

LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND  
EASTERN EUROPE

---

A Thesis  
Submitted to  
the Temple University Graduate Board

---

In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
MASTER OF THE ARTS

---

by  
Andrea J. Geraldts  
Diploma date May, 2015

Examining Committee Members:

Richard H. Immerman, Thesis Advisor, Professor and Edward J. Buthusiem Family,  
Distinguished Faculty Fellow in History, Marvin Wachman Director, Center for the Study of  
Force and Diplomacy

Petra Goedde, History, Temple University, Associate Professor, Associate Director,  
CHAT (Center for the Humanities at Temple)

©  
Copyright  
2015

by

Andrea Gerald  
All Rights Reserved

## ABSTRACT

Between 1963 and 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson struggled to take advantage of increasing instability in Eastern Europe. By negotiating Most Favored Nation trade treaties and using the Import-Export Bank of America to finance “deferred payment” trade arrangements, Johnson hoped to strengthen American and Eastern European relations. Where Johnson failed to arrange new trade agreements he opted for broadening diplomatic ties. Johnson believed advantages to this strategy included weakening Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw nations, generating a new influx of trade to stabilize the American balance of payments, and preventing Soviet expansion into third world nations. I argue that President Johnson was unsuccessful in Eastern Europe because certain segments of Congress would not support deeper ties with Communist nations. Congress’ refusal to treat with the Warsaw Nations stemmed from two sources: a refusal to validate the Communist system and increasing American involvement in the Vietnam War. President Johnson promoted improved interactions, desiring stronger East- West ties and weaker Soviet control in the region. Congress endorsed the international isolation of Communist nations, aiming to cause economic collapse in the Communist governments.

For my Grandfather who will never read this.

For Zain, so you understand that you can do  
anything if you want it bad enough.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iii
DEDICATION	v
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION: THE ENVIRONMENT	1
2. JOHNSON AND EASTERN EUROPE	4
3. JOHNSON VERSUS CONGRESS	15
4. ARMS CONTROL AND THE GLASSBORO SUMMIT	23
5. CONCLUSION: JOHNSON'S UNFULFILLED AGENDA	27
REFERENCES CITED	31

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION: THE ENVIRONMENT

On May 24, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed an assemblage at the Virginia Military Institute, in Lexington, Virginia.<sup>1</sup> The occasion commemorated the dedication of the George C. Marshall Library. Rather than emphasizing the works of George Marshall, Johnson declared it was time to look forward to a new era. Johnson refocused American foreign policy with a few unassuming sentences: “We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe,” said Johnson. “They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid.”<sup>2</sup> The United States would no longer demarcate the world based on simple definitions of Communist or Non- Communist nations. Instead, Johnson declared his peaceful intentions toward the Warsaw Pact Nations. Scarcely six months after taking office, Johnson began to pursue his ambition to bring the Warsaw Nations into the fold of the industrialized Western world. He pursued this goal through the entirety of his presidency, using trade treaties, consulate expansions, executive orders, and efforts to improve communications among the nations.

Lyndon B. Johnson took the oath as President of the United States November 22, 1963, and immediately began implementing his ambitious domestic and foreign agenda. The Civil Rights era and the Vietnam War encompass the majority of scholarly work regarding the Johnson Administration. Foreign policy texts focus on his escalating commitment to the Vietnam War and the adverse effects it had on his other initiatives. Johnson “put the highest priority upon following the consensus of his senior advisers and never chose an alternative that they would have [had] rejected,” wrote David Kaiser in 1994, representing conventional criticism.

“This tactic helped lead him into a full-scale war in Vietnam, and also helped make the years 1965-69 generally unproductive ones in East-West relations.”<sup>3</sup> Frank Costigliola in the same year wrote, “Johnson.....expected that bridge building would open arms of political, economic and cultural contact with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” but his was one of few voices crediting Johnson with a positive foreign policy agenda.<sup>4</sup> Warren Cohen and Nancy Tucker conclude with the same conventional wisdom that Kaiser embraced. President Johnson was a poor foreign policy strategist, who lacked interest in the field and was heavily dependent on the advice of his cabinet.<sup>5</sup> Eric Goldman, a former Johnson advisor turned historian, and Philip Geyelin both believed that President Johnson was not only inefficient at foreign policy; he also actively sought to avoid it.<sup>6</sup>

This thesis challenges common perspectives by arguing that the disproportionate attention paid to Vietnam has distorted the Johnson record. Indeed, historians have paid scant attention to Johnson’s outreach programs to other countries, especially the Eastern European satellites.<sup>7</sup> The abundance of newly released records from the Johnson White House enables the scholar to understand how misrepresented Johnson was as a global policy maker. Rather than an inefficient bungler, Johnson can now be viewed as a politically astute grand strategist. Creating positive East-West Relations was a high priority for President Johnson, stymied only by Congressional obstruction.

Johnson’s efforts to reach out to Communists in Europe rested on assumptions of cooperation from Congress, which were not forthcoming. Initially limited to conservative Cold Warriors, Congressional opposition spread to both sides of the aisle as the number of American troops deployed to South Vietnam increased. Congress had significant legal weight on its side.<sup>8</sup> Various laws enacted after the Bolshevik Revolution and World War II

severely constrained U.S. trade with Communists. Other laws, not Communist-specific, similarly hampered economic entanglements with any nation in default of its debts to the United States. This comprised every Communist nation in Eastern Europe, with the sole exception of Bulgaria. Congress utilized every law, closed all loopholes, and limited every transaction within its control.

The 1964 elections delivered to President Johnson a large majority in the Senate, with Democrats outnumbering Republicans 68 to 32. The House had a similar divide, with 295 seats going to the Democrats and 140 going to the Republicans.<sup>9</sup> In theory, this meant nearly unlimited power for President Johnson to enact his mandate. In reality, the demographic makeup of the 1964 congress included a deeply divided Democratic party, reducing President Johnson's support base. With the exception of conservative congressional hawks, it was often difficult to determine how a Congressman would vote regarding trade with Communist nations. This became more predictable as the Vietnam War dragged on, but even before 1966 there was no predetermined base which was certain to either oppose trade with Eastern Europe or support it. The House of Representatives was far more likely to introduce anti-Communist legislation than the Senate. The majority of the bills attempting to restrict trade with Eastern Europe originated in the House.<sup>10</sup>

Johnson endeavored to improve economic and cultural ties with Communist nations in Eastern Europe. He advocated global arms control and cultivated lines of communication with the USSR.<sup>11</sup> Johnson accomplished this by skirting an unfriendly Congress, in some instances resorting to executive orders. Congress did not accept such machinations lightly. Over the course of five years, Congress stripped the Executive of its legal capacity to unilaterally creating binding agreements with Communist nations.

## CHAPTER TWO

### JOHNSON AND EASTERN EUROPE

President Johnson's ambitions in Eastern Europe followed a pattern, established incrementally and non-linearly, in the years after World War II. Each newly elected presidential administration took only sporadic action towards Eastern Europe until the arrival of President Johnson. President Eisenhower extended trade treaties to Poland and relaxed the trade embargo with the Eastern Bloc.<sup>12</sup> President Kennedy had requested and received from Congress the legal right to sell surplus commodities to Eastern Europe, but traded primarily with Poland and Yugoslavia.<sup>13</sup> But there was no pattern to offers to trade. Some executives decided to trade, some did not. Why was Johnson so interested in Eastern Europe? Though the records do not specify one overarching motive the evidence suggests several interlocking theories. One possibility is Johnson's interest in expanding US trade globally, including most of the continent of Europe.<sup>14</sup> Johnson also wished to prevent Western European development of nuclear weapons, in keeping with his reluctance to escalate the arms race with the USSR.<sup>15</sup>

These policy initiatives notwithstanding, President Johnson also had another goal. In order to limit the amount of resources the USSR exported, Johnson hoped to increase consumer demand in Eastern Europe beyond the Soviet capacity to provide. Conceivably, this could force European Communist nations into a slight Western turn, while decreasing Soviet influence.<sup>16</sup> It would also assist in limiting Soviet expansion into the Third World nations. Soviet influence in South America concerned multiple American presidential administrations, and Johnson was no exception to this.<sup>17</sup> Johnson hoped to force the USSR to

divert goods heading toward developing nations to the Warsaw Pact countries. A significant expansion in consumerism behind the Iron Curtain was unlikely, and for Johnson it was never a goal. However, he was optimistic that a small increase in financial demands from various Eastern European nations would exercise a noticeable impact on Soviet resources. Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were all beginning to experience, or remained in, contracted economic conditions.<sup>18</sup> The effect this had on the local populace was not inconsequential. Each of the above nations was facing popular unrest to one degree or another throughout the 1960s.<sup>19</sup>

Concurrently, Johnson hoped to weaken Soviet hegemony over its neighbors.<sup>20</sup> Similar to American interference in South and Central America, the USSR put considerable pressure on its satellites to conform to Soviet political interest. Ostensibly billed as acting in the best interests of all involved, in fact the USSR indulged in protectionist policies designed to propagate the Soviet interpretation of communism, whether beneficial to the local population or not.<sup>21</sup> Despite Soviet trade policies with the Warsaw-Pact nations, all of the members to one degree or another were dependent on the USSR for a significant portion of trade. Johnson hoped that equalizing the trade balance between Eastern Europe and the West would weaken Soviet influence in the region. If it was possible for the United States to produce even a slight crack behind the Iron Curtain, Johnson wanted to do so. This complex strategy would weaken the Soviets while maintaining the “Containment” policy, expand American trade, and slow the arms race with the USSR.

Despite opposition from Congress, Johnson successfully negotiated with Poland and increased trade with Romania. He helped augment tourism in Bulgaria and opened diplomatic channels with Hungary. He likewise met with Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin.

Johnson took a personal interest in expanding trade relations and opening lines of communication with the Warsaw Nations and the USSR.<sup>22</sup> Memos and embassy notes show direct lines of communication with President Johnson regarding lowering trade barriers and expanding tourism with Eastern Europe.

Johnson deemed it an auspicious time for widening relations with Eastern Europe. Nikita Khrushchev's policies had created a power vacuum in the Warsaw Nations.<sup>23</sup> Khrushchev's 1956 "Secret Speech" condemning Stalin's purges and cult of personality served to delegitimize many of Stalin's most oppressive policies.<sup>24</sup> Without Stalin's iron grip, many of the Eastern European nations began to focus on the needs of the individual countries, rather than working as a bloc.<sup>25</sup> Poorly planned economic policies in the Warsaw Pact countries fomented popular unrest.<sup>26</sup> Even nations still controlled by Stalinist rulers, such as Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, began searching for ways to ease the burden on its populace.<sup>27</sup> The Warsaw nations needed more than the USSR could provide, and Johnson sought to take advantage of this situation.

The Eastern Bloc nations reacted to United States overtures in a variety of fashions. Poland and Romania pursued trade expansion aggressively. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia would trade only under specific conditions. Hungary was willing to consider trade with the US, but was skeptical of the stability of such trade due to Congressional hostility. Johnson never considered trade with Albania or East Germany a worthwhile endeavor. Albania aligned itself with China in early 1960, and the Soviets broke relations with it in 1961.<sup>28</sup> It was also an undeveloped nation, with limited resources useful for trade. These factors made trade with Albania undesirable. Trade with East Germany was nearly impossible, as the

United States did not formally recognize the existence of the Democratic Republic of Germany.

Difficulties engaging in trade with Communist nations arose from more than philosophical disagreements. There were technical matters that required attention as well. Until 1962, the President could declare trade with any country to be in the “national interest,” and offer them a Most Favored Nation treaty (MFN)<sup>29</sup>. Dwight Eisenhower was the sole president to utilize this for a communist country. Eisenhower granted a MFN to Poland in 1960<sup>30</sup>. Congress allowed this presidential prerogative to exist until 1963, when President Kennedy engaged in a trade for wheat with the Soviets. The USSR was experiencing a severe wheat shortage in 1963, and Kennedy approved the sale of surplus wheat by private enterprises to the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, with the use of Export-Import Bank of America to guarantee against private losses<sup>31</sup>.

Because of this trade, Congress removed the presidential discretion clause allowing the offering of a MFN treaty to any communist nation. Furthermore, the 1963 Congress completely stripped the MFN treaty from Poland and Yugoslavia.<sup>32</sup> Congress eventually relented and allowed Poland and Yugoslavia to keep the treaties in late 1963, but not until after President Johnson took office. Johnson was not responsible for the wheat trade with the USSR, but much like successive American presidents after him, limitations enacted to punish a previous administration hamstrung his ability to make truly concrete offers to the Warsaw Nations.<sup>33</sup> Congress would not grant him the power to unilaterally trade with any nation he so desired, despite repeated requests.<sup>34</sup> He had hopes for greater cooperation after the 1964 elections and a Democratic majority, but he never received it.

One solution to Johnson's inability to offer loans for commodities to Eastern Europe was to use The Export-Import (EX-IM) Bank of America as an insurance agent for private capital. Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6581, creating the Ex-Im bank on February 2, 1934.<sup>35</sup> Its purpose was to aid global trade during the Great Depression.<sup>36</sup> The EX-IM's function was to insure or guarantee sales of American exports to countries that might constitute a credit risk. Businesses fearful of loss then had assurance of payment, whether from the country in question or the US government. Should the country default, the US government would reimburse the exporter.

The bank's secondary purpose was to facilitate trade with the USSR.<sup>37</sup> The EX-IM never functioned as a trade agent between the USSR and the United States. The concurrent passage of the Foreign Securities Act, commonly known as the Johnson Debt Act after its sponsor California's Republican Senator Hiram Johnson, effectively banned trade with the USSR. The Johnson Debt Act prohibited trade with any nation in default on its debts to the United States.<sup>38</sup> The Bolshevik government had declared any Tsarist debts to be invalid, including those with the United States. The United States did not accept a change in government as a valid reason to repudiate one's debts from any country.<sup>39</sup> The result was a loss of trade privileges for the USSR due to being in default on its loans. The EX-IM became the main lending institution for the United States government instead.

After reviewing the Johnson Act in 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy declared that while the United States government could not trade with much of Eastern Europe, private businesses were exempt from this stricture.<sup>40</sup> Expanding further, he affirmed short-term loans and "credit" to be disparate entities, thereby declaring the legality of EX-IM insuring private capital against trade losses with Communist nations. Businesses previously

unable to risk trade with nations in default to the United States on its loans could now invest their own capital in those same nations, with the guarantee of payment by the United States government. Using this tool, Johnson hoped to encourage American businesses to broaden trade with Eastern Europe.

President Johnson also openly supported the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and arms control more generally.<sup>41</sup> In this, many of the Warsaw nations were in accord with him. The Polish and Romanian heads of state spoke of tremendous apprehension over a nuclear-armed Europe. Both countries advocated arms reduction and were against arming the Western European nations.<sup>42</sup> National leaders in Eastern Europe believed any further weaponization would result in a greater Soviet presence in the Warsaw nations. Poland and Romania both had engaged in a subtle independence movement from the USSR.<sup>43</sup> Economic changes coupled with a relaxation of political oppression helped leaders of each country to create power bases separate from Muscovite leadership. Polish and Romanian leadership utilized that local support for their continued rule, and then proceeded to reach out to Western Europe and the United States for a stronger relationship based on trade and cultural exchanges. Neither Poland nor Romania wanted stronger economic or political ties with the USSR; something they believed was inevitable with a nuclear armed Western Europe.

Johnson took the first steps of his agenda in late 1963. He initiated two key projects with Romania. The first was to offer the use of the EX-IM bank. In 1963 and early 1964 Romania used the bank only for agricultural products.<sup>44</sup> The success of these ventures encouraged Johnson and Romanian Premier Georgiou Dej to contemplate projects of a greater magnitude. The principal obstacle was President Johnson's inability to offer Romania a Most-Favored-Nation treaty. Romanian tariff rates were nearly thirty-six percent, as

opposed to rates of fourteen percent for countries with a MFN.<sup>45</sup> This effectively locked Romania out of the American market, and prevented it from gaining a positive trade balance with the US. The use of the EX-IM bank, while helpful, only offered short-term or medium length loans. Realistically this meant loan lengths between eighteen months and five years.<sup>46</sup> With no trade to accumulate capital, Romania could not ensure repayment of large loans in such limited periods. While the EX-IM offered a short-term solution, it was no true substitute for a MFN treaty.

There were other methods available to prove to Romania that Johnson was serious about his offers of friendship. In May 1964 the State Department began to assist Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in its negotiations with Romania about the sale of a rubber factory. The process of approval took nearly a year. As the final agreement came to fruition, public outcry in conjunction with Congressional disapproval, particularly from conservative members opposed to any trade with Communists, caused the arrangement to collapse.<sup>47</sup> Organized by the Young Americans for Freedom, boycotts gained ground and protests at Firestone retail branches became common.<sup>48</sup> Protestors gaining support from one of Firestones main competitors was the final touch, as Firestone could not viably accept the economic loss.<sup>49</sup> Firestone abruptly backpedaled. Citing company dependence on retail sales, Firestone recommended the Johnson administration approach a rival business with no retail branch.<sup>50</sup> Lack of interest on the part of Firestone's competitors meant this goal never reached completion.

Concurrently Johnson's administration began negotiations for the trade of modern petroleum extraction equipment. Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk did not anticipate any difficulty with this, but events proved them mistaken. The Trade Control

board balked instantly.<sup>51</sup> The grounds for their hesitation were multifaceted. American political leaders could not conceive of a nation as insignificant and powerless as Romania actively defying a nation of the USSR's magnitude.<sup>52</sup> Congressional opinion, on both sides of the aisle, denied Romanian ability to refute Moscow's wishes. A case of transferred "American Exceptionalism," the minds of Congress could not accept a satellite nation with its own agenda.<sup>53</sup>

The Trade Control Board deliberated the notion that the USSR directed the Romanians to pursue the sale in order facilitate Soviet counterfeiting and production of modern petroleum equipment based on American designs. American oil companies possessed the most sophisticated machinery in existence at the time, while Soviet oil equipment was becoming sadly obsolete.<sup>54</sup> Discussions focusing on the possibility that Romania would purchase equipment and immediately ship it to Russia occurred at length.<sup>55</sup> American petrochemical companies, and parts of the American government, concurred that the risk for counterfeiting or transshipping was too high. The Trade Control Board approved not a single aspect of the sale.<sup>56</sup> In 1965, Dean Rusk informed Romania's new leader, Nicolai Ceausescu, that America would not be able to accommodate its request.

In contrast, negotiations with Poland were as positive as one could hope for in Cold War Europe. Poland could claim the dubious distinction of having experienced invasion by both the Germans and the Soviets during World War II. This fact engendered a certain amount of American sympathy. Over five million Poles died during the conflict, and countless more died after the USSR usurped the county's ruling body.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, Poland's possession of a MFN treaty gave it an advantage over the other Warsaw-Pact Nations. It could trade with the US at the same rates as any other trading partner, giving

Poland the ability to create a positive trade balance with the United States. Poland had negotiated a repayment of US debt, removing trade barriers from the Johnson Act. The presence of a large and politically active Polish-American constituency encouraged positive trade and cultural relations between the nations.

Johnson made two decisions that positively influenced relations with Poland. The first was the curtailment of the Multilateral Force (MLF); an experiment began under the Eisenhower Administration and continued under Kennedy.<sup>58</sup> Conceptualized as a method to control nuclear proliferation, among other things, it offered the use of American nuclear arms to NATO controlled submarines and warships. Ships manned by NATO troops created a transnational nuclear force, negating the need for national stockpiles. The United States and its Western European allies never came to agreement terms on the subject. France particularly was reluctant to accept internationally controlled nuclear weapons as a substitute for a national supply, especially with West Germany's inclusion in the force.<sup>59</sup> If such a force was to exist, France wanted it to be under strictly European control, with treaties negotiated between France and Germany.<sup>60</sup> By 1965, it became clear that the program was causing more problems than it could solve, and Johnson discontinued it.

The impact this had on relations Poland was significant. Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee in Poland, had expressed to Dean Rusk his trepidation about a nuclear-armed Germany.<sup>61</sup> Gomulka stated clearly that he felt negotiations between NATO and West Germany put all nations at risk due to inherent German belligerency. Germany's inclusion in a nuclear-armed naval force created unnecessary tensions with Poland. As a secondary concern, he also believed that the MLF was another step in the arms escalation process.<sup>62</sup> The USSR would certainly respond in some fashion, thus beginning a

new round of tit-for-tat actions on the part of the superpower nations. Gomulka insisted that the most reasonable plan of action was to focus on arms reduction and a nuclear freeze.<sup>63</sup> Johnson's announcement of the failure of the MLF, and its subsequent termination eased a great deal of apprehension in Polish leaders.

Secondly, Johnson's appointment of John Gronouski as ambassador to Poland in 1965 pleased both the Polish leaders in Warsaw and his Polish-American constituents. Previously the Postmaster General, he was the first Polish American to hold a cabinet level position.<sup>64</sup> His appointment enabled the Johnson administration to settle the long-standing problem of looming Polish debt payments. Having a MFN trade treaty afforded Warsaw options other Communist nations did not have. Poland could export goods to the United States, allowing it to accumulate capital in exports to repay debts to America. Exporting goods to the US also enabled Poland to accumulate capital for other ventures, namely imports from the United States. Despite this, Poland was unable to begin paying on its US debt.

Gronouski's tenure as ambassador could not have taken place at a more ideal time. Lack of oversight from the USSR opened avenues for negotiations that simply weren't available previous to Nikita Khrushchev's removal in 1964. This coupled with Poland's declining economic growth pressured Gomulka into making concessions he may otherwise not have made.<sup>65</sup> 1966 the Poles signed a trade agreement between the two nations that was a clear US triumph. Gronouski negotiated a ten-year treaty that delayed Poland's repayment to the United States, but at a cost of radically increased American imports.<sup>66</sup> Important in a different fashion, one provision of the treaty exchanged Polish debt for the initiation of an English language program at all schools and universities in Poland. Funding for this project would come from Poland, in exchange for a reduction of foreign debt.<sup>67</sup> The language

requirements were a coup for spreading American culture in Poland, as Russian and Polish were the only languages taught in Polish schools. The widespread teaching of English opened the door to broader exposure to Radio Free Europe, Voice of America and various publications designed to promote the American perspective of the Cold War. Though a long-term goal, it was nonetheless a significant victory.

## CHAPTER THREE

### JOHNSON VERSUS CONGRESS

Use of the EX-IM by Romania and Poland began the first Johnson era Congressional debate on the topic of trade with Communists. Senator Karl Mundt, a Republican from South Dakota, began the dialogue by introducing legislation that would codify Robert Kennedy's analysis of the Johnson Act, in November of 1963.<sup>68</sup> Mundt adamantly opposed trading with Communists, and used any political maneuver necessary to prevent it. In his amendment he concurred that private businesses could trade independently of government oversight. Accordingly, any company that chose to accept risky foreign investments need not turn to the United States government for rescue.<sup>69</sup> The American taxpayer should not be responsible for private losses on overseas speculations. Using the EX-IM, a government entity funded by taxpayers, was unnecessary. This legislation never passed in either house, but it was indicative of what the future would hold. As Congress became more opposed to trade with Communist Europe, attacks on the EX-IM would become more common.

Completion of the Polish treaty by John Gronouski brought a second round of Congressional censure. Conservative Republican Congressional hawks such as Representative Paul Findlay (Illinois) and conservative Democrats like Senator Robert Byrd (West Virginia) forced themselves to accept the new treaty with Poland. Politically impotent in the face of Poland's MFN status, they had no choice. Poland was not technically an aggressor nation, and Gronouski's treaty removed the prohibitions against trading with debtor nations by negotiating a settlement for repayment of Polish debt.

Though Congress was powerless to prevent Johnson's success in Poland, even liberal democrats such as Arkansas's J. William Fulbright agreed to make it increasingly difficult to make those same offers to other Communist nations. The renewal in 1966 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 removed the Presidential discretion clause granting the President the right to determine trade with a Communist country to be in the "national interest" of the United States.<sup>70</sup> Further amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 mandated a termination of trade with any nation shipping to North Vietnam, including Western allies.<sup>71</sup> The President's office retained an executive prerogative clause to ignore that restriction upon determination that trade with a non-Communist country engaged in trade with North Vietnam was in the national interest of the United States.

The combination of Congressional reticence, legal hurdles, and public opposition put Johnson in a difficult position. By all indicators he was negotiating in good faith, yet to other countries, he looked inconsistent. Romania was not alone in questioning President Johnson's ability to produce what he offered. Failure to follow through began to impinge on Johnson's ability to begin a dialogue. The difference in governing style became radically apparent and frequently the Communist countries did not accept that the President of the United States had power limitations. Bulgaria openly questioned Dean Rusk on the topic, dismissing public opinion as a smoke screen designed to protect President Johnson from any real obligations.<sup>72</sup> As the years went on and Johnson had less and less to offer, the Warsaw nations began to discount Johnson's trade overtures as insincere.<sup>73</sup> Western Europe placed no such hurdles on trade, and Eastern and Western Europe continued the slow process of reconciliation.

President Johnson was unwilling to abandon his quest to build bridges to Eastern Europe. He focused on his goal to expand demand for American goods in the Communist

nations. To a limited degree, this was successful. Bulgaria went through a consumer explosion in the mid to late 1960's. Johnson, while unable to negotiate trade treaties in Bulgaria, ably assisted in increasing American tourism. The impact this had on some Bulgarian communities cannot be overstated. American tourists had, and still have, expectations of certain standards of living. A lack of modern amenities and conveniences causes the average American to choose different vacation locales.<sup>74</sup> For the first time since the start of Communist rule in Bulgaria, privately owned hotels, taxicabs, and food vendors became commonplace. A consumer class began to emerge, putting pressure on Bulgarian leaders. Poland also went through a consumer class explosion. The country experienced this due to Gomulka's enactment of a national wage increase, but the effect was the same. Ordinary citizens in Communist countries were experiencing, many for the first time, private capital ownership and the benefits that accompanied it.

President Johnson sought to capitalize on this newly created consumer need. Because Congress stymied his efforts to encourage trade behind the Iron Curtain, he turned to the use of Executive Orders. At the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York City, President Johnson on October 7, 1966, announced that he had signed a presidential determination declaring four new Communist countries eligible for loans from the Export-Import Bank.<sup>75</sup> He simultaneously removed four hundred items from the American controlled trade list.<sup>76</sup> The impact this had on actual trade was minimal. Nevertheless, psychologically it was a vital boon to Johnson's international reputation. Congressional hamstringing of Johnson's Eastern European agenda affected his credibility in the global arena, leaving Johnson looking weak and politically impotent. By unilaterally declaring minimal trade rights for Communist countries, Johnson boosted his image as a firm

policymaker. A nearly universal improvement in relations occurred between America and the Warsaw Nations. Bulgaria noted how pleased it was with the President's attempts to equalize trading rights, and Poland agreed to the refinancing of its looming debt.<sup>77</sup>

Congressional reaction to Johnson's tactics was nearly instantaneous and intensely critical.<sup>78</sup> Many Democratic Congressional members considered Johnson's high-handedness an affront. Those Democrats previously willing to work with President Johnson despite not agreeing with his position, such as New York's Representative Edna F. Kelly, no longer gave ground. Even Congressional members deeply sympathetic to the plight of Eastern European countries such as Senator Claiborne Pell (D- Rhode Island) felt forced to concede that Johnson overstepped the boundaries of executive privilege.<sup>79</sup> Rather than accede to Congressional wishes, Johnson blatantly stepped around them. The House of Representatives convened a committee the following day. Calling in various Cabinet members to explain Johnson's position, Congressional leaders ripped the unfortunate officials to pieces.<sup>80</sup> Both parties participated in the questioning of Johnson cabinet members.<sup>81</sup>

Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were suspicious of hidden motives on the part of the President. Cabinet officials attempted to paint Johnson's use of executive orders as simply a continuation of previous policy. Committee member Representative Edna F. Kelly (D-NY) captured Congressional skepticism well when she said:

As usual the news of any policy changes appears first in the press and we learn about it from that source. I do not consider what our government is proposing in the field of East-West relations as a continuation of existing policy. I think it is reaching for something that has been dormant for a good many years.<sup>82</sup>

Conservative Republicans expressed outrage over the expansion of contact.<sup>83</sup>

Congressional disapproval stemmed from the method used to accomplish these ends, not simply the actions themselves. Congressional allies discussed with President Johnson an East-West Trade Bill as early as 1965. There was not enough support, even with a Democrat-controlled congress.<sup>84</sup> As the hearings continued, the Deputy Secretary of State explained to Congress that the Johnson Administration had taken no new steps. Rather Johnson had simply quickened current policy.<sup>85</sup> There had been bills in committee for months to the effect of offering the use of the EX-IM bank to the other communist nations.<sup>86</sup> Johnson had made no secret of his intentions to trade with Eastern Europe, and Congressional roadblocks decreased his international credibility. This rationalization did not impress House Republicans.

Congressional actions of this nature did not stem from a lack of information on events in Eastern Europe, but rather from ideological inhibitions.<sup>87</sup> The men and women of the Senate and the House knew very well the radical changes undergoing the nations behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>88</sup> Ultimately, it was a question of whether or not the United States should entangle itself with nations pledged to the destruction of Western ideology.<sup>89</sup> Initially it was the most conservative members of Congress who refused to relent on trade with any Communist. By late 1966, Congress as a whole was beginning to balk, primarily due to the Vietnam War. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee no longer overlooked Eastern Europe's trade with North Vietnam, or the cost of funding a war in Asia while attempting to justify broadening trade ties and cultural interactions with Communists in Europe.<sup>90</sup> The Johnson administration attempted to explain its "building bridges" strategy of increased tourism and greater economic interdependence. The idea rested on assumptions of slow but gradual shifts of political power. As a Communist nation became more deeply

intertwined with the capitalist world, it would eventually find itself sliding into a market economy with the full support of its people.<sup>91</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel Jr. explained to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 18 1966:

If the question is asked as to why we are seeking to expand our trade and other economic considerations with the Soviet Union and with Eastern Europe at the same time we are fighting Communist aggression in Vietnam, I would say that resistance to such force is only one part of our strategy in seeking a peaceful world. It is also equally our purpose to show the Communist nations their best interests lie in promoting the wellbeing of their peoples through peaceful, constructive relations with the free world.<sup>92</sup>

When arguments for soft power failed, Johnson attempted to convince Congressional skeptics through stark economic figures.

The United States was in the midst of an economic contraction, combined with a growing deficit. Balance of payment obligations had increased. 1964 showed a 1.6 billion dollar shortfall, significantly more than the previously estimated 900 million.<sup>93</sup> In the years after World War II, the United States economy expanded at an unprecedented rate, with the US providing thirty-five percent of all exports in the world. By 1963, Western Europe had recovered, and global trade had equalized. In 1964, the United States was supplying roughly fifteen percent of the goods on the global market. The actual amount of American goods exported in 1964 was only four percent of GDP.<sup>94</sup> Congress faced a choice. In order to meet its balance of payment obligations the US needed to expand its exports to a rate of seven percent each year. To continue to meet its domestic and foreign financial obligations, trade expansion was a necessity.

The president of the EX-IM bank and the Secretary of Treasury testified before Congress on October 18, 1966, in order to explain this fact, again, and to justify President Johnson's speech on October 7.<sup>95</sup> The need for economic stability justified trade with

peaceful nations, whatever their political structure. The Warsaw pact nations were communists, true, but they were non-combative and exhibited a degree of internal political freedom that distinguished them from the policies set by the USSR.<sup>96</sup> There were even nations such as Poland and Romania who were on the verge of a deliberate breakaway from the USSR.<sup>97</sup> Encouraging the weakening of Soviet imperialism was justifiable in its own right.

A pivotal factor in increasing Congressional hesitation was the Vietnam War. Even those Democrats who followed Johnson's lead in civil rights and other dimensions of Johnson's "Great Society" began to balk at trade with communist nations. Representative Wright Patman (D-Texas), was in favor of supporting the [Robert] Byrd Amendment during the 1967 debate over amendments to the 1945 Export-Import Bank Act.<sup>98</sup> The Byrd Amendment was a radical proposition. It would amend the charter of the Export-Import Bank, preventing the EX-IM from extending credit to any nation engaged in trade with the North Vietnamese government.<sup>99</sup> By including all of the United States Western Allies in its scope, it attempted to force a global embargo of North Vietnam. Patman was a known populist leader, a strong supporter of civil rights and an avid advocate of American troops. His willingness to support the Byrd Amendment showed how distasteful trade with Communists had become to the majority of Congress. Republican opinion came from those like Representative Paul Fino (R-NY) who stated:

"I do not hesitate to say I am shocked to hear the testimony this morning which seems to place more concern for losses of dollars and cents and very little or no regard for lives being lost in Vietnam. I would like to ask you gentleman what is wrong with penalizing any country, prohibiting them from buying any US products if we knew such products would wind up in communist countries and eventually in Vietnam."<sup>100</sup>

The Byrd amendment passed in both houses in March of 1968, softened by a Presidential "national interest" clause. All commerce with any nation engaged in even the

most innocent of trade with North Vietnam was now illegal, unless the President could prove it was in the “national interest” to continue such trade. Congress’s culminating action on East-West trade during the Johnson Administration slammed closed any remaining options for extensive trade with the satellite nations. Johnson’s options for trade with Eastern Europe disappeared with the passing of the Byrd Amendment in 1968.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### ARMS CONTROL AND THE GLASSBORO SUMMIT

The crowning achievement of President Johnson's efforts at "bridge-building" with Communist nations was his June 1967 meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey. While not directly related to negotiations with Eastern Europe, it supports Johnson's publically declared interest in reducing intercontinental European tension. A lessening of hostility would affect American and Western European ability to negotiate with Eastern Europe.<sup>101</sup> The 1966 Arab-Israeli war gave the United States and the USSR the opportunity to collaborate in the interests of preventing war in the Middle East.<sup>102</sup> On June 7, 1967, an emergency meeting of the UN was to take place to address the crisis in the Middle East. Johnson considered the effects of a meeting with the man second in power only to Leonid Brezhnev.

Johnson deliberated about the wisdom of a summit with the Soviet representative, speaking in detail with his closest advisers. Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, and McGeorge Bundy agreed on the desirability of conversing with Kosygin.<sup>103</sup> Primary consideration then became location and timing. The complexities of this historic meet were not easily satisfied. The United States had to maintain its stance on the peace process in the Middle East, especially during the tense period just after the Arab-Israeli War. The USSR was in the same position, with the rest of the communist world and several of the non-aligned nations expecting it to present a bold front on the question of Middle Eastern tensions. Any

meeting would have to take place after the UN council, removing pressure for political posturing.<sup>104</sup>

On June 16, President Johnson gave American ambassador Llewellyn Thompson an invitation to present to Premier Kosygin via Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin.<sup>105</sup> As an opening gambit, President Johnson offered Camp David or the White House as a possible setting. Kosygin was willing to meet but unable to agree to either of those locations, simply due to the political overtones inherent in both locations.<sup>106</sup> Kosygin dismissed various sites, including Maguire Air Base, out of hand. Kosygin believed any meeting had to be in a neutral zone, in the interest of international credibility. A military base was inherently too aggressive, and Camp David or the White House had too much significance as American political symbols.<sup>107</sup>

It was the Governor of New Jersey, Richard J. Hughes, who suggested the final location. Glassboro State College (now Rowan University), in Glassboro New Jersey, was roughly equidistant from both New York and Washington. On June 23, 1967, at 11:30 am EST, Premier Kosygin and President Johnson arrived at this small state college in central New Jersey. Johnson and Kosygin began a series of discussions that lasted for two days. The President of the United States and the Soviet Premier met with only their translators. The most trusted advisors of each man sat in an anteroom waiting for them to emerge. The reasons for this are undocumented; one can speculate that each political leader wished privacy to be able to express their opinion without facing any pressure from their advisors.

President Johnson did not believe any sweeping changes would come about from this summit. Neither man had the political power to resolve deep-seated philosophical issues. His primary goal revolved around convincing Kosygin, and thereby the USSR, of the need

for more stringent global arms control.<sup>108</sup> His secondary objective was a simple need to speak with the Soviet Premier, face to face. President Johnson had great faith in man's ability to understand each other, given the time. The success of the Washington-Moscow hotline during the Six-Day War proved to Johnson that the USSR and the US could communicate and work in concert if needed. Johnson hoped to intensify peaceful communications.<sup>109</sup>

Johnson and Kosygin believed the limited time available to both men needed wise utilization and should not be wasted arguing politics. Initially they discussed the recent problems in the Middle East. Johnson immediately admitted US culpability in the tensions.<sup>110</sup> In an effort to convince Kosygin of the need for global arms control, he stated his belief that both the US and the USSR had erred in selling weapons to Egypt and Israel. Johnson believed that the US and the USSR should have been more responsible regarding arms dissemination. Had they done so, it was possible the recent conflict would not have happened. Kosygin dismissed this as so much handwringing. He believed that weapons were plentiful and easily purchased, if the USSR and the US failed to provide weapons someone else would.<sup>111</sup>

Johnson did not allow himself to become discouraged. In the two days these powerful men met, he raised the topic of nuclear armament limitations, prevention of building anti-ballistic missile shields and limiting arms sales to developing nations no less than five times.<sup>112</sup> Johnson was willing to send American representatives anywhere the Politburo was willing to go to negotiate.<sup>113</sup> Kosygin refused to take concrete steps to reduce military stockpiles or consider negotiation locations, stating that in order for change first the US must end the war in Vietnam.<sup>114</sup> In that sense, this meeting was a failure. Johnson was

unable to convince Kosygin of the need to reduce intercontinental and global tensions by limiting arms production.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION: JOHNSON'S UNFULFILLED AGENDA

LBJ's Eastern European agenda was one more piece in a grand strategy intended to reduce global tensions while simultaneously expanding the US trade base. Johnson's repeated efforts toward global arms control challenges the popular misconception of him as a warmonger. Johnson's willingness to abandon the Multilateral Force and to engage in private discussions with Kosygin regarding personal reluctance to build an anti-ballistic missile system only reinforces Johnson's public commitment to limit the arms race. Though he was responsible for the intensification of the conflict in Vietnam, Johnson did everything in his power to lower hostilities in Europe. President Johnson's attempts to crack the Iron Curtain may not have been successful, but it was a legitimate and ongoing effort on the part of the administration.

President Johnson took many steps toward promoting rational communication based on individual nations, instead of narrow views of Communist or non-Communist political systems. Rather than allowing political philosophies to bind him to a way of thinking, Johnson depended on the power of persuasion to change opinions around the world, persuasion he hoped to back up with concrete offers of increased commercial interaction and cultural exchanges. In some cases, he settled for advancing diplomatic channels. In others, he openly offered trade treaties. In every case, he focused on the nation in question, treating each as an independent entity regardless of satellite standing with the USSR. Johnson was willing to use open warfare to manage conflicts with Communist nations, made clear by his

ever-deepening commitment to Vietnam. Nevertheless, he also attempted to use “soft power” to accomplish his goals in Europe, often to his own political detriment. His greatest challenge was convincing Congress and the American public to do the same. His rationale for his actions revolved around lessening Soviet hegemony, expanding the US economy, and reducing belligerency globally. He was not as successful as he hoped to be, due to Congressional interference and Soviet intransigence.

Congress was to a large degree triumphant in its efforts to confound President Johnson’s bridge building eastward. The legislature’s refusal to consider the 1966 East-West trade bill and repeated attempts to prevent the EX-IM bank from extending credit to Warsaw Pact nations added an element of instability to President Johnson’s foreign policy that was difficult to overcome. Constant addendums to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 slowly made further offers of food or loans impossible to make. Trade with America created a sense of instability between Eastern Europe and the US. Johnson offered treaties with one hand, and Congress negated them with the other. Arguments from fiscally conservative economists and business leaders, traditional allies of the Republican Party, could not sway anti-communist ideology.<sup>115</sup> Liberal democrats willing to support trade with Communist Europe gradually withdrew their support.

August 21, 1968 ended the Johnson administration’s experiments of peaceful relations with the Warsaw nations. The Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia to prevent a Czech breakaway from Moscow’s definition of Communism. A global outcry accompanied this invasion, and any American goodwill or sympathy towards Soviet satellites, except Czechoslovakia, vanished overnight.<sup>116</sup> Swiftly following the invasion was the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine declared that the USSR had the

right to define Capitalism and Communism, and unequivocally validated the USSR's right to invade any "Socialist" country that strayed from the given definition.<sup>117</sup> Used to retroactively justify the Czechoslovakian invasion, it indicated Moscow would not tolerate "separate roads to socialism." The Warsaw Pact nation's willingness to follow Moscow's orders, even to the point of invading a neighboring sovereign country, showed Congress that Johnson's depiction of "peaceful" nations was incorrect.

Johnson's failure resulted from three independent factors. The first was his ever-deepening commitment to the Vietnam War. Secondly was the American Congress. Lastly, Leonid Brezhnev's consolidation of power in Moscow clamped down on political maneuvering by the Warsaw nations. These components eradicated any hope for a reconciliation of East and West, at least under the Johnson administration. While a full shift from communist to a capitalist system was unachievable, and never a goal, Johnson's administration could have conceivably assisted in moderating Communist practices in Eastern Europe.

Johnson's inability to convince Congress of the necessity to bring the full might of American "soft power" to bear in Eastern Europe weakened his attempts at reconciliation with European Communists. The critical years 1964-1968 provided Johnson with an opportunity mostly free from Soviet interference. Had he taken the opportunity to focus on tying the Warsaw Nations deeply to Western economies and culture, its possible Soviet oversight in the area would have lessened. Unfortunately, Johnson focused his attention in Vietnam to a larger degree than Eastern Europe. The Vietnam War increased opposition to economic ties between the US and the Warsaw Pact nations from both the American Congress and much of Eastern Europe. Moderate successes aside, Johnson never

accomplished his full objectives of “bridge building” behind the Iron Curtain. Not due solely to his own shortcomings, but due to Congressional roadblocks he was unable to overcome.

## REFERENCES CITED

- 
- <sup>1</sup> *Public Papers of the President, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1964), vol. 1: 389. (Hereafter abbreviated *PPP, LBJ, 1963-64*, 2 vols.) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26264&st=Remarks+in+Lexington&st1=> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup> David Kaiser, "Men and Policies, 1961-1969" in *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Policy During the 1960s*, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press 1994), 12.
- <sup>4</sup> Frank Costigliola, "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany and the End of the Cold War," in *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-1968*, eds. Warren Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf-Tucker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 193.
- <sup>5</sup> Nancy Bernkopf-Tucker, "Lyndon B. Johnson: A Final Reckoning," in Cohen and Tucker, *Johnson Confronts the World*, 311-320.
- <sup>6</sup> Eric Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Knopf, 1969); Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York: Praeger, 1966).
- <sup>7</sup> Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), details the many difficulties arising in Western Europe during the Johnson Administration. H.W. Brands' compilation of essays, *The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), analyzes Johnson's foreign policy on a global scale. Bennet Kovrig addresses the issue of economic and cultural bridge building with Eastern Europe in *Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York: NYU Press, 1991.) The essays in Cohen and Tucker, eds., *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, offer details on such topics as German and American actions regarding the MLF, Johnson and the African continent, and the Johnson administration and Latin America, while generally supporting the popular conception of Vietnam being President Johnson's downfall. Frank Constigliola's "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany and the End of the Cold War," in this volume discusses Eastern Europe briefly, but does not provide any sources for his conclusions. Arthur Waldron in "From Non-Existent to Almost Normal; US China Relations in the 1960s" in *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Policy During the 1960s*. ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), chapter 7, discusses United States and Chinese relations through the 1960s. Paul Y. Hammond's *LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992) only briefly mentions Johnson's failure in Eastern Europe.

---

<sup>8</sup> Foreign Securities Act of 1934, commonly called The Johnson Debt Act, prevented trade with any nation deemed to be in default to its debts to the United States. See Foreign Securities Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1934), <http://trac.syr.edu/laws/18/18USC00955.html> (accessed February 10, 2015). All European communist nations except Bulgaria were in technical default, prohibiting any trade credit extensions these countries. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, section 5, withdrew or suspended the MFN status of The Soviet Union and all satellite nations, with the exception of a Presidential waiver allowing the President to declare trade with a nation to be in the national interest. See Trade Extension Act of 1951, S. Rep 82-299(1951) at 2, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), [http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.11487\\_s.rp.299?accountid=14270](http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.11487_s.rp.299?accountid=14270)(accessed January, 2012). The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, section 231, broadened the definition to include any nation under Communist control regardless of location, and removed the Presidential discretion clause. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1962), (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), at 40, <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=14270&groupid=96626&pgId=182fa584-c8cb-4dd1-853b-c59413169aeb&rsId=14ADA23F574> (accessed January, 2012). The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, known as the Battle Act, controlled exportable items to the Soviet Union and broadened to include any nation deemed to be working against US interests. The Battle Act gave Presidential authority to impose sanctions on any nation not following the controlled trade list. See Amendments to the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (The Battle Act), S. Rep. No. 81-199(1961). (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), [http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12322\\_s.rp.199?accountid=14270](http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12322_s.rp.199?accountid=14270) (accessed January, 2012). The Agricultural Trade Assistance Act of 1954, Public Law 480, renamed the Food For Peace Program in 1961, was modified in 1966, restricting funds from being dispersed to any nation engaged in trade with North Vietnam. See House Committee of Conference, Food For Peace, Cong. Rep. No. 89 -2304, (1966), (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966) at 2-3, [http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12713-7\\_h.rp.2304?accountid=14270](http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12713-7_h.rp.2304?accountid=14270) (accessed January, 2012). All of the Warsaw Pact nations traded with North Vietnam, making them ineligible for the Food for Peace Program.

<sup>9</sup> United States Census Bureau [www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0411.xls](http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0411.xls) (accessed February, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> The amendments to the Food for Peace program originated in the House. The Findley Amendment and the [Robert] Byrd Amendments both originated in the Senate but their introduction was simultaneous in the House. The House was also far more likely to send investigative teams to Eastern Europe and hold hearings on changes in the area. The majority of Congressional documents cited in this study originated in the

House rather than the Senate. The members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee were arguably some of the most educated people in the country on the topic of changes in Eastern Europe. See House Committee of Foreign Affairs, *Our Changing Relationship With Europe: Report of a Special Study Mission to Europe*, H. Rep. No. 90-26, (1967). (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967), [http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12755-2\\_h.rp.26?accountid=14270](http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12755-2_h.rp.26?accountid=14270) (accessed January, 2012). See also Report on Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, *Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc*, H.R. Rep. No. 88-1442, (1964), (Washington, DC: GPO, 1964), [http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12621-1\\_h.rp.1442?accountid=14270](http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12621-1_h.rp.1442?accountid=14270) (accessed January, 2012). Lastly, Subcommittee on Europe Foreign Affairs, *Special Study Mission to Europe*, H.R. Rep. No. 89-15, (1965). (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1965-foa-0008?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2012). Also *Hearing on Recent Developments in East West Relations, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 89 Cong., (1966). (Washington DC: GPO, 1966), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1966-foa-0015?accountid=14270>, (accessed January, 2012) among others. There are no corresponding documents from the Senate.

- <sup>11</sup> National Security Action Memorandum, Number 352, 8 July 1966, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. 17, document. No. 15, Eastern Europe, (Hereafter abbreviated FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 17: 15)*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d15> (accessed December, 2012).
- <sup>12</sup> Return of Polish MFN; see Department of State Central files 611.48 and 411.4841, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960). While I could not personally travel to the National Archives please see Editorial Note, undated, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 10 (part two): 112*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/d112> (accessed February, 2012).
- <sup>13</sup> Associated Press, "Senate Authorizes Red Satellite Aid," *New York Times*, May 12, 1961.
- <sup>14</sup> Executive Order 11,132, 28 C.F.R.13533 (December 14, 1963), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=106286> (accessed December, 2011). Letter From Secretary of Commerce Hodges to Secretary of State Rusk, 15 January 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 8:225*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v08/d225>, (accessed December, 2011). For a discussion on President Johnson's difficulties with increasing agricultural exports to Western Europe, see Memorandum of Conversation, 9 February 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 8: 276*,

- 
- <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v08/d276> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>15</sup> Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 14 January 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 11: 2, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d2> (accessed December, 2012). Oral Message From President Johnson to Nikita Khrushchev, 22 February 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 11: 11, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d11> (accessed December 2012). See *PPP, LBJ, 1963-1964*, 2 vols. (Washington D.C. : GPO, 2005), vol. 1:129, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26009&st=&st1=>, (accessed December, 2012). Also *PPP, LBJ, 1966*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966) vol. 1: 32, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27704&st=&st1=> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>16</sup> Minutes of Meetings of the Export Control Review Board, 20 January 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 9: 149, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d149> (accessed December, 2012). is the earliest mention of Johnson's economic plans regarding blatant pressures on the Soviets for a switch towards a consumer economy. Report of the President's Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy, an undated document between 19 August and 16 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 9: 161, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d161> (accessed January, 2012). See also Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union, April 29, 1965, Box 25, National Security File, Miller Committee, LBJL. The Miller Report was widely circulated, though Johnson did not choose to use it as justification to introduce an East-West Trade bill in 1965.
- <sup>17</sup>For an overview of this topic, see Jeffery Taffet's *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America*, (New York: Rutledge, 2007). See also Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, *PPP, LBJ, 1965*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), vol. 1: 18, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26885&st=&st1=> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 17 January 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 8:1, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d1> (accessed December, 2011). See also House Committee of Foreign Affairs, Conditions Behind the Iron Curtain and in Selected Countries of Western Europe, Report of a Special Study Mission to Europe, H. R. Rep. No. 88-2290, (1963). (Washington, DC: GPO, 1963), at 5-8, <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1963-foa-0013?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2012).

- 
- <sup>19</sup>Report of a Special Study Mission to Europe, *ibid.*
- <sup>20</sup> Paper Prepared by the Department of State, undated but generally located between 18 February and 26 August 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 12, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d12> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>21</sup> Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, *ibid.* at 191-195.
- <sup>22</sup> National Security Action Memo (NSAM) Number 304, 3 June 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 4, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d4> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>23</sup> Special Report by the Central Intelligence Committee, 27 March 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17:2, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d2> (accessed December, 2011 ) for an in-depth discussion of changes in the USSR and the Warsaw-Pact nations.
- <sup>24</sup> See Nikita Khrushchev's Secret Speech available online at <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956khrushchev-secret1.html> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>25</sup> Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, *ibid.* See also "National Intelligence Estimate", *ibid.*, at 21-22,.
- <sup>26</sup> Special Report by the Central Intelligence Committee, *ibid.*, at 2-8. Also National Intelligence Estimate, *ibid.*, 21-22. In addition, Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, 18 February 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 10, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d10> (accessed December, 2011). Lastly NSAM 304, undated, *ibid.*, at 43-51.
- <sup>27</sup> Special Study Mission to Europe, *ibid.*
- <sup>28</sup> Special Report by the Central Intelligence Agency, *ibid.*, at 50. See also House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, Part 2, section 242, subsection (3), *ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup> Most Favored Nation Treaties were standard international treaties afforded to friendly nations. They ensured that if an import from a friendly nation with such a treaty received lower tariffs, then all countries with a binding MFN treaty would receive the same lower rate. Countries without such a treaty were charged higher import tariffs, which made those imports non competitive in price.
- <sup>30</sup> Return of Polish MFN; see Department of State Central files 611.48 and 411.4841, *ibid.*

- 
- <sup>31</sup> *PPP, John F. Kennedy, 1963*, 1 vol. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1964), vol. 1: 405, <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4730928.1963.001/823?view=image&size=100> (accessed February 11, 2015).
- <sup>32</sup> Leon M. Herman, *East-West Trade: An Overview of Legislation, Policy Trends, and Issues Involved*, June 17, (1968). (Washington, DC: GPO, 1968), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.crs-1968-ssx-0006?accountid=14270> (accessed February, 2012).
- <sup>33</sup> By 1968, when Congress had closed nearly every trading loophole, there was very little any new president could do regarding Eastern Europe. It would have been nearly impossible to extend trade treaties to any nation under Soviet control.
- <sup>34</sup> Johnson, or his proxy, introduced an East-West Trade bill to Congress in 1966, proposed an East-West Trade bill in 1965 and reintroduced an East West Trade bill in 1967. All of these bills included the provision of Presidential discretion to offer a MFN to communist nations. Congress, both houses and both parties, defeated these bills each time. See "Congress Shuns President's Soviet Bloc Trade Plan." in *CQ Almanac 1966*, 22nd ed., at 438-40. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1967, <http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal66-1301730>, (accessed January, 2012). Also see Otto Zausmer, "U.S. Blocks Trade Bridge: LBJ Plan for E. Europe Bogged in Congress", *Boston Globe*, October 16, 1966, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/366958294/13DA3C3473411B5459D/3?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2013).
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>36</sup> Executive Order 6581 Creating The Export-Import Bank of Washington, *PPP, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1934*, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1934) 3: 18, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14772&st=&st1=> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>37</sup> Recent Developments in East West Relations, *ibid.*, at 13.
- <sup>38</sup> Foreign Securities Act, ch. 112, 48 Stat. 574, 18 U.S.C. § 955, 1934-04-13, *ibid.*
- <sup>39</sup> Recent Developments in East West Relations, *ibid.*, at 13.
- <sup>40</sup> While the actual declaration is unavailable, this change in policy is referenced in *Bill 2310 Government Guarantees of Credit to Communist Countries, Hearings before the Committee of Banking and Currency*, 87th Cong., (1963) at 27-32, <HTTP://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1963-bcs-0016?accountid=14270>, (accessed December, 2011).

- 
- <sup>41</sup> Message From President Johnson to Chairperson Kosygin, 14 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 11: 61, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d61>, (accessed December, 2011). Report to the President from the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 21 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 9: 61, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d61> (accessed December, 2011). Draft Memorandum, 11 January 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 9: 107, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d107> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>42</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 23 September 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 123, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d123> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>43</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 18 May 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968, XVII*, vol. 17: 142, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d142> (accessed December, 2011). Airgram to Department of State, October 16, 1964, Box One, Country File, Romania, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library. (Hereafter abbreviated CF, Romania, NSF, LBJL)
- <sup>44</sup> US balance of payment surplus December 1963-February 1964 came nearly solely from agricultural exports. See Minutes of Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Export Expansion, 7 April 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 8: 232, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v08/d232> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>45</sup> Joseph Slevin, "U.S. Tariffs Bar Red Trade," *Boston Globe*, October 14, 1966, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/366536247/13DA3C4BD0D1EECC53A/1?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2013).
- <sup>46</sup> Transcript of Background Press and Radio News Briefing, June 1, 1964, #24, Box One, CF, Romania, NSF, LBJL
- <sup>47</sup> "LBJ Assigns Ball to Romania Fiasco," *Boston Globe*, July 27, 1965, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/366173452/13DA3C676F51E986182/1?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2013). In addition, "Johnson Calls for Check into Romanian Deal Collapse", *Baltimore Sun*, July 27, 1965, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/hnpbaltimoresun/docview/539869402/13DA3C90A14224A9E37/1?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2013). This article notes that 45 members of the House of Representatives were members or serve on the advisory board of the Young Americans for Freedom, credited with the movement that destroyed the Firestone deal.
- <sup>48</sup> The Young Americans for Freedom came to life in 1960 as a response to the liberal left student movements. Members included many prominent politicians, including Ronald Reagan. It was officially absorbed into the Young America's Freedom in 2011

- 
- <sup>49</sup> Telegram to the Department of State from Bucharest, April 17, 1965, #46, Box Two, CF, Romania, NSF, LBJL.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup> US government agency responsible for reviewing proposed trade items, and ensuring the items proposed for trade did not violate the restricted list. Comprised of the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Defense.
- <sup>52</sup> Export Control Review Board, Minutes of Meeting, April 1, 1965, #73, Box One, CF, Romania, NSF, LBJL.
- <sup>53</sup> See Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Of the Committee of the Judiciary, Rebellion in the USSR's Europe, Fact and Fiction, S. Rep. No. 89-1952, (1965). (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=14270&groupid=96626&pgId=efb5d1ab-fe1e-454a-ac7b-5d65fd1d94bd&rsId=14AC0A5CC58> (accessed January, 2012). In addition, Minutes of the meeting with the Export Control Review Board, April 1, 1965, #73, Box One, CF, Romania, NSF, LBJL.
- <sup>54</sup> Minutes of the Meeting with the Export Control Review Board, *ibid.*
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>57</sup> Joseph Stalin engineered a replacement government for the Polish people while the previous government was still in exile after Hitler's invasion. New ruling body put in place was Pro-Communist. The Institute for National Remembrance, a Polish initiative, calculates the losses between 5.2 million and 5.8 million. Number changes depend on inclusion of military casualties during WWII and casualties incurred from the USSR after the end of WWII. On December 10, 1964, the Polish delegation to the UN put the number at 6 million see Memorandum of Conversation, 10 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 120, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d120> (accessed January, 2012). See also Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (NY: Basic Books, 2010)
- <sup>58</sup> Willifred L. Kohl, "Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force." *Political Science Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (1965): 88-109, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2147185> (accessed January, 2012) Raymond H. Dawson, "What Kind of NATO Nuclear Force." *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 351 (January 1964), at

- 
- 30-39, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035218> (accessed January, 2012). A very in-depth discussion on US policy regarding NATO and European power sharing of nuclear arms is available in Memorandum of Conversation, 8 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 13: 61, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d61> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>59</sup> Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, 15 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 8: 64, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d64> (accessed December, 2011). In addition, see Telegram From the Embassy in France to the United States, 5 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 7: 42, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d42>, (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid. Also, Costigliola, *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, at 179.
- <sup>61</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 10 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 120, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d120> (accessed December, 2011). In addition, “Memorandum of Conversation”, 23 September 1966, *ibid.*
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> *PPP, LBJ*, vols. 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), vol. 2: 463, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27200&st=Gronouski&st1=> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>65</sup> Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State, 6 April 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 127, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d127> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>66</sup> Outgoing telegram to Department of State from Warsaw Embassy, December 12, 1966, #71, Box One, CF, Poland, NSF, LBJL.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>68</sup> Government Guarantees of Credit to Communist Countries, Before the Committee on Banking and Currency. S. Doc. No. 88-2310, (1963), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1963-bcs-0016?accountid=14270> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid.

- 
- <sup>70</sup> Leon M. Herman, “East-West Trade: An Overview of Legislation, Policy Trends, and Issues Involved”, *ibid.*
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>72</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 29, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/pg\\_119](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/pg_119) (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>74</sup> For a discussion on tourism problems, see Memorandum of Conversation, 9 June 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 117, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d117> (accessed December, 2011).
- <sup>75</sup> *PPP, LBJ*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), vol. 2: 503, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27908&st=&st1=> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>76</sup> American Controlled Trade List was the list of embargoed trade items. The American list was much longer than the Eastern European list. For a complete listing of items, see *Recent Developments in East West Relations*, *ibid.* at 67.
- <sup>77</sup> For text of Polish treaty, see Outgoing telegram to Department of State from Warsaw, *ibid.* For Bulgarian opinion, see Memorandum of Conversation, 2 November 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 17: 33, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/d33> (accessed April, 2012).
- <sup>78</sup> “House Bars Funds to Spur Red Trade,” *New York Times*, October 19, 1966, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/116964583/13DA36FFF2F4C9372D7/1?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2013). *Recent Developments in East West Relations*, *ibid.*
- <sup>79</sup> Representative Pell was instrumental in the attempts to open communications with Czechoslovakia, as he held a fondness for the Czechoslovakian people. This engendered in him a feeling of deep sympathy for the captive nations of Eastern Europe. See Committee on Foreign Relations, *Czechoslovakia, 1968*, S. Rep. No. 90-0961 (1968), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1968-for-0003?accountid=14270> (accessed February, 2012).
- <sup>80</sup> *Recent Developments in East West Relations*, *ibid.*

- 
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid, see also Louis Dombroski, “Laud Johnson Europe Plan”, *Chicago Tribune*, October 9, 1966, <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1966/10/09/page/10/article/laud-johnson-europe-plan/index.html> (accessed June, 2012).
- <sup>82</sup> Recent Developments in East West Relations, *ibid*.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>84</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 5 October 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 17: 153, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/pg\\_418](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v17/pg_418) (accessed April, 2012).
- <sup>85</sup> Recent Developments in East West Relations, *ibid* at 67. Note also the yearly revision on ComCon list and constant change of embargo list defining what was considered “strategic.”
- <sup>86</sup> East West Trade Relations Act of 1966, Submitted by Dean Rusk pursuant to President Johnsons directions, to the Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (D-MA) and Vice President Hubert Humphrey in his capacity as President of the Senate, on May 11. Text of the introductory letters sent and the proposed legislation is available in the Department of State Bulletin , 54 Dep't St. Bull. 831 (1966) No. 1405, [http://heinonline.org.libproxy.temple.edu/HOL/Page?men\\_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/dsbul54&id=1039&size=2&collection=journals&terms=1966%20May|DEPARTMENT%20OF%20STATE|BULLETIN|of|1966%20May%2030.%201966|1966|OF&termtype=phrase&set\\_as\\_cursor=0#833](http://heinonline.org.libproxy.temple.edu/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.journals/dsbul54&id=1039&size=2&collection=journals&terms=1966%20May|DEPARTMENT%20OF%20STATE|BULLETIN|of|1966%20May%2030.%201966|1966|OF&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=0#833) (accessed August, 2013).
- <sup>87</sup> As noted earlier, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had large amounts of information on changes in Eastern Europe. There were yearly inspections of Eastern Europe from House members from 1964-1968. Some members such as John Culver and Claiborne Pell (though he was a Senator) went multiple times.
- <sup>88</sup> *Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, Part II, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 88 Cong. (1964), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1964-foa-0010?accountid=14270> (accessed December, 2011). The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study Mission to Europe, 1964, H. R. Rep. No. 89-0634 (1965), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1965-foa-0008?accountid=14270> (accessed December, 2011). See Rebellion in the USSR’s Europe, Fact and Fiction, *ibid*. Subcommittee to Investigate Administration of Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on Judiciary, Study of the Communist Party and Coalition Governments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European Countries, S. Rep. No. 89-0823 (1966), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t21.d22.cmp-1966-sjs-0004?accountid=14270> (accessed February, 2012). House Committee

- 
- on Foreign Affairs, *Our Changing Partnership with Europe*, Report of Special Study Mission, H. R. Rep. No 90-26 (1967), [http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12755-2\\_h.rp.26?accountid=14270](http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t47.d48.12755-2_h.rp.26?accountid=14270) (accessed March, 2012).
- <sup>89</sup> Arguments against trading with Communists on ideological grounds appear in nearly every congressional record examined on the topic. For a smattering of the material, *Government Guarantees of Credit to Communist Countries*, Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, *ibid.* See also *Recent Developments in East West Relations*, *ibid.* Also, *Senate Joint Resolution 169, Considering East West Trade, Part One, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Finance; Committee on Banking and Currency*. 90 Cong., (1968), <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1968-bcs-0023?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>90</sup> *Recent Developments in East West Relations*, *ibid.*
- <sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>93</sup> Report From the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Johnson, undated but between two documents, date range 22 January to 1 February 1965, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. 8: 33, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v08/d33> (accessed January, 2012,).
- <sup>94</sup> *Government Guarantees of Credit to Communist Countries*, Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, *ibid.* “Report From the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to President Johnson,” *ibid.*
- <sup>95</sup> *Recent Developments in East West Relations*, *ibid.*
- <sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>97</sup> Romania under Dej had begun a process of independence from the USSR. This included refusal to participate in CEMA, refusal to support Khrushchev’s ouster, participation in the “Group of Nine,” a UN initiative of nine members of Central Europe to engage in peaceful coexistence and broadly reaching trade agreements with most of Western Europe. Sources for this are located in *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, Part II*, *ibid.* Also *House Committee of Foreign Affairs, Our Changing Relationship With Europe: Report of a Special Study Mission to Europe*, *ibid.*, as well as *Rebellion in the USSR’s Europe, Fact and Fiction*, *ibid.* Also, see *Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc*, *ibid.*

- 
- <sup>98</sup> *A Bill To Amend the Import Export Bank Act of 1945, Supplemental Hearings, Hearings Before Committee on Banking and Currency, 90 Cong.*, (1967), at 1-2, <http://congressional.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1967-bcu-0013?accountid=14270> (accessed February, 2012).
- <sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, at 1-2.
- <sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, at 13.
- <sup>101</sup> See previous discussion on Polish and Romanian wishes to reduce global arms and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
- <sup>102</sup> Message From Premier Kosygin to President Johnson, 5 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 19: 156, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d156> (accessed January, 2012). Message From White House to Premier Kosygin, 5 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vols. 19:157, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d157> (accessed January, 2012). Message From President Johnson to Premier Kosygin, 5 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 19: 159, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d159> (accessed January 2012). Message From Premier Kosygin to President Johnson, 6 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 19: 173 , <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d173> (accessed January, 2012). As well as various others displaying clear collaboration on both sides towards an end of hostilities in the Middle East.
- <sup>103</sup> Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 17 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 220, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d220> (accessed January 2012). Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, 17 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 221, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d221> (accessed January, 2012). Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Bundy) to President Johnson, 21 June 1967, *FRUS1964-1968*, vol. 14: 221, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d222> (accessed January, 2012). Memorandum From Presidents Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 21 June 1967 , *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 223, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d223> (accessed January 2012) .
- <sup>104</sup> Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 17 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14:220, *ibid.*, at 496, subsection (a), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d220> (accessed January, 2012).

- 
- <sup>105</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 16 June, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 218, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d218> (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>106</sup> Telegram From Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Department of State, 22 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 227, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/d227> (accessed January 2012).
- <sup>107</sup> *Ibid*, at 511.
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, at 510.
- <sup>109</sup> *PPP, LBJ*, 2 vols., (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967) vol. 1: 283, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28320&st=&st1=> ( accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>110</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 23 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 229, at 518, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg\\_518](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg_518) (accessed January 2012).
- <sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, at 525.
- <sup>112</sup> *Ibid*, 519 and 529, Memorandum of Conversation, 25 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 234, at 539, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg\\_539](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg_539) (accessed January, 2012). Memorandum of Conversation, 25 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 235, at 544, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg\\_544](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg_544) (accessed January, 2012).
- <sup>113</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 23 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 229, at 522, *ibid*. Memorandum of Conversation, 23 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 231, at 530, [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg\\_530](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v14/pg_530) ( accessed January, 2012). Memorandum of Conversation, 25 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 234, *ibid*, at 540 .
- <sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, at 540. Memorandum of Conversation, 25 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 14: 235, at 545, *ibid*.
- <sup>115</sup> “Report to the President of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the Soviet Union,” *ibid*. Government Guarantees of Credit to Communist Countries, *ibid*.
- <sup>116</sup> For global reaction to the Soviet invasion, see “Crude Force Condemned,” *The Guardian*, August 22, 1968,

- 
- <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/185301030/13DA372291E5683DCA7/1?accountid=14270> (accessed January, 2013).
- “Indefensible Say Jurists,” *The Irish Times*, August 22, 1968, accessed January 2013, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/525126151/13DA3815EC378BA14F1/1?accountid=14270>.
- “Albania Condemns Both Sides,” *Irish Times*, August 22, 1968, <http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.temple.edu/docview/525070573/13DA381DD4856BDCCBA/1?accountid=14270> (accessed January 2013).
- <sup>117</sup> Jaromir Macratil, ed. *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (Budapest: Hungary Central European University Press, 1998).