interviews with ex-Senderistas and academics also helped to reinforce and shed light on this hypothesis:

*Why were different types of violence used during the conflict?*\(^{74}\)

Penalties varied by the sin committed. Some were capital offense; some were not.

*Did region affect the variation of penalties?*

Of course. In Lima, the penalties did not have to be so extreme. They could read the propaganda and also understand it.

*What about the sierra?*

In the sierra, people may not speak Spanish. And if they did, they may be illiterate [so posters and leaflets would not work]. But even if they were literate, they may not understand the words.\(^{75}\)

*So Sendero used different forms of violence to communicate with Quechua speakers?*

Of course. Penalties were definitely intended to send a message.

*If Sendero did not have a problem with killing, why not kill every person who needed to be punished?*\(^{76}\)

Sometimes the order was to punish but not kill.

*What explains the use of non-lethal violence?*

Sendero would recycle old customs.

*Whose customs?*

The hacienda owners. They would take a finger or take a tongue from peasants for different offenses (e.g., theft, disrespect). The community does not forget.

*Why would Sendero kill civilians in various attacks, but sometimes refrain from killing, and instead maim, in the sierra?*\(^{77}\)

Culture.

*Culture? What do you mean?*

Violence is a part of the sierra culture. *“La letra con la sangre entra.”* That *décima* is a reminder of the past. Physical punishments were used to achieve better school performance in state schools.

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\(^{74}\) Author’s interview with an ex-Senderista on 15SEP15 and again on 07NOV15 in Ayacucho.

\(^{75}\) This is an important point of the interview. While some of the Quechua speakers may have spoken Spanish, they may not have understood the meaning of all of the words, necessitating the need for other forms of communication (i.e., communicative violence).

\(^{76}\) Author’s interview with an ex-Senderista on 19JUL16 in Ayacucho.

\(^{77}\) Author’s interview with an academic on 08AUG17 in Lima.
So, the sierra people have been socialized into violence? Yes, violence was a pedagogical tool. Violence was used to teach the sierra people to follow directions and obey authority.

The sample interviews above all point to a cultural narrative that necessitated the use of communicative violence in particular communities in order to communicate with those residents. The census data presented and variations explained above, provides evidence of Quechua-speaking communities (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa) selected as recipients of communicative violence compared to their more Spanish-speaking district counterparts (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba). When taken together, this combination of evidence leads me to fail to reject H₃.

Conclusion

My findings reject H₁ and H₂, but fail to reject H₃. The data show no acts of communicative violence occurred in the more populous districts, tested through two different operationalizations of city size: population size and population density. Where the population was both large and mobile (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba), communicative violence did not occur. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where the population was smaller and less mobile (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa), communicative violence occurred.

The data show acts of communicative violence occurred in the districts with a higher cultural difference between perpetrators and communities. Where the concentration of Spanish-speakers was higher (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba), communicative violence did not occur. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where the population had a higher concentration of Quechua-speakers (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa), communicative violence occurred.
Both the census and interview data reveal that the first two hypotheses - population size ($H_1$) and population mobility ($H_2$) - are not supported. Therefore, both $H_1$ and $H_2$ must be rejected. However, both the census and interview data reveal that the third hypothesis - cultural differences ($H_3$) - is a contributing factor in explaining the conditions under which communicative violence will take place. Therefore, I must fail to reject $H_3$. 
CHAPTER 6 - INDUCTIVE HYPOTHESES AND EVIDENCE

“There was no one there to protect us, so we had to do it for ourselves. There was no state presence whatsoever - it was a complete absence of the state.”
Interview, Civilian Self-Defense Member, Huancavelica, July 2016

In this chapter, I begin to test inductive hypotheses about Sendero Luminoso’s use of communicative violence during the Internal Armed Conflict using district-level data in Ayacucho and Huancavelica. I include a section on evidence to either reject or fail to reject my inductive hypotheses. Finally, I conclude with a summary and suggest further implications of these results.

Evidence

H4: The greater the absence of state presence in a particular area, the more likely it is that armed actors will be able to conduct operations with impunity. Therefore, communicative violence is likely in locations with low state capacity.

Evidence for H4 supports this hypothesis. While there is no clear metric to help determine the sufficient minimum number of interviews to be conducted in the field, as this issue is project-dependent, a “saturation” model is suggested (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 211-4). This involves hearing the same story told over and over again, and from different groups of people. In my interviews, victims, civilian self-defense forces, police, military, academics, and Senderistas all put forth the idea of state absence as a causal explanation for communicative violence.

Why did communicative violence occur in some communities and not others? That type of violence occurred where there was an absence of the state. Sendero could do whatever they wanted.

78 Author’s interview with a journalist on 02AUG16 in Lima.
Why did communicative violence occur in some communities and not others? A lack of development. Where there was no state presence, Sendero was free to commit bloody acts at will.

Why did communicative violence occur in some communities and not others? There was no state presence. No schools, no classes for the children. We were all alone.

Why did communicative violence occur in some communities and not others? Sendero cut fingers in areas outside the reach of the military bases where they would be safe.

Why did communicative violence occur in some communities and not others? Communicative violence happened in the oreja (ear) - farther from the military.

Using transportation, education, healthcare, and security administration as dimensions of state capacity, I found evidence of weak state capacity in the districts where communicative violence took place and evidence of strong state capacity in the districts where communicative violence did not take place.

Roads

The study of state infrastructural power speaks to spatial and social control (Soifer and vom Hau 2008, 226). In this project, I use roads and access to districts as a proxy for transportation in order to study the spatial control of the state. In the case of transportation, the logic follows that states must be able to access its citizens in order to carry out the administration of some very basic set of services. These

79 Author's interview with an academic on 15AUG16 in Ayacucho.
80 Author's interview with a CAD leader on 20JUN17 in Ayacucho.
81 Author's interview with a community leader on 24JUN17 in Huancavelica.
82 Author's interview with a community leader on 28JUL17 in Ayacucho.
83 The Department of Ayacucho resembles the outline of a dog. The Province of La Mar includes part of the head and the ear of the dog, which is where Chungui is located. Acts of communicative violence occurred in the farthest southeast portion of La Mar (i.e., in the ear of the dog).
services might include such things as building schools and hospitals, installing
electrical towers, establishing police and military outposts, and conducting a census.
For example, by administering a census, the state is able to count the number of
people within its borders and then tax them in order to pay for any variety of state
services (e.g., healthcare, education, security, etc.) In order to reach its people,
particularly in the distant south central Andean highlands, the state must travel via
roads (i.e., not accessible via water routes as is required in parts of the jungle
regions of the Amazon basin).

If the state is unable to reach its people, not only is a basic service like a
census difficult if not impossible to accurately administer, but so too would be
security provision in the furtherance of enforcement of law and order. For example,
if roads do not exist - paved or unpaved - the state will have a difficult time
transporting troops, trucks, weapons, ammunition, supplies, etc. to the front.
Establishing military bases with the capacity to land helicopters, heavy artillery, and
other armaments would also be extremely difficult without the ability to move
freely, or even at a slower than normal pace. Therefore, acts of communicative
violence should be greater in areas with little or no roads rather than in
communities where roads are present and modernized (i.e., paved) because a weak
state would be unable to prevent such violent acts from occurring with impunity
because of a lack of access to the communities, while a strong state would be able to
protect its citizens, or be able to bring belligerents to justice, if such events were to
occur because it would be able to reach those communities and make its presence
known and felt in a more rapid and orderly fashion.
My findings show little to no accessibility via roads to areas where communicative violence occurred (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa). Where any roads did exist, they were not paved. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where communicative violence did not occur (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba), roads were present and sometimes paved.

**Table 6.1 - Highways in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa in 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Highway</th>
<th>CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministry of Transportation and Communications, National Geographic Institute, municipal government archives, and author’s interview data

Table 6.1 shows the four selected districts with their corresponding presence or absence of major highways in 1985. Maps of the Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica, which showed the presence or absence of major highways, were sourced from the 1963-70 “Peruvian Historical, Geographical, and Landscapes Atlas” found in the archives of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications in Lima. Interviews\(^\text{84}\) with both the Director of the Archives and his staff were also conducted at the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to gain further insight into the history of road construction in order to build a roads and access timeline across Ayacucho and Huancavelica.

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\(^{84}\) Author’s interviews on 07AUG17 and 10AUG17 in Lima.
In addition, interviews with the archival staff at the National Geographic Institute in Lima, the state repository of all cartographic data stored in and on Peru, were conducted in order to acquire the most comprehensive and up-to-date maps of the areas under study in this project. The archival staff at the National Geographic Institute informed me that the United States Air Force assisted the Peruvian state in the 1950s and 1960s with aerial photos. As such, they were able to confirm that the maps from the 1960s and 1970s were the most accurate accounting of presence or absence of roads during the Internal Armed Conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in light of the fact that major highways were not constructed during the conflict. Furthermore, in order to further triangulate the data available on roads, interviews were conducted with current and former mayors (where available), municipal staff, and community leaders in each of the four districts in this study. Municipal leaders were also able to provide city plans and maps in Acobamba and Chungui.

As seen in Figure 6.1, in Chungui, where communicative violence occurred, the main roads from both the departmental and provincial capitals (Huamanga and San Miguel, respectively) to Chungui were non-existent. The closest district to Chungui that even had a highway under construction as of 1970 was Chiquintirca, 25.5 kilometers from Chungui along today’s still unpaved highway. Once the Internal Armed Conflict broke out in 1980, highway construction in Ayacucho all but ceased - particularly in the high altitude and Sendero-controlled areas of La Mar.

85 Author’s interviews on 21AUG17 in Lima.

86 Author’s interviews on 01JUL17, 12JUL17, 28-31JUL17, and 01AUG17 in Ayacucho, and on 12-3JUL16 and 22-4JUN17 in Huancavelica.
According to both the current and immediate past Mayor of Chungui, the highway connecting Chiquintirca to Chungui did not arrive until 2000.\textsuperscript{87} As of August 2017, the highway outside of San Miguel connecting Chungui to the provincial capital is still unpaved.

**Figure 6.1 - Map of Chungui and San Miguel in 1970**

![Map of Chungui and San Miguel in 1970](image)

Source: *Atlas Historico, Geografico, y de Paisajes Peruanos (1963-70)*

As mentioned in “Chapter 5 - Deductive Hypotheses and Evidence,” acts of communicative violence took place outside of the population centers and in the subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (e.g., *centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caserios*). In addition to a complete absence of

\textsuperscript{87} Author's interviews on 31JUL17 and 01AUG17 in Ayacucho.
highways reaching to the district capital of Chungui during the Internal Armed Conflict, there were no highways reaching Socos and other affected communities in the *Oreja de Perro* (Ear of the Dog). As of August 2017, the highway outside of Chungui is unpaved and ends before a two-day hike in the Andes, with altitudes exceeding 4,000 meters, in order to reach Socos. While a lack of highways and roads is not sufficient to explain why communicative violence occurs, a combination of the context of the Internal Armed Conflict and the lack of reach by the state created an inability of the state to enforce law and order, thus allowing Sendero to commit acts of communicative violence with impunity.

As seen in Figure 6.2, in Churcampa, where communicative violence occurred, the main roads from both the departmental and provincial capitals (Huancavelica and Pampas, respectively) to Churcampa were non-existent. While neighboring districts like Locroja and Mayoc had cut and in some cases, paved roads, Churcampa was isolated without any form of highway system connecting it to those and other districts. Once the Internal Armed Conflict broke out in 1980, highway construction in Huancavelica all but ceased - particularly in the *Zonas de Emergencia*, under military command, and at times controlled by Sendero, areas in and near Acobamba. According to a former Governor, Judge of the Peace, and President of the Community, the highway connecting Churcampa to other districts

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88 The Department of Ayacucho resembles the outline of a dog. The Province of La Mar includes part of the head and the ear of the dog, which is where Chungui is located.

89 While Churcampa is now the capital of a Province with the same name, it was part of the Tayacaja province in 1985.
did not arrive until the mid to late 1990s.\textsuperscript{90} As of June 2017, the highway outside of Churcampa connecting it to other districts like Locroja and Mayoc is still unpaved.

**Figure 6.2 - Map of Churcampa and Acobamba in 1970**

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6.2.png}
\end{center}

Source: *Atlas Historico, Geografico, y de Paisajes Peruanos* (1963-70)

As mentioned above, acts of communicative violence took place outside of the population centers and in the subnational population groupings smaller than the district level (e.g., centros poblados, comunidades, anexos, and caserios). In addition to a complete absence of highways reaching to the district capital of Churcampa during the Internal Armed Conflict, there were no highways reaching other affected communities like Maraypata (anexo) and Paccay (anexo). As of August 2017, the

\textsuperscript{90} Author's interviews on 22JUN17 and 24JUN17 in Huancavelica.
highway outside of Churcampa (and in Churcampa) is unpaved. A one-lane dirt road connects the district capital to the smaller subnational population groupings and other districts like Locroja. While a lack of highways and roads is not sufficient to explain why communicative violence occurs, a combination of the context of the Internal Armed Conflict and the lack of reach by the state created an inability of the state to enforce law and order, thus allowing Sendero to commit acts of communicative violence with impunity.

As seen in Figure 6.1, in San Miguel, where communicative violence did not occur, the road from the departmental capital was planned, cut, and paved until Tambo, the district closest to San Miguel (23.4 kilometers along the highway) en route to the departmental capital of Huamanga. Because roads both existed and were largely modernized and paved en route to San Miguel from Huamanga, the state was able to establish its presence in San Miguel and transport components of its coercive apparatus to combat Sendero Luminoso when needed. As a result, the people of San Miguel could see and feel the state presence on a daily basis.

As seen in Figure 6.2, in Acobamba, where communicative violence did not occur, multiple highways entered and exited the district. These included paved highways from Huancahuancana in the southwest, unpaved highways from both Anta in the northwest and Caja in the northeast, and highways under construction connecting to Tacarayoc in the north and Pomacocha in the east. With so much access to Acobamba, the Peruvian state could deploy security forces when needed and thereby be able to counter, stymie, and prevent Sendero attacks more readily than in areas where it could not reach due to lack of roads and access.
Healthcare

Soifer uses vaccination rates as one indicator of state administrative capacity in contemporary Latin America (2012, 593-4). In this project, I use the presence or absence of public health facilities as an indicator of state administrative capacity in Peru. Depending on the type of health facility and the services offered in a given district, I am able to determine to what extent the state was able to exert its administrative capacity. To do this, I move beyond a strictly binary evaluation of state health facilities, and rank this indicator along a sliding scale of High, Medium, and Low, from most to least administrative capacity.

Table 6.2 - Health Centers in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa from 1973-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Health Center</th>
<th>CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministry of Health and author’s interview data

Table 6.2 shows the four selected districts with their corresponding ranking of health centers from 1973-86.\(^{91}\) Annual “Basic Information on Health Infrastructure” reports from the years 1973, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1986,\(^{92}\) were found in the archives of the Ministry of Health’s General Office of Information and Statistics in Lima. These reports assess and describe the Peruvian

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\(^{91}\) A table with a listing and count of all three categories of health facilities by year for all four districts studied in this project can be found in Appendix E.

\(^{92}\) The data collected prior to 1985 (the year studied in this project), from 1973-83, are used to provide a baseline for national healthcare infrastructure. Data were not collected from reports after 1986 due to the fact that the instances of communicative violence studied in this project took place in 1985. As a result, further development or reduction of healthcare facilities after the year analyzed in this study does not affect the results presented here.
public healthcare system nationwide per year of publication. Included in these reports are the three categories of health facilities available throughout the country and the total number of health facilities per department, province, and district. The reports also include the definition of each category, ranked from most advanced to least advanced (i.e., Hospital, Health Center or Clinic, and then Health Post), which follows below:

*Hospital* (Hospital): It is a technically planned establishment, constituted, equipped, and administered, with organized medical staff and sufficient personnel, which has beds for hospitalization of patients for more than 24 hours and which provides medical attention and nursing care, to fulfill functions of promotion, prevention, recovery, and rehabilitation.

*Centros de Salud* (Health Centers or Clinics): It is the establishment responsible for developing activities of promotion and recovery of health. They provide medical consultation services (general medicine, minor surgery, obstetrics and pediatrics), dental consultation, immunizations, environmental sanitation, nursing home visits, some health centers may have intern beds. Its radius of action corresponds to a jurisdiction of 2,000 or more inhabitants.

*Puestos Sanitarios* (Health Posts): They are in charge of activities of promotion, protection, and recovery of health, such as elementary medical care, first aid, immunization, promotion of environmental sanitation, and registration of bio-statistical information. They are assisted by duly-trained auxiliary personnel, who develop activities based on manuals or instructions that guide and limit their functions. Receive periodic supervision of the Health Center or Clinic. (Ministerio de Salud 1979, 5-6)

According to the Ministry of Health’s Basic Information on Health Infrastructure reports from 1973-86, only San Miguel, where communicative violence did not occur, had a Hospital, the most advanced of the three categories of healthcare facilities, during the entire time period. As a result, I rank San Miguel as “High” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities. This consistent and advanced
presence of the state, coupled with the presence of roads mentioned above, helps to reinforce the idea that because the state was able to extend its administrative capacity to the fullest extent in San Miguel, it was able to prevent acts of communicative violence in a district that was otherwise affected by Sendero violence.

Of the four districts studied in this project, only Acobamba, where communicative violence did not occur, had a Health Center or Clinic, the middle position of the three categories of healthcare facilities, during the entire time period. As a result, I rank Acobamba as “Medium” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities. Similar to San Miguel above, Acobamba had a combination of access via paved and cut highways and a consistent mid-range healthcare facility and during the Internal Armed Conflict. Therefore, both Acobamba and San Miguel are considered districts with a strong state presence.

In Chungui, where communicative violence occurred, there was only a Health Post, the least advanced of the three categories of healthcare facilities, throughout the time period. Because of this, I rank Chungui as “Low” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities. Indeed, as of July 2017, the Health Post in Chungui consists of a small shed with a skeleton staff of two or three health workers who occupy the facility a few days per week, depending on the weather and access to the remote district (i.e., heavy rains often wash out the road from the provincial capital, thereby making access to Chungui impossible by the sole\textsuperscript{93} daily transport in and out of the

\textsuperscript{93} While individuals are able to travel freely in private 4x4 vehicles, as of July 2017, the modal form of transportation is still only one van (sometimes two) available to the public that leaves from the provincial capital (San Miguel) at 5am for the four-hour trek to the district capital. That same van (or
district capital). The facility’s medical supplies are equivalent to a basic first-aid kit, with minimal amounts of painkillers (e.g., ibuprofen), antiseptics, elastic bandages, and adhesive bandages.  

The description of the Health Post in Chungui in 2017 is an indication of what the Health Post in Chungui was like during the Internal Armed Conflict. Coupled with the absolute lack of roads connecting the district to the provincial and departmental capitals, several Chunguinos who lived in Chungui during the Internal Armed Conflict claim the Health Post in the 1980s was practically non-existent:

*How would you describe the state health facilities during the terrorism epoch (Internal Armed Conflict)?*

There was no state presence. Chungui was the most forgotten part of La Mar. We received the most golpes (hits) but the least assistance.

*How was the Health Post in the 1980s?*

There was a complete absence of the state. There was no one to help us. Many people died because they were not helped by the state.

Although Chungui’s basic healthcare facility in 2017 is still ranked “Low” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities in Peru, it was still far more advanced of what existed in in Chungui in 1985. Therefore, Chungui ranks as the lowest and least advanced of healthcare facilities for all four districts studied in this project.

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94 Author’s visit to Chungui in July 2017.

95 A native or resident of Chungui.

96 Author’s interview with a former CAD leader on 30JUN17 in Ayacucho.

97 Author’s interview with a former Governor and Community President of Chungui on 01JUL17 in Ayacucho.
In Churcampa, where communicative violence occurred, my findings are mixed. According to the Ministry of Health’s Basic Information on Health Infrastructure reports from 1973-8, Churcampa’s health facility was classified as a Health Post, the least advanced of the three categories of healthcare facilities, and the same as Chungui. However, in the Ministry of Health’s Basic Information on Health Infrastructure reports from 1979-86, Churcampa’s health facility was classified as a Health Center or Clinic, the middle position of the three categories of healthcare facilities, the same as Acobamba. While this might lead one to believe Churcampa’s ranking should be “Medium” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities, similar to Acobamba, I rank Churcampa as “Low” for the following reasons.

First, while Churcampa did have a Health Center or Clinic (“Medium” ranking) once the Internal Armed Conflict began in 1980, the state’s administrative capacity was not as substantial or robust in the years and decades prior when it only had a Health Post. As a result, the state’s presence on the healthcare front was not as long and consistent as it was in its departmental neighbor, Acobamba. And second, the Health Center or Clinic in Churcampa as of June 2017, similar albeit better than Chungui, is rudimentary.98 The present-day healthcare facility for a community that doubles as both a district and provincial capital lacks the same accommodations as its departmental counterpart, Acobamba. Both districts suffered violent attacks at the hands of Sendero and the Peruvian coercive apparatus, but coupled with a lack of roads and access, several interviewees who lived in Churcampa during the Internal Armed Conflict claim the Health Center or Clinic in the 1980s was weak at

98 Author’s visit to Churcampa in June 2017.
best, as alluded to in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter. Therefore, while Churcampa does not rank as the lowest and least advanced of healthcare facilities for all four districts studied in this project, it is still ranked as “Low” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities.

*Education*

I choose to use education as another indicator of state administrative capacity. Darden uses the content of schooling as a link to nationalism in his study of the role nationalist networks played in the formation of Ukrainian armed resistance to Soviet occupation in the 1940s (2009a, 7). He argues that national loyalties instilled in a community during the introduction of mass schooling create a powerful and enduring national tie. After national identities have been established through the schools, they are sustained and replicated over time within communities (2009b, 1). The idea that schooling is tied to nationalism is also put forth by Balcells (2013) in her study of Catalan nationalism. She argues that although the Catalan identity persists in both France and Spain, Catalan national identity is not as salient in France as it is in Spain. The main driver behind this variation is the attributes of the historical process of the spread of mass literacy in each country.

While nationalism is not and should not be equated with state capacity, the two concepts have linkages. If a state’s infrastructural power is the capacity of the state to penetrate society and implement its desires throughout its sovereign lands (Mann 1984, 189), then it stands to reason that by establishing public schools throughout the country, the state will instill a national identity and pride. This
national identity and pride can then be used by the state to count its people, extract from them without their consent, conscript, etc. If need be, the Red Queen can shout, “off with his head,” and actually implement this action (189).

With this in mind, I look to mass public schooling in order to determine one aspect of the state’s administrative capacity in a given district. However, as Luna and Soifer point out, “a measure of schooling, taxation, or policing at the national level tells us little to nothing about the presence of the state in a given community within its borders” (2017, 889). Because of this, I use the presence or absence of public schools at the district-level in order to capture this subnational variation. The logic is that if a district has a large number of public schools (or a low proportion of students per school, depending on the district’s population), the state’s capacity would be considered high or strong in that district. Conversely, if a district has a small number of public schools (or a high proportion of students per school, depending on the district’s population), the state’s capacity would be considered low or weak in that district.

Table 6.3 - Public Schools in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>4,149 (2)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>2,111 (11)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>315 (25)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>1,874 (3)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministry of Education and author’s interview data

Table 6.3 shows the four selected districts with their corresponding presence or absence of public schools in 1985. Although the archives at the Ministry of
Education are unavailable to the public, I was able to secure a listing of all public educational institutions (including both open and closed) for the Departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica through a petition for public information from the Unit of Statistics (Unidad de Estadística - UE). From these two reports, I was able to filter by province and district, cull out non-schools, and determine how many schools were in each district up to and including 1985. The data presented in the Column labeled “School” shows both the number of schools in each district in parentheses, as well as the number of residents per school to the left of the parentheses.99

In Chungui, where communicative violence occurred, there were only two public schools in the district up to and including 1985. Controlling for population, I found that there were 4,149 Chunguininos for every one public school. In contrast, in San Miguel, where communicative violence did not occur, there were 11 public schools in the district. Again, controlling for population, I found that there were 2,111 San Miguel residents for every one public school. This nearly 2:1 ratio demonstrates the state had nearly double the presence in San Miguel than it did in Chungui on the education indicator. The implication is that on this front, the state’s administrative capacity was twice as strong in San Miguel as it was in Chungui. The takeaway is that where administrative capacity was strong, communicative violence did not occur.

In Churcampa, where communicative violence occurred, there were only three public schools in the district up to and including 1985. Controlling for

99 This number was calculated by dividing the total number of residents in each district (sourced from the 1981 Peruvian census) by the total number of schools in each district (sourced from the Ministry of Education).
population, I found that there were 1,874 residents of Churcampa for every one public school. In contrast, in Acobamba, where communicative violence did not occur, there were 25 public schools in the district. Again, controlling for population, I found that there were only 315 Acobamba residents for every one public school. This nearly 6:1 ratio indicates the state had nearly six times the presence in Acobamba than it did in Churcampa on the education indicator. The implication is that on this front, the state's administrative capacity was six times as strong in Acobamba as it was in Churcampa, nearly three times higher than San Miguel compared to Chungui. The takeaway here is that where administrative capacity was strong, communicative violence did not occur.

In addition to data on public schools provided by the Ministry of Education, I also interviewed community leaders, parents of students during the 1980s, and individuals who were public school teachers or students during the Internal Armed Conflict. The testimonials overwhelmingly told the same story as the information provided by the state. Civilians confirmed that where communicative violence occurred (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa), there was a low state presence via schools, and that where communicative violence did not occur (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba), state presence was felt more strongly. Furthermore, in Chungui and Churcampa, known Senderistas and Sendero sympathizers worked as teachers in some of the public schools.\textsuperscript{100} Thus, even the slight state capacity present in those districts was partly co-opted by the very forces it was intended to counter.

\textsuperscript{100} Author's interviews on 04NOV15, 07NOV15, 20NOV15, 21NOV15, 01DEC15, 30JUN17, 01JUL17, and 28-31JUL17 in Ayacucho; 12JUL17, 08-9AUG17, and 12-3AUG in Lima; and 12JUL16 and 22-4JUL16 in Huancavelica.
Security

As mentioned above, part of Soifer’s measurement of state capacity includes a security provision dimension with three indicators: violent crime rate, lynching rate, and private security per capita (2012, 596). Any project that studies violence must include this dimension in its assessment of state capacity. As such, in this project, I use police stations as a proxy for security in order to study the spatial control of the state. I choose this proxy as opposed to Soifer’s for a number of reasons.

First, during the Internal Armed Conflict, in which at least 69,000 people were killed or disappeared, the violent crime rate was obviously high throughout the affected areas. Furthermore, as discussed in “Chapter 4 - Methods and Data,” as more mass graves and other undocumented cases of violence continue to emerge and register with the Unique Victims Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas - RUV), in addition to the several thousands of individuals still missing or disappeared, the estimate of 69,000 victims mentioned above has become evidently low. As a result, any data on the violent crime rate in the affected areas are not reliable. And further, as Soifer points out, because “the presence of violent crime reflects the inability of the state to provide security” (2012, 592), this indicator does not adequately capture variation between the districts under study in this project as they all experienced violent crime at the hands of multiple actors during the conflict. Therefore, this indicator cannot be used to help assess the security dimension of state capacity.
Second, lynching rates are connected to the violent crime rate, so there is covariation between the two indicators. But beyond this reason alone, communicative violence can also be considered lynching because of its rooted “street justice” characteristics. Because communicative violence occurred in some communities and not others implies a weakness of the state in some districts but potentially not others. Reliable data for lynching rates during the Internal Armed Conflict are unavailable, which also excludes this indicator for this project.

Third, the use of private security during Peru’s Internal Armed Conflict is best analyzed through the use of the peasant patrols (rondas campesinas) and civilian self-defense forces (Comités de Autodefensa - CADs). Excellent research has been conducted in extensive detail by several other scholars more well-versed on this subject (Coronel 1996; Starn 1999; Tapia 1997; Zech 2016). However, because CADs existed throughout all four districts in the project during the period under study, this indicator does not adequately capture variation between the districts. Therefore, this indicator also cannot be used to help assess the security dimension of state capacity.

Instead, I use police stations as a proxy in order to study the security provision dimension of state capacity. The presence or absence of police stations is both a logical and easily measured indicator of the state’s presence as it relates to security. It is a logical measure because whenever a crime has been committed, regardless of its nature, the police are contacted in order to resolve the issue (i.e., to provide security for the local population). It is an easily measured indicator because unlike the rondas and the CADs, the police are an official state force. The police, as
an official state institution, existed before, during, and after the conflict. Unlike schools and healthcare facilities described above, there was a pointed and aggressive initiative to expand and reform this state institution in order to combat Sendero. Data for this indicator were found in the historical archives of the PNP's Division of Historical Police Heritage and via interviews with staff members, and supplemented with interviews of local leaders and residents of the four districts to triangulate the information presented below.

Table 6.4 - Police Stations in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa in 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Peruvian National Police and author's interview data

Table 6.4 shows the four selected districts with their corresponding presence or absence of police stations in 1985. The evaluation of whether a district scored a “No” or a “Yes” was answering the following binary question: “Was a police station present in the district in 1985?” If a police station was present in the district, regardless of the number of police officers or other associated staff and equipment

101 Like the police, the military was also an official state institution that existed before, during, and after the conflict. However, access to data on military bases (i.e., location and dates of establishment and operation) is closely guarded. While I was able to secure a list of military bases that existed throughout the conflict, it is incomplete (i.e., not every military base is listed and there are no dates associated with each base) and thus unreliable. Furthermore, because Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde did not deploy troops to Ayacucho until late 1982, over two years after the conflict began, most of the military bases were added post facto, which would only demonstrate a state presence after the fact, and not before.

102 See Soifer and Vieira (2019) for a discussion of the consolidation of disparate and competing police forces into one unified Peruvian National Police (PNP) during the 1980s.
present at the police station, that district was scored a “Yes.” If a police station was not present in the district, that district was scored a “No.” The scoring of this indicator includes all three different police organizations in Peru in 1985 (i.e., the Civil Guard [Guardia Civil - GC], the Peruvian Investigations Police [Policía Investigaciones del Perú - PIP], and the Republican Guard [Guardia Republicana - GR]).

In San Miguel, where communicative violence did not occur, there is evidence that a prison existed in the district as early as 1931 (PNP Decree 08JUN82). There is also evidence of a separate police station by at least June 8, 1982 (PNP Decree 11JUL00). This latter decree states that the police station in San Miguel was responsible both for the protection of the District of San Miguel, as well as Tambo, the next closest district en route to the departmental capital of Huamanga. As a result, I score San Miguel as a “Yes” for having a police station in 1985.

In Chungui, where communicative violence occurred, there were no records found of a police station in the district in 1985. According to one former Mayor of Chungui, the police station did not arrive in Chungui until 2011, one year after the first installation of electricity. This is in line with a decree found in the PNP archives that states the aforementioned District of Tambo did not receive a police station until August 17, 1998 (PNP Decree 30JUN00). Tambo is a district closer to the departmental capital than San Miguel, and therefore much closer to the state’s

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103 Although the Guardia Republicana (GR) existed in 1985, it did not have police stations. Rather, the GR was in charge of administering jails (author’s interview on 15AUG17 in Lima).

104 Author’s interview on 31JUL17 in Ayacucho.
core presence than Chungui. Because of this, I score Chungui as a “No” for having a police station in 1985.

In addition, I interviewed numerous members of the civilian self-defense forces (CADs) who were active in the Province of La Mar during the Internal Armed Conflict. There was no equivocation - the CADs formed in San Miguel to protect the remote areas of the district and were later backed by the central Peruvian state with modest firearms and coordination.105 Because there was already a police presence in San Miguel, it provided both a presence of the state and a modicum of a sense of security in the district. However, as seen in Figure 6.3, the CADs formed in Chungui in 1982, precisely because of a lack of state presence. CADs in Chungui felt they had no other recourse but to form and fight Sendero due to the state’s inability to protect its citizens.106

In Acobamba, where communicative violence did not occur, there was a provincial headquarters of the PIP established by at least September 19, 1984 (PIP - Orden General 1985). Several local residents also informed me that they remembered the police station before the violence broke out in 1980. As a result, I score Acobamba as a “Yes” for having a police station in 1985.

In Churcampa, where communicative violence occurred, there was no police station. In fact, a 60-day extension of Supreme Decree 065-84-IN was requested on December 7, 1984, in order to continue to put Churcampa under the control of the military. Churcampa was located in one of the Zonas de Emergencia, which were

105 Author’s interview on 30JUN17 in Ayacucho.

106 Author’s interview on 28JUL17 in Ayacucho.
emergency zones under military command because of the presence of Sendero (PIP - Orden General 1985, 30). The PNP records show a police station did not arrive in Churcampa until April 1995 (PNP Decree 29JUN00). Because of this, I score Churcampa as a “No” for having a police station in 1985.

**Figure 6.3 - Plaque and Monument to the Formation of the CADs in Chungui (1982)**

![Plaque and Monument to the Formation of the CADs in Chungui (1982)](image)

Source: Author's photo (2017)

Evidence for $H_4$ has been provided by maps from both the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and the National Geographic Institute; official
Ministry of Health reports; official Ministry of Education reports; and the Peruvian National Police archives. Furthermore, this archival evidence has been supported by interviews of elites and non-elites, victims, armed combatants, and local residents. When combined, the evidence presented here tells a convincing story: where the state was absent and had weak capacity, Sendero committed communicative violence. And where the state was present and had strong capacity, Sendero did not commit communicative violence. Therefore, I must fail to reject H₄.

**H₅:** The more rugged and remote the terrain, the more difficult it is for the state to counter an insurgency. Therefore, communicative violence is likely in locations with a high level of rugged or remote terrain.

Evidence for H₅ supports this hypothesis. Throughout several fieldwork visits to the four districts studied in this project, a thought kept recurring - it is more difficult to reach certain districts than others. Sometimes there are roads and sometimes there are not. Sometimes transportation is available and sometimes it is not. Some districts are located at higher altitudes, which makes it more difficult to breathe. Meanwhile, other districts are located at lower altitudes, which make breathing easier to do. Traversing through some districts is easier to do than others. In short, the terrain in some districts makes it hard to get to and operate within them, while the terrain in other districts makes it fairly easy to get to and operate within.

As stated above in the “Inductive Hypotheses” section, Nunn and Puga found that rugged terrain within Africa provided protection to those being raided during the slave trades (2012, 20). The rugged terrain offered “protection to those being raided. It provided caves for hiding and the ability to watch the lowlands and
incoming paths” (21). It is this ability to run and hide that can be applied to Sendero and communicative violence. The more rugged the terrain and remote from the core capital, the more difficult it would be for state forces to reach and counter the Senderistas. Being able to escape capture and punishment allows combatants to operate without fear of enforcement by the state. In addition to Nunn and Puga above, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) work on rough terrain is also helpful for this hypothesis. They argue that rough terrain with poor road access at a distance from state power centers should favor insurgency and civil war (80). Even if state forces were able to reach the contested zones, the rugged terrain would afford protection and areas of refuge where Sendero could melt into the geography.

Supporting data for this hypothesis was found in the archival records of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, and the National Geographic Institute. It was further reinforced by participatory observation over the course of extended fieldwork, as well as with interviews of military officials, armed combatants, and local civilians. Using roads and local knowledge as insights, I found evidence of rough terrain in the districts where communicative violence took place and evidence of less rough terrain in the districts where communicative violence did not take place.

*Transportation*

As discussed in H4 above, and in particular Table 6.1, where highways existed, communicative violence did not occur (i.e., in San Miguel and Acobamba). Where highways did not exist, communicative violence occurred (i.e., in Chungui and Churcampa). The importance of roads in this project cannot be overstressed.
But in addition to roads as a proxy for a daily and continued state presence, roads speak to the state’s ability to mount an effective counterinsurgency by deploying troops, constructing military bases, transporting supplies, etc. Conversely, a lack of roads would imply a greater opportunity for insurgents to prosper because of a lack of counterinsurgent forces and capabilities.

If the state is unable to reach a district with a lack of highway access, it is not able to provide security to its citizens. “Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80). The rural areas discussed in this project include the two districts that experienced communicative violence (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa). Because the state could not easily reach Chungui and Churcampa, Sendero was able to commit atrocities with impunity. According to members of the Peruvian Army’s Special Forces Unit who were active in the Department of Ayacucho during the Internal Armed Conflict, when the state was able to access these districts, the state forces were often not well-equipped, had difficulty re-supplying, and faced hardships and complications entering and exiting the combat zones:

*Can you tell me what it was like getting to your military base?*

Special Forces never had a base to stay.

*How were you able to carry out your operations?*

We would be dropped in by helicopter, fight, and then be picked up at a predetermined spot in 10 days, depending on how long the mission was supposed to last.

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107 Italics in the original work.

108 Author’s interview with a former Special Forces member on 12AUG17 in Lima.
What was it like in the highlands when you arrived?109

It was difficult to fight. We had no trucks. The helicopters would drop us off and then we would travel by foot. We carried only what was on our backs. We would march days without food, having to grab yucca and cacao along the way.

Were you able find the Senderistas?

It was difficult to find them. They would escape to the jungle and hide. It was hard to tell who was a Senderista and who was a campesino.

In contrast, the difficulties encountered by the state coercive apparatus in Chungui and Churcampa were much different in the two districts that did not experience communicative violence (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba). Because roads had already existed prior to the conflict, both paved and unpaved, there was already a state presence in those two districts. Furthermore, once the military was finally deployed to Ayacucho in late 1982, the state was able to readily transport troops and equipment to its highland power centers in order to counter the insurgency. In addition to the police stations already in place before the conflict, military bases were quickly established to combat Sendero.

Knowledge

In any conflict, knowledge is literally power. “Information is a key resource in irregular war; it is the link connecting one side’s strength with the other side’s weakness” (Kalyvas 2006, 174). As mentioned above in the “Roads” section of H4, the United States Air Force assisted the Peruvian state in the 1950s and 1960s with aerial photos, which means the maps from the 1960s and 1970s were the most accurate accounting of presence or absence of roads during the Internal Armed Conflict, particularly in light of the fact that major highways were not constructed during the conflict. When coupled with the fact that there were no military bases or

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109 Author’s interview with a former Special Forces member on 17AUG17 in Lima.
police stations in the districts where communicative violence occurred, it is clear to see that the state did not have much knowledge of the Districts of Chungui and Churcampa. This lack of knowledge also includes a lack of information about the terrain in those districts. With little knowledge of the land and the roads other than aerial photos from decades earlier, the state did not have a grasp on the various non-vehicle entrance and exit routes, making it virtually impossible to protect civilians living in those areas.

In contrast, Sendero had a firm grasp on the terrain in Chungui and Churcampa. It had been operating escuelas populares110 in the decade prior to the outbreak of violence in May 1980. One former Mayor of Chungui confirmed that he was a student at a Sendero escuela popular when he was a child.111 These escuelas populares allowed Sendero to gain intimate knowledge of the communities it had infiltrated, which helped to reinforce its control over those areas by protecting against denunciations. As Fearon and Laitin point out, “the key to inducing the local population not to denounce the active rebels is local knowledge,112 or information about who is doing what at the village level. Local knowledge allows the active rebels to threaten retribution for denunciation credibly” (2003, 80). This in turn leads to an empirical implication of local knowledge - a rural base should greatly favor insurgency because it is easier to get away with anonymous denunciation in urban areas, which enhances the state’s counterinsurgency efforts (80). This effect

110 Translated to “popular schools,” these were schools operated by Sendero in order to teach Quechua children how to read and write, while simultaneously indoctrinating them with pensamiento Gonzalo, or Sendero ideology.

111 Author’s interview on 31JUL17 in Ayacucho.

112 Italics in the original work.
of the urban-rural divide on denunciations and control is clearly seen in the four districts studied in this project. Where the state coercive apparatus had knowledge of the community and the terrain in urban San Miguel, Sendero was unable to commit acts of communicative violence. Where the state coercive apparatus had no knowledge of either the community or the terrain in Chungui, Sendero had extensive knowledge of both. As a result, while the state was unable to establish control over Chungui, Sendero was able to carry out its agenda, including committing acts of communicative violence.

**Rugged Terrain**

Fearon and Laitin measure rough terrain as the proportion of the country that is “mountainous” (2003, 81). Peru is home to the Andes Mountains, the longest and second-highest mountain range in the world. As a result of this mountainous rough terrain, Peru is a state with a condition that significantly favors insurgency. Furthermore, all four districts studied in this project are located in the south central Andean highlands. Because of this, mountains alone do not help to explain why communicative violence occurs in one district but not another. Thus, and as presented in Table 5.1, I look at differences of altitude to help explain how rugged terrain serves as one condition under which communicative violence takes place.

In Ayacucho, the disparity between the altitude of San Miguel (where communicative violence did not occur) and Chungui (where communicative violence occurred) is significant. San Miguel sits at 2,661 meters whereas Chungui’s elevation is 3,499 meters, a difference of 838 meters. This difference may not appear great, but one can feel an 838-meter difference in altitude, particularly one
not accustomed to such a high elevation. For the Peruvian state’s coercive apparatus, this is exactly what happened. The overwhelming majority of military personnel and non-local police officers sent to combat Sendero in the highlands were from Lima and other coastal cities. As such, they were unaccustomed to such high altitudes after spending their entire lives at sea level.

In Huancavelica, the disparity between the altitude of Acobamba (where communicative violence did not occur) and Churcampa (where communicative violence occurred) is not as significant as the difference of altitudes in the Ayacuchano districts, but is noticeable. Acobamba sits at 2,940 meters whereas Churcampa’s elevation is 3,262 meters, a difference of 322 meters. Again, this difference may not appear great, but one can feel a 322-meter difference in altitude, particularly one not accustomed to such a high elevation.

When combined with the lack of transportation infrastructure (roads) and knowledge of the communities and terrain (local knowledge), these differences in altitudes help to explain how Sendero was able to commit acts of communicative violence in Chungui and Churcampa. The two districts were communities they knew well from investing time and resources years prior to the outbreak of the conflict, unlike the state. As such, Sendero knew not only family and community members, but also points of access and escape that only local knowledge can help with - again, knowledge the state did not possess. Sendero was also accustomed to the higher altitudes from spending such a prolonged amount of time in those communities, whereas the Peruvian military were predominantly from other parts of the country along the coast. Taken together, these characteristics of rugged terrain help to
explain one of the conditions under which communicative violence takes place.

Therefore, I must fail to reject H₅.

Conclusion

My findings fail to reject H₄ and H₅. The data show little to no accessibility via roads to areas where communicative violence occurred. Where roads did exist, they were not paved. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where communicative violence did not occur, roads were present and sometimes paved. While some schools are listed as having existed during the Internal Armed Conflict, locals report that in the areas where communicative violence occurred, the schools were abandoned due to fear - both of insurgents and state forces. In fact, often only the escuelas populares, schools operated by Sendero, existed. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where communicative violence did not occur, schools were present and in operation. The medical facilities in Churcampa and Chungui, if they could even be considered that, were sparse, without any beds available for patients. In contrast, a ranking of “High” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities was present in San Miguel (Ayacucho) and a ranking of “Medium” was present in Acobamba (Huancavelica), which was more robust than the ranking of “Low” found in Churcampa and Chungui.

“State violence is one way used to exercise control over society and implement policies” (Soifer and vom Hau 2008, 224). These areas were considered Zonas de Emergencia, under military command, and at times controlled by Sendero. The Peruvian state did not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory, as per the Weberian definition of a state. In other words, the state
lacked infrastructural strength. Therefore, the security and administrative dimensions of the state were not fulfilled, as required for state capacity by Soifer (2012). Although military bases were added post facto (i.e., after the violence initially erupted) and police stations were often targets and victims of attacks, military bases and police stations were present in the areas where communicative violence did not occur (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba). In contrast, military bases and police stations were not present in the areas where communicative occurred (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa). Furthermore, because a census was conducted at the very beginning of the conflict (in 1981) and not again during the conflict until most of the violence subsided (in 1993) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 2017), it is difficult to imagine the reach of the state extracting from its citizens during a time of civil conflict (Thies 2005).

While the rugged terrain index (Nunn and Puga 2012) still needs to be analyzed, some of the highest altitudes in Peru can be found in the areas where communicative violence took place. Furthermore, and related to H4 above, even in 2017, the main highways to areas where communicative violence took place are still unpaved and do not reach some areas. Locals claim the highways did not reach their current point until the early 2000s, which implies they were not in existence during the 1980s. Analysis of maps and accesses shows that the collective local memory is correct and confirmed. Furthermore, due to the rugged and remote terrain where communicative violence occurred, testimonies from both state and insurgent armed actors, in addition to civilian witnesses, claim that escape and camouflage were relatively easy after an attack.
In 1990, the JNE suspended the use of indelible ink for voters in the emergency zones of the south central highlands through “Resolution No. 648-90-P/JNE” in order to “preserve the security of the citizens who live in the emergency zones” (El Peruano 1990, 83193). This edict was a direct response to Sendero’s use of communicative violence leading up to and during the 1985 national elections in order to intimidate civilians into not voting. Other forms of violence (e.g., lethal violence, demonstrations of control via electrical blackouts, etc.) occurred throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. But as mentioned above, demonstrations of control via electrical blackouts would not have been an effective act of violence Sendero could have used in those areas because if a community does not have electricity, that electricity cannot be taken away. However, it was only Sendero’s threat and use of communicative violence that altered how the Peruvian state carried out its compulsory voting in the emergency zones. The JNE’s workaround in 1990 (i.e., the suspension of the use of indelible ink for voters in the emergency zones of the south central highlands) is the “smoking gun” that shows communicative violence was not just another form of violence carried out by Sendero. Rather, it was a purposeful use of a specific kind of electoral violence in service of Sendero’s goal of delegitimizing the Peruvian state.

An interview with a Peruvian elections expert and university professor sums up this chapter well: “Geography is the reason why your communicative violence occurred in the sierra. Sendero knew their areas like ants. A lack of development is
another reason for communicative violence in Peru. Where there was no state presence, Sendero was free to commit bloody acts at will.”

Both the archival and interview data reveal that these hypotheses - a lack of state capacity and rough terrain - are both contributing factors in explaining the conditions under which communicative violence will take place. Therefore, I must fail to reject both $H_4$ and $H_5$.

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113 Author’s interview on 15AUG16 in Lima.
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION

“Those [Sendero] are the animals we dealt with. After everything we have talked about, do you still want to talk about fingers, professor? Fingers?”
Interview, Police Officer, Ayacucho, November 2015

At the end of my interview with a police officer who had just informed me of a brutal lethal Sendero attack involving another officer's wife, child, and mother (as seen in “Chapter 3 - Context”), I found myself at a crossroads. I was six months into a seven-month fieldwork trip, had already spent an aggregate of eight months in-country, but could not find any evidence of communicative violence. Was I barking up the wrong tree? Should I be focusing on more graphic and lethal types of violence? Should I abandon this project altogether? Those questions were important ones to ask, but slowly subsided as I made progress in building working relationships with locals, identifying acts of communicative violence in different communities, and seeing a more complete picture of the Internal Armed Conflict in Peru.

In this concluding chapter, I identify the conceptual and theoretical contributions of this project to the political violence literature, describe my research findings, highlight the virtues of the research methods I employed, discuss social and policy implications, and make suggestions for future research and exploration. I finish with a brief discussion of my final thoughts.

Conceptual and Theoretical Contributions

This project makes two major contributions to existing scholarship. First, in conceptual terms, it introduces communicative violence as a new category of violence to consider. In doing so, it introduces the idea of communicative violence as
a type of violence that is meant to communicate a message to various audiences. This theoretical move thus has potential implications for the political communication literature, in addition to the civil war literature. The non-lethal scarring and maiming aspect of communicative violence is an important analytical departure from other scholars who focus strictly on homicides. For example, Kalyvas (2006) introduces selective and indiscriminate violence in order to explain violence in civil war. Durán-Martínez (2018) introduces visible violence to explain why criminals expose or claim responsibility for their attacks. While both of these scholars help to explain variation in violence, their typologies aggregate and subsume all forms of violence, which does not allow for the study of a nuanced variation amongst different violent acts as this project does.

Second, and as will be discussed below, my research findings help explain the variation in use of this non-lethal violence on civilians. I develop and evaluate a novel set of hypotheses (both deductive and inductive) to account for the conditions under which armed actors use communicative violence in the Peruvian case. Empirically, I tested hypotheses involving population size, density, and mobility, cultural differences, state capacity, and rugged terrain. My findings show that cultural differences, state capacity, and rugged terrain help to explain when and where combatants used communicative violence in Peru, and suggest these new hypotheses might also be true for other cases where communicative violence was employed (e.g., Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, India, etc.)
Research Findings

The five testable hypotheses above reveal a combination of factors that help to explain when armed actors will use communicative violence. Although I rejected two deductive hypotheses (i.e., $H_1$ - population size and density, and $H_2$ - population mobility), I failed to reject one deductive hypothesis (i.e., $H_3$ - cultural differences) and both inductive hypotheses (i.e., $H_4$ - state capacity, and $H_5$ - rugged terrain).

The data show no acts of communicative violence occurred in the more populous districts, tested through two different operationalizations of city size: population size and population density. Where the population was both large and mobile (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba), communicative violence did not occur. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where the population was smaller and less mobile (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa), communicative violence occurred.

The data show acts of communicative violence occurred in the districts with a higher cultural difference between perpetrators and communities. Where the concentration of Spanish-speakers was higher (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba), communicative violence did not occur. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where the population had a higher concentration of Quechua-speakers (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa), communicative violence occurred.

The data show little to no accessibility via roads to areas where communicative violence occurred. Where roads did exist, they were not paved. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where communicative violence did not occur, roads were present and sometimes paved. While some schools are listed as having existed during the Internal Armed Conflict, locals report that in the areas where
communicative violence occurred, the schools were abandoned due to fear - both of insurgents and state forces. In fact, often only the *escuelas populares*, schools operated by Sendero, existed. In contrast, in the neighboring districts where communicative violence did not occur, schools were present and in operation. The medical facilities in Churcampa and Chungui, if they could even be considered that, were sparse, without any beds available for patients. In contrast, a ranking of “High” on the sliding scale of healthcare facilities was present in San Miguel (Ayacucho) and a ranking of “Medium” was present in Acobamba (Huancavelica), which was more robust than the ranking of “Low” found in Churcampa and Chungui.

Although military bases were added post facto (i.e., after the violence initially erupted) and police stations were often targets and victims of attacks, military bases and police stations were present in the areas where communicative violence did not occur (i.e., San Miguel and Acobamba). In contrast, military bases and police stations were not present in the areas where communicative occurred (i.e., Chungui and Churcampa). Furthermore, because a census was conducted at the very beginning of the conflict (in 1981) and not again during the conflict until most of the violence subsided (in 1993) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 2017), it is difficult to imagine the reach of the state extracting from its citizens during a time of civil conflict (Thies 2005).

While the rugged terrain index (Nunn and Puga 2012) still needs to be analyzed, some of the highest altitudes in Peru can be found in the areas where communicative violence took place. Furthermore, and related to H₄ above, even in 2017, the main highways to areas where communicative violence took place are still
unpaved and do not reach some areas. Locals claim the highways did not reach their current point until the early 2000s, which implies they were not in existence during the 1980s. Analysis of maps and accesses shows that the collective local memory is correct and confirmed. Furthermore, due to the rugged and remote terrain where communicative violence occurred, testimonies from both state and insurgent armed actors, in addition to civilian witnesses, claim that escape and camouflage were relatively easy after an attack. Both the archival and interview data reveal that these hypotheses - a lack of state capacity and rough terrain - are both contributing factors in explaining the conditions under which communicative violence will take place.

Virtues of Research Methods Employed

In empirical terms, through in-depth archival work and extensive interviews over the course of 15 months in the field, I have identified cases that were heretofore unidentified and underreported by media and truth and reconciliation commissions, thus exposing deficiencies in wartime reporting and documentation, and giving voice to the voiceless. My findings are wholly dependent upon the research methods I employed in the field. By spending extended time in highland communities, I was able to forge working relationships that allowed me collect original data.

While I gained traction from the CVR by identifying overall patterns and areas in the country most affected by violence as seen in Figure 3.2 (i.e., in the central Andean highlands), I chose not to rely on the CVR dataset as the sole source of data for my research. As demonstrated above, while the Comisión de la Verdad y
Reconciliación (CVR) is an important first step for Peru, it is not complete. First, the CVR was not based solely on media reports; it was based on a process of post-conflict data collection by a government-sponsored commission. This included interviews and public hearings with victims and those affected by the conflict. However, similar to media access in the 1980s and 1990s, the CVR did not reach all parts of the country affected by the violence - particularly those areas most remote and hardest hit. And even when the CVR was able to have a presence in those areas, it was ephemeral, sometimes only lasting one or two days.

Second, and not unrelated to the first, Lewis (2017) notes that even the 2006 codebook for the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, a well-respected collaborative project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), acknowledges a bias in using media accounts against conflicts in earlier decades and less-developed parts of the world (1445). This difficulty is of significant note when political, urban, and other biases make it particularly difficult to capture the true devastation caused in civil wars, further underreporting casualties (Kalyvas 2006, 38-51). And third, the Armed Internal Conflict in Peru was particularly dangerous for journalists. It is thus no surprise that underreporting of violence would take place in emergency zones where journalists feared to enter. Therefore, as Lustick (1996) argues, one must be cautious in accepting the dominant historiographical trend as fact rather than as a narrative or even protagonist in research analysis.
Social and Policy Implications

The Internal Armed Conflict lasted from 1980-2000. Due to the fact that nearly 40 years have elapsed since the outset of the conflict, there are numerous actors who are no longer available to provide insights based on their lived experiences. However, because I was fortunate enough to access and interview former armed combatants, their victims, and those affected by the violence, I am able to provide yet another piece of scholarship on the Sendero conflict. This last point is of particular importance when the politics of memory is taken into account.

Throughout my time in the field, I encountered numerous young people who had never heard of the name Abimael Guzmán or even Sendero Luminoso. This is largely due to a refusal by those who lived through the conflict to discuss the violent events - a coping mechanism to move beyond the 1980s and 1990s and into a more peaceful Peruvian society. Rather than imbue my own perspective and desire to rehash the past, my work can serve as a new recording of the conflict that will be ready for those who wish to learn more about Sendero's strategies and tactics if and when the time comes. Even after the CVR, media reports, and other studies before me, new data are being discovered every day. Based on my own findings, this trend is likely to continue for future scholars of Peru.

The policy implications of my findings are straightforward, yet come with a word of caution. It is easy to make a case for more state intervention and infrastructural development in order to combat the potential for communicative violence to occur in the future - particularly in remote, indigenous, and rugged communities. However, a respect for culture and local customs must also be taken
into account. Consider the intrusions of states and development in pristine highland and jungle communities throughout South America. Peoples who depend on the earth’s natural resources for survival are often left to deal with the repercussions of pollution associated with strip mining, deforestation, and other development efforts detrimental to the environment.

*Suggestions for Future Research*

During a number of interviews with residents who lived in the areas most affected by the violence in Perú, an interesting issue emerged. Without any prompting, interviewees offered up information about the leadership of the bloodiest cadres. According to local residents, the leaders of the most gruesome attacks were women. The human subjects interviewed included victims and family members of those affected by the violence, government officials, police, former terrorists, teachers, merchants, academics, and other strata of local society. As such, the variation of interviewees and the commonality of responses suggest further research is needed. However, measurement of this variable is nearly impossible.

First, rosters of combatants and their locations were not maintained by terrorist organizations. Second, identifying “the bloodiest” cadres is no easy task. The public record of documented violence is thin to nonexistent, particularly in an area where journalists were afraid to venture and report on news events due to the abovementioned massacre of eight journalists and their guide in Uchuraccay, as well as other targeted journalists. Nevertheless, it is still an interesting topic worth investigating. A recent special issue of *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (Volume 35, Number 3, May 2018) takes up the issue of “Gendered Participation,
Well-being, and Representations in Political Violence.” By analyzing the impacts of war and conflict on women's statuses and lives, as well as the effect women have on war, conflict, and post-conflict environments (Kadera and Shair-Rosenfield 2018, 211), this issue might yet be tackled.

Table 7.1 - Recorded Acts of Violence in 1985 in the Four Districts of Chungui, San Miguel, Acobamba, and Churcampa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>UBIGEO</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Incidents (1985)</th>
<th># CV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chungui</td>
<td>50505</td>
<td>8,297</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>50501</td>
<td>23,226</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acobamba</td>
<td>90201</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churcampa</td>
<td>90501</td>
<td>5,623</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (2003)

As seen in Table 7.1, I looked to the CVR dataset for a snapshot of violence in 1985. Table 7.1 shows all four districts under study in this project, along with each district's geocode for specific geographic coordinate, total population, total number of violent incidents recorded by the CVR in 1985, and total number of incidents of communicative violence in each district in 1985. On one hand, the data presented is intuitive as the largest amount of violent incidents in 1985 also corresponds with the district that had the largest amount of incidents of communicative violence (i.e., Chungui). On the other hand, this data is suspect because in addition to no acts of violence recorded in 1985 for Acobamba, the CVR dataset also showed no acts of violence recorded in Acobamba throughout the entire conflict (1980-2000). This is highly irregular as both newspaper accounts and interviews reveal several instances of violence in Acobamba. Therefore, further investigation of the internal armed

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114 This column includes an aggregate amount of all acts of violence in the four districts studied in this project, regardless of perpetrator (e.g., Sendero, police, military, etc.)
conflict in order to document missing observations in the CVR dataset is recommended.

Furthermore, as has been discussed earlier in this dissertation, there are a number of other states where communicative violence has taken place (i.e., Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, India, etc.) A deeper dive into each of those cases, as well as an expansion of this study in Peru, might allow for not only a richer analysis, but also greater external validity.

**Final Thoughts**

During my first fieldwork trip to Peru in 2013, I spent the majority of my time in various archives in the capital city of Lima. However, I made a point of visiting *la cuna de la violencia* (the cradle of the violence - Ayacucho) for a one-week visit. Following the 10-hour overnight bus ride from Lima, I went straight to the Museum of Memory (*El Museo de la Memoria*). Operated by an NGO, the National Association of Relatives of the Kidnapped, Detained, and Disappeared of Peru (*Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecido del Perú* - ANFASEP), the Museum of Memory sits outside of the city center in Huamanga. It is housed in a humble cement building with beautiful murals depicting scenes from the Internal Armed Conflict on the outside.

My first experience in Ayacucho was as a tourist, viewing the various museum holdings showing how the conflict unfolded. I felt slightly odd being the only patron in the museum, but during my visit, I was fortunate enough to meet a woman named Angélica Mendoza de Ascarza, who I had assumed was managing the museum. She provided me with a guided tour of the facility and explained how the
conflict began, who the major players were, and the various types of violence that occurred over the decades. She also explained the founding of ANFASEP, their mission, and the purpose of the museum: “Para que no se repita, joven (So that it does not happen again, young man).” Although I did not know it at the time, Señora Mendoza was better-known in Peru as “Mamá Angélica,” one of the original founders of ANFASEP, still searching for her son who had been abducted and disappeared by the Peruvian military. Mamá Angélica’s words have stuck with me over the past five years and guided my research along the way. In addition to the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions this project makes in political science, my hope is that this work will also make a normative contribution in the prevention of similar human rights abuses in the future.
Bibliography


United States Census Bureau. 2017b. “Phoenix (City), Arizona.”


**APPENDIX A: TORTURE CATEGORIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campo</th>
<th>Nivel de medición</th>
<th>Tipo</th>
<th>Dominio</th>
<th>Descripción</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T01</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Golpes como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T02</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Suspensión/Colgaduras como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T03</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Descargas eléctricas como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T04</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Asfixia/Inmersión como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T05</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Quemaduras como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T06</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Cortes/heridas intencionales como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T07</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Drogas como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T08</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Simulacro de ejecución como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T09</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Ingestiones forzadas como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T10</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Tortura psicológica como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T11</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Inmovilizaciones como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T12</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Privación temporal de alguno de los sentidos como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T13</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Desnudo forzado como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T14</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Privación del sueño como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T15</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Privación de alimentos como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T16</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Privación de higiene como forma de tortura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T90</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>0=No 1=Sí</td>
<td>Otras formas de tortura</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B:
INTERVIEWS

Total Interviews
142

Unique Interview Subjects
126

Category
Academic = 13
Affected = 13
Bureaucrat = 7
CAD = 14
Civilian = 15
Journalist = 15
Military = 4
NGO = 5
Police = 7
Politician = 19
Senderista = 8
Teacher = 13
Victim = 9

Location
Ayacucho = 85
Huancavelica = 22
Lima = 35

Sex
Male = 114
Female = 28

Year
2013 = 9
2015 = 37
2016 = 43
2017 = 53
APPENDIX C: CONSENT FORM

Informed Consent

Purpose
I am a doctoral student at Temple University, conducting research for my dissertation. I am trying to understand the history of Peru during the 1980s and 1990s. I am interested in understanding everything that happened in your district/neighborhood and would like to learn about it from you. I am speaking to many people in this community from many different groups to collect as many details as possible.

Procedures
Participation in this study will involve an interview, which I expect will last between 30 minutes and two hours, depending on your availability.

Risks and Benefits
Participants in this study may experience lots of emotions, as you will be describing the history of your community. This study will not benefit you personally, but I hope that it will help the world to have a greater understanding of the Peruvian experience.

Confidentiality
All of your responses will be held in confidence. I will never tell anyone that you spoke with me or identify you by name in any of my writing. I will not tell anyone else in your community what you told me. No government or other organization will ever be allowed to see my notes. My notes will be safe. I will keep them with me or locked up at all times. They will be protected by a password, a secret word that only I know. No one without the password can see the notes.

Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to participate, to end participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to answer any individual question. Do you have any questions?

Questions
If later you have any questions about this study, you may contact me or someone else who can help you by calling any of the numbers on this card: [give referral card.]

Agreement to Participate
Is there anything you did not understand? Do you have any other questions? Do you agree to participate in this interview?
Subject Referral
Thank you for participating in my study. If you have any questions after the study, please contact me at: 957.390.705. Someone will be available to speak to you in Spanish.
APPENDIX D:
SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Sample Interview Protocol - Armed Actors

I would like to learn from you about the history of your community, especially around the time of [add whatever time being studied in particular community].

Have you always lived in this community?
  • If not: Where did you live before? When did you move here? Why did you move?

What was life like in your community before [time period]?

How were relations between neighbors? What about different [ethnic] groups?
  • Did you have any friends from the other [ethnic] group?

What changed during [time period]?
  • How were relations between neighbors?
  • Did people from your community join or support an armed group or the government?
  • How did daily life change?

How did you find out about what was going on during [time period] (e.g., newspaper, radio, word of mouth, etc.)?

How was communication made between cells/cadres?

What was the make-up of your particular group?
  • Ages?
  • Sex?
  • Quantity?
  • Ethnicity?

Do you know of your group entering particular sites more than once?
  • Why?
  • How long did the stays usually last?
  • Was there much variation in duration of stay?
  • What explains this variation?

How would your group communicate with the communities?
  • Propaganda?
  • Physical acts?
  • Did communication vary by community?
    • If so, how?
Did your group ever control the communities they visited?
  • What did they do to maintain/show control?
  • Did this vary by community?
    o If so, how?
    o Why?

Can you explain the training received by your group?
  • How were they organized?
  • Was it centralized?
  • How long did it take?
  • Did you ever take refresher courses/trainings?

Can you talk about command within your group?
  • How were leaders selected?
  • How could you identify this person?
  • What was this person’s personality?
  • Did you have to obey your leader(s)?
    o Why? What happened if someone did not obey?
  • Were decisions made by the leader or by committee?

How did the group treat civilians when they first arrived?
  • Can you describe what you know of the first day that they arrived?
    o And the next day?
  • Did their behavior change over the course of the week?
    o Over the course of the month?
    o Over the course of [time period]?
    o (As much detailed time info, in as short time periods, as possible)

I’ve been told not all acts toward civilians were the same.
  • Why do you think your group acted as they did toward civilians?
  • Was there ever a discussion of why they committed particular acts over others (e.g., lethal v non-lethal)?
    o If so, what were some of those reasons (e.g., different acts deserved different responses, etc.)?
    o Was location/terrain ever a consideration?
  • Did different people within the armed group act differently? Why?
  • Were different [ethnic] groups of civilians treated differently? How?
  • Were different [sex] groups of civilians treated differently? How?
  • How did civilians interact with your group?
    o Did they help your group?
    o Run from your group?
  • When did your group leave a particular area (e.g., other group took over, unknown, etc.?)
Do you think the experiences of your community were similar to or different from other nearby communities? Why or why not?

Is there anything else you think that I should know about the history of your community?

Do you have any questions for me?

Is there anyone else with whom you think I should speak?

If I have more questions, may I come back to speak to you again?

**Sample Interview Protocol - Civilians**

I would like to learn from you about the history of your community, especially around the time of [add whatever time being studied in particular community].

Have you always lived in this community?
  • If not: Where did you live before? When did you move here? Why did you move?

What was life like in your community before [time period]?

How were relations between neighbors? What about different [ethnic] groups?
  • Did you have any friends from the other [ethnic] group?

What changed during [time period]?
  • How were relations between neighbors?
  • Did people from your community join or support an armed group or the government?
  • How did daily life change?

How did you find out about what was going on during [time period] (e.g., newspaper, radio, word of mouth, etc.)?

Did an armed group (also ask these questions with respect to government armed forces) enter your community?
  • If yes, did the armed group enter more than once? (If yes, then ask these questions for each time...)
  • What armed group?
  • How long did they stay?
    o Did they stay in the community or just come through periodically?
    o Were they in control of the community?
      ▪ What did they do to maintain/show control?
    o Where did they come from?
- Were they from a specific area by birth?
- Where did they come from directly (next town over, etc.)?
  - How many armed actors were there?
  - What were the armed actors like?
    - Ages?
    - Sex?
    - Did they seem educated or farmers or professionals?
    - Did they seem to be trained?
      - What made you think that they were/weren’t trained?
    - Did they seem to be organized?
      - What made you think that they were/weren’t organized?
  - Could you identify a leader(s)?
    - How could you identify this person?
    - What was this person’s personality?
      - Did the armed actors obey their leader?
        - Why? What happened if someone did not obey?
      - Were decisions made by the leader or by committee?
  - How did the group treat civilians when they first arrived?
    - Can you describe what you know of the first day that they arrived?
      - And the next day?
    - Did their behavior change over the course of the week?
      - Over the course of the month?
      - Over the course of [time period]?
      - (As much detailed time info, in as short time periods, as possible)
  - Why do you think they acted as they did toward civilians?
    - Did they ever say why they committed particular acts (e.g., lethal vs non-lethal)?
    - Did different people within the armed group act differently?
      - Why?
    - What did other people in your community say about why the armed actors were acting that way?
  - Were different [ethnic] groups of civilians treated differently? How?
  - Were different [sex] groups of civilians treated differently? How?
  - How did civilians interact with the armed group?
    - Did they help them?
    - Run from them?
    - Did people from your community flee? Did a specific [ethnic] group flee or remain?
    - Did all civilians flee?
  - When did the armed group leave?
- Why did the armed group leave (e.g., other group took over, unknown, etc.)?

Do you think the experiences of your community were similar to or different from other nearby communities? Why?

Is there anything else you think that I should know about the history of your community?

Do you have any questions for me?

Is there anyone else with whom you think I should speak?

If I have more questions, may I come back to speak to you again?
### APPENDIX E:
CATEGORIES OF HEALTH FACILITIES

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**Legend**
- H = Hospital
- CS = Centro de Salud
- PS = Puesto Sanitario