A CASE FOR THE CAKRAS: FINDING THEIR PLACE IN CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE

A Dissertation
Submitted to
the Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by
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Diploma Date, July 2015

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ABSTRACT

The intention of this project is to make a case for the cakras by finding their place in contemporary discourse. The assumption that allows for this project is that the structure and context of the cakras as psycho-physical phenomenon are not sufficiently established in scholarship. The method employed is to illuminate the cakras, which are primarily addressed as historical/textual entities, as phenomenological and psychological entities. This will be done through the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the additions to his depiction of the lived body as per Yuasa Yasuo, who introduces the “unconscious quasi-body” (i.e., the subtle body) as a level of the body of which one may become aware. The cakras will also be presented as that which function similarly to psychological entities, introducing the depth psychology and commentary of C.G. Jung.¹ By doing so, the human component of the cakras will be drawn out of historical/textual matters and into the lived experience of the human body where they may become the subject of phenomenological and psychological analysis. Through arguing for the addition of these standpoints, future dialog with other disciplines may be facilitated.

¹ All references to “psychology” in this project will be to the depth psychology of Jung unless otherwise noted. This is due to the perceived usefulness of Jung’s “psychical phenomenology” which directly addresses the field of psychic phenomenon, as opposed to other such fields of psychology that overlook such an assumptions, such as behaviorism.
For Adria and her boundless love and support.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to the assistance of comity members Marcus Bingenheimer, Lucy Bregman and NAGATOMO Shigenori in this project, especially that of Dr. Nagatomo as I suspect I will not understand the impact and implications of his mentorship for years to come.

I must also at this time acknowledge the timeframe in which I wrote this project. This was completed in seven months. I write this predominantly to express that the work contained herein is entirely mine as with such a disastrously limited timeframe I was not able to work as closely with my comity as I had imagined beforehand. Large-scale revisions were simply out of the question due to time constraints. As such, many of the thoughts and argumentation contained herein are inchoate—the refinement of which shall comprise my nascent academic career.

I would like to thank Kin, Holly, Vishma, and Ermine for our regular dissertation accountability meetings which helped me establish a pace that would make the completion of this project possible. I would also like to thank Beth for her indefatigable support and friendship. My thanks also go to Trish and Adam for being great colleagues and friends. I would also like to thank Ermine again for tolerating my incessant ridicule of William James.

Before, reading other acknowledgments I never understood why spouses were thanked as they seemed not to contribute much to the academic and intellectual content of the
project. I now recognize how ridiculous that sentiment is with embarrassing clarity.

Thank you, Adria.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Objectives

This project was set in motion upon my first encounter with the *cakras*. As a fledgling graduate student, I found the topic as fascinating as I did frustrating. The theory of the *cakras* were fascinating to me as the theme of psychical localization in the context of self-cultivation struck me as both original and deeply insightful, offering a novel approach to elucidating the psycho-physical constitution of the individual. Yet at the same time I found the topic frustrating as it rested upon the assumption of the mysterious subtle body and otherwise flew in the face of modern biological assumptions about the body.

So, as I asked myself the question “what on earth is a *cakra*?” I searched for an answer that would satisfy my frustrations. However, no such answer was forthcoming as apparently all of the literature available either failed to offer a satisfactory answer, relied on intra-textual explanations, or else relied upon the jargon of the subtle body, presuming the reader simply knew beforehand what was being discussed. Unsatisfied with this treatment, I chose to pursue this question and search for an answer in the form of this dissertation. That is, I would like to make a case for the *cakras* and more firmly establish their place in contemporary discourse.
By “finding their place in contemporary discourse” I mean that I would also like to dispel the esoteric and perhaps even “wishy-washy” reputation that surrounds the *cakras*. To present a generalized sketch of current writing covering the *cakras*, it appears that those who have written on this topic have either done so from an academic, historical/textual perspective, or from the perspective of a contemporary *cakra* practitioner; the latter seemingly exclusively relying in part on the interpretation of C.G. Jung. The problem that arises is that the former takes too little time (often no time at all) to explain *cakras* outside of their rigidly defined historical context, and the latter more often than not merely assert the *cakras* as obvious facts, making too little effort to clarify and contextualize what they are.

The outcome of this project is that I have identified five general methodological standpoints from which the *cakras* may be inspected, one of which will be prioritized in this project. They are 1) the historical/textual standpoint, 2) the psychological standpoint, especially depth psychology, 3) the subtle body standpoint, 4) the contemporary *cakra* practitioner standpoint, and 5) the standpoint of physiological *cakras*.

The historical/textual standpoint will only be introduced cursorily as there is a fair amount of research established in this field along with reputable translations of the seminal texts in which the *cakras* may be found. However, the problem with this field in general is that *cakras* are treated as textual artifacts and not as living phenomenon. The definition of terms in such treatments are inter-textual in the sense that they are defined
intra-contextually, which is problematic. ¹ The cakras are a form of spiritual technology and as such their most proper domain is the human mind-body. When and where they come from, and the context of the tradition from which they emerge is most certainly important, but when asking “what is a cakra?”, such answers fail to address the lived human side of cakras, overlooking the potential of a philosophy of the cakras to function as a lens with which to view the contemporary human being.

Point 2) returns to this human side of cakras as they are “brought to life,” so to speak, through interjecting the psychical structure of depth psychology. This too is a field that has enjoyed a great deal of attention by scholars of various caliber. The primary voice in this dialog is that of C.G. Jung as his 1932 commentary on the cakras in many respects has become the de facto interpretation of the cakras in the writing of contemporary cakra practitioners. What Jung accomplished was to provide a psychological contextualization to the historical/textual cakras by placing them in the living context of the human psyche.²

To further explain, the following diagram may be of help.

¹ For example, A = B + C, B = A − C, & C = A − B certainly offers “definitions” of these terms, but their definitions do not step outside of their domain.

² Jung’s “psychologism,” its implications and extent will be discussed in Chapter Eight.
The historical/textual *cakras* (H/T C) exist in an abstract, academic space defined by strict analytic methodologies such as historiography, philology, anthropology, etc. Such methodologies take as their referent something uniquely situated in history (H). Such historical situation by default places the *cakras* into the context of the past, and away from lived human experience. What I propose here is that this field takes on an entirely different life when it is juxtaposed with the field of depth psychology (D.P.). Although Jung’s depth psychology is certainly historically/textually situated, its referent possesses radically different characteristics that are accessible to novel methodologies. The elements of Jung to be utilized in this juxtaposition are philosophically ahistorical (AH).

This deserves further clarification. Jung’s depth psychology is indubitably ensconced in the cultural milieu of early twentieth-century Europe. The intention of this project is in part to extract the features of his psychology that do not vary over time. For example, we may consider the similarities between a tenth-century Tantric *sādhaka* (spiritual seeker) and a twenty-first-century contemporary *cakra* practitioner. It would be difficult to argue...
otherwise that there are elements of both of these people’s psyche of which they are not aware. That is, the experience of both of these people may be discussed in terms of “the unconscious.” In addition, the same stands for the presence of images that bubble up from the unconscious, a general impulse to advance the state of one’s psyche, and the presence of neuroses. That these are intrinsic elements of the human psyche as established by the standpoint of Jung’s depth psychology is an assumption made by this project.

To further clarify, Jung treated with such a philosophical emphasis may be understood akin to Plato’s forms and ideas. That is, I would like to establish such terms as “the unconscious” as a bare idea that has not been enmeshed in circumstantial cultural particulars; i.e., taken a form. But unlike Plato, I suggest such assertions are provisional in nature, useful only insofar as they are helpful. These philosophical elements of Jung thus refined may more readily be brought into conversation with the historical/textual cakras.

The third standpoint is that of the subtle body, which as Yuasa explains is psychologically unconscious and physically invisible (Chapter Five). Following Yuasa, the subtle body may be approached through phenomenology beginning with the everyday ordinary standpoint, primarily because the subtle body is a lived experience and phenomenology presumes a standpoint wherein the immediate experience of one’s own lived body is taken as a starting point.
I will introduce another image to clarify what the addition of this standpoint adds to this project. The “lived body” of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can also be treated as a living phenomenon that does not vary historically. Again, it would be difficult to argue that the immediate experience of one’s lived body as a bare philosophical category changes over time, although the historical and social context surely does. In the very same sense as discussed with respect to the ahistoricity of some of the features of Jung’s depth psychology, Merleau-Ponty surely has an historical/textual context, but the referent of his phenomenology is immediately present by definition. As such, it may be positioned alongside the depth psychology of Jung, as Jung’s work can be understood as a form of “psychical phenomenology.” The “lived body” (L.B.) will be put forth as a metonymy of phenomenology as it is the ground of all human experience.

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3 Although Jung and Merleau-Ponty may both be tentatively considered as expressions of phenomenology, Jung expressing “psychical phenomenology,” the fundamentals of their standpoints differ. As mentioned, Jung’s psychology is quite Platonic in nature while Merleau-Ponty makes no such assumptions. Their difference may also be drawn on either sides of Cartesian and Baconian scientific reasoning. Reconciling this divergence must be accomplished at some other time. This may perhaps best be done by prioritizing the methodology of Yuasa whose interest in starting with an everyday, ordinary standpoint and verification through praxis generates a very stable and inclusive starting point.
Figure 2.

What this image represents is that depth psychology and the lived body situated perpendicular to each other represents two standpoints—one of the mind, one of the body—that share a correlative relationship and a great deal of overlap. Their compatibility rests in their shared epistemology. That is, they both take the matter of experience as a given; psychology beginning with the symbols and dynamics of the psyche, and phenomenology with the lived experiences of the body. At the heart of the sum total of these two perspectives (D.P. + S.B.) represents the mysterious subtle body which cannot be grasped by either standpoint, yet supports each.

These three standpoints will primarily comprise this project, with more attention paid to the phenomenological and psychological standpoints to accentuate the ahistorical aspects of the cakras. In doing so, this project investigates the shared space between three
standpoints addressing the *cakras* as a means of building a bridge between the historical and contemporary in order to facilitate contemporary discourse on the topic.

The fourth and fifth standpoint will not be addressed in this project although their mention is worth consideration. The standpoint of the contemporary *cakra* practitioner is too far outside of the purview of this project as it is primarily concerned with self-cultivation and healing trauma hidden away in the mind-body. These writers who base their understanding of the *cakras* based upon personal experience offer a radically different insight into the *carkas* when compared to the historical/textual writers, but their methodology often merely asserts the reality of the subtle body and the *cakras*, its proof circularly stemming from the effectiveness of their therapy. As per the reference to Plato above, such practitioners appear to be exclusively focused on the forms of *cakras* as they exist in a modern-day cultural context. Due to its apparent popularity, this method clearly has value, but it is far from rational which, in my opinion, tends to repel more than it attracts. The contextualization of the *cakras* offered by this project may help explain the work of contemporary *cakra* practitioners, but that is a task saved for a later day.

Last is the physiological standpoint, which is all the more so outside the purview of this project. The problem with a physiological discussion of the *cakras* is two-fold. First, the inclusion of the object body, medical-material body, or biological body adds a cumbersome third term that complicates the original assumptions of this project. That is,
there is too great of a thematic leap to move between the historical/textual cakras and the physical body as their methodological standpoints are simply unlike in kind.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 3.

The above figure represents the collection of standpoints that would lead to this discussion, which brings the object body—which is an historical phenomenon in the same sense that historical/textual cakras are an historical phenomenon, tantamount to a cadaver—into conversation with the ahistorical mind-body as defined above.

The second problem with a discussion of the physiological standpoint is that very few assertions can be made about the relationship between the mind and the gross body without controversy as this is a highly contested problem.

The objective of this project is to find some middle ground between these first three standpoints that is not encased in a purely historical context in order to facilitate future discourse. By juxtaposing the historical/textual cakras with a depiction of how cakras...
are presumed to engage in the mind-body as understood by phenomenology and depth psychology, many of the constituent elements of the cakras as well as the requisite epistemological standpoint may be accounted for. In doing so, this will establish avenues of dialog with the cakras so that they may more readily find themselves engaged in contemporary dialog.

The guiding question of this project may then be expressed as, “what thematic corollaries may be found in contemporary discourse with which to contextually flesh out the theory of the cakras so that they may more readily be drawn into dialog?” By identifying such familiar precursors of the cakras (e.g., modern theories of the subtle body and depth psychology) in contemporary discourse, and this project argues that there can, more open discussion on the topic may ensue.4

**Methodology**

The primary methodology of this project is phenomenological and psychological in nature as it presumes a standpoint that prioritizes the immediate lived experience of one’s own mind-body. This offers a more accessible domain of information that is neither strictly limited to historical texts nor bound to the assumptions of contemporary cakra practitioners. It also has the advantage of an established field of discourse such as the

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4 “One cannot engage in a conversation with a topic with which one is not familiar,” is the general assumption of this project. As is stressed in the project, one must be careful to avoid reductionism. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, there is a tremendous difference between identifying familiar concepts at work in the unfamiliar, versus reducing the unfamiliar to naught but the familiar.
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the depth psychology of Jung, as well as the philosophy of Yuasa who drew from both.

A psychological approach will also draw forward the psychical aspects of the cakras. As will be argued in this project, the cakras in part find their origin in Tantric maṇḍala practice, which undergoes a process of interiorization starting with a maṇḍala outside of the human body, resulting in an array of cakras inside the human being. Jung then finds the cakras even further embedded in the human psyche as symbols that reference endogenous psychic mechanisms of self-transformation.

The philosophy of Kasulis will also be employed as it offers a means of formalizing and contextualizing divergent methodology, specifically his categories of intimacy and integrity.

These methods were selected in order to identify places in contemporary dialog where complimentary elements and methodologies used to discuss the nuances of the human mind-body and human transformation can be found. In doing so, a comparative study with the cakras may be undertaken, not just with respect to similarity, but by identifying modern understandings of the human psyche, such elements can be identified at work in the cakras. For example, as discussed in Chapter Five, Yuasa explains how one may become sensitive to the stirring of the subtle body. Such a commentary offers a link

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5 The “modern” approaches to the psyche will be limited to Jung for the sake of focus, although similar more up-to-date approaches may also potentially be used for such a comparison. Their end result would presumably be similar.
between ancient philosophies, and modern phenomenology. Jung’s commentary offers a similar such link with psychology.

Jung and Merleau-Ponty were also selected as their focus complements each other, while their methodology does indeed clash. They both naturally begin their projects with objects of immediate lived experience; symbols, and sensory information and action, respectively. This creates a complementary pair within a similar methodological orientation. This pair can be thought of as psychical/bodily. It may also be expressed in terms of Yuasa with respect to his four-circuit motor schema, that Merleau-Ponty represents the upper circuits, while the depth psychology of Jung operates at the level of the lower circuits. Their dissimilarity is most notable in Jung’s essentialization and ontologization of psychical forms, which is platonic in nature. Merleau-Ponty makes no such assertion. This disparity is overlooked for the time being.

The philosophy of Kasulis is included in this project as “a means of formalizing and contextualizing divergent methodology;” i.e., he assists in articulating which methodological presuppositions will assist in this project and, more importantly, which obstruct it. This will be primarily discussed in the second and third chapters, identifying such standpoints as material reductionism, theōria, and what he calls “integrity” as that which must be avoided.

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6 See Chapter Five, page 175.
Jung and Yuasa represent methodologies that establish a basis for investigating the subtle body and the symbolism that corresponds with it. The immediate experience of one’s own psyche and body represent Kasulis’s position of *in medias res* wherein such immediate experience is given priority over external modes of observation. To remain in the domain of the external would be to offer a competing methodology, which is not fruitful. By focusing on experience itself, such competition can be avoided offering a complementary perspective rather than an antagonistic one. As internal phenomenon, *cakras* and the subtle body are not strictly constrained by physiological rules. When *cakras* are discussed, they must be spoken about in terms of both psychical symbols and expressions of the subtle body.

Merleau-Ponty and Yuasa assist in this conversation with respect to the bodily based epistemology of the subtle body as is the focus of Chapter Five. Jung assists by affirming the psyche’s inclination towards establishing wholeness and equilibrium, as well as demonstrating that *mandalas* are more common than one may expect. Jung presents the case that *mandalas* are not as foreign as expected, and as such, neither are *cakras*. Jung explains that *mandalas* reveal information about the condition of the psyche, so it is not a far step at all to understand *cakras* as psychically localized *mandalas* that reveal information about the psychical state correlated with a specific region of a person’s body.

The standpoints of these methodologies are complimentary in nature as they share the purview of the immediate experience of being in order to flesh out the potential referents of the historical/textual *cakras*. This is more than as case of mere psychologism, or
psychological reductionism. As discussed in Chapter Eight, to paraphrase Clarke, this project presumes that “cakras can be treated as psychologically and phenomenological defined things” while avoiding the position that “cakras are naught but psychologically and phenomenological defined things.” (Clarke, 151) That is, these methodologies represent advantageous philosophical standpoints for comparative dialog with the cakras, especially with respect to their emphasis on the analysis of immediate experience.

Content

In order to present this phenomenological articulation of the cakras, this project will first present the prevailing standpoint with which a psychology/phenomenology of the cakras must compete. Chapter Two begins this project with establishing the primary standpoint which must be overcome in order to grasp the cakras, which is the standpoint of theōria; which I present as the defining methodological standpoint of Greek culture and the Scientific Revolution. As such, this chapter addresses this standpoint as found in both of these eras, first inspecting the rise and etymology of theōria, as well as a brief commentary by Watsuji on Greek influences on theōria. Second, it will address the attitudes surrounding the Scientific Revolution and The Enlightenment focusing on how epistēmē changed, which signified a break from theōria to something much stricter. Then, this chapter will inspect the aftermath of this maneuver, which are Counter-Enlightenment movements. Romanticism, the body, nature, and religion will be intruded as examples that caught the attention of various writers who identified that something was being excluded in discussions about being human. In doing so, this chapter proposes to draw attention to the shadow generated by theōria. The assertion of this project is that
the *cakras* and the methodology required to discuss them on their own ground exists in this shadow.

The first section simply titled “*Theōria*” addresses just that, beginning with its Greek roots. The etymology of the term is discussed first, addressing both the more straightforward *thea* + *horaō* (look/appearance + see/observe), and then the possibility of *theos*, which suggests a more religious or spiritual connotation, which is not out of line with Aristotle’s understanding of the term. Next, the philosophical context of the term in early Greece is introduced. Starting with Heraclides who first symbolically referred to those in attendance and important events like the Olympic Games as the “*theōroin,*” the observers, who he felt were the most important people in attendance as they represented those who simply observe. This was a metaphor for Heraclides’s own value for observation and understanding, which was shared by Plato who wrote on the topic of *theōria* in his *Republic*. Unlike these two, Aristotle found *theōria* to be an end in itself, representing the value he too placed on passive observation. This section concludes with Watsuji’s speculation as to why perhaps this attitude arose in the Mediterranean, as he emphasizes the orderliness of the environment, slavery and democracy, which allowed for freedom from the burden of labor and leisure, which allowed the Greeks to look upon the workings of their worlds with curiosity as if Gods looking down from Mount Olympus. In presenting these points, this section establishes the nature and origin of *theōria*. 
The second section of Chapter Two addresses the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, identifying the standpoint of *theória* as it was found in this era. After a general definition of these movements, the nature of *epistêmē* as it functions within the scientific method will be addresses, which was explicitly warned about by Aristotle. Aristotle presumed that *epistêmē* could only be deduced from first principles which would then account for observations of the world. But Bacon switched these around, placing the observations first. This created a shunt that removed the individual from the equation. The result is that the practical ends of scientific knowledge drive science itself; e.g., technological invention and capitalism can function for their own sake. Such systems are isolated from Aristotle’s *nous* and *sophia*, which were replaced by *ratio* and other modes of thought that deemphasized the role of the individual. This section concludes by presenting three cases for how this process of excluding the individual manifested in terms of 1) the body, 2) nature, and 3) religion. The objectification of these three was only natural during the Scientific Revolution, but in each case, something fundamentally human was neglected that requires attention.

By identifying the nature of *theória* and how it permeates modernity, this section will have also identified that which alienates competing standpoints. If *cakras* are to be understood on their own ground as a fundamental expression of the mid-body, it is valuable to first recognize and then utilize an alternative standpoint that allows for an analysis of the immediate experiences of being.
Chapter Three expands on the theme of Chapter Two by introducing the philosophical paradigms of T.P. Kasulis. This casts *theōria* in a new light, as what Kasulis calls “integrity.” But as Kasulis explains, integrity shares a background/foreground gestalt relationship with a correlative opposite, “intimacy.” Intimacy thematically accounts for what was excluded during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. This chapter will explain this paradigm, introduce it in terms of cross-cultural definitions of the body, and then how the predominance of integrity has led to imbalanced attitudes in the contemporary age. By introducing and defining these terms, the paradigm required for a discussion of the *cakras* and the subtle body will be established as the paradigm of intimacy. This project asserts that the shift between the foreground of integrity (i.e., *theōria*) and the background of intimacy is what is required in dialog with the *cakras* as it is simply not a matter of either/or; either *theōria* or the requisite standpoint of the *cakras*. They may both exist simultaneously and complimentary.

The first section of this second chapter presents Kasulis’s philosophical paradigms of intimacy and integrity which he explains are contextual grids that force the topics of their investigation to take the form of their assumptions. Integrity represents what has been called the standpoint of *theōria* which presupposes “bright and clear” knowledge that is objective and external, as well as that which can be easily represented symbolically (e.g., mathematically, geometrically). This is clearly the presupposition of the sciences. As *theōria*, and thus integrity, strongly suggests a standpoint wherein one stands outside of and looks inward at, intimacy’s standpoint is situated in the midst of things; “*in medias res*.” Intimacy then represents dark knowledge that is highly personal, somatic, and
affective that lacks the clear borders of integrity. Kasulis explains that these two positions do not share just an either/or relationship, as such relationships are the product of integrity. Instead, they share a gestalt relationship where one occupies the foreground and one the background, like the famous vase and face. Depending on one’s inclinations, either the face or vase may stand out. Kasulis claims that the same applies with intimacy and integrity. Cultures (however one choses to defined that term) that emphasize science and rationality prioritize integrity. It is the contention of this project that such groups will then have a difficult, if not impossible, time taking dialog seriously when concerning subjects of intimacy—such as the cakras.

This section concludes by proposing an informal logical fallacy called “overstepping the bounds of one’s domain” which is intended to draw a clearer distinction between the domains of intimacy and integrity, as well as cultivate greater awareness between the strengths and weaknesses of either standpoint. Three cases are presented here of modern scientists that employ integrity to the exclusion of all else, with the exception of Einstein who is introduced as one such example who entertained a more balanced perspective; i.e., he was more mindful of the limits of his domain.

This chapter next introduces the work of Kuriyama who explored a cross-cultural comparison of the human body and how the body was understood diverged between cultures. It is the contestation of this section that Kuriyama’s project of divergence is quite compatible with the philosophical categories of Kasulis, which appears quite helpful as Kuriyama makes no such philosophical distinctions. Starting with the Greek
body, the emphasis on *theōria* is once again called into question with respect to how it isolated the observer from the body in the work of Aristotle, Galen and Descartes. This section also addresses the skepticism and doubt experienced by medical practitioners who were drawn to the certainty of mathematics and science, and repulses by other methods of seeing the body that were based upon more personal methods of diagnosis.

This chapter concludes by introducing intimacy into the above examples of medical and philosophical understanding as a standpoint that has unduly been excluded. By relegitimizing this standpoint, a deeper and more complete discussion about the body and generally being human may take place. In doing so, this chapter presents a philosophical standpoint that can account for the *cakras* that does not antagonize the prevailing standpoint of integrity, and may in turn lead to more compelling dialog.

Chapter Four addresses the subtle body through an exposition of classical *Sāṃkhya* philosophy. This chapter begins with a discussion on the nature of the standpoints, or “*darśanas,*” of *Sāṃkhya* and Yoga addressing their relationship to each other and generally investigating the terms. The chapter then addresses the subtle body of *Sāṃkhya*, followed by the insights of, and a critique of Mikel Burley. This chapter is introduced to establish a classical formulation of the subtle body, and to emphasize the practical relationship *Sāṃkhya* shares with Yoga which demonstrates that it is not a purely rational philosophy, but that which may be verified experientially.

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7 By “Classical *Sāṃkhya,*” I mean to limit the discussion to the *Sāṃkhya-śāstra* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the *Yoga Sutras* of Patañjali for the sake of brevity and focus. Ordinarily the contemporaneous commentaries surrounding the literature are included under the term “classical.”
The first section addresses the relationship that obtains between the *darśanas* of Sāmkhya and Yoga, exploring their historical precedence and development. It is generally understood that neither the *Sāmkhyakārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa nor the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali were “written,” per se, but rather compilations of previously existing schools of thought, which leaves many unanswered questions as to the relationship between these schools in their pre-classical age. Mikel Burley proposes four relationships for consideration. They are 1) the single system thesis, 2) the divergence thesis, 3) the grafting-on thesis, and 4) the separate systems thesis. 1) suggests that Sāmkhya and Yoga represent two expressions of a single system; 2) suggests Sāmkhya and Yoga are two surviving expressions of one earlier, lost school of thought; 3) suggests that Patañjali “grafted on” Yoga with a touch of theism to appeal to a broader audience and; 4) suggests that they are simply two different standpoints that are too unique to be unified. In this project, the hyphenated expression “Sāmkhya-Yoga” is intended to mean the superimposition, of 1), 2), and 4).

Moving on to the subtle body, the Five *Kośas* are next introduced as historical and thematic precursors to the subtle body. They are briefly defined in order to flesh them out as an example of the inchoate subtle body. Next the term “subtle” will be inspected to demonstrate how the term functions representing degrees of accessibility. That is, the more subtle an aspect of experience is, the less access one ordinarily has to it; Yoga being the method of stilling the mind to bring about that access. Along with accessibility follows hypostasis, or the idea that degree of subtlety also means degree of support as the
more subtle aspects of consciousness are also the more foundational. It should be noted that the more subtle aspects of being support both the body and what is ordinarily referred to as the mind (manas). Next, how Sāṃkhya philosophy explicitly delineates these gradations of experience is addressed emphasizing the degrees of prakṛti or primordial matter.

This fourth chapter concludes with looking at the recent work of Mikel Burley who identifies and then argues against prevailing realist interpretations of Sāṃkhya. He instead argues for an idealist reading of Sāṃkhya, closer in spirit to Kant. He also presents what he terms a “synchronic” reading of Sāṃkhya, rather than what he sees as the modern reading, which is “diachronic.” That is, rather than the tattvas (principle constituents) of prakṛti progressing in series, their relationship is better understood as spread out and interpenetrating each other. This section the makes Burleys case for the abandonment of the realist interpretation and the taking up of an idealist position. This project, however, argues for a phenomenological reading, which although different, stands in contrast to realism. The chapter concludes with a brief critique of Burley with respect to the role played by Yoga in the Sāṃkhya system, arguing that it is the practical application of Yoga that turns the idealist claims of Sāṃkhya into empirical realities for the spiritual seeker. The comparison with Kant does not stand as Kant derived his idealist philosophy through ratiocination, which is thematically radically dissimilar from the empirical verification of Yoga.
Chapter Five builds upon the depiction of the subtle body as per \textit{Sāmkhya} by transitioning to an explicit phenomenological study, introducing Merleau-Ponty’s and the thematic extension of his understanding of the lived body as per \textsc{Yuasa} Yasuo. This chapter first presents Merleau-Ponty to establish his terminology, to include his general phenomenological orientation towards knowing one’s own body, human expression as action, and his intentional arc. Next, Yuasa’s four-circuit body schema is presented which introduces a means of phenomenological awareness of the subtle body. Yuasa defines the subtle body as the unconscious quasi-body, which is next discussed. This chapter concludes with a reintroduction of Kasulis’s philosophical paradigms explaining how they add clarity and context to Yuasa’s understanding of the subtle body as something to be cultivated rather than presumed or taken for granted. Yuasa also establishes an everyday standpoint for addressing the subtle body, which is invaluable to this project.

The section addressing Merleau-Ponty begins with a juxtaposition of him and Kant in order to draw out the dissimilarity of their positions. Although they both seek to articulate the mechanism behind experience, Merleau-Ponty more radically accentuates the experience itself, while Kant preferred his own brand of abstract idealism. Merleau-Ponty wanted to avoid such abstraction as he proposed that such thinking “crystalized” the mind, pulling the individual out of the domain of experience. For him, the immediately lived experience of one’s own body was central. This body is a body of action that expresses itself through doing, which leads to his discussion of the habit-body.
The habit-body accounts for the natural and inculcated patterns of bodily activity familiar to the individual. The habit-body thus familiarizes the individual to the world through possibilities of utility and action. In doing so, the expressiveness of the body functions immediately, as in the case of fingers effortlessly expressing one’s thoughts onto a typewriter (or keyboard). He defines this seamless expression as an “intentional arc” that unifies past, present, and future in one expression of the body. By defining the habit-body and intentional arc as such, Merleau-Ponty offers a means of discussing being wherein mind and body are brought together less disjunctively.

Yuasa expands Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of the body by introducing what he proposes as four information circuits of the body. They are 1) the sensory-motor circuit, 2) the circuit of coenesthesia, 3) the emotional-instinct circuit, and 4) the unconscious quasi-body. The sensory motor circuit is comprised of the sensory and motor apparatuses that make up the body. The circuit of coenesthesia is an internal information apparatus about the state of one’s body comprised of two sub-circuits; the circuit of kinesthesia (sensation of movement) and the circuit of somesthesia (sensations of the body). These two systems function as a feedback apparatus that adds immediate feedback to one’s actions and the state of one’s body. The emotional-instinct circuit reveals information about the state of one’s organs, which is usually silent unless there is something wrong, generating both localized pain and un-localized stress.

The fourth circuit of Yuasa’s body scheme is the unconscious quasi-body which functions as a third term between that mediates between the psychological and
physiological. In order to cultivate an awareness of this, one must either be born with a natural sensitivity to it, or through training of the third circuit, developing a sensitivity. The body’s circuits then sympathetically detect the stirrings of the unconscious quasi-body inferring its existences as a submarine traveling just under the surface of the water may be inferred by the presence of its wake.

This chapter concludes with a section which revisits Kasulis’s intimacy and integrity, interjecting them into Yuasa’s body scheme to further contextualize his methodology. Here, Yuasa’s argument for the democratic (integrity) and elitist (intimacy) view of the body are presented. His general argument is that the deeper two circuits of his body schema only become a phenomenological fact when one undergoes deliberate and sustained training. The knowledge that arises he terms “elite” in the same sense of the capacities of an elite athlete surpass those of the average, ordinary person. This transitions into a discussion of Yuasa’s contention that the inclusion of the “super-normal” will aid in such conversations. “Normal” is often defined by the absence of “sub-normal” conditions, but Yuasa finds this unsatisfactory and insufficient, as one can train to become super-normal. This is already evident in athletics, and all manner of intellectual training, but when it comes to overall health, psychological health, and awareness of subtler aspects of being, such ideas of “super-normalcy” are relatively unheard of.

Chapter Six introduces the maṇḍala of which the cakras are a subset. This will be done in two parts. The first of which will present the maṇḍala in the process of interiorization,
which brought the *mandala* from an external phenomenon into the individual as a thematic precursor to the *cakras*. The second section turns to Jung and his psychological explication of *mandala* imagery, highlighting four of Jung’s primary principles that contextually situate in depth psychology some aspects of the *mandala*. This chapter articulates the standpoint of depth psychology which offers a depiction of the mechanisms of consciousness with respect to the unconscious. This unconscious can also be read as the influences of the unconscious quasi-body (the subtle body) from the previous chapter.

The first section addresses the change from *mandala* to *cakra*. This begins by establishing a precedent for such a transformation with respect to micro-macrocosmic correlativity, beginning with the general interiorization that transformed the literal, external fire sacrifice of the *Vedas* into a figurative, internal sacrifice in meditation as found in the *Upaniṣads*. This process of interiorization is then discussed as a physical interiorization as sacred geographic and ceremonial places became internal places. This is followed by a discussion of the interiorization of sacred practice wherein one’s own bodily energy becomes the focus of the ritual, not as something to be incidentally agitated and projected into a ritual, but the focus of the ritual itself. The nature of bodily energy in such practice is discussed next. This leads to an example of mapping of the deities originally found in a *mandala* to the body itself wherein the various psychically localized regions of the body and their corresponding emotional energies are given divine personae for the purpose of worship and self-cultivation.
The second section turns to the depth psychology of Jung as a means of elucidating and psychologically contextualizing the processes explained in the first section. This begins with a general explanation of how manḍalas appeared in Jung’s work, which differs quite radically from the themes of the previous section, primarily in their stated origin; Jung presumed mandalas were endogenous while Tantric manḍalas are explicitly tradition- and history-bound, marking them as exogenous in nature. The endogenous and ahistorical nature of Jung’s manḍalas are explained, followed by a discussion of how some of the features differed in what Jung encountered in his work. Libido is next addressed and its role in psychological growth, which has a powerful correlate with Tantra, which focuses explicitly on the rousing of bodily energy. Libido, for Jung, could be “canalized” and directed towards greater spiritual goals, rather than the more mundane desired goals of one’s energy. A brief discussion on the archetypes and Jung’s active imagination follow as these two principles can be understood to be fundamentally operative when meditatively engaging in a maṇḍala.

Chapter Seven finally introduces the cakras and nādis as found in the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa, introducing them generally, both in the context of this text, and as explained by contemporary cakra practitioners. This covers a brief presentation of the text, an overview and clarification of the general themes found therein, and a discussion on modern interpreters of this text. This chapter establishes the historical/textual context of the “standard” cakras, while also introducing and defining the relevant terms.
The first section discusses the context of the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa, both its history and its influences, as the “standard” model of cakras can be derived from this text. As this text has sufficiently been explained elsewhere, for brevity’s sake, the svādhiṣṭhāna cakra will be explained as per this text to demonstrate an example of the characteristics of this text.

The following section addresses the general themes of the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa focusing on the cakras and nāḍis as explained by modern scholars and contemporary cakra practitioners. This begins with a discussion of the nature of the cakras similar to the endogenous/exogenous distinction established in the previous chapter. This re-affirms that cakras are both something historical and textual as well as innate. The cakras are then explained by a number of contemporary writers to further clarify what they are and the role they play. This is followed by a similar treatment of the nāḍis, both conceptually and through the experience of kuṇḍalinī awakening as explained by two authors. This section concludes with a commentary on the relationship between the subtle body of the cakras with the physical body.

The third section presents an overview of modern writers on the cakras. This is primarily done as a substitute for a more thorough and systematic exposition of the writings of contemporary cakra practitioners as this introduced too many new elements to this project (e.g., healing), and due to time constraints. Its intention is to identify which resources are available on the topic, and to what extent they are useful. It also identifies the contemporary cakra practitioners who are pioneering the field, specifically Anodea Judith, who under ideal circumstances deserves a chapter-length treatment of her work.
due to her novelty, syncretism, and general insights into the psychically localized problems of being human.

Chapter Eight presents Jung’s commentary on the *cakras* of the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* and a critique of Jung’s position, primarily with respect to his principle of individuation and the Self. This is intended to draw out what Jung illuminates in a discussion of the *cakras*, and what Jung interjects; identifying what is there versus projecting his own interpretation.

The first section addresses Jung’s commentary on the *cakras* and begins with an overview of the types of scholarship on the topic. This presents three degrees of authors, running from the least thorough and most practical, to the most thorough and least practical. The are 1) syncretic reductionists, 2) hermeneutic transposers, and 3) critical scholars. The first unabashedly conflate Jung with the *cakras* as tools of self-help. The second occupies a middle ground of conversation, and the third is the most critical, while also distancing itself the most from the lived, practical aspects of depth psychology. Next this section addresses Jung’s take on the *cakras*, addressing his 1932 comments to Hauer’s lecture, Jung’s personal familiarity with *maṇḍalas*, and then carefully extrapolating Jung’s definition of each of the *cakras*. Once this is established, the Jung’s explanation of the symbolic value of the animals found in the *cakras* is presented wherein he argues for the psychical foundation of the transformation that occurs between each *cakra*.
The second section contextualizes Jung by presenting critiques of his position. The first of which presents three contexts of the cakras that Jung weaves through in his lectures, which demonstrates Jung’s creative understanding of the cakras. Jung talks about the cakras in the context of the psychological maturation of society, the dawn of society, psychological health, and spiritual awakening. The following three critiques add context to Jung standpoint and require further study. They are that Jung only read texts in translation, avoided metaphysics, and strongly embraced either/or thinking when discussing “other” cultures. What this does is raise an onus of clarification that may be leveled at Jung and those who support him, which this project does not proclaim to resolve. The final issue to be addressed in this section is a defense of Jung’s psychologization, basically asking to what degree does Jung clarify existing phenomenon, and to what degree does Jung interject his own creative theories.

By presenting the cakras in such a light will accomplish two things. The first is that it will added a lived context to the human body through the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Yuasa by offering a depiction of the structure of the lived body that defines how the subtle body may come to be experienced as a lived reality. The second is that it will add a lived context to the human psyche, articulating the structures of the psyche as defined by Jung that function within the cakras.

### IV. Disclaimers

After having established what this projected proposes to do, this section will establish what this project will not do. That cakras, it seems, reside at the intersection of many
conversations, and it would be impossible to engage in all of those conversations in any way meaningful. It is hoped that this project may add to these conversations in a number of ways, the clarification of which must wait for another day. This will address historical, philosophical, health, and bodily issues that will not be engaged by this project.

The first historical concerns how the Theosophical Society came to appropriate the cakras. The general sketch this groups popularity stems from a diffused spiritual hunger due to languishing religion and the impoverishment of science, combined with a rising interest in physical culture in Europe. As such, the spiritual insights of the East, most notably postural yoga practice, caught the attention of many during the nineteenth century. Avalon’s translation of the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa caught the attention of the Theosophical Society, who embraced the cakras. How the cakras rose to popularity within the Theosophical Society, paying special attention to what trends preceded their introduction, would be quite illuminating.

The Theosophical understanding of the cakras transitions into the New Age appropriation of the cakras and the subtle body. Such an investigation would be two-fold; first with respect to their historical dissemination, and then with respect to what novel interpretations of the cakras have been presented. What should be taken more seriously is what, what I term, “contemporary cakra practitioners” have to add to discussions about the cakras as many such writers are not merely propagating insipid and poorly thought out philosophy, as the term “New Age” often pejoratively suggests. Instead, many
writers are writing from the perspective of practical experience, both personally and through established counseling services. As such, they are offering nuanced insights into the human mind-body through the cakras and the principles of psychical localization. There is surplus of fascinating insights that rightfully require further and careful academic study.

Next, this project does not venture into the domain of parapsychology. This topic gets invariably brought up in all manner of discussions of the subtle body. Motoyama (2015) makes the single most compelling argument for parapsychology and the cakas, but such a discussion is simply too far off course for this project. This topic too could be addressed both historically and philosophically.

The other philosophical topic that begs for further discussion is a comparative study of bodily energy. Just what the differences and similarities between ruach, prāṇa, and chi are would develop several different contexts for how this aspect of the human being is understood to function. If they could be compared more critically, I suspect a deeper consensus of what they are and how they function in the human being would come to light.

The topic of health is suggested in this project, but never given adequate attention as it would naturally lead to a divergence from its central theme. This is both with respect to mental health and physiological health. How these concepts are understood in Western Medicine, Traditional Chinese Medicine, and Āyurveda would be fascinating, especially
with respect how they each understand the relationship of the mind-body and thus treat illness. This may also entail a deeper investigation of the mechanisms of the placebo effect.

In a similar vein, health may also be discussed from the level of a culture as per Fromm. Such an inquiry would ask what it means for a society to be sick, for example, asking what the psychological and physiological consequences of inundating a society with the values of materialism, consumerism, and capitalism are, and how a more emphatic conversation on the subtle body may perhaps intervene.

The specific function and intention of yogic self-cultivation would also assist this project, especially the yoga devised by those who include cakras in their methods (e.g., Hatha Yoga). Such practice would look at the practical aspects of seeing cakras as living spiritual tools available to the practitioners. This would lend a strong voice to this discussion, adding contextualization to much of which that is only offered abstractly. Such a study would tie well into the above omitted conversations about health as well.

Next, a study that simply must be undertaken is a further investigation into the physiology of the cakras. A number of scholars have written on the topic, but nothing exhaustive has really been undertaken. (Maxwell; Jain; Motoyama, 2015) The endocrine system and meridian system appear to be the best candidates for such a discussion, as well as well as Motoyama’s Apparatus for Meridian Identification (AMI). There is
technology available and researchers committed to drawing this comparison, and it is only a matter of time until someone writes an epoch changing book on this topic.

That last topic that should be included in this larger discussion of the subtle body and *cakras* is modern theories of social construction of the body. This is a field that is a natural ally of this conversation, yet somehow finds itself excluded from dialog. How modern western scholars have investigated the construction of the body will certainly add insight to the problems of moving between different definitions of the body; biological body, social body, subtle body, etc.

This current project must limit itself to a phenomenological/psychological contextualization of the *cakras*, which is already a complicated enough meeting of methodologies. Hopefully, if this project can accomplish what it has stated it will do, it will add insight which may assist in the abovementioned conversations that fall outside its purview.
2. THE RISE OF THEŌRIA

The purpose of this chapter is preparatory in nature as its purpose is to establish the contextual background in which this project’s question finds itself. That is, if we are to ask the question, “why do the cakras seem out of place in ‘Western culture,’” we must first establish, at least in a general sense, what we mean by “Western culture” and why we find this term out of place. In doing so, we will need to identify the essential philosophical and historical points that can be understood as the origin of the standpoint of thought, attitudes, and assumptions that shape the current age. We will then need to identify the shortcomings and other problems contained within this standpoint, and what it neglects.

This chapter will serve as a sketch of the Greek standpoint of theōria as its presupposition of detached observation is the predominant standpoint that defines intellection in our current age. The assumptions of theōria, although arising in ancient Greece, have remained essentially the same although the topics they address have changed. We will first inspect theōria from three different angles. We will first introduce how the term was metaphorically explained by Heraclides, Plato and Aristotle as the highest means of understanding, elevating theōria above praxis. Next we will introduce the etymology of the term as this further contextualizes the term and adds additional insights. And third, we will introduce the social and natural phenomenon which may have shaped theōria, as per the insights of Watsuji.
This chapter will conclude with a brief sketch of the Scientific Revolution as it was this movement that brought about a new standard for knowledge that emphatically excluded one’s own experience and further cemented theoria as the default standpoint from which to view the world due to the tremendous success of this revolution. This will begin with an introduction of some of the founders of the movement, like Copernicus and Newton, and then address the shift that occurred in terms of Aristotle. This will be followed by Counter-Enlightenment examples as a means to foreshadow the following chapter as the case is made that the body, nature, and religion cannot be constrained exclusively by the materialist paradigm. We will also pay attention to Aristotle’s nous as this will serve as an example of how the immediacy and importance of individual experience was deprioritized, if not omitted, during the Scientific Revolution. Let us begin.

Theoria

This section will examine the Greek standpoint of theoria, what may have influenced its formation, how it in turn influenced Greek thought, and finally how this standpoint worked its way into European culture. Its origin can be traced back to Greece, which began with a tacit and seemingly coincidental understanding of the human being’s relationship to nature. This standpoint, further developed by early Greek philosophy began when technē, techniques and skills applied to material arts, was applied to the abstract realm of the mind in the processes of observation, which led to a perspective or standpoint from which internal technē could be contemplated.
Theōria became the defining methodological standpoint of Greek culture. This perspective coupled with rational methods became the standard by which the likes of philosophy, religion, medicine, and early science were held. These standards in turn delineated what were considered acceptable means of discourse, as well as discovery, which shaped Greek and European culture alike. In this section, we will explore the assertion that the fundamental assumptions of theōria as a methodological standpoint remained, in principle, functionally unchanged when the empiricists Francis Bacon (1561-1626) systematized what is now known as the scientific method. This standpoint served as the foundation for the Scientific Revolution, which played a central role in the European Enlightenment. The general argument here is that we can trace the roots of the changes that arose during the Enlightenment to early Greek theōria.

We currently find ourselves in the “Information Age” or “Digital Age,” both of which suggest an era defined by computing and the wide-scale democratization of information and digital opportunity, which is still essentially the legacy of Greek theōria. We must keep this legacy in mind as the problems—and solutions—concerning adopting the standpoint of theōria remain consistent and applicable regardless of in which age one happens to live.

**Greek Thought and the Roots of Theōria**

The origins of theōria can be found early in Greek intellectual history, most notably in the works of Plato and Aristotle. This can be inspected as a philosophical or perhaps etymological phenomenon, but the conditions that led to its arising may be considered as
well. These conditions have been considered by Watsuji, with which he also introduces his theory that as these conditions shaped the nature of theορία, they reciprocally shaped how these conditions appear. This will be discussed below.

**Etymology of Theορία**

This passive form of intellectual understanding derives its etymological roots from the Greek word for spectator, theορός, which is an amalgam of the Greek words θεα, which means look or view, and ηραό which means seeing. (McNeill, 252) But these are not merely synonymous verbs. As McNeill notes, “θεα as look or view refers not to a subjective, nor even to a human ‘activity,’ but to a view understood as the outward appearance or ‘look’ that something presents in showing itself in its distinctiveness…”(255). As such, theορός, from which the early Greek philosophers derived theορία, suggest the meeting of the appearance of a thing and the passive observation of that appearance, encompassing both.

However, we must also consider the possibility of theος, or “god,” influencing this particular word choice, although it may be little better than conjecture, a point noted by Heidegger. (McNeill, 253) This conjecture is worth consideration as it appears at home in Aristotle’s theology which essentially reduces the divine to the unmoved mover, whose handiwork is apparent in the order expressed when quietly observing the universe. This possibility becomes all the more probable when we consider Aristotle’s use of the term nous. Nous, or intellect, according to Aristotle, was the capacity which allows them to observe or partake in the intellectual world. In his Protrepticus, Aristotle uses the
analogy that thoughts are to nous as sights are to vision. (Nightingale, 194). This is not, however, rational activity, but merely the pure act of perceiving thoughts in and of itself; “the mind’s eye,” as it were.

Aristotle emphasizes a participation with this unmoved mover vis-à-vis nous in his *De Anima*, and oddly nowhere else in his corpus of work. In this contentious section, Aristotle differentiates between *nous pathetikos* and *nous poiētikos*. The former being the passive aspect of *nous*, or the capacity for *nous* to receive thought, which is not merely a passive observation of the appearance of things, but a subtle and sublime participatory experience of the workings of the universe. *Nous poiētikos* then is “active intellect” which, according to Cohoe, is characterizes as “separable, unaffected, and unmixed, while also being actual in its essence or substance.” (Cohoe, 10) In the sense of “separable”, Aristotle writes that “when separated, [nous poiētikos] alone is undying and everlasting” which opens up a variety of metaphysical questions that have influenced a number of religious thinkers. (Cohoe, 2-3). Cohoe cites one more passage that clarifies how important Aristotle found *nous poiētikos*. He writes, “‘Without this nothing thinks,’ where *this* can be taken as referring to either of these two sorts of *nous*, or, alternatively, ‘without *this*, it thinks nothing,’ where the antecedents to both *it* and *this* would be ambiguous.” (Cohoe, 10) In this section of *De Anima*, Aristotle is literally declaring *nous poiētikos* as the sine qua non of the human being, as suggested by the possibility of this existing in such a way that is independent of the other aspects of the human soul. This without question contains within a variety of religious connotations; witnessing the movements of God, immortality of the soul, etc. It seems Aristotle may have had in mind
the supplanting of mythological gods in favor of a divine and immediate experience. As such,  
thEOS as a root of theōRIA may be given some consideration, at the very least as a  
double entendre.

With theōRIA more or less established as the standpoint of nous overseeing things from a  
position distant from the ordinary world, we shall return to the primary theme of this  
project, which is the body. Aristotle’s depiction of theōRIA, along with his depiction of a  
tripartite soul as found in his de Anima, suggest a certain detachment or distancing of the  
human body with respect to one’s own self-identity. “Detachment or distance” can be  
used in the sense of recognizing the body as secondary or even tertiary in nature when  
compared to the status of the rational soul. This sentiment is also inferred from his  
holding of the observation of athletes above the training and competition as exhibited by  
those very athletes. Continuing this sentiment, in his Politics, Aristotle makes the  
following statement,

    Men ought not to labor at the same time with their minds and with their  
    bodies; for the two kinds of labour are opposed to one another; the labour  
    of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body.  
    (Aristotle, 1309)

From this we can catch a glimpse of Aristotle’s value of the body, and his sentiment that  
the body’s cultivation is both unlike in kind and at odds with the cultivation of the mind.

Although Aristotle’s hylomorphic conception of the body expressed the unity of matter  
(hyle) and form (morphē), he did not hold the two as equals, which he explicated in his de  
Anima. Therein he elevates the rational soul, nous, and that which engages in theōRIA,
above the muscular body (locomotive soul), and all the more so over the nutritive soul, which shares characteristics with plants. (Aristotle, 535-606) This prioritization of morphē over hyle—theōria over training the body—is an extension of Plato’s prioritization of eidos, and this bias and its consequences have followed theōria through history, relegating the cultivation of the body to a secondary status. We will return to this point below.

Theōria as Observation

4th century B.C.E. Greek philosophers used the term theōria to categorize a form of intellectual engagement, metaphorically summarized by Heraclides of Pontus. (Nightingale, 18-19) This member of Plato’s Academy used those present at the Olympic Games or other important occasions as a metaphor for the different modes of engagement pursued by those individuals. He did this in order to differentiate and rank the goals and desires that drew these people to the games both figuratively and literally. At the middle were the athletes, who were driven by promises of fame and glory upon victory, which represented physical training and discipline (praxis) At the top were those who came to spectate, or the theōroin, who attended the games with the wish to merely observe without seeking anything at all for his or herself other than the experience itself. Yuasa notes that this position may have been considered the most exalted as it reflected the mythological motif of the Greek Gods looking down from Mount Olympus to observe the
affairs of mortal humans. (Yuasa, 1993; 35) At the bottom came those who arrived in order to conduct business, motivated by the lure of wealth.¹

Plato too makes such a distinction, but slightly more subtly in the beginning of his Republic. (Nightingale, 74-75.) This treatise begins with Socrates visiting the polis of Peiraeus to attend a festival celebrating the goddess Bendis. He is convinced to stay one more evening as the festival will continue through the entire night, and his friends assure him there are spectacles “well worth seeing.” As it goes, they gather at home for a preparatory dinner but fall into deep conversation, utterly forgetting about the festival. This maneuver, claims Nightingale, is deliberately employed by Plato as means to symbolically elevate investigations and observations of the abstract over and above the mere observations of a festivals.

Aristotle elaborates on this in his Protrepticus explaining what he found the value of theōria to be. (Nightingale, 19) While Plato saw the goal or telos of theōria to be a combination of witnessing and understanding so that one may report his or her observations back to others who were not able to attend the event in person, Aristotle saw things differently. He writes that this theōria, the passive act of spectating, is not useful or advantageous, is more valuable than money, and should be conducted merely for its own sake. Smith notes that theōria in this context for Aristotle is not rational discourse or problem solving, but pure, passive observation and not technically related to anything

¹ Yuasa mentions that the popularity of gladiatorial events raised the athlete in the public opinion, pushing the observer to the role of a face among the nameless masses. He notes that today financial power coordinates such events, which has elevated the vendor, leaving Heraclides’s hierarchy entirely reversed.
practical at all. (Smith, 268) That is, according to Aristotle, *theōria* was its very own *telos*. This depiction of *theōria*’s “uselessness” may compromise one’s sensibilities concerning how we understand intellectual endeavors in our current age as it is starkly unproductive (in the conventional sense) by nature. In this sense, “philosophy” as the term is usually understood is advantageous, useful, considered for other sakes, comprised of rational discourse, and is employed for problem solving. As such, *theōria* is not “philosophy” but something different altogether.

**Watsuji**

WATSUJI Tetsurō, in his *Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study*, identifies a number of cultural and environmental factors surrounding early Greece that may have led to the development of the standpoint of *theōria*. His contention is not that the environment determined the characteristics of the culture, although such a position is quite viable (e.g., Lewthwaite, Ballinger), but something more complex. Watsuji’s position is that there exists a relationship of reciprocation between, in this case, the environment and *theōria*. That is, the environment in which Greek culture happened to find itself influenced the cultural appropriation of *theōria*, while *theōria* reciprocally influenced the Greek understanding of the environment.

In brief, Watsuji claims that it was the orderliness of the Mediterranean climate that allowed for the impression of orderliness to arise in the minds of early Greek thinkers, a sentiment shared by Cook (Watsuji, 73) (Cook, 5-6). As Watsuji tells the tale, this was brought to his attention by his traveling companion, Professor Otsuki of Kyoto
University’s Department of Agriculture, when he commented, “There's no weed-grass in Europe, you know.” (Watsuji, 60) This came as a shock to Watsuji, as his conception of farming was quite different. He writes,

‘Grass pulling’—the extermination of weeds—is the core of the farmer's work in Japan; if it is once neglected, cultivated land turns almost at once into jungle. This ‘grass pulling’, especially in the case of the rice paddy, assumes the significance of a ceaseless struggle against tough and unyielding weed-grasses at the most trying season of the year… But in Europe [and the Mediterranean] there is no call for such a battle with weed-grasses; once land is cleared and cultivated it submits meekly to man for all time and does not seize the chance to revert to waste land. (Watsuji, 69-70)

Although perhaps a bit exaggerated, these differences in environment are what Watsuji proposes led to a difference in how Greek and Japanese culture intellectually and mythologically understood and organized the world in which they happened to be found. And the resultant understanding, the cultural philosophical standpoint, in turn determined which were the acceptable ways to view, categorize, and discuss the environment.

Leaving the environment and the contentious position of environmental determinism aside for now, Watsuji identifies a number of Greek cultural characteristics (regardless of whether or not they were influenced by nature) that paved the way for the appropriation of the standpoint of theōria, to include a competitive attitude, slavery, and an interest in material arts (technē). The competitive attitude, Watsuji explains, was one of the fundamental traits of Greek life and culture which, “began with the conversion of the farmer-herdsman to a warrior life once he had taken to the sea.” (Watsuji, 82) Taking to the sea, for Watsuji, is central to the cultivation of competition, as he suspects it was the life and death struggle for resources (crops, livestock, etc.) on the mainland that slowly
forced people to take to the sea in the first place. Unfertile land and swelling populations made natural ingredients for periodic warfare, and an ensuing bellicose attitude.

Next, we must consider the role of slavery and democracy in the advancements of Greek culture. Ironically, along with rampant slavery, the Greeks also developed democracy, which is all the more so indicative of a very powerful spirit of individuality, independence, and liberty to be assumed for all Greek citizens. Democracy is essential for understanding how competition persisted within Greek culture, as democracy allows room for numerous people to all simultaneously function at the top echelon of a regulated society, where the competitive impulse can be expressed in a more organized less martial form. More important to the purpose of this project, with the creation of a democratic slave-society, the Greek was liberated from the bonds of labor, while remaining entitled to the products of this labor. That is, the Greek was no longer required to bodily toil in nature as this was a job for a slave. This freedom from labor resulted in the hitherto unprecedented emergence of the key prerequisite of intellectual evolution; that is, leisure. But keeping in mind the abovementioned competitive spirit of the Greek, this led to a very distinctive sort of leisure activity. Concerning this, Watsuji writes,

The polis with its slave class enabled the citizen, freed from labour directed to gaining the necessities of food, clothing and a roof, to "observe" such labours at a distance. But when the Greek citizen became such, he was already imbued with a spirit of competition, so that his "observation" was competitive observation rather than mere indolent inactivity. (Watsuji, 85)

What Watsuji is suggesting is that the competitive spirit of the Greeks may have influenced a competitive strain of observation, which is in essence the spirit of analysis;
that is, philosophy. This is not a unifying or synthetic form of observation, but a divisive one. It is difficult to claim as confidentially as Watsuji does that this may have occurred in a causal sense, and perhaps he is more interested in retroactively constructing a compelling story of Greek culture, but nonetheless, these attitudes arose. Leisure allowed the Greeks to turn their attention to philosophical observation, or perhaps merely noticing aspects of their world previously unexplored, but within this leisure was a propensity for competition.

Prior to the emergence of leisure, Watsuji suggest that all of one’s purposeful activity was directed to that which was strictly necessary for survival (e.g. food, shelter, clothing), with an exception being that which brought pleasure—both of which are fundamentally mammalian in nature (i.e., in Aristotle’s terms, of the locomotive and nutritive soul). With free time and slaves to take care of life’s necessary chores, creativity and understanding blossomed. Watsuji here cites Aristotle, who held knowledge and learning in the highest regard, which was in part addressed above. Aristotle especially esteemed inventors as their novel arts and techniques (technē) for improving some aspect of production demonstrated a keen awareness of universals, and a heightened capacity to observe. This technē was at first constrained to material arts, such as pottery, metalworking, and dyes, but reached its height in observation, but it was, as discussed above, an observation for the sake of observation, no longer constrained within the field of the necessary and material. This was pure observation, or theōria. (Watsuji, 89)
According to Watsuji, observation for the sake of observation, wrapped up in the competitive spirit of the Greek, in the already submissive countryside of the Mediterranean, naturally led to the humanizing of nature, and “a standpoint with man standing at the center exercising its control over nature.” (Watsuji, 79) This insight remains valuable regardless how one chooses to situate the relationship between Greek thought and the Greek countryside; 1) if the environment shaped theōria, 2) if theōria shaped how the environment was understood, or 3) if theōria and the environment reciprocally influence each other, as proposed by Watsuji. This standpoint, with humanity standing over and above nature came about only when the energies usually reserved for toiling against nature in order to survive (i.e., the effort taken up by slaves) was thus channeled elsewhere, which led to substantial cultural developments, all of which (e.g., politics, rational thought, the arts) were ensconced in the principles of separation, competition and observation. The primary consequence with which we are concerned of this centralization of theōria was that it entailed a literal systematic removal of Greek citizens from nature, and a figurative divorcing of the Greek philosopher from the body.

This is a point to be taken up more thoroughly later, but in brief, how the standpoint of theōria influenced how the body and mind were valued, metaphysically situated, and mutually cultivated in early Greek philosophy, is of great importance to this project as it is the legacy of these assumptions that influence understandings of the body today.
The Greek Body

What do We Mean by “Body?”

Before this investigation of the body begins, it is prudent to clarify exactly what is meant by the term “body” as there are a great deal of presuppositions tied up in this question. That is, assumptions predispose thought of the body in certain ways. More so, the expressions “epistemology of the body” and “thinking about the body” reveal an additional term inexorably bound to the body, which is “mind”; that there is something non-material that accompanies the material and is doing this thinking. Which in a sense implies that to study the body in the absence of this “mind” is to study a corpse. Regardless of what name this phenomenon of “mind” goes by, it is what KURIYAMA Shigehisa believed Greek doctors, as well as Chinese doctors, were ultimately interested in. He writes,

…doctors strove above all to comprehend what the body expressed. They sought to know the invisible, inaudible, intangible truth of living beings through bodily expressions that could be seen, and heard, and touched—to work back from manifest signs to their secret vital source. (Kuriyama, 271)

However, this “vital source” need not strictly be ontologized through some manner of idealism. As Kuriyama notes, “Say that a living person possesses a soul, or spirit, or vital breath, and we have only invented names for ignorance.” (271) Regardless of name, it was that which must be safeguarded and secured against internal and external threats as it was the very essence of life itself.

Whether one chooses to call this essence a soul, spirit, or what have you, it is clearly a matter of one’s own perspective, the elucidation of which with respect to the body is the
scope of this section. To delve into cultural perspective for a moment, T.P. Kasulis notes that these dispositions function at two levels. As will be the topic of the following chapter, he proposes that a philosophical paradigm is running at the very base level of culture that functions as an operating system that influences all matter of cultural phenomenon. (Kasulis, 66) From this ground layer rises a less abstract and more concrete level of everyday phenomenon such as gender norms, mores and taboos, natural science/philosophy, and—central to this section—conceptions of the mind-body relationship.

Kuriyama explains that although Greek and Chinese doctors looked at the same general human body, they saw radically different things. To demonstrate he presents a fourteenth and sixteenth century depiction of the body which crisply demonstrates just how much these two cultures diverged. (Kuriyama 10-11) The first is Chinese acupuncturist Hua Shou’s drawing from the Shisijing fahui (1341), and the second is from Vesalius’s Fabrica, (1543)
It is in this respect that Kuriyama asks how two wildly divergent views of the human body came to be. Kasulis adds to this conversation by addressing a base layer beneath the surface, interjecting his categories of intimacy and integrity; Hua Shou depicted the body vis-à-vis intimacy and Vesalius depicted the body vis-à-vis integrity. What we mean by “body” is determined by the standpoint from which we choose to view it.²

² The following insight was brought to my attention by Dr. Lucy Bregman. These two bodies suggest Kasulis’s categories of intimacy and integrity; intimacy suggesting the acupuncture of Hua Shou’s body and integrity suggesting the “anatomical seeing” of Vesalius’s body. Bregman made the comment that although in their foreground they each represent intimacy and integrity, their background expresses their opposite. That is, Hua Shou’s body “floats in the artist’s space,” “like cuts of meat on a butcher’s chart” which suggests integrity, and Vesalius’s body is striding and pointing up and down. In the background are plants and ruined buildings suggesting the natural and historical context of this body. I take these observations to be an affirmation of the gestalt relationship that obtains between intimacy and integrity to be discussed in the following chapter.
Agency of the Soul

In this section a contention put forward by Kuriyama will be discussed; that the origins of mind-body dualism as we know it can trace its roots back to early Greek thought. He introduces this by means of what he identifies as the preponderance on muscular agency. That is, as the body was seen more and more as a machine, it was only inevitable that the soul would become to be seen as the machine’s operator. Explaining this point, Kuriyama writes,

I come to my chief contention about the origins of muscle-consciousness: the rise of the preoccupation with muscles, I suggest, is inextricably intertwined with the emergence of a particular conception of personhood. Specifically, in tracing the crystallization of the concept of muscle, we are also, and not coincidentally, tracing the crystallization of the sense of an autonomous will. Interest in the muscularity of the body was inseparable from a preoccupation with the agency of the self. (144)

By “muscle-consciousness” Kuriyama is indicating a change in standpoint wherein the individual is not understood as an entity whose will is expressed as the body, but through the body. His contention then expresses a gradual change of attitude towards the mind that began to understand it more and more as being decidedly unlike the body.

The Greek body, like any other body, was shaped by its cultural pre-suppositions. Further building upon these themes, Kuriyama may be cited when he writes, “the fundamental puzzle of anatomy concerns the crystallization of a particular way of peering into the body, the birth of a certain visual style.” (119-20) This “visual style” argues Kuriyama, was “anatomical seeing,” which brought about this “muscular-consciousness.” In this respect, we can see the function of theōria operative in the conversation, which may allow it to be provisionally stated that the Greek body is none other than the theōria
body. That is, this “way of peering into the body,” this “certain visual style” is the standpoint wherein one’s own lived body appears objectively as a distinct and separate material phenomenon.

This standpoint represents not merely how the body was seen, but how it was lived. As Kuriyama notes, “differing ways of touching and seeing the body were bound up with different ways of being bodies.” (13) That is, there is a reciprocal relationship that exists between how one sees the body, and how one lives one’s own body. The standpoint of theōria was not merely a philosophical tool that could be employed when needed, but it also became internalized and essentialized as the de facto existential standpoint of the individual. The conception of the Greek soul may even be traced back to, or perhaps just strengthened by, this disposition to observe.

However, only the roots of the problem can be found here, as early Greeks who were interested in the body, notably Aristotle and Galen, did not accept this distinction. In the following section we will briefly outline Aristotle’s and Galen’s understanding of the soul in order to demonstrate how more disjunctive forms of dualism were not present at this time, although its spirit certainly was.

Aristotle. If we begin with Aristotle, we should first note his divergence from Plato on the matter of the body/soul relationship. Plato, as per his Phaedo, presents four arguments for the immortality of the soul, which were quite in accord with common beliefs of the afterlife of the time. Without rehashing the details of this work, suffice it to
say that Plato adamantly embraced the notion that the individual’s soul would continue to exist after the death of the body, continuing to partake in the Form of life, establishing a strict form of dualism wherein soul and body were cast as opposites.

Although Aristotle also advocated a form of dualism, his version saw body and soul as more intimately entwined, offering a starkly different rendering of the soul’s immortality. To begin with the relationship itself, Aristotle saw the soul and body as expressions of form and matter, respectively. Concerning asking about their relationship, he explains, “it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one….” (Aristotle, 555) That is, they are two expressions of the same thing. On this matter he further writes, “as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal.” (556) This makes it clear that Aristotle saw the relationship between the soul and body in a far more unified sense that Plato. As such, there is little room for any notion of one’s “shade” or the like persisting after death, which would be akin to asking about the shape impressed on wax in the absence of wax.

Concerning the capacities of the soul, Aristotle writes, relying on his theory of causes, “[The soul] is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end [telos], it is (c) the essence of the whole living body.” (561) While (b) and (c) are more definitionally true, (a) should give us pause as it introduces a strain of dualism wherein there appears a split between actor and action. Or, in the case of Kuriyama’s thesis, room for his suspicions about muscular agency to find purchase. Looking into this issue more, we find that Aristotle did make concessions for some degree of immortality. That is, the highest
capacity, *nous*, was in fact immortal. Returning to *De Anima*, Aristotle defines this when he writes, “it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable, it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers.” (558) It is difficult to articulate exactly what Aristotle has in mind here, as he himself for one reason or another chose not to write on the topic other than in passing. What we can take from it is that Aristotle, although insisting upon the inseparable nature of soul and body, saw the highest capacity of the soul, *nous*, as something utterly unlike in kind to the body.

Aristotle puts forth a very intimate form of thinking in his *nous poietikos*, which is the “capable of receiving the form of an object” and is “potentially identical in character with its object without being the object.” (Aristotle, 589) Philosophically, this term has little to do with the distance implied by *theōria*, which, as will be discussed below, fell out of favor when *theōria*’s methodology became overly prominent.

**Galen and “Anatomical Seeing.”** Turning to Galen of Pergamon, Kuriyama identifies him in particular as being an influential character in his theory of cultural divergence, citing Galen’s penchant for viewing the body as what we would now call a biological organism. Although Aristotle too engaged in dissection, Galen’s efforts to be both a philosopher and the preeminent physician of his time led to a degree of ambivalence when it came to his treatment of the soul. Kuriyama’s assertion is that due to Galen’s investment in anatomy, a certain standpoint developed in which the body became to be seen more and more as a physical phenomenon as the tripartite Platonic soul was
discretely housed within specific organs of the human body. This Kuriyama addresses as “anatomical seeing.”

With Galen’s anatomical seeing in mind, Kuriyama writes,

> By the end of the century, Socrates will be speaking of human beings as creatures centered around an immortal core called the soul. But it would still take time for the Socratic soul, a prisoner in flesh, to evolve into Galen’s autonomous agent—into a self possessing muscular will. (146)

Although both Aristotle and Galen were both more ambivalent when it came to this issue, Kuriyama emphasizes the concept of will and muscular agency as discreet phenomenon as he sees them as the precursors of the less ambivalent positions of today. As an example of this ambivalence, Shields notes that Aristotle entertained three theories of the soul, the compatibility of which is troublesome; “1) an immaterial *nous*, 2) a theory to go with the theoretical ontology… elaborated most succinctly in *De Anima* II.1…, and 3) a pneumatic soul, spurned by Plato in the *Phaedo*… and apparently by Aristotle himself in *De Anima* 1.5.” (Shields, 134) Kuriyama appears to be emphasizing a blend of Shield’s first and second point; the immaterial soul entwined with and in control of a material body.

Galen also signified a deeper division from Aristotle as, according to Hankinson, Galen was not at all interested in Aristotle’s immortal soul. Galan found this idea “plausible, but otherwise extraneous to the study of the body.” (Hankinson, 201) This middle position between the extremes of philosophy and physiology led Galen to, citing Hankinson again, “a middle course between excessive and unfounded dogmatism on the
one hand, and a complete skepticism on the other.” (206) Regardless of how strongly worded by Kuriyama, Galen signified a shift in thought that more favorably situated addressing the body as a physical entity that denied the soul’s immortality and perhaps all the more so its medical irrelevance.

Presented next is the matter of control. Galen adopted Plato’s tripartite soul, accepting Plato’s division of the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive components. What Galen added that was unique to this system was that he correlated these three capacities to the brain, the heart, and the liver respectively. (Hankinson, 198) This all the more so signified this shift towards the body qua material machine. This point is emphasized by Kuriyama when he inspects the notion of organs. Kuriyama’s general thesis is that the word for organs, “organa,” was also the term for “tool” or “instrument.” This, he contends, is evidence that the body was thought of as the instrument of the soul, which clearly presupposes a user. (264) This signified a divergence from the form/matter relationship and the establishment of the hegemony of an abstract agent.

In this section, theōria was established as the prevailing standpoint of Greek culture. Throughout Greek and European history Aristotle’s influence was seemingly ubiquitous as his philosophy, logic, theology, and science set a standard to which all other thought was held. It could very well be said that Aristotle’s influence was exhaustive. However, this influence encountered strong opposition in the form of the Scientific Revolution.
The Scientific Revolution and The Enlightenment

This section will progress thematically similar to the preceding, to continue a sketch of the standpoint of *theōria* as it propagated into the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} century. The standards set in place by Aristotle held until they could be demonstrated otherwise, as is the case with Copernicus, who laid to rest Aristotle’s assumptions on the motion of heavenly bodies that stood for two millennia. This is considered the first crucial discovery that compromised Aristotle’s influence, ushering in a new era of human thought; the Scientific Revolution. Copernicus also initiated a parting of ways with religious authority, progressing, as Feuerstein phrases it, “without the doctrinal straightjacket of the church.” (Feuerstein, 2013; 2) This independence ushered in a new authority.

Before we begin, we should note that Europe and its cultural and technological developments surely did not occur in a vacuum. The Islamic world had its own revolution centuries before, forever changing the field of astronomy, and leaving us with algebra (*al-jabr*) and the Arabic numeral system. Adding to these numbers, the number zero was received from India. China too had its own scientific revolutions that predate the Islamic which further shaped astronomy, navigation and generally inspired the possibility of material technology in the cultures in which they came in contact. Nonetheless, for the scope of this project, we will focus on Europe as its intellectual hegemony is essential to this project.
The task set before Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) was to rectify the fields of mathematics and geometry with the requirements of Aristotelian/Ptolemaic astronomy. (Henry, 19) In doing so, it could be said that Copernicus literally shook the earth from its very foundation, at least in a metaphysical sense. But he did not merely establish a new standpoint from which to theoretically observe the universe, he unsettled the prevailing myths and metaphysics that undergirded the story of what it meant to be human. As such, this new standpoint was not simply astronomical; it was existential. It is sometimes easy to overlook the enormous difference—the radical discontinuity—between a geocentric universe and a heliocentric solar system. The very universe that Aristotle gazed at in passivity simply changed, and perhaps even more importantly, so did the role of the observer. There may be some manner of correlation between theōria and the metaphysics of a geocentric earth. Theōria was given a privileged and even revered position, as was the earth. It seems that the very same maneuver that decentralized the earth and identified our sun as but one of billions and billions decentralized theōria.

As Henry notes, Copernicus was not necessarily a revolutionary figure in his own time, but merely a dutiful, conservative scientist. (Henry, 20) The revolution would not be underway until Newton. Isaac Newton (1642-1727) set the Scientific Revolution thoroughly in motion with the release of his Principia in 1687, a truly revolutionary book that became the timeless standard for classical mechanics, or, all the more suggestive of its importance, Newtonian mechanics. As Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) refined the
orbital mechanics of Copernicus’s heliocentric solar system and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) collected data on the matter the likes of which had never before been imagined, Newton’s *Principia* introduced the universal law of gravity that tied it all together, along with introducing an equally revolutionary form of mathematics to explain it all.

There are numerous other figures that had a role to play in this revolution, but this brief introduction sufficiently identifies the basic shift in era that needs to be highlighted for the purpose of this project. What needs to be identified in this context is how the metaphysics and epistemological assumptions of *theōria* transformed into the methods of science as we know it. Codified by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), the scientific method assumed new axioms about the nature of our universe, and the metaphysics of Aristotle (heavenly spheres, unmoved movers, etc.) gave way to a new standpoint of materialism (Kepler’s Laws of Planetary Motion, Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, etc). This transition in worldviews was aided by the discoveries of Copernicus and Kepler which brought forth the powerful realization that the laws of the heavens were the same as the laws of the earth. (Henry, 25) The emphasis on the polarity between heaven and earth, up and down, was replaced with the new concept of gravity and its ensuing circular/elliptical motions.

*A New Epistēmē*

As the predominantly metaphysical, perhaps even quasi-religious, worldview gave way to realism, something subtle yet still very powerful was changing in the *zeitgeist*. At the heart of *theōria* was the observer, the *theōros*, for whom spectating was understood as *the*
defining activity of the human being *par excellence*. For an astronomer like Copernicus gazing through his telescope, the awe and mystery of the universe must surely have been present.\(^3\) In many respects, Copernicus was still functioning within the platonic realm. Having been trained in mathematics and geometry, he could still “gaze with the mind and not the eyes” when looking at the stars, seeing it all in term of mathematics. (Nightingale, 81) This is still an act of *theōria* as an immediate apprehension of the universe, but Copernicus set in motion something entirely different.

What occurred can be understood as a change in how *epistēmē* functioned philosophically. *Epistēmē* was the chosen term for knowledge, or scientific knowledge, by the Greeks but it was not yet “scientific” in the sense that the term is understood today. The general assumption behind the classical use of the term *epistēmē* was that universal truths could be deduced from basic principles. That is, it was reasoned purely intellectually, as the criterion of experimental verification had not yet been introduced. It was Francis Bacon who proposed a new approach to *epistēmē* that functioned as a bridge between Aristotelian *epistēmē* and *technē*, which differed radically from Greek and Medieval forms of *epistēmē*. (Kwaśnicki, 54)

The difference was subtle, yet profoundly revolutionary. Instead of experimentation functioning as evidence in support of a theory— *technē* supporting *epistēmē* —, theory, according to Bacon, was strictly a consequence of experimentation. (Kwaśnicki, 54) In

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\(^3\) The author can attest to this fact, having once witnessed a moon of Jupiter appear from behind the planet in real time.
other words, *epistēmē* was no longer understood to require some sort of technical demonstration to demonstrate its validity, *epistēmē* was now thought of as the result of material experimentation. Within this there is a problem foretold by Aristotle.

Included in this problem was the practical nature of science. That is, the developing sciences of the age did not merely expand general theoretical understanding; it allowed people to act in new practical ways. That is, science brought along with it technology. The issue here is that *epistēmē* was not just becoming bound to *technē*, but also to *phrónēsis*, or practical wisdom. As the sciences progressed, so did their technology, and following right behind was an entirely new world of options, the likes of which had never before been dreamed. These were not just advancements in the tools of science, like the compound microscope or the refracting telescope, but inventions that would revolutionize the culture; military, medical, and transportation technology.

New scientific methods combined with the excitement that followed this boom in technology usurped what Aristotle saw as the most essential part of being human; that is, *nous*. As mentioned above, this shift in the nature of *epistēmē* changed *technē* from proof of an idea, to that from which an idea is derived. For Aristotle, *epistēmē* was only derived from first principles, which, in contradistinction to the scientific method, was only able to be grasped through *nous*. (Aristotle, 1027) This assumption of Aristotle centralizes the role of the individual, whereas the scientific method renders the individual more or less irrelevant. “The data speaks for itself,” as it were.
About this inversion Aristotle makes his point explicitly clear, but he does so in terms of *sophia* which he explains as a contemplation of the highest principles, defined by the merging of *nous* and *epistêmê*. (1028) This is generally rendered as “philosophical wisdom,” a term likely to draw disdain. The central element of *sophia* rendered irrelevant by the new *epistêmê* of science was *nous*, as the contemplation of *sophia* presumed the individual as a central component of contemplation, whereas science assumes a standpoint wherein the individual is irrelevant, if not non-existent. It is also important to note that “philosophy” was understood as a love of wisdom, *philo sophia*. As *nous* was removed from the equation, the definition of “philosophy” changed.

Aristotle explicitly warned against such an inversion as he held *sophia* in high regard as a great virtue and simply as that which brings people the highest happiness. (1034) Concerning its relationship to practical wisdom, he writes, “It would be thought strange if [*phrónësis*], being inferior to [*sophia*], is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing.” (1034) From this we can see a very clear categorical distinction between the two modes of thought, and also the warning that the fruits of technology can come to take control of and drive the system that produces it. Being brought up in the context of ethics, Aristotle has in mind how to structure one’s character and live a good life, making decisions and meaningfully guiding oneself into the future. In order to accomplish this, one needs to cultivate *nous*, and thus *sophia*, and let their practical decision-making flow forth from this cultivated wisdom. If *nous* is not in control, that control is given over to
technology itself. That this becomes “immoral” in an Aristotelian sense is obvious. This point is important enough to a degree that Aristotle repeats it. He writes,

But again [phrónēsis] is not supreme over [sophia], i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state. (1036)

This is the fundamental point of divergence to be emphasized in this section; i.e., the exclusion of the individual qua lived phenomenon from the scientific process. The ethical and personal element to Aristotle’s understanding of the issue is utterly excluded by supplanting the individual with material experimentation.

This change in how epistēmē was understood is the very essence of the scientific method, and this change, and the ensuing change in zeitgeist, extended to all matters of culture, which began the Age of Reason, or “The Enlightenment.” As such, these scientific changes were not merely constrained to the laboratory, but permeated just about everything. But this method overlooked something; something that could not at all be subjected to—stood outside of—the scientific method.

The Decline of Nous Poiētikos

As we transition into the next section on the Scientific Revolution, we should address the progression of Nous into this era. Aristotle’s exhaustive influence demanded recognition in all spheres of thought susceptible to rationality, and in this case, the sphere of theology was quick to adapt. This highest capacity bestowed with near spiritual qualities was
adopted by such highly influential Christian thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Aquinas accepted a number of Aristotle’s positions, to include *nous poiêtikos*, which Aquinas represented as “active intuition.” Thomas also accepted Aristotle’s form/matter distinction and both the primacy and immediacy of active intuition.

However, centuries later during the cultural shift to be addressed below, philosophers such as Descartes entirely dropped the active intellect’s primacy in favor of *ratio* as expressed by his “*cogito*.” This *ratio*, perhaps “ratiocination,” is an expression of passive intellect, or “*nous pathetikos*” defined by its receptive capacity to be aware of rational symbols in the mind, as opposed to the generative, creative capacities of *nous poiêtikos*.

This is an issue addressed in detail by Martin and Barresi in their *Naturalization of the Soul: Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century* (2004). In this period, the soul slowly transitioned into the mind itself, which was conveniently the domain of the emerging dominance of science. By the end of the eighteenth century, the soul had in essence been reduced to the mind. The problems presented by Plato in his *Phaedo*—and intimated by Aristotle—such as what happens after death, what adds continuity to the human being moment to moment, were taken out of the metaphysical sphere and thrust into the sphere of science and the body. This shift in domain shifted the self as a living creative phenomenon right out of meaningful discourse.
The Aftermath

It is difficult to articulate exactly what was lost during this transitional era beyond \textit{nous}, but \textit{that} something was lost speaks for itself. The inarticulate nature of what was lost played a great role in its exclusion, due to the prioritization of that which is bright and clear, which will be discussed in the following chapter. That which was clear and publicly discussable was prioritized during this time. Concerning topics such as politics and how matter works, this was a pretty good idea, as well as in the context of dispelling destructive superstition. However, when these criteria were applied to the body, nature, and religion, something was left behind.

The term “counter-enlightenment” was popularized in the 1970s by Isaiah Berlin, and was taken up by Gerrard. It is relevant to this project that Gerrard mentions that study into these “counter-enlightenments” is, “lagging at least a generation behind the scholarly literature on the enlightenment…” (Gerrard, 2) This suggests the illusiveness of the topic, its unpopularity, and perhaps implicit threats to the status quo. Concerning these movements Gerrard notes that there was no single counter-enlightenment, and that there were many separate counter-movements. (Gerrard, 4). The only thing they had in common was the phenomenon to which they were reacting. Despite their multiplicity, Gerrard contends that they all share three principles; they 1) implicate a cast of characters, most notably Rousseau and Voltaire as their champions, along with a secondary cast, to include the likes of Kant and Hume, cast as villains; 2) claim the Enlightenment was “deluded and dangerous in some fundamental way;” and 3) “contest what [Gerrard calls] ‘the Enlightenment perversion of reason.’” (Gerrard, 10-11) By 3)
he means that each counter-enlightenment movement disagrees over the reach or domain of rationality. Or as he himself states, “The battle has been over the scope, meaning and application of reason, not over whether it is good or bad…” (Gerrard, 11) This issue of “scope” will be taken up in the following chapter in more detail as this seems to be the essence of The Enlightenment itself, as well as the problem faced by this current project.

To briefly explain the heart of the problem to which the counter-enlightenments responded, we can propose the following sketch. With the popularity of science’s successes, its methodology was fetishized, elevating it beyond its natural scope and domain. The essence of the problem was that when the standpoint of science and rationality was placed in an absolute position, and as such became uncontestable, the only arguments science and rationality could accept against itself were rational, scientific ones. The consequence being that the domain of science was thought (erroneously) to be exhaustive. In addition, the scientific standpoint predetermined what form of argumentation and expression were valuable or even allowed. This self-selecting capacity in-part isolated rationality from all other modes of expression. In this sense, rationality was thought to be exclusive as well as exhaustive. When it was applied to the domain of being human, the human being was reduced to a highly abstract rational being, which was a clear thematic continuation of Aristotle’s tripartite soul in the sense that mere biological functions were considered secondary in nature and even obstructive to the cultivation of rationality. The heart of the issue that spurred the counter-enlightenment movements was the legitimization and re-establishing of the domains of fundamentally human phenomena such as emotion, personal experience, and artistic
expression. The counter-enlightenments did not hold that science was wrong, *per se*, but that it needed to recognize the limits of its own domain.

*The Body*

To turn towards the purview of this project, the human body will be examined in the context of this tension between the Scientific Revolution and the Romantic response. The Romantic Movement or Romanticism, spanning from the late eighteenth century, to the mid-nineteenth century, was one such explicit reaction to the exclusivity of rational thought that was thrust upon the human body. For the realists, as the heavens were understood to follow mechanized processes, so was the human body. This endeavor is notably expressed by the physician Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), whose *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* (1543) established a new precedent in the field of anatomy. Joffe makes a similar comparison, that Vesalius was influenced by the general *zeitgeist* of discovery and that his systematic exploration, study, and discoveries concerning the human body mirrored the spirit of discovery exhibited by the explorers of the age, as well as their geographical and cartographical successes. (Joffe, 8) The study of the human body as a machination is indeed important, but the spirit of the time rendered the human body as *merely* a machination.

Following suit, René Descartes (1596-1650) saw the body as something essentially akin to a clock, chocked full of gears, springs and other simple machines, resorting to an abstract (and quite absurd) form of dualism to tie the mind and body together. (Descartes, 59-60) The worldview Descartes was left with faced the problem of how “[immaterial
souls] fit into an otherwise wholly material world, governed by mechanistic laws.”
(Martin & Barresi, 7) With respect to Galen’s sentiment on the soul, there may very well be other realms of the soul, but the successes of science made only the material one matter. Barresi notes that roughly before the Scientific Revolution, bodily resurrection as a topic had lost favor in theological circles and the immaterial rational soul became the center of focus. (Barresi, 2) Descartes, in an effort to make room for this soul in the midst of the popularity of rationality, proposed his strict form of dualism. The ambivalence entertained by Galen had essentially vanished; the immaterial soul was equated with the conscious self, and the body was left as a phenomenon of the material world. The only remainder of this ambivalence could be found in Descartes’s own inability to account for just how these two interacted. That they were unified or fused together he clearly accepted, the nature of which he was never able to articulate. (Descartes, 57) Although Descartes’ substance dualism stands as nearly a caricature of the mind-body problem of the era, it sufficiently represents the problem in general. Vesalius and Descartes were two of the, perhaps not “engineers”, but “architects” of the Enlightenment, the legacy of which was addressed by the Romantics.

It was up to Romantic thinkers to attempt to seal this fissure that appeared between mind and body, particularly with respect to their value. Frosch, while writing on British Romantic conceptions of the body, notes that, citing William Blake (1757-1827), the healing of this division was at the very heart of the Romantic agenda. He writes,
Thus divided, man is a composite of the five-sense body of Lockean empiricism and the transcending mind of Cartesian rationalism; and Blake is always insistent that to embrace one pole of a division and deny the other is merely to intensify the process of self-distortion. (Frosch, 376)

In his article, Frosch provides clear examples of how the British Romantic poets—Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Keats—understood that the healing of this schism was the solution to the problem of their time, as presented in the abstract, symbolic and evocative prose that defines Romantic poetry. Contrary to such substance dualists and those who rendered the body as merely a machination, the Romantics understood the solution to this problem as a return to the realm of sensual enjoyment, but free of the shame and restrictions of the over-zealous application of rationalization. (Frosch, 378)

Seemingly as an explicit reaction to Kant’s transcendentalism and *a priori* categories of understanding, Frosch notes that this return entailed shattering the absolutism of one’s own perspective but without fundamentally transcending or leaving behind any aspect of the lived body. (379, 383-384) Lofty imagery aside, the Romantics advocated a view of the human body that was *lived*; expressive of unhindered creativity and the full gamut of human emotion; none of which were addressed—or even remotely alluded to—in Vesalius’s *De Humani Corporis Fabrica*.

**Nature**

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) advocated an Aristotelian position with respect to nature in which he elevated the human being above nature itself. In Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* he demonstrates his belief that humanity was in some way removed from nature, as pointed out by Eliot Deutsch. (Deutsch, 1989) Deutsch explains this position while
offering a critique that is very much in line with the Romantic agenda. In this text, Kant wrote on experiences of the sublime, which he explained as an experience of the majesty and power of nature (e.g., Yosemite Valley, a powerful thunder storm). But Kant took this phenomenon not as an opportunity to reflect on nature with humility and awe, but as an opportunity to reflect upon our own superiority. We can see already how this attitude reflect the cultural “conquest” of nature vis-à-vis modern science. With the world so reduced to material, as an idealist, Kant understood that the experience of the sublime is just that; an experience. That is, experiences are wholly of the mind (phenomenal), and not at all in nature itself (noumenal). Successful reflection upon this overwhelming sensation drives a wedge between one’s lower instincts (e.g., fear and trembling) and one’s higher intellectual capacities (i.e., transcendental idealism). The resulting separation is what sets one in a position over and above nature (as well as animals and simple people for that matter).

The problem Deutsch sees in Kant is that this attitude only leads to a divorce of the subjective states of the individual with his/her body as well as nature when rendered as objects, which is well in accord with the problems perceived by Romantic thinkers. So, as a counter-point to Kant’s rational reflection on the sublime as a means to reaffirm the strict prioritization of mind over body and nature, Deutsch offers the term “natural reverence” which is “the attitude, the awareness, of the belonging together of [people] and nature in freedom—in such a way that allows for meaningful, creative play in that relationship.” (Deutsch, 259-260) In brief, Deutsch advocates re-thinking the hierarchical stratification of humans and nature, to place the two on equal footing in order
to “bring our scientific understanding of nature’s organic complexity into an integral harmony with a spiritual understanding of reality’s simplicity.” (Deutsch, 265)

Although a contemporary thinker, Deutsch’s sentiment may be classified as a more current manifestation of Romantic ideology. Deutsch, writing on environmental ethics, is addressing the modern industrial capitalist standpoint that sees nature only in terms of potential wealth; industrialism and capitalism both having been shaped by Enlightenment thought. As such, Deutsch is more or less advocating the same point the Romantic Movement did, but more specifically focused on modern environmental problems.

**Religion**

To briefly address the spirit of Romantic religious thinkers, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) makes for an excellent candidate as his *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* explicitly defends Protestant Christianity from Enlightenment-era reductionism. For Schleiermacher, religion was not a phenomenon under the purview of rationality, but instead was based on a primary human experience he referred to as a “feeling of the infinite”, which was prior to both cognition and volition. (Gregory, 71-72) For an example of Schleiermacher’s expressing of this phenomenon, he writes,

> Would that I could and might express it, at least indicate it, without having to desecrate it! A manifestation, an event develops quickly and magically into an image of the universe. Even as the beloved and ever-sought-for form fashions itself, my soul flees toward it; not as a shadow, but as the holy essence itself. I lie on the bosom of the infinite world. At this moment I am its soul, for I feel all its powers and its infinite life as my own; at this moment it is my body, for I penetrate its muscles and its limbs as my own. (Schleiermacher, 32)
For Schleiermacher, “this moment is the highest flowering of religion.” (Schleiermacher, 32) This expression was identified and studied years later by Sigmund Freud under the name of the “oceanic feeling” which Freud defined as, not an “article of faith,” but a “purely subjective fact” which Freud considered to be the very basis of religion itself. (Freud, 11-12) Stated negatively, this experience, Schleiermacher adamantly notes, has absolutely nothing to do with the infatuation with metaphysics and morals that he saw dominating Protestant theology during his time. (Schleiermacher, 12)

Further identifying a means of expressing the problem of the age as he saw it, Schleiermacher notes that the human soul is a product of two opposing drives, not so surprisingly defined functionally similar to Blake as cited above in the sense that there are two natural components to the human being, and in balancing them, one becomes aware of something far greater than the apparent sum of their parts. The first drive “strives to draw into itself everything that surrounds it, ensnaring it in its own life and… wholly absorbing it into its innermost being. The other longs to extend its own inner self even further, thereby permeating and imparting to everything from within, while never being exhausted itself.” (Schleiermacher, 5) Such a person caught up in the first type of drive, according to Schleiermacher is driven by enjoyment. They see no other purpose than to strive after the sources of their pleasure. They are “quieted so long as [they have] grasped one of [their sources of desire].” (Schleiermacher, 5) The other type of person is opposed to pleasure and seeks only meaning, reason and purpose in the world. The first is alienated from his or her desires and the second is obsessed with rational thought. Schleiermacher writes, “those who lie at the extreme ends of this great series are fervent
natures, who are turned in upon themselves… They never get beyond perceptions of the individual phenomena; always occupied with egoistic concerns.” (Schleiermacher, 6)

However, when these two drives are in balance in a person, they represent a human ideal for Schleiermacher. Such people in “whom both tendencies are combined in a more fruitful manner”, he believes, are those who can truly speak on behalf of God. (Schleiermacher, 6) What requires our attention here is the theme of balance suggested by Blake as identified by Frosch, as it appears to be the very same insight.

To conclude this brief section on Romanticism and Religion, I will present one final passage from On Religion that further demonstrates Schleiermacher’s critique of the zeitgeist. He writes,

> To know of only one point of view for everything is exactly opposite of having all points of view for each thing; it is the way to distance oneself directly away from the universe and to sink into the most wretched limitedness, to become a true serf, bound to the place on which by chance one may be standing. (Schleiermacher, 62)

In this passage, we find a very clear critique of monolithic standpoints, addressing in this case the absolute perspective championed by the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment, and even rational Christian standpoints. He contrasts this “having one point of view for everything” with the state that arise when one assumes a more balanced posture in which one entertains “all points of view for each thing.” The former, he adds, is akin to slavery; a slavery wherein one is no longer free to experience the “feeling of the infinite.”
Conclusion to Chapter Two

This chapter constructed a brief sketch which addressed a common thread that ran from early Greece through the standpoint of *theōria* to the Scientific Revolution, the Age of Reason and the ensuing Romantic Movement. In this was identified a standpoint that was seemingly outside of and above the limits of nature, whether Aristotle’s quiet *theōria* or the fantastically successful realism of science. This standpoint of scientific understanding was structured such that *nous*, and other renderings of the expressive acts of individuality, were no longer welcome; a point that did not go unnoticed by the various counter-Enlightenment movements. In both cases, the lived experience of the human body was relegated to secondary status in favor of rational discourse, more implicitly so by Aristotle, and explicitly in the application of the scientific method and materialism.

This concluded with a sketch of the Romantic reactions to this maneuver, who reacted to the enlightenment in order to demonstrate that something was surely lost during this era. This is the fundamental point that was emphasized in this section that must be kept in mind in reading the following chapters of this project; that current infatuations with science and rationality exclude the individual *qua* lived phenomenon.

The value that the author sees in this sketch is that it identifies a problem that lingers to this day. The Romantic Movement did not manage to “solve” the problem of the era; solve being a problematic—if not ridiculous—term. As in order to solve something, one must fall into the trap of framing the problem in terms of the rational paradigm; the very paradigm that is attempting to be “solved.” But it did bring to light that there is indeed a lingering problem as this fundamental imbalance has left a lingering mark on our culture,
both local and planetary. A number of movements fueled by the rebellious and balancing strain of thought introduced by the abovementioned counter-Enlightenment movements have followed, each making their mark and receding without imparting the caliber of social change they intended or perhaps was even possible. Such movements include Transcendentalism, Western Occultism, and Theosophy; all of which arose due to this nagging sense of lack.

Such movements had the modern advantage of drawing from the novel standpoints of other cultures as these movements arose at a later time when access to global communication and information was simply more available. Many of these traditions looked to the East, in particular, to postural Yoga and Yogic metaphysics. This tradition has given careful attention to the body and devised specific methods for getting oneself more in touch with one’s body, but such traditions are all too often just as choked with their own monolithic, albeit novel, dogmas. So as we find ourselves today, the blending of Yoga’s techniques of the body and mind into the general milieu of our current culture presents quite a challenge as the context of classical Sāmkhya-Yoga differ from the context of the reaches of the post-enlightenment era, to say the very least. But nonetheless, this seems to be the task at hand; a task taken up in Chapter Four.

In the following second chapter, we will revisit this theme of the predominance of theōria, but recast this phenomenon in the terms of T.P. Kasulis’s philosophical paradigm of intimacy and integrity, which will allow us to reconsider how “exclusive” the current preponderance on science and its methods really is, as well as changing the scope of the
project, as “the West” is simply not at adequate categorical distinction. Although a strain of thought may have western roots, its influences are global. That is, one may encounter the preponderance of integrity wherever one goes at the expense of intimacy. As Kasulis explains, the self *qua* lived experiences really has not gone anywhere (how could it?), but has merely slipped into the background. And as such, it can so be retrieved. The body will be the topic of this chapter as well, looking at how the themes of *theōria* from this chapter worked their way into the understanding of the human body.
3. INTEGRITY’S ROLE IN THE ESTRANGEMENT OF INTIMACY

In this chapter assumptions of theōria will continue to be investigated along with the resultant dualist view of the body that arises but in a new light by introducing the philosophical paradigms of T.P. Kasulis. This chapter will take a step deeper to look at the philosophical assumptions of theōria while juxtaposing them with a complimentary and not altogether different standpoint. Kasulis identifies what he calls “integrity” as the driving philosophical principle of Greek though and standpoints that share a similar orientation. In contrast to integrity, Kasulis introduces “intimacy,” which represents a different yet familiar orientation to approaching the world that instead prioritizes holism and interdependence. As he explains, these exist in a gestalt relationship where one occupies the foreground the other the background, and the insistence upon the exclusive use of one ensures the partial or complete repression of the other.

Returning to Greece, this chapter will inspect the understanding of the body as formed by the principles of integrity and the resultant cultural assumptions about the mind and body. To aid in this endeavor, KURIYAMA Shigehisa will be of assistance as his work on cultural divergence concerning views of the body addresses many pertinent and helpful points. The terminology of Kasulis will be utilized in order to identify integrity’s role in the manifestation of stricter forms of dualism and materialism with respect to the human being that can be contrasted with alternative understandings which are better interpreted in terms of intimacy. Issues to be addressed in this section are Kuriyama’s identification
of what Kasulis would term “integrity,” such as the criterion of lucidity, skepticism towards the esoteric, the role of geometry in thoughts of the body, and the early Greek distinction between body \textit{qua} agent as it stands in contrast to the soul.

This chapter will conclude with a consideration of what I call “overstepping the bounds of one’s domain,” which is a reflection on cultivating awareness of the limits of one’s preferred standpoint. This section will concluded by reintroducing Kasulis’s categories of Intimacy and Integrity, and their essential gestalt relationship as a proposed means of looking at the above problems of divergence differently.

**Intimacy and Integrity: Legitimizing New Domains**

In this section, a pair of philosophical paradigms will be introduced that will assist this investigation, which is the position presented by T.P. Kasulis in his \textit{Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference} (2002). In a piece that predated this publication, Kasulis describes this as a “contextual grid” that is superimposed over an object of consideration by an individual or even by a larger group at a cultural level. (Yuasa, 1987: 1) The problem he identifies is that this grid often obfuscates certain aspects of the object of consideration, creating blind spots relative to the chosen standpoint. As he explains, “the more intently we look for the answer in terms of the grid, the more impossible the task becomes.” He suggests that the only way to address these problems is to adjust the grid.
In his *Intimacy or Integrity*, Kasulis presents two “contextual grids” or what he explains to be two philosophical paradigms, intimacy and integrity, making the argument that differences can be better understood by looking at them in terms of whether an individual or a culture tends to prioritize, or hold in the foreground, one standpoint or the other. Cultural difference aside, these categories will help discuss the issue at hand, primarily with respect to Kasulis’s assertion of the gestalt paradigm in the sense that he proposes entirely different paradigms of perceiving the world and oneself that are merely hidden in the background of our own orientations; hidden in plain sight. With this current project in mind, as will be shown below, in light of Kasulis, the assumptions of the Scientific Revolution and its ensuing problems can be more meaningfully cast in terms of intimacy and integrity.

There are problems that arise when making such broad generalizations about culture that this project hopes to avoid. It may have been remotely feasible a century ago but the information age and globalization have brought the world’s people a lot closer together. Technology and its driving standpoint whose inception can be traced to Europe is now global—the same applies to Yoga and its Indian roots—and the values that accompany them seem to have traveled with them. That is, industrialization is no longer a “Western”

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1 For the sake of this project, the cultural aspects of Kasulis’s categories will be minimized as for the time being they may introduce superfluous and distracting elements to the conversation. This is especially true with respect to the current age of globalization wherein cultural distinctions have become far more permeable.

2 Kasulis notes that these terms are not at all absolute, as he proposes them simply for their heuristic value. I offer them in the same light in the sense that I do not want to establish psychological truths, essences, or a typology, but instead offer a means of addressing the “intimate” aspects of being that were overlooked during the enlightenment.
trait, nor is Yoga strictly “Eastern” anymore. In this sense, in this global age, distinctions such as “Western” and “Eastern” are losing their meaning outside of historical discussion. I believe that it is in this sense that Kasulis proposes his categories of intimacy and integrity, as these attitudes can be employed to talk about anything from individuals to making generalizations about groups, regardless of where they may be geographically or historically located.

Kasulis warns against one-sided and reductionist perspectives when engaging in dialog, which is central to this current project. To a certain degree, such initial assertions of difference may be useful as they set the stage for conversation. As a kindred example, writing on discussing difference in the context of Jung, (who will be discussed in detail in Chapters Six and Seven), Clarke writes,

> In hermeneutical terms it does of course make sense to create some kind of initial distance between interlocutors, but phrases such as these carry a huge weight of prejudice [sic] which can only serve to frustrate the whole attempt at dialogue… [Leaving any categorical distinctions] unanalysed and unqualified [is] grossly inadequate and misleading. (Clarke, 162)

Jung drew perhaps extreme over-generalizations between cultures in terms of “extroversion” and “introversion” that were simply untrue and generally disruptive, while carrying only a modicum of usefulness. Kasulis explicitly warns against this sort of one-sidedness.

In contrast to this one-sidedness, Kasulis emphasizes correlativity, suggesting that the matter of standpoint or orientation is never an either/or matter, and that intimacy and integrity vary person by person in spite of what one may say about generalizations about
cultures. Yet it is the assertion of this project, as discussed in the previous chapter, that integrity has been predominantly influential in Greece and Europe, which is now global in scope. This predominance has in turn generated a perspectival bias. As Clarke writes, “…in the passage of ideas from East to West, where the languages and cultures of the latter have assumed the status of world domination, may we not be witnessing something less like an innocent conversation and more like an imperial annexation? (166) This is very strongly worded, but perhaps appropriately so.³ The point made by both Clarke and Kasulis is that the hegemony of the Western worldview has historically ran rough-shod over alternative standpoint, and as such a more favorable means of discussing difference is in order. Counter-reductionism and correlative will be the methods emphasized here so that the marginalized position of intimacy may be given its own room to stand.

**Integrity**

Integrity will be introduced first as this position represents the standpoint that accounts for the methods and assumptions of theōria and the scientific method which predominates. As will become evident, this term and its characteristics resonate with the depiction of theōria from the previous chapter. To explain the term, Kasulis lists five characteristics of integrity that define it in contradistinction to intimacy. (Kasulis, 25) To begin, 1) integrity is a position that represents that which is objective and publicly verifiable. This is to say, it presumes that nothing is concealed and its arguments are “bright and clear,” open, and accessible to all. This also incorporates the criteria of

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³ Jung’s “imperial annexation” of Yoga will be discussed in Chapter Eight, while the scope of this chapter will be the “annexation” of intimacy by integrity.
verifiability and peer review of the scientific community. 2) In the standpoint of integrity, relationships are external. To explain this, Kasulis uses the example of losing one’s wallet. (37-38) The money in one’s wallet belongs to him or her; it is a matter of property rights, ownership, and the legal entitlement to what is earned. This Kasulis refers to as “belonging-to.” In contrast, Kasulis notes how different the loss of money is from the loss of a cherished picture of a loved one carried in the same lost wallet. This Kasulis refers to as “belonging-with,” which is a principle of intimacy to be further addressed below. External relationships are clearly defined and independent of whoever is inspecting them. 3) In integrity, knowledge is empty of affect. That is, emotional tones and other personal elements that accompany one’s knowledge are understood to be essentially irrelevant if not disruptive and undesirable; a fact is a fact independent of how one feels about it. 4) Knowledge is strictly intellectual and symbolic; purely conceptual. This establishes that symbols are the only acceptable language of integrity. Finally, 5) Knowledge within the standpoint of integrity is bright and open, or “self-conscious of its own grounds.” In tandem with 1), if information is objective, it must be obvious and clearly so. Nothing can remain hidden or obscured.

**Intimacy**

Intimacy should strike the reader as familiar as Kasulis suggests this is the prevailing standpoint that guides scientific and rational discourse. Although markedly different in nature, so too should the standpoint of intimacy. Intimacy, as defined by Kasulis, is the standpoint defined by interdependence, synthesis and holism, and as such the assumptions of integrity do not apply. For example, even the expression “standpoint” is
compromised. “Standpoint” suggests the position from which a domain is constructed, and in the Greek context this suggests *theōria*. However, the standpoint of intimacy Kasulis defines quite differently, as the position “*in medias res,*” or “in the midst of things.” (95) As an example, Watsuji recognizes this difference in what he has in mind by the expression “resignation to life,” which is the standpoint he claims arises when one is perpetually smothered by nature and life in a monsoon-fed jungle. (Watsuji, 21) From this position, the role of the individual is not minimized, but instead, one assumes an exhaustively immersive position of highly personal immediacy and interconnectedness.

To further clarify, Kasulis introduces five characteristics of intimacy that each stand in contradistinction to the above five characteristics of integrity. To begin, 1) intimacy is still objective, but personal rather than public. For example, learning about a sport versus playing a sport. There is an immediate, embodied, and personal understanding that is still objective, but is not something that can be explained outside of actually doing. For example, two athletes may be able to discuss the nuances of playing their sport that a non-athlete may objectively understand, but their knowledge will simply be unlike in kind. 2) Relationships are intimate and personal. This is the aforementioned “belonging-with.” In the case of the lost wallet, one has a very different relationship with the lost photos as they represented something invaluable that was established through experience over time. This is also suggested in Watsuji’s discussion of the meaning of the Japanese term chosen for “human being,” which is *ningen* (人間). Watsuji argues against discreet and isolated (integrity) definitions of the human being based on some combination of mind and body, and instead emphasizes the fundamental relationships between human
beings that truly establish our humanity, what he calls “betweenness.” (Watsuji, 1996, 13-14) Such relationships are inseparable from the individual.  

3) Knowledge has an affective dimension. That is, our knowledge is simply that; our knowledge. For example, knowledge about the immediate inner workings of one’s self is by definition intimate. 4) Knowledge is somatic as well as psychological. Knowledge is embodied and assimilated through experience; it is not merely a learning of the mind, but a learning of the body and it is a learning that is a result of doing. This suggests that such learning takes a great deal of mental and/or physical effort. Learning to golf would be one such example as there is simply no substitute for regularly repeating the requisite patterns of motion and spending time learning how to intuitively read the greens. Finally, 5) intimacy’s ground is dark and esoteric. Dark knowledge is that which arises over time, and it cannot be immediately or easily shared. In order to gain this knowledge, one must set oneself on a path and practice it for a long time. For example, take driving a manual transmission vehicle. There are surely purely mechanical means of explaining the underlying principles, but practice is simply the only way to know how to drive a manual transmission. “You just have to develop a feel for it,” is an expression of intimacy.

Concerning the body, integrity looks at it with principles, to include objective sciences like biology, physics, and psychiatry, which rely on mathematical methods and the

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4 The consequence of childhood development in the absence of such relationships is catastrophic. For example, the case of Oxana Malaya who was raised by dogs. (Grice, 2006) This suggests that relationships, or betweenness, are essential, which compromises ontological claims of one’s essence being reduced to the mind and/or body.

5 “Esoteric” often carries the connotation of that which is passed on to an initiate by a guru, but this is not suggested by Kasulis’s use of the term as such passage is strictly objective in nature and thus falls under the purview of integrity.
postulation of universals to define a particular. Intimacy, on the other hand, looks at the
body as my lived body, which is indifferent to mathematical systemization and defined by
personal growth and creative expressiveness. We see here two very different strains of
thought at work; one analyzing the human being, breaking it up into its component parts
from afar in order to identify the principles that guide it, and the other dynamically
integrating the human being further into its environment, its relationships, and even its
own body through action.

**Benefits of the Gestalt paradigm**

Central to Kasulis’s categories is the relationship between the two, which is defined by
the gestalt paradigm of foreground and background.\(^6\) The advantage of this situational
arrangement is that moving between each standpoint does not require movement, *per se.*
It is a matter of adjusting one’s focus in order to bring what was in the background to the
foreground and vice versa. That is, as in the case of this project, it is a matter of moving
between the standpoint of detached objectivity, to *in medias res;* a more articulate form
of the sentiment expressed in the section on Romanticism in the previous chapter. For
example, Schleiermacher rejected purely rational articulations of theology (integrity) in
favor of his “feeling of the infinite” (intimacy).

Briefly, an example provided by Kasulis can be introduced as a means of defining how
this relationship *does not* function. It is a familiar story with Indian roots although
interpreted creatively by Kasulis, of five blind sages touching an elephant. (Kasulis, 156)

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\(^6\) See Footnote 2 in Chapter One.
Here, each sage feels the elephant (some matter to be investigated) and exclaims, “it feels like a thick snake,” “a palm leaf,” etc., each roughly describing the portion of the elephant from their respective standpoints. Bad phenomenology aside (Idhe, 29-30), such a view of perspective suggests the relative situation of each, and perhaps that one merely needs to adopt the position of the other (literally or figuratively, in this case) and their perspective of the matter will change. But this, Kasulis states, is not at all how one goes about changing perspective. This understanding is based on the assumptions of either/or, reductionist thinking, which is a property of integrity.

Instead, Kasulis proposes that such differences are better captured by the gestalt paradigm, using the classic example of Rubin’s vase; the two faces and a vase. In the gestalt paradigm, the relationship of the two images is a matter of which is held in the foreground and which recedes into the background, which suggests that when one image is present (i.e., in the foreground), the other recedes and may even be obscured. Note here how the epistemological assumptions contrast with the previous metaphor of the five blind sages and the elephant. In the first, that which is hidden is literally beyond the range of experience (either present or absent), while in the second, the observer has access to both positions, yet only notices one—at least at first. If one is to move between the standpoint of theoria and in medias res, “movement” is defined quite differently. In order to grasp the other standpoint, the only thing new introduced is how one sees.

It is worthwhile to note that the gestalt paradigm contains elements of both positions and can be explained from either – that it is both a seamless whole (intimacy) consisting of
two different parts (integrity). When such a diagram is encountered, one may see only two faces for a while, but then suddenly, the vase may appear. Although one perspective may be favored, this sudden inversion demonstrates an innate capability of seeing both perspectives. This is arguably Kasulis’ greatest point; that there are *complimentary* perspectives utterly invisible to our own that we intrinsically have access to. Not just negations of our affirmations, but utterly incomprehensible differences that will remain hidden in plain view until such a perspectival shift is undergone.

By centralizing the gestalt paradigm, Kasulis is asserting 1) that people already have immediate access to all the information needed and that although the standpoint of intimacy may appear incomprehensible and unfamiliar, it is far more accessible and familiar than one may believe at first. The gestalt paradigm also asserts 2) that in order to understand another perspective necessarily entails that one must also temporarily leave one’s current standpoint or contextual grid with which one is more familiar. This second point seems lost on those who hold that their position is absolute, for that which is absolute cannot be set aside. This is all the more compounded when cast in the either/or paradigm.

Kasulis asserts that if we wish to become more mindful of this situation, sensitizing ourselves to what usually rests in the background, we must learn to become “bi-orientational” which has as its goal the understanding of one’s own perspectival bias along with recognizing the merits of other seemingly incompatible perspectives. (Kasulis, 156) Learning to see, or to *live*, both is what Kasulis has in mind.
Overstepping the Bounds of One’s Domain

I would like to discuss the issue that arises when one is faced with a number of standpoints. Taking the term figuratively, when one assumes any position or standpoint, the nature of that standpoint predetermines what one is able to see and how it will appear. This is precisely what Kasulis had in mind by “contextual grid.” What one is able see is what I would like to call a “domain.” This is the purview, paradigm, or jurisdiction of any one standpoint. This domain is not merely defined by the field that is being overlooked, but also by its conflation with the methodology implied by the overlooking. “Jurisdiction” is a fine example as it is comprised of 1) a geographically delimited region, and 2) a method of oversight, which in this case is legal authority. With this term in mind, the issue central to the above concerns is a matter of what I will call “overstepping the bounds of one’s domain,” which I propose as an informal logical fallacy. This is what occurs when, assuming one standpoint, one inappropriately encroaches into the domain of another standpoint, and all the more so, when one leaves the domain of his or her standpoint. Again, this is not merely a matter of the object viewed, but of the viewing method in question.

Whenever an object of interest is analyzed, a standpoint must be assumed. That is, we must choose how to look at it, and what tools of analysis we wish to employ. Professionals, by their nature, tend to specialize and routinely inculcate the standpoint appropriate to their profession, although everyone does this to some extent. The point that requires attention is what happens when an individual is confronted with a
phenomenon that is at odds with the presuppositions of their standpoint, and as such does not easily find a place in their domain. A mildly hyperbolic example of such attention to one’s domain can be found in Heinlein’s *Stranger in a Strange Land* in the case of the “Fair Witness;” a person trained and sworn to report information accurately. When a Fair Witness is asked, “That house on the hilltop--can you see what color they've painted it?” she replies, "It's white on this side." (Heinlein, 130) This character, Anne, demonstrates that she is only capable of commenting on what she has access to, in this case, what is in her field of vision, cognizant of the slim chance that the other sides may be some other color. Such attention to detail and to such limitations must also be exercised, regardless of the standpoint.

Concerning how people respond to new information that challenges their standpoints, it may be put forward that a person has three options at hand. They must a) restructure the format of their domain in order to make way for the new idea, b) recognize the possibility that the structure of their domain is incomplete as it cannot account for this new idea while still maintaining that their domain is still mostly valid, and c) deny the validity of the idea.

Option a) is the “eureka” moment, or a spontaneous paradigm shift. This is essentially the process of learning wherein one appropriates alternative means of investigation into their standpoint. Option b) is a form of skepticism, carrying with it both positive and negative connotations. In the positive sense, it is what Campbell refers to as “open minded skepticism,” in which one retains a sense of open curiosity towards that which
does not fit easily into one’s domain. (Campbell, 129) Such an attitude does not discard unfamiliar experiences, but staying true to its initial standpoint may respectfully acknowledge, yet set aside that which is novel. This respectful acknowledgement also appears in the seventh proposition of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* when he writes, “What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence.” Skepticism in the negative sense of the term then does not outright dismiss the idea, but assumes the worst, not taking a definite position while employing reductionism, usually suspecting some manner of trickery. On this topic Feuerstein comments “Sometimes scientists forget that their models, systems, and adopted paradigm are only conceptual approximations, and they defend these artifacts as if they were reality itself.” (2013, 61) This suggests the highest form of exclusive skepticism wherein “that which must be passed over” isn’t even acknowledged as real. Option c) is the most problematic, as it is the very essence of close-mindedness. It is a position that normalizes its own standpoints, taking a closed domain, and assuming its own exhaustiveness to making judgments about what exists outside of this domain.

If one wishes to remain rational, one may only make value judgments about what is appropriate to the standpoint one entertains. For example, the Fair Witness cannot comment about the other side of the house. The best one can say about what exists outside of his or her domain is that whatever it is, it does not comply with the rules that have been accepted as true (option b). When it comes to truth claims, they are only valid within the domain in which they were constructed, and to make a truth claim about another domain is problematic to say the very least. This problem that arises from
making such a truth claim about another domain is what I have in mind by the informal logical fallacy, “overstepping the bounds of one’s domain.”

**Alder, Tyson, and Einstein**

In this sub-section, three cases will be presented that demonstrate “overstepping the bounds of one’s domain,” the first two demonstrating the rigidity of adhering to the standpoint of integrity, and the third demonstrating a keen sensitivity to integrity’s limitations.

The first example is Mike Alder, a mathematician and philosopher, who introduced a term he employs to determine whether or not an idea can or should be taken seriously by scientists. Playing on “Occam’s Razor,” he flippantly phrased his term “Newton’s flaming laser sword,” asserting Newton’s positivist criteria of testability as the criteria for determining whether or not an idea is worth scientific consideration. (Alder, 2014) Alder concludes his article on the topic with a very telling sentiment. He writes,

> It seems to me fair game to use the flaming sword on the philosopher who meddles in science which he does not understand. When he asks questions and is willing to learn, I have no quarrel with him. When he is merely trying to lure you into a word game which has no prospect of leading anywhere, you really have to decide if you like playing that sort of game.

From this we get a very clear impression of where Alder stands as a thinker and what he thinks about philosophy. It is clear that he is not even remotely interested in even entertaining philosophical problems, while dismissing the entire field of philosophy as a
He appears to hold his position as something that is pristine and inviolable which must be protected from the likes of a nosy philosopher. The issue of “leading” somewhere all the more so suggests Alder’s values.

Neil deGrasse Tyson assumed a similar attitude in a recent podcast interview. Speaking with the voice of a hypothetical scientist, he says,

> Look, I got all this world of unknown out there. I'm moving on. I'm leaving you behind. You can't even cross the street because you are distracted by what you are sure are deep questions you've asked yourself. I don't have the time for that. (Levine, K., 2014)

The sentiments of Alder are reflected in this statement; that the functional, practical *ends* of science far out-weigh mere philosophical speculation. In Tyson’s defense, he is in fact a scientist, and it is his job to do science. In this context, his statement is completely understandable; he is a scientist and not a philosopher, for whom Alder’s criteria of “Newton’s Flaming Laser Sword” is quite valid, if not necessary. That being said, there are implicit values that accompany this attitude. For example, when Tyson states, “what you are sure are deep questions,” carries with it a mocking and derisive tone, suggesting that the questions with which the philosophy of science—let alone non-scientific fields of philosophy—concerns itself have no real value. Here, Tyson is normalizing the values of his own position, which is an expression of the absolutism inherent in science.

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7 One may be reminded of the allegory attributed to Amos E. Dolbear wherein a fish is judged by its ability to climb a tree. Alder could be imagined as a squirrel derisively chattering at the fish below his tree. One may wonder if Alder has ever tried swimming…
Albert Einstein is the third example, but in this case he demonstrates a keen awareness of something non-scientific. When asked if he believed that everything could be explained in a scientific way, he responded, “Yes, it is possible, but it would not make sense. It would be an inadequate representation, as if one described a Beethoven symphony in terms of air pressure waves.”8 (Born, 1957) Taken as a caricature of a counterpoint to the former, the attitude expressed herein explicitly leaves room for something non-scientific, a maneuver not made in the examples of Alder and Tyson.

With respect to the aforementioned options available when addressing new information, neither of these three choose a) as they are all scientists discussing that which is outside of their chosen standpoint, which is only natural. The other two degrees of skepticism and denial remain.

Alder’s application of the term “Newton’s Flaming Laser Sword” clearly establishes the domain in which he is willing to have a conversation. He is simply not interested in even entertaining thoughts that are foreign to his methodology of choice. The philosopher who “asks questions and is willing to learn” is one who is already obedient to the established rules of the scientific method. I would go so far as to say that such a person, by definition, isn’t a philosopher any more. The philosopher, according to Alder, is the one who “lures you into a word game which has no prospect of leading anywhere.” This

8 Born: Ja, glauben Sie den, daß sich einfach alles auf naturwissenschaftliche Weise wird abbilden lassen können?
Einstein: Ja, das ist denkbar, aber es hätte doch keinen Sinn. Es wäre eine Abbildung mit inadäquaten Mitteln, so als ob man eine Beethoven-Symphonie als Luftdruckkurve darstellte.”
demonstrates the problem at hand, that Alder, speaking from the standpoint of science, feels he’s being “lured” into a mere “game,” which he already knows won’t lead anywhere. This is not a case of a close-minded Alder exercising option c), but what he understands as his own defense of science’s domain from intruders. There is a degree of exclusivity here, if not zealotry, that defines the problem faced today; that science is a closed system, operated only by those on the inside, and that commentary from outside its domain is a game that won’t lead anywhere.

Tyson, as a scientist representing the domain of the scientific method echoes this sentiment; he doesn’t have time for that. His trivializing of philosophy comes in his expression, “what you are sure are deep questions.” It is worth speculating how he could have framed this statement while remaining more respectful of another’s domain. This attitude is worth identifying as it is not merely the opinion of one man, but a manifestation of the larger zeitgeist. There must be a powerful cultural force at play if someone can become so popular while being so dismissive.

Einstein in his response offers an example of open-minded skepticism wherein he fully acknowledges a domain inaccessible to his chosen standpoint while respectfully employing a familiar example of listening to Beethoven. He respectfully calls to attention the methodological dissidence between one’s lived experience (intimacy) of listening to music versus air pressure waves (integrity). In these examples, it appears that Einstein was the most cognizant of the bounds of his domain.
In this section, intimacy and integrity, their relationship, and an observation about sensitivity to their domains was discussed. Framed in Kasulis’s paradigm, the preponderance of integrity as a cultural movement can be seen as that which pushed integrity into the foreground, while pushing intimacy into the background. The fundamental problem as identified in this project can be distilled to; what are the consequences of subjugating intimacy to integrity? To paraphrase Dōgen, if we illuminate only one perspective, what falls into shadow? Also, if this is an accurate representation of the issue, it is prudent to investigate how we may better identify and define the nature and origin of the imbalances we face.

In the following section, these insights of Kasulis and overstepping the bounds of one’s domain will be introduced to a discussion with Kuriyama who proposes a very similarly structured insight into how the human body was understood in different cultures.

**Kuriyama on Cross-Cultural Comparison**

In order to investigate this matter of cultural divergence with respect to the prioritization of either intimacy or integrity more closely, KURIYAMA Shigehisa’s *The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine* (2002) will be introduced. This will be done as this book very lucidly presents one scholar’s research into the body with respect to cultural difference. His general thesis is that using the same basic set of human senses, physicians in Greece and China understood the human body as expressing radically different things. The central example used by Kuriyama is that both Greek and Chinese doctors found the method *par excellence* for diagnosis to be grasping
the patient’s wrist in order to feel the pulse. Although each culture’s doctors felt that the wrist provided insight into the inner condition of the body, their fundamental conceptions of the body’s structure were starkly different and seemingly incompatible. But this was just the beginning of the divergence. The Greek understanding that arose from inspection of the pulse progressed over time to sheer mathematics (e.g., rate and pressure), while the Chinese investigation of mo is what progressed to what is now the meridian system of Traditional Chinese Medicine. It will be argued that the two medical traditions introduced by Kuriyama correlate with the two general philosophical paradigms introduced by Kasulis.

What may be appropriated from Kuriyama for the sake of this project is his awareness of difference and of the assumptions made by each historical medical position that led to this difference. In this section, a number of arguments drawn from Kuriyama’s research into the matter will be outlined, focusing on the Greek half of his project. This section will also interject the philosophical terminology of Kasulis as these two thinkers employ very different methods that mutually complement each other. The assertion of this section is that the medical traditions identified by Kuriyama can be understood as sharing the philosophical paradigms introduced by Kasulis. Turning to Kuriyama’s explication of the Greek body, it will be shown that the philosophical assumptions and cultural attitudes that follow strikingly resonate with Kasulis’s definition of integrity. The task set for the following chapter will be to introduce the body as per Sāmkhya-Yoga as a new counterpoint to the Greek body, redirecting this thesis of cultural divergence from China to India, as well as exploring Kasulis’s terms in this new context.


The Relationship between Kuriyama and Kasulis

This section will begin by introducing the complimentary methodologies of Kuriyama and Kasulis, beginning with the former and re-introducing Kasulis with respect to this new context. The purpose of Kuriyama’s project is to explain the historical divergence that occurred between Greek and Chinese conceptualizations of the human body through careful research into numerous historical records that depict how the body was understood, or more specifically, how the body was touched, seen and lived. In doing so, he employs a method that relies on the body’s senses to demonstrate, for example, how early doctors from Greece and China saw the human body differently. The result is a very lucid, meticulous, and well researched account of the facts surrounding this divergence. However, Kuriyama ostensibly avoids discussing why or how these positions diverged; only that they did.

Kasulis, on the other hand, does present a philosophical paradigm that ventures to address these questions. In doing so, he presents two complimentary standpoints, intimacy and integrity, that constitute a general account for how these two standpoints differ. Kasulis explains that these paradigms function much like “operating systems” in the sense that the unique combination of intimacy and integrity operate at the most basic level, out of which are constructed the standpoint’s (whether it be philosophical, medical, or as encompassing as cultural) preferences, idiosyncrasies, and dispositions, or “programs,” if you would. (Kasulis, 67) And much like an operating system, it tends to remain invisible to the basic user until one chooses to inspect it more thoroughly. What Kasulis’s
philosophical categories accomplish is that they draw our attention to the subtle and often invisible aspects of a comparative project like Kuriyama’s that tend to be overlooked. It is also important to note that Kasulis’s categories are heuristic in nature. In this sense, Kasulis’s intention is not to ontologize some aspect of the human psyche in respect to its collective nature, nor is he attempting to construct some meta-narrative of cultural psychology. Instead, he introduces these categories provisionally as a means to provide insight into the difficulties of cross-cultural communication of ideas. That is, Kasulis proposes his terms as a means of articulating the nuances of particulars and not as a universal to be essentialized and analyzed in themselves. The value of his philosophy is based entirely on its usefulness and ability to account for cross-cultural confusion and, all the more so, on its capacity to clarify.

The problem with Kuriyama’s account, as illuminating and insightful as it may be, is that it does not explicitly clarify the nature of this divergence in a lucid manner. Kuriyama aims to demonstrate how sensory experience accounts for how Greek and Chinese doctors systematically confronted what the body expressed, but he essentially leaves the issue at that these cultures diverge, merely intimating what “that” may be. But the question, “how exactly are these standpoints different,” for the most part is merely suggested or implied, and goes unanswered. This is precisely why the conflation of Kasulis and Kuriyama is so valuable. By conflating these two thinkers Kuriyama’s insights can be recontextualized and easily channeled into the more descriptive and illuminating philosophical paradigms of Kasulis.
This is what I have in mind by the term “complimentary critique.” It needs to be made clear that Kuriyama is simply not engaging in a philosophical project, so a philosophical critique of his project would be inappropriate. Even if Kuriyama’s anachronistically had access to Kasulis’s work, I do not suspect he would have changed his position or method much as he was successful in what he attempted in his own right. Regardless, I find that Kasulis’s philosophical insights into the issue of how the human body is understood to be more penetrating as they nestle into something far more expansive. As mentioned, the prioritization of either intimacy or integrity influences the language of a person’s or group’s operating system that generally remains out of sight.

**The Need for Clarification**

Kasulis’s philosophical paradigms illuminate that which Kuriyama overlooked. A few examples that make this case will be presented here. To begin, take the case of Kuriyama’s “anatomical seeing.”9 It is not that he chooses this lens, but how he explains—or more so how he does not. For example, Kuriyama writes, “[anatomical seeing] involves a distinct urge, a special desire.” (120) When discussing this issue he employs this vague and emotive sort of vocabulary extensively (i.e., “urges” and “desires”) often offering it at face value without clarification. Other examples are his use of the term “hunger for transparency,” (64) and “thirst” (75) to represent some sort of innate, seemingly biological, drive for clarity. Kuriyama’s contention, however ill-defined, is that this “desire” was found in Greek thought which in turn influenced and remained intact in European thought; a contention shared by this project. He more

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9 See Chapter Two, page 48.
explicitly articulates the nature of this odd desire when he writes, “clearness, in Europe, was less a characteristic trait than a characteristic ideal, less a fact than a desire.” (64) He continues with a comment on European discourse on the pulse emphasizing that there was a “fierce yearning for clarity.” And finally, he reveals most clearly his understanding of his position when he writes, “The compulsion to clarify is itself an enigma. (64) It is evident that Kuriyama recognizes this drive, but he is content accepting the drive as a mysterious yet self-evident phenomenon; a point on which Kasulis would disagree.

It appears to be the case that this “hunger for transparency” can more easily be accounted for and explained if we employ Kasulis’s cultural orientation of integrity. If this is done, the compulsion to clarify is not seen necessarily as an “enigma,” or a “hunger” but may be more clearly stated as a property of integrity. To explain, by its very nature, when a question is posed within the framework of integrity, it is assumed to be the case that the answer will be “bright” and “clear,” as defined above. What I suspect Kuriyama has in mind by the term “anatomical seeing” is that, for example, Galen, as a physician, sought a bright and clear articulation of the workings of the human body, and as a philosopher, how the human soul integrated into it. As such, it appears to be the case that what Kuriyama identifies as the standpoint of “anatomical seeing” is alike in kind, if not identical to, the standpoint of integrity. If this is the case the Kasulis adds a more rational means of discussing this difference, and Kuriyama provides an example of Kasulis’s philosophical paradigms.
Skepticism and Doubt

The problem with which this project is faced is the certainty and absolutism that accompanied the scientific revolution as defined by Kasulis’s integrity. The clarity of its methods seemed to, and still seems to, improve year after year, expanding its knowledge base and delivering a seemingly endless progression of technological marvels. What this project is concerned with here are not its successes, but its shortcomings; what it overlooked and left behind. The other side of the issue of clarity and certainty—its shadow, if you would—are equally defining characteristics of the scientific revolution, which are skepticism and doubt. In the context of this project, it is this skepticism and doubt, supported by what was argued above and in the previous chapter, that are encountered when attempting to discuss that which does not readily conform to the presuppositions of integrity.

Bright and Dark Knowledge

This skepticism and doubt can be well articulated if Kasulis’s terms of integrity and intimacy are once again presented along with the ensuing nature of knowledge in each. I will refer to these divergent cases of knowledge as bright and dark knowledge, which correlate with integrity and intimacy respectively.\(^{10}\) The brightness of integrity, or what I will call “bright knowledge” is the general expectation of our society, and as such may appear to be merely common sense, or worse, simply a depiction of how things are. This is the heart of the problem faced when making the transition from bright knowledge to dark knowledge, that bright knowledge has been normalized. That this problem is not

\(^{10}\) “Bright” and “Dark” are terms employed by Yuasa, who greatly influenced Kasulis.
“bright” or “clear” is exactly the nature of the problem! As briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, integrity is impersonal, intellectual, and conceptual, and all of these traits are expressed by the idea of “bright knowledge”.

Bright knowledge is the sort of knowledge that can be openly and (relatively) easily shared between people. If we treat a thing as a material phenomenon, there are a number of physical principles, and an accompanying number of clever tools, that can be measured and shared between potentially anyone. The measurements of height and weight, for example, do not vary based on who is doing the weighing. Two people can make identical measurements and, assuming they are fluent with the equipment—another aspect of bright knowledge—, will reach nearly the same value. And if their values differ, the isolation of the error is also open to public verification.

Bright knowledge is also intellectual and conceptual. That is, it easily takes a discreet, clearly delineated form in the human imagination. As the assumption is made that integrity is the system alluded to by Kuriyama, he personally defines this form of knowledge as, “the geometrical logic of space, time, and number.” (Kuriyama, 94) That is to say, bright knowledge is constrained by the most supremely objective language at our disposal; mathematics. In the case of the human pulse, which is defined by the strict category of time and the enumeration of its passing intervals, one may say that their pulse is “racing,” and the idea of accelerated tempo is easy to call into mind as it is a common experience. One may think of starting slow and then think of it getting faster—an experience familiar to all. No special training in mathematics or physics are required
whatsoever to have this insight. This concept is also *impersonal*. Although the awareness of tempo is indeed a personal experience, there is nothing that uniquely binds the experience to any one person. Our senses easily alert us to tempos as they are part of the natural world. The same everydayness of bright knowledge stands for shape and number as well.

But when feeling the pulse, as Kuriyama observed, early Greek and Chinese doctors felt something more than just tempo that was neither bright nor common whatsoever. They were dealing with a trait of intimacy that Kasulis calls “dark” or “esoteric.” This darkness, or what I will call “dark knowledge,” is the opposite of bright knowledge in the sense that its traits are quite the opposite of integrity’s brightness. Concerning his use of the term “dark” Kasulis writes, “[it is] nonpublic, but objective, insight is available only to members of a certain group who have undergone special training… It is open to everyone who has entered the intimate circle… by undergoing the appropriate praxis.” (Kasulis, 48) There are three key elements of this description. The first is that it is *nonpublic* in the sense that it is information only available to those who have undergone the appropriate praxis, which is some manner of physical training. This *praxis* is the second key; that those who have access to dark knowledge are those who have invested a great deal of effort into the refining of a craft. The third, and possibly the most important key point is that regardless of how dark and esoteric this knowledge is, it is still objective, albeit in a different manner. That is, two experts who have undergone similar training can come to a consensus about a matter about which the uninitiated may be clueless.
In many respects, how Kuriyama articulates the division between these modes of understanding is, for the most part, in accord with Kasulis’s standpoints of intimacy and integrity, although Kuriyama clearly does not use these categories. In light of the brief sketch of “bright” and “dark” knowledge above, I will next demonstrate how Kuriyama’s articulation of the division between these two modes of understanding reflects these categories. The two themes I will identify are the “clarity of integrity” and “haptic mastery.”

Having already made the case for the clarity of integrity, in the following passage from Kuriyama on the difference between European pulse taking and Chinese qiemo, a number of themes found in the above discussion of Kasulis’s categories of “bright” and “dark” knowledge are already present. For example, Kuriyama writes,

Why didn’t the awareness of traces and similarities engender in qiemo an unquenchable thirst for clarity like that which so decisively shaped European pulse taking? To answer this question we need first to analyze more carefully the nature of this thirst in Europe. We must begin by pondering just how lucid description differs from the obscure. (75)

By “traces and similarities,” Kuriyama is referencing the role played by language in qiemo, which is to say, the language of intimacy. The language of intimacy can only intimate—it cannot explicate—and as such, such language appears to the uninitiated to obscure the topic of conversation. “Clarity” is a central term investigated by Kuriyama, and an excellent one at that. “Clear” carries with it many of the same connotations of “open” and “bright” that are identified by Kasulis. “Lucid” and “obscure” are functionally synonyms for “bright” and “dark.”
Turning to “haptic mastery,” Kuriyama expresses many of the same insights of Kasulis when it comes to the characteristics of intimate knowledge, many of which are evident in the following passage. Kuriyama writes,

A chronic concern was the idiosyncrasy of perceptions: people don’t all feel things in the same way. An expert detects an ‘antcrawling’ pulse where a beginner finds nothing unusual. Who is right? This discrepancy may well lie in the beginner’s blunt tact. Then again, the alleged expert may be lying.¹¹ (66)

“Idiosyncratic” suggests the highly personal, yet still objective, nature of a doctor’s grasp of the pulse. “Feeling” suggests at least three things; the affective dimension of the experience, the somatic dimension of the experience (that information is being exchanged by touch), and that the experience is comprised of a relationship between the patient and doctor. In this passage alone, Kuriyama identifies four out of the five characteristics of intimacy presented by Kasulis. In the intimate mastery of quimo, tense versus chordlike mo, for example, was a matter of subtle distinction, but whose discernment was literally a matter of life and death. So why should the expert’s feedback be considered more valuable than the beginner’s? This was simply not a distinction that could be taught; the master’s personal, dark knowledge was something that had to be cultivated over years.

It also appears that Kuriyama recognized the nature of haptic knowledge. For example, concerning the detection of “floating mo,” Kuriyama writes, “If one lifts the fingers there is abundance; if one presses down one finds insufficiency.” (Kuriyama, 93) This clearly demonstrates the intimate and physically interactive character of dark knowledge wherein the doctor is entwined in the diagnosis; the doctor is not using an impartial apparatus, but

¹¹ Kuriyama, 66.
their own fingers. He identifies this in the following passage, but there is a very clear value judgment added onto the end. He writes, “The definition identifies the flooding *mo* by specifying its relationship to the fingers. It asserts what the flooding *is* by describing how it *feels.*” (95) Although another example of haptic knowledge, the language of the second sentence again clearly prioritizes integrity over intimacy, juxtaposing being (ontology) with mere feels (subjectivity). It takes a generous reading of this in order to claim Kuriyama is placing both on the same level. But, then again, this may be delivered this way for effect.

An additional citation from Kuriyama will be presented that demonstrates his awareness of intimacy and integrity, but it also reveals the extent of his understanding of the relationship between the two, which I again assert can be greatly strengthened by Kasulis. Kuriyama writes,

> Listening to a doctor who reports an undulating pulse, we may strain to visualize the fact conveyed by the word. We ask, “What exactly do you mean by that?” struggling to “make clear” in our minds the image motivating the speaker. Yet we can never be fully confident about our insights, never be sure of the coincidence of imaginings. Once speaking is conceived as the expression of ideas in the mind, then the hunger for transparency becomes irresistible—though it remains ever insatiable, though we cannot peer into other minds. Does your idea of “undulating” correspond to mine? We simply cannot know. (80-81)

At first glance, this passage may come across as very common place and familiar. This is surely due to the fact that its biases resonate with the biases of integrity. This confusion, suspicion, and even distrust are endemic to the orientation of integrity once intimacy and its dark knowledge has receded so far into the background that it has been forgotten. In
this passage, Kuriyama is doing just this; prioritizing the orientation of integrity and *normalizing* the inherent confusion and suspicion.12

**The Certainty of Brightness.** As integrity tightened its grip on the culture that prioritized it, integrity along with its attendant idiosyncrasies became absolute. But why was that? At least one reason for this is that integrity and its bright knowledge rely exclusively on image-thinking, or the clear and distinct formation of images in the mind. As Kuriyama succinctly notes in respect to pulse-taking, “Discourse on the pulse [in the West], in short, bound the understanding of meanings inseparably to the picturing of images.” (79) But this was a picturing of images that was utterly unlike the dark knowledge of the Chinese doctor who mysteriously explained a pulse that was raspy or like wet sand. The very heart of the images of integrity’s bright knowledge was mathematics and geometry. That is, these mental images took the form of and were exclusively bound to easily and clearly communicated forms.

It should also be noted that the distinct difference between, especially in the case presented by Kuriyama, what Yuasa identifies as “vocal language” versus “written language.” (Yuasa, 2008; 77) Yuasa uses as an example the word “dog.” In English, a vocal language, the sounds and symbols represented by d-o-g are for the most part arbitrary. This suggests a degree of abstraction and thus a level of difference between the word and the thing it represents. In a written language, like Chinese, dog is represented

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12 As a general critique of Kuriyama, due to the casual almost story telling-like meter of his writing, it is often the case that the reader may lose track of what Kuriyama is employing for effect, and what he is employing as a reflection of his own understanding. This is one such case.
by a pictograph of a dog (犬), “with legs firmly planted on the ground, and with ears raised in attention.” Yuasa suggests that the nature of these two languages dictated how their grammar developed; vocal language developing a more rigorous set of rules and written language a more relaxed grammar (e.g., no declensions of nouns, or tenses). (78) The point to be taken is that by language’s very nature, it predisposes its speakers to certain intellectual proclivities. In the case of the Greeks, this corroborates the current sketch of integrity.

As Kuriyama points out, “the etymologies of the Greek terms nous, ennoia, and idea, all associated thoughts with mental pictures.” (Kuriyama, 80) This reveals a great deal of what sort of ideas were prioritized, cultivated and valued by Greek thinkers. To address them briefly, nous and its verb form noein represent a mental image of a thing or situation or the mental organ that holds these clear images. (121) Ennoia represents a general understanding of a thing that is latent in the human mind, sometimes referred to (literally and figuratively) as conception. And idea comes from ideō, “I see,” and eidos, Plato’s famous term, “form,” which were “the only objects of epistēmē, or “true science.” (121) The nuances of the terms are not what is at stake here as these terms varied depending on by whom they were employed. What needs to be recognized is that they each explicitly share the same criteria established by Kasulis in his depiction of integrity’s brightness. Each of these, especially nous and eidos capture the spirit of integrity.
The clarity of mental images is what is central to integrity and the philosophy it generates. As such, it should be no surprise that this central criterion was passed down due to its stability and invariance. A very prominent example of this clarity in the current age is the concept of intentionality, which is not so much a philosophical abstraction, employed only by philosophers, but a common-sense means to articulate how phenomena appeared in the mind. As Husserl defines the term, “Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.” (Husserl, 1999; 33) That is, consciousness is always “consciousness of.” This suggests that whatever is being entertained by the mind, or cogito, is an intentional object with discreet borders that can be inspected from afar. That this is a refined articulation of theōria goes without saying. Intentionality in its varying forms, shaped by the suppositions of integrity, permeates assumptions about what things are in relationship to the mind.

Although the foundation of integrity was present in 2nd century Greece, its totalitarian character did not arise until much later in Europe. Kuriyama cites William Heberden as an Enlightenment-era thinker whose attitude toward clarity reflects the absolutizing of integrity. Heberden, as a British physician, denounced anything subjective in favor of only that which can be expressed mathematically, as that which can “most perfectly [be] described and communicated to others.” (68) The clarity of communication was essential to his orientation as he writes, “the chief source of confusion is the employment of terms which are susceptible to more than one interpretation.” (70) It is important to note how
this attitude overtly excludes the training and cultivation of dark knowledge as it requires that all principles must be verbally accessible to both a practiced master and a novice. In this sense, for Heberden, the problem of clear knowledge was essentially a problem of words; the only communication that was even worth consideration was that which could be transmitted with one-hundred percent fidelity. The natural consequence of Heberden’s attitude and the attitude of thousands like him was that the scientific community focused exclusively on that which delivered clear, literal knowledge of the world and the human body. The natural candidate that met these criteria was mathematics, which quickly became the only acceptable scientific language. Heberden’s attitude also expresses a deep skepticism of that which could not easily be accounted for by the scientific method and mathematics. This skepticism will be turned to next.

The Doubt of Intimacy. As the Greeks cast their gaze upon the world from afar and developed their position of theōria, which is ostensibly an expression of the principles of integrity, the perspective of intimacy seems to have fallen from view. To use the terms of Kasulis’s Gestalt paradigm, the bright and clear rose into the foreground and the dark and obscure not only fell into the background, but in some cases entirely out of sight. This is a process that began with Greek thought and reached an apex during the European Enlightenment. The crux of the matter is summed up in the allegory of Maslow’s Hammer; Maslow writes, “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” (Maslow, 15-16) This aptly reflects the cultural bias against intimacy, but it also reveals something deeper. That is, the belief that

13 “Apex” being employed optimistically in hope that the one-sidedness abates.
integrity is the only “tool” in possession, which is patently false. Once could metaphorically see Kasulis’s notion of becoming culturally bi-orientational through a number of interpretations such as 1) taking up another tool, 2) learning to put down one’s own tool, or more so, 3) recognizing that one had two tools all along.

But this is currently not the case, as mathematics and geometry, to include “the geometrical logic of space, time, and number” that can be clearly represented in the mind stand as the standard for communication. (Kuriyama, 94) Chinese insights into the body which “flowed and lacked sharp contours,” and assuredly escaped the confines of mathematics and the scientific method, were and still appear to be an affront to this predilection. (106) These flowing and soft contours endemic to intimacy are derived from a template for reality that does not begin with space and time (or space-time) as we are accustomed to them. Instead, the Chinese world was a world of qi. Take, for example, this classic example from the Dao Dejing. “Way-making (dao) that can be put into words is not really way-making, and naming (ming) that can assign fixed reference to things is not really naming.” (Ames & Hall, 77) Here we find an example of the overt rejection of integrity.

It does seem to be the case, as Kuriyama notes with respect to this issue, that, “the core problem lay in the human inability to see the imaginings of others.” (80) If this is the case, our ability to see the imagining of others stems from our unconsciously inculcated paradigm, which is presumably cultural in nature. If one lacks the same framework, or worse, presumes that there is no other framework than his or her own, then one have little
or no chance of understanding what other perspectives, or “contextual grids,” have to offer concerning knowing and being human.

The situation established by the predominance of integrity is primarily defined by the successes of the standpoint of material reductionism and a deep suspicion towards that which cannot be subsumed by the scientific method. A consequence of this is the alienation of mind from body.

**Intimacy and Integrity in the Context of this Project**

Kasulis’s insights are valuable as it may be said that this project contains both elements of intimacy and integrity. As per the schematic representation of this project as depicted in Figure 2, the psychological and phenomenological contextualization or “enlivening,” if you would, represent Kasulis’s intimate standpoint of *in medias res*, while the historical/textual *cakras* presume the standpoint of *theōria/integrity*. It would most certainly be disastrous to presume only the standpoint of *theōria* when making such an assertion, as the schematics of Figure 2 would utterly break down. Such a standpoint is represented in the following figure.
Such a monolithic approach to the project at hand tears apart its fundamental assumptions of the intimate reading of phenomenology and depth psychology, arranging the three disciplines in an array wherein a comparative discussion becomes difficult if not impossible.

This is the standpoint presumed by this project. It is not monolithic, but perhaps “dialithic” in the sense that it presumes Kasulis’s binocular vision wherein both integrity and intimacy may be considered. There is one domain being inspected by two complementary standpoints.

**Conclusion to Chapter Two**

In this chapter it has been argued that integrity is the foundational principle upon which *theōria* was established. In doing so, it has also called attention to intimacy, or the lack

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14 As a reminder, S.B. = the subject-body of phenomenology; H/T C = historical/textual cakras; D.P. = depth psychology. See Chapter One, Page 6.
thereof. In this sense, intimacy can be understood as the shadow of integrity and theōria, as that which slips into the background and evades notice when integrity is prioritized and normalized. A natural consequence arises due to assuming the standpoint of theōria is that when the mind is thoroughly accepted to be that which observers the body from an abstract, allegedly impartial, and third-person perspective, the capacity to rectify their divergence becomes lost and accounting for their interaction becomes problematic, estranging intimacy and even one’s own body. In a more immediate sense, integrity, this absolutism that leads to such staunch dualism, is a predominant attitude today that confounds discussions on intimate matters. The focus of this project is an extension of this very phenomenon; how to introduce the principles of intimacy into discussions dominated by integrity, or at least make room for them. This is the aim of Kasulis, which is naturally why he was introduced into this chapter, his insight being not just the introduction of this paradigm of intimacy and integrity, but the suggestion that the cultivation of a bi-orinetational attitude is necessary. This may be understood to mean training to accept the simultaneous presence of (at least) two seemingly exclusive and incompatible standpoints that are in fact complimentary in nature.

The following chapters follow a gradual exposition of intimacy, beginning with classical Sāṃkhya philosophy, and then a critique of this a reading vis-à-vis classical Yoga to demonstrate that the insights of Sāṃkhya are not merely intellectually postulated abstractions similar to the endeavors of Kant, but rather aspects of being that may be personally experientially verified through diligent somatic praxis (intimacy). The fifth chapter will address the psychological and physiological mechanisms at work during
such praxis as introduced by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and the ensuing refinements as proposed by Yuasa. This will add a practical and more tangible example of how intimacy may function in tandem with integrity, so that we may move away from the abstract and more towards the practical.
4. EXPANDING THE MIND-BODY PARADIGM THROUGH SĀṂKHYA:
THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATION OF THE SUBTLE BODY

The task set for this chapter will be to introduce the body as per Sāṃkhya-Yoga as a counterpoint to the Greek body. This will investigate the “subtle body” as found in Sāṃkhya philosophy as this idea is an indispensable first step to understanding the cakras. Although in the most general sense, the subtle body may refer to the object of any number of theories as found throughout the world’s spiritual traditions, as the topic at hand is Indian in nature, it is essential that this inquiry is likewise constrained to India.¹

Such a theory finds its roots as far back as the fifth or sixth century in the Taittṛīya Upāniṣad in the form of the Five Kośas. After a brief overview, we shall look to classical Sāṃkhya to begin, as here can be found a clear articulation of the subtle body more explicitly united with yogic practice.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra) is that which accounts for the less apparent and less accessible components of one’s being upon which ordinary conscious experience is conditionally dependent.² It would be anachronistic to say that these subtle aspects of consciousness are constrained by the physical body (sthūla śarīra), as in Sāṃkhya philosophy the physical body, or at least the experience of

¹ For those interested in a more general survey of the topic, see Samuel and Johnson’s 2013 edited volume, Religion and the Subtle Body in Asia and the West.

² To clarify, the subtle body is that which supports the ordinary, every-day mode of consciousness. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, in meditation, when the ordinary activities of this consciousness come to rest, the more subtle and less-conscious aspects of the psyche enter into the field of awareness.
“one’s own body” as a physical phenomenon, is dependent upon more subtle aspects of being. To be more specific, within the scheme of tattvas (principles of reality, literally, “thatness”) as found in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, the domain of the subtle body begins with one’s capacity for sensory experience. In this scheme, the sense-capacities (jñānendriyas) comprise the field of sensory input, or the domains through which we may know the aspects of the material world (mahābhūtas). The jñānendriyas, which are mental phenomenon, are connected to the mahābhūtas, which are material phenomenon, through a third, not immediately or ordinarily experienced term, the tanmātras, or “modes of sense-content.” Such modes of sense-content and other representations of the subtle within Sāṃkhya philosophy, which will be further explained in this chapter, are comprised of both mental and physical components while being reducible to neither.

In order to investigate the subtle body as a preparatory step to a discussion of the cakras themselves, the classical source of the subtle body will be presented, which is the Sāṃkhya-kārikā as was briefly introduced above. To do so, a brief overview of the Sāṃkhya system will be presented, starting with the primary dyad of the system of primordial consciousness and fundamental matter, puruṣa and prakṛti, and then quickly introduce the following twenty-three tattvas, or primary constituents of reality, that comprise the components of the Sāṃkhya standpoint. In doing so, close attention will be

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3 “One’s own body” is a term used by Merleau-Ponty that suggests the immediate experience of one’s body as it arises to oneself as a phenomenon of consciousness, as opposed to, perhaps, an objective, external reflection upon the body as a material/biological entity. Throughout this chapter, similar terms will be used that emphasize Kasulis’s standpoint of in medius res, intimacy’s “in the midst of things,” which suggest the immediate lived experience of one’s own body, although not necessarily confined to the phenomenological standpoint of Merleau-Ponty.
paid to the use of the term “subtle,” and what is suggested by it, and most importantly, how the subtle body is experienced.

In this investigation of Sāṃkhya, the work of Mikel Burley will be presented, first as an interpretive guide to Sāṃkhya, and second leveling a critique against him. Burley makes the case in his 2007 book, Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience, that a re-reading of Sāṃkhya-Yoga is in order. The purpose of his project, merely suggested in the title, is to demonstrate that one cannot reasonably assume that Sāṃkhya and Yoga advocate any form of material realism. Following this rejection of realism, Burley asserts that Sāṃkhya is better understood as a form of phenomenology, or proto-phenomenology, in the sense that it presumes experience as a given, rather than as a consequence of matter according to popular cosmogonic models. It is in this sense that Burley asserts Sāṃkhya and Yoga to be a “metaphysics of experience,” but he does so by drawing heavily from Kant. This leads to the dubious position that Sāṃkhya is merely an idealist philosophy, which overlooks the importance of Yoga’s practical aspects. As

4 Such conclusions are more appropriate for the darśana of vaiśeṣika.

5 With respect to his “metaphysics of experience,” a perhaps more accurate term overlooked by Burley is “metapsychics,” which is used by Yuasa to denote a “metatheory of the body-mind.” (Yuasa, 1987; 217) The term “metaphysics of experience” contains a very explicit juxtaposition of mind and matter that is, intentionally so or not, reductionist in nature, as if metaphysics can quite easily account for experience. “Metapsychics,” on the other hand, as Yuasa writes, “…seeks a transcendent region beyond the inner psyche… [that] advances through one’s inner experience toward nature, …which forms the fundamental delimitations of possibilities for human being.” (Yuasa, 1987; 240) Yuasa also notes that praxis is tied to metapsychics as knowledge of this “transcendent region beyond the inner psyche” is not merely the product of ratiocination, but of empirical verification. This is a fundamental distinction that Burley does not seem to follow as the presuppositions of Sāṃkhya and Kant are simply unlike in kind.
such, this section must also level a critique at Burley for perhaps over-intellectualizing Śāṅkhya and minimizing its practical Yogic component.

Burley’s reading of Śāṅkhya also functions as a thematic segue into the next chapter wherein these themes from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty and Yuasa will be revisited. However, as will be demonstrated, in making this argument, Burley pays insufficient attention to Śāṅkhya philosophy’s practical component, Yoga, for which there is absolutely no correspondence in Kant.

By first presenting Śāṅkhya and Yoga philosophy’s depiction of the subtle body, and then presenting Yuasa’s unconscious quasi-body in the following chapter, ample grounds for suggesting the nature of the subtle body will have been provided. This shall serve as the thematic foundation upon which the final chapters of this project are based, which will be an investigation of the cakras of the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa.

A Clarification of “Śāṅkhya-Yoga”

Śāṅkhya-Yoga, Śāṅkhya/Yoga, & Śāṅkhya and Yoga

To begin, what is meant by the expression “Śāṅkhya-Yoga” must be clarified as this conjunction of terms suggests a number of possible interpretations, one of which will be emphasized in this project. The emphasis chosen reflects the nature of their relationship most suitable for the goals of this project. One could possibly render in text the two in a variety of ways as well, e.g., “Śāṅkhya and Yoga,” “Śāṅkhya/Yoga.” As such, this requires clarification as to what is intended by the use of the hyphenated representation
above. To clarify this issue, Burley addresses a number of interpretations as to the relationship between the two *darśanas*, identifying four possible relationships between the two.⁶ (Burley, 2007; 39) Beyond semantic housekeeping, by more clearly establishing the relationship that obtains between these two *darśanas*, this will foreshadow an essential point taken up by this project; specifically that theory and practice must complement each other, and that neither exist isolated from the other.⁷

The problem at hand begins with the fact that *Sāṃkhya* and Yoga as Hindu spiritual and religious phenomenon predate their respective classical texts by a number of centuries. Although the *Yogasūtra* (*YS*) was written—or compiled rather—between the third and fourth century C.E., and the *Sāṃkyakārikā* (*SK*) between the fourth and fifth, references to both are made in pre-classical texts, such as the *Bhagavadgītā* (*BG*) which was written around the second century B.C.E. Larson makes note of this, suggesting *Sāṃkhya* is better understood as a “slowly growing organism” that assimilated bits and pieces from the traditions it came in contact with, achieving maturity with the writing of the *Sāṃkyakārikā.*” (Larson, 1969) As such, this pre-classical period leaves a great deal of speculation when it comes to determining the relationship between the two *darśanas* as understood by its practitioners and advocates. To turn to a specific example, the *Bhagavadgītā* make explicit reference to the followers of *Sāṃkhya* (*BG 3.3*), and goes on to later enumerate the quintessential *tattvas* of *Sāṃkhya* philosophy (*BG 13.6*). All the

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⁶ The “*darśanas*” are the six orthodox (*āstika*) “schools of thought,” “philosophies,” or “standpoints” of Hinduism.

⁷ The point to be taken up below is that ultimately *Sāṃkhya* was derived from the experiences obtained in meditative practice, which stands in contrast to how Kant derived his philosophy through ratiocination. With this divergence in mind, likening *Sāṃkhya* to the metaphysics of Kant seems inappropriate.
more important for the matter of establishing the relationship at hand is at *BG* 5.4 wherein is stated, “Simpletons separate [Sāṃkhya and Yoga], but the learned do not; applying one correctly, one finds the fruit of both.” (Miller, 1986, 57) This is an essential point that shall be returned to throughout this chapter.

Moving on, to introduce Burley’s four categories that attempt to make sense of this relationship, they are; 1) the single system thesis, 2) the divergence thesis, 3) the grafting-on thesis, and 4) the separate systems thesis. (Burley, 2007; 39) Starting with the single system thesis, this position was put forward by Chakravarti who advocated that Sāṃkhya and Yoga were merely the “concave and convex side of the same sphere.” (Burley, 2007; 40) That is, Chakravarti understood the two *darśanas* to be merely the theoretical and practical expressions of one essential thing. From this position, Burley notes that the expression “Sāṃkhya-Yoga” was not merely an expedient contraction of “Sāṃkhya and Yoga,” but a singular expression that was a testament to their self-same identity comprising a unitary school of thought, which is perhaps better expressed by the abovementioned rendering “Sāṃkhya/Yoga,” as if either term necessarily implies the other or perhaps could be functionally used interchangeably.

This particular assertion is flawed for one primary reason. “Darśanas” are rigidly defined standpoints with clear methodological assumptions. Chakravarti’s position that they are actually the same thing under two different names is problematic as such a combination of *darśanas* requires the construction of a “meta-darśana,” if you would, which would effectively be the binocular convergence of two standpoints. Although this
is at least theoretically possible in a very abstract sense, the two-pronged approach can never truly be reconciled as one unified position. This perhaps has more to do with the limitations of language than the feasibility of Chakravarti’s assertion.

Next, Burley proposes the divergence thesis, which suggests that Sāṃkhya and Yoga are two surviving expressions of one earlier, lost school of thought. This is generally supported by their divergent methodologies, intentions, and audiences. The divergence between metaphysics and practical application would seem, according to this account, to be the result of an ancient schism which was centered about emphasizing two different aspects of this original lost school, which then drifted off to form their own unique schools. That is to say, they are thought to be descendant from a common ancestor. Or, as Burley puts it, with respect to the previous possible relationship, that they are cousins rather than twins. (Burley, 2007; 40) The primary problem this thesis faces is that is suggests what is essentially some long-lost proto-darśana, which is absurd prima facie, as there are simply no such references to this in pre-classical texts.

The grafting-on thesis comes next. This thesis was put forward by Dasgupta who held the position that Classical Yoga followed Sāṃkhya chronologically. His idea was that Patañjali, the compiler of Classical Yoga, “…not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaning the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all on the Sāṃkhya metaphysics.” (Burley, 2007; 42) This position advocates that Yoga was merely a technical exposition of the metaphysics put forward in the Sāṃkhya karikā. Burley also makes note of Garbe, who held that Patañjali
must have been a popularizer of the abstract and atheistic *Sāṃkhya*, who sought to present this useful material in a more practical form as well as returning his Yoga to the realm of the divine (and thus the more popular) with the addition of *īśvara*.8 (Burley, 2007; 41)

According to this thesis, Yoga is essentially an embellishment of *Sāṃkhya*. This thesis too contradicts the relationship presented in the *Bhagavadgītā*, which predates both of these texts. But more so, it fails to address how exactly *Sāṃkhya* was derived, leaving room for the possibility that it could have come about in the absence of yogic contemplative methods, a position rightfully rejected by Burley. (Burley, 2007; 41, 47)

The final thesis is the separate systems thesis, as advocated by Feuerstein. Feuerstein states that although their differing methodologies both emerged from perhaps even the same Vedic sources, they are simply unlike in kind. The gist of his argument stems from that fact that both *Sāṃkhya* and Yoga have a very clearly status as separate *darśanas*, respecting the importance of this term. If one were merely reducible to the other, or if they were reducible to some other *darśana*, as mentioned in the second thesis, there would only be a solitary *darśana*, yet two are found. As such, this distinction should not be overlooked. Feuerstein does have a point here, but it is perhaps overstated to such a degree that Burley accuses him of hyperbole. (Burley, 2007; 55) Feuerstein appears to be

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8 “Īśvara” in the context of Yoga represents one’s chosen form of the divine, which is a far softer theistic expression that what is suggested by Garbe.
giving undue consideration to *Sāṃkhya* and Yoga’s status as *darśanas* and overlooking their natural and obvious common ground.

To sift through these possibilities and settle on an explanation of what I intend to mean by “*Sāmkhya*-Yoga,” we may look at the intersection, or perhaps superimposition, of 1), 2), and 4); 3) being too far off the mark, as will be seen below. Within this intersection, a meaningful definition will arise.

**On Darśanas**

To make this case, it is helpful to look at the definition of the term “*darśanas.*” Within the current context, it suggests “philosophy,” or “school of thought,” and this rendering appears to be common. However, as it stems from the root “*dṛṣṭ*,” we see that “philosophy” is a more idiomatic employment of the term most agreeable to preexisting western academic categories. The term itself seems to share more in common with the idea of a “view” or perhaps “view point.” More specifically with respect to the six orthodox *darśanas* of Hinduism as popularly understood, the term seems to suggest how the world appears under certain assumptions. I make this argument in light of the previous discussion in Chapter Three, wherein was discussed the relationship between a standpoint and a domain. With this in mind, the *darśanas* may be seen as merely a number of complimentary standpoints that share a semi-common domain, with each of the six paired off where their complementarity is more pronounced. The collective domain of these six ordinarily presented under the absurdly ambiguous and perhaps
anachronistic term, “Hinduism.” The strength of this complementary approach is that no single darśana is expected to be exhaustive, and that to assume so is an error.9

Further addressing the complementary nature of Sāṃkhya and Yoga is the common ground shared between these two darśanas, which appears to be soteriological in nature. Although not one-hundred percent congruous, both the Sāṃkhya and Yoga contain an explicit telos as presented in YS 1.2-4, and SK 1, which share striking similarities.10 Although employing different vocabularies, they both suggest stopping or stilling the dis-ease (dukkha) and agitations (vṛtti) of consciousness by ceasing to identify with the more coarse aspects of one’s mind-body, seeking a state of liberation or isolation from these. Their methodology clearly then differs in the respect that Sāṃkhya presents the metaphysical grounding of the problem of dukkha, while Yoga presents the practical tools that lead to salvation. To read one in the absence of the other, as mentioned in the Bhagavadgītā citation above, is foolish. BG 5.4 deserves further clarification in this matter as it states, “Simpletons separate [Sāṃkhya and Yoga], but the learned do not; applying one correctly, one finds the fruit of both.”11

9 If “Hinduism” may be thought of as some sort of supreme meta-darśana, each individual darśana could perhaps be understood as metonymy or synecdoche; referring to the whole by one of its parts. This may also apply to the relationship between Sāṃkhya and Yoga, that whatever they jointly comprise may be referenced in its entirety by one of its parts.

10 SK 1: Due to the affliction of threefold distress, the inquiry into its removal [arises]; [if said to be] pointless because obvious [methods exist], this is not so, for such methods are neither singularly directed nor conclusive. (Burley) YS 1.2-4: Yoga is the stilling of the changing states of the mind. When that is accomplished, the seer abides in its own true nature. Otherwise, at other times, [the seer] is absorbed in the changing states [of the mind]. (Bryant)

11 Burley writes, “Reading the Sāṃkhya and Yoga in isolation from the Yogasūtra is analogous to reading the list of ingredients in a recipe without having any instructions on what to do with those ingredients (and in
Although Śāṃkhya and Yoga may be separated, the Bhagavadgītā asserts that this is a foolish endeavor; those who understand accept this relationship to be one of inseparability. The nature of this inseparability is precisely the problem. One way of addressing it, as done so by Burley, is to juxtapose the methodology of Śāṃkhya with Yoga; idealism v. mysticism. At first gloss, this gross generalization seems to stand, but this ultimately is a caricature of each position. A more careful inspection reveals that each darśana contains elements of the other. The metaphysics of Śāṃkhya are ostensibly present in Yoga, and all the more interesting, as mentioned by Burley, “…there is good reason to suppose that Śāṃkhya metaphysics is, at least in part, a theoretical formalization of truths held to have been revealed through Yogic contemplation.” (Burley, 2007; 42) Burley more explicitly mentions SK 64 wherein puruṣa is liberated through the attainment of a state of content-less consciousness. This breaks ratiocination’s ordinary paradigm of “consciousness of,” and as such, Burley notes, that it is “fair to assume that the knowledge being alluded to… is of a supra-rational kind.” (Burley, 2007; 47) “Supra-rational” knowledge, however that may be defined and understood, is entirely outside the scope of phenomenology, which suggests a very

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12 “Mysticism” is a term used by Burley that suggests the revelation of immediate spiritual truths as a result of practice. However due to the superfluous baggage that accompanies this term, this author would like to distance himself from it.

13 SK 64: Thus, from the assiduous practice of that-ness, the knowledge arises that 'I am not,' 'not mine,' 'not I'; which [knowledge], being free of delusion, is complete, pure, and singular.
flexible use of the term as the knowledge obtained in such practice surpasses the paradigm proposed by Husserl or Merleau-Ponty.  

Turning to the more practical *darśana*, we must take into account Yoga’s *vijñāna* and *viveka*, which carries a more immediate and intuitive connotation that arises as a result of yogic self-cultivation. (Burley, 2007; 45) What is crucial is that the discriminating knowledge sought in Yoga practice is not merely a word game, but a state of self-realization wherein the individual can immediately experience these finer and finer discernments of the categories of awareness first-hand. The result is that there obtains a state of mutual complementarity between the two *darśanas* wherein the careful rationality of *Sāṃkhya* strengthens Yoga and helps guide its practitioners, and the discriminative insight brought about by Yoga practices clarifies and authenticates the categories presented by *Sāṃkhya*. That is, their metaphysical and soteriological components compliment, or perhaps inter-resonate, and strengthen the other.

With all of this in mind, the expression “*Sāṃkhya-Yoga*” can be understood to represent the intrinsic inseparability and complementarity of these two *darśanas*.

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14 This appears to be a matter of standpoint as Merleau-Ponty assumes an ordinary, every-day standpoint while *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* assumes the standpoint of *puruṣa*, or the soul. With this qualification in place, the term “phenomenology” still remains useful as it takes the phenomenon of consciousness as its objects of concern. What changes is the matter of scope; i.e., whether or not the ordinary, every-day standpoint can itself be taken as a phenomenon to be observed by a higher state of awareness.

15 *vijñāna* and *viveka* both suggest discriminative insight, the former in the sense of an individual’s capacity for it and the latter in the sense of discrimination in an abstract sense; i.e., discriminative capacity and discrimination.
Methodologically speaking, they still retain their status as *darśanas* as their methods and standpoints differ. Burley states the following with respect to their differences,

When Sāṃkhya and Yoga are described as 'twins', or aspects of the same 'sphere', it is rarely, if ever, implied that the Yoga of Patañjali perfectly reflects the *Sāṃkhya* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Rather, what appears to be meant is that Yoga (of which Patañjali’s is the best-known version) shares enough in common with expositions of *Sāṃkhya* (of which Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s is the most ostensibly coherent) for the classical forms of *Sāṃkhya* and Yoga to be regarded as complementary and not antagonistic. (Burley, 2007; 40)

Although they may stem from one source, their classical forms in which we find their texts simply differ, despite their complementarity.¹⁶

Concerning this notion of an original source, Burley notes that *Sāṃkhya*-Yoga may be best understood as “two complementary streams emanating from a single source.” (54) This rings true, but the nature of this source is not explicitly defined. To even ask what this source is may not be a fruitful question at all, as that source is simply the infinitely complex nexus of the human being itself. The insight of *Sāṃkhya*-Yoga appears to be then enumerating that which about something may be said, while leaving the experimental verification to the individual.

**The Subtle Body of *Sāṃkhya***

In this section the phenomenological reading of *Sāṃkhya* will be continued as a means of investigating the subtle body. This section will begin with a brief overview of the Five *Kośas* which were thematic precursors of the subtle body of *Sāṃkhya*. The

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¹⁶ At this point one may notice that the western over-emphasis of textual authority may be warping the importance here placed on the “classical” forms of these *darśanas*. 
phenomenological perspective will be maintained as to emphasize the tattvas of Sāṃkhya as phenomena of experience. With respect to this orientation, Burley notes that, “…‘subtle’ should be taken primarily to indicate an object's degree of accessibility to a knower…” (122) As such, how these degrees of subtleness are understood will be investigated so that a more vivid depiction of the subtle body may be constructed.

*The Five Kośas*

The Five Kośas account for a thematic precursor of the subtle body, so their discussion is relevant to this project. As found in the circa sixth-century B.C.E. Taittirīya Upaniṣad, the kośas, or “sheaths” were a thematization of the progressively more refined layers of being which may be experienced during religious cultivation. They are 1) Anna-maya kośa, the “sheath composed of food,” 2) Prāṇa-maya-kośa, the “sheath composed of life force,” 3) Mano-maya-kośa, the “sheath composed of mind,” 4) Vījñāna-maya-kośa, the “sheath composed of intelligence,” and 5) Ānanda-maya-kośa, the “sheath composed of bliss.” (Feuerstein, 1998; 141) The Taittirīya Upaniṣad briefly explains these five kośas emphasizing the progressive refinement and identification with the highest, which is bliss. Cast in terms of the veneration of Brahman, or the Supreme Reality of being, consciousness, and bliss (satchidānanda), the Taittirīya Upaniṣad advocates seeking union or an immediate return with Brahman through all stages. 17 At the base, one is encouraged to see Brahman in food, which is a contemplation that as the entire universe

17 It is worth noting that the first two kośas of food and prāṇa represent being (sat), the second two, mind and intelligence/discrimination are aspects of true consciousness (cit), and bliss is clearly bliss (ānanda).
is Brahman, so is the food consumed. The same approach is applied to each kośa, seeing each level of one’s existence as being yet another, albeit more refined, manifestation of Brahman. This culminates with bliss (ānanda), which is the highest state beyond the limitations of even intellect.

The kośas are relevant as they suggest a very early depiction of the subtle body and the general theme of the gradation of one’s being running from the most gross to the most subtle. “Food” appears quite in accord with the most base level of existence as the physical body is literally composed of what one has previously ingested. This appears as the outermost layer of one’s being, similar to the mahābhūta of earth as advocated in Sāṃkhya. Wujastyk offers an insight into this most course layer of being when he notes the following,

One of the commonest words for “body” in Sanskrit, deha, is derivable from the grammatical root dih meaning “anoint, smear,” and it seems at least arguable that the metaphor conveyed by this word is of the body as an external coating or covering. However, indigenous discussion of this metaphor, if it ever existed, is lost to us. (Wujastyk. 190)

This suggests the potential of an idiomatic and deep-seated understanding of the human body as something quite limited and superficial with respect to what are understood to be higher and more spiritual modes of self-identification.

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18 This is perhaps akin to Carl Sagan’s paradigm challenging insight, that “we are all star-stuff.”

19 The assumptions of the Five Kośas and of Sāṃkhya differ with respect to the apex of their systems. The Kośas entail micro-macrocosmic correlativity whereas Sāṃkhya entails the monadic isolation of puruṣa (kaivalya) from prakṛti.
On the other end of this spectrum is ānanda. It is a testament to the spiritual-technological development of Sāṃkhya that ānanda was relegated to the level of the karmendriyas (modes of action), which is startlingly low in comparison to the centrality it enjoyed in the kośas. Ānanda in the context of Sāṃkhya is mere sexual pleasure. This is an important aspect of self-cultivation, especially as found in the Tantric traditions, but according to Sāṃkhya, it is far from the apex. This spectrum depicts an early attempt to identify the gradations of one’s being, and more so, one’s experience that suggests degrees of subtlety that confound ordinary distinctions between mind and body.

**Being Subtle**

Following Burley’s approach, whether or not there is a material-like component to the subtle body can be left for another day as this is not relevant to the current inquiry. The “subtle body” certainly suggests some sort of materiality, but, such an investigation is not important at this time. For example, the tanmātras (modes of sensory contact) certainly have biological components, yet they are curiously reducible to neither purely mind nor body. Ultimately, it is simply wrong-headed to merely address biology as this a priori assumes material reductionism which needlessly embroils the task at hand. That is, it identifies half of the phenomenon and then presumes the other half is accounted for as well. In addition, as shall be demonstrated, such an approach tries to reduce the subtle body to the gross body, which is entirely in conflict with the assumptions of Sāṃkhya.

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This may be also be akin to pīti (rapture) as found in traditional Buddhist jhāna meditation. It is a state to be attained, but not one to be clung to.
The *tattvas* are progressively more subtle (i.e., progressively less accessible) aspects that constitute the human being which may enter the awareness of those committed to do so. This capacity to enter into awareness is essential as, under the *Sāṃkhya* system, such things are comprised of *prakṛti*, which is by definition observable by *puruṣa*, regardless of how subtle. Two primary interrelated points that must be kept in mind when comparing *Sāṃkhya* to other systems are, first, that *Sāṃkhya* presumes the standpoint of *puruṣa*, and second, that the psychical constituents which comprises the ordinary, everyday perspective are considered just as relative as any other *tattva*, a point many other systems, such as that of Kant and Merleau-Ponty, do not consider.

**Hypostasis**

In addressing the psyche in the context of the *tattvas*, the concept of “hypostasis” may be useful, which literally means “that which stands under” and idiomatically is used to denote the fundamental essence of a thing. C.G. Jung, in the context of commenting on the subtle dimension of Yoga explains, “hypostasis means that there is something below which *is* substantial, upon which something else rests.” (Jung, 1996; 10) In the context of *Sāṃkhya*, that which supports one particular aspect of experience is not merely a point of conjecture or an abstract theory, but something to be immediately verified by the individual. This is to say that each and every *tattvas*, by their very nature, are potential objects of concentration. By focusing on one *tattva*, its hypostasis or supportive *tattva* becomes known and may become an object of focus itself.
During meditation—one-pointedness (ekāgratā) attained through absorption (samādhi)—, whether or not a tattva appears either absolute or relative depends upon the state of cultivation achieved by the meditator. For the materialist, matter is simply the foundation of all of reality. But as suggested by accounts of meditation, the experiential phenomenon of the material world may vanish, leaving the meditator in a void-like, or spaceless state wherein one’s ordinary and familiar reliance on the conceptual scheme of matter is absent. This suggests that there is “something below which is substantial” that supports the lived experience of materiality that can be empirically verified through meditation.

This brief depiction may make sense to a number of people regardless of their presumed methodological standpoint, as this can be accounted for in both Śāṅkhya and phenomenology. However, the two differ in the nature of their bracketing. Phenomenological bracketing entails the willful suspension of assumptions, in this case assumptions about materiality, whereas in samādhi, this is a practical lived bracketing. But this goes beyond merely suspension of belief as it has an immediate experiential correlate.

The step that follows this which is most indicative of Śāṅkhya’s depiction of the subtle body, that is surely its greatest divergence from other schools of thought, is that Śāṅkhya suggests that ego and ratiocination may be treated precisely as one’s experience of matter is treated during meditation. That is, they are seen to be relative processes of existence, strictly neither mental nor material but subtle, that can be set aside during deep
meditation. In other words, Śāṅkhyā entertains the bracketing of ego-consciousness itself, which is the fundamental standpoint of phenomenology, which suggests Śāṅkhyā goes over and above the purview of phenomenology as phenomenology remains fixed in the standpoint of ego consciousness. As the ultimate witnessing consciousness of puruṣa is taken as the ultimate standpoint, all of prakṛti, to include the basis of the ego (ahāmkāra) and the highest wisdom (buddhi), and the entire standpoint of phenomenology for that matter, is successively treated in this manner. Other writers mentioned, such as Kant, Merleau-Ponty, and Jung all presuppose a mode of consciousness that is involved in the ego, which according to Śāṅkhyā, is relative, not one’s true identity, and generally not a stable place upon which to base a standpoint.

Śāṅkhyā’s primary critique of such other positions is that they have taken as their hypostasis something that is relative, presuming it to be bedrock. That is, in the Śāṅkhyā system, there is no ultimate hypostasis, as anything that can be identified as such is of the nature of prakṛti.

**Mistaken Dualism**

This sub-section’s purpose is to clarify the nature of dualism in the Śāṅkhyā-Yoga system prior to the following explanation of prakṛti. This will utilize Feuerstein as an example of how dualism should not be approached, offering a correction to his formulation. A secondary point to be taken up is that Śāṅkhyā begins with the initial assumptions of phenomenology in the sense that the phenomena of consciousness are its proper domain, and as such they share a rejection of materialism. The overlooking of this
primarily reveals itself when others introduce materialism into this system and when the
dualism of Śāmkhya is mistakenly understood to be Cartesian in nature. That is, matter
plays little to no role in phenomenology, only how the phenomena of consciousness
recognize what would ordinarily be called matter. With this in mind, a certain degree of
suspicion is only natural when dealing with materialism in the context of Śāmkhya.

One such writer who introduces materialism into conversations with Śāmkhya is Georg
Feuerstein. For example, when explaining his understanding of “subtle” he writes,
“Wedged between our familiar material universe and the ultimate Reality are the multiple
layers of subtle (sūkṣma) existence.” (Feuerstein, 1998; 139) As well as, “[The subtle
body is] a nonmaterial to semimaterial medium that couples the physical body with the
immaterial mind.” (Feuerstein, 2013; 117) In addition, Feuerstein project the
cosmogonic reading of Śāmkhya, advocating for Vijnāna Bhikshu’s “atomistic” reading
of the guṇas (the characteristic strands of the tattvas) and the subtle body being akin to
sub-atomic particles. (Feuerstein, 2013; 55-6) The rejection of the realist reading will be
taken up below as Burley thoroughly refuted this reading in his 2007 text. Feuerstein, as
published in 2013, make no mention of Burley’s work. The term, “material universe,” as
well as the “nonmaterial to semimaterial medium that couples the physical body with the
immaterial mind the suspiciously worded” too strongly suggest a materialist reading of
Śāmkhya.

To offer a more thorough critique, a correction to Feuerstein may be offered. When he
writes, “Wedged between our familiar material universe and the ultimate Reality are the
multiple layers of subtle (sūkṣma) existence,” the use of the term “wedge” suggests volumes as it calls to mind two rigid and opposing positions that have a very firm foundation. He proposes “our familiar material universe” and “ultimate Reality” as these two poles that are to be driven apart. The former is an appeal to the ordinary, everyday standpoint, and the latter is a sheer metaphysical assertion. Feuerstein too appears to fall into the same trap of normalizing the ordinary, everyday standpoint that overly essentializes the subtle body.

Next, the poles suggested by Feuerstein need to be adjusted. In part, his depiction is moderately accurate, but the term “our familiar material universe” is inadequate. At the lower bound of Sāṃkhya, the mahābhūtas are thought to be phenomenological in character, which is a methodological break from Feuerstein’s assertion of “our familiar material universe.” The upper bound of Sāṃkhya is puruṣa, the soul. “Ultimate reality” may be interpreted as the union of puruṣa and prakṛti. The subtle layers (presumably tattvas) then run as a spectrum of progressive degrees of support between the two bounds.

The point to be made is that it is simply an error to project anything reminiscent of Cartesian dualism onto Sāṃkhya. For what would have to pass as “mind” is puruṣa, which is the witness consciousness that cannot in any way be taken as an object, only its isolated witnessing may be experienced. “Matter” would represent the mahābhūtas, which project an inappropriate cosmogonic and overly realist reading onto Sāṃkhya.
In order to not belabor the fundamentals of Sāṃkhya, they will be addressed only in passing, keeping to the issue of subtleness and the subtle body. As was suggested above, and will be more explicitly addressed below, Sāṃkhya’s most notable feature is its dualism, but this is a dualism that is very distinct from that of Descartes. This is primarily with respect to the standpoint and method assumed by both. Descartes presumes the standpoint of the ordinary and every-day, which resorts to ratiocination, or his cogito, and a rational understanding of the Christian soul. In contrast, Sāṃkhya presumes the standpoint of the soul (puruṣa) whose isolation from materiality (prakṛti) and even the cogito of Descartes may be empirically verified through practice. That is to say, Descartes holds a position of soul-body dualism while Sāṃkhya holds soul-phenomenon dualism, or perhaps more on point but also more confusing, soul-mind/body dualism.21

Although Descartes and Sāṃkhya differ in their means of explaining the interaction between these two aspects, they differ quite starkly in what one is expected to do with this dualism. Descartes appears to have “ainted himself into a corner,” if you would, in the sense that he has used the rational mind to isolate itself from the body, and then continues to seek a rational solution to this problem. Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, proposes this dualism and then though its paired darśana of Yoga offers a path to liberation or isolation of the soul from. It first offers the fact of the conjunction or

21 “Soul-mind/body dualism” suggests that there is a witness consciousness or soul (puruṣa) that stands apart from all aspects of being that are traditionally rendered as mind or body.
merging (samyoga) of consciousness (puruṣa) and the “stuff” that makes up existence (prakṛti), albeit with no attempt to explain why or how they interact.

In Burley’s understanding of prakṛti, he finds the cumbersome and unfamiliar term “procreatrix” to be an accurate translation as it “has the sense of a feminine creative source or ‘mother’.” (x) This suggests the generative and hierarchical nature of prakṛti, while avoiding the realist, and incorrect, translation of “matter.” As puruṣa and prakṛti merge, they generate a spectrum of subtleness dependent upon the degree to which puruṣa mistakes prakṛti for itself. This spectrum must be investigated in light of this notion of conditionality in order to more closely inspect the subtle body.

To inspect conditionality, the concept of the creative and the created as defined in SK 3 will be of assistance.22 SK 3 establishes that a spectrum of creativeness manifests from prakṛti, the “procreatrix,” the only uncreated (avilkṛti). The metaphysics of Sāṃkhya simply stop at this point; that which precedes or “creates” prakṛti is not a matter of interest.23 The seven tattvas that follow, buddhi (wisdom), ahamkāra (ego/ “I-maker”), and the five tanmātras (subtle sense potentials), are both that which is created, and that which creates. “The sixteen” are the five jnānendriyas (sense-capacities), five karmendriyas (action-capacities), the mahābhūtas (five elements), and manas (mind), and

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22 Mūlaprakṛti is uncreated; the seven- ‘the great’ (mahat) and the others- are creative and created; the sixteen, meanwhile, are [merely] created; puruṣa is neither creative nor created. (162-164)

23 This is a point contested by Tantra which has added additional tattvas to the Sāṃkhya basis in order to tie this system back to Śiva.
they are that which are created but do not create. *Puruṣa* is neither creative nor created. (92)

For the sake of focus, the scope of this study may be reduced to concentrate on the relationship between the *tanmātras* and the *mahābhūtas* as the *tanmātras* are the most mundane, or perhaps the “least subtle” *tattvas*, yet also the most familiar. To begin with the *bhūtas*, they are the only thing that would be recognized strictly as “matter” as they are the elements that appear in the ordinary, everyday field of experience. However, there is quite a difference between how the two are understood. As *Sāṃkhya* is not a realist position, it does not consider the “elements” to have an independent existence outside of the individual. Instead, they represent the immediately perceived characteristics of things as they are experienced by the sensory apparatuses of the human body, and how they appear as the phenomena of consciousness. The five elements are earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), and space (*ākāśa*). But rather than representing materials (i.e., permutations of matter and energy), they represent the characteristics of each as experienced by the discerning individual. Earth represents hardness or solidity, water represents liquidity, etc., as perceived by the body. (123-4) In many respects, it may be acceptable to suggest that *Sāṃkhya* advocates its own *epoché*, wherein one is only concerned with the appearance of things as they arise within the field of experience.

As per *SK* 22, from the *tanmātras* “come” the *mahābhūtas*. The *tanmātras* are then the condition that gives rise to the *mahābhūtas*, establishing the *tanmātras* as more subtle in
the spectrum. For now we may leave the jnānendriyas/buddhīndriyas (the five sense capacities) aside, as they are the means of conscious recognition of the bhūtas as conditionally constructed by the tanmātras. For example, cakṣus is the buddhīndriya of “seeing,” which suggests the conscious recognition of vision-phenomenon. Keep in mind that the buddhīndriyas are counted among that which are created yet do not create, so they do not contribute to the manifestation of the bhūtas; their place is to receive, not generate. The tanmātra, or mode of sensory contact, of visible forms is rūpa, which is the subtle means by which “earth” (prthivī) manifests in consciousness. That is, within the experience of seeing, there is that which consciously experiences visual phenomenon (cakṣus), the characteristic of that which is seen (prthivī), and the mode by which visual forms may manifest before the mind (rūpa).

Within this system, it can be seen that capacity to sense (buddhīndriya) and the thing sensed (bhūta) are immediate and intuitive categories. But the mode of sense experience (tanmātra) is that which supports and gives rise to the potential for experience. It is wrong-headed to turn one’s attention to the physiological aspects of the human nervous system to look for an analog, as this is looking for the subtle in the realm of the gross. It may be attempted to grasp at a neurological definition of the term, but this will run headlong into the “hard problem,” confronted by material and psychological explanations of experience simultaneously.

24 According to Burley, that there is a “one-to-one thesis” that exclusively ties one element to one mode of sense experience is surely a forced distinction. (128) I have not heard of, nor can I imagine, an argument to the contrary.
However, if this investigation is carried out during meditation, it may make more sense. A common experience may be that during moments of intense focus, one may lose track of sense experience; e.g., complete unawareness of what others are saying, or perhaps losing spatial awareness of one’s body. It is not just a matter of not paying attention, but of focusing to such a degree that one’s very capacity to give rise to the experience of sound itself is set aside. For example, even if there is a sound to be heard, one simply does not hear it. This experientially compartmentalizes the tanmātras as discreet elements of consciousness that can be entirely set aside during meditation. As was explained with respect to the tanmātras, the same applies to all manifestations of prakṛti.

**Burley’s Reading of Sāṃkhya**

Although he has been mentioned above, this section more explicitly addresses the work of Mikel Burley. In his aforementioned book, he introduces the hypothesis that Sāṃkhya-Yoga may be better understood as if akin to the transcendental realism of Kant. This is both with respect to Kant’s delimitation of metaphysics and his idealism. Burley defines this interpretative shift in the following,

> The reorientation that I have in mind here is that which takes place when one ceases to conceive of empirical reality… as something that exists outside and independently of our consciousness, and instead conceives of consciousness as being, in some sense, the field or domain within which empirical reality exists. It is this reorientation that constitutes the first step towards idealism and away from metaphysical realism… (12-13)

In the context of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, Burley finds it to be almost self-evident that those who formulated the basic principles of Sāṃkhya-Yoga—and most other eastern
contemplative traditions, he adds—had in mind some form of perspectival shift as defined above. This is the same shift employed by Brentano who made “a deliberate shift to seeing things in the world out there, to seeing experience as something within the mind.” (65) This shift was later termed “phenomenological *epoché*”—Greek for “suspension”—by Husserl who defined the term as a “universal depriving of acceptance,” an “inhibiting” or “putting out of play” of “all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, probable, etc).” (Husserl, 1999: 20) Burley argues that such an *epoché*, although he does not use the term, was employed by the founders of *Śāṃkhya*-Yoga; a fact that has been, according to Burley, “so abysmally overlooked by the majority of interpreters, that a rectification is urgently required.” (Burley, 2007: 13) As such, Burley’s argument is as much a critique of misinterpretations as it is an elucidation of these classical *darśanas* themselves.

The problem can be resolved, argues Burley, if the realistic and “diachronic” interpretation of the *tattvas* is abandoned in favor of a reading that takes the *tattvas* as a “synchronic” analysis of experience.25 Burley proposes how the *tattvas* can be understood in terms of conditionality rather than as direct causality and offers an account of the elements as the forms that must accompany sensory content rather than as material entities that are themselves transformations of more subtle entities.

25 “Diachronic” suggests that which progressively changes over time. In the context of *Śāṃkhya*, Burley equates this with the serial “evolution” of the *tattvas*. “Synchronic,” in the context of *Śāṃkhya* suggests an ahistorical simultaneity.
In the greater context of this project, this orientation is the taking of a step away from realism into the domain of the psyche, although this may have been more powerful had Burley entertained the concept of metapsychics rather than metaphysics. As shall be shown in the following chapter, the rigidity of Kant’s idealism and Burley’s emphasis on it may very well be an impediment to self-cultivation, as such strong idealism and its explicit assumptions has its own problems. Nonetheless, following Burley’s explanation of Sāṃkhya and extrapolating its understanding of the subtle body is valuable in the context of the matter at hand.

**Synchronic/Diachronic**

Burley is forced to frame his argument in light of Sāṃkhya’s defining characteristic; its apparent process of “evolution” or unfolding of the twenty-four constituent elements (tattvas). Western interpreters of this process seemed to overly embellish this process in translation, inserting supporting words not found in the text that suggest Sāṃkhya was intended to be cosmogonic in nature. (112) Cosmogenesis under the confines of the material assumptions of astrophysics suggests a diachronic, causal evolution of the universe. This imputation of cosmogony can perhaps be thought of as analogous to the Big Bang, where all of reality can chronologically be traced back to a singularity, from which emerged elementary particles, from which emerged hydrogen, which was formed into heavier elements in the cores of stars, etc. But according to Burley, employing this story telling device is simply not useful, and projects upon Sāṃkhya a

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26 An investigation into the popularity of “the Big Bang” amongst academics during and around the 1920s as an intellectual talking-point du jour would surely illuminate this issue.
diachronic realism that it simply not actually present in the text. That is, Sāṃkhya simply does not account for an ancient Indian precursor to the Big Bang.

Borrowing a term from Halbfass and van Buitenen, Burley proposes that instead of a *diachronic* reading of Sāṃkhya, indicating the seriatim development of these *tattvas* through time, that a *synchronic* passage of time, indicating the *tattvas*’ simultaneous existence, more accurately accounts for the intentions of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. (110-111) It seems the problem is that the cosmogonic reading of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, which is actually not present in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, outshone the soteriological message, which is explicit.

Burley’s synchronic reading of Sāṃkhya removes the projected cosmogonic structure attributed to it by its modern interpreters. The essence of Burley’s concern is that the diachronic reading simply does not make sense in the context of experience. This is primarily due to the privileged position taken by *tattvas* that arise “earlier” or more fundamentally. If the analogy of the Big Bang is used, there is one privileged singularity that gave rise to progressively less fundamental aspects of matter which make up the material universe. If this analogy is carried over to consciousness, it simply stops making sense, as there would be, if we follow the analogy, an endless string of “Big Bangs” that give rise to the entire conscious process moment to moment. As such, if all of these elements of consciousness are occurring simultaneously, moment to moment, the Sāṃkhya schema may make more sense as it would allow for the dynamic interplay of various elements of experience. Such an interpretation emphasizes the immanence of
puruṣa, as well as, to reverse the metaphor, the immanence of the initial energies of the Big Bang.

Burley sees the evolutionary, cosmogonic nature of the Sāṃkhyakārikā more so as a “symbolic model representing the interplay between diverse elements within the complex structure that makes up subjective experience” and not something to be taken literally. The issue of “symbolic” and “literally” are at stake here, as they further suggest Burley’s position. As symbols are that which suggest something beyond themselves, what does Burley mean here? Are the tattvas merely symbols? If so, symbols of what? This perhaps may be saved by interjecting that whatever they suggest may be empirically verified through practice. “Literally” suggests Burley’s greater rejection of realism, as they are not to be understood as purely physical things. However, if the tattvas of Sāṃkhya are seen as metapsychical entities, this “literality” may be less threatening.

To solidify his point about the rejection of realism Burley states, “Nowhere within the Sāṃkhya-Yoga schema do we find any explicit references to a world of objects whose reality transcends their being objects for a subject.” This demonstrates this break from the modern cosmogonic reading of Sāṃkhya; while the Big Bang presumes an abstract observer-independent position, Sāṃkhya makes it explicit that all manifest forms of prakṛti exists solely in the context of puruṣa’s observation. This may also be thought of as a case of “overstepping the bounds of one’s domain” as discussed in Chapter Three. That is, regardless of whether or not a physical world exists independent of puruṣa is
entirely irrelevant to the soteriological aim of *Sāṃkhya*-Yoga, and utterly beyond its scope and intention.\(^{27}\)

Burley explicitly calls attention to this cosmogonic reading of *SK* 22, which was alluded to above as this verse seems to have been overly embellished by interjecting words not found in the original that imply this cosmogonic reading. Burley’s translation of this is,

> “From *prakṛti* [comes] the great; from that, egoity; and from that, the group of sixteen; again, from five of those sixteen, [come] the five elements.” \(^{(168)}\)

Compare this with the following translation cited by Burley from 1896 (Jhā) and note the causal vocabulary interjected without the use of brackets,

> “From Prakṛti issues Mahat ... ; from this ... issues Self-consciousness (*Ahaṃkāra*), from which proceeds the set of sixteen; from five of these sixteen, proceed the five gross elements.” \(^{(112)}\)

Burley notes that an interpretive error is being made that influences the translation, stemming from how the ablative ending is understood. For example, take the case of “From *prakṛti, mahat.*”\(^{29}\) Taken in the most ordinary sense, the ablative defines from where a thing comes, as in “I come from Duluth;” “Duluth” is in the ablative case. But this is too simple and straightforward a reading for Burly. As he writes,

> “…[we must] treat the ablative inflections in the aforementioned verse as indicative of relations of conditionality and dependence other than material causality. That is to say that when, at *SK* 22, we read that 'From *prakṛti* [comes] the great; from that, egoity,' and so forth, the term ‘from’

\(^{27}\) I will again assert that making such claims about matter falls under the domain of the *darśana* of *vaśeṣika*.

\(^{28}\) Although not purely causal in nature, these interjected terms correlated with an era that embraced the cosmogonic reading of *Sāṃkhya*, so a more strictly causal interpretation is reasonable.

\(^{29}\) *prakṛtermahāṃstato* ... *prakṛteh mahan*.  

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might alternatively be read as 'due to' or 'because of', which terms, though equally valid translations of the Sanskrit ablative, are less committal when it comes to temporal implication.” (126)  

As he explains, the synchronic reading transforms the causal relationship to one of conditionality and dependence, which minimizes the seriatim temporal connotations attributed to Śāṅkhya. When the relationship between tattvas is established synchronically, it appears to more naturally reflect a more ordinary understanding of consciousness.

With this perspectival shift in mind, Burley identifies two problems that can now be overcome that could not if one accepted a diachronic reading of Śāṅkhya. The first is the problem of how the physical arises from the psychological. If the diachronic “evolutionary” view of Śāṅkhya is taken, the metaphysical conundrum of how realism arises from idealism remains, which, argues Burley, is not at all Śāṅkhya’s purpose or intention. The second problem is the issue of how psychological phenomenon can arise chronologically when they are all present at any given time. Burley’s solution is that the diachronic and realist reading of Śāṅkhya simply needs to be abandoned as an historical relic of misinterpretation. He instead proposes a “synchronous analysis of experience” that “significantly ameliorates the incongruities with which multiple generations of interpreters have saddled it.” (7)

There is one other seemingly overlooked element that needs to be taken into consideration before we pass by Burley’s argument. This arises if we were to insist upon

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30 Burley makes a similar claim in footnote 9 found in his translation of the Śāṅkhya-kārikā. (203-204)
a diachronic approach to Sāṃkhya-Yoga, as this reading may still contain a shred of validity. That is, this diachronic approach would have to take the form of empirically verifying progressively deeper and more fundamental stages of consciousness that correlate with one’s progress in yogic self-cultivation. As can be seen, such an interpretation emphasizes the practical components of yoga, which loses the philosophical flavor the idealist reading Burley is advocating, and instead shifts its emphasis back onto the methods of Yoga. Such an interpretation begins with the synchronic assumption advocated by Burley, but then takes on a diachronic flair as these stages are back-tracked one by one until puruṣa exists in isolation. In this sense, the experience of the progressively more subtle tattvas may be said to arise diachronically, albeit in reverse order.

Phenomenology and the Rejection of Realism

Burley models his epistemological shift after Kant’s transcendental metaphysics as the two seem, at a certain level, to have much in common up to a certain point. It was Kant’s goal to distinguish between what was the proper domain of philosophy, and what existed outside of that domain, so the congruity between the two positions is at least apparent. To begin with what was excluded, Kant found that the nature of the immortal soul, the issue of free will, and the existence of God all existed outside the domain of rational thought, these topics being essentially speculative in nature. Rationally, such categories are simply unfalsifiable, and as such, little can be said about them in the domain of rational discourse. Kant sought to set aside speculative metaphysics in favor of a metaphysics that was grounded in something immediate that was empirically testable.
What he settled on was a study of the structure of consciousness, inspecting what Husserl later referred to as the “universal apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego [Ich].” (Husserl; 1999; 28) These conditions that gave rise to individual experience could be inferred by experience’s very possibility. (Burley, 57) They could not be experienced, but instead transcended it.

This epistemological shift was quite a break from the norm, especially concerning the cultural preponderance with materialism Kant faced. Consciousness and the body were surely correlated, but their relationship was grossly misunderstood. Kant took this a step further and introduced a priori constraints on the mind which were the “transcendental conditions [that] give rise to experience [and] have no empirical properties of their own.” (58) This was a clear attempt to progress the mind-body problem, but one that only managed to resituate the terms in a new dualistic context.

On Kant’s account of transcendental philosophy’s novelty, Rolhf notes, “This account is analogous to the geocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone.” (Rolhf, 2014) This is a fitting metaphor that demonstrates the degree of Kant’s novelty. It suggests the similarity between the shift from a popularly accepted geocentric universe to a heliocentric solar system put in motion by Copernicus, and Kant’s shift away from ideas such as the individual as tabula rasa put forth by Locke. In both of transitions, the point
of view was taken out of a privileged position of abstract and uninvolved stability, and thrust into the midst of things.

It is here where Burley sees the usefulness of Kant’s similarities with Śāṃkhyā; that the two are faced with similar initial suppositions. As the *darśana* dyad of Śāṃkhyā-Yoga is explicitly soteriological in nature, it too appears to set aside metaphysical claims that cannot be empirically verified or accounted for (i.e., irrelevant to its soteriological aim). As is my contention, such concerns are saved for other *darśanas*, such as *mīmāṃsā*, and more liberal and theistic interpretations of Yoga, such as *bhakti*.³¹

Kant’s and Śāṃkhyā-Yoga’s standpoints are also similar in the respect that they recast the issue of “mind-world dualism” in terms of what Burly provisionally terms of “subject-experience dualism.” However, as discussed in the critique of Burley below, these orientations are only superficially similar as the “subjects” of each system are simply unlike in kind. Their similarity is more in accord concerning the notion of “matter.” Under such a perspectival shift, the definition of the term changes drastically, as the idea of a physical world that exists independently of a conscious subject ceases to be relevant. As Burley quips, that matter under such a shift—in the case of Śāṃkhyā, *prakṛti*—matter is only “‘matter’… in the sense that it is that which makes up the matter of experience.”

³¹ As an aside, it may be worth considering that this may very well be why Śāṃkhyā is considered “atheistic” by some, although “non-theistic” seems far more fitting. Śāṃkhyā simply may fail to mention the divine as it finds the topic irrelevant to its depiction of soteriology.
Abandoning Realism

With this definition of the matter of consciousness in mind, the importance and value of discarding the realist position in the context of Sāṃkhya-Yoga shall briefly be discussed. Especially in the context of Yoga’s more practical character, there is a danger in the assumption of realism, as it ontologizes and thus concretizes aspects of experience. This is the primary point of dissimilarity between Kant and Sāṃkhya-Yoga, as Kant is only interested in knowledge that can be attained through the rational process. Sāṃkhya clearly contains rational elements, but it is more likely that these rational insights were mutually reinforced by the experiential insights of Yogic self-cultivation; that is, Sāṃkhya (and Yoga) are both descriptive and explanatory in nature. (132) As Burley writes,

[Sāṃkhya and Yoga] describe... observations made during sustained inwardly oriented contemplation; and, at the same time, they are supported at certain points by arguments that appeal to the rational proclivities of the student, who has perhaps yet to enjoy the 'first-hand evidence' that will later (if the 'map' is followed correctly) verify the teachings. (132)

For Kant, the nature of “inwardly oriented contemplation” is strictly cerebral, symbolic, and rational in nature that never moves beyond the ordinary everyday standpoint.32 Whereas in Yoga, this contemplation is founded in samādhi and one-pointedness (ekāgratā), which is simply unlike in kind as it professes experiences that generate standpoints that are well beyond the scope of the ordinary and everyday. All the more so,

32 That is, Kant’s orientation is based strictly on Kasulis’s philosophical paradigm of integrity.
the strong soteriological themes of the *Yogasūtras* and *Sāmkhyakārikā* are simply nonexistent in Kant’s work.

Otology is Kant’s shortcoming in the comparison with *Sāmkhya*-Yoga, in the simplest sense of the term; as the combination of *ontos* (being) and *logia* (study). To capture a thing with a word in this sense—to determine what something *is*—is to pull it out of time, so that the word in question is not just immediately true for the moment, but always true, irrespective of when. For example, the basic assumptions of “atomism” still linger in the general common sense when it comes to matter, but modern science tells us that atoms are no longer indivisible nor permanent, yet these assumptions persist; in both our shared reality and in the human mind. It is not that matter is permanent in space in time—it surely isn’t—but that it has become permanent in the human psyche. This is the position of materialism; that the mind thinks of itself as comprised of matter. This applies to both matter as understood by the field of physics, and “the matter of consciousness”—*prakṛti*—as identified in *Sāmkhya*. If these ideas become fixed in the mind, the entire project of *Sāmkhya*-Yoga is reduced to a primitive, childish fantasy from another age. But this mistake is explicitly rejected by *Sāmkhya*-Yoga as per *SK* 20 and *YS* 1.4.33 The heart of the problem is that ontology forces the same constraints of realism onto ideas themselves; i.e., idealism. As it is in error to assume that matter is the foundation of our being, so is it to assume that ideas are foundational.

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33 *SK* 20: Due to the conjunction of those [two, i.e. *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*] the non-conscious *liṅga* appears as though conscious, and similarly, owing to the activity of the *guṇas* the non-engaged appears as though active. (Burley)

*YS* 1.4: Otherwise, at other times, [the seer] is absorbed in the changing states [of the mind]. (Bryant)
The assumption of Śāmkhya-Yoga is that what is truly foundational is puruṣa or the seer. Kaivalya (isolation) in this capacity is not understood as a withdrawal from just the material world, as this would suggest a form of “mind-world dualism.” Rather, Śāmkhya-Yoga assumes a “subject-experience dualism,” which is not constrained to just an immediate appearance of the material world, but encompasses all manner of experience as that which can be experienced is by definition prakṛti. The assumption of materialism runs head-on into this practice, which is all the more reason to reject a realist reading of Śāmkhya. Instead, on the contrary, the assumption of Śāmkhya-Yoga is that the individual identifies with pure consciousness or “the seer,” and not with matter or even one’s own mind. All of the tattvas, not just “matter” in the sense of the mahābhūtas, are understood in the same way, that they are to be let go; that one should “cease to invest” (nirodha) in them.

The misidentification with prakṛti in Śāmkhya-Yoga is crucial to understanding its view of the human body, as an immediate, lived experience, and not as an object for objective study. To clarify, Nagel’s article “What is it Like to be a Bat?” may be taken as an example. As Nagel suggests, there is absolutely no way we can know what it is like to be a bat, in spite of how much time we spend studying their movements and the principles of echo-location. Only bats “know” what this is like.34 It is the same if some other form of intelligence were to objectively study human beings as material things. They may very well obtain one-hundred percent mastery over understanding the bio-mechanics and

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34 As an aside, there are cases wherein those who have undergone intensive training have had the experience of literally being another species of animal. For example, Abram (2011) and Greenwood (2013)
neurology of the human body, but they will never—can never—know what it is like to live a human body. From this lived experience, one is faced with, to use Kant’s expressions, the *phenomena* of experience as it arises within the human understanding and not the *noumena*, or thing in itself. Sāṃkhya differs from the philosophy of Kant in the respect that Kant is making a negative value statement about the nature of *noumena*, that it exists, but we can know nothing about it, whereas Sāṃkhya makes no such claim. For its soteriological goal, only attention to *phenomena*, if you would, is necessary.

In the context of this project, there are problems with the ontologizing of the subtle body in the same sense as there are problems with ontologizing the physical body. But there are also differences. By this I mean that the same general issue of separating the phenomenological experience of gross matter (*mahābhūtas*) and the realist understanding of matter arises when inspecting the subtle body, but with some new variables included. The foremost issue to be addressed I would consider the “imputation of realism” as extended to the subtle body. That is, by the nature of language, when “the body” is discussed, the lingering influences of materialism are present, and the lived experience of one’s own body is conflated with the materialist conception of the body, assuming that the body seen objectively is more or less the body lived immediately. This gives rise to the question, what *is* the subtle body; structuring the question in such a way that seeks a realist answer. Although there are methods and theories that attempt to physiologically account for the subtle body (Motoyama, 1978; Shang, 2001; Maxwell, 2009), the subtle body is foremost recognized through one’s lived experience.
A Critique of Burley

The biases of Burley will be addressed in this section, specifically with respect to what he is not addressing. For the most part, Burley is quite up front with his orientation, so I do not propose that this critique will be devastating or carry any condemnation. It is more of a matter of standpoint; as Dōgen states, “When one side is illuminated, the other remains in darkness.” It is clear that Burley is advocating one particular position and as such, this position’s shadow—what he is omitting—deserves attention. What particularly stands out are the practical aspects of Yoga, and Burley’s conception of individuality.

To begin with the practical components of Yoga, Burley surely pays due attention to the topic, but the nature of his project is simply philosophical in nature. His project emphasizes the Śāṅkhya side of the Śāṅkhya-Yoga dyad, which is philosophical in nature, overlooking the more practical components of Yoga, such as the specific methods and struggles faced by the practitioner. As he notes, “In this study my principal criterion has been - where two or more alternative interpretive options present themselves - to favour that which, other things being equal, appears to be the most philosophically coherent.” (108) “Philosophical coherence” is his standard, along with textual analysis, which is simply evident by the nature of the arguments he makes and the general framing of his project; namely the rejection of realism and the assertion of the usefulness in similarity with Kant’s transcendental metaphysics. That Kant, the primary source for Burley’s argument, relied on no bodily self-cultivation whatsoever, favoring strictly ratiocination suggests a divergence from the practical influences of Yoga and Śāṅkhya.
The role of praxis will be more explicitly addressed in the following chapter, but for now suffice it to say that Burley simply favors theōria over praxis. He does discuss this in a general sense as in the above-cited passage, “[Sāṃkhya and Yoga] describe… observations made during sustained inwardly oriented contemplation…” (132) This is an aspect of his argument that he clearly maintains, but what is found to be missing is an investigation into the nature of this “sustained inwardly oriented contemplation.” That is, Burley sets aside the conversation of how samyama—yogic meditative practice—leads to such insights. More specifically, how samyama facilitates the systematic dis-investment or withdrawal (nirodha) of physicality (mahābhūtas) and the successive experience of the more subtle tattvas that reflects the state of one’s degree of self-cultivation.

The second point to be addressed concerning Burley’s omission is the nature of ego in Sāṃkhya-Yoga; that is, Burley emphasizes a theoretical over a practical ego. The nature of the ego can be inferred in classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga, primarily as addressed by discussions of the kleśas (afflictions) and the nature of the sense capacities (tanmātras). (YS 1.5, 2.1-3) This is all the more illuminated by testaments by modern Yoga practitioners. (Horton, 2012). As a philosophical project, it appears that the role and nature of ego in Burley’s project is exclusively confined to the tattva of ahaṃkāra (ego / “I-maker”), which is the very source of reflexive self-identification, while saying nothing about self-identification with one’s body (bhūtas), one’s modes of sensory contact (tanmātras), and one’s mind (manas). This more mundane level of self-identification is where yoga practice begins. Burley seems to take the intentional capacity of mind too far at this point, as if there is some abstract and distant observer who never really muddies its
feet, so to speak, within the *tanmātras*. That is to say, it appears that Burley philosophically identifies with the ordinary ego and not with *puruṣa*. This advanced degree of awareness is only obtained after a sufficient amount of practice, if at all. Prior to this, the view of *ahaṃkāra* as the source of ego is an abstract, philosophically prescribed concept. For the novice just beginning, ego takes on a far more mundane and ordinary form wherein “I” may be composed of one’s senses, mind (*manas*), and ideas.

As a case for both points, Burley never draws a distinction between Kant’s acceptance of *a priori* knowledge and Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s treatment of this, which would fall under the penultimate *tattva* of Buddhi. The standpoint of *puruṣa* is “above” Buddhi in Sāṃkhya-Yoga, whereas in Kant, the individual is constrained or “below” this level. This distinction very clearly stratifies the two strains of thought, highlighting Kant’s incompatibility with Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

These oversights and omissions can be reduced to Burley’s stated purpose, “an Indian metaphysics of experience” when it is simply inappropriate to label Sāṃkhya as a metaphysics at all as “metapsychics” is a more fitting term. If attention is directed to what Burley is attempting, why and for whom, his stated context, purpose, and intent are clearly stated. Nonetheless, with respect to articulating the subtle body, Burley’s insight will only go so far.
Conclusion to Chapter Four

In this chapter the case was presented for the primary epistemological shift—away from realism and towards experience—required for understanding the subtle body while describing the subtle body as found in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā. In employing Burley’s reading of Sāṃkhya, he takes a position wherein abstract metaphysics and materialism are not accepted, holding as fundamental the field of one’s own experience. However, as opposed to the methods of Kant, the absolute interdependence between Sāṃkhya and Yoga wherein theory and practice are inseparable have been emphasized. This makes clear that the more subtle aspects of awareness are not derived merely through ratiocination, but empirically verified through yogic practice. In the context of Sāṃkhya-Yoga qua praxis, the tattvas and their own interdependence are verified, and just as the gross elements (mahābhūtas) are understood as aspects of conscious experience and not as matters of realism or materialism, so are the subtle elements that comprise consciousness to include the entire psychic landscape that is ordinarily understood as the ego.

With this discussion of the subtle body in place, we next turn to the work of YUASA Yasuo, whose work significantly expands the idea of the subtle body by building upon more modern foundations. Yuasa foremost draws from the phenomenological body scheme of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, modern neuroscience, Japanese and Indian philosophy, and the field of depth psychology. By intertwining these fields, Yuasa makes the case that, much like Sāṃkhya, there is an aspect of human experience that is not entirely mental, nor entirely physical that evades our everyday conscious understanding.
of the lived body. Expanding Merleau-Ponty body scheme, he refers to this as the “unconscious quasi-body,” the cultivation of which, he explains, is one of the ultimate goals of meditative self-cultivation.
5. MERLEAU-PONTY AND YUASA ON THE SUBTLE BODY

In this chapter the subtle body will be further examined by introducing Yuasa Yasuo by way of Merleau-Ponty. Yuasa has much to contribute to this project as he offers his “unconscious quasi-body,” which is a well-articulated demonstration of the subtle body. Yuasa builds upon Merleau-Ponty’s body scheme, which we will introduce first, adding his own insights to the matter through what he identifies as four circuits of information within the human body; the unconscious quasi-body being the fourth. Differentiating between these two thinkers, Yuasa makes the case that “Eastern” models of self-cultivation generally follow a pattern of psycho/physical development which results in the emerging awareness of one’s body that differs starkly from our ordinary experience of the body. Merleau-Ponty too rejected the body that arises due to our ordinary experience, what he calls the “object-body,” instead beginning his phenomenology with the immediate lived experience of the “subject-body.” Yuasa also begins his depiction of the body with such immediate experience, but as will be presented below, the two simply differ in many respects.

The point of these two scholars’ primary agreement other than beginning with the subject-body can be summarized in the following. Merleau-Ponty writes, “we must ask why there are two views of me and of my body… and how these two systems can exist together.” (Merleau-Ponty, 122) This comment, left in passing in a footnote, cuts to the heart of the problem at hand as it draws attention to the fact that there appear to be
multiple and competing ways of understanding oneself. Both Merleau-Ponty and Yuasa follow a similar insight into a schematic depiction of the human being that is strictly *neither* psychological *nor* physiological in nature (i.e., reducible to neither), yet includes elements of both. With respect to the previous chapter, it may be noted that it is also not a heady intellectual abstraction, as was the case with Kant. Merleau-Ponty, although a fierce opponent of Kant’s work, has far more in common with him than Yuasa, as shall be argued below. This is certainly due to the cultural and intellectual milieu in which they each found themselves. Although Merleau-Ponty was a philosopher, he was also a trained psychologist. And as such it can be seen in his work that he writes such that he may appeal in part to scientists. In the capacity of both professions, he found himself ensconced in the rigidity of rational analysis, imparting upon his insights a distinct flavor identified in the preceding chapters as “integrity,” although directing his attention to personal experience, which suggests “intimacy.” Yuasa, on the other hand, although also a trained philosopher, drew from the rich meditative traditions of Japan, seeing wisdom of the body as a project to be carefully cultivated; imparting on his project a strong penchant for “intimacy” while structuring his argument in terms of “integrity.”

To gradually present this case for the subtle body, this chapter will begin with Merleau-Ponty as his phenomenology makes for a familiar point of departure. This will present evidence for Merleau-Ponty’s taking the lived-body as the condition of experience, which contextually situates his project, at least in part, in the domain of intimacy. Although he is clearly ensconced in the cultural biases of integrity, as the case shall be made below, it appears that he advocated an understanding of the human being far more compatible with
intimacy while rejecting the absolutism that often accompanies the “object-body” as insisted by the paradigm of integrity. Although Merleau-Ponty identifies the human being as being fundamentally active and expressive in nature, he does not go so far as to advocate the deliberate cultivation and refinement of such expressiveness, which is where Yuasa expands on his project the most.

In the introduction to Yuasa, two essential points will be emphasized: his four circuits of the body’s information system, and Yuasa’s emphasis on knowledge of the body being the result of deliberate self-cultivation. Yuasa’s four circuits begin with the sensory-motor circuit, which is the sum of perceptions of the external world and bodily actions directed toward the external world, perhaps akin to the karmendriyas (capacity for action) and bhuddendriyas (capacity for the senses) of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The second circuit Yuasa refers to the internal information apparatus of the body, which is comprised of the circuit of kinesthesis and the circuit of somesthesis; the passive awareness of the body and internal organs respectively. The third circuit is the emotional-instinct circuit, which is akin to Merleau-Ponty’s habit-body as it is the mechanism responsible for the habituation of action. Finally, the fourth layer is the unconscious quasi-body, which is psychologically unconscious and physiologically invisible, announcing itself only after diligent practice. Practice, or self-cultivation, as mentioned is the primary point of divergence between Yuasa and Merleau-Ponty, a point that again relies upon the distinction between intimacy and integrity.
In doing so, it is the intention of this chapter to further elucidate the subtle body by establishing familiar footing in western discourse, in this case, phenomenology. By starting with phenomenology and expanding upon it *vis-à-vis* Yuasa, and again emphasizing the paradigms of intimacy and integrity, the intention is to further establish a cogent starting place from which to incorporate the *cakras* in discussion.

**Merleau-Ponty**

This section will present the position of Merleau-Ponty in order to introduce his general phenomenological orientation and his body schema, to be expanded upon below by Yuasa. This section will begin with his general epistemological position, that the lived-body is the foundational condition for experience and that the object-body is an intellectual abstraction secondary in nature to that condition. Once established, this section will turn its attention to Merleau-Ponty’s body scheme upon which Yuasa elaborates.

**Body as Condition of Experience**

Merleau-Ponty begins his phenomenology with a paradigmatic shift wherein the ordinary rules for approaching and understanding the world objectively are set aside in favor of a description of the immediate experience of one’s own lived body. Merleau-Ponty’s paradigmatic shift, although similar in some respects to Husserl’s *epoché*, differ with respect to the role and self-identity of the individual as they contrast with experience. Husserl’s *epoché* was decidedly Cartesian in nature which isolated or perhaps even distilled one’s ego from experience. Merleau-Ponty’s shift is far less dualistic in nature.
He describes this shift in a number of ways, which will be addressed in this section in order to develop a well-rounded depiction of his position.

The divergence between Merleau-Ponty and Kant should be noted here as well as Kant was presented in the preceding chapter and as Merleau-Ponty was an outspoken critic of him. His primary contention was that Kant’s philosophy was ultimately based upon “analytic reflection,” a critique shared by this project. “Analytic reflection” may be understood as a manifestation of the paradigm of integrity, possessing the general characteristics enumerated in earlier in this project. Merleau-Ponty found this insufficient as it is bound by the projection of ideas, although Kant’s position did indeed begin with an investigation of one’s immediate experience. One could say that Merleau-Ponty’s insistence upon experience was simply more radical than Kant’s, as he wished to distance himself from transcendental idealism, seeking something more in-between, and cast in terms of both the body and the unconscious.

To begin, expressed negatively, the assumptions of Merleau-Ponty’s position are based upon the rejection of rational analysis, both in the context of idealism and realism. He writes that when we do entertain ideas, we distance ourselves from our own experience. As he writes,

The whole life of consciousness is characterized by the tendency to posit objects, since it is consciousness, that is to say self-knowledge, only in so far as it takes hold of itself and draws itself together in an identifiable object. And yet the absolute positing of a single object is the death of consciousness, since it congeals the whole of existence, as a crystal placed in a solution suddenly crystallizes it. (Merleau-Ponty, 82)
Here Merleau-Ponty warns that when one “absolutely posits” an object, whether an external object or an abstract internal object, consciousness “dies.” By this we can understand that he is suggesting the natural domain of consciousness to be not constricted by adamantly held ideas established through the “positing” of objects, whether they are mental or physical in nature. As addressed in the previous chapter, both the “crystallization” of matter (i.e., realism and materialism) and the “crystallization” of mental phenomenon, as in the case of Kant (i.e., idealism). This death of consciousness occurs when consciousness grasps itself as a symbol, again, mental or physical. Whichever the case may be, Merleau-Ponty means to suggest something entirely other, especially with respect to the body.

For Merleau-Ponty, the human body is a lived-body that is dynamic and experienced immediately as a lived phenomenon, which is lived from the inside. This is a very clear break from Kasulis’s paradigm of integrity, and an equally clear example of intimacy’s in medias res as discussed in the previous chapter. (Kasulis, 95) Merleau-Ponty suggests this paradigmatic shift starting with the epistemological vantage point of the lived body in the following; “…I observe external objects with my body… but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable.” (104) He demonstrates here the absurdity of self-reference with respect to the lived-body, both literal and symbolic, that it is something immediately present to conscious experience and not mediated through symbols or ideas. He also expresses the absurdity of an abstract observer that observes observation, which may be construed as a caricature of theōria.
Further defining this shift, Merleau-Ponty explains that the body is not merely a thing that acts within the world (suggestive of the Newtonian worldview), but, as he writes, “The body is our general medium for having a world.”\(^1\) (169) This presents a radically different understanding of space, moving away from the Cartesian “container model” of space, geometry and physics, to space defined by the expression of the human body and the inseparability of the individual *qua* “being in the world.” In other words, the medium of the world is not abstract spatiality into which the object-body is placed, but the lived body itself. Or also as he defines it, “The body is essentially an *expressive space.*” (169, emphasis added) Within his framing of this phenomenological paradigm, the distinction between experience and materiality becomes blurred.

In further rejection of the inadequacies of the object-body Merleau-Ponty writes,

> I cannot envisage this form which is traced out in the nervous system… I cannot gain a removed knowledge of it. In so far as I guess what it may be, it is by abandoning the body as an object, *partes extra partes,* and by going back to the body which I experience at this moment… I cannot understand the function of the living body except by enacting it myself…

(87)

Here he identifies the disconnect between the “two views of me and my body;” the object-body, in this case, the material body as defined by the nervous system, and his own lived experience. In order to conduct his phenomenology, he suggests abandoning the “body as an object” as that which exists alongside of or in addition to (*partes extra partem*).

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\(^1\) For the sake of comparison, this expression, “The body is our general medium for having a world,” appears right at home in *Sāṃkhya,* seemingly suggesting the *tanmātras* or the conditions of the subtle body that allow for the one’s experience of the elements (*mahābhūtas*).
partes) one’s own experience. Although biology demonstrates that the human being has a nervous system, one's own nervous system is not something that is ordinarily immediately intuited or experienced by a person. For example, we are not directly aware of nerve impulses running up and down our arms when we type as the nerve impulses themselves as defined by the standpoint of biology. By abandoning the body as understood through biology and the understanding of human anatomy, he returns to this own living body. Here he states that this is done through “enacting it” himself.

**Being as Action**

Action is at the very heart of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, expressed pithily by, “Consciousness is… not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.” (Merleau-Ponty, 159) That is to say, our being is expressed by doing, echoing the cliché that “being” is both a noun as well as a verb. Crucial to action is his concept of “depth,” which expresses an inherent existential immersion in the world. Contrary to a purely objective understanding of one’s being with respect to the environment which may perhaps be referred to as a container model of being, from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological perspective, according to Steinbock, “Depth is the dimension where things envelop one another, overlap, antagonize, encroach; …[it] immediately discloses …the fact that perceiver and perceived are intertwined and yet never coincide completely.” (Steinbock, 1987: 337) Here Kasulis’s intimacy may again be found at work.

Steinbock presents an example proposed by Merleau-Ponty, which is the case of walking into a familiar room and opening the curtains, and how the overall presence of the room
changes; where hidden and reclusive things spring to life and readiness. That which was
uninviting and gloomy, upon the opening of the curtains, reveals a word of familiar
possibilities. (338) It is in the context of this immersive understanding that action finds
its place.²

Merleau-Ponty identifies a modality of being wherein the expressiveness of actions
constitutes one’s very world. As he explains, “…in the normal person the subject’s
intentions are immediately reflected in the perceptual field, polarizing it, or placing their
seal upon it, or setting up in it, effortlessly, a wave of significance. (Merleau-Ponty, 151)
This is what was suggested by Steinbock’s example; that when we approach familiar
objects, they are illuminated by an immediately felt significance defined by that object’s
usefulness in relation to the degree that it allows the body to express its will. This is the
“habit-body” that becomes accustomed to reacting to familiar stimuli, such as a hand
responding to a door knob. Although this may be understood objectively incorporating
the object-body’s physical function and practical outcome, it is more so understood
immediately through the subject-body.

Merleau-Ponty uses the example of a typewriter, and the habituated ease with which
accustomed fingers express the body’s will immediately and without deliberation. He
writes,

² This understanding is not in accord with Sarukkai’s position, wherein he defines “depth” to be purely a
matter of that which is “outside” the individual whereas Steinbock does not draw this distinction. (465)
However, this distinction does not weigh on this general synopsis.
[Habit] is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. The subject knows where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where one of our limbs is, through a knowledge bred of familiarity which does not give us a position in objective space. (166)

“Forthcoming only when bodily effort is made,” demonstrates the body’s learning that does not at all transfer immediately to bright and clear conscious awareness. With the example of the typewriter, or to modernize, a computer’s keyboard, we may reasonably suspect that most people would not be able to readily draw a keyboard from memory without painstakingly physically reenacting typing familiar words and extrapolating the movement of the fingers. The same could be said of playing a song on an instrument, the progression of which may only be recalled after physically playing out the fingering of the song. In explanation, Merleau-Ponty states that it is “a knowledge bred of familiarity which does not give us a position in objective space.” That is, the fingers, after they have learned how to type, cease to register in one’s conscious conception of space.

Once such an action becomes set as habit, Merleau-Ponty claims that one’s perception of one’s self-expression changes with respect to space. He writes,

In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them. (Merleau-Ponty, 162)

Here, Merleau-Ponty is very clearly criticizing the Newtonian worldview wherein space and time are understood to be strictly a priori categories. Instead, he recognizes that his body is a spatial and temporal expression itself which cannot be pulled from this nexus of
rationality, save through abstract and artificial means (e.g., the construction of the object-body). This expression is surely what he has in mind when he writes, “...to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it.” (79). For the object-body to “inhabit” another object clearly makes no sense, but when the immediacy of one’s phenomenological experience is taken with respect to the object’s habituated usefulness to the individual and the individual’s particular understanding, the object joins with the individual’s intentional expression.

As a meaningful aside, Merleau-Ponty accredits this principle of human being for phantom limb syndrome. (95-99) The habit-body as an expressive phenomenon thus defined habituates itself towards the world through its actions, as in the case of one’s fingers and a keyboard. In Steinbock’s example, when he opens the curtains to his study and the light pours in, his keyboard is illuminated. The habituated meaning of the keyboard is understood through the potential of the fingers’ expression of one’s thoughts. But this habituation is not entirely contained within the phenomenological domain, as the habit-body appears to persist even when the corresponding portions of the object-body is damaged or even removed. This is how Merleau-Ponty understands phantom limb; that habituated meanings in objects call forth memories of the body’s expression, even in such cases wherein that very part of the body has been lost. In the case of the lost hand, the visual perception of a keyboard or a door knob, thoroughly habitually impressed an expression of one’s will through a very particular part of the body—one’s hand—into the habit body, casts a habituated intentional arc wherein the expressiveness of the hand is
called to action. The result is that the anticipation of the hand’s action calls back a habituated image of the hand, although the hand is not present.

Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology in general advocate taking a second look at human experience with respect to the body as a lived-body that avoids the “crystallization” of either idealism or realism. As was argued in Chapters Two and Three, the disparity of materialism and the imbalances that have followed relegated the lived experience of the body to a secondary, if not arbitrary, status. In many respects, phenomenology can be understood as an attempt to reincorporate this basic understanding back into discourse, which is why it is a natural ally in the discussion of Yoga and the subtle body. As mentioned in the introduction, Merleau-Ponty suggests, “we must ask why there are two views of me and of my body… and how these two systems can exist together.” (Merleau-Ponty, 122) Answering “why” may not be the right question to ask, but how these two systems can exist together is entirely possible.3

The Habit-Body and the Intentional Arc

Merleau-Ponty’s habit-body was incorporated by Yuasa in his four-level body schema. This level of the body is responsible for inculcating patterns of action into the body and is comprised of the various capacities to cast the “intentional arc.” Merleau-Ponty defines the intentional arc in the following,

3 With this section in mind and the exposition of Burly from the previous chapter, one may consider which naturally has more in common with Sāṃkhya; Merleau-Ponty or Kant.
[The intentional arc] projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. (Merleau-Ponty, 157)

The intentional arc is a feedback loop of sorts comprising the entire human being’s past and present, which spans the psychological and the physical, and directs action. In this sense it is the mechanism that translates one’s impulses and ideas into spontaneous actions of the body, or perhaps the body’s natural capacity for molding behavior conducive to the meaningful satisfaction of desire. At a very fundamental level, the energy that drives this arc may be understood by the term “libido.” This arc, notes Morris, is not rational or logical in nature, and grasps desire, the thing desired, and the requisite motor subsystems of movement required for the task as a complete whole. (Morris, 2000; 62) As such, it is most explicitly unconscious in nature, the individual often being only aware of its arising and consequences.

For example, one may perhaps see this intentional arc in action in cases of “beginner’s luck” wherein a person attempts an action for the first time. By first noting visually how another’s body moves, the individual’s body models its own expression after their movements, and upon physical exertion, the task is executed surprisingly well. What Morris would emphasize in such an example, is that the body unconsciously recognizes and executes this as a unified whole, employing preexisting habituated patterns of movement. As a result, the action is seamlessly executed as a whole and not cobbled together piecemeal. To return to the example, the beginner, of course, soon loses the adroitness they once exhibited and must train in order to re-attain that level of skill.
Through repetition, the habit-body slowly establishes new routines that accomplish desired tasks.

The body’s potential for inculcation seems to be what drew Merleau-Ponty to this concept of the habit-body. This is in addition to the ordinary sense of the “object body,” which was used above; the body-image that follows the materialist suppositions of western medicine. Beyond this body, however, is a more personal and immediate sense of the body, which Merleau-Ponty called the “body image.” As he writes, “Brought down to a precise sense, this term [body image] means that my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task.” (Merleau-Ponty, 114) That is to say, Merleau-Ponty saw the body as something intrinsically expressive in nature; as a thing oriented towards accomplishing tasks in the physical world.

This body is not defined spatially as the object body ordinarily is, measured objectively in height and weight. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “spatial awareness is not a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation.” (115) This suggests that this bodily awareness is not held to just the confines of the object body, but is instead spread across one’s desires, one’s physicality, and the pertinent elements of one’s environment. “Spatiality of situation” suggests an understanding of one’s own body defined only with respect to the accomplishment of a certain task. Take for example playing basketball and typing. The former defines the body with respect to a hoop of a certain height, a court of certain dimensions, and a number of other players, wherein the entire body is employed to finding various ways to put the ball in the hoop. The latter is drastically different as the
body expresses itself very subtly through presumably sitting and very short stroke of the fingers over the keys.

The body image and the personal contextual situation of space are both elements that comprise the intentional arc. These elements represent the centrality and immediacy of the physical body with respect to the actions it undertakes and in turn inculcates. As we next turn to Yuasa, he incorporates Merleau-Ponty’s habit-body into his four-level body schema, leaving this habit-body as level-two while adding a third and fourth deeper level which Merleau-Ponty never considered.

**Yuasa**

This section introduces the philosophy of **Yuasa Yasuo**, specifically his four-fold body schema which expands upon the insights of Merleau-Ponty, adding an additional, deeper level. Yuasa also adds to this discussion by delivering a gestalt figure/background dichotomy and a criticism of mind-body dualism, taking consciousness to be something that converged between the two fields of psychology and physiology, not accepting a compromise or stopping at correlativity, but instead employing a third-term between the two.⁴ Also expanding beyond the scope and methodological assumptions of Merleau-Ponty, Yuasa centralizes self-cultivation (*shugyō*) as the means for deliberately training the unconscious functions of the subtle-body. In doing so, Yuasa makes a case for what he terms the “unconscious quasi-body” which is his term for the subtle body.

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⁴ As the term may carry a number of contemporary interpretations, by “mind-body correlativity” I mean only to suggest a general awareness of the inseparability of mind and body which stands in contradistinction to “mind-body dualism.”
As a preparatory note on methodology, Yuasa assumes a standpoint similar to that of Merleau-Ponty in the sense that they are both preparing information to be discussed in the domain of the everyday and ordinary. Although Yuasa cites the self-cultivation methods of Yoga and the like, his objective is to make a case for the unconscious quasi-body that can be approached and discussed while still retaining that its verification is left to certain devoted, or sensitive, individuals. This is to say that although Yuasa’s and Merleau-Ponty’s methods are similar, Yuasa’s surpasses Merleau-Ponty’s in its depth.

In this section Yuasa’s understanding of the body will be established as an expansion of Merleau-Ponty’s body schema. Yuasa’s building upon Merleau-Ponty’s schema takes into account more explicit neurological and physiological aspects of human physiology, while introducing elements of eastern philosophy also unaccounted for in Merleau-Ponty, most notably *ki*-energy, which is one expression of the subtle body.

Yuasa’s account of the body begins where Bergson and Merleau-Ponty began; with the sensory-motor circuit. This circuit is an expression of the common every-day function of one’s experience defined by the relationship that exists between sensory information perceived from the environment and motor responses whose actions are expressive of the body’s utility towards the world. This stimulus and response loop is habituated through action and repetition. (Yuasa, 1987; 169) Merleau-Ponty’s insight into this matter comes in identifying an additional, deeper layer to the body—the habit body—beneath the
sensory-motor circuit, that was foundational for the human being and was fundamentally expressive in nature.

**Yuasa’s Four Circuits of the Body**

Merleau-Ponty’s study of the human body was focused on working with patients who had traumatic brain injuries. This revealed to him a rather intuitive depiction of our capacity for habit formation. Yuasa, expanding upon these insights, introduces further layers of the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenological experience which more exactly articulate the mechanism at work in the unconscious regions of experience. Yuasa expands Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of the body, separating the elements that comprised the habit-body into a more gradual spectrum of components, more carefully systemizing four levels of the body. These circuits are 1) the sensory-motor circuit, 2) the circuit of coenesthesis, 3) the emotional-instinct circuit, and 4) the unconscious quasi-body.

To begin Yuasa’s depiction of his body schema, the first layer of this schema is the sensory-motor circuit as defined by Merleau-Ponty. He adds that underneath the sensory-motor circuit there is a second layer which he calls the “internal information apparatus.” The internal information apparatus is the domain of one’s internal awareness wherein one receives information about the state of one’s body beyond the scope of ordinary “sensing” from the first layer. This second layer Yuasa breaks down into two parts, the first of which he calls the “circuit of kinesthesis.” This term he designates as the system of nerves which provide feedback as to the body’s movement, functioning as the support for the sensory-motor circuit by providing a stream of feedback to one’s bodily actions.
The second portion of Yuasa’s internal information apparatus are the splanchnic nerves, which comprise the circuit of somesthesia, which transfers information about the condition of the organs to include feelings from the skin, muscles, tendons, and internal organs, and the sensation of balance. (Yuasa, 1993; 46)

Yuasa notes that there is a fundamental difference between one’s awareness of each of these first two circuits. The former is bright and clear such that one’s movements and physical sensations are easily localized within the awareness of one’s body. For example, in picking up a small and delicate object, one is explicitly aware that it is being held, for example, with the finger tips. The clarity being necessary as the feedback in this circuit is required for subtle acts of dexterity and balance, like applying just enough pressure to, perhaps, hold a paper cup upright and with just enough pressure to keep it secure without crushing it. Splanchnic sensation, however, does not usually possess this lucidity, as one does not have an immediately clear understanding of the position or state of the internal organs unless there is something wrong with one of them. Yuasa explains that this is because there is a larger area in the cerebral cortex designated to the former. As a result, as Yuasa writes, “We take the motor sensation to be at the periphery of ego-consciousness, the splanchnic sensation is further behind it, formed at the base of a vague, dark consciousness.” (Yuasa, 1993; 46) These two circuits of the internal information apparatus when taken together, Yuasa terms the circuit of coenesthesia, which he likens to a feedback apparatus.
Following the sensory-motor circuit and the circuit of coenesthesia is the third layer of the experience of the body Yuasa terms the “emotional-instinct circuit,” which consists of the autonomic nervous system (sympathetic and parasympathetic) which regulates and maintains the function of the internal organs. Yuasa notes that special attention must be paid to this circuit’s unique character as it is far more dark and distant from ordinary consciousness than the previous two. That is, in the same sense as mentioned above concerning how the circuit of somesthesia is less connected to the cerebral cortex than the circuit of kinesthesia, the autonomic nervous system does not connect to the cerebral cortex at all. Centripetally, this circuit regulates such functions as digestion and heart rate, which are regulated entirely unconsciously, ordinarily by the parasympathetic nervous system. Centrifugally, this circuit communicates only through stress and emotion which are diffused throughout the body. This is to say that the information given out from the emotional-instinct circuit is entirely unlocalized.

This circuit is central for the maintenance of life, as well as the source of sexual and other instinctual energy. To return to Merleau-Ponty for a moment, it this level of unconscious energy that drives the intentional arc, deriving its driving energy from basic energetic impulses of the body. (Merleau-Ponty, 182) Merleau-Ponty’s famous case of a man named Schneider, due to a traumatic brain injury, was unable to apply this sexual energy to his world, and as such, his world became barren of meaning, becoming pathologically emotionally neutral to his world. One’s emotional coloring of the world, according to Merleau-Ponty, whether that be sexual desire, or desire to express one’s thoughts on a typewriter, derive from something he believed to be sexual at its basis. But as this energy
functions at the level of the emotional-instinct circuit, its energy is diffused throughout one’s experience.

This third circuit, as well as the somesthesis of the second circuit, Yuasa notes, is insufficiently paid attention to by western science; the exception being depth psychology, which is keen to recognize the potential for an unconscious source to some psycho-physical maladies. To explain in more detail, Yuasa defines the habit body as the second circuit, to which those who have trained their body diligently have more access. That is, the first circuit more easily “hands off control,” as it were, to inculcated sub-routines habituated through practice. According to Yuasa, the ease with which someone performs such an action can be disrupted by emotion, such as anxieties that arise during public speaking, or frustrations that arise during participation in sports. In a more mundane sense, this may apply to any number of emotional agitations that arise at any time, even in the case of something such as interacting with a cashier at the grocery store, or simply being out in public. This third circuit, Yuasa claims, is primarily neglected as training the body is ordinarily limited to the first two circuits, as they are focused on athletic actions such as speed and strength, whereas the training of this third circuit trains the emotional responses and inhibitions of the whole person.

To acquire an understanding of how such stray emotions upset the individual, Yuasa states that one must begin cultivating the third emotional-instinct circuit through meditation, which focuses the mind such that it is no longer disturbed by the arising of agitating emotion and by the intrusions of the “over-thinking” mind. This is to say that
both unconscious emotional agitation and the conscious over-corrections of ratiocination perturb the expression of the body. As Yuasa writes,

…if a person can maintain calmness without being swayed by emotion, the movements of the mind and body will coincide with each other smoothly and freely. In short, controlling emotion in self-cultivation enhances the degree of correlativity between the movement of the mind and body, and develops a more intimate relation of union between mind and body. (Yuasa 1993; 55)

One may cultivate such awareness and control in a specific art, such as swordsmanship or meditation, but the benefits of learning to more harmoniously maintain one’s emotional-instinct circuit applies to the entire personality. The mindfulness and awareness of one’s lived-body cultivated in order to excel in, for example, archery, entirely transfer to such mundane aspects of negotiating life, such as not losing one’s temper in traffic, and dealing with emotional agitation in the case of the everyday people with which one happens to come in contact; both their agitation and one’s own.

These secondary effects of cultivating the emotional-instinct circuit are not merely coincidental or accidental, but are at the very heart of self-cultivation. On the point of the big picture of such training Yuasa writes,

Training solely for technique without concern for the perfection and enhancement of the personality has usually been regarded as heretical in Eastern cultivation theories. No matter how one may excel in bodily skills or scholarship, one cannot win respect as long as there is a flaw in one’s human sentiments. The preoccupation with technique alone is taken to be dangerous. (Yuasa, 1987; 209)

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5 One may also reflect on how the effects of alcohol function in a disastrously similar fashion as they are both means of “dealing” with disruptive emotions and over-thinking; the former meaningfully resolving emotion and the latter chemically suppressing it.
Although potentially construed as foreign or mysterious, this sentiment is not entirely out of place in popular western modes of physical cultivation. Although the “perfection and enhancement of the personality” is not ordinarily discussed forthright, the discipline formed by practicing a sport ultimately influences other aspects of one’s character. This is especially true with respect to youth athletics, where young people learn, alongside the basic fundamentals of a sport, values such as teamwork, discipline, and practice, which clearly translate off the field.

One may perhaps take a more cynical view with respect to professional athletics. It is a matter of conjecture that the measure of success in, for example, professional tackle football has relatively little to do with the cultivation of one’s personality as the standards are strictly physical. The cultivation of one’s personality may again be a case of the gestalt foreground/background relationship. As the two are clearly interrelated, if pure physicality is in the foreground of an athletic micro-culture, issues of character fall into the background, and as one pays attention to the news, at times entirely out of sight. One may imagine how out of place it would be, if not downright comical, for there to a portion of the National Football League’s pre-draft scouting combine (wherein prospective players demonstrate their physical prowess) where the flaws in their character are tested; presumably after the 40-yard dash and before the 225 lb. bench press for repetitions. The number of NFL players renowned for their professional immaturity, uncoachability, and general psychotic behavior off the field is a testament to this standard, or perhaps lack thereon. Be that as it may, the men in the league who have
truly become better all-around people by practicing their sport beyond the confines of physical performance receive little or no attention.

This emphasis on physicality may safely be reduced to an environment that emphasizes the cultivation of the first and second information circuits as defined by Yuasa, in many respects ignoring the third. Although a clear degree of discipline is required to progress into professional athletics, the all-too-common aberrant behavior of professional athletes at least suggests that this aspect of training is clearly not a very high priority for the NFL.

**Yuasa and the Subtle Body**

The first three circuits of the body’s information system as presented by Yuasa are in accord with conventional physiological and psychological understanding of the human body, and there is nothing overtly contentious that accompanies their introduction. His fourth circuit, however, requires the expansion of the ordinary understanding of the mind-body in introducing Yuasa’s particular formulation of the subtle body; the unconscious quasi-body.

**The Unconscious Quasi-Body**

Yuasa introduces his fourth circuit of the body’s information system under a handful of terms; the “circuit of *ki* (気; Chinese, *qì*/*ch‘i*),” “visceral-meridian system,” and “unconscious quasi-body” (Yuasa, 1993; 111) The latter term will be primarily used in this section as it least suggests tradition-specific terminology (i.e., “*ki*” and “meridian system”). This will be done for the sake of simplicity and focus. Although it will not be
addressed in this chapter it should be noted that Yuasa draws heavily from their respective fields in order to contextualize, authenticate, and validate his point. Drawing from Traditional Chinese Medicine, *Qigong*, and the meditative teachings of the likes of Kūkai and Dōgen, Yuasa makes it clear that he is not inventing anything by this term, but merely re-presenting something quite old in a more modern fashion.

To begin to unpack this term, we return once again to Merleau-Ponty’s body schema. Yuasa presents Merleau-Ponty as a western and more familiar example as his insights provide the established terminology that brings much insight to the issue. He writes,

> The mode of a ‘bodily scheme,’ throwing a net of potential actions toward the external world—linking it to the physiological bodily system, while incorporating within it a placement in the external world—can be grasped neither by an analysis of psychological functions experienced immediately in consciousness nor by an analysis of positivistic physiological functions. (Yuasa, 1987; 172)

These psychological and physiological components of Merleau-Ponty’s body schema are neither accessible to the individual who experiences them, nor to the psychologist or physician who studies them second-hand. What Yuasa suggests is that, as he explains, there “remains a ‘third term’ mediating between the psychological and the physiological-physical… inferred based on manifest functions in consciousness and the physical dimension…” (Yuasa, 1993; 141) A consequence of this inference is that the analysis of psychological functions experienced immediately in consciousness and the analysis of positivistic physiological functions are in fact grasped *in part* by both, as they each recognize that something very clear is indeed occurring, yet neither represent an exclusive standpoint from which to authoritatively define the observation. The nature of
this inference demonstrates that whatever this third term may be, it is neither strictly psychological nor strictly physiological. It is this formulation of “neither psychological, nor physiological” that requires attention.

Merleau-Ponty seemed to have been aware of this very phenomenon, using the same expression of a “third term” between the psychological and the physiological. (Yuasa, 1993; 122) All the more explicitly suggesting this fundamental unity, he writes, “The union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually external terms, subject and object, brought about by arbitrary decree. It is enacted at every instant in the movement of existence.” (Merleau-Ponty, 102) Here we see Merleau-Ponty patently rejecting the mind-body dualism of Descartes, while at the same time emphasizing one’s fundamental being as expressed through the body.

The point to be emphasized here is that the “substance” of the subtle body, if that term may be used at all, “lies in the region of the psychologically unconscious and the physiologically invisible.” (Yuasa, 1993; 117) As such, knowledge of this fourth circuit of the unconscious quasi-body is derived only indirectly; that is, it must be inferred. Such examples of this inference can be found in such systems such as depth psychology, which makes inferences about the nature of the psyche based on analysis, and acupuncture which bases its inferences on its observed curative effects. However, such knowledge may not be accessible to most people, especially those ensconced in a paradigm that views the very problem explicitly one-sidedly; e.g., materialism.
Yuasa explains that through various means one may come to develop an awareness of this. Yuasa uses the example of “hearing a voice without seeing the person producing it.” I am however partial to the analogy of a submarine traveling well beneath the surface of the water, detectable only by the subtle wake it leaves behind. In this analogy, the submarine represents the movements of the unconscious quasi-body, which is not immediately detectible as it is “underwater;” i.e., psychologically unconscious and physically invisible. However, this movement leaves a trace that may be detected in other layers of the body’s information system, for example, in felt sensations in the viscera or the skin, or images that emerge from the unconscious. In this way, the psychologically unconscious and physically invisible unconscious-quasi body makes itself known.

With this in mind, it naturally follows that the unconscious quasi-body occupies a foundational space that is neither reducible to idealism nor realism, that it is neither purely psychological nor physiological while possessing characteristics of both. With respect to the idea of a standpoint, it appears that neither position, the psychological nor the physiological, can fully account for this phenomenon. This lack of clearly defined standpoint makes discussion of the subtle body problematic, which again returns to the distinctions of intimacy and integrity. In order to approach the unconscious quasi-body, a form of bracketing must be performed, wherein one’s inclinations toward the reductionism of idealism or realism must be suspended, and the darkness of intimacy must be taken into consideration.
In order to discuss the subtle body and its various expressions, such as Yuasa’s unconscious quasi-body, a new logical paradigm in needed, as the either/or paradigm (an expression of integrity) loses its usefulness when confronted by such a topic. In the case of the unconscious quasi-body, we find that the expression “neither psychological nor physiological” simply does not make sense as such a definition seems to excuse the unconscious quasi-body from conversation. It all the more so does not make sense that because the unconscious quasi-body is not in accord with the either/or paradigm, it should be dismissed as nonsense. It is the contention of this project that perhaps the greatest inhibitor to the understanding of the subtle body is the either/or paradigm. If this is the case, then a more fundamental and inclusive paradigm is required.

**Intimacy Revisited: Body as Project**

Idealist and realist depictions of the subtle body render the individual unsatisfactorily, both due to their incompleteness, in part due to the insistence of the mind that seeks to securely grasp such an important phenomenon firmly with words. But as mentioned in the previous chapters, this is ostensibly an impulse unique to the paradigm of integrity, which demands that knowledge present itself both bright and clear. This section will return to the discussion put forth by Kasulis to investigate Merleau-Ponty and Yuasa’s insights with respect to Kasulis’s philosophical paradigms. As shall be argued below, an understanding of the subtle body requires all of the criteria presented by Kasulis in defining intimacy; knowledge within the paradigm of intimacy 1) is objective, but personal rather than public, 2) is intimate and personal, 3) has an affective dimension, 4)
is somatic as well as psychological, and 5) is dark and esoteric.\(^6\) In looking at the body from the paradigm of intimacy, Yuasa’s chief contention may be better understood; that becoming aware of the unconscious quasi-body only occurs when the body is treated as a project to be cultivated.

Yuasa renders this contention clearly in the following. Once presented, we may return to an analysis *vis-à-vis* integrity and intimacy. Yuasa writes,

…the modern Western pattern of thinking is a kind of ‘democratic’ theory taking the majority as its standard. By contrast, the traditional Eastern pattern of thinking is an ‘elitist’ theory with a goal which only a few can reach through their efforts. [And as such,] …the Eastern elitist view of human being does not take the essence of human nature simply as a given, but takes it as an unknown which needs to be practically investigated. Self-cultivation is an endeavor to discover the true self through this practical investigation and to actualize it. (Yuasa, 1993; 63)

In this passage, Yuasa differentiates between a “democratic” and “elitist” theory of knowledge, which already resonates with the previous discussion of integrity and intimacy. A few words of clarification are in order as in this passage Yuasa is employing very broad terms. As a preparatory remark, it should be noted that such a distinction is not strictly either/or as these too share a foreground/background gestalt relationship. Yuasa is constraining his assertion to the juxtaposition of two broadly culturally defined understandings of the human body *vis-à-vis* philosophy, but this is not to say that either are exclusive. His contention is that they are that which occupies the foreground.

\(^6\) See Chapter Three, page 88.
To return to Kant, focusing on his depiction of the body, the method he employs surely follows the paradigm of integrity. What Yuasa has in mind by “democratic” is that the body thus proposed is open to public scrutiny and consensus. It is so open in the sense that it is a verbal project, presenting its case clearly in mathematics, geometry, and words that follow acceptable and familiar rational processes; it is bright and clear, and everything Kant puts forward is out in the open, exposed to scrutiny. As such, another may inspect his work, follow the arguments, and offer either criticism, support, or a blend of the two. For anyone to engage with Kant, a familiarity with logic, language, and philosophy are required, which are also bright and open for those who wish to inspect them.

To return briefly to Kasulis, the term “democratic,” clearly suggests the principles of integrity. Also with respect to the example of Kant above, we may recall, knowledge according to the paradigm of integrity is 1) objective and publicly verifiable, 2) defined by external relationships, 3) empty of affect, 4) intellectual, conceptual, and symbolic, and 5) bright and open.7 “Democratic,” as Yuasa employs the term suggests that which is clear (2, 3, & 5), publicly open to debate (1), and intellectual (3) in nature, most importantly suggesting that truth is determined through consensus and oftentimes subject to peer-review.

When addressing the body within the paradigm of integrity, the prevailing “philosophy” of the body hardly registers as philosophy, for it is so deeply ingrained that it is not

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7 See Chapter Three, Page 87.
“mere” philosophy, but simply how things are. In this case, the prevailing philosophy of the body is assumed by this project to be medical materialism; the standpoint wherein the human body is understood through the lenses of physics, chemistry, biology, and other similar and sciences and their derivatives. It appears that Descartes’s mind-body dualism lingers on. As is the focus of this project, divergent understanding of the body are to be elucidated, emphasizing the important difference between, to use Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the object-body and the subject-body. In contradistinction to the philosophical standpoint of medical materialism that gives rise to and substantiates the object-body, Yuasa has in mind a number of philosophers who have explicitly addressed the lived, subject-body and the mind-body relationship as something to be cultivated, such as Kūkai, Dōgen, Watsuji, and Nishida.⁸ (Yuasa, 1987)

This “elitist” theory of knowledge that Yuasa describes as it pertains to understanding the subtle body does not follow the abovementioned criteria, primarily due to this change in focus, from describing the body to cultivating the body. Samuel notes that what Yuasa refers to as “elitist” theories of the body—theories derived from the employment of the principles of intimacy—were not done so merely to describe the body itself, “but because they wanted people to do something in relation to them.” (Samuel, 2013; 250, emphasis added) Yuasa makes a very similar comment stating, “[integrity-based] mind-body

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⁸ Yuasa, as well as Kasulis, emphasize the “westernness” of medical materialism and the “easternness” of self-cultivation practices, but this distinction offers little to the discussion, other than affix a general place to an idea. Ultimately, as a citizen of planet earth, both as separate manifestations of the heritage of the collective species must be taken, recognizing the insights of both without essentializing the value of “westernness” or “easternness.” That is to say, from a planetary perspective, these distinctions are not very useful. However, as I contend, the distinction between intimacy and integrity, regardless of where they find their roots, is quite useful.
theories have a strongly held attitude of asking theoretically what is the relationship between the mind and body, but [intimacy-based] mind-body theory takes the attitude of asking how the mind-body relationship becomes or changes through training and practice.” (Yuasa, 1993; 64) Samuel’s “doing something” and Yuasa’s “becoming or changing” both suggest another of Yuasa’s key terms; shugyō (修行), which, as he explains, “carries the meaning of perfecting the human spirit or enhancing one’s personality.” (Yuasa, 1993; 8.) “Elitist,” while a potentially polarizing term, in the context of shugyō suggests “exclusivity” in the sense that few people thoroughly undergo this training, and it is the few who are then qualified after many years of training to comment on the nature of what their studies have revealed. “Elitist” in a general sense surely applies to any group with a highly refined skillset, even in the domain of integrity (e.g., astrophysics, neurology), so Yuasa constrains this term to account for just those who are cultivating the mind-body in “doing something” or “becoming or changing.”

To return to Kasulis again, these “elitist” insights into the body are greatly clarified through the paradigm of intimacy. As defined above, the unconscious quasi-body can only be inferred through sensations of the body and emotion, and brought out only through practice. Yuasa, writing on the cultivation of the subtle body states, “Further endeavor brings an experience to the cultivator in which one feels that in addition to one’s physical body there is another, different body. It is just like the feeling of something which should not be existing when there is nothing.” (Yuasa, 1993; 89) This is to say, the process of self-cultivation itself gives rise to the experience of the subtle body. On this point, Sarukkai notes that in yogic practice, “The phenomenological
consequence of these postures lies in their ability to allow us a grasp on the internal ‘structure’ of the body and place it in the 'same level of visibility' as the external hand.” (Sarukkai, 471) The body thus cultivated reveals “something which should not be existing,” which is the psychologically unconscious, physiological invisible “internal structure of the body” that announces itself only through practice. This practice is “elitist” in the sense that this knowledge is available only to those who cultivate it with their bodies.

It is absolutely essential to reiterate Kasulis’s point concerning objectivity with respect to intimacy. Although intimacy is dark and esoteric, the knowledge it generates is still objective in the sense that the experiences had by, for example, practitioners of Yoga, are still open to discussion by those who have undergone the same training. This suggests that the subtle body, as elusive as it may be, has the potential to be treated as an objective phenomenon, and not just abstract flight of fancy generated within small groups.

This objectivity arises through experiences which primarily arise through cultivation, although there are cases of persons being born who are naturally sensitive to the movements of ki-energy. (Yuasa, 1993; 112) The consequence of this is that average people who have not undergone the training, or are simply not naturally sensitive, will not have access to this experience. This experience which is neither psychological nor physiological, most certainly favors the personal rather than the public criteria as defined by Kasulis. It remains “public” in the sense that two people who undergo the same training will be able to discuss their findings similar to some degree to how two scholars
may discuss Kant. That such self-cultivation has an affective dimension speaks for itself as the domain of this inquiry is one’s own conscious experience. As this term is neither psychological nor physiological, and that which comes about only through practice, it is a case of knowledge that is somatic as well as psychological. And finally, these are subtle suggestions to be pieced together from dim unconscious realms which resonate with Kasulis’s dark and esoteric knowledge of intimacy. As such, from the “bright and clear” perspective of integrity, these subtle messages may pass by totally un-noticed or ignored as mere aberrations.

An unlikely ally in this discussion is Sam Harris, who claims to have made his own modest attempts at meditative practice. In the following lengthy yet highly pertinent passage, Harris reiterates many of these criteria emphasizing the epistemological shift by way of an analogy of a telescope. He writes,

…the problem with a contemplative claim …is that you can’t borrow someone else’s contemplative tools to test it. The problem is that to test such a claim …we have to build our own contemplative tools. Imagine where astronomy would be if everyone had to build [their] own telescope before [they] could even begin to see if astronomy was a legitimate enterprise. It wouldn’t make the sky any less worthy of investigation, but it would make it immensely more difficult for us to establish astronomy as a science. To judge the empirical claims of contemplatives, you have to build your own telescope. …to judge whether certain experiences are possible …we have to be able to break our identification with discursive thought… [which] …is not work that our culture knows much about.

This apt metaphor of the telescope reiterates the divergence of intimacy and integrity, also acknowledging the cultural aspect emphasized by Kasulis and Yuasa. “Building your own telescope,” or the contemplative training in self-cultivation, is precisely the difference between intimacy and integrity. Harris’s analogy also emphasizes the
objective nature of these claims as he claims “we must build our own telescope.” Although we don’t have access to the “telescopes” of others, internal technology, according to Harris—and in accord with Kasulis—, remains objective.

Yuasa defines his four circuits of bodily knowledge in such a way that anticipates and incorporates this kind of self-cultivation, spiritual training, and internal technology. His most overt example of this is his *The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory* (1987) which has been cited a number of times in this chapter. Yuasa sees self-cultivation practices (*shugyō*) as that which identifies and dissolves emotional obstructions of the personality as defined by his bodily circuits and discussed above so that one may become more sensitive to the stirrings of the unconscious quasi-body. These, for Yuasa, are the goals of such practice when the human being is seen as a project to be worked upon in order to cultivate an elitist understanding of the human body.

The self-cultivation practices that lead to this elitist view of the body with respect to the four circuits thus depicted, self-cultivation practices have then a radically different stated objective when compared to western bodily training. As Yuasa writes, “The various exercises handed down in Eastern self-cultivation methods such as Yoga are designed to enhance the functioning of organs governed by the autonomic nervous system, unlike Western-style exercises which aim at enhancing the capacity of the motor organs
(muscles).”⁹ (Yuasa, 1993; 60) Such “exercise” of the autonomic nervous system functions at the level of the unconscious quasi-body, which is responsible for human activity and a very basic and “subtle” level of the individual. One may say that dealing with errant emotions is essentially dealing with the symptoms of a psycho-physical problem. Regardless of the problem’s origin, either psychological or physiological, exercise at the level of the autonomic nervous system may strengthen and elucidate the nature of one’s problem, so that one may move beyond the influences of such an errant emotion.

Yuasa’s “Super-Normal”

In concluding this section, we will return once again to Merleau-Ponty and the nature of what he accomplished. In light of this project as defined above along Kasulis’s philosophical paradigms of intimacy and integrity, it appears that Merleau-Ponty still has more in common with Kant than he may like. That is, he is constructing a theory through the tools of integrity to explain the underlying mechanisms that drive the human being. Yuasa does so too for that matter, but he centralizes health and shugyō. Merleau-Ponty was astutely aware of health, but the patients he studied were predominantly cases of young men returning from war with shrapnel in their skulls. This too weighs on the distinction between “democratic” and “elitist.” Health as defined in this context was to

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⁹ Yuasa here is perhaps making an over-generalization in order to demonstrate a point. One can imagine any number of “Western” practices that require learning to develop a better relationship with one’s “nerves” which may interfere with one’s performance. This again may be a case of foreground/background prioritization. That is, Yuasa may be stating that “Western-style exercises” hold in the foreground motor performance while “Eastern-style” holds the relationship to one’s own autonomic nervous system in the foreground. This does not explicitly suggest that the background of either preference is absent, although there are surely instances wherein this is the case.
look at a damaged young man’s brain, and deduce what was not happening, adopting the definition of “health” as the absence of damage defined in contrast to the “abnormal.” In Yuasa’s “elitist” view, one who cultivates the body attains a “super-normal” understanding of the body, along with super-normal health, introducing a radically different paradigm of health. (Yuasa, 1987; 62-64) As such, this more clearly demonstrates how Yuasa expands upon Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body, incorporating the practices of intimacy and this notion of super-health. A point to be emphasized is that although Merleau-Ponty identified the expressiveness of the body vis-à-vis his body schema, he never advocated training or cultivating it in the way suggested by Yuasa.

**Conclusion to Chapter Five**

In this chapter a case has been made for the subtle body while relying predominantly on familiar categories, such as the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, Kasulis’s paradigms of intimacy and integrity, and the insights of Yuasa concerning his four-circuit body schema. In doing so, it is hoped that this chapter has been able to bypass what Samuel identifies as naïve materialism & naïve idealism, or blind reductionist attitudes that presume subtle body phenomenon to be either wholly material or idealist. (Samuel, 2013; 252-3) As addressed in the previous chapter, both the “crystallization” of matter (i.e., realism) and the “crystallization” of mental phenomenon, as in the case of Kant (i.e., idealism) are to be avoided. This is what Merleau-Ponty identifies as the death of consciousness; when consciousness grasps itself as a symbol, again, mental or physical.
Instead, a “third term” defined by the “neither nor” paradigm was proposed that can be empirically verified through self-cultivation.
6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAṆḌALA IMAGERY AND THE CLARIFICATION OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

In this chapter Tantric maṇḍalas will be investigated as historical phenomenon and from the standpoint of depth psychology. By assuming the standpoint of depth psychology, modern insight into the structure of the psyche will elucidate or perhaps corroborate the role and structure of Tantric maṇḍala practice. To do so, this chapter will establish two points. The first is to establish that maṇḍalas are the technological precursors of the cakras that follow the developmental course of interiorization, and the second is that tantric maṇḍala practice most certainly engages the unconscious, and that by employing the insights of C.G. Jung, the psychological processes involved when meditatively engaging with a maṇḍala may be more clearly articulated. By doing so these terms may be clarified which establish a foundation for the following chapter wherein the cakras vis-à-vis Jung will be discussed.

To carry out this project of elucidation and familiarization, this chapter will first begin with the historical and thematic development of the tantric maṇḍala as a process of interiorization and micro-macrocosmic correlativity. Interiorization defined the developments of Tantra in the eighth and ninth centuries C.E. which was the process of transferring external ritual space into the interiority of the mind-body; similar to the

1 In hindsight, it appears that I was beguiled by modern research on cakras that was Buddhist in nature, which is a thematic divergence from the stated method of this project. More appropriate discussions on Hindu Tantra occurred during the 80s and 90s. That being said, the arguments in this chapter are still relevant as they have analogs in the Hindu Tantra tradition.
progression found in the Vedas as they thematically shifted from external rituals to meditative practices as found in the Upaniṣads. That is, the ritual of the fire sacrifice was drawn into the individual so that the sacrifice was performed entirely internally. Central to this process is the principle of micro-macrocospnic correlativity, wherein the individual (microcosm) identifies his- or herself as a localized expression of the greater universe (macrocospm). The interiorization of sacred practice naturally follows wherein the spiritual technology of Tantra employed in the maṇḍala as a means to focus and venerate various gods was directed inward so that the gods and one’s corresponding bodily energy are then recognized as residing inside the body. This is the process of “mapping” or the development within Tantra in which the deities were mapped on to various psychic, sensory, and physical aspects of the individual. The deities thus laid out in an array along the human body represents a thematic shift from maṇḍala to a form of strictly psychically localized maṇḍala—which is the definition of a cakra as per this chapter.

The second section of this chapter will address C.G. Jung’s understanding of the maṇḍala along with three additional aspects of Jung’s psychological system that further assist in a study of the maṇḍala, which are libido, archetype, and active imagination. Starting with maṇḍalas themselves, as a psychiatrist working with the mentally ill, Jung encountered maṇḍalas as explained and drawn by his patients that shared a similar fundamental structure with Tantric maṇḍalas, suggesting evidence for a primordial expression of the unconsciousness (i.e., archetype). The following three ideas to be addressed further develop Jung’s understanding of the maṇḍala by presenting his concepts of libido, archetype, and active imagination which account for the primary psychological processes
that function in a psychological approach to manḍala practice. Here Jung’s concept of libido will be defined, paying special attention to how it can be obstructed and how these obstructions can be redirected through “canalization.” This will be followed by a brief section on the scientific nature of libido in order to solidify its value in the context of the explicative nature of this project. This will be followed by an inspection of the role of the animal/animus in this process, paying special attention to the manifestations of these archetypes in manḍala imagery. This chapter concludes with a discussion of active imagination to describe the animating process wherein one’s unconscious steps forward to participate in the deepened focus of the individual.

By presenting the cakras as a development from external manḍalas into specific psychically localized manḍalas, and then by offering the explanatory resources of C.G. Jung, this chapter intends to clarify what cakras are, thematically focusing with respect to the previous chapters, and preparing for the discussion of the following chapters.

**From Manḍala to Cakra**

This section addresses the hypothesis that mandalas underwent a thematic transition on their way to becoming cakras. The definition of manḍala presumed in this section is a circular images of psycho-spiritual matters intended for contemplation that are laden with psychological and transformative undertones. Essential to this depiction of the manḍala is micro-macrocosmic correlative wherein the individual is understood to be a microcosmic expression of the macrocosmic deity. This is to say, the purpose of the manḍala is to presume the identity of the deity who resides within it. With this
orientation in mind, it may be said that in such a practice, the individual enters the maṇḍala, animating the gods and goddesses therein with the various energies of the body; vicious gods appealing to aggression, and lusty gods appealing to sexual desire. The nature of the transformation emphasized in this section is that there appears to be a thematic shift that arose from projecting one’s entire self, or the components of one’s self, into the maṇḍala, to compartmentalizing the self and projecting the appropriate maṇḍalas into the individuals. For example, as will be further explained below, an array of goddesses from one maṇḍala overtime found themselves transferred into cakras that resided along the human body. This section will make a case for this hypothesis by demonstrating a precedence for internalization, explaining micro-macrocosmic correlativity, presenting the role of bodily energy, and finally demonstrating this process of mapping the deities to the body itself.

**Interiorization of Sacred Space and Micro-Macrocosmic Correlativity**

The following two sections will address the concept of “interiorization,” which is central to an aspect of historical development of maṇḍala imagery in Tantra.² As White explains, this is a process that found its precedent in the Vedas as Vedic ritual underwent a similar transformation in the Upaniṣads. This transformation was one of internalization or interiorization wherein the external fire sacrifice was drawn into the interior of the human mind-body. White identifies the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, a seventh- to sixth-century B.C.E. text, as a possible turning point in early Hinduism. As he writes,

² This is not to suggest that all maṇḍala practice followed this path as there are certainly exceptions to what is discussed in this section.
Within a few centuries of the composition of this Brahmana text, a revolution in Indian thought would issue into the notion that humans too could internalize the sacrifice and thereby entirely bypass the mechanism of external sacrifice. (White, 1996; 13)

This process of internalization also occurred in Tantra wherein that which was external was drawn inside. White supports this correlation of this transformation with the transformation undergone by Tantra when he writes,

This inward turn, which would ground the entire gnostic and nondualist project of the Upaniṣads, also sowed the seeds for the innovation of a body of techniques for internal bodily transformation—i.e., for the practice of *haṭha yoga.* (White, 1996; 13)

Davidson identifies this process as being essentially ubiquitous in tantric practice. (Davidson, 2002; 143) Payne and Bentor hold similar such positions, Payne flatly stating, “The transition from Vedic Ritualism to tantric yoga is often equated with the interiorization of ritual.” (Payne, 2011;1046, Bentor, 2000) Thus generally stated, more specific examples are in order.

Dalton presents a very clear depiction of this process incorporating spatiality; a thesis supported by Samuel. (Samuel, 2008; 286) As Dalton explains, the “internalization of ritual performance” and the development of “internal yoga” developed in the 8th, 9th and early 10th century, which establishes the classical age for Tibetan Tantric Buddhism. (Dalton, 2004; 2). He explains that this was not a rejection of ritual, *per se*, nor did it attempt to reduce ritual to its psychological components. The shift was spatial in nature, transferring the external ritual to the interior bodily space of the practitioner. As he

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3 *Hatha Yoga* borrowed heavily from the metaphysics and symbolism of Hindu Tantra and the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* to include incorporating its subtle body structure along with *cakras.*
writes, “The tantric subject had become the site for the entire ritual performance; the body’s interior provided the devotee, the altar, the oblations, and the buddha to be worshipped.” (Dalton, 2004; 2) The ritual remained, but the domain in which it was practiced underwent an “interiorization,” transforming external sacred space into a sacred internal maṇḍala.

Central to this process of interiorization is the principle of micro-macrocosmic correlativity, wherein the individual (microcosm) identifies his- or herself as a localized expression of the greater universe (macrocosm). This idea is central to Hindu soteriological themes, especially with respect to its more theistic strains. The creator God—whichever God one happens to believe in, e.g., Śiva, Vishnu, or Śakti—created the cosmos, according to Gupta, “by preforming a sacrifice; and what he offered in that sacrifice was Himself—for, indeed, nothing else existed. Thus the universe was made out of the body of God… Hinduism never quite lost sight of this idea… (Gupta, 33-4) Gupta adds that the purpose of the maṇḍala is to symbolize this intrinsic identity. If the universe is created out of God, and humans are created out of the universe, it naturally follows that human beings are in a literal sense a part of God. (Gupta, 34) As Gray explains, “The aim [of this practice] is to completely re-envision one’s body as the pure abode of the maṇḍala deities, an abode that is in fact co-extensive with the universe” which expresses the totality of this identification, that is, with the entire universe. (Gray, 304)
Gupta also emphasizes that there are three ranges or spectra employed by various schools of Hindu thought that account for the degree of separation and dissimilarity between the things found in the universe and God (however one wishes to define this term). They are conscious to unconscious, simple to complex, and—most important to this project—subtle to gross. (Gupta, 36) To clarify, the divine is represented by, for example, pure consciousness, and the emanations of its creation exist along a spectrum that becomes progressively less conscious. This is, of course, the spectrum embraced by Śāṅkhya philosophy. The Tantric expansion of Śāṅkhya extends the isolation of puruṣa through additional stages to return to that from which it came, emphasizing that the microcosm (the individual) is fundamentally none other than the macrocosm (Śiva).

Gray identifies this theme of micro-macrocosmic correlativity in the Cakrasaṃvara tradition, which is a school of tantric Buddhism founded during this classical period. He writes that the aim of this tantric text was “to completely re-envision one’s body as the pure abode of the maṇḍala deities, an abode that is in fact co-extensive with the universe.” (Gray, 2006; 304) The meditative practice focused on the maṇḍala was to make the individual into the deity, and allow the deity to express itself in the individual. The culmination of the meditation was the individual “envisioning oneself as Śrī Heruka as the center of oneself and as the center of the universe.” (Gray, 2006; 304) As such, the maṇḍala contains what Gray terms “semiotic multivalency,” expressing simultaneously both characteristics of the universe and characteristics of the individual. (Gray, 2006; 301) This multivalency is essential to envisioning oneself as the deity of the maṇḍala as
one must generate a secondary symbolic identity that transcends the ordinary constraints of identifying with one’s ego.

In Gray’s article, there are two distinct expressions of this multivalency, the first of which being the body vis-à-vis God. In this capacity, the Cakrasamvara Tantra enumerates parts of the body, derived from lists found in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, and the deities that correlatively accompany them. (Gray, 2006; 303) The pantheon of gods that flank Śrī Heruka are each given a corresponding place within the human body. (Gray, 2007; 58-60) The contention to be pursued below is that each of these secondary gods were means of channeling and purifying the latent bodily energy that resides throughout the body. The second expression of self-identity’s multivalency in the midst of the micro-macrocosmic correlative system was furthered by correlative pairing these gods with famous pilgrimage sites.4 (Gray, 2006; 306) This established a third point of reference, unifying the body with the land, the universe, and the symbolic expression of the maṇḍala’s deities. The process of interiorization established a correlation between the abodes of the gods and the interior of the body.

To move onto the historical aspects of the maṇḍala’s early conception and formulation, several scholars assert that the beginning of this process of internalization began with the motif of the cakravartin as the apex or hub whose influence spread geographically through concentric circles. (Albanese, 1977; 9-10; Gray, 30; Flood, 9) Albanese explains

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4 See also Widorn and Kinberger’s “Mapping the Sacred Landscape of Lahaul – The Karzha Khandroling Maṇḍala” for a modern account of how the body was juxtaposed with a geographical region.
through Snellgrove that this motif of the *cakravartin*—a central ruler with concentric levels of influence—first symbolically expressed itself by shaping the organization of Buddhist temples and stupas. Within these are found the positional arrangement of depictions of the Buddha arranged through the theme of kingship and hierarchy. (Albanese, 13) By analyzing a series of early tantric and *Mahāyāna* texts, he finds that the themes of kingship were strongest in the earlier Tantras, emphasizing the centrality of Vairocana, the *Mahāyāna* and *Vajrayāna* Sun Buddha. As the texts progressed, there was, as Albanese writes, “a movement from historical event to higher and higher levels of abstraction and/or interiorization,” moving from *cakravartin*, to the literal centrality of Buddhas in sacred space, to more abstract hierarchical representations of the Buddha, like the doctrine of *trikaya* (i.e., the three bodies of the Buddha; *Nirmānakāya*, *Sambhogakāya*, and *Dharmakāya*). (Albanese, 1977; 10-11)

The issue of interiorization as a progression from *cakravartin* imagery may be charted to the doctrinal hierarchical structure of the Buddha and bodhisattvas, to the construction of temples that represented this hierarchical nature. Albanese cites Snellgrove again and his work in identifying examples of Buddhist temples wherein the hierarchical structure of Buddha’s is represented literally as four floors of a temple. Albanese presents as an example from Snellgrove the Mahābuddhavihara temple in Pātan. He writes, “Here there are four stories—Śākyamuni at the bottom, then Amitabha followed by a small stupa, finally on the apex, the *vajra-dhātu-manḍala*. The whole is a representation of the three Buddha bodies with the mandala as a symbol of the supreme Buddha body.” (Albanese,
The symbolic geometry of this space with its hierarchy and expanding concentric domain reflect this *cakravartin* imagery.

The next step in this progression is the transformation of three-dimensional sacred spaces into two-dimensional sacred spaces; that is, into *maṇḍalas*. One’s relationship to the sacred space remained unchanged. But now, practitioners did not enter the temple; the temple entered the practitioner. One notable example is that of the *Hevajra Tantra* wherein the three bodies of the Buddha are explicitly correlated with a region of the human body, and an aspect of one’s personality (*Hevajra Tantra* Part II, Chapter 4, verses 56-8). The manifestation body (*Nirmāṇakāya*) represents the physical aspect of the individual and is situated at the navel. The enjoyment body (*Sambhogakāya*) represents the capacity of speech and is found in the throat. The supreme body of the Buddha (*Dharmakāya*) represents the mind, and is located in the heart. (Albanese, 1977; 12) Here, what was at first external doctrine followed this progression of interiorization to imprint these concepts onto the mind-body of the individual.

The repercussions of this particular formulation are essential to this current project as it demonstrates the culmination of this process of interiorization, where the progression from temple to *maṇḍala* finally comes to rest in the domain of the psychological and physiological; that is, a nascent depiction of *cakras*. As per Dalton’s above assertion that “the tantric subject had become the site for the entire ritual performance,” it demonstrates how the interior of the practitioner became the domain of the ritual. Next, as sacred space was internalized, so too was the internalization of sacred practice.
Interiorization of Sacred Practice

Having briefly established the shift in location of tantric rituals, from outside to inside, the interiorization of practice itself will be the topic of this section. As the body’s interior became the location of ritual, new bodily ritual conducted internally came about. For example, Dalton explains that early Yoga tantras relied on a four-fold system of mudras (“seals”) to conduct these now internal rites. These four mudrās, he explains, are mahāmudrā, dharmamudrā, samayamudrā, and karmamudrā.5 (Dalton, 6) Mahāmudrā is the name of the practice of imagining oneself as the physical appearance of a deity. Dharmamudrā refers to mantra and the syllables spoken by the deity. Samayamudrā refers to the symbolic accoutrements worn or held by the deity, and Karmamudrā refers to emulating the actions and postures of the deity. Through these four mudras, the practitioner could focus on the capacities of the being, speech, dress and actions of the deity in meditation, engaging in the aforementioned micro-macrocosmic correlativity that exists between the two.

Such early Yoga tantras, according to Dalton, consist of two stages in the practice of these internal rituals; development and perfection.6 (Dalton, 7) According to an early, untitled tantric text, the stages of development account for a systematic construction of an

5 Dalton takes this list of four from the Āryatattvasamgraha-sādhanopāyikā.

6 Development (Skt. utpannakrama; Tib. bskyed rim). Perfection (Skt. sampannakrama; Tib. rdzogs rim).
imaginary, internal maṇḍala, followed by three stages of concentration (samādhi). In this particular example, the first concentration is a concentration on thusness (tathatā samādhi). This meditation was followed by the “all-illuminating concentration” (samantāloka samādhi) in which a clear disc of the moon was imagined in the middle of that space. As a symbol for enlightenment, this moon was imagined to be symbolic of the practitioner’s mind. The final concentration is the “causal” concentration (hetu samādhi) in which a seed syllable is placed on top of the moon-disc, and the deity is imagined to sprout from it. The visualization would be complete when the manifested deity would return back into the seed syllable which was imagined to emanate from the practitioner’s heart. (Dalton, 8)

The next development in tantric ritual is its most distinguishing,—if not notorious— which is the ritualization of one’s own sexual anatomy. (Dalton, 7). During the second half of the eighth century, the role of sexual energy became central in tantric practice, and the articulation of the subtle anatomy that carried and guided this energy became a topic of great importance. Bodily energy will be addressed next, akin to what Freud and Jung called “libido,” and its role in self-cultivation next.

**Bodily Energy in Tantric Maṇḍala Practice**

Micro-macrocosmic correlativity and the interiorization of sacred space were discussed above in the context of Tantric maṇḍala practice. The latter will be expounded here,

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7 “Concentration” is Dalton’s translation of “samādhi” which works within the context he is exploring, while “single-pointed meditative absorption” may be a better translation.
investigating the role of sexual and bodily energy in the practice. To do so, Flood’s four-fold depiction of the mapping process as found in Tantra may be used. Recognizing the impossibilities of a more systematic survey of tantric texts due to their complexity and interrelation, he presents four interrelating attributes of tantric practice. (Flood, 147) He begins this list with the correlation of one’s own objective experience with the absolute subjective experience of the divine, which is an example of micro-macrocosmic correlativity. Second, he lists the practice of mapping the pantheons of deities in to the body, which is the process of interiorization. His third attribute of tantric practice is the most central to this project, as it is the development of the cakra system, which is locating energy centers inside the body. The fourth is the emphasis on the role of sexual energy in ritual practice. The role of libido in the last three qualities of tantric maṇḍala practice as depicted by Flood is the topic of this section.

There is within this list a gradual development of awareness of libido in this practice. As Dalton explains, maṇḍala practice’s earlier forms focused merely on blissful sensations that arose in the body, in particular, “energies associated with sexual pleasure which [rush] through the practitioner’s torso.” (Dalton, 11) He suggests that such insights, “reflect an early prototype of the subtle body systems that were articulated in more complex forms in later works.” (Dalton, 10-11) Here a link may be proposed between libido and the subtle body. Fortunately, with the previous chapter addressing Yuasa’s depiction of the subtle body, this is not difficult.

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8 The highest of the five koshas being equated with bliss (ānanda) may also suggest such a relatively unrefined understanding of bodily energy.
Fundamental to *Tantra* is that, as Preece writes, “vital energy of the body and emotions is seen as an essential ingredient; far from being abandoned.” (Preece, 80) In the following sections how this energy is identified and expressed in *Tantra* will be addressed.

**Mapping the Body with Deities**

The process of “mapping” deities to the human body is a refinement and expansion of the motif of one-to-one micro-macrocosmic correlativity and interiorization, where the individual envisions his/herself as the deity. The refinement of this motif is expressed by expanding the one-to-one correlation to correlating a variety of gods and goddesses with various corresponding aspects of the human psyche.

Farrow and Menon explain one example of this phenomenon in the context of the *Hevajra Tantra*, an eighth century Tantric text. (Farrow & Menon, viii) In their introduction to this text, they expound upon the notion of “Concealed Essence” (*saṃvara*), which is contextually analogous to the subtle-body. They write, “…the *maṇḍalas* of the deities are the original sources of the causal activity of the genetically inherited traits. In turn the effect of the interplay of these traits with the senses and the subsequent reactions and responses go to create the fully formed personality.” (Farrow & Menon, xxvi) Here they establish the primacy of the subtle body in such a way that that suggests the synchronic interpretation of *Sāmkhya* philosophy as discussed in Chapter Four. But in this case, they assert that the fundamental *tattvas* are expressed in the form of *maṇḍalas*. 
This assertion of the primacy of the *maṇḍalas* as the foundation of the individual is further expressed by Farrow and Menon in the following.

> The marks or reflections of the basic essences of life, the polarity points which are biologically essential for the development of the body, are the locations of the deities [sic] *maṇḍalas* found in the fully formed body.⁹

These locations or abodes are the causal sources for the emotional natures and the reaction patterns of arising which were sealed into the potential personality by the bonding of the bio-genetic essences. (Farrow & Menon, 1992; xxv-xxvi)

By “polarity points,” they are referring to “life generating male and female essences,” which suggest the dynamic tension of sexual energy. (Farrow & Menon, xxv) This passage establishes the natural and fundamental state of embodied emotions that are crucial to Tantric practice. As these subtle components give rise to the gross body, it is the yogi’s goal to resolve and internalize them. (Farrow & Menon, xxiv-xxv) A depiction of the divergence between the subtle body and the gross body is also found here, explaining how the personality takes its form as the patterns of the subtle body are “sealed” into the physical.

This progression to diversifying the divine form of the various aspects of the psyche can be found in an early tantric piece, the *Hymn to the Circle of Deities Located in the Body (dehasthadevatācakra-stotra)*. (Flood, 155-6) What is of interest here is that although this brief hymn pairs different aspects of the human psyche with different divine beings, with only minimal correlations to specific parts of the body. At the center of the *maṇḍala*

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⁹ By using the term “essences” the authors are essentializing the subtle body in an overly strong way that is not in accord with the methods of this project.
are the god and goddess Ānandabhairava and Ānandabhairavī joined in sexual union and located in the region of the heart, but this is the most specific localization. The various deities worshiping on the periphery of this maṇḍala are expressions of what appear to be analogous to the tattvas of Sāṃkhya, and some not, such as certainty, pride, touch, sight, ego, and higher mind. (Flood, 155-6) The point of development in the Hymn to the Circle of Deities Located in the Body suggests a psychologically orientated mapping rather than a more physiologically explicit method.

In the Hevajra Tantra, The first deliberate correlation of a specific psychological phenomenon with a specific physiological location can be found; an act of what may be called “psycholocalization” and ostensibly the first manifestation of what are now known as cakras. (Flood, 157; White, 2006; 224) As per Farrow and Menon’s translation, “the Body of Essential Nature [Nirmāṇakāya] is located in the heart. …the Body of Enjoyment [Sambhogakāya] is located in the throat. The Centre of Great Bliss [Dharmakāya] is located in the head.10 (Farrow & Menon, 222). Although this may be a forced distinction due to its very general nature, other Tantras followed this trend of finding the correlates within the body for psychological phenomenon, matching the psychological with the physiological correlates of the subtle body. Such later texts presumably influenced by the maneuver of interiorization as found in the Hevajra Tantra, began to explicitly map all of the forms of the divine onto specific locations in the anatomical body. (Gray, 2007; 58-60)

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10 Again, Farrow and Menon are interjecting an essentialized subtle body, in this case where the subtle body is not at all ordinarily included.
Goddesses from Maṇḍala to Cakra

This thematic process of interiorization as presented in this section concludes with a case for how this process transformed from interiorization and then to psychical localization. This case will be made by presenting a case wherein a stark transformation in thematic organization occurred within the Hindu tantric tradition. This begins with the organization of deities in the Kubjikāmata Tantra, and how those deities were then found organized in the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa centuries later.11

The Kubjikāmata Tantra is one of the earliest sources to use the term cakra as it is commonly understood. But as White explains, its use was “generally restricted to the groups of deities located in a maṇḍala, which served as their base or support.” (White, 2006; 223) Although mostly a semantic transformation, this use of the term “cakra” functionally replaced “maṇḍala.” This circle of deities from the Kubjikāmata Tantra contained a list of goddesses—manifestations of Śakti—which are Ḍākiṇī, Rākiṇī, Lākiṇī, Kākiṇī, Śānkhiṇī, Yakṣiṇī, and Kusumamālinī. Śākiṇī, and Hākiṇī. This cakra was focused on the throat and the meditation involved envisioning this field of goddesses and sacrificing the various elements of one’s body to them. (White, 2006; 228-9) In terms of psychical localization, the theme of this practice was to imagine them in an array arranged in the maṇḍala/cakra, and then focusing on them one by one. The

11 An assumption made by this hypothesis is the transformation of this information across all of India as the Kubjikāmatatantra was written in the tenth century in northwestern India, and the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa was written in the sixteenth century in eastern India. (Heilijgers-Seelen, 1994, 2; Avalon, vii) The presumption is that this information migrated east as the Kaula school spread across India although this has not been explicitly demonstrated in this project.
*Rudrayāmala Tantra* includes a similar list, replacing the last three with Śākiṇī, and Hākiṇī.

However, this changed. In both of these cases, they came to represent the *cakras*. (White, 2010; 156) As White writes, “The gradual internalization of these powerful female entities was effected by internalizing their formations into the hierarchized *cakras* of the yogic body. Two early instances of their process may be found in the [*Kaulajñāna Nirṇaya*] and the [*Kubjikāmata Tantra*.” White, 2006; 222) That is, that even within the *Kubjikāmata Tantra*, these goddess were also relegated to their own locations within the body. This is more explicitly demonstrated in the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* wherein each of these goddess, Ṛākiṇī, Rākiṇī, Lākiṇī, Kākiṇī, Sākiṇī, and Hākiṇī, are mentioned by name, in order, as inhabiting the six lowest *cakras*.

This suggests a further degree of interiorization wherein the psychological and the physiological are more explicitly correlated with each other, which suggests a progressively deeper awareness of how psychical phenomenon is tied to specific regions of the body. In the case of the six manifestations of Śakti being contained in one *cakra* in the throat, this emphasizes the role of the individual as the person making the sacrifice. Perhaps it could be said that by further compartmentalizing the human mind-body into *cakras*, the sacrifice could be conducted more piecemeal and thus more deliberately.

*Deity as Prescription*
In the tantric tradition, as the emotions are understood to arise within the body, and so were the transformative tantric deities thought to reside within the body. (Farrow & Menon, xviii) Through meditation upon a particular deity, the practitioner would cultivate the corresponding emotional constitution of that deity. This can be thought of as a prescription given to a yogi by his or her guru, or personally chosen, in order to cultivate exactly what is needed. In other words such a maṇḍala is understood to be strictly exogenous in nature, which stands in contrast to the endogenous maṇḍalas of Jung to be discussed below.

Rob Preece comments on this process in his *Psychology of Buddhist Tantra* (2006). Preece, as a 40-year practitioner of Tantra, Jung enthusiast, practicing psychotherapist, and meditation instructor, is well suited to comment on this issue as his training is quite in line with the standpoint of this chapter. Although there are many tantric deities, the practitioner must recognize and thus choose a form of the divine that is “constitutionally the most transformative for them.” (Preece, 3) This deity is not a purely external deity, but instead is cooperatively animated by the idiosyncrasies of the individual’s psychological constitution. The relationship to the deity is thus felt as, “a deep inner resonance, or as an energetic quality that pervades the body.” (Preece, 4) This suggests that the practitioner already has a deep familiarity with the nature of the deity, and that nothing overtly foreign or manipulative are being forced upon the individual. The “one size fits all” approach is simply antithetical to the practice.
This may be understood perhaps in terms of Yuasa’s unconscious quasi-body, as a symbolic image taken up by the psyche as a means of helping focus unconscious emotional energies in such a way that is not at odds with the habituated familiarity with the object body. Preece suggests that the image of the deity is akin to a homeopathic remedy that is perfectly suited to the disposition of the individual. (Preece, 167) The deity in this regard functions as a “catalyst” for transformation, allowing for the expression of the individual’s potential unhindered by whatever manner of obstruction they may possess, allowing the individual to work through whatever inhibits this expression. Preece notes that each quality of the individual requires an expression of the divine that resonates with it. For example, if one is looking to transform the expression of sexual or perhaps aggressive energy, a deity as a metaphor for that energy exemplifies the emotional characteristic can be chosen in this practice. (Preece 167) In doing so, unconscious energies may be brought in line with conscious focus.

This symbolic self-identification with a deity within a mandala and ensuing expression of one’s energy becomes a new gradient for the libido’s expression, elevating the energy’s possibility to apply itself to the individual’s transformation. (Preece, 183) The point to be emphasized here is that although the raw fuel of spiritual transformation is one’s own libidinal energy, this energy is ultimately harnessed by the prescription of symbol and the emotions of the body are still generally constrained to deities within a mandala.

12 This is an issue that deserves its own chapter as exploring that which inhibits the expression of one’s natural expression of bodily energy is central to contemporary cakra practice. A contemporary approach to this issue would certainly add a great deal of context to this discussion.
Jung on Maṇḍala Imagery

The maṇḍala is an image that appears throughout the body of Jung’s work, making it one of the more distinct features of his psychology. The maṇḍala he understood to be a symbolic, archetypal expression of the state of the unconscious that would reveal details about the overall state of the individual’s psyche. In this section, C.G. Jung’s insights into depth psychology and maṇḍala imagery will be presented as a means of contextualizing and clarifying Tantric maṇḍalas. As a brief introduction to Jung’s understanding of the maṇḍala, three points will be addressed, the first is that Jung understood the maṇḍala to be strictly endogenous in nature, suggesting that maṇḍalas are native to the human psyche and reveal themselves to the individual. The second point is a consequence of Jung’s psychological orientation. As he was interested in the psyche, his understanding of the psyche is explicitly ahistorical. The third point is that Jung noted that in his patients’ maṇḍalas, the center was either empty or symbolic of something else, but never placed the individual at the center.

After this introduction, a presentation of Jung’s understanding of libido will be presented. Libido shares characteristics with psychic and subtle energy, so closely that in many respects they may be treated as identical. This section will present libido and how it functions in Jung’s depth psychology in order to draw out its transformative properties. This subsection will conclude with a brief discussion of libido’s objectively measurable properties to establish it more firmly.
This section will conclude with a brief discussion of both archetypes and active imagination. These two principles further add context to maṇḍala practice as they explain what Jung understood to be a structural and functional component of the psyche, respectively.

**Jung on Maṇḍalas**

This section will introduce three terms that distinguish Jung’s conception of the Maṇḍala from Tantric maṇḍalas. The first issue to be addressed is that of the endogenous nature of the maṇḍalas in the sense that Jung understood the maṇḍala to be that which finds its origin in the unconscious of the individual. The second will be that Jung did not see the maṇḍala as a historical phenomenon. Surely it had its historical manifestations, but it was essentially a product of the human psyche, which is only incidentally influenced by time. The third term to be addressed is the center of Jung’s maṇḍala. For Jung, the maṇḍala was always empty.

It should be noted that Jung’s standpoint on the psyche influences the scope and depth of his understanding, particularly with respect to his view of the ego. Writing in the early twentieth century in Europe, he was intellectually constrained by his culture, but more so, his role as a psychiatrist perhaps had a greater role in influencing his theories. That is, Jung’s understanding of the psyche was shaped by studying and treating primarily schizophrenic patients. This orientation apparently normalized his understanding of the term “healthy” as something along the lines of “that which is free from abnormal qualities.” The consequence is that this frames Jung’s concept of “individuation” in a
very either/or sort of way. This issue was discussed in the proceeding chapter under Yuasa’s distinction of “abnormal, normal, and super-normal” wherein Yuasa advocates that meditative traditions—presumably to include *maṇḍala* practice—aim for a state that exceeds normalcy. In Jung’s case, it appears that he did not conceptually account for the “super-normal.” Although this may be the case, Jung was certainly aware that there were aspects of consciousness that exceeded the mundane, yet he never did fully draw a distinction between the sick and the seeking. It can be presumed as Jung both collected *maṇḍala* images from his patients that expressed their own healing process, yet he also drew his own with explicit reference to his own individuation as found in his *Red Book*.

(Jung, 2009) As a psychiatrist, he presumed the source of the *maṇḍalas* drawn by his patients arose from the unconscious.

**Endogenous**

Central to Jung’s understanding of *maṇḍala* imagery is the characteristic of endogenous-ness in the sense that he understood the creation of *maṇḍalas* to be undeliberated, internally manifesting mental images that depicted the current state of the patient’s unconscious which would arise enmeshed in the context of their current conscious state. Or perhaps, as Jung explains, “an involuntary confession of a peculiar mental condition.

(Jung, 1969: 82) More importantly, Jung understood the *maṇḍala* to be a latent, archetypal expression of the psyche that has always been present in the collective consciousness; “…an ‘eternal’ presence, and the only question is whether it is perceived by the conscious mind or not.” (Jung, 1993; 222)
Jung identifies a secondary source for the manifestation of psychical *maṇḍalas*. This first was simply an archetypal expression of the unconscious, and these second, he writes, “the other source is life, which, if lived with complete devotion, brings an intuition of the self, the individual being.” (Wilhelm, 102) Here Jung expresses his recognition of devotional practice’s influence on the appearance of *maṇḍalas* and also on the characteristics of what appears in those *maṇḍalas*.

**Historicity**

Jung’s understanding of the *maṇḍala* is explicitly ahistorical in nature. The *maṇḍala* is always an expression of the human psyche, its arising varying as little as the human anatomy. As an example of this lack of concern with time, a critique of Jung may be inspected. Albanese raises such a critique of Jung. The nature of her criticism is that Jung’s strictly psychological interpretation is a form of “double vision,” that although he recognizes the importance of the *maṇḍala*, he does not pay sufficient attention to its historical and cultural context. (Albanese, 1977; 4) This is primarily with regard to the differences between the nature of a *maṇḍala* drawn up by one of Jung’s patients, and the various *maṇḍalas* passed through the tantric tradition.

Albanese identifies a passage from Jung that exemplifies her point. (Albanese, 1977; 5) Jung writes, “It seems to me beyond question, that these Eastern symbols originated in dreams and visions, and were not invented by some Mahayana church father.” (Jung, 1993; 96) From Jung’s psychological perspective, this conjecture rings true, but as Albanese notes, this overlooks,
A vast excluded middle… comprised of monument and myth and evolving ritual which however much it had originally been the projection of somebody's dream or vision still passed via the media of external historical and social concretization back into the psychological realm. (Albanese, 1977; 5)

Although an important insight, the “media of external historical and social concretization” is simply outside the purview of depth psychology, which makes for an odd “critique” if it can even be called so as it is not the role of depth-psychology to treat maṇḍalas as such.

As a psychiatrist, Jung’s lack of historical contextualization may be considered a modern critique. Within the context of Jung’s depth psychology, such distinctions are considered irrelevant as Jung was only interested in categorizing what he understood to be the universals of the human psyche. As such, accusing a psychiatrist of psychological reductionism may be about as valuable as accusing an historian of historical reductionism. As such, this renders such a critique absurd as it appears to be merely the result of competing methodologies. For Jung, the psyche and that which it produces are living phenomena and not historical relics.

An Empty Center

Next is an aspect of the maṇḍala noted by Jung which is the recurrent imagery of its center. That which occupies the center of the maṇḍala is of utmost importance to the image. For the patients who generated maṇḍala imagery for Jung, the center was notably empty, or symbolically occupied, while the center of many tantric maṇḍalas are occupied
by a deity (e.g., Śrī Heruka). It appears that the nature of divinity in each culture seems to be the underlying issue here.

To begin, Jung’s understanding of the mandala was influenced primarily by his role as a therapist in treating the mental illness of his European patients, and not in observing the transformative process of Tantra in India. In observing the mandalas of his patients, he notices the lack of divine figures at the center of the mandala, but instead is found a symbol of the individual. For example, he writes,

…there was never a deity occupying the centre. The centre, as a rule, is emphasized. But what we find there is a symbol with a very different meaning. It is a star, a sun, a flower, a cross with equal arms, a precious stone, a bowl filled with water or wine, a serpent coiled up, or a human being, but never a god. (Jung, 1969: 80)

These various symbols, which are visually represented in a number of his works, he suggests are representations of the “Self,” which is an archetypal expression of wholeness. As Jung writes, “The place of the deity seems to be taken by the wholeness of man.” (Jung, 1969: 82) The divergence of these two orientation’s intentions, as “becoming well” and “spiritual seeking,” however one may choose to define either term, are simply different.

The “self,” sometimes rendered as “Self” (Selbst) to assure that it is not mistaken for “ego,” (Ich) is the term Jung uses to account for the totality of the individual; the sum total of both the conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche, representing the wholeness of the individual. As such, it is not a notion that can be captured by the ego, which functions purely in the domain of consciousness, which is why it must be
represented symbolically; as a star, a sun, etc. This image, Jung writes, “is surrounded by a periphery containing everything that belongs to the self—the paired opposites that make up the total personality.” (Jung, 1990a; 357) These paired opposites are exhaustive, suggesting that the self is beyond all such dual pairs. That is to say, the conscious/unconscious pair comprises the individual.

In defining the self, Jung purposefully refrained from physical and metaphysical speculation. (Jung, 1993; 220-1). To consider the self as a physical phenomenon is to employ material reductionism, which Jung adamantly rejected. To postulate a metaphysical or spiritual substratum to the self is to engage in unfalsifiable conjecture, which he found beyond the scope of psychological usefulness.

The center of the *mandala*, in these cases represents the self by way of vacancy or symbolic representation, pertaining primarily to images of healing generated by patients seeking Jung’s psychological aid. But tantric *mandalas* clearly contain images of the divine. As Jung writes,

> …in the interior of the [Tantric] quadrangle, …there is a Holy of Holies with its magical agent, the cosmic source of energy, be it the god Śiva, the Buddha, a bodhisattva, or a great teacher. …And equally in the Western mandalas of medieval Christendom the deity is enthroned at the centre, often in the form of the triumphant Redeemer together with the four symbolic figures of the evangelists. (Jung, 1993; 129)

Here is found a very different phenomenon at the center of the *mandala*, a depiction of “the cosmic source of energy” which is quite thematically different from Jung’s depiction
of the self. This divergence is essential to the current project. Clarifying this divergence Jung writes,

Between the Christian and the Buddhist mandala there is a subtle but enormous difference. The Christian during contemplation would never say "I am Christ," but will confess with Paul: "Not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. 2:20). Our sutra, however, says: "Thou wilt know that thou art the Buddha." At bottom the two confessions are identical, in that the Buddhist only attains this knowledge when he is anātman, ‘without self.’ But there is an immeasurable difference in the formulation. (Jung, 1969: 574-5)

Here are found different definitions of selfhood, albeit defined in extremely over-generalized terms. As a generalization of each tradition, Jung claims that in the “Christian tradition,” whichever sect he has in mind, a strict ontological disunity between the individual and God is ordinarily encountered, such that a Christian may doctrinally never “become.” In contrast, Jung explains that in the “Buddhist” tradition, presumably some strain of Mahāyāna and/or Tantra, all things have Buddha-nature and as such may potentially become Buddhas, although they may not be aware of this. For example, in the Prajñāpāramitā tradition of Mahāyāna, The Buddha as an historical person is considered the Nirmāṇakāya Buddha, or manifestation body of the Buddha, while the Dharmakāya Buddha is the unmanifest truth that pervades the cosmos. This divergence suggests how Jung understood the delimitations of individuality which accounts for much of his understanding, and perhaps misunderstanding, of maṇḍala imagery, primarily in this sense that the deity at the center of the maṇḍala is none other than a symbolic expression of the individual; a statement of extreme heterodoxy in Jung’s early 20th century Europe.
In this section Jung’s concept of libido will be inspected. This will be done to establish a thematic correlation between transformative properties of libido and the role played by sexual energy in some maṇḍala practice. As will be argued in this section, this aspect of maṇḍala imagery can be found quite clearly in the depth psychology of C.G. Jung.

In Jung’s work he identifies “libido” as a psychological energy that animates conscious processes by coloring them with emotionally toned imperatives that arise from the body and thus the unconscious. This energy is far more than sexual energy—a point on which he diverged with Freud—accounting for all of the body’s energetic imperatives. He writes in his commentary to Wilhelm’s translation of The Secret of the Golden Flower that these autonomous systems are always at work, regardless of whether or not one believes in them or how many arguments to the contrary one may level as they function outside of the capacity of our ordinary moment-to-moment consciousness. (Wilhelm, 1962; 112) Jung continues suggesting that these “autonomous psychic contents” are the gods of this current age. As he writes, “Today [the gods] are called phobias, compulsions, and so forth, or in a word, neurotic symptoms. [They] have become diseases; Zeus no longer rules Olympus but the solar plexus…” (Wilhelm, 1962; 113) The libido is often found to function in conjunction with the archetypes, animating the psyche with foreign and often unwanted suggestions. And as Jung suggests, these impulses and the form they take may be found in a particular part of the body (e.g., the solar plexus); a point of explicit similarity with the tantric tradition.
Libido as Subtle Body and “Concealed Essence”

For Freud, libido was purely sexual although he claimed this foundational energy was also pre-sexual, a point shared by Merleau-Ponty. (Merleau-Ponty, 157-8, 181) For Merleau-Ponty, perception ordinarily contains an erotic structure. As Yuasa explains, “…eros or libido vivifies perception in the normal person’s relating to the world. In fact, our life-space appears to us with a sexual meaning or value.” (Yuasa, 1987; 176) These are all suggesting an innate character to consciousness that has at its foundation a drive that most clearly announces itself sexually although not at all constrained to the genitals. As Yuasa further explains, “We have no Western equivalent of this psychosomatic energy, though the concept of libido in depth psychology or that of élan vital in Henri Bergson’s philosophy is analogous to it.” (Yuasa, 1987; 124) Although there are a number of approaches to this vivification of experience, this investigation will be constrained to Jung’s depth psychology.

Libido in Jung’s Depth Psychology

Jung, like Freud, recognized an “energetic” component of the human psyche that functioned as a motivating and animating drive to the human being. It is not a mere instinct, which would reduce libido to some base animal impulse, but what Jung called an “indisputably creative power” that was both the cause of our lives, as a physiologically sexual phenomenon, as well as a fundamental factor of the psyche. (Jung, 1981; 57) As such, Jung variously suggests the following terms that define libido; psychic energy, life energy, bio-energy, and vital energy. (Jung, 1981; 17) He is quick to note that this is not a “life force,” which would suggest material reductionism. Jung was also clear in
rejecting what he termed Freud’s “pansexualism.” (Jung, 1981; 19) Jung did so to free libido from such a strictly sexual interpretation, both in the sense that libido precedes a strictly sexual expression, and that it functions outside of it. An example of this can be found in the aforementioned case in Tantric Buddhist practice explained by Preece wherein a form of the divine that resonated with the energetic idiosyncrasies of the individual. If the individual was primarily sexual, a sexualize form of the divine was chosen; if the individual was primarily aggressive, a violent form of the divine was chosen. The point is that sexual and aggressive energies are both forms of libido. With this definition of libido in mind, the following section will address a process identified by Jung by what he called “canalization,” or the capacity to transform and redirect libido.

**Canalization of Libido.** A clear example Jung uses to illustrate this point is that of a primitive group of people found in Australia called the Wachandi who performed a spring agricultural ritual in which the earth took the shape of the female’s genitals. (Jung, 1981; 42-3) Performed by men, the earth became “an analogue of the object of instinct,” figuratively taking the form of a woman, and—more importantly—literally becoming a receptor for sexual energy. The purpose of the ritual is to redirect the personal self-interest in the expression of one’s libido from the personal level to the level of the group; generating concern for maintaining the earth and feeding the group rather than just oneself.

This calls to attention an insight of Jung’s as expressed in the following. “…man when left to himself lives as a natural phenomenon, and in the proper meaning of the word,
produces no work. It is culture that provides the machine whereby the natural gradient is exploited for the performance of work” (Jung, 1981; 41) Three terms that need to be expounded upon and clarified here are “work,” “machine” and “gradient.”

By “work” Jung has in mind not just “effort” or “exertion,” but the capacity to exert oneself beyond the requests of the libido for satiation. That is, to exert oneself in order to generate surplus for others beyond one’s own personal need. In the context of the above agricultural ritual, the male farmer’s libido was redirected to the earth so that his personal sexual energy and self-interest was projected into the craft of agriculture. In further explaining, Jung writes that this canalization is,

…a transfer of psychic intensities or values from one content to another, a process corresponding to the physical transformation of energy; for example, in the steam-engine the conversion of heat into the pressure of steam and then into the energy of motion. (Jung, 1981; 41)

This transformation of energy from libido to what is essentially psychological farming technology further suggests “work” in the capacity of an individual becoming a “worker.”

Turning next to the term “machine,” it appears to be a loaded issues, primarily in the sense that cultural and social machines may be cynically seen as that which reduces people to their capacity to produce, accompanied by class stratification (e.g., slavery, industrialization, etc.). Although an important topic, it is well outside the constraints of this project. However, this idea of social and cultural “machinery” is quite relevant. On one hand, one may see social technology as a machine for extracting work out of people
for the greater good (or the elite few), but on the other, one may see religious and spiritual technology as a mechanism for redirecting one’s energies toward the refinement of spiritual matters. One such explicit example of this refinement can be found in the Daoist tradition. (Rousselle, 66) Here depiction of such refinement is found, starting with three currents that run through the human being. The first, is explicitly sexual in nature, is the seed (jing) or sexual energy, the next is the subtle energy (qi), and the last is spiritual energy (shen). Jing is ordinarily directed outward, but through cultivation techniques, it may be directed inward which manifest as qi, which in turn may be transformed into shen. This is the sort of inner “machinery” applicable to this project. The contention of this project is that, Tantra, maṇḍalas, and cakras are one such form of machinery.

The term “gradient” is comprised of both of the above terms. Using yet another metaphor to explain libido, Jung uses the example of water flowing downhill. (Jung, 1981; 38) Under ordinary conditions, water simply flows where it may, not, as mentioned above, doing any work. This is the ordinary gradient of libido; it expresses itself as naturally as water flowing downhill. However, this is often not the case as the psyche is generally disturbed by the concessions it has to make in order to adapt to society in work. This results in obstruction of libido, analogous to building a dam. Mental health may be considered as establishing an unrestricting gradient for the flow of libido (Albanese, 1977; 1). The gradient may also be constructed and function as a machine as discussed above, in this case analogous to a mill.
Jung’s work as a psychologist may be expressed in part as the process of identifying un- or mis-expressed libido in a patient, and then helping him or her develop a more healthy gradient for that energy. Essential to this basic formulation is the possibility for the individual to deliberately change. In this capacity to change, Jung identifies two general directions for the expression of libido, progression and regression. Jung advises that this is not merely a case of “development” and “back-sliding,” as both serve a purpose in the establishment of a new gradient. (Jung, 1981; 37) Regression, Jung states, is a necessary aspect of development, although one the individual may not necessarily consciously relate to development. To explain, it is a retraction of one’s traditional libidinal patters that resembles an “early infantile state or even an embryonic condition within the womb.” (Jung, 1981; 37) Once the libido has been retracted to such a primordial state, it may then more deliberately and more healthily be re-expressed, establishing a new gradient.

**Objective Properties of Libido.** In this section libido will briefly be addresses as a subject of scientific study in order to combat the position that such internal musings are merely subjective; a condemnation that usually dismisses such topics as irrelevant. As a scientist, Jung was compelled to render his study of the psyche in scientific language, which is what shall be addressed here. This is far from a digression as it is important to this project as the establishment of libido as a scientific phenomenon further adds legitimacy, when applicable, to subtle energy phenomenon.

To begin, Jung was adamant that he was not discussing physical energy, stating that his use of the term was a conceptual abstraction borrowed from the more familiar term. But
much like the energy at home in the field of physics, there is no “thing” called energy, as it too is abstracted from the relationship between things (e.g. potential energy, kinetic energy). The shift he makes is that psychic energy is generated from tension in the psyche that arises in response to external or psychic stimulus.\textsuperscript{13} Whereas in physics, energy arises due to the relationship between physical elements. Jung sought to distance himself from the materialist standpoint, avoiding conversations with the material reductionism \textit{du jour}, as such a conversation would have been fruitless. Jung makes this point very clearly when he writes, “I am not concerned in the least in fitting psychic energy processes into the physical system. (Jung, 1981; 7) And further more when he writes, “…we must certainly break with what seems to me the untenable ‘psychophysical’ hypothesis, since its epiphenomenal point of view is simply a legacy from the old-fashioned scientific materialism.” (Jung, 1981; 7)

Jung’s clearly rejected materialist assumptions that were the scope of main-stream scientific inquiry in his day, but he did not reject the methods of science. A technique Jung developed early in his career to render his discoveries about the psyche in a scientifically meaningful manner was his word association test. (Jung, 1976b; 101-11) In this text, Jung would present a patient a series of words and 1) record the patient’s answer, and 2) time the patient’s reaction. By then drawing relationships between the number of words affected by the neurosis, noting their frequency, intensity, and accompanying affects, he could estimate the energetic value of the neurosis that was

\textsuperscript{13} For example, the sexual energy that arises upon encountering the object of one’s desire, or the anxiety that arises when an emotionally laden term is to be responded to.
ailing the patient. Moving on to more traditional physiological measurements, recording the rate of the pulse and respiration, as well as measuring the galvanic skin response, a doctor could further make an objective case for the presence of an affliction in a patient. (Jung, 1981; 14). This suggests a correlative psychosomatic relationship between psychic and bodily states. The aura of influence of a neurosis thus identified, Jung called “constellation,” allegorically similar to a black hole (my expression, not Jung’s); black holes cannot be directly observed by their very nature, but what can be observed is its influence on other observable phenomenon. For example, a black hole can be “observed” by charting the orbit of a planet seemingly around nothing, and by watching distant light bend through its gravity well, further suggesting the psychosomatic relationship. In presenting his theories in this way, Jung was able to direct attention to the unobservable aspects of human consciousness without reducing them to physical phenomenon, or establishing them as idealist entities.

**Jung on Archetypes: Animus/Animus**

The archetypes are a central concept of Jung’s depth psychology and one of his most novel contributions to the field. They are psychic patterns that exist in the unconscious, which are the psychic inheritance of previous generations of human beings that arise in the psyche regardless of in which culture one happens to find oneself.14 (Jung, 1990b; 280) Jung further defines the archetypes as an *a priori* virtual image of the world with which they must establish a relationship. (Jung, 1972; 190) Archetypes also lack content,

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14 One could say that the archetypes of the human psyche are as variable as human physiology. Humans certainly vary, but there overarching similarity that unites the species overshadows the relative irrelevance in differences.
and interject themselves into conscious life only after the individual has experienced the facts of its world. (Jung, 1972; 190) That is to say, no one ever experiences a pure archetype. For example, it is only when a child first sees his or her mother, that they see the mother or the mother archetype.\textsuperscript{15} In one’s early life archaic disposition to instinctively recognize one’s mother can be found. As the child grows, the mother archetype stays with him or her until it is outgrown. Perhaps foreshadowing the themes within the mandala, Jung states that the purpose of coming of age ceremonies is to inhibit or withdraw the libido invested in the mother archetype and then transforming and redirecting that energy to a new symbol, often times a social or religious institution.

From an objective standpoint, the child/mother relationship appears rather straightforward, but when viewing the issue from the standpoint that takes as its domain the entire psyche, the issue appears more nuanced. In this case, Jung explains that one’s sex and gender are not as polarized as may be believed, stating, “No man is so entirely masculine that he has nothing feminine in him.” (Jung, 1972; 189) By this he suggests that although one may exclusively identify strongly as one sex or gender, its opposite is still active, its “contrasexual demands accumulating in the unconscious.” (Jung, 1972; 189) This neglected aspect of one’s sexuality then takes up residence in the unconscious which, according to Jung, becomes the underdeveloped voice of one’s shadow. It is the contention here that Tantra capitalizes on these motifs as a means of drawing the individual into a state wherein consciousness is reunited with these repressed contents.

\textsuperscript{15} The subtle body probably functions in a similar manner, adjusting its expression to the situation in which it finds itself, which is thus constrained by a number of environmental and cultural factors.
The archetype of primary concern is what Jung calls the *anima* or *animus*. In a hetero-normative context, these are sexual depictions of one’s unconscious, taking the opposite form of the individual. For men, the *anima* is an idealized image form of the female; for women, the *animus* is the idealized male (or males). This presumes a sexual dynamic between the individual and the unconscious as the two seek equilibrium and mutual expression through the other. The point to be emphasized is that the *animus* is the face of the unconscious from the perspective of the conscious. The insight of sexualized *maṇḍalas* is that they are not merely some lusty god or goddess out of a text, but may be interpreted as a prescribed face to channel libido and thus become animated by the unconscious.\(^{16}\)

**Jung on Active Imagination**

Active imagination is the final insight of Jung to be introduced in this chapter that illuminates *maṇḍala* practice, hopefully rendering it all the more understandable. For Jung, active imagination, although it variously went by a number of names throughout his writing, is the capacity for the unconscious to participate and animate the focus of consciousness, whether that be during play, prayer, or any object of focus.\(^{17}\) More tersely put by Chodorow, “…active imagination is the essential, inner-directed symbolic attitude that is at the core of psychological development.” (Jung, 1997; 17) This suggests a more participatory and less violent meeting with the unconscious. Chodorow clarifies that the

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\(^{16}\) Jung notes that the *anima* or *animus* may take on a variety of forms depending on the individual. For example, the *anima* may manifest as a maiden, or as a terrible witch.

\(^{17}\) Chodorow enumerates these forms in her *Jung on Active Imagination*. (Jung, 1997, 3-4)
“activity” of active imagination is both an aspect of consciousness as well as unconsciousness as it requires a conscious decision to engage with the unconscious.

Jung perhaps most famously explains active imagination in his memoirs when he tells the story of how he worked his way through a period of extreme personal stagnation by simply doing what his unconscious suggested. Recalling how he was at wit’s end he writes, “Since I know nothing at all, I shall simply do whatever occurs to me.’ Thus I consciously submitted myself to the impulses of the unconscious.” (Jung, 1989; 173) What his unconscious turned him to was an old childhood leisure activity of making small castles out of rocks and mud. As he took up this practice, he was inundated by powerful emotions and creativity, an act of “regression” as discussed above. The purpose of regression in this case was to return to an earlier instance of emotional expression, not to “regress” in the pejorative sense, but to rekindle that energy and once again move forward with it.

Jung writes elsewhere that active imagination is a means to “gain possession of the energy that is in the wrong place” and does so by making “the emotional state the basis or starting point of the procedure.” (Jung, 1981; 82) Continuing, he writes, “[the patient] must make himself as conscious as possible of the mood he is in, sinking himself in it without reserve and noting …all the fantasies and other associations that come up. Fantasy must be allowed the freest possible play, yet not in such a manner that leaves the orbit of its object…” (Jung, 1981; 82) A clear articulation of his active imagination is found here which consists of regaining obstructed or lost energy, emotionally engaging in
this energy, and observing what sort of thoughts and feelings are associated with it. The
essence of this practice is to allow one’s absorption to “convert libido from a ‘lower’ into
a ‘higher’ form.” (Jung, 1990a; 232) This absorption applies to mere play, but also to
spiritual matters.

As the *manḍala* may be classified as an artistic expression, especially as understood by
Jung, the insights of Ernst Gombrich are valuable in explaining active imagination. This
is mentioned by Gupta with respect to the work of Gombrich, who introduced a theory of
art and how it relates to human expression. (Gupta, 37) Gombrich identifies four levels
of artistic expression; 1) magico-medical, which creates moods and evokes feelings, 2)
renaissance, which attempts to depict reality as it is experienced, 3) romanticism, which
attempts to express one’s inner state, and 4) a state wherein “the artist gets feedback from
his creation, and interacts with the tradition within which he works.” (Gupta, 37). This
fourth stage very clearly resembles Jung’s active imagination which is a deliberate artistic
participation with the feelings and impulses of the unconscious. Jung writes about how
he overcame a period of personal and professional stagnation by instinctually returning to
the hobby of building castles. (Jung, 1989; 173) This activity carried with it tremendous
amount of spontaneous feelings and its own myths and symbols that Jung allowed to
participate in his psyche by returning to this simple creative act. Gupta recognizes the
*manḍala* as an expression of this caliber wherein it is “the artist himself who discovers
and selects the kind of emotion he wishes to cultivate and express.” (Gupta, 37) The
tantric *manḍala* and Jung’s active imagination with respect to the *manḍala* function in
this regard, seeking harmonious communication with something greater than the
individual *qua* ego, either with the divine in Tantra or with the unconscious of the individual in Jung.

The contention of this chapter is that Jung’s active imagination is a suitable means of explaining tantric *maṇḍala* visualization practices as the numinous images of the *maṇḍala* are meditated upon. It is not a stretch to suggest that “*dhyāna*” contains similar connotations of this merging in one-pointedness (*ekāgratā*), which clearly entails the participation of the unconscious as defined by Jung.¹⁸ One “sinks down” into the playful participation of the unconscious wherein the conscious and the unconscious cooperate in their focus.

**Conclusion to Chapter Six**

This chapter has presented two points concerning *maṇḍalas*. The first was to establish a rough historical pattern of development defined by interiorization. By tracking the historical chain of progress, from interiorizing the deity, mapping the deities to locations of the body in a *maṇḍala*, and then abstractly assigning a number of *maṇḍalas* to the body, *maṇḍalas* progressed into *cakras*. By establishing this progression of interiorization, this will have to some degree elucidated the thematic progression from traditional Hindu and Buddhist thought to the esoteric nature of the *cakras*. The second point addressed is that these processes can be understood greatly in part as functioning under the rules of depth psychology as established by C.G. Jung. By juxtaposing the

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¹⁸ The two differ with respect to the degree of the unconscious’s inclusion. Jung advocated perhaps a playful give-and-take between the conscious and conscious whereas *dhyāna* suggest a far greater degree of conscious discipline and focus.
historical and the psychological, evidence has been provided that further grounds and contextualizes the *cakras*. 
This purpose of this chapter is to offer some definitions to terms that have been suggested so far in this project, both in general and with respect to the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa as the cakras defined therein have become standardized in some circles. This chapter will also function as a preparation for the following chapter which will present C.G. Jung’s commentary on the cakras. The term “cakra” in the context of this chapter will refer both to the maṇḍalas depicted in such works as the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa, and also the general idea of psychically localized regions of the subtle body. As such, the term will serve the role of both denoting a specific tradition-bound image as well as a general statement about subtle anatomy, the definition appealing to context.

This chapter will begin with a terse overview of the svādhiṣṭhāna cakra in order to demonstrate the symbolism found in the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. It will then take a more historical and textual orientation in order to tie many of these ideas back to specific locations, whether that be a classical text or the written work of a contemporary New Age energy healer. This will begin with Avalon’s The Serpent Power, and then address some modern commentators and interpreters of the ideas presented therein to establish the breadth of how the cakras are understood. Next, the cakras will be discussed and defined, both classically and modernly, followed by the same treatment of the conduits of subtle energy; the nāṇis.
The Šaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa

This section will introduce the 16th century text, the Šaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa, which depicts what may be consider as the “standard” interpretation of the cakras. The convention of placing “standard” in quotes has been borrowed from David Gordon White who uses them in order to emphasize that this interpretation is standard primarily for contemporary and New Age appropriators of the cakras. When in fact, as he writes, “…there is no ‘standard’ system of the cakras. Every school, sometimes every teacher within each school, has had their own cakra system. These have developed over time, and an ‘archaeology’ of the various configurations is in order.” (White, 2006; 222) A cursory thematic attempt at such “archeology” was offered in the proceeding chapter, but the point to be emphasized is that this “standardization” may be traced directly to the astonishingly influential translation project of Arthur Avalon, the pen-name of Sir John Woodruff.

In his book, The Serpent Power, Avalon offers a translation of two sixteenth-century texts, the Šaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa (The Description of the Six Centers), and the Pādukā Pañcaka (The Five-Fold Footstool). It is the former that is the object of focus here as this text had an inordinate impact on the West’s understanding of the yogic subtle body; to such a degree that the cakras as presented in this text became the “standard” model of the cakras. (Taylor) This is due to two primary reasons. The first is that this text was simply structured and presented in such a way that caught the attention of a European public eager for the esoteric and oriental. The second is that the Šaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa is
particularly well known for its succinct and vivid explanation of cakras. Although this
distinction of “standard” has ostensibly been undermined by modern scholarship, and it is
abundantly clear, as White writes, that “every school, sometimes every teacher within
each school, has had their own cakra system” the standard model nonetheless persists. A
detailed investigation into the propagation and integration of the cakras as presented in
the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa is beyond the scope of this current project, it is the assertion of
this project that Jung’s interest in this text added much weight to the perceived
authenticity of the ideas contained within.

For now, we may return to a brief introduction to the cakras as they appear in the
Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. According to Avalon, the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa was composed by a
Tāntrika Sādhaka by the name of Pūrṇānanda in Bengal in 1577 C.E. This was not
composed as a stand-alone text, but as the sixth section of a larger text called the Śrī
Tattva Cintāmaṇi. (Avalon, vii-viii) It appears that most of those who comment on this
text’s origin simply reference the material presented in this brief section in Avalon’s
preface to his The Serpent Power, with or without citation.

The Svādhiṣṭhāna as per the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa

It is not the intention of this project to present a detailed analysis of the cakras, but rather
to find ways to more meaningfully talk about them as living phenomenon, in this case
primarily through a conversation with Jung in the following chapter. There is certainly
no shortage of commentary on this system of cakras, and it may be more valuable to
simply redirect the reader to the standouts within the sea of commentary. As it stands, a
terse recapitulation will be of little value, and a detailed explication of the symbolism and mythology of the cakras would require several designated chapters. That being said, adequate yet brief overviews of the cakras of the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpana may be found in the following; the original English source of Avalon, Spiegelman & Vasavada, Burley (2000), Pandit, Feuerstein (2001), and Motoyama (2003b).

For the sake of brevity, only one cakra will be cursorily examined here within its own context to demonstrate the nuances that appear in each cakra. The reader may also explore both Judith’s and Motoyama’s chapter on the svādhiṣṭhāna to provide a modern contrast to the issue. (Judith, 103-63; Motoyama, 2003a; 48-77) Judith is recommended as per the explanation in the previous paragraph, and Motoyama is recommended due to his unique position as both a contemporary cakra practitioner and scholar. The svādhiṣṭhāna will be introduced below, primarily due to its position of relevance in Jung’s writing. This overview of the svādhiṣṭhāna will be extracted from Burley (2000) and Feuerstein (2001) unless otherwise mentioned.

To begin, “sva” in the Sanskrit means “self” or “own” denoting self-reference as in the case of “svabhāva” which means “self-nature” or “one’s own becoming.” “Adhiṣṭhāna” means “abode,” “standing place,” or “base.” Together “svādhiṣṭhāna” suggests something along the lines of “the original abode of the self,” or as Burley suggests, one’s “ownmost body.” The location or physiological correlate of the svādhiṣṭhāna is the root of the genitals.
Each cakra has a particular element and a number of petals associated with it. The petals of each cakra approximate what are referred to as divisions (bhedas) or portions (kalās) as found in the Kubjikāmata Tantra. (White, 2006; 229) The base cakras, the mūlādhāra, has four petals and the number expands the higher the location along the spine, culminating with one thousand petals at the topmost cakra, the sahasrāra. The bottom five cakras are each also correlated with the five gross elements (bhūtas), again running in a grade from top to bottom; starting with the earth element at mūlādhāra (prthivī) and ending with the space or “ether” element at viśuddha (ākāśa). These two factors of petals and bhūtas thematically correlate with the above discussions of kuṇḍalinī awakening and bhūtaśuddhi as the chakras lay out a trail of sorts running from bottom to top, from the most gross to the most subtle, which reflects the focus and the path one’s spiritual practice within a cakra-based spiritual practice. In the case of the sahasrāra, it is the second cakra which has six petals and is represented by the element of water (jala).

It should be noted that the cakras of the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa are represented by colors, again suggesting a spectrum of refinement, from low to high. They are, from lowest to highest; crimson, vermilion, the color of a heavily laden rain cloud, red (the color of the bandhūka flower), smoky purple, white, and colorless. This is introduced at this time as it appears that nearly all modern writers on the cakras for some reason have abandoned this aspect of these cakras in favor of the seven colors of the rainbow. Why this became the standard would make for an interesting question for research. And all the more so, why were these colors chosen by Pūrṇānanda? This is not entirely clear.
Each *cakra* also contains a masculine and feminine element of the divine. The female aspects of the divine are manifestations of Śakti, which are Dākinī, Rākinī, Lākinī, Kākinī, Sākinī, and Hākinī. These goddesses can also be traced back to the *Kubjikāmata Tantra* wherein they each appear in a single *maṇḍala* oriented at the throat. (White, 2006; 228-9) White suggests that they represented those who receive an offering of the *yogi’s* body. They too are again aligned along a spectrum, ingesting the most gross to the most subtle aspects of the *yogi’s* body. The physiological aspect of these offerings did not make their way literally into the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* as the nature of the offering they represent changed subtly, but they do appear to perform the same general role, which is allowing for the resorption of the *bhūta* related to that *cakra*. The male deity that appears in each *cakra* is a manifestation of one of the Hindu triad, either Brahmā, Śiva, or Viṣṇu. The variations of these deities also run along a spectrum, from a mundane form of Brahmā at the *mūlādhāra* in the form of the child creator Śiśuḥ Śṛṣṭikārī, to a resplendent form of Viṣṇu at the ājñā. In the case of the *svādhiṣṭhāna*, we find the goddess Rākinī, and Hari (Viṣṇu) seated on the mythical birdman Garuḍa.

The last element of the *cakras* to be discussed are the animals located in the bottom five *cakras*. These are an elephant, a sea monster, a ram, a gazelle, and a white elephant. This will be addressed in the following chapter as Jung’s discussion covering these creatures offers a great deal of insight into understanding how they too function as a spectrum, albeit through the lens of Jung’s psychologism. At this point, suffice it to say that they too, like the rest of the aspects of the *cakras* represent a spectrum of their own.
At the level of the *svādhiṣṭāna*, we find the leviathan Makara, who is a strange fish/crocodile creature. He is being ridden by the god of the sea, Varuna.

**General Themes**

*Where Cakras May be Found*

Before the following chapter’s depiction of the cakras, it would be prudent to first define them in context of the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirupana* and discuss the problems inherent in them. To assist with identifying these problems, we may return to the discussion of the previous chapter wherein Flood’s argument for “entextualization” is presented. Flood introduces this issue by presenting the case of a “cakra balancing” service he found in his local phonebook. With this in mind he writes,

> Implicit here is a Western appropriation of the tantric body that we might see as a reification of it, and a view that the tantric body is something that can be revealed for those with the means to do so. The argument of this book, on the contrary, is that in its medieval Indian context the tantric body is not a given that is discovered but a process that is constructed through dedicated effort over years of practice. (Flood, 19)

Flood’s comment draws out a tension that must be dealt with before we proceed. This issue is a matter of which aspects of the *cakra* system are intuitive, that is, what aspects can be “revealed for those with the means to do so,” and which aspects are firmly rooted in social, textual, and historical contexts. On its face, “*cakra*” is an ostensibly Sanskrit term, and as a word it always finds itself in the context of a text and language, which itself happens to reflect the ideas and values of a person (the author), who happens to find his or her self in a particular time and place. But “*cakra*” may also be employed in a more general sense to describe the phenomenon of “psychical localization” and mind-
body correlativity. (Jung, 1996; 34) As discussed in Chapter Five, Yuasa argues that a sensitivity to the subtle body may be cultivated by expanding one’s awareness towards deeper levels of the information circuits of one’s body. This phenomenon appears to arise throughout diverse cultures when the spiritually inclined turn their attention inward, as demonstrated by Lockhart, and Samuel and Johnston. This issue at hand is whether or not one accepts the phenomenon of the psychically localized subtle body as an intrinsic facet of human existence or not. The assumption of this project is, just as the human body was expressed prior to and in the absence of any hard understanding of biology, the psychically localized subtle body is expressed as well.

If this is not the case, then it must be concluded that the subtle body is purely a product of the imagination. Certainly the imagination is involved, but the question that remains is, “what is the imagination guiding?” In this respect, Flood’s comment still stands, as this “cakra balancing” service probably has little to do with the “tantric body” as he defines the term. It can be presumed for the moment that the proprietor of this service is in fact entirely out of touch with ninth-century Indian understandings of the psychically localized subtle body, and is instead employing a twenty-first century British understanding. Nonetheless, the psychically localized subtle body—the cakras—remains the topic of interest.

An additional point should be made that it is not the intention of this project to normalize the cakras, but more so to investigate to what degree the cakras are, to paraphrase Flood, “something that can be revealed for those with the means to do so.” What appears to be
revealed are psychically localized relationships between the mind and body, and whatever pre-packaged cakra system one may be drawn to represents a proposed schematic for how to organize these relationships in a cogent and—all the more importantly—discussable manner. The cakras at one level may be considered an aspect of the unconscious quasi-body as defined by Yuasa, that functions invisibly and unconsciously, and prior to the distinction of mind and body that span the distinction between the nervous system and consciousness. But as unconscious, invisible phenomenon, an imaginative form can be given to them to bring them into the light of consciousness. In this sense, the historical/textual cakras may be understood as forms given to the abstract inclinations of the subtle body.\(^1\) As we begin, we must remain aware of this distinction as to reduce either side to the other would be in error. That is, the cakras thus defined neither belong exclusively to the realm of idealism nor realism.

Cakras

Commentary on the cakras is nearly boundless, as those interested in the topic represent an exceedingly diverse group of writers who each employ their own methodology of preference in articulating them. However, there remains a fair degree of continuity between these definitions that may assist in defining the term.

\(^1\) This is akin to Jung’s understanding of the archetypes. He explains that the archetypes exist, but do not take a form until they encounter something in the real world that brings them to life. For example, the mother archetype becomes active only when one meets his or her mother. Perhaps the same may be true of cakras. In this sense I do not mean to suggest that the subtle body is some absolute \textit{a priori} entity, but more so something that may be posited provisionally to guide discussion; a place-holder, perhaps.
In the most basic sense, “cakra” means “wheel” or “circle,” which seems to be universally understood, but wheels of what? The context of the cakras is not the realm of the physical ordinarily governed by the laws of modern science, but of the subtle body and the energies latent within, these terms being generally clarified in Chapters Five and Six respectively. However, there is little consensus as to how the subtle body may be articulated. Mikel Burley offers one such guarded definition of the cakras when he writes, “In the context of human subtle physiology, cakra signifies a ‘centre’ or ‘vortex’ of ‘force’ or ‘energy’ situated at various junctions throughout the subtle matrix of nādis.” (Burley, 2000; 159) Here we find various terms suggestive of wheels, a reference to some manner of subtle body reminiscence of Jung’s libido, and the introduction of the third term. This third term being the notion of nādis, or conduits of subtle energy, which will be taken up below. Dale offers the following definition that emphasizes the interrelationship between the gross (sthūla) and the subtle (sūkṣma) aspects of the body. She writes, “Chakras are… also called energy centers, or energy organs, they negotiate both physical and subtle energies, transforming one into the other and back again.” (Dale, 235) Here we find an interplay between degrees; between the gross and the subtle. This is suggestive of the gradations of the subtle as found in Sāṃkhya philosophy as discussed in Chapter Four. Dale and others, most notably Motoyama, emphasize the role that the cakras play as the mediator between these different levels of being as the more subtle realms support and orchestrate the grosser.
The *cakras* as gradations of being share much in common with the *kośas* as presented in Chapter Four. This is, for example, attested to by Lockhart in her definition of the *cakras*. She writes,

> The chakras may be regarded as idealized versions of the actual anatomy and physiology of the subtle body, which are used as guides for visualization and contemplation. The yogin uses them purely as objects of focused contemplation to help him gain insight into the particular states of being that are governed by the five *kośas*. (42)

In the first sentence of this citation is found a sensible and clear depiction of the *cakras* that echoes Flood’s entextualization, that the *cakras qua maṇḍala* images are exogenous symbols to assist with focusing psychical localization. But it is the second sentence that is of more concern. Here, Lockhart correlates the *cakras* with the *kośas*. Avalon more explicitly addresses this phenomenon in the following. Quoting at length, he writes that the *cakras* are,

> …subtle centers of operation in the body of the Shaktis of Powers of the various Tattvas or Principles which constitute the bodily sheaths. Thus the five lower Chakras from Mūlādhāra to Viśuddha are centres of the Bhūtas, or fine forms of sensible matter. The Ājñā and other Chakras in the region between it and the Sahasrāra are centres of the Tattvas constituting the mental sheaths, whilst, the Sahasrāra or thousand-petalled lotus at the top of the brain, is the blissful abode of Parama Shiva-Shakti which is the state of pure Consciousness. (103)

Here Avalon and Lockhart explicitly tie each *cakra* to a different sheath (*kośa*). The first five *cakras* are easy to defend as they are explicitly tied to the five gross elements (*bhūtas*) in the *Ṣaṭčakra Nirūpaṇa*. Avalon also seems to suggest the second sheath of *prāṇa* by mentioning the power associated with each. The last three finding their place in the *cakras* associated with the head.
Although there are similarities, this is surely a case of mixing spiritual metaphors, which appears to be endemic to the topic. Kośas, or sheaths, suggest concentric layers of being, perhaps like the layers of a green onion. Cakras follow an entirely different metaphor as they are understood to be locations of subtle energy strung out along the regions of the spine generally correlating with the major plexuses of nerves. Specific to the cakras that is not found in the kośas is the arising of kūṇḍalini energy as the driving force behind this transition that arises from the lowest to the highest cakra. Kūṇḍalini, which will be further addressed below, is considered the most subtle of the body’s energies, more subtle than prāṇa. (Avalon, 95) If the two systems were to be conflated, the advancement of kūṇḍalini would symbolize the retreat of the lower kośas. As such, there appears to be an inverse relationship between the presence of kūṇḍalini and the presence of the kośas. For example, as the kūṇḍalini rises through the suśumṇa, or primary nādi running through the spine, the psychological phenomenon and sensory awareness associated with that cakra fades from conscious awareness. In the case of kūṇḍalini reaching the sahasrāra, the final cakra, one is allegedly left within a state of naught but bliss (ānanda). However, this correlation leaves much to be discussed as there does not appear to be a way to make a simple one-to-one correlation between the kośas and cakras except in a very general sense.

MOTOYAMA Hiroshi proposes a highly syncretic model of the cakras that provides a metaphysical framework which may offer a solution to this matter, albeit novel and a clear diversion from the metaphysics of the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. Motoyama’s cakra system is based on the familiar three levels of existence; the gross, subtle, and causal. At
each level of this system, a different form of energy governs. Physical energy, chi energy, and psi energy, each with progressively fewer limitations. The cakras are the control centers in the human body that mediate this energy from its highest source, down to the mundane. (Motoyama, 2003a 8–9) Motoyama’s system allows for a more independent treatment for each cakra as each cakra servers a specific role in negotiating these degrees of energy. As he further defines his system in agreement with Dale, “…the chakra is seen to be an intermediary for energy transfer and conversion between two neighboring dimensions of being, as well as a center facilitating the energy conversion between a body and its corresponding mind. (Motoyama, 2003b; 23) Self cultivation then takes the form of facilitating the unhindered interchange of these energies.

Within Motoyama’s system, that which orchestrates the seven cakras at the causal level is none other than puruṣa. What this adds to the discussion concerning the overlap of kośas and cakras is that each cakra can be cultivated independently, offering a horizontal plane of cultivation spanning the gross to the causal. This vertical axis is accompanied by the traditional vertical cultivation of the arising of kuṇḍalini. Taking these two into account provides a metaphysical framework that doesn’t necessarily solve the above problem, but it perhaps may clarify it as the kośas may be interpreted in this system as belonging to the horizontal dimension while kuṇḍalinī may retain its vertical domain.

2 This appears to be modeled on the three degrees of energy as found in Daoist yoga, jing, chi, and shen, as discussed in Rouselle’s Spiritual Guidance in Contemporary Taoism (1986).
As Motoyama has added his own refinements to the *cakras* to better account for his own philosophy and personal spiritual experience, so too do others who write on the topic. One such example mentioned above is Barbara Brennan. Brennan’s unique twist on the *cakras* is that her system is based upon her own experience with personally being able to see auras in people and things. As such, she defines the *cakras* in the following. “All the major chakras… and acupuncture points are openings for energy to flow into and out of the aura.” (Brennan, 45) This is a rather sharp break from the general metaphysics of the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpana*, as it does not so much as suggest the concept of auras.

In the most general sense, *cakras* are agreed to be psychically localized regions of the subtle body that regulate the flow of bodily energy. This energy can flow between the gross, subtle, and causal levels of the human anatomy, as discussed in the case of Motoyama, but more traditionally, this energy is understood to flow upward from the root *cakra* to the topmost.

**Nādis**

The *nādis* are generally understood to be the conduits through which the energies of the subtle body flow, the most important of which being the *suśumna nādi* (which is associated with the spinal column) through which *kuṇḍalinī-śakti* is said to travel during certain peak spiritual experiences. *Kuṇḍalinī* is the raw energy of *prakṛti* that only enters consciousness under certain circumstances. In the Tantric tradition, *kuṇḍalinī* is often referred to as *kuṇḍalinī-śakti* as an expression of the divine generative energy of the universe whose tension with consciousness must be resolved.
To provide a terse historical overview of the nādis, they appear to have far earlier thematic precedents than the cakras. One notable example comes from the Chandogya Upaniṣad, which was composed approximately twelve-hundred years prior to the first recorded examples of cakras. This text states, “There are a hundred and one channels of the heart. One of these passes up to the crown of the head. Going up by it, one goes to immortality. The others are for departing in various directions.” (White, 2006; 220-1)

Even at this early stage in the development of yogic practical metaphysics we find some fashion of pathway leading from a center of the body out through the top of the head. By the time kuṇḍalinī finds its way into tantric systems, it has worked its way down to the base of the spine and taken the form of a serpent.

David Gordon White identifies the first reference to a serpent dwelling in the lower abdomen as the circa eight-century c.e. Tantrasabhāva Tantra, that went by the name Kuṇḍalī, which meant she who is ring-shaped. He identifies the first references to “kuṇḍalinī” as coming several hundred years later in the Jayadrathayāmala, a tenth- to eleventh-century tantric text, now serpentine in nature. (White, 2006; 232) The imagery of a serpent with respect to kuṇḍalinī, White suggests, is a derivative of Indian iconography. He presents the examples of serpents coiled around the base of temples as support, as well as images of the Buddha sitting on the coils of a serpent with its hood extended acting as a canopy. (White, 2006; 233) The extension of the serpent’s hood over the Buddha is also suggestive of the arising kuṇḍalinī, which is central to the subtle mechanics explained in the Śaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. Testimonials to the arising of kuṇḍalinī,
two of which will be discussed below, suggest a literal rising up much like a defensive cobra, while also conforming to Indian iconography as mentioned by White.

This text shares a commonality but also a stark dissimilarity with its earliest precursor, the *Kubjikāmatatantra*; a circa tenth-century text. As Heilijgers-Seelen explains, this earlier text derived from the Kula (Śakti) tradition, which emphasized the arising of śakti, rather than the meeting of rising Kula and descending Akula (Śiva). (Heilijgers-Seelen, 1994; 57) This appears to have influenced the character of this practice, emphasizing the monopole of śakti. However, in spite of this emphasize on female energies, the *Kubjikāmatatantra* makes no mention of kuṇḍalinī by name, focusing primarily on the more mundane results of meditating on individual cakras. (Heilijgers-Seelen, 1994; 60) As such, the conflation of the cakras with kuṇḍalinī appears to be a much latter invention.

*Kuṇḍalinī* arises when a sufficient degree of preparation has taken place. Examples of such exercises influenced by the *Saṭcakra Nirūpana* include historical schools of āsana practice such as those of *Hātha Yoga*, and the modern yoga practices of MOTOYAMA Hiroshi, which appear to have led him to his own experience with *kuṇḍalinī*, to be addressed below. (Motoyama, 2003) A general term for such practice is *bhūtaśuddhi*, which means cleansing the elements. As White explains, “…*bhūtaśuddhi* refers to the preliminary purification of the divinities residing in each of the five elements (*bhūtas*) that make up the body.” (White, 1996; 272) These divinities and elements are none other than the divinities and elements as found in the symbolism of each cakra. Defined as
such, kūḍalinī’s arising appears to be correlated with the resorbtion of the tattvas of Sāṁkhya philosophy. Bhūtāsuddhi here suggests a preparation of each cakra to be resorbed into the more subtle levels. White makes this more explicit in the following.

Thus, when the kūḍalinī rises from the mūlādhāra cakra (…identified with earth) to the svādhiṣṭhāna (…identified with water), the element earth becomes resorbed into and encompassed by the element water. Likewise, water is resorbed into fire in the third cakra, the manipūra…; fire into air in the anāhata cakra…; and air into ether in the viśuddhi cakra… (White, 1994; 208)

Judith adds that the flow of causality between the purity of the cakras and the activation of kūḍalinī may go in either direction. That is, cleansed or activated cakras may facilitate the rise of kūḍalinī, and kūḍalinī may also cleanse or activate the cakras. (Judith, 452) This would suggest that a degree of reciprocation may be at work.

Kūḍalinī Awakening

Next will be presented two depictions of kūḍalinī awakening as explained by Gopi Krishna and Motoyama. Krishna’s account is perhaps the most famous as his book is well known. The following is a succinct passage as to what he experienced when his kūḍalinī apparently activated prematurely.

Suddenly, with a roar like that of a waterfall, I felt a stream of liquid light entering my brain through the spinal cord. Entirely unprepared for such a development, I was completely taken by surprise; but regaining self-control instantaneously, I remained sitting in the same posture, keeping my mind on the point of concentration. The illumination grew brighter and brighter, the roaring louder, I experienced a rocking sensation and then felt myself slipping out of my body, entirely enveloped in a halo of light. It is impossible to describe the experience accurately. (12-13)

It may first be prudent to emphasize the last line of this passage; it is impossible to describe the experience accurately. But none the less, Krishna explains his account as an
onslaught of sensory overload. What is perhaps more interesting are the paranormal phenomenon that followed this event that he explains in his book, *Kundalini: The Evolutionary Energy in Man*, such as the capacity to compose poetry in languages he had never spoken before. (Krishna, 209) As per his experience, Krishna suggests that there is something well beyond the physiological realm of experiencing intense light and sound.

Motoyama’s account is similar in many respects, although he had an advantage Krishna lacked, which was simply far more preparation. Motoyama was afforded the advantage of beginning ascetic practice as a child under the guidance of his mother and a Shinto priestess. Although he took more than a decade off from regular meditation, when he began his intensive meditative practice, he had some preparation. With this in mind, here is his account,

One day, when I was meditating…, I felt particularly feverish in the lower abdomen and saw there a round blackish-red light like a ball of fire about to explode in the midst of a white vapor. Suddenly, an incredible power rushed through my spine to the top of the head and, though it lasted only a second or two, my body levitated off the floor a few centimeters. I was terrified. My whole body was burning… I felt as if my head would explode with energy. Hitting myself around the “Brahman Gate” at the top of the head was the only thing that brought relief. This, then, was the first time I had experienced the rising of the kuṇḍalinī śakti to the top of my head through the suśumṇa. (Motoyama, 2003b; 241)

Motoyama’s account is similar in many respects, most notably with respect to the physiological discomfort, which emphasizes the physical aspect (*prakṛti*) of kuṇḍalinī, as well as the perception of its initial inherent violence. Motoyama also identifies odd paranormal phenomenon that accompanied this experience. As he explains, he physically beat himself around the crown of the head, the sahasrāra cakra, as this gave him some
comfort. He explains that kūṇḍalinī must exit the crown of the head. In the case of Gopi Krisna, he was not able to release this energy, which nearly cost him his life. Motoyama emphasizes that this discomfort and frightening violence abates with practice, and the experience becomes more natural, leading to higher spiritual experiences such as leaving one’s body.

Ultimately, we cannot say much about what kūṇḍalinī is outside of the context of various texts and authors’ testimony as such accounts seem to have more in common with works of fiction rather than everyday experiences of the mundane. To offer a definition, it appears to be a force that is both physical and psychological in nature that arises when a human being deliberately chooses to re-structure his or her subtle body from being a creature oriented predominantly towards physical and physiological phenomenon, to being an entity oriented towards “spiritual” matters, however one may define the term. Kūṇḍalinī also appears intimately linked to the habituated patterns of psychically localized energy that must be resolved so that a more open and free experience of one’s own body may be obtained. It appears that at this level, such “spiritual” phenomenon are not matters confined to books and the testimonials of others, but now empirical matters of day to day life.

**Physiology**

A point of clarification is in order concerning the relationship between human physiology and the cakras. The two are most certainly related, so it is the nature of their relationship that requires this clarification. As Avalon warns, “Writers of the Yoga and Tantra
schools use the term Nāḍī, by preference, for nerves. …It must, however, be noted that the Yoga Nāḍī are not the ordinary material nerves, but subtler lines of direction along which the vital forces go.” (Avalon, 104) This particular distinction has been suggested above, primarily in terms of the gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma), and causal (karāṇa) levels of existence, suggesting that the nādīs and cakras are phenomenon of the subtle realm.

But nonetheless, the nādīs seem to beg for a physiological comparison. The issue of correlating the nervous system with the subtle body became a focus of interest at the beginning of the nineteenth century in such works as Haṃsasvarūpa’s Saṭcakranirūpanacitram (1903). This short text argued for the correlation between the human nervous system and the subtle body of the Saṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. This text was full of anatomical drawing in order to convincingly and pictorially demonstrate the overlap between the subtle and the physiological. This text presumably influenced later comparative thinkers such as Brajendra Nath Seal who argued for the correlation between the regions of the spinal column and the cakras. (Avalon, 104) More recently, Motoyama has made a similar assertion, but adding his own scientific research to correlate the condition of one’s spine with the activity of the cakras as each cakra appears to correlate to a specific nerve plexuses that emanate from the major regions of the spine. (Motoyama, 2015).

It appears that there is good reason to correlate physiology with the subtle body. On its face, such a discontinuity would be an odd case of Cartesian parallelism, the subtle and
gross body being held together by some unassailable mystery of happenstance. The entire theory of cakras, however, is just the opposite of this assumption. As the process of interiorization was discussed in Chapter Six, the abstract emotions projected into a circle of deities seem to have been more carefully intuited to reside in very specific locations within the human body, closing the gap between mind and body. Even before the correlation between the nervous system was considered, this body-mind connection was recognized in other fashions. As White demonstrates, the earliest form of the six-cakra system appears to have been modeled on the Caraka Samhitā. He writes that the Bhāgavata Purāṇa lists six sites (ṣaṭsu...sthāneṣu) of the human body ‘from which he ‘will surge upward into the beyond (param)’ and that each of these regions “correspond quite exactly to anatomical notions of the vital points of the body (mahā-marmāṇi) or the supports of the vital breaths (prāṇāyatana).” (White, 2006, 224) The point to emphasize is that these early depictions of cakras were actually early depictions of human medical anatomy. 3

With this insight in mind, the comparison between the nervous system and the cakras seems far less to be a post hoc forced distinction, and something legitimately indicative of mind-body correlativity. Both nerves and “supports of vital breath” have an objective and subjective component. The nerves of a cadaver may be investigated, and so may the lived experience of being a human being, and both of these will suggest that specific

3 This is not to say that the cakras can be found anywhere within Āyurveda. (Wujastyk, 199-200) All that is being asserted is that these works identify similar important regions of the body.
regions of the body are responsible for specific functions and sensations, but physical and mental.

However, care must be taken to avoid reductionism. Avalon succinctly states the elements of this problem in the following,

“It is a mistake, therefore, in my opinion, to identify the Chakras with the physical plexuses mentioned. These latter are things of the gross body, whereas the Chakras are extremely subtle vital centers of various Tāttvik operations. In a sense we can connect these subtle centres the gross bodily parts visible to the eyes as plexuses and ganglia. But to connect or correlate and to identify are different things. (161)

The issue he identifies is the distinction between correlation and identity. That is, whether or not one may speak of the carkas as subtle body correlates of certain regions of human anatomy, or of the cakras as to physiological regions themselves. This may be a matter of semantics, but not an irrelevant one. A Motoyama explains, cited above, “the cakra is seen to be an intermediary for energy transfer and conversion between two neighboring dimensions of being” clearly marking the cakras as elements of the subtle body. Whether or not one wishes to address the physiological correlates of the human anatomy as a cakra may be a matter of personal taste, or perhaps their mention may be accompanied by a silent qualification; e.g., “the pineal gland is (a possible physical correlate of) the ājñā cakra.” The implication may also be of the nature of a physiological point of reference as the sensations of the subtle body are superimposed over the physical body; e.g., the anāhata cakra expresses itself through the felt sensations in the region of the heart. As discussed by Yuasa the subtle body (unconscious quasi body) makes itself known through the same system of nerves that provide feedback for
the gross body. Using Motoyama’s terms, if a *cakra* is understood as that which transfers energy between levels of being, the energy of the subtle body is still transferred into the level of the physical body where it makes itself known. This may be expressed through the metaphor of a submarine traveling beneath the surface of the water. The *cakra* is functionally invisible and unconscious—submerged—, but its “wake” is detectable on the “surface,” or in the correlating realm of the gross body.

The greatest issue in this respect that needs to be overcome appears to be the insistence upon the primacy of matter, and the overall employment of the material reductionist paradigm. For example, if one imagines that *Haṭha Yoga* is naught but physical exercise, a meaningful discussion of the subtle body will be impossible because it will reduce the body to a physical machine, and then ask how the machine affects consciousness. Such a reductionist attitude will simply not do. Instead, the proper domain of yoga must be understood as the meaningful integration of the mental and the physical. In terms of *cakra* practice, the first step of *bhūtaśuddhi* is to relinquish the supremacy of the earth element, which strongly suggests relinquishing the mind’s disposition towards assuming material reductionism. A culture founded upon such an assumption surely has its work cut out for it.

**Interpreters and Legacy**

Commentaries and explications of the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* appear to be nearly limitless in number if one turns attention to the hundreds of books and websites devoted to *cakras*, the variety of novel interpretation seemingly boundless. The vast majority of these
properly belong to the blanket-term of “New Age” authors, who appropriate the *cakras* in a variety of ways in order to suit a variety of ends. This all the more so echoes White’s insight that “every school, sometimes every teacher within each school, has had their own *cakra* system.” In spite of their diversity, the description as rendered in the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* appears to be a common thread throughout. For example, Samuel identifies this problem with New Age thinkers with respect to the novelty they introduce to conversations about cakras by mentioning Barbara Brennan. He writes that her book, *Hands of Light*, “provide[s] an impressively complex and detailed account of subtle realities, but the details appear almost entirely dependent on the author's personal perceptions.” (Samuel, 2013; 254) That is, her depiction of the subtle body appears to be based on her own experiences as an energy worker with intuitive insight into human auras while making few to no references to classical depictions of the subtle body and *cakras*. Brennan’s unique interpretation is that the *cakras* are manifestations of the human energy field, which she can clairvoyantly experience. (Brennan, 43)

Although it may be easier and perhaps more convenient to dismiss such authors from participation in conversation on the topic, this may be done to our own detriment, as such practitioners have accrued, in some cases, a lifetime of practical wisdom concerning their own understanding of the cakras. Although not orthodox practitioners, their insight is still valuable for a general understanding. This may especially be the case for those who have integrated some form of the *cakras* into spiritual counseling. In the opinion of this author, one such contemporary *cakra* practitioner that deserves further careful investigation is Anodea Judith. Her book *Eastern Body Western Mind: Psychology and
the Chakra System as a Path to the Self (2004) presents a very systematic introspective depiction of the psyche and its relationship to the body. This book is identified by another respected contemporary cakra practitioner, Cyndi Dale, as the go-to source for an interpretation of Avalon’s “standard” cakras by professionals in the field of contemporary cakra practice. (Dale, 240) It must be emphasized that although Judith employs the “standard” model of the cakras—mentioning the Śaṭcakra Nirūpana only twice and both times in passing—her understanding of the cakras is highly psychological, based on twenty years of spiritual cakra-based counseling and personal cakra practice. As such, these contemporary cakra practitioners in a sense may be thought of as human laboratories wherein the mind-body relationship vis-à-vis the cakras are tested, and it may be to our detriment to discard the data obtained. Ultimately, regardless of their textual and contextual context, the cakras as depictions of the human being are living phenomenon, and to reduce them to merely historical curios without addressing these living components only reveals half of their story.

Before we turn to academic and otherwise more thorough authors who have investigated this system with more attention to detail and an eye for categorical distinction, Motoyama Hiroshi and Cyndi Dale deserve special attention as they seem to sit at the cusp between contemporary cakra practitioner and academic, more so in the case of Motoyama. Motoyama received formal training in Philosophy at Tokyo University of Literature and Science which shows in some facets of his writing. But perhaps more intriguing is his status as a yogi and a psychic. This brings about a very curious tension in his work, where we find on the one hand a consistent metaphysical system focused on
the *cakras*, and on the other, shockingly casual testimonials concerning paranormal phenomenon and his own verification of advanced spiritual states. Depending on the reader, this has a polarizing effect; either elucidating his philosophy or giving rise to suspicion.

The “standard” *cakras* are central to Motoyama’s philosophy which is based on the metaphysics of *sāṃkhya-yoga*. He explicitly offers his insights into the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* in his *Theories of the Chakras: Bridge to Higher Consciousness* (2003), albeit tersely as he re-presents the passages of the text in such a way that clarifies the *cakras* while adding his own parenthetical points of clarification. (Motoyama, 2003b; 163-84)

In his *Awakening of the Chakras and Emancipation* (2003) he offers his more personal explanation of the *cakras*. As is the case with Judith, Motoyama is presenting *his* understanding of the *cakras* as informed by his personal experiences. Again as with Judith, the insights Motoyama shares concerning interacting with *cakras* are invaluable in their own right.

George Feuerstein identifies three authors who he suggests have made meaningful contributions to the understanding of the subtle body and the *cakras*. (Feuerstein, 2013; 260) These are Shyam Sundar Goswami, Maureen Lockhart, and Cyndi Dale. Feuerstein wrote an introduction to Goswami’s book on the *cakras* and recommends it as one of the more thorough on the topic, along with Lockhart’s *The Subtle Energy Body: The complete Guide*, and Dale’s *The Subtle Body: An Encyclopedia of Your Energetic Anatomy* (2009). To address Dale first, her book is written with an emphasis on healing,
targeting an audience of modern energy healers. Here she writes on human physiology, the energy fields of the body, acupuncture meridians and nādis, and various accounts of the cakras. Lockhart’s book appears more general in nature, writing a more historical overview of the subtle body, writing first on Eastern topics and then writing on the subtle body in the west. The Eastern section begins with an explication of the basic ideas of the subtle body, and then turns to how these manifest in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Daoism.

Goswami’s book Layayoga: An Advanced Method of Concentration (1980), republished under the more appropriate title, Layayoga: The Definitive Guide to the Chakras and Kundalini (1999), is perhaps the most thorough and exhaustive treatment of the cakras available, albeit discouraging to use. In this text the author presents an exhaustive, encyclopedic catalog of the cakras. His treatment begins with an overview of vaidikā, purāṇikā, and tantrikā sources that explicitly and implicitly deal with the cakras, and then moves on to a thorough organization in which text each cakra is mentioned and by which permutation of its name it is addressed. Although thorough, this text suffers four major drawbacks that drastically limit this book’s usefulness. The first is that little to no bibliographical information is included so that the reader is unaware of which edition of which text is being addressed. Unless already intimate with the material, the reader is presented with information at face value with little means to double-check claims made by the author or to track down the source that is being explained. The second is that the author makes no use of footnotes/endnotes, and there are numerous places where contextual clarification would be very helpful. For example, the author presents “the Chakra System as Exposed by Maheswara,” yet offers no immediate clarification as to
who “Maheswarā” is, or in which text this depiction may be found. (Goswami, 1999; 161) The third is that the index does not incorporate the texts and names cited throughout the book and is overall alarmingly terse. For example, the abovementioned “Maheswarā” is simply not listed in the index, making the reference made by the author prohibitive to locate. The author makes no attempt to explain who “Maheswarā” is, what text he/she wrote, and how to find it. All the more so with respect to this current project, the “Shatcakranirupana” is simply not listed, which makes this text prohibitively difficult to use if one would like to be guided to its citations. The fourth, as already implied, is that the author uses an inefficient and perhaps outdated method for Romanizing Sanskrit terms rather than employing the efficient International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST); e.g., swadhishtana rather than svādhiṣṭāna. As thorough as this text is, it is in desperate need of a third printing wherein these issues are addressed. Such a text would be useful—to say the very least—and may become a definitive text on the issue if it were more user-friendly.

A thorough overview of the symbolism found in the cakras of the Saṭcakra Nirūpaṇa may be found in Shumsky’s The Power of the Chakras: Unlock Your 7 Energy Centers for Healing, Happiness, and Transformation (2014). Here Shumsky provides a great deal of contextualization explaining, for example, the finer details and characteristics of the gods and goddesses as found in each cakra. This book is exceedingly thorough, albeit flawed. As informative as this may be, Shumsky’s book is not at all intended for an academic audience so there are no citations providing sources for the formidable amount of additional information provided. Shumsky adds a great deal of additional
contextual information to the *cakras*, but makes no references to where these details come from.

The last author to be suggested in this section is Mikel Burley, who in his *Haṭha-Yoga: Its Context, Theory and Practice* (2000) presents an easy to use synopsis of the *cakras* of the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa*. (Burley, 2000; 160-4) Here he presents a succinct table that identifies each of the distinguishing features of the *cakras*, such as their definition and location, associated color, mantra, and element. This may be the most succinct and academic brief depiction of the *cakras* of the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa* available, albeit terse, if one is looking for an overview of the themes of these *cakas*. Burley is more careful, but not nearly as thorough as Shumsky.

What then can be done concerning this spectrum of modern thinkers? The position taken by this project is that each of these authors, through their own practical wisdom, can provide insight into the *cakras* by presenting their own unique data concerning what *cakras* are in their most general sense, and what role they play in self-cultivation. Many contemporary *cakra* practitioners approach the *cakras* as highly westernized tools of psychological and spiritual healing, and from their insights we can extract the mechanisms of harm and healing, as well as spiritual growth with respect to the body and emotion. It is just such a perspective that caught the attention of C.G. Jung, whose insights into depth psychology and the study of religion leaves him in a favorable place from which to provide a meaningful psychological interpretation of the *cakras*. Chapter Eight will be devoted to investigating Jung’s insights into the *cakras*. Perhaps more
importantly, this chapter will offer a critique of Jung that will draw to the foreground the implications of a purely psychological interpretation as such a maneuver contextually diverges from the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. In spite of this liberal re-contextualization, Jung’s influence in New Age understandings of the cakras is vast.

A Comment on Contemporary Cakras

The ultimate problem faced in this project is navigating the convoluted boundaries between methods, cultural context, and interpretation. In this sense, the only way to know the cakras of the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa would require a time machine so that one may travel to sixteenth-century Bengal in order to practice with Pūrṇānanda. As this is not really an option, the staunchest sticklers for categorical rigor may rightly proclaim that one may never know these cakras. Jung’s warning about adopting another culture’s traditions may stand here as well as the various gods and goddesses of the cakras as extracted from the ancient mythological tapestry of Hinduism may never unconsciously resonate with a person whose psyche is likely the legacy of the strange confluence of The Enlightenment and Christianity. But nonetheless, some sense must be made out of them.

In order to navigate these borders, it is reasonable to ask which aspects of the cakras are socially and culturally constrained, and which are potentially empirical facts open and available to the inspection of those interested. In other words, how much is the body culturally conditioned? With respect to this question, it is not ordinarily the case that one would happen to encounter the sea god Varuna riding the Makara sea monster when investigating the svādhiṣṭhāna cakra, unless one was previously exposed to that
particular image.\textsuperscript{4} However, there are yet a number of sensations and orientations of consciousness that are probably quite similar between people when it comes to investigating this region. With respect to this, we may focus on the familiar as the \textit{cakras} are ultimately based on human physiology; gross or otherwise.

To assist with drawing out the familiar, the assistance of contemporary \textit{cakra} practitioners may be sought who have diligently explored the mind-body relationship through various theories of the \textit{cakras}. In the opinion of this author, the foremost of such contemporary \textit{cakra} practitioners as mentioned above is Anodea Judith. She clearly makes no attempt whatsoever to confine her understanding of the \textit{cakras} to their historical textual roots as she is actively engaged with them through her own career in \textit{cakra}-based spiritual counseling. As such, she has developed a very compelling modern case of the \textit{cakras} which she has presented in her book, \textit{Eastern Body, Western Mind: Psychology and the Chakra System as a Path to the Self} (2004). In this extremely syncretic text she draws from depth psychology, Indian metaphysics, and her own experiences both in self-cultivation and as a spiritual counselor to illuminate her understanding of the body-mind relationship, the trauma that may arise when this relationship is damaged, and suggestions for healing.\textsuperscript{5} Despite the personal testimony, there does not appear to be anything near the caliber of Judith’s personal experience and insight into this matter when it comes to other comparable books on the market. For

\textsuperscript{4} One exception is the case of Motoyama’s mother who apparently saw “an upside down sailboat” in the region of her heart during mediation, which is the seed mantra \textit{yam}, \textsuperscript{4}, of the \textit{anāhata} or heart \textit{cakra}. (Motoyama, 2015; 323)

\textsuperscript{5} In this author’s opinion, a portion of the value of this text was abstractly measured by the degree of distressing introspection that was invoked by its reading.
example, one may look into similar attempts at drawing forth the mind, body, and personality in the works of Jelusich’s *Eye of the Lotus: Psychology of the Chakras* (2004) and Ritberger’s *Your Personality, Your Health: Connecting Personality with the Human Energy System, Chakras, and Wellness* (1998). Both of these books are thematically very similar to Judith’s and both of their authors have a similar background rooted in their own personal experiences with *cakra*-based therapy, yet both fall short of the insight and thoroughness of Judith. The reason Judith is introduced is that her book stands as an excellent modern example of insights into the *cakras* that warrants its own academic investigation by those interested in the topic. The legitimization of mind-body psychical localization is beyond the scope of this project, but this author contests that anyone interested in personally pursuing this may very well start with Judith’s book.

**Conclusion to Chapter Seven**

In this chapter, the *cakras* were defined and identified in a number of contexts, ranging from New Age healers to classical Tantric texts. In doing so, many of the generalities addressed in previous chapters have been given a more definite form. But more so, the discussions of this chapter function as a transition to a discussion of Jung’s commentary on the *cakras*. 
8. JUNG’S COMMENTARY ON THE CAKRAS AND A CRITIQUE OF JUNG

In this chapter, C.G. Jung’s psychological commentary on the *cakras* will be presented, and this presentation will be two-fold. First, his depth psychological explication of the *cakras* will be presented which will offer a familiar insight into the unfamiliar by introducing Jung’s understanding of the unconscious and individuation into the conversation about the *cakras*. In doing so, reductionism and “psychologism” must be avoided; a point to be addressed in the critique of Jung below. As Nathan Katz suggests, “…we are not so concerned with Jung as a hermeneutic for Tibetan texts as we are with comparing two more or less systematic images of what it means to be human…” (Katz, N. 1992; 302) Through such a comparison, mutual insights may be gained into both.

In the context of this project, there are at least two points to be aware of when studying Jung’s position, the first of which being what Jung legitimately adds to discussion. For example, Jung’s depiction of the unconscious and active imagination may be seen as general insights into the landscape and function of the human psyche, which function as illuminative tools of inspection; their internal operation being as demonstrable as the external physical postures of Yoga. However, the second point to remain mindful of is how much Jung is projecting incompatible and disruptive interpretive mechanisms into the discussion. Coward notes this disruptive character of Jung’s commentary in the following; “What Jung’s ‘Commentary’ accomplished then, and still does today, is to provide added insight into *his* understanding of the *process of individuation*, not an
accurate description of *Kuṇḍalini*. (123, Coward) Remaining aware of Jung’s penchant for interpretive reductionism is absolutely crucial. The contention of this section is that although some of Jung’s insights are extremely fruitful when discussing the *cakras*, some impede the discussion more than they assist. As Coward notes, the primary flaw of Jung’s commentary appears to be his understanding of individuation, which necessarily entails his understanding of the ego’s primacy.

**Jung on the Cakras**

*Three Types of Study*

Before we begin, a quick word on the available material on the topic of Jung and Tantra is in order. As it stands, it appears that Jung’s hermeneutic approach has been extraordinarily influential in conversations between the two topics, influencing New Age healers and scholars alike. However, Tantra is simply not a psychology but none the less it has been interpreted as such. This point will be addressed more thoroughly below, but it appears that Jung and many following his influence have interpreted Tantra as a tool for mental health and the refinement of the personality.

There exists a clear gradient of degrees of psychologization in this field, three of which will be introduced here in order to establish a spectrum. They are, “syncretic reductionists,” “hermeneutic transposers,” and “critical scholars.” At the low end are unabashed syncretic reductionists who appropriate Jung into spiritual practice and who seem to appropriate Jung’s interpretation of Tantra and yoga purely for its usefulness in healing. The shortcomings of this position is that it makes no distinction between the two
fields so that the offered interpretation remains focused and practical in nature. Two examples are Breaux’s *Journey into Consciousness: The Chakras, Tantra and Jungian Psychology* (1989) and Harris’s *Jung and Yoga: The Psyche-Body Connection* (2001).

Breaux, much like Motoyama, is apparently a psychic/scholar whose insights are supposedly based upon his own spiritual experiences as well as personal research. The overlap of these orientations adds insight into his ideas of mental health and healing, while also aptly citing Jung and Joseph Campbell in the process. Harris’s book transposes Jung’s psychology into an everyday Yoga practice.

The next degree may be termed “well-meaning hermeneutic transposers.” This group is not at all interested in the immediate application of healing as the prior group and tend to be well educated and well informed on the topic. They apply Jung’s methods as a lens through which to examine and interpret Asian thought in order to transpose these ideas into more familiar terms. This is the standpoint assumed by this project; that *cakras* can be elucidated by Jung’s depth psychology without being reduced to it. The weakness of this position is that it must hop back and forth between perspectives in order to develop a dyadic conversation. Spiegelman accomplished this to a degree with two co-authors in his *Hinduism and Jungian Psychology* (1987) with Vasavada and *Buddhism and Jungian Psychology* (2004) with Miyuki. The former provides Jungian commentary—often reductionist in nature—and engages in a back-and-forth dialog between the two authors. The latter presents a brief overview of Buddhist themes and remains primarily focused on *Chan* Buddhism’s “Ten Ox-Herding Paintings,” but otherwise addressing only very general themes (e.g., *dukkha*, meditation). Preece’s *The Psychology of Buddhist Tantra*
(2006) also offers insightful commentary on Tantra but from the perspective of transpersonal psychology.

The highest degree may be simply called “critical scholarship.” The edited volume by Meckel and Moore, *Self and Liberation: The Jung/Buddhism Dialog* (1992), contains an assortment of prominent thinkers writing on Jung covering a variety of topics, three of which address Jung and Tantra. Moacanin’s *Jung’s Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism: Western and Eastern Paths to the Heart* (1988) is a slow-paced and detailed overview of Jung and Buddhism concluding with a brief comparison that may represent the lower bound of this group. Feuerstein’s *The Psychology of Yoga: Integrating Eastern and Western Approaches for Understanding the Mind* (2013) is a little sparse, but well researched and cited, covering the historical development of the psychological treatment of yoga, to include *kundalini*. The foremost of this group are Coward and Clarke. Coward’s book, *Jung and Eastern Thought* (1985) set a high standard for scholarship on Jung as he was very critical with Jung. His book also includes a very useful annotated bibliography, critiquing those who wrote on Jung and their own criticality. The foremost author on the topic of Jung and the East is Clark. His confusingly named *Jung and Eastern Thought: A Dialog with the Orient* (2001) presents a lucid overview of Jung’s position and the tension between Jung and Tantra. Often citing Coward, Clark’s is easily the best book on the topic as the attention to discourse about cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary dialog is quite thorough. Clark also manages to write with a tone that manages to venerate Jung for his accomplishments while also disparaging him for his oversights. The weakness of this orientation is its objectivity as it tends to avoid the
more intimate and immediate standpoints (i.e., Kasulis *in medias res*) which perhaps have the most say about human experience.

**Jung’s Cakras**

In 1932, Indologist Wilhelm Hauer delivered a number of lectures by the name “Yoga, Especially the Meaning of the Cakras” (*Der Yoga, im besonderen die Bedeutung des Cakras*) in which he presented the *cakras* and *kundalinī* to a soon-to-be confused audience.\(^1\) (Jung, 1996; xi) Jung’s lecture served the purpose of clarifying the foreign ideas presented by Hauer. But this clarification decidedly distorted the *cakras* as they were forced into Jung’s depth psychological format. This commentary represents the vast majority of Jung’s comments on *cakras* although he wrote extensively on Eastern themes throughout his collected works and elsewhere. The most notable examples are his *Notes on Lectures Given at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule*; volume eleven of his collected works, *Psychology and Religion: West and East*; and his introduction to Richard Wilhelm’s translation of *The Secret of the Golden Flower*.

The latter of the three played a very important role in Jung’s personal life. (Jung, 1989; 197) Jung had endured a depressed period in his career wherein he ceased being academically and professionally productive after his break with Freud. During this time, he took to drawing his own *mandalas* which he understood as periodic insights into the

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\(^1\) The nature of this clarification should be inspected more carefully. Both were deeply interested in oriental religion and the prevailing *volk* movement at the time. (Pietekainen) What deserves more attention was that Hauer, the year following these lectures, joined the National Socialist party. Although Jung initially saw Hauer as a natural ally, after this decision Jung distanced himself from Hauer, and Hauer did likewise. With this in mind, one may wonder what Hauer said in his lecture and if it carried themes that were not at all endemic to the proposed topic.
state of his own psyche. The arrival of Wilhelm’s manuscript meaningfully coincided with Jung’s daily drawing as the maṇḍala imagery contained therein confirmed Jung’s suspicion that the maṇḍala was not merely his own invention, but something much deeper latent in the collective unconscious of the species.

Jung’s commentary on the cakras follows thematically from the topics introduced in Chapter Six, primarily with respect to his understanding of maṇḍala imagery. That is, Jung understood the cakras to be symbols that communicated information about the unconscious. But as he notes, the nature of this information is beyond the scope of the everyday and ordinary. As he writes, “[The cakras] symbolize highly complex psychic facts which at the present moment we could not possibly express except in images.” (Jung, 1996; 61) Expanding on this theme of ineffability he writes, “A symbol, then, is a living Gestalt, or form—the sum total of a highly complex set of facts which our intellect cannot master conceptually, and which therefore cannot be expressed in any way other than by the use of an image.” (Jung, 1996; 61) This wording is not novel to Jung’s general understanding of the mysteries of the unconscious, but in the context of the cakras and kuṇḍalinī awakening, it draws attention to the extra-intellectual capacities of the human mind-body that have escaped the notice of the intellect-heavy culture of the West.

This returns the conversation to Chapter Three wherein the biases of Kasulis’s “integrity” were discussed, which calls in to question the capacity of an integrity-based culture to meaningfully discuss that which is beyond the purview—or outside the domain of—
integrity. Jung offers his own insight into cultural difference that resonates with Kasulis’s categories of intimacy and integrity in the following, …it appears to us as though India were fascinated by the background of consciousness, because [Europeans] are entirely identified with our foreground, with the conscious. But now, among us, too, the background, or hinterland, of the psyche has come to life, and since it is so obscure and so difficult to access, we are at first forced to represent it symbolically. (Jung, 1996; 61-2)

This reaffirms Kasulis’s comments on the predominance of integrity. This rendering of the unconscious seems only natural as Jung identified the unconscious as that which synthesizes information (as opposed to analysis) and is far more diffused, both of which suggest Kasulis’s intimacy. With respect to India, Jung suggests that India has a far more intimate relationship with the unconscious. As this is certainly contentious hyperbole, at best it could be said that the author of the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpāṇa and other such texts were more in touch with the unconscious than the average educated twentieth-century European. The bottom line is that Jung recognizes something in the unconscious that is given a voice by the symbolism of the cakras, the matter at hand being to what degree did his psychological system coincide with the insights of the Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpāṇa, and to what degree did they diverge.

An explication of Jung’s understanding of the cakras shall begin here. It is important to stress that for Jung, each cakra is a whole world. (Coward, 1985; 116) That is, they are not compartmentalized sub-regions of the psyche, but rather an immersive whole that shapes and shades one’s experience. Jung comments on the cakras starting with the root cakra (mūlādhāra) and ending with the fifth (viśuddhi). This stopping short is due to his
idiosyncratic understanding of the *cakras*, which is essentially founded on the supremacy of intellect and the absolute nature of ego, these two assumptions being the fundamental points of divergence between the two systems. As will also become apparent, Jung’s general idealism removes his psychology from more practical and immediate explanations of embodiment as, for example, were more clearly accounted for by Merleau-Ponty, as was discussed in Chapter Five. Jung was, perhaps, a “psychical semiotic phenomenologist,” starting with the symbolic structure of consciousness and thereby articulating the *structure and dynamics of the psyche*, whereas Merleau-Ponty began with more practical matters such as sensory experience, locomotion, and action.²

To begin with *mūlādhāra*, the root *cakra*, Jung appears to render a helpful general definition of the term, but his commentary reveals a very different position. Jung identifies the basic physicality of the *cakra* as a symbolic testament to the primacy of embodiment. He writes, “…the name *mūlādhāra*, meaning the root support, also shows that we are in the region of the roots of our existence, which would be our personal bodily existence on this earth. (Jung, 1996; 23) Also in the context of the *mūlādhāra* he writes, “It is exceedingly important that you are rational, that you believe in the definiteness of our world, that this world is the culmination of history, the most desirable thing. Such a conviction is absolutely vital.” (Jung, 1996; 28) Both of these accounts suggest the importance of recognizing the physical body and the historical world as the

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² They also appear to differ as Jung follows a Cartesian model of psychical science while Merleau-Ponty appears to follow something more Baconian.
ground of humankind’s purposeful activity. But where Jung diverges is that he stops at merely recognition.

The following passage quoted at length represents Jung’s penchant for idealism, as well as what may be identified as Kasulis’s category of integrity. He writes,

If we assume that mūlādhāra, being the roots, is the earth upon which we stand, it necessarily must be our conscious world, because here we are, standing upon this earth… And whatever we say of mūlādhāra is true of this world. It is a place where mankind is a victim of impulses, instincts, unconsciousness, of participation mystique, where we are in a dark and unconscious place. We are hapless victims of circumstances, our reason practically can do very little. (Jung, 1996; 14-5)

There are two themes that stand out that need to be addressed. The first is Jung’s insistence that mūlādhāra is the domain of consciousness, or perhaps ordinary consciousness, which is an insightful clarification to the role of this region of the body, especially with respect to his mention of participation mystique. The ordinary person is mired in a field of the impulses of the gross body, which consciously and unconsciously influence the psyche. Jung referred to this state by participation mystique, which he explains in the following,

[Participation mystique] denotes a peculiar kind of psychological connection with objects, and consists in the fact that the subject cannot clearly distinguish himself from the object but is bound to it by a direct relationship which amounts to partial identity. This identity is based upon an a priori one-ness of subject and object. (Jung, 1976; 572)

This appears to suggest a state wherein Kasulis’s paradigm of intimacy prevails and the psyche is not yet able to differentiate itself from its surroundings through integrity. Moving out of mūlādhāra necessarily suggests moving out of participation mystique. The mechanism behind this phenomenon remains, but now takes a new form, unwillingly
as unconscious impulses, and willingly through active imagination. Ideally a state obtains wherein the principles of intimacy and integrity—separation and wholeness—find a more equal balance, especially with respect to the separation of the unconscious and conscious mind, and the unified Self.

The second theme that needs to be addressed is Jung’s emphasis on the term “victim,” which places a very clear value judgment on his depiction of the mūlādhāra with respect to one’s early relationship with it. This reveals Jung’s position, and the general position of integrity, which presumes a more antagonistic position towards this other. Being a victim of one’s own body impresses a very distinct either/or paradigm onto the issue. That is, the body as that which “victimizes” oneself becomes an other, which is antithetical to Jung’s individuation. However, this polarity of individual versus the unconscious takes on a less polarized view when the individual moves out of the maṇipūra.

Moving on to the svādhīṣṭhāna cakra, the sacral cakra, Jung identifies this as the cakra “where psychic life may be said to begin.” (Jung, 1996; 63) He continues.

Only when this level became activated did mankind awaken from the sleep of mūlādhāra and learn the first rules of bodily decency. The beginning of moral education consisted in attending to our needs in the places suitable for them, just as still happens in the education of a small child. (Jung, 1996; 63)

Jung again is normalizing his cultural perspective, interpreting the cakra for an early twentieth-century European audience. Here Jung articulates the beginning of psychic life as a step out of the participation mystique wherein the individual separates his or herself
from the objects of desire. The reference to the *mūlādhāra* is with respect to the object of consciousness, i.e., material things and one’s relationship to them, while the consciousness of *mūlādhāra* remains distinctly unconscious. Consciousness relationships of one’s desires are now out in the open while their interrelationship remains in the murky unconscious.

So, it is at the level of *svādhiṣṭhāna* that Jung sees the beginning of psychic life. This point will be returned to below where Jung more graphically expounds on the role this *cakra*, this region of the body, and the psychological attributes associated with it plays in psychological development. In brief, Jung sees this *cakra* as the metaphorical darkness into which the hero must enter in the hero’s journey. This is the *cakra* associated with water (*jala*), which just so happens to resonate with the mythology of baptism and the “night sea journey.” Jung also notes that deep water is a metaphor for the unconscious. Adding to this, the *makara* or leviathan is the creature depicted in this *cakra*, lurking at the bottom of the sea, which is none other than the dragon that must be slain by the hero. This is one of the stronger and more useful insights of Jung as these similarities are far too compatible to be mere coincidences or foreign projections.

Moving on, Jung explains the *manipūra*, the naval *cakra*, is the first *cakra* wherein one truly experiences the divine. As he writes,

*…manipūra* is the center of the identification with the god, where one becomes part of the divine substance, having an immortal soul. You are already part of that which is no longer in time, in three-dimensional space; you belong now to a fourth-dimensional order… where there is only infinite duration—eternity. (Jung, 1996; 31)
This will perhaps make more sense in the discussion below on Jung’s symbolic depiction of the hero’s journey through animal symbolism. It may be wondered what Jung has in mind here and whether there is universal appeal to his interpretation. This suggestion of a “fourth dimension” is odd as it suggests the development of a state of consciousness wherein one takes on a decidedly different role outside of one’s ordinary standpoint. This external standpoint, if addressed strictly analytically and rationally may be none other than the standpoint of theōria.

Jung makes this claim about encountering the divine in spite of the fact that the divine is explicitly present in all cakras. He would argue that although that is the case, the manipūra is the first cakra wherein one actually becomes conscious of the divine. For now it may be noted that the manipūra is the cakra that is past the unconscious blockade of the svādhiṣṭhāna where one becomes more intimately acquainted with, perhaps through this fourth-dimensional misidentification, the rich tapestry of emotions that reside in the region of the stomach.

Looking at the nervous system, there is certainly something interesting about this region of the human body. The enteric nervous system emerges from the lumbar spine where a vast number of neurons can be found along the stomach and small intestines—as many neurons as can be found in the brain of a small cat. If there is any merit to the serial resorption of the cakras, once the concerns of the gross body and unconscious impulses

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3 This region of the spine and the correlating nerve plexus Motoyama correlates with the manipūra cakra. (Motoyama, 2015)
come into agreement with consciousness, it appears that this “second brain” begins to incorporate itself into consciousness. Of course this makes little sense from the perspective of the gross body, but it appears that Jung suggests such a spiritual incorporation is tantamount to an experience of the divine.

The anāhata, or heart cakra, according to Jung, is “the first psychical localization that is within our conscious psychical experience.” (Jung, 1996; 34) More primitive cultures exist in lower cakras, as per the correlation with participation mystique with the mūlādhāra above, but at the heart, a more stable form of consciousness settles. Jung gives the example of a Pueblo chief who thought that all Americans were crazy because they were convinced that they thought in the head. “He said: ‘But we think in the heart.’” (Jung, 1996; 34) This is also suggestive of the Chinese “xīn” (心) or “heart-mind.”

Continuing on the role of the heart Jung writes,

> Everywhere in the world feelings are associated with the heart. If you have no feelings, you have no heart; if you have no courage, you have no heart, because courage is a definite feeling condition. And you say, “Take it to heart.” Or you learn something “by heart.” You learn it, of course, by the head but you won’t keep it in mind unless you take it to heart. Only if you learn a thing by heart do you really get it. In other words, if it is not associated with your feelings, if it has not sunk into your body until it reaches the anāhata center, it is so volatile that it flies away. It must be associated with the lower center in order to be kept. (Jung, 1996; 45)

In the symbol of the anāhata cakra is found a šatkona, or hexagram, that represents the union of Śiva and Śakti. This represents the symbolic merging of one triangle descending from above (Śiva) and one ascending from below (Śakti). This point of balance psychologically rendered appears to be a state wherein the conscious and unconscious are on similar footing, which is what Jung has in mind by “the first psychical
localization that is within our conscious psychical experience.” That is, here the psyche finds its first point of stability wherein the ego manages to fully differentiate itself from the impulses of the body. Jung explains what he believes occurs at the level of the anāhata in the following,

...you begin to reason, to think, to reflect about things, and so it is the beginning of a sort of contraction or withdrawal from the mere emotional function. Instead of following your impulses wildly, you begin to invent a certain ceremony that allows you to disidentify yourself from your emotions, or to overcome your emotions actually. (Jung, 1996; 39)

This clearly suggests moving outside of the realm of participation mystique, out of the unconscious grasp of the mūlādhāra and svādhiṣṭāna, where one is no longer necessarily entangled in the unconscious realm. In cases where the unconscious does have hold of the individual, the individual can still take a step back and reflect on the entanglement.

Jung claims that at the level of anāhata, individuation begins, which should be more or less obvious from the preceding. (Jung, 1996; 39) After the ego attains an initial degree of separation from the chaos of the body’s impulses and participation mystique, the option then becomes apparent that one may potentially establish a more harmonious relationship with it. Also suggesting Jung’s individuation, he defines the anāhata as the abode of the Self. As he writes, “…the ego is always far down in mūlādhāra and suddenly becomes aware of something up above in the fourth story, in anāhata, and that is the self. (39-40) Jung equates Śakti with his unconscious, being a representation of the deepest unconscious libidinal drives, and equates Śiva with consciousness as the sum of
the higher abstract aspects of consciousness, making the ṣatkona of the anāhata the center of the Self.

At the level of viśuddhi, the throat cakra, Jung’s insistence on the anāhata being the center of the human being is all the more further established. As he plants the Self firmly at anāhata, experiences of the above cakras are treated like those of below, as only temporary excursions into unknown realms that are treated as deviations from his norm. As he writes, “…in viśuddha we reach beyond our actual conception of the world.” (Jung, 1996; 47) As the realm of spacelessness, or the aether (ākāśa), Jung revealingly sees the viśuddhi as a place of intellectual abstraction from our current perspective that is the realm of psychical facts.

Although sure of the Self’s place centered at anāhata, he sees the possibility of vast social growth that may one day lead to moving to that cakra. This he proposes in several steps. First, he proposes that to enter viśuddhi is to obtain “a full recognition of the psychical essences or substances as the fundamental essences of the world, and by virtue not of speculation but of fact, namely as experience.” (Jung, 1996; 47) What we have here is extremely similar in nature to what is proposed by Sāṃkhya Philosophy as proposed in Chapter Four in the capacity that the subtler supports of consciousness become clear through praxis and the ensuing direct experience. However they differ in the sense that Jung maintains that such observations take part from the perspective of the

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4 There is simply no analog to this assertion in any metaphysical system related to kundalini yoga or the cakra.
ego. Jung’s similarity with Sāṃkhya continues when he further explains this progression. Moving from mūlādhāra to anāhata requires recognizing the physical reality of emotions, as well as their psychical components. He then adds, “but to cross from anāhata to viśuddha one should unlearn all that. One should even admit that all one’s psychical facts have nothing to do with material facts. (Jung, 1996; 49) Here Jung is very much aligned with the principles of Sāṃkhya, specifically with respect to entertaining states of consciousness beyond the confines of apparent materiality. As suggested by the viśuddhi cakra, its associated element is spacelessness (ākāśa), which suggests a state of consciousness that no longer psychically categorizes things with respect to shape or form.

Jung makes a surprisingly bold assertion about the nature of consciousness and the future of the human species in the following passage.

The concept of the atom, for instance, might be considered as corresponding to the abstract thinking of the viśuddha center. Moreover, if our experience should reach such a level, we would get an extraordinary vista of the puruṣa. For then the puruṣa becomes really the center of things; it is no longer a pale vision, it is the ultimate reality, as it were. You see, that world will be reached when we succeed in finding a symbolical bridge between the most abstract ideas of physics and the most abstract ideas of analytical psychology. If we can construct that bridge then we will have reached at least the outer gate of viśuddha. (Jung, 1996; 47)

It appears that by “atom,” Jung is not simply calling to mind the simplified Newtonian conception of the atom, for example the hydrogen atom depicted as a single electron in orbit around a single proton rendered as analogous to the moon orbiting the earth. This is a gross over simplification and well within the realm of forms and space. The ethereal atom he has in mind is the one explained through quantum mechanics wherein the
electron is spread around the nucleus as a shell of probability, which utterly transcends
the Newtonian understanding of reality. Jung wrote contemporaneously with the golden
age of modern physics and the formulation of quantum mechanics, so he must have seen
these bold new worldviews distinctly as that which radically challenged the prevailing
materialist paradigm that constrained the common sense of classical physics let alone
common sense. Jung is thus comparing this jump in abstraction in physics with the
change required to for one to move into the realm of viśuddhi; to personally see into
principles that defy common description. It may be said that at the level of viśuddhi and
ākāśa, the Newtonian principles by which we organize our everyday experiences no
longer apply.

Again, Jung is in accord with the insights of Sāmkhya in his statement, “if our experience
should reach such a level, we would get an extraordinary vista of the puruṣa.” This
suggests that as the lower tattvas recede, the more abstract take center stage. Also again,
he emphasizes “experience” rather than indolent speculation. The nature of this
experience, however, is not very clear as he advocates no practice and emphasizes the
role of symbolism as in, “that world will be reached when we succeed in finding a
symbolical bridge between the most abstract ideas of physics and the most abstract ideas
of analytical psychology.” Here Jung may be introducing something quite novel as he is
no longer discussing kundalinī awakening on the individual level, but the advancement of
the entire species. A conscious experience beyond form and space seems to be entirely

5 That is, a shell of probability is entirely beyond Newton’s laws of motion, which are based upon our
ordinary, everyday experience of the world.
devoid of symbolic capture, which calls into question how tenable Jung’s science-fiction-like boast may be. Along these lines of social progress into the viśuddhi he also clams, “…we are reaching, say, into the remote future of mankind, or of ourselves. For any man has at least the potential faculty to experience that which will be the collective experience in two thousand years, perhaps in ten thousand years.” (Jung, 1996; 56) This appears to contextualize Jung’s idea of Self as something that is patently culturally situated.

At the level of ājnā, the cakra between and slightly above the eyebrows, Jung identifies as the final vestiges of psychic existence that is “not even to be called self, and you know that you are going to disappear into it. The ego disappears completely; the psychical is no longer a content in us, but we become contents of it. (Jung, 1996; 57) Jung may be suggesting an experience akin to moving beyond ahamkāra (the ultimate sense of “I”) into an experience wherein puruṣa is entirely isolated (mokṣa) from all matter of experience, or prakṛti. However, Jung finds little value in such an experience as it conflicts with his value of the ego.

At the final cakra at the crown of the head, the sahasrāra, Jung takes a very ambivalent position. One on hand he appears to fully acknowledge the varying degrees of experience as defined by Sāṃkhya and their analogs as found in Kuṇḍalinī Yoga. But on the other, he is excessively dismissive of them. For example he writes, “To speak about the lotus of the thousand petals above, the center, is quite superfluous because that is

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6 This is an expression of the recurring problem of Jung, that he did not see any value in transcending ego-consciousness, presumably due to his experience with mental illness and a general esteem he placed on social conformity.
merely a philosophical concept with no substance to us whatever; it is beyond any possible experience.” (Jung, 1996; 57) The “us” in question appears to be educated early twentieth-century Europeans, and not the yogi who allegedly has had such an experience. As such, his point is not that there is no experience of sahasrāra, but that there is really no point in trying to talk about it. As he writes,

…there is no object, no God, nothing but brahman. There is no experience because it is one, it is without a second. It is dormant, it is not, and therefore it is nirvāṇa. This is an entirely philosophical concept, a mere logical conclusion from the premises before. It is without practical value for us. (Jung, 1996; 57)

Again, this “us” applying to those who approach the sahasrāra intellectually from afar. What Jung overlooks is that the attainment of this state is precisely the goal, the non-dual unification of the individual with the divine wherein all distinction between the microcosm and the macrocosm are released and a radically different experience of being obtains.

**Animals and Individuation**

Perhaps the most compelling commentary Jung adds to his explication of the cakras is his interpretation of the animals that appear in the first five cakras as he interprets them as symbolic expressions of psychic maturation. He recognizes the gradation from the most gross to the more subtle as represented in the cakras, running from earth (pṛthivī) in the mūlādhāra cakra and aether (ākāśa) in the viśuddhi cakra, which is the transformation or resorption of elements as expressed in Sāṃkhya philosophy and bhūtaśuddhi practice. (Jung, 1996; 42-3) As per his psychological interpretation, the animals of each cakra
represent a symbolic expression of the state of mind of the person whose psychic center happens to predominantly dwell in that cakra.

Concerning any comments about Jung’s psychologization, it may be noted that Jung does not appear to be forcing this reading of the cakras into his own psychology as this process appears to be very much in line with other similar themes of self-cultivation. Bhūtaśuddhi suggests the purification of the lower cakras so that one may move into higher experiences of being, as does Sāṃkhya, the Five Kośas, and Yoga. As such, in responding to claims of psychologization, it must be asked, to what degree is Jung’s commentary a projection of his own symbols and values, and to what degree is Jung simply explaining what is there? If the animals of the cakras are not symbols which represent progressively refined states of consciousness, what are they? What remains to be mindful of is how this progression of refinement is actually undertaken, and how much of Jung’s Self and individuation are projected onto Kuṇḍalinī Yoga.

Starting at the bottom and working up, in the mūlādhāra is found the symbol of an elephant, which is “emblematic of the strength, firmness, and solidity of [prthivī].” (Avalon, 95) Beyond just a mere elephant, it is Airāvata, the mount of the god Indra, which all the more so suggests the material support for something greater. Jung interprets the elephant as the “tremendous urge which supports human consciousness, the power that forces us to build such a conscious world… [and] as the symbol of the domesticated libido, parallel to the image of the horse with us.” (Jung, 1996; 51) Jung identifies the power of the elephant with the base level of libido whose drives ordinarly
assail the individual. A person who is caught up in these drives, whose psyche is centered around the mūlādhāra, has not yet differentiated his or herself from these drives and is a perpetual victim of participation mystique.

Moving on to the next cakra, in the svādhiṣṭāna is found the makara, the leviathan from the deep that appears to be half fish, half crocodile. Jung suggests that the change between the psychic states between the mūlādhāra and the svādhiṣṭāna is both subtle yet extreme as the fundamental libidinal energy manifest in each cakra is precisely the same, it is only one’s relationship to it that has changed. This is to say, that the elephant, “the biggest, strongest animal upon the surface of the earth” and the makara, “the biggest and most terrible animal down in the waters” are precisely the same creature. (Jung, 1996; 51)

Jung explains that the change to one’s own psychic energy between these two cakras is a transformation from being the passive recipient, or “victim” of these nourishing life-energies, to being assailed by the horrors of this beast now as its adversary. According to Jung, who often found the sea to be an expression of the unconscious, this is a symbolic expression of the Hero’s journey, in this case what Campbell calls the “night-sea journey” wherein the Hero must confront his or her “demons” head-on. (Campbell, 2008; 214-5) But this is done under the worst circumstances, underwater and at night; i.e., unconsciously. Breaux adds an insight to this issue when he comments that the beast—the makara, dragon, or whatever matter of beast besets the individual—tends to hoard things that they cannot use, like gold and maidens, which is a fitting symbol for the
libidinal desires that must be confronted. (Breaux, 45) Both Jung and Campbell liken this journey to the symbolism of baptism as ritual drowning.

On the other side of this transition, if executed successfully, the individual emerges into the light for the very first time, which Jung identifies as the very first spiritual cakra as one is now partially free of the grip of the libido. (Jung, 1996; 30) The animal at the manipūra cakra is the ram, which is now the third permutation of the elephant. As he writes, “[the elephant] is no longer an insurmountable power... It is now a sacrificial animal, and it is a relatively small sacrifice—not the great sacrifice of the bull but the smaller sacrifice of the passions. That is, to sacrifice the passions is not so terribly expensive.” (Jung, 1996; 51) The general symbolism here is a depiction of the powers of the elephant and the ram with respect to the body of a human being. To move one’s psyche up to the manipūra is to overcome the insurmountable force of the elephant, the frightening unknowns of the leviathan, and transform it into the meek yet feisty energy of the ram. This transformation suggests a new degree of freedom and new potential for growth. As Jung writes, at the stage of manipūra, “You have overcome the worst danger [now that] you are aware of your fundamental desires or passions.” (Jung, 1996; 52) The ram is also tied with the image of fire, fire being the very heart of the Vedic sacrifice (agni y ajña) which is here being internalize, and also a tool for human use. With the brutal force of the elephant now contained in the comparatively docile ram, one may direct attention to moving upward.
Jung equates the next level of the heart, the anāhata, with his understanding of individuation, which is a central point where Jung and Kundalini Yoga clearly part ways. It appears that Jung understands to some degree what the higher cakras entail, but he never sees a way to progress beyond the confines of his own psychological system. In the following passage Jung explains the anāhata cakra as if it were functionally similar, if not identical, to his principle of individuation. He writes,

So the crossing-over from manipūra to anāhata is really very difficult. The recognition that the psyche is a self-moving thing, something genuine and not yourself, is exceedingly difficult to see and to admit. For it means that the consciousness which you call yourself is at an end. …you discover that you are not master in your own house… and that is the end of your monarchy. (Jung, 1996; 54)

Jung’s allusions to individuation are quite evident as he defines this movement to the anāhata as the end of the ego’s supremacy. The ego now must seek to tame and harmonize itself with the unconscious, which is none other than awakening to the reality of the Self. That is, the ego must realize that it is but a player in a much larger game and must come to terms with the unconscious activity of the Self, over which it has little control.

This crossing over from manipūra to anāhata is, according to Jung, the transformation of the ram to a gazelle (or some species of antelope), whose basic behavior, to Jung, represents this liminal space between ego and Self, between the clear and the unconscious. There is a rather poetic section in Jung’s commentary addressing the gazelle which reveals volumes about his understanding of the anāhata.7 (Jung, 1996; 52)

7 “The next animal is the gazelle, again a transformation of the original force. The gazelle or antelope is not unlike the ram, living upon the surface of the earth—the difference being that it is not a domesticated...
The first point of symbolic difference between the gazelle and the ram is that the gazelle is not at all domesticated—not a sacrificial animal—, which suggests re-introducing a degree of wildness back into the psyche. It is not aggressive, like the elephant, makara, or ram, and is instead shy and elusive.

Concerning this elusiveness, Jung notes that “when you come upon a herd of gazelles, you are always amazed at the way they disappear.” (Jung, 1996; 52) This suggests that one may obtain only brief experiences of this higher psychical realm, at least at first. This represents the difficulty of dealing with such a state as it is exceedingly brief, and for the most part not understandable, much like coming face to face with one’s greater Self.

Jung notes that there is a bird-like quality to the gazelle as it soars over the earth as it runs taking up to ten-meter strides, spending more time in the air than on the ground. The corresponding element is thus appropriately air. As Jung writes, “Such an animal would

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animal like the male sheep, nor is it a sacrificial animal. It is not at all offensive; it is exceedingly shy and elusive, on the contrary, and very fleet of foot—it vanishes in no time. When you come upon a herd of gazelles, you are always amazed at the way they disappear. They just fly into space with great leaps. There are antelopes in Africa that take leaps of six to ten meters—something amazing; it is as if they had wings. And they are also graceful and tender, and have exceedingly slender legs and feet. They hardly touch the ground, and the least stirring of the air is sufficient to make them fly away, like birds. So there is a birdlike quality in the gazelle. It is as light as air; it touches the earth only here and there. It is an animal of earth, but it is almost liberated from the power of gravity. Such an animal would be apt to symbolize the force, the efficiency, and the lightness of psychical substance—thought and feeling. It has already lost a part of the heaviness of the earth. Also, it denotes that in anāhata the psychical thing is an elusive factor, hardly to be caught.” (Jung, 1996; 52)

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8 This very sentiment is also reflected in The Ten Ox-Herding Paintings, specifically the third frame. In this Zen allegory for the spiritual quest, the Ox represents one’s own originally enlightened mind, paradoxically represented as some other thing. In this third frame called “seeing the ox” or “catching a glimpse of the ox,” one experiences this state for only a moment before it retreats. It is not only temporally elusive, but its character is too. As the accompanying poem suggests, “Its majestic head and horns no artist could draw.” (Yamada, 37)
be apt to symbolize the force, the efficiency, and the lightness of psychical substance—
thought and feeling. (Jung, 1996; 52) It appears Jung sees in the *anāhata* the roots of
one’s psychical existence. In order to stay true to his own conception of the early
twentieth-century European psyche, Jung simply never progresses beyond this point as
the harmonizing of higher psychical states with one’s ego defined the limit of his system.

The fifth and final animal to appear in the *cakras* at the level of the *viśuddhi cakra* is the
elephant, but this time again pure white in color. The primary symbolism of the
transition between the gazelle and the white elephant is that a transformation takes place
where the gazelle completely leaves the ground. This is symbolically expressed by the
corresponding element of *ākāśa* which represents spacelessness. *Ākāśa* is also often
rendered in the English as “aether,” which may be more distracting than helpful. But
what may be helpful is considering *ākāśa* as it appears in the Buddhist *jhānas*. Wynne
demonstrates that the Buddhist *jhānas* are thematically correlated with the *bhūtas* in the
same order as found in the *Ṣaṭcakra Nirūpaṇa*. If we borrow from Buddhism, the fifth
*jhāna* is *ākāsānañcāyatana* or the realm of infinite space, but this infinite space suggest a
formless (*arūpa*) world where many of the presuppositions of ordinary consciousness are
suspended. Outside the world of forms, subtle realms are encountered. Thus, this
elephant represents a conscious state wherein one is now confronted by a sea of psychical
impulses. The return to the symbol of the elephant suggests that same brutish strength,
and perhaps a new set of challenges to the *sādhaka*. 
This is where Jung leaves the discussion as his understanding of the psyche is absolutely insistent upon the participation of a socially viable ego. As mentioned above, Jung sees the viśuddhi through the lens of what approaches science-fiction, as something that a culture must appropriate en masse, and not merely an experience for an individual.

A Critique of Jung

In this section a critique of Jung will be offered so as to distance and contextualize Jung’s commentary in order to highlight how Jung diverged from Kuṇḍalinī Yoga. The primary issues to be addressed where Jung and Kuṇḍalinī Yoga part ways are on the nature of psychology and the nature of the ego as Kuṇḍalinī Yoga is not merely psychology, and its treatment of the ego is vastly different.

Three Strains of Mind-Body Correlation

Before the critique, as a rough hermeneutic device, this section will propose three different strains of thought that run though Jung’s work that relate to how he understood the role of the cakras. At a glance, it is self-evident that what Jung identifies as “psychical localization” exists, as the functions of consciousness tend to localize themselves within the human body. As Yuasa explains, some of the physiological correlates of conscious experience are more directly connected into the cerebral cortex, while others do not connect at all, diffusing emotion about the body.\textsuperscript{9} In spite of this, certain aspects of consciousness are closely related to parts of the body; e.g., thinking in the head, feeling in the stomach. Next, it appears that there may be something self-

\textsuperscript{9} See Chapter Five, page 188.
evident about the nature of the gradations between the *cakras* as there is a spectrum running from the most base to the more refined, with the more carnal functions operating in the lower body, and the more abstract (e.g., emotional and intellectual) in the upper body. What Jung sees as self-evident is that psychological maturation starts at the bottom and works up. *Kuṇḍalinī Yoga* agrees with him in part, but not entirely.

The three strains mentioned above are three varying strains of psychical maturation that all share the body as their basis. They depict three levels of growth; 1) the dawn of society, 2) psychological health, and 3) spiritual awakening. It is the contention here that Jung all too casually maneuvers between these categories without drawing sufficient distinction between them.

The first, the dawn of consciousness, arises a lot in Jung’s writings, most often when he makes reference to “primitive” man. This aspect of maturation is then social in nature as Jung primarily defines “primitives” in contradistinction to early twentieth century Europeans, and even speculating about the future of civilization. So, this theme of the “dawn of society” suggests a social and evolutionary perspective that runs from rudimentary, pre-conscious states staunchly mired in *participation mystique*, all the way to advanced states of spiritual awareness and social advances. When discussing this, Jung is making a generalization about the psychical average of an entire culture. For example, Jung makes claims such as the following,
…we can say that our civilization has reached the state of anāhata—we have overcome the diaphragm. We no longer locate the mind in the diaphragm, as the Old Greeks did in Homeric times. We are convinced that the seat of consciousness must be somewhere up in the head. (Jung, 1996; 46)

When Jung writes about what is called here the dawn of society, he is referencing two cultural groups and drawing a contrast between them in order to emphasize cultural maturation.

The second type of maturation Jung writes about is that which is focused on mental health and psychological healing. As a psychologist, this is naturally his primary focus. Looking into the contrast between 1) and 2) would make for an interesting study, as Jung’s definition of a healthy individual is one that is highly functional in the context of society. This gives rise to a problem suggested by Jung and offered as a critique in the chapter. If a culture is currently at the level of anāhata, as Jung suggests his culture is, then concepts of “normal” and “psychological health” will be defined by the degree to which one conforms to the standards of a society. Jung’s insistence on the centrality of the Self can be thought of as an expression of this. This insistence demonstrates Jung’s commitment to this position of psychology as a means towards the psychological maturation of the ego and the ensuing definition of psychological health; i.e., capable of pursuing individuation.

The third aspect of maturation is “spiritual awakening” which in this context suggests a radical change of consciousness wherein the ego—which Jung so adamantly clung to—is absolved in the course of meditation and other spiritual practices. Oddly enough, in
Jung’s writing, he is very clearly aware of this as a possible lived experience, but he is never capable of delivering this experience meaningfully to his audience. What this does is eliminate the reality of the lived experience of the subtle body, self-cultivation, and self-annihilation, which are totally outside the confines of the parameters established by Jung’s psychology. Using Yuasa’s term, spiritual awakening entails becoming “super-healthy” psychologically speaking. (Yuasa, 1987; 62-64) Jung’s ultimate purpose as a psychologist appears to be constructing and maintaining a healthy relationship with one’s unconscious, which falls in Yuasa’s middle category of “health.” In these terms, Jung’s error is mistaking the practice of becoming super-healthy with merely becoming healthy.

The point here is that this process of maturation vis-à-vis mind-body correlation and psychical localization, for whatever reason, appears to function symbolically on each of these three levels. The purpose of this project is to accentuate this third stain of maturation vis-à-vis mind-body correlation and psychical localization. Having presented the first two positions thus far, the third position may become clearer if a critique of Jung is leveled from the position of the third.

**The General Critiques of Clarke**

This section will begin with an overview of the critiques leveled at Jung by Clarke that are general in nature and do not directly address the issues of psychologism and the Self, as they will receive their own treatment below. These general critiques address texts, contexts, and Jung’s dualism. They all have at their core the simple fact that Jung was a product of his time in the sense that he didn’t have that much information at his disposal.
and was laden with many of the philosophical and methodological assumptions of the age in which he lived.

A fundamental problem Jung faced when interpreting texts was his access to the texts themselves. Although familiar with the research languages of his time—a native speaker of German, delivering lectures in English and French, and familiar with Latin—Jung approached these foreign texts on which he commented only through translation. (Clarke, 171) The problem is that his psychological commentary was not a direct investigation of a text, but was potentially colored by the psychological biases and inclinations of these texts’ translators. As such, his commentaries may in part reflect the inclinations of the likes of Avalon (The Serpent Power), Wilhelm (The Secret of the Golden Flower), and Evans-Wentz (The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation). For example, this is most definitely the case with Wilhelm as per Lackner (1999). For example, Wilhelm “translated” the binary components of the Daoist soul, hun and po as anima and animus. Lopez also suggests Evans-Wentz made similar such personal interpretations.

In addition to the problems faced by being constrained by such first translations of texts—near the conception of their fields of study at that—Jung was further constrained by his access only to texts. (Clarke, 165) That is, texts were his only access to the ideas he commented on.\(^{10}\) This led to exaggerated and inflated stereotypes of the Eastern texts passing for the norm rather than relying on data and analysis from other disciplines.

\(^{10}\) As was discussed in Chapter Six, Jung surely studied maṇḍalas, but in the context of his patience. The distinction was made in that chapter between endogenous and exogenous maṇḍalas, and Jung did not study those who engaged in spiritual practice with exogenous maṇḍalas.
Jung’s textual focus persisted in spite of the fact that other means of studying religion were at his disposal which would have potentially added more balance to his commentary. For example, although Jung apparently practiced some of the postures of Yoga, he did not study under a guru to fully explore the potential experiences about which he wrote.\textsuperscript{11} (Jung, 1989; 177)

The central critique of this project that is shared by Clark is Jung’s utter disinterest in metaphysics. This is of primary concern with separating the standpoint of Jung’s Self from the standpoint of micro-macrocosmic correlativity and other such states wherein the ordinary confines of space break down. As Clarke writes,

\textit{…[Jung] offered no discussion of the ontological status of the \textit{chakras} or of the channels that supposedly connected them together, but as in all his writings about esoteric systems of thought he treated them in purely symbolic terms. What concerned him was not whether there ‘really’ is a system of energy centres within the body, but rather how we could understand and make sense, and perhaps make use, of these ideas in terms of our modern Western assumptions. (112)\textsuperscript{11}}

Jung made no effort to conceal his disinterest with metaphysics. For example, he writes, “My admiration for the great philosophers of the East is as genuine as my attitude towards their metaphysics is irreverent. I suspect them of being symbolical psychologists, to whom no greater wrong could be done than to take them literally.” (CW13.74, Clarke, 151) Jung’s concern is that he does not believe that the bold metaphysical claims of the

\textsuperscript{11} Clarke also critique’s Jung for “[failing] to address adequately the whole cultural and historical context in which religious and philosophical ideas arise.” (Clarke, 164) However, that was not at all Jung’s intention, and entirely beyond the purview of depth psychology. Jung was not an historian, so there is little merit in such a critique.
East, such as that of self-annihilation, has any experiential correlate for the Westerner. This is the exact position this project must avoid.

The next critique stems from Kasulis’s paradigm of integrity, which is Jung’s polarizing dualism. Jung, as a product of his time, was most certainly ensconced in this standpoint, as defined in Chapter Three. This manifests in many ways, but only two cases will be examined here. The first is his broad-scale cultural polarization, drawing radical “us/them” distinctions between cultures. This was done, for example, by claiming the West was extroverted and the East was introverted. (Clarke, 167) This is in many respects what Kasulis advocates, and very clearly in line with Watsuji’s broad cultural philosophy. Kasulis differs from Jung and Watsuji with respect that he is self-aware of the limited usefulness of such distinctions as there are always exceptions. Such distinctions are valuable as they allow conversation about difference, but quickly lose value when these distinctions are essentialized and absolutized as hard and fast facts.

To conclude this portion of general critiques, Clarke faults Jung for failing to recognize the usefulness of Yoga and otherwise having such a low opinion of his culture to appropriate this practice. (Clarke, 173) As is evident today, Yoga enjoys extreme popularity and cases of psychological breakdowns due to the perverse foreignness of the practice are virtually unheard of. Perhaps Jung’s role as a therapist influenced his foresight on this issue as he primarily worked with the mentally ill, over-emphasizing people’s capacity to incorporate new symbols and practices into their psyches. In
general, Jung seemed to have far too of a conservative understanding of the flexibility of society in spite of the fact that he saw social progress and development as inevitable.

**A Defense of Psychologism**

“Psychologism” is the psychological interpretation of non-psychological phenomenon and it carries with it two values. In its original context it, it was merely a means of interpreting philosophical matters through psychology, making it explicitly hermeneutic in nature. The other value is pejorative in nature, taking a step beyond hermeneutics into reductionism. Writing on these two tracks in the context of Jung, Clarke writes, “It takes not the form that ‘A can be treated as B’, but rather that ‘A really is nothing but B’.” (Clarke, 151) However, such a distinction is very difficult to parse. This is primarily due to problems of logic and language as represented by Figure 4.12 If an issue such as the nature of the human psyche is approached through strictly rational and analytic methodologies (i.e., integrity), then the problem compounds itself. The preceding sentence can even be accused of “psychologism” as it employed the term “psyche.” It is the contention of this project that whatever it is that comprises the referent of the term “psyche” is a fundamental aspect of the human being. At a certain point, such “critiques” become absurd, as if one were to accuse the use of the term “breath” in the context of a discussion of prānāyāma as being a needless interjection of the standpoint of medical materialism. The assumption of this project is that fundamental aspects of the human being such as “breath,” legs,” and “psyche” are taken for granted. Yet the problem does

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12 See Chapter Two, page 111.
remain; to what extent was the vocabulary of Jung an accurate depiction of this structure, and to what extent was it an anachronistic projection?

In the following passage an example of Jung’s self-stated reasons for his psychologism may be found. He writes,

[When discussing Kuṇḍalinī Yoga] one needs a great deal of psychology in order to make it palatable to the Western mind. If we do not try hard and dare to commit many errors in assimilating it to our Western mentality, we simply get poisoned. For these symbols have a terribly clinging tendency… But they are a foreign body in our system—corpus alienum—and they inhibit the natural growth and development of our own psychology… Therefore one has to make almost heroic attempts to master these things… in order to deprive them of their influence. (Jung, 1996: 14)

Here we catch Jung red-handed deliberately deploying psychologism in the best interest of his reader, or in this case, those gathered at the lecture. He uses a metaphor of ingestion, that he must make these ideas “palatable” lest we become “poisoned.” This perhaps gives rise to the awkward image of a mother bird pre-masticating and regurgitating food for her young. This certainly reveals a great deal about what Jung felt his relationship was to his audience.

That Jung claims that these foreign symbols infect the psyche—inhibit the natural growth and development of our own psychology—also suggest how important Jung found the concept of dutifully sticking to one’s culturally inculcated symbols. It may be wondered what he means by “our psychology,” as this suggests “early twentieth-century European psychology.” In this sense, Jung appears to be playing the role of a clergyman looking after his flock. To keep the European psyche safe, Jung seems to be intentionally
rendering foreign religious ideas in such a way that is minimally disruptive; i.e., as mere psychological phenomenon.

Jung’s principle of individuation appears to be at the heart of this interpretive project. For Jung, individuation was the very essence of spiritual practice. This did not appear to apply just to his European audience—his “us”—but universally to all of humanity. As such as R.H. Jones states, cited in Clarke, that “Jung has simply substituted his own theoretical constructs for ‘equivalent’ religious concepts, and thereby has systematically distorted the intentions of Eastern thinkers (1979: 141ff). (Clarke, 176) Jung was essentially transposing and reducing other definitions of religious goals so that they would coincide with his definition of individuation. Jones argues that “what Jung failed to appreciate was the difference between his own conceptual framework and that of the Eastern traditions he was dealing with – a failure which resulted in a systematic distortion of the latter. (Clarke, 169) This issues appeals to Jung’s methodological standpoint, which was metapsychical, rather than metaphysical.

Although there is ample room to critique Jung for these misappropriations of Eastern thought, Jung’s intentions were not at all sinister. As Clarke writes,

The purpose of [Jung’s] dialogue with the East… was not that of absorbing and integrating Eastern thought into a super-philosophy [e.g., a monolithic standpoint] but rather of healing the one-sidedness of Western culture by forcing it to recognise the need to open itself out to its complementary opposite. For [Jung] the East could lead the West to the rediscovery of the inner cosmos, of the worlds of the imagination, of intuition, of the unconscious, but only in its own terms and with its own methods. (Clarke, 145)
In this sense, Jung saw the East and its ideas as a much needed remedy for the ailments of his time, seemingly zeroing in on the elements of its philosophy that spoke to the neglected aspects of the European psyche. This may be interpreted as seeking a balance to the one-sidedness of *theōria*; restoring the intimacy of the unconscious back to the public domain. This maneuver, accomplished by Freud, Jung, and their contemporaries, was of monumental importance for Western culture. The critiques of Jung in a sense may be understood as a carry-over of critiques against the colonial attitude; presuming that Jung was violently extracting what is valuable while marginalizing the rest. As per the citation from Clarke, this is clearly not at all Jung’s intention, so whether or not his psychologism was either a helpful hermeneutic or a violent act of reductionism is a matter for those who choose to force Jung into a discussion in which he was not knowingly a part.

**Conclusion to Chapter Eight**

Regardless of his intentions, we are left with the psychological legacy of Jung’s commentary on the *cakras*, which have shaped generations of contemporary *cakra* practitioners. However, it is simply indispensable to retain an acute awareness of what Jung illuminated and what Jung interjected. What Jung illuminated was the compatibility of the symbolism of the *cakras* with some manner of psychical growth; his interjection being that this psychic growth was his individuation. What has persist from Jung’s commentary in the modern age is more so his attention to the minutia of psychological growth and self-betterment. For it can reasonably be assumed that the psychical
impediments faced by both ancient yogis and contemporary *cakra* practitioners, to a certain extent, are in many respects the same.
9. CONCLUSION

The problem addressed by this project is that insufficient attention has been paid to the cakras as relatable human phenomenon. This project asserts that a bridge of dialog may be constructed that spans the historical and the contemporary if contemporary philosophical and psychological accounts of the cakras are brought in to dialog. For example, a historical investigation of the cakras conducted by employing a contemporary phenomenology of the cakras (à la Yuasa and Jung) adds structural context to ancient cakra practice. In the other direction, the historical cakras, especially the “standard” cakras of the Saṭcakra Nirūpaṇa, may be presented as the thematic precursors of the cakras of contemporary cakra practice so that a keener awareness of what is novel and what is classical may be developed. Only through a study of the multivalency of the cakras as defined by the intersection of several standpoints can the full range of their complexity—and potential usefulness—be brought out into the open.

This project has historically contextualized the cakras, both in a proposal for their thematic development, and also as defined through the Saṭcakra Nirūpaṇa. But this historical/textual rendering of the cakras is but one standpoint that presents the cakras as historical artifacts. The standpoint overlooked by such a rendering is that “history” and “texts” are not the only substrata of the cakras, as the cakras are explicitly human affairs. As such, in order to develop a more complete depiction of the cakras, their psycho-physical structure with reference to the human being must be taken into consideration.
This project has made the case that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the additions thereupon made by Yuasa, in conjunction with the depth psychology of Jung offers just such context by considering the cakras as immediately lived phenomena of the mind-body. To make this point, the first two chapters established an example of the paradigmatic shift required to turn attention away from the popular standpoint designated by “theōria” in order to appropriate a standpoint from which the subtle body, both its physical and psychological manifestations, may be addressed. Put differently, these chapters identify a monolithic hegemon that deters heterodox discussion for the simple reason that they compromise its specious absolutism. The classical philosophical example of the subtle body was then introduced through Sāṃkhya. This was followed by a phenomenological elucidation of how the subtle body may express itself from the everyday standpoint as defined by Yuasa, which stands in contrast with the standpoint of puruṣa as assumed by Sāṃkhya. Jung’s depth psychology was introduced next as a means of psychologically contextualizing Tantric maṇḍalas. Maṇḍalas were also presented as the thematic precursors of cakras. In doing so, the psychological context provided by Jung may be transferred to the cakras. The final chapters address the cakras of the Śaṭcakra Nirūpana, and then Jung’s commentary on them.

By presenting the cakras in such a light has accomplished two things. The first is that is has added a lived context to the human body through the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Yuasa by offering a depiction of the structure of the lived body that defines how the subtle body may come to be experienced as a lived reality. The second is that
has added a lived context to the human psyche, articulating the structures of the psyche as defined by Jung that function within the *cakras*.

There is a point that has not been addressed by this project that would make for a natural thematic extension of this project’s stated goal. This is a discussion of the insights of what I have termed “contemporary *cakra* practitioners” who are those who have been using the *cakras* as the cornerstone of their own present-day spiritual practice and in turn have used these insights in their own spiritual counseling practice. Such a discussion would focus on the work of Anodea Judith and Motoyama Hiroshi, both of whom are mentioned in this project, as they appear to be two standouts in this modern field. Through a detailed investigation of their work, examples of the nuances and idiosyncrasies of the subtle body and how it weaves itself through the mind-body primarily with respect to psychical localization, the structure of the *cakras* can be made all the more clear. Such an investigation would add specifics to the generalizations suggested throughout this project, both phenomenologically and psychologically.
Bibliography


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