

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS ON
POST-INDEPENDENCE STATE BEHAVIOR
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

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ABSTRACT

This project is concerned with examining the impact of colonial administrations on post-independence state behavior in Southeast Asia. Despite a similar historical context, the region exhibits broad variation in terms of policy preferences after independence. Past literature has focused, largely, upon pre-colonial or independence era factors. This project, however, proposes that state behavior is heavily determined by a combination of three colonial variables: indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure levels. It also constructs a four-category typology for the purposes of ordering the broad variation we see across post-colonial Southeast Asia. Utilizing heavy archival research and historical analysis, I examine three case studies in the region, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, that share a common colonial heritage yet exhibit markedly different post-independence preferences.

Vietnam's colonial legacy is characterized by high indigenous elite mobility, medium colonial income diversity, and medium-high levels of institutional-infrastructure. This creates a state where the local elites are capable and socially mobile, but lack the fully developed skill sets, institutions and infrastructure we see in a Developmental state such as South Korea or Taiwan. As a result, Vietnam is a Power-Projection state, where elites pursue security oriented projects as a means of compensating for inequalities between their own social mobility and acquired skills, institutions and infrastructure. In Cambodia, indigenous elite mobility and colonial income diversity are both low, creating an entrenched, less experienced elite. Medium levels of institutional-

infrastructure enables the elite to extract wealth for class benefit. As a result, the state becomes an instrument for elite enrichment and is thus classified as Self-Enrichment state.

Laos' colonial history is characterized by low levels of indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure levels. Laos' elite are deeply entrenched, like their counterparts in Cambodia. However, unlike Cambodia, Laos lacks sufficient institutional-infrastructure levels to make wealth extraction worthwhile for an elite class. Laos' inability to execute an internal policy course, or even enrich narrow social class, categorize it as a Null state.

The theory and typology presented in this project have broad applications to Southeast Asia and the post-colonial world more generally. It suggests that the colonial period, counter to more recent literature, has a much greater impact on states after independence. As most of the world is a post-colonial state, understanding the mechanisms for state behavior is very important.

To my family.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

Over three-quarters of the world's sovereign states are former colonies, including the majority of Asia, all but two states in Africa, and the entirety of the Western Hemisphere. Even Europe has nearly a dozen countries that could be accurately described as post-colonial entities. The debate on the impact of colonialism has been one of the discipline's most heated, inextricably bound to the narrative of the twentieth century: the Cold War, revolution, suffering and, on occasion, triumphs and closure. However with its myriad permutations of colonizer, colonized, and colonial context, distilling a universal theory for colonialism's lasting impact has proven incredibly difficult. The purpose of this project is to examine the impact of colonial legacies on the policy behavior of former colonial domains in Southeast Asia after independence. I propose a four-category typology that serves two functions: classification of the broad variety of outcomes in the region and illustration of the processes by which the colonial period shapes the independence period.

The typology organizes outcomes into four different categories, each of which encapsulates an aggregation of different policy priorities, preferences and strategies. The four categories proposed are null (where the state lacks a coherent internally-generated policy agenda), self-enrichment (where the state serves as a vehicle for the enrichment of a specific social class), power-projection (where the state pursues security-oriented policy above all else) and developmental (where the state pursues a diverse policy agenda). Past literature has attempted to explain the state in numerous ways, typically utilizing a single-

dimension¹. Other authors have attempted to marginalize the impact of colonialism altogether. I argue that the post-colonial state's type is determined by a combination of three different colonial variables: indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure levels. These variables shape post-independence context, including the relevant political actors, their policy priorities and strategies, as well as the physical and political environment they interact in. With much already written on the developmental state, this project focuses upon the expanded typology and utilizes three case studies, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, to demonstrate power-projection, self-enrichment, and null states.

In Vietnam, a power-projection state characterized by high indigenous elite mobility, moderate colonial income diversity and relatively high infrastructure, we see the elite inherit both high levels of human capital and group coherence, but also deep insecurities resulting from an uneven colonial presence. To remedy this, the state pursues security-oriented policies. Both Cambodia and Laos are characterized by low elite mobility and income diversity scores; however, in the case of Cambodia, the new state possesses an institutional-infrastructure level sufficient to permit a continuation of the colonial extraction process. As a result, Cambodia is a self-enrichment state while Laos, possessing consistently low scores across the three variables, becomes a null state, incapable and unwilling to pursue a significant policy agenda.

Southeast Asia is arguably the most diverse region in the post-colonial world and this dissertation controls for historical factors as well as illustrate a broad outcome range. Utilizing these case studies both clearly demonstrates my theory, which in turn hopes to

¹ Such as direct vs. indirect rule.

contribute to the broader discussion of post-independence policy and administrative behavior among former colonial domains.

What follows is, first, a discussion of the relevant literature pertaining to the impact of colonialism on post-independence state policy. Afterward, my colonial variables will be introduced and discussed, followed by the presentation of my typology and its outcomes. Finally, there will be an explanation of the causal mechanisms that place cases into the different types described in the typology.

Existing Literature on Role of Colonial Legacies

To better demonstrate my proposal's contribution to the literature we will first engage existing literature on the impact of colonialism on contemporary states. There are two important debates to address. The first debate engages with the question of whether or not there is an impact and, if so, to what degree. This literature is generally divided into two camps. The first posits there is no significant impact of colonialism on contemporary policy. The second, by contrast, holds that colonialism does have an impact. The latter camp is, in turn, divided into two broad groups; those that state the impact to exist but be relatively marginal, and those that believe colonialism to be more deterministic. This last group's rationale can be based upon chronological factors, as well as the degree of colonial administrative penetration.

The second debate proposes region-specific explanations for Southeast Asia's variance. Here, I identify three major arguments; the importance of pre-colonial

conditions, the impact of Japanese occupation during World War 2, and regional adaptation to the Cold War international political order.

I will address both literatures, as well as their shortcomings, before proposing my own theoretical alternative. A brief summary, Table 1, is presented for convenience.

Table 1

Summary of Literature

<i>Argument</i>	<i>Impact of Colonialism</i>	<i>Summary</i>	<i>Examples</i>	<i>Deficiencies</i>
Pre-Colonial	Insignificant	Pre-Colonial conditions have a greater impact on development than colonial.	Bruce Cumings (2005), Herbst (1996, 2000).	Ignores fundamental alterations to socio-political structures by colonialism.
Direct Rule	Marginal or Deterministic	Degree of colonial penetration equates greater impact.	Lange (2009), Fanon (1952, 1961).	Unable to explain variation in state outcomes, understates impact of indirect rule.
Japanese Occupation	Marginal or Deterministic	Japanese occupation erased preexisting colonial conditions.	Kohli (1986), Midgal (1988).	Cannot explain variation on state types where occupation was similar.
Cold War	Insignificant	Cold War adaptations, either political or as a result of war, trump colonial legacy.	Vu (2010), Booth (2007), Kim (2009), Doner et al (2005), Stubbs (1999).	International politics always a factor in any time period, war common throughout region, cannot explain for variation.

Significance Debate

Insignificant

At one end of the significance debate are those who argue that colonialism's impact has been negligible. This camp is generally split into two groups. The first argues that the colonial period is too deeply bound to the pre-colonial past. The second group argues that colonialism goes too far back and that the Cold War's complexities have erased much of the colonial period's impact.

The first group's argument hinges upon the importance of the pre-colonial. Particularly historically heavy work makes the claim that colonialism is an arbitrary point from which to begin analysis. Bruce Cummings, in his discussion of South Korean development, acknowledges the Japanese colonial era, however he also makes the claim that it may ultimately be an intervening variable between Choson dynasty and Il-Sung/Rhee (Cumings 2005).

This is problematic, particularly for the Korean case, because of the sharp distinction between colonial and pre-colonial Korea. While there is some historical continuity, it is also true that Japanese colonialism deeply shook the Korean social order (Midgal 1988, Kohli 1994). The decay of the caste system was a gradual process, however, the Japanese occupation created a new social hierarchy altogether, one in which Koreans no longer occupied the apex.

Others point to the degree of penetration of many colonial states into the territory they were to administer. Jeffrey Herbst, discussing Africa, describes the nature of many

colonial states as being constrained to a capital (Herbst 1996). These states had only a passing presence in much of the vast countryside, and little capacity or desire to do so (Herbst 1996, 122). Pre-colonial socio-political structures, defined by overlapping allegiances of convenience based on people rather than land (Herbst 128-129), may contribute to the problems facing post-independence African states in maintaining borders arbitrarily set for them by foreign powers. This too is problematic, because there have been clear efforts by the post-colonial state to preserve the boundaries set down, or to erode tribal/traditional modes of political allegiance. These behaviors can be found in Southeast Asia and across the wider post-colonial world. The creation of these boundaries are more a part of the colonial experience than a phenomenon confined to the moment of independence or afterward.

While the first group of scholars posits that colonialism is too recent a time frame to begin with, while other scholars claim that it is too distant. The argument here is that the complexities of the Cold War international system, characterized by its intense bipolarity and frequent intervention, have erased whatever vestiges of the colonial system that remained following tumultuous transitions to independence. The view is not a common one, though some do incorporate important elements of the theory (as we will see in the next section).

The effects of colonialism are apparent. The establishment of borders based upon colonial spheres, alone, has created a good deal of tension. For Asia, this has been a cause of external conflict, while in Africa the problems have been more internal. Extractive colonial policy left many areas with a dearth of human capital. As a result, the

overwhelming majority of work accepts that colonial rule had at least degree of impact on society and on states (Booth 2007, Migdal 1988, Neher 2002, McNeely 1995, Mahoney 2010, Vu 2010, Kohli 1986, Etemad 2007, Lange 2009). That is where the heart of the debate actually lies; how great, and in what dimensions, is this impact significant.

Marginal Impact

Some, such as Anne Booth and Tuong Vu, posit that the colonial impact is present but marginal. For example, in her discussion of Southeast Asia, Booth notes that colonial goals of profit-seeking create a for-export infrastructure centered on metropolitan/urban areas. These areas serve as both the gateway to the empire, but also as a market for the (usually agricultural) peripheral regions of the colony (Booth 2007). However, while colonialism is responsible for creating this infrastructure Booth does not argue that it guarantees a developmental state, in-and-of itself. Rather, Booth believes that, while it is important to consider the historical, the effects of leadership are often even more profound, potentially warping the state's post-independence period. The behavior of leadership is, often, highly contextual; contingent upon the historical circumstances in which they are nested (Booth 2007). So, Booth would argue, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's administrative style is more so the by-product of a rolling adaptation to Cold War realities than the penetration of British colonial policy into everyday life of the Chinese demographic in British Malaya (Booth 2007).

I find this explanation for state behavior problematic. In the case of Lee, the ability to recognize political situations was not formed at the moment of crisis, but long

before the federation crisis in the 1960s. While Lee is an independent agent, it is a highly contestable claim to make that Lee's behavior was not significantly impacted by his own background, specifically one defined by elite mobility and a complex colonial administration. It is highly doubtful that Lee would have considered independence an option at all had he not been educated, a member of the Chinese Diaspora in a predominantly Malay colonial domain, and had not possessed the administrative experience that he did.

Vu marginalizes the colonial and pre-colonial further, positing that the conditions on the ground at the moment of state formation (independence) are more important for determining the nature of politics and the state going forward (Vu 2010). The claim is that the nature of relationships amongst elites is crystallized at the moment of independence and, likewise, their engagement with mass politics is set. Vu argues that the divisions created by independence and the state-building process redefined the roles and behavior of the elite in places like Malaysia, more than its economic history.

Vu's argument, while complex, becomes problematic if one were to attempt to explain coups, civil wars and other major upheavals in a systematic way, particularly those that do not happen immediately after the 'moment of formation.' An example of this could be the Cambodian civil war. The Khmer Rouge cannot readily be accounted for in Vu's calculus, as they are a political non-entity at the time of independence. They are, however, in contention for political control of the country within fifteen years. Just over twenty years after independence, the Khmer Rouge captures the capital Phnom Pehn. Similarly, discussion of mass politics is problematic for areas such as Southeast Asia and

Sub-Saharan Africa. In many regional cases, there is nothing that could reasonably be categorized as 'mass politics.' Vietnamese mobilization may exist, a product of Marxist strategies for warfare and production, however, many other cases are devoid of any such mobilization. A lack of civil society or a 'mass' to organize or express itself politically makes the formula less useful for such examples.

One illustrative example, discussed in further detail later, demonstrates this reality. In Cambodia, peasant rebellions crop up several times, particularly at the turn of the 20th century. These rebellions often forced the French colonial administration to seek out the influence of the Cambodian monarch, as a result of a lack repressive capacity on the part of the administration. However these rebellions, while often in reaction to tangible grievances, often have little real policy impact. The traditional authority of the Cambodian king often ended these mobilizations without violence. Where the king's traditional authority did not end the revolt, the rebellions were put down and little was done to directly redress the causes of the revolt. Furthermore, these revolts were frequently organized around regional elites, rather than any kind of grassroots movement. There was insufficient organizational experience at the non-elite level to affect any meaningful political change. This story repeats itself in neighboring Laos. In Vietnam, it is the existing elite classes (such as the Mandarins) who are able to exert pressure on colonial administrators, not the village-bound majority of the population. Thus, theories based upon mass politics for such reasons may overstate their importance, or misattribute state behavior.

Dan Slater's work, *Ordering Power*, is similar to Vu in its focus on the relationship between elites and the masses. While there is some greater reverence paid to the colonial roots of the circumstances he's observing, Slater ultimately determines that post-independent crises are most important (Slater 2010).

Others, such as Wonik Kim, agree with Vu's notion that the moment of independence is pivotal (Kim 2009). However, Kim posits a less deterministic view of politics in the post-colonial era, suggesting that it is the process of de-colonization after independence that defines a state as they attempt to break free from what they view as detrimental lines of thought (Kim 2009). While permitting for variance in post-colonial states, Kim's argument does little to explain for differences amongst states. For example, why did both Khmer and Lao leaderships fail to adapt to post-cold war realities, despite sharing the same process of de-colonization. Similarly, it cannot explain similarities amongst states with different colonial and post-colonial histories, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Both pursue security oriented policy, yet they do not share a colonial administration, independence transition or post-colonial conflict history.

Deterministic

Herbst, Booth, and Vu stand in contrast with older, more historically-determinant works. Perhaps the most representative example of such is Atul Kohli's work on colonialism and development. Kohli argues that colonialism has had a profound impact on the development of independent states, specifically on the behavior and maturation of indigenous elites (Kohli 1986). The viewpoint is perhaps most clearly represented in his

work on the Korean developmental state, where he claims that the Japanese colonial presence fundamentally altered the relationship between the Korean state and society by centralizing authority, eliminating waste and corruption, aligning the state and dominant classes, land reform and creating conditions suited to export-oriented industry (such as weak labor unions and powerful producer-class alliances (Kohli 1, 1994).

Others, such as Joel Midgal, while perhaps not nearly so determinist, claims that colonialism helped to shape post-independent states in very tangible ways. Midgal, too, utilizes the example of the Japanese colonial presence in Korea to demonstrate how foreign administration can help to break down a stagnant social hierarchy that had excluded segments of the population (Midgal 1988). Prior to the Japanese presence, the nobility in Korea were enormously privileged, and even the small-landowning class in Korea was disenfranchised from the political process. This future business class would serve as the seed to the Chaebol that would drive the Korean economy post-independence (Cumings 2005). While the impact of the Japanese occupation is powerful in that regard, simply re-shuffling social hierarchies is insufficient in itself to explaining the variance we see in post-colonial domains.

Lange and Frantz Fanon speak to another common hypothesis in the more deterministic camp, which orients the impact of colonialism along lines of direct versus indirect rule. Lange suggests that a greater degree of colonial presence produces a stronger, more developmentally successful state (Lange 2009). Fanon, by contrast, argues that direct colonial administration can lead to profound social tension and, as a

result, political instability following independence (Fanon 1963, 1968). Both accept the basic presumption that a greater presence equates to a more significant impact.

In this work, I argue that this presumption (presence=impact) is false. Even a relatively indirect mode of rule, of the type observed in Myanmar by the British, can profoundly affect the post-colonial state. Conversely, as will be demonstrated in our case studies, even if we were to accept that colonial penetration equated to state strength, which does not explain the variance in policy preferences and targets that we see in the former French Indochina alone².

Explanations for State Type Variation in Southeast Asia

Other scholars have put forward alternatives explaining for variation in post-colonial behavior in Southeast Asia. Here, I discuss three of the most common; those arguing for the importance of the pre-colonial period, the Japanese occupation, and the impact of the Cold War.

Pre-Colonial Conditions

The first argues that pre-colonial conditions carry forward throughout the colonial period to the independence period. These new states are generally weak and have limited capacity, pushing leadership to seek new forms of support to maintain the state. This is a common explanation put forward for Sub-Saharan Africa, as it goes a long way in explaining the rapid decay of states in the post-bellum period.

² Jeffrey Herbst, in *States and Power in Africa*, discusses in more detail the problems colonial literature has in reconciling the impact of colonialism on state behavior following independence (Herbst 2000, 20).

In the African case, borders were determined by colonial powers based upon the physical environment, many ethnic groups found themselves split, or now forced to cooperate with groups with whom there may have been little in common, or an outright antagonistic relationship. These new states quickly discover that they lack the capacity to enforce the territory thrust upon them by the international order and large areas of the country pass from their control (Herbst 1996). In some cases, it devolves to traditional powers (chieftains, alliances, etc.), warlordism (as with Somalia, DPRC) or, worse, into effective statelessness.

This explanation, however, is problematic, especially when one seeks to generalize from the African case. While it is true that many former colonial states are weak, there are numerous exceptions to this rule, particularly when one leaves the African continent. There are outcomes, particularly in Asia, where states are very powerful (Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore) or at the very least capable of carrying out some sort of policy agenda (Myanmar, Cambodia, Philippines). Indeed, with Asia, strong states are the rule. This comes despite a complex pre-colonial history that, in some cases, is not all that different (in terms of centralization, anyway) from what we see in Africa. Amorphous political authority figures into Southeast Asia's political history and was, in many ways, a driving engine of French colonial expansion in the region. Even within Africa, there is a broad range of 'weakness,' spanning the outright failed (Somalia), near-failed (DPRC), relatively benign (Ghana), and even states that have demonstrated stability and relative prosperity (Gabon, Mauritius, and South Africa.) This

discussion does not even begin to include North Africa, where the states have been effective in executing a policy agenda.³

As a result, this pre-colonial explanation is insufficient to explain the broad variety of outcomes that we see. The most important, I think, is that the pre-colonial explanation understates the effects of the colonial administration. While it is true that, in many areas, colonial penetration may not reach the hinterland of the territory (Herbst 1996, 122), it is also true that the administration will fundamentally alter the landscape of controlled territory for its own needs. New infrastructure, while extractive in intent and nature, can still profoundly alter the strategic assessments of decision-makers after colonial withdrawal. Fanon's work on the psychological impact of colonialism demonstrates that the colonial relationship can begin affecting groups deeply, very quickly (Fanon 2005). This is not to understate the potential impact of the pre-colonial, however, one would expect that if the pre-colonial could exercise as much influence as some proponents would suggest, than the state structure in Sub-Saharan Africa should have been abandoned soon after independence. There were internal efforts toward the preservation of these states. Conversely, while it is true that there existed an international order thrust upon it, this did not stop Somalia's decay, despite direct intervention by one of the world's super powers.

The pre-colonial period can be useful in explaining particular parts of the picture; such as how the Cambodian king came to possess the immense cultural power that he does. However, the colonial period fundamentally altered the social and political arenas

³ Herbst's excludes North Africa on theoretical grounds (Herbst 1996), but that does not alter the fact they possess a similar tumultuous history, including extensive periods of independence and colonization, and have produced stronger states.

in areas affected by it. While the degree of colonial permeation may have been different from case to case, the very existence of a colonial period at all represents a paradigmatic shift in the history of these places. The Cambodian king possessed immense symbolic strength (one that the French had to actively account for) however the reality is that the King of Cambodia became a political actor in a world shaped not by Angkor, but by the colonial period. His borders were decided by the French, his legal and symbolic authority were gradually separated and, in the case of the former, eroded. Ultimately, this project argues that the pre-colonial can certainly be said to inform conditions on the ground during the colonial period and forward, but colonialism directly shaped the socio-political context in which these states act post-independence.

Japanese Occupation

The second major alternative explanation for post-colonial policy preference, specifically for Southeast Asia, is the Japanese occupation from 1940-1945. Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, were perceived by the Japanese to be a much more intimately connected to the Japanese homeland. Southeast Asia's Japanese experience is linked to the "Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere." Japan's presence in Southeast Asia was less direct, with the Japanese aware that their limited logistic capacity prevented outright occupation of these areas. Therefore, places like Myanmar, Indonesia, and Indochina were encouraged to develop states of their own, so long as they were Pro-Japanese (Owen et. al. 2005, 330). The Japanese, following the Meiji Restoration, had engaged in a policy of heavy industrialization and modernization of its national institutions. Coupled

with a series of regional wars, including an intervention in China and a conflict with Russia in the century, this policy of 'modernization' had entered Japan onto the world scale and it now began to export the lessons learnt to its fledgling client states in the region in exchange for raw materials (Booth 156-58). This included administrative expertise, but also the availability of arms and military training to create 'indigenous' armies (Slater 2010, 65-66). The creation of these local armed forces accomplished the dual goal of easing the load on the Japanese armed forces as well as undermining European influence in the area (Slater 65). The argument goes that the Japanese occupation 'annihilated' the existing colonial institutions (Slater 67) and set the new states on a course for independence (Midgal 1988). Local collaborationist leadership was, as a result, Pro-Japan⁴.

This dissertation accepts that the Japanese occupation was pivotal, providing for a shake-up of the established order at the time. However, this project posits that the Japanese occupation cannot accurately explain the variation on outcomes we see in the region. It also does not completely capture the story for all cases, because its greatest impact comes from its interaction with the various preexisting European colonial administrations. In Vietnam, the Japanese encountered a newly emergent elite class that was already becoming mobilized at the ideological and martial level. In Indonesia, the story varied from densely populated Java, where Dutch influence was high, to more remote places like Borneo where the population was thin. However, while the Japanese may have been crucial to passing along martial and administrative skills to the Javanese,

⁴ This is for a number of reasons. Aside from ridding themselves of European colonialism, some argue that there was an implicit understanding that the Japanese occupational experience would ultimately lead toward independence (Owen et al, 159).

the core of post-war Indonesia, they were less important to the existing, French-trained elites in Vietnam. Yet, both Vietnam and Indonesia pursue similar security-oriented projects after the war. Even in areas where the Japanese approach was more parallel, the post-independence preferences tended to be different from case to case.⁵ So, this project presupposes that, while crucial in facilitating the end of the European colonial regimes, the Japanese occupation was too short and too shallow in its depth to fundamentally alter decades of pre-existing colonial administrations. In short, the Japanese occupation was an important part of the colonial story, but it does not represent the entirety of the colonial experience.

The Cold War

The third major alternative explanation argues that the states we see today reflect an adaptation to the international order that existed at the time of their inception and early post-independence development. This argument focuses on two key points: state capacity and the impact of war dictating policy.

With regards to the first point, the argument focuses on the question of whether a small, resource-constrained state can pursue a course of action that deviates significantly from the will of the Cold War's two superpowers. As a result, the argument goes, we should not be surprised by the number of weak, client states that emerge in the Cold War as the great game is played between Moscow and Washington. History suggests that it is often in the interest of self-preservation for weaker states to accept the decisions of the

⁵ Slater discusses the parallels in the Japanese approach in Indonesia and Myanmar (Slater 64-66). The military occupied an important spot in society and government, post-independence, in both places, but similarities end there.

stronger. This approach, then, supports the notion that we should see regimes acting in their rational self-interest, pursuing policies in response to pressures either external (Doner et al 2005, 329-330), internal (Vu 2010, Booth 2007) or both (Kim 2009).

However, this is a broad generalization that does not account for a number of historical scenarios where localities were able to take advantage of the international situation for their own benefit. Again, particularly in Southeast Asia, we see a number of such cases. Thailand, for example, utilizes its position between two colonial powers to maintain a real measure of independence while its neighbors were swallowed up. Post-independence, it is not impossible to walk an independent path, as one sees with India and the non-aligned movement. Singapore managed to manipulate the international system to its economic benefit, and both Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea were able to navigate the Sino-Soviet split for their own benefit. In other scenarios, being 'insignificant' can actually be exploited by a state for its own benefit, as is the case with Laos.

One of the major shortcomings of this alternative, then, is that it presumes that international intervention, even by states exponentially more powerful, means that the weaker state will be unable to pursue any independent policy of its own. International politics are ever present, not only in the independence era, but also the colonial and pre-colonial. The international system is an added set of factors for the state to account for, but it is rarely entirely determinant. As we will see later, even small and weak states can take advantage of the system to a degree determined by their will and capacity to recognize and exploit the system. This is not a phenomenon that requires advanced

degrees in social science or financing; it is one present throughout the course of human history.

The second point, as discussed extensively by Richard Stubbs, is that warfare can dictate developmental outcomes for states (Stubbs 1999). This argument holds that underdeveloped states experience a number of transformative effects as a result of being involved in major conflicts (Stubbs 1999, 339). This includes a number of which that are conducive to development, such as bureaucratic centralization, land reform, government incentives for industry, to name a few (Stubbs 339). Stubbs argues that post-colonial states in the region were now unencumbered by previous constraints or realities (Stubbs 350), and that they were the direct beneficiaries of American aid (Stubbs 341-342) that provided both an influx of capital (Stubbs 346) and markets for newly export-oriented economies.

Stubbs' argument is problematic for explaining variation in Southeast Asian outcomes. Conceptually, Stubbs himself admits that countries will sometimes experience these benefits indirectly, through several degrees of separation (Stubbs 348). In fact, in some scenarios, such as Singapore, it is the de-escalation of conflict that creates the most benefit (Stubbs 348). Stubbs' major examples, like Japan and Korea, also overlook Pre-World War 2 development.

For Southeast Asia more specifically, Stubbs' war-centric theory on developmental outcomes simply does not hold. While Thailand benefitted immensely from American interest in the region, Cambodia and Laos never developed the sort of powerful, developmentally-minded states we would expect to see. All of our case studies,

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, were very much at the front during the cold war. However, we do not see the emergence of these economies, and in the case of Cambodia and Laos, we see relatively little in terms of the expected structural, societal or institutional reforms.

Conclusion

Against these arguments in the literature, this project proposes that the major sources of policy preferences stem from the greater colonial period as a whole. I suggest that indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and the degree of institutional/infrastructural development profoundly affect the nature of the players and their environment following independence. These variables permit for explanations not present in the current alternatives; elites capable of adaptation and states of various sizes and agendas able to act outside of the strict expected outcomes of the post-WW2 international system.

Theory and Typology

Introduction

As a region, Southeast Asia exhibits a broad range of state type outcomes. For example, Singapore is a strong developmental state, prioritizing economics, education and political stability. The region also includes Vietnam and Indonesia that have, historically, been more aggressive in asserting their agenda on the international level, and also have demonstrated strong commitment to internal security. Included also are historically weaker states such as Laos, as well as those with strong authoritarian trends

in Myanmar and Cambodia. As such, Southeast Asia provides an excellent region in which to observe the many different priorities post-colonial states can choose.

This project distinguishes itself from previous studies in two important ways. First it constructs a typology to organize potential state types. Utilizing a typology permits a visualization of the impact of these separate variables, both independently and interaction with one another, on the state type following independence. It is of particular use for multi-dimensional studies such as this one, as it could be used to capture multiple causal factors in a theory, simultaneously.⁶ Typologies permit for a systemic exploration of multiple paths to a particular outcome (Elman 2005, 298), as well as testing these potential outcomes through “counterfactual reasoning (Elman 299).”⁷

Second, this project utilizes three colonial variables as part of a multi-dimensional examination of the impact of a state's colonial legacy. Previous literature tends to be more singular in its focus, such as in the debate over direct versus indirect colonial rule. I propose, instead, that it is a combination of three different variables, working in concert that produces the variation in state types.

I propose a typology of four state type outcomes that both classifies the variation we see in Southeast Asia, and offers an explanation for this variance nested in the region's colonial legacy. I focus on three factors in particular have the most profound


⁶ See Andrew Bennett's "Causal mechanisms and typological theories in the study of civil conflict" in Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed). *Transnational Dynamics of Civil War* (pgs. 205-231). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2013. Also, see Colin Elman's work on explanatory typologies (Elman, Colin. "Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics." *International Organizations*. Vol. 59. No. 2. 2005. 293-326).

⁷ Elman also discusses how the utility of a typology is dependent upon the strength of the theory on which it is based (Elman 299). For this very reason, great attention has been paid to the development of theory for this project.

effect; they are indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructural levels. The relative levels of these variables, and their interaction, define the relevant political players and the environment in which they interact.

In regions where all colonial variables are high, then the result is a developmental state (one that pursues a diverse developmental portfolio.) In those where either colonial income diversity or indigenous elite mobility is high but the other (colonial income diversity or indigenous elite mobility) is medium or low, then the result is the power-projection type (where the state prioritizes security above all else.) Where indigenous elite mobility and colonial income diversity is low, then institutional-infrastructure becomes the deciding factor. In those states whose legacy is characterized by medium or high levels of institutional-infrastructure, the result is the self-enrichment state (a type whereby the state serves as a vehicle for the enrichment of a specific social class). Where institutional-infrastructure is low the result is a null state (one lacking an internal policy agenda, and/or the capacity to execute it.)

Figure 1



Determining State Type

Thus, my proposed explanation accurately represents the full-range of state-type outcomes. It acknowledges the extensive scholarship on the developmental state, but also includes three additional categories that allow us to create a theory that explains for variation without being confined to dichotomies based on limited, single-variable approaches.

The highly traditional and agrarian nature of the region means that the elite groups often possess a wildly disproportionate amount of resources relative to their

population and are usually best poised to impact policy. As a result, the study is somewhat top-down, often focuses on elite-driven and state level mechanisms. I have tried to best account for 'mass politics' and 'civil society' whenever possible. Individual cases where mass politics may be at play are addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Finally, there is one more methodological note to make. Utilizing a typology, by definition, involves a simplification of reality. The purpose of the typology, and of the project at large, is to characterize the impact of colonialism in Southeast Asia. During the process, historical nuance is sacrificed for the sake of analytical clarity. There may be a certain discomfort that accompanies such simplification, however the loss of these historical details does not subtract from the validity of the results.

What follows will be a brief definition of several important terms and phrases going forward. Afterward, we will discuss the colonial variables, as well as the individual mechanisms in-play that affect state-type outcome. Then we will examine the typology more closely, looking at its key characteristics and how they are impacted by the colonial variables in play. We will then introduce the cases to be utilized in this study (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), the rationale for their selection and their utility as cases.

The *state* in this project can refer to its classic Weberian definition (Weber 1919/1998), but also to what I refer to as the dominant social class (DSC). This class need not necessarily serve as a complete image of societal elites, but it does refer to the class or section of those elites which serve as the engine for the development and

functions of the state⁸. In some cases, the DSC is an early, cocoon-like phase of state development but, as we go on, we will see that it appears prominently in discussion of the colonial and early-independence era. The DSC may gradually become the state at large, losing features that separate it from the state at large. Other groups may become important as the functions of the state expand, parallel to the story of the development of the state as an idea. However, in other cases, such as in Cambodia, the DSC has remained the dominant actor in society and the functions of the state exist, almost exclusively, to serve the ends of the DSC. So, in the case of Vietnam, the party becomes intimately bound to the functions of the state, possessing many parallel positions but, in effect, the two are one and the same. In the Cambodian case, traditional elites have grown appendages of existing social structures to serve the functions of the state. In short, the party is the state in Vietnam, but the elites run the state in Cambodia.

When this project refers to *state type*, it refers to both policy preferences and to the overall goals of the state following independence. It, therefore, refers both to individual phenomenon, such as Cambodian investment in offshore drilling, but also to greater trends in a state's post-colonial history, such as Thai interest in economic development, or Vietnamese interest in security. This project is more concerned with the aggregate of a state's interests than with isolated state policies. Over time the sum of the smaller individual phenomena will coalesce and support my broader characterizations of policy agendas for my cases.

⁸ A good example of this class would be Weber's bureaucrats, as envisioned in *Politics as a Vocation* (Weber 1919/1998 77-128). For my purposes, however, the class needs not to be exclusively socio-economic.

Colonial Variables

As stated above, this project posits that the character of a state's colonial legacy constrain its future character and position in the proposed typology. This project focuses on three key elements of this legacy, Indigenous Elite Mobility (IEM), Colonial Income Diversity (CID), and Institutional/Infrastructural (INF).

Variables will be measured, per case, from start of direct colonial administration to point of independence or transitional period; in general this includes a time frame running from approximately 1850-1950. All variables take into account what will be a gradual change over time on account of technological innovation (such as with infrastructure, telecommunications, etc.)

Indigenous Elite Mobility

Indigenous Elite Mobility is defined by the dynamics of the local elite (not technocrats or bureaucrats sent from the Imperial homeland). Elite in the Southeast Asian context refers to a relatively narrow segment of the population in which an overwhelming amount of 'power' is centered. This often refers to political power, but within the regional context, this sort of power often presupposes economic and cultural power. Political power is rarely exclusive of the other spheres⁹ of society¹⁰.

⁹ Dan Slater speaks to the power of 'communal' elites, those possessing symbolic or cultural power (Slater 2009, 203-254). Within Southeast Asia, these elites can wield enormous influence, and their power is often rooted in deep historical context.

Elites, then, become a class that is usually tied to political power as their primary social resource. In the region, as said before, this usually correlates to economic and symbolic strength as well. This project will utilize archival research methods to identify politically significant families and organizations in order to observe any elite mobility. Mobility is defined here in three ways; transformation, creation and disintegration. It should be noted that the types of mobility are not exceptional in and of themselves; this work makes no claim about links between specific types of elite mobility and state types. It is the total sum of all mobility that is important.

Transformation refers to the movement of elites from one societal sphere to another in a significant way. For example, the movement of Korean elites from nobility to commerce would constitute a notable transformation. If, as in Myanmar, the same elite class continues to dominate specific spheres of society (military and political) this would represent a lack of transformation.

Elite mobility can also be measured by the disintegration of old elites. This can be observed by first identifying existing elites and then, through historical examination, tracking them through the colonial period. If the group disappears or otherwise marginalizes, without having made a fundamental transformation, then it can be said to

¹⁰ There are three exceptions to this rule of multifaceted power: Buddhist temples, the Chinese Merchant class and marauding Chinese banditry, for example. These are not included as members of the indigenous elite, for several reasons. Buddhist Temples, though symbolically powerful, are in many cases subordinated to higher traditional authorities. Monks may possess traits distinguishing them from the general population, such as literacy, however, they possess little direct political or economic authority and are, almost by definition, separate from society. Banditry does not accurately represent an established class. Bandits are not necessarily local (as with Laos.) Finally, the Chinese merchant class is not included for a combination of reasons. They were often a very narrow group that is involved deeply in trade, often as middlemen between different localities. As such, their political allegiances were never clear, and maintained a powerful cultural distinction. This separation removed them from the population, and they were often excluded from the formal political process whenever possible. In Vietnam, the Chinese Diaspora is substantially more integrated into society and many key elite families have some Chinese background.

have disintegrated. This could be nobility fading away, or it could be one new class supplanting the existing class (as the new intelligentsia did with the preexisting Vietnamese bureaucratic class.)

Finally, elite mobility can be gauged by the emergence of new important players. This may not always be as dramatic as one would suppose. For example, in Vietnam, the emergence of a literate, professional class would represent the emergence of a new elite in Vietnam, as the narrow segment of the population would dominate many professional positions, while also filling the ranks of the nationalist and Marxist insurgencies. In Cambodia, for example, we see no major new classes of elites emerge; most elites throughout the course of Cambodia's colonial period are all related at some degree from the Cambodian nobility. The same is true with much of Laos.

For ease of categorization, elite mobility will be graded on a three-level scale, low, medium and high. Low mobility indicates no significant shift in the occupations of elites, no or few additions of new elites, and little to no disintegration of old elites. An example of medium nobility would include elite movement across societal roles, expressed as general trends, as well as some marginal creation and disintegration of elites. High mobility would indicate a dramatic shift in a relatively short amount of time. Existing elites will have either made major shifts in occupations or have disintegrated, and new elite classes will have emerged in great numbers to impact society in a significant way.¹¹

¹¹ Such upheaval would often, though not always, be part of a broader change in societal structure, such as the disintegration of a caste system, etc.

Elite mobility is a variable that primarily defines the relevant actors in the post-colonial state. Elites who are mobile are forced out of political positions that were locked or stagnant upon the institutionalization of colonization, and by moving to different areas of society are able to acquire new skill sets and remain relevant, in effect maintaining their elite status. This transfer often includes not only the acquisition of new human capital through education and experience, but also fosters a culture of adaptability and indicates a rejection of status quo. This adaptation is, by no means, a guarantee of success. Elites can and will fade away, a process that is by no means recent or limited to the region of focus. Similarly, new elites emerge to fill these niches, particularly in societies that are intensely stratified, as many in Southeast Asia will be.

Elite mobility, thus, defines the actors, how they perceive themselves, others, and their position in the system, both domestic and international. For example, elites that stem from newly emerged or recently transformed groups will be less disposed toward maintenance of the status quo. This represents a rejection of a system that either actively disenfranchised them previously, or produced a decay that necessitated an evolution. Where elite mobility was low, maintenance of the status quo becomes of great importance, as the group's prosperity and prestige are tied to the system. When thrust onto the international arena, non-mobile elites will be more predisposed toward behavior that guarantees the maintenance of the system. Mobile elites will be predisposed toward asserting their agenda on the domestic and international scene, and be better prepared to develop an agenda in the first place.

Colonial Income Diversity

Colonial income diversity refers to the number of sources of income and ratio thereof of a colonial administration. Generally, this project is concerned with three major forms of colonial income; taxation (both direct and excise), colonial exports (through wholly or partially owned state enterprises), and subsidies (provided to compensate for budget shortfalls by the imperial authority).¹² Data on these sources are available both in colonial records, as well as an extensive supply of secondary research on the subject.

Colonial income diversity is useful in two ways for our purpose. First, it defines the conditions of resource accumulation available to the elites. A state with access to multiple sources of income is potentially strategically stronger, as it provides a number of opportunities for the elites to exploit in a post-colonial setting. Second, a state with high income diversity represents an elite body that will have also potentially accumulated a much more significant amount of education and experience with a diversified economy. In scenarios where elites have had the opportunity to engage in different sectors of society, they will have had the opportunity to develop diversified skill-sets. This becomes especially clear in the case where traditional direct taxation is overrepresented in the income portfolio. We typically conceive of direct taxation as a characteristic of a strong state, but this is not the case in Southeast Asia. Direct taxation, here, does not presuppose the state always has the capacity to extract tribute by force. In some cases, it is intimately

¹² Unlike post-colonial India, the amount of money provided by nobility to the upkeep of the colonies and post-colonial state is minute.

bound to traditional, semi-feudal relationships or tributes of a cultural type, for instance tithe. Second, direct taxation is often extremely basic in the region; in many cases, it involves a labor quota and not any actual currency or good. In many cases, the ability to collect taxes rests with the symbolic or cultural tribute demanded by the sovereign, as opposed to the state's coercive capacity. Furthermore, a state that is dependent upon this basics form of income in Southeast Asia is dependent upon trends in population size and soft power. Pre-colonial political allegiances in the region were overlapping and mercurial; this limited state strength. In those scenarios where the pre-colonial status quo was reestablished and maintained by the colonial administration, we shall see that it direct taxation remained a direct limitation. After independence, elites whose position were maintained by direct forms of taxation often resorted to the most logical means of human resource extraction; force.¹³ There are alternative scenarios, as will be discussed later.

Income diversity, like IEM, is graded on an ordinal 3-level scale. The scale reflects the number and type of sources, as well as the role of direct taxation. As with IEM, the rubric used (see Table 2) serves as a general framework for classification.

¹³ Myanmar is an example of this, where many of the military and political elites were reliant upon direct taxation for the maintenance of their position. After independence, it was more economical to continue the system than to diversify.

Table 2

Scale of Colonial Income Diversity

Level	# of Sources	Types of Sources	Role of Direct Taxation
Low	1-2	Direct or Excise	Strong
Medium	2-3	Direct and Excise or Export-oriented	Medium
High	3	Excise, Direct, Exports	Low

Institutional-Infrastructure

Institutional-Infrastructure development represents the presence of the state throughout the territory in question. The project will focus upon several indices, including judicialization, institutional presence (as most clearly gauged by health and education development), and physical infrastructure (the presence of well-kept road, rail, ports, airports, as well as electrical and telecommunication grids). All these measurements will, of course, be adjusted for chronological and regional realities. That is to say, they will be taken into account in relation to one another. Measuring Hanoi and Phnom Penh against London would not yield any useful scale. Judging Hanoi against Phnom Penh, however, illustrates a much clearer difference of developmental levels. In addition, when accounting for INF (Institutional-Infrastructure development), it is useful to understand the region as a whole, as opposed to simply the urban centers. Therefore, if a colonial state has a significant institutional presence in both rural and urban areas, that

would suggest a much higher INF. Related, if the colonial administration is unable to maintain basic roads and courts at the metropolitan center of the colony, then it would strongly suggest low INF.

Like the other variables, INF will be graded along a categorical 3-level scale. A region graded as 'low INF' would be characterized by a lack of physical infrastructure, little to no institutional presence, and/or the inability to enforce tax collection/law in a given area. This lack of INF will be, generally, below the regional average. Medium INF represents the approximate regional levels of INF. A case with this score, it will generally be on par with its neighbors in terms of quality of physical infrastructure, as well as institutional presence and enforcement capacity. Judicialization, for example, may be complete in urban areas but still incomplete in rural. High INF will be defined by infrastructure and institutional presence much higher than the regional average. Road-Rail will be extensive and maintained, a number of ports will be dredged and in use, electric and telecom grids will extend much further into the colonial hinterland.

Whereas IEM defines the players, INF defines the playing field. Elites, sculpted by their social background and public experience (economic and political, as represented by CID), will react to the realities defined by INF. This can be clearly illustrated by the behavior of local Marxist cells in the region, both during the colonial and independence eras. Different philosophies are executed in different ways. For example, the Vietnamese Marxist strategy was carried out throughout Indochina, ignoring differences of INF. As a result, the Khmer and Lao cells died away, until their post-colonial revival under local leadership.

In addition, the degree of INF also has a profound reinforcing effect upon trends seen in the other two variables. A large number of effective schools would make the emergence of a new intelligentsia much easier, greater collection capacity would lead to increased revenue.

Typological Outcomes

The typology I propose consists of four categories; developmental, power-projecting, enrichment and null. Three questions define the typology. First, is the state capable and/or willing to execute an independent policy agenda? This agenda will be comprised of state projects and represent the full spectrum of potential interests; a new dam, a fighter wing, a housing block, educational reform, etc.

The second question concerns the beneficiary of the state's executed agenda. Is society at-large, that is to say, the majority of the population, benefitting from the state's agenda, or is the primary beneficiary narrower (i.e. the dominant social class)? Are these projects being executed primarily for the benefit of a group of society that constitutes less than the majority, or is it being carried out for the state at large. This can be problematic, as most regimes are inclined to argue they are acting on behalf of the majority. However, the cases selected will provide examples where the distinction is clear for sake of analysis and clarity.

Finally, if the state is carrying out the agenda on behalf of the state at large, are these state projects geared toward development generally or security specifically? This question addresses whether or not the state is pursuing security-oriented projects, both

internal and external. This does not suppose that a development-minded state will neglect its military, however, it will carry out a diverse portfolio of projects that continue the process of development. A clear non-regional example of this would be South Korea, a modern military and a developed economy, as opposed to North Korea, which has prioritized security at the expense of all else.¹⁴

There are four potential outcomes, Null, Enrichment, Power-Projection and Developmental, as summarized in Table 1.

Null

A Null state is defined as one in which the state lacks the will and/or capacity to formulate, execute and enforce a policy agenda independent of exogenous forces. Such a state could include a failed state, where all institutions have collapsed, a failing state, where institutions are decayed and marginal, as well as a puppet state that depends on the enforcement mechanisms of a neighbor. Thus, for my purposes, a puppet state has 'failed,' as its institutions have internally decayed and were never replaced from within.

The null state is, thus, easily defined yet trickily observed. A state can be defined as lacking the ability, or capacity, for a number of different reasons. For my purposes I focus on three key points, with the first two being rather Weberian-essentialist. First the state must possess the ability to control and enforce its will/agenda over the area which it is commonly accepted to control. Secondly, the state, if it exists, must maintain some type of meaningful stability and connection to the society which it is meant to represent.

¹⁴ North Korea's exact classification is beyond the scope of this project, this example was used for demonstration of security-orientation only.

In practice this means that a state placed in power by a foreign faction, or a state generally lacking the ability to police its own territory, are both considered null states.

The third flag signaling a null state is a scenario whereby the state is not a product of a foreign power, actively enforcing its agenda throughout its territory, but does so through the contracting of localized power brokers. This may be, for example, a warlord guaranteeing control of security in a certain region, lack of judicialization, etc. There is, of course, an enormous range when dealing with these types of scenarios, and in many formative states such elites are essential to state formation. However, the difference lies in ultimate authority. There are a number of cases where local power brokers carry out functions as agents of the state, but these are often arrangements of convenience. If the state is incapable of enforcing its will directly, then I argue this state is reliant upon these brokers and, thus, a null state as well.

A null state, then, would be one in which the state has neither the will nor capacity to carry out a meaningful policy agenda of its own. Its agenda is either dictated from abroad, or it is reliant on forces exogenous to itself for the enforcement of its policy choices. In Southeast Asia, Laos (discussed in Chapter 4) and Papua New Guinea are the two cases which most accurately fit this example. Across Asia more broadly, Mongolia may also qualify as a Null State.

Self-Enrichment

If a state possesses the capacity to carry out an independent policy agenda, this project's next question is, whether or not the primary beneficiary of this agenda is the

state at large, or the DSC (. An enrichment state is one where the state serves as a vehicle for the preservation and enrichment of the DSC. The DSC may vary from case to case, but with enrichment states there will be a clear beneficiary, rather than the state at large.

As stated before, the DSC may initially have been a singular elite group that came to dominate many state functions. However, unlike in other scenarios, this elite group never transformed itself into a true 'state' class, in the way that Weber's bureaucrats do (Weber 1919/1998). That is, in the case of the latter, bureaucrats exist because of the state, receive their legitimacy from it and would be functionless without it. In the case of the DSC, the elite group never makes that transformation. State functions are carried out by extensions of the DSC's preexisting structures. So, for example, in a military dictatorship, the military just happens to be carrying out tasks that would normally be relegated to a civilian government. As we will see in the Cambodian case, the elites from each epoch are, essentially, from the same elite group, though ideology changes. That said, the state for all three remained primarily a means for the preservation and enrichment of the ruling elite/DSC. In the case of the Vietnamese communist party, however, the party became the state, though it retains numerous parallel positions¹⁵.

An enrichment state, therefore, is one where we expect to see a state capable of executing at least some manner of independent policy agenda. However, its primary beneficiary will be targeted; the DSC (that is, more often than not, the dominant elite group). In Southeast Asia, Enrichment states include Cambodia (discussed in Chapter 3)

¹⁵ For example, most of the key members of the government are also the ranking members of the Politburo of the Communist Part of Vietnam.

and Myanmar. Across Asia, and the post-colonial world as a whole, this may be the most common outcome, possibly including the Philippines, the Middle East and Central Asia.

Power-Projection

A power-projection state is one in which the DSC has transformed itself into a true state-class and is capable of carrying out an independent policy agenda. However, to be classified as power-projection these states will pursue policies and projects that consolidate and enhance both internal and external security, seeking to address perceived security threats first and foremost. While the state will, by necessity, carry out most normal functions of a contemporary state, the broad policy agenda will be geared toward the achievement of 'security' above all else. In times of duress, the state will choose the security option, over the broadly developmental. The state is, in essence, attempting to project its power both inwards and externally to the international community.¹⁶

A state that, all things being equal, consistently chooses the military air strip over the civilian airfield, heavy rail for the transport of strategic goods and troops as opposed to light rail for commuter service, the steel factory over the textile, etc, would be one that is likely categorized as 'power-projection.' A power-projection state will also choose

¹⁶ Doner et al discuss the need of developmental regimes to maintain broad support coalitions in the face of what they call 'systemic vulnerabilities,' (Doner et al, "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of the Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective." *International Organizations*. Vol. 59. Spring 2005. 327-361). They are proposing the process of coalition building as an alternative explanation for the behavior of elites in developmental states, specifically South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore as compared with Southeast Asian states in the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. Doner et al, however, are speaking to the tendency of these states to prioritize growth in order to produce the necessary wealth to maintain political coalitions. They tend to understate the importance of American military aid and are too selective in what they qualify as a sufficient external threat. However, for the purposes of this project, it may be useful to understand the recognition of these external threats as a 'common enemy' validating the power-projection state's focus on security.

policies that enhance internal security as well; persecution or 'political rehabilitation' over political inclusion. It should be noted that these insecurities are perceived; they may not necessarily exist as objective reality.

Therefore, a power-projection state is one in which the state seeks out an independent policy agenda oriented around security, both internal and external. Examples in Southeast Asia include Vietnam (Chapter 2) and Indonesia.

Developmental

The final category is a state in which a broadly developmental agenda is pursued. This does not necessarily exclude military spending, however, the state's agenda will include security projects but as part of a diversified portfolio. The developmental state can perceive the value of economic development as an end unto itself, for example.

The developmental state has been extensively studied by numerous authors, perhaps most famously in the works of Chalmers Johnson. Its internal characteristics often include a powerful independent bureaucracy with financial controls, enjoying political stability (Johnson in Deyo1987, 136-166). The state often cooperates with large, indigenous business conglomerates, focusing upon foreign exports (Johnson 1987, 156-166). Therefore, elites in developmental states do not simply operate within or hijack the existing state apparatus, as is the case with the Null and Self-Enrichment states. Instead, elites use their advanced skill sets and position in the social hierarchy to develop additional institutions or foster cooperation between the state and other sectors of society. While it is not the purpose of this project to revisit Johnson's definition of the

developmental state (Johnson 1987), it is worth emphasizing that my variables, particularly elite mobility, are not incompatible with state autonomy and other characteristics of the developmental state.

Therefore, with a developmental state, we expect to see a state that benefitted from high levels of our colonial variables that, upon independence, pursues a complex policy agenda benefitting the state and society at large. In Southeast Asia, the only complete example is Singapore. Across Asia as a whole, Taiwan and South Korea are classic examples.

Mechanisms

This section will summarize the linkages between indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure and state type outcomes. In scenarios where all variable scores are consistently low, the outcome is a null state. Elite stagnation permits the same elites to continue to dominate the same spheres, and simultaneously prohibits or discourages them from attempting to accumulate new skill sets, education, experience, etc. No new elites emerge to facilitate adaptation to new scenarios, and the elites continue to attempt to address them in the same manner as they had during the colonial period. Low CID reinforces both this behavior as well as the initial results of a region with low INF; limited capacity for wealth. In this scenario, the region is incapable of producing a dominant social class or the wealth to enrich it. There may be enough wealth to enrich individuals or families relative to their surroundings but there is no true cohesion, whether political, economic or ideological. These elites are

stagnant, themselves a legacy of the colonial period, and they are ill-equipped in all ways at dealing with the complexities of the post-colonial world. The environment itself possesses little development (INF) of any type, and thus the opportunity to solve many problems simply does not exist. As a result, the state is essentially failed and one is likely to see the pursuit of individual self-enrichment, but not the enrichment of a broad social class or group.

A self-enrichment state emerges from an era where the colonial legacy is characterized by similarly low levels of indigenous elite mobility and colonial income diversity. However, unlike the Null state, the Enrichment state will have a legacy that includes a more extensive institutional/infrastructural presence. The availability of some supply of income, of access to the greater portion of the countryside, and for the capacity of institutionalization means that the DSC will be able to consolidate their position as a group. Unlike the null state, where enrichment happens on an individual basis (though by individuals who will likely be from the same background) the Enrichment state's medium or high INF will enable a group cohesion into an identifiable group (the DSC), which shares a common sense of self-preservation and, because of their limited backgrounds, will seek to reintroduce the colonial power balance. Our Cambodian case will demonstrate that each successive DSC will, ultimately, reintroduce the reinforced absolutism of the protectorate monarchy. Thus, Self-Enrichment states, like null states, possess little in terms of elite dynamism and have very little experience with complex government. However, the territory itself may possess a sufficiently advanced institutional base or infrastructure that a dominant social class can afford to form and

seize power. This dominant social class need not necessarily be a new social group, but it will begin to utilize the limited resources available to them. It may not be enough to catalyze a transformation to a state class, or it may be more than enough but the DSC lacks the will or desire to make the shift as a manner of social inertia. The status quo is easy and preferable if one is already established as part of the elite.

This project argues that we will see a power-projection state emerge from two possible colonial scenarios. In all cases, however, the defining characteristic will be an inconsistency across the variables measured but for which either IEM or CID will be high. In the first scenario, (High IEM, Med CID) a dynamic elite includes a variety of new actors prepared to act within a new political paradigm that their predecessors were not. They will possess sufficient experience across multiple sectors (or, hypothetically, possess a sufficiently advanced human capital pool to compensate for a lack thereof) that they will be able to act (and have reason to act). A low or medium II produces an environment that does not guarantee economic or political security following independence. As a result, the newly 'self-aware' state becomes obsessed with achieving self-preservation of the state unit as a whole. Therefore, the power-projection state understands its quest for political consolidation as a necessary requisite for further development or, may simply understand security and self-preservation to be of the utmost priority as a given. In another scenario (High CID, Medium IEM) the DSC either has access to a great enough resource pool in INF or is ideologically consistent enough in itself to make the transformation to state class. The "self" in self-preservation and self-enrichment comes to be defined as the state at large, including its entire population.

However, lingering insecurities wrought by inexperience, entrenched old elites, or possibly a lack of general institutions/infrastructure, create a security crisis. Threats to internal and external security, real or perceived, are prioritized as self-preservation becomes the driving force. A power-projection state could potentially be described as a developmental state caught in a perpetual “siege mentality.”

Generally, speaking, in scenarios where all variables are high, the outcome will be a developmental state. Possessing the most adaptive, dynamic elites, with the most complex experience and education, these states are capable of taking advantage of their excellent infrastructure and institutions. This enables them to best solve security, political and economic problems and leads to the pursuit of a complex policy agenda. These states understand the dangers of overspending on the military, or of neglecting it completely, etc. As a result, these elites are the most likely to create institutions and pursue policies that promotes general welfare, while reinforcing their own position in society.

All these are, of course, broad generalizations. As we will see in our cases, low, medium and high levels of development are categories themselves. A state may possess something like a 'lower High IEM' and so on. This is because the categorical outcomes of the typology themselves are not absolute. Malaysia, for example is one case that represents a potential 'border-line' case between Developmental and Enrichment. Myanmar's military elite are, similarly, very obsessed with security despite their enrichment qualification. The cases selected for this study are most representative of the broad types that this study introduces. Further study would seek to expand the typology to the region more broadly.

Table 3

Typological Outcomes for Mixed/High IEM or CID

Colonial Income Diversity	Indigenous Elite Mobility	
	High	Other
<i>High</i>	Developmental State	Power-Projection State
<i>Other</i>	Power-Projection State	Null State/Self Enrichment State (See Table 4)

Table 4

Typological Outcomes for Low IEM/CID

CID/IEM	Institutional-Infrastructure	
	<i>High, Medium</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>Low</i>	Self-Enrichment	Null

Table 5

Case Study Outcomes

Case	Indigenous Elite Mobility	Colonial Income Diversity	Institutional-Infrastructure	State Type
Vietnam	High	Medium	Medium-High	Power Projection
Cambodia	Low	Low	Low-Medium	Self-Enrichment
Laos	Low	Low	Low	Null

Methodology

The study will employ a blend of qualitative techniques, specifically heavy archival research and extensive utilization of historiography. This approach was selected for several important reasons, most centrally feasibility and availability of data. In the Vietnamese case, much historical literature has been focused on the first and second Indochina Wars and internal government documents are much more difficult to attain. In the case of Cambodia, many of the primary records simply don't exist in-country any longer (the result of extensive and bloody civil wars), and with Laos, many records simply don't exist at all. A research plan that includes in-field work on three continents (including a visit to French Overseas Department Records in Paris) is infeasible. Instead, I have chosen to rely on a more historiography-based approach, supplemented by some

primary documentation (largely correspondences and reports, especially in the post-colonial Vietnam section).

This is not without its difficulties. Two, in particular, have emerged as most problematic. The first is general availability of information. In no case is this clearer as with Laos. Laos' political insignificance has placed it effectively off-radar for political science as a discipline. The lack of openness since the Pathet Lao victory in the 1970's means that more recent information is difficult to discern, and prior to that the record is even thinner. There are very few sources for colonial Laos, as even the French considered it a backwater, subordinate to their Vietnamese protectorates. As a result, I found myself very dependent on a few sources. The second issue is reliability of the sources that are available. This is most problematic in the Vietnamese case, particularly in the post-colonial era. In this case, I am confronting a number of different factors. The legacy of the Second Indochina war is, in many ways, still very fresh. US-Vietnamese relations were only normalized some twenty years ago. Similarly, many sources written at the time could potentially have been, at best, incomplete or, at worst, ideologically or theoretically tainted (Lustick 1996, 613).

As suggested by Lustick, I have utilized several key strategies to address these concerns. I have pursued as many sources as possible in cases like Laos and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia, in order to increase the size of the pool available. I have attempted to filter any potential theoretical lenses applied by past scholars that may alter outcomes. This was, for example, necessary in dealing with sources written toward the beginning of

the 20th century as scholarship was, in many ways, fundamentally different.¹⁷ Whenever possible, I have employed triangulation of historical narratives to locate the greatest amount of "overlap" (Lustick 1996, 616). However, ultimately, I am working with some regions for which there is just very little information available, and must trust my own capability to work out reasonable 'gaps' in the historical narrative.

Case Selection

With the wealth of work done on the developmental state, I have chosen to exclude this outcome to help focus the scope of the study. The three cases, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, represent the other possible outcomes (null, enrichment and power projection). They also permit for sufficient variety in colonial history while, at the same time, controlling for broad administrative differences by empire. Each was a member of French Indochina, yet actual administration differed (within a range) from one another. This prevents problems that would arise from comparing French and British colonies, which may have very different economic or settler policy. Each case will be examined during their colonial and post-independence periods. For the colonial period, each case will be examined beginning with a permanent colonial presence and conclude with the exit of the French as colonial administrator (whether negotiated or otherwise). The post-independence period will begin from the Geneva Accords in 1954 but end at three different points: 1986 for Vietnam, 1979 for Cambodia and 2010 for Laos. These separate end points were selected because an arbitrary singular, common date could cut

¹⁷ Scholarship was often less sensitive to issues of culture, both of the subject and of the author. Many late-19th century/early-20th century sources betray this with language and ideas, such as cultural essentialism, that feel antiquated or inappropriate.

dissect important events for one case and not the others. Details on the cases, including precise timelines under analysis, will be presented following a brief discussion of the research methodology employed in this project.

Case Study Outline

Chapter 2 presents Vietnam, which will provide an example of a power-projection type. Its colonial period will span from 1867 (the point at which the majority of the territory today recognized as Vietnam was brought under French control) till 1954, the close of the 1st Indochina War with France (the war of independence). The post-independence period will focus upon North Vietnam from 1954 through 1975, and then Vietnam post-unification from 1975 through 1986. North Vietnam is chosen as the primary unit of analysis early on as the Republic of Vietnam, throughout the Diem era (late 1950's, early 1960's) remained so tightly bound to the United States, whereas the North was a relatively independent political actor and, thus, a clearer case to use to study the effects of colonialism. The end-date, 1986, represents the point at which the People's Republic of Vietnam underwent a major constitutional shift and a changing of the political guard. It is a convenient point at which to end, as it provides approximately 32 years of policy making, including war-time, peace-time, as well as pre- and post-unification priorities.

In Chapter 3 we will examine Cambodia, an example of the self-enrichment type state. Its colonial period will be measured from 1863-1953. This marks the point at which King Norodom made a formal appeal for French protection through to 1953, the point at

which Paris accords recognized Cambodian independence. The post-independence period will run from 1953-1979, terminating with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the establishment of a Pro-Vietnamese government. It will include, however, an analysis of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1953-1970), Khmer Republic (1970-75) and the Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979). Examination of Cambodia will conclude with the installation of the pro-Hanoi government following the Third Indochina for two reasons. First, autonomy is questionable during the time the country is occupied by Vietnam. Second, examining three different regimes, all with different ideological orientations, presents sufficient data to justify my categorization. Three different sets of leadership (that is, distinct groups of individual people) all exhibit the same policy predispositions, deriving from their common colonial experience.

In Chapter 4, we will examine Laos, our Null state example. Laos' colonial period will be 1893-1954, the period of time in which Laos was formally added to, and administered as a part of, French Indochina. Laos exhibits the characteristics of a null state throughout its post-independence period, and will be observed from 1954-2010. During the height of the Lao Civil War, leading up to the Pathet Lao victory in 1975, both the Royal Lao and Pathet Lao administrations will be observed. For both cases, null state characteristics will remain readily apparent. Following 1975, the examination will be on communist-led Laos up to 2010. As information on Laos was sparsest, I have chosen to extend its examination chronologically by 20-30 years to compensate.

Conclusion

During the course of this project, we will seek to explore the impact of a state's colonial legacy on its post-colonial state type. Rather than accepting a basic colonial penetration argument, or an outright colonial determinism, this project offers an alternative where the combination of three different key variables, indigenous elite mobility, colonial income diversity, and institutional-infrastructure levels interact to produce one of four possible state outcomes. These outcomes are organized into a typology that includes null, or failed states, enrichment states serving as a vehicle for a dominant social class, power-projection states, development-minded states seeking to project their power internally and externally, and developmental states pursuing broadly developmental policies.

I will utilize extensive historiography, complemented by additional archival research, into three case-studies, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. These three cases will permit me the ability to display the connection between a variety of different colonial legacies and their correlation to state-policy preferences in the independence era.

This project hopes to make a useful contribution to the vital discussion of development and the importance of the colonial past in shaping the behavior of contemporary actors. It does not make claims about the nature of regimes themselves (democratic, authoritarian, etc)., nor claim that there exists any direct link between democracy and the colonial past. Such discussions are outside the scope of the project.

We now proceed to the three case studies. Each will begin with a brief overview of the case, before proceeding to the colonial period. During this half of the case study,

we will pay specific attention to the colonial variables (IEM, CID, II) and how they helped shape the state type after independence. The second half will examine both policy, and subsequently its typological classification, and how these priorities were shaped by the colonial variables. Each case will conclude with a brief discussion on these connections, demonstrating how colonial legacies directly caused the respective state type in each case.

The final concluding chapter will discuss the findings of the study, as well as discuss the value and utility of this theory for Southeast Asia and the post-colonial world more generally.

CHAPTER 2: VIETNAM (CASE STUDY A)

For my first case, exemplifying a power-projection state, we will examine Vietnam. This case will begin with a brief introduction to the case, including a brief history. The case analysis will be divided into two parts; colonial (1862-1940) and post-independence (1953-1986). The colonial period will include the gradual annexation of Vietnam by the French, the formation of French Indochina, and cease with the Japanese occupation. This period in Vietnam is characterized by extensive indigenous elite mobility (driven by education and professional opportunities), moderate colonial income diversity (utilizing multiple sources and less reliance on direct taxation) and moderate-high levels of institutional-infrastructure (the highest in the region); all features that I predict will be associated with the Power-Projection state. The post-independence era will be divided into two segments. The first half will focus upon the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 1954 until reunification with the South in 1976. The second half will follow the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from reintegration till the 1986 Doi Moi reforms. The reforms serve as a convenient bookend to the policy period, as they permit for an exploration of policy by Vietnam through war-time, peacetime, and both pre- and post-unification. During both of these periods, Vietnam exhibits the characteristics of a power-projection state; an independent policy agenda with a security-focus and a nation-wide scope.

Historical Context

Despite limited earlier French expeditions, Vietnam's colonial story begins with annexation of Cochinchina by France in 1862. Over a period of 25 years, French control over the region extended through the central (Annam) and northern (Tonkin) provinces of Vietnam. In 1887, the three Vietnamese protectorates, along with the Kingdom of Cambodia, were reorganized as the French Indochinese Union. Laos was added several years later and, by 1893, the territory had largely assumed the shape and size it would retain until conclusion of the Second Indochina War.

During the colonial period, Vietnam formed the core of the Indochinese Union. As the colony was required to be self-sufficient, Vietnam bore the brunt of colonial extraction. To facilitate this process, infrastructure and institutions in the region were far better developed, by the French, than its neighbors Cambodia and Laos and, on the whole, were amongst the better in the Southeast Asia region. Though colonial era companies never reached the same level of development as we see in other regions of Asia, they were still comparatively better developed and, combined with more repressive excise taxes, formed part of a more developed income portfolio. In contrast with its French Indochinese neighbors, the Vietnamese indigenous elites were highly mobile, capitalizing on educational opportunities and the French need for administrative functionaries. The Vietnamese king and nobility were gradually marginalized politically. The Mandarin bureaucratic class, which had developed out of the earlier Chinese occupation, attempted to cling to power by exerting influence over French-reformed institutions such as education. However, over time, the Mandarins too were replaced by

emergent bureaucratic and intellectual classes. These new classes achieved higher education in French lycée and, while not nearly as wealthy as the local French expatriates, were distinctly separate in terms of affluence and education from their countrymen. The local French administrators relied heavily upon this class to fill local functionary positions and low-level administrative posts in neighboring Cambodia and Laos (Lancaster 70, 1961).

Overall investment in Vietnam, both political and economic, remained subject to shifts in French colonial strategy. Unlike its North African colonies, France did not necessarily view Vietnam as an integral part of the empire. Institutional and infrastructural investment was less complete and comprehensive till after the dawn of the 20th century. Vietnam received more interest as the region became a potential source of valuable resources. This policy continued up through the depression, during which the area saw a dip in outside investment.

During the 1940s, the local French administrators were expelled by the invading Japanese. Unlike other areas in Southeast Asia, there was less collaboration with the invaders. This was due to a far better developed resistance, whose leadership was, in overwhelming majority, drawn from the newly emergent intellectual and middle class in the region. Though there were both nationalists and Marxists, it was the latter that formed the strongest resistive elements. With the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, France attempted to reassert itself in the region. French ambitions in the region were in direct conflict with local resistance who sought to achieve independence. The resulting conflict, the First Indochina War, was fought for nearly nine years from 1946 through 1954.

During the bloody conflict, the French suffered several defeats, including the pivotal battle at Dien Bien Phu where Vietnamese resistance, led by General Vo Nguyen Giap, captured the mountainous base. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 divided Vietnam in two; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the North) led by Ho Chi Minh, and the Republic of Vietnam (the South) backed by the United States.

The original intent was for reunification, but when it became clear that Ho Chi Minh would triumph, the elections were scrapped and American support for the South was ramped up. The Second Indochina War (the 'Vietnam War') was fought from 1955 to 1975. By the height of the war, the mid-late 1960's, the majority of the war was being fought in South Vietnam and in neighboring Cambodia and Laos. The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, also known as the Viet Cong, carried on the majority of the fighting against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and its American allies. The Viet Cong, in turn, received extensive support from the DRV and, by extension, other members of the Communist Bloc.

The Second Indochina War was extraordinarily costly, both in terms of economics and human lives. The American bombing campaign was the most extensive since World War 2, and involved millions of pounds of explosives. In addition, an extensive campaign was fought in neighboring Cambodia and Laos, often between American special forces, their indigenous allies, and both Viet Cong and DRV regulars.

With American popular opinion turned against the war, the US gradually scaled back its involvement and, by 1973, the nature of the war changed. Without American support, South Vietnam proved unable to resist the battle-hardened North and by 1975,

DRV troops captured Saigon. Soon thereafter, Vietnam became involved in the Third Indochina War, which saw an inconclusive conflict with neighboring China, and a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The latter saw the genocidal Khmer Rouge removed and replaced with a Pro-Vietnamese administration. This intervention, combined with continued bad blood from the previous Indochina War, resulted in Vietnam becoming a global pariah state for the length of its occupation of Cambodia.

Following reunification, Vietnam underwent several failed economic reforms that resulted in a de facto abandonment of strict Marxist economic policies. Furthermore, it had pursued a security-oriented reintegration policy that alienated South Vietnamese officials and functionaries that limited the south as a source of vital human capital. By the early 1980's, Vietnam was in a precarious financial position. The party old guard were retired or marginalized, and a new wave of leadership carried out liberalizing reforms known as Doi Moi. Several years later, Vietnam withdrew support from its puppet in Cambodia.

Following these reforms and scaling back of its intervention in Cambodia, Vietnam's economy and world standing has improved considerably. This has come with costs; increased corruption, environmental concerns, and strained-relations with China.

Colonial Examination

This section will seek to explore the nature of French colonial policy and administration in Vietnam, from its beginnings in 1862 to the invasion of French Indochina by Japan in 1940. We will pay particular focus to three periods; the

annexation process leading up to and including the formation of French Indochina from France's colonial holdings in the area (1862-1887), its administrative commitment to educational reform and the institutional dominance of a French-modeled education system (1917-1920), and a recommitment to investment in Vietnam in the period leading up to the outbreak of war (1920-1940). In our examination of the Vietnamese colonial experience, we will see the transformation of the Vietnamese elite, detail the finances of Vietnam's colonial administration (isolated as best is possible from French Indochina as a whole), and witness the creation and expansion of infrastructure, with the goal of improving economic capacity, in the area to a level matching or exceeding the region's best. Organizing our historical analysis in this fashion permits us to better identify and track the evolution of French policies and their effects on the mobility of Vietnam's indigenous elite over time, the degree of institutional infrastructure created and the diversity of the colonial government's income.

The historical analysis will be followed by a discussion of how the policies laid down during the colonial period affects post-independence policy preferences. In Vietnam's case, we will see that a high level of elite mobility, as defined by a new intellectual class supplanting the decaying noble and mandarin class, creates a new revolutionary leadership prepared to exploit the colonial reality of a relatively well-developed, metropolitan infrastructure, and budgetary self-sufficiency achieved through utilizing a variety of income sources.

The Formation of French Indochina

French expansion into Southeast Asia was a lengthy, piecemeal process. The earliest French involvement into the region began early in the 19th century. However, it was not until the 1860's, under the direction of Napoleon III, that France began to be significantly involved.

In the early 1860's, a series of French expeditions into Cochinchina, centered around the Mekong Delta in the southern third of contemporary Vietnam, were waged by admirals in the imperial navy. Driven by personal ambition in many cases, many of these initial expeditions were limited to the temporary occupation of particular cities or strategic points of interest. In the 1860's, the French would expand their involvement in the area by conducting military operations against the local Vietnamese kingdom and force the indigenous monarchy to cede Cochinchina outright to French control, a process that would be completed in 1867 (Cady 1954, 275). The inability of the Nguyen dynasty to halt European aggression would continue on for several decades, gradually eliminating their political sovereignty and significance within Vietnam. In the meantime, however, French enthusiasm for expanding into the region proved fickle; Napoleon III would lose interest, admirals would gain and lose favor, and initial surveys did not indicate any significant economic potential (Cady 268, 274-276).

The area of Cochinchina was directly administered by the French. Improvements to local infrastructure and the streamlining of the local legal system¹⁸ in and around

¹⁸ French courts would be dominant by 1879 (Osborn 1969, 226).

Saigon permitted the emergence of a new mercantile class¹⁹, though they would remain a relatively small and unimportant group until later in the colonial period. The remainder of Vietnam would be annexed gradually over the next twenty years, beginning with Annam (central Vietnam) in 1884, and Tonkin (northern Vietnam) soon thereafter. The Nguyen dynasty, responsible for the recent unification of Vietnam at the beginning of the 19th century, remained the nominal heads of state with increasingly marginalized political power and legal jurisdiction.

In 1887, the three protectorates of Vietnam (Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin) would ultimately be reorganized and grouped together with the Protectorate of Cambodia, to form French Indochina. The emperor's powers were now strictly redefined and the presence of French officials more significant. The colonial governor, appointed by the colonial ministry, became the real power in the region, with most major decisions requiring his approval. Over the coming years, despite a few rebellious acts, the royal family and much of the existing nobility gradually ceded the majority of their remaining authority to the French governor in exchange for guarantees to their continued existence. One such example is an 1897 decree in which the emperor formally surrendered his taxation powers in exchange for an allowance for the upkeep of the palace and imperial family (Nguyen The Anh 1985, 149).

The marginalization of the emperor had effects stretching beyond Hanoi, however. The Vietnamese educated class, referred to as Mandarins like their Chinese counterparts, also found themselves in a difficult situation. Their education and

¹⁹ This process would help create a colonial class by balancing out some of the traditional pro-Chinese legislation that had been common in the area, though, by and large, the emergent landowning class would be a fairly small fraction of the population at large.

bureaucratic appointments were their source of legitimacy, and with the emperor irrelevant they faced a similar fate (Nguyen The Anh 150). Their solution was to reinterpret their role as instruments not of the emperor, but of the state at large, and thus formed the bulk of the indigenous bureaucracy working under their French administrators (Nguyen The Anh 155). This "scholared gentry" chose to continue on what they saw as the struggle the emperor had lost, but in fact, they themselves would become largely consumed with maintaining the status quo (Nguyen The Anh 156). This would manifest itself in the chaotic education system that would characterize Vietnam, and Indochina at large, as the Mandarins continued to push for syllabi that reinforced traditional power structures and value systems.

In addition to an administrative restructuring, French Indochina also received, for the first time, a consistent "mission statement." French involvement in the area had been less an economic venture, till this point, and more so an issue of prestige and, more distantly, security. Interventions in a much larger prize to the north, China, required a launching point and, furthermore, France required leverage against increasing British presence in Southeast Asia (Cady 1954, Le 2002, 18). French leadership had been unwilling to cede entire regions of the globe to the British sphere of influence without any contestation at all, more on a matter of principle than anything else.

The Indochinese expeditions had been seen as unpopular and unnecessary at home, and as a result the entire colony seemed to be branded as a liability. Therefore, the decision was made that Indochina would be required to be self-sufficient financially, as

well as contribute to the overall defensive fund of the French Empire (Le 18). Vietnam would bear this burden significantly more than the other areas of Indochina.²⁰

Without significant funds from France, colonial governors were forced to achieve fiscal solvency through more traditional means; taxation. It is true that the burgeoning merchant classes in Cochinchina contributed to local development (Le 46-47), but the brunt of administrative costs and, later, infrastructure projects were financed through taxes. The lower three levels of government (village, city, and district) would utilize traditional direct taxation as they had in the pre-colonial era (Thompson 1968, 184).

The federal government, overseeing the entire union, would not rely on direct taxation, but rather indirect. More often than not, this took the form of excise taxes on "luxury" items; alcohol, opium, and other government monopolies.²¹ These monopolies were particularly disliked by the populace and were more often than not at the heart of many instances of tension over the next several decades (Thompson 1968, 85, Sages 2010, 3).

Still, despite these limitations, the colony would achieve the required self-sufficiency and, particularly later as infrastructure and business improved on the ground, would begin to contribute financially in an increasingly large amount. This surprising capacity to generate wealth would cement its status as a "wealth producing" colony, and would ultimately be considered second only to Algeria in terms of importance (Le 47).

²⁰ Cambodia, sparsely populated and lacking the mineral deposits and extensive agricultural capacity of Vietnam, would be perpetually subordinated to Vietnam within the Union. Laos, added in 1893, would remain a quiet backwater for most of the period.

²¹ This also included tolls, ferries and so forth, which were often directly administered by the government.

Indochina lacked the ‘luxury’ of a soft budget constraint as a result of a lack of imperial subsidies. Within Indochina, Vietnam remained the primary producer of raw materials, civil servants and wealth for the colony. As a result, Cambodia and Laos never saw the same level of investment and would remain backwaters. Vietnam's administrators, however, were familiar early on with the need to access multiple different sources of income. This included the need for direct taxation, a system familiar to the local population, but also to access wealth via excise taxes and colonial exports. Budgetary self-sufficiency and a pragmatic approach to income would be vital traits that the DRV would make use of post-independence, despite their Leninist ideological commitments.

1917-1930s- Educational Reform

A combination of multiple levels of colonial administration and the continued influence of the old bureaucratic class produced a situation in which there was no unified education system, even after the administrative restructuring in 1887. In the twilight of the First World War, the governor of Indochina would begin an ambitious set of reforms aimed at standardizing educational policy throughout the colony. Education, as an institution, would be one of the most pivotal elements of the French presence in the area, directly increasing the overall level of institutional-infrastructure, while also facilitating indigenous elite mobility.

Confucian-oriented Traditional schools had continued on alongside newly introduced French-schools through the early years of the Union. Later, hybrid-models

designed to better meet the realities of Vietnam were introduced. However, following the educational reforms beginning in 1917, all other models aside from the approved French model were henceforth declared "private, their existence dependent upon strict adherence to an approved curriculum (Kelly 1982, 179)."

The new public school system was a modified version of the lycée system, terminating with a baccalaureate and progression to university or more advanced vocational training. Numerous new schools were opened and older ones, many single-room schoolhouses, were outfitted to serve the new model. Student enrollment would increase many fold (Thompson 285, Kelly 1982, 180), including many from the nouveau riche that had begun to emerge. Education was seen as the key to socio-political advancement; education meant a government position, and a government position meant a comfortable lifestyle and prestige (Thompson 284, Kelly 1987, 198).

While successful in its goals of increasing student enrollment, the new system created many new problems for the colonial administration. Three elements in particular stand out: the conflict over the curriculum, France's policy toward indigenous Vietnamese occupying higher bureaucratic positions, and, subsequently, the impact these new intellectuals ultimately had on Vietnamese society at large.

With regards to the curriculum, there emerged a three-way battle between the Mandarin class which was being increasingly pushed out of power, the emerging intelligentsia, and the French administrative officials. The first battle, between the mandarins on one side, and the intelligentsia and administration on the other, was fought over the very purpose of this new education that was suddenly being made available. For

the French, it proved extremely economic, particularly under the restraints of budgetary self-sufficiency, to utilize Vietnamese in functionary and low-level bureaucratic positions. Clerks, teachers, police officers, could be effectively staffed at a cost of one-tenth what hiring someone from France would cost. For the new intelligentsia that had begun to emerge with the initial introduction of earlier French economic and educational reforms, increased access to technical and higher education was desired. For this new class of Vietnamese, education could bring prestige that new-found money could not, or it could address the issue of wealth as well.

The Mandarins were, however, more interested in the status quo. Not unlike the Emperor, the mandarins were wary of any new institution that threatened to encroach further on their already diminished status, and utilized their remaining power and position to pressure officials into including more "cultural" education into the curriculum. This proposed curriculum pushed for increased morality, reverence of the emperor (and by extension, the mandarins themselves) and celebrating Vietnamese culture (Kelly 1987, 199). Despite some initial successes, the Mandarins were a fast fading class, and many of the new generation had begun to pursue their education through the official system, or other economic ventures in urban areas. The pursuit of the technical and pragmatic over cultural and traditional was a fast moving tide, permeating not only government positions, but would be a pattern reproduced across numerous professions.²² The

²² Thuy Linh Nguyen describes the "medicalization" of midwifery, for example, detailing the bureaucratization of medical professions (Nguyen, T.L., 2010 133-182). In this case, too, the traditional lost out; what had formerly been a road to prestige was now shut, as many midwives did not have the ability to pursue formal schooling or adhere to the rigid bureaucratic processes in place.

Mandarin families, like many of the existing elites, would begin to isolate themselves increasingly from society at large.

The second battle and third battles fought are actually interconnected. As mentioned prior, enrollment in schools were often high, and the French, not unlike the Chinese centuries before during their occupation of Vietnam, found the Vietnamese to be more than capable students. As more and more students graduated from the lycée, there was an ever increasing demand for university level education. With limited resources in Vietnam itself, there were more and more applications to study abroad in France proper. How aware the French administration was of the fate of their Chinese predecessors is subject to debate²³, but there was significant hesitation to permit large numbers of Vietnamese studying in France (Cooper 2001, 40). While debates raged at home, particularly in the wake of World War 1, over the ethics of colonialism, conservative opinions prevailed and the education system became a means of surveillance and indoctrination as well as training (Cooper 38). Increasingly, propaganda was introduced into the curriculum as fact, designed to complement the "civilizing project," and to instill the superiority of all things French (Cooper 37-41). Culture did begin to feature in the curriculum, however, as examples of backwardness (Kelly 1987, 196). Despite internal criticisms, the education system was fast becoming the instrument of choice to combat

²³ Starting with the Han around 200 BCE and ending with the Tang in about 900CE, China lorded over Vietnam, either directly or indirectly. During this time, Chinese bureaucracy and the mandarin system were introduced to Vietnam. Apt pupils, the Vietnamese would eventually begin using their training against the Chinese, and rebellions became longer and bloodier, until the Chinese abandoned the venture in at the start of the 2nd millennium.

what French administrators saw as emerging nationalism and, later, the specter of Marxism.²⁴

The attempt to create a unitary education system, standardizing practices throughout Vietnam and Indochina at large, would falter fairly early on as a result of these conflicts (Kelly 1987, 191; 1982, 187). What ultimately emerged was a complex patchwork of successive and parallel systems, and this break down, would only further raise suspicion amongst the French and chafe the Vietnamese intelligentsia (Kelly 1982, 188-189).

While there existed limitations on the pursuit of education, in the form of propaganda and the breakdown of the unitary system, the French were also forced to make concessions to meet the increasing demand for tertiary education. New universities, particularly in Hue, Hanoi, Da Nang and Saigon were opened to accommodate the influx of students. As time went on the French also began to utilize Vietnamese officials not only in functionary and bureaucratic positions in Vietnam, but began to export them into the bureaucracy governing other areas of Indochina. Particularly in places like Laos, a colonial backwater, the French became increasingly reliant on their Vietnamese officials in ever higher bureaucratic positions. As a result, the newly educated class, their authority and prestige guaranteed to them by their technical expertise (Benda 1965, 234), become increasingly socially-aware of their own position.

²⁴ Thompson notes a textbook that lauds the utility of the horse (for drawing wagons), of the sheep, for its wool, and of the dairy cow, for its milk. Many, if not most, Vietnamese peasants had never seen any of these animals (Thompson 286-287).

While, as we will see, there did emerge a bourgeoisie culture concerned with consumption of consumer goods and so forth, it is also true that there emerged a new preoccupation with "higher" ideological causes of nationalism, socialism, etc. The lycée system would train many future revolutionaries, both Marxist and Nationalist,²⁵ and, like Dutch schools in Java, become an object of intense resentment following Japanese victories over European powers early in World War 2 (Thompson 287).

The education system installed during the colonial period facilitated indigenous elite mobility, creating a distinct class of intellectuals and urban dwellers separate from the increasingly marginalized nobility and mandarins. This newly emergent class would prove pivotal in the post-independence era. It would form the core of leadership for both nationalist and communist movements.

1920s-1940s- Economic Investment

By the 1920s, Vietnam had emerged as one of France's most valuable colonies. Its economic self-sufficiency, originally intended to be a constraint, had actually served to emphasize the eventual success of the colony as the years went on. Multiple times between the establishment of the union and the outbreak of war, Indochina would frequently supplement French defense coffers. Vietnam, with the largest population and the highest concentration of easily exploitable resources, would be responsible for the majority of this wealth generation. However, following World War 1, French investment began to increase in the region as business began to consider Vietnam's broader

²⁵ Among those prominent personalities: Ho Chi Minh, Tran le Xuan, Giap, Pham, Le Duan, Le Duc Tho,

commercial potential. This included both state interests in the area, but also private investment, which was beginning to feel more confident in the region.²⁶

Beginning at the start of the 20th century, and picking up pace from the 1920s onward, the French began to increase investment into Indochina, driving forward improvements in many different sectors. A major cereal producer, Vietnamese rice production emerged as an obvious first target for investment, particularly local. Initially, the increased yield was sold domestically, but increasingly became subject to use for military requisitions as well as export as time passed. Later, Vietnam would begin to export rubber, being one of the world's major (and only) producers at that time. With the implementation of the plantation system by the 1930's, Vietnam had emerged as a major agricultural producer for France (Cooper 30, Le 18-20, 34, Thompson 104-142). In Cochinchina, these not only produced wealth for the local government, but also benefitted the Chinese Diaspora, as well as helping to foster the creation of a new landowning class (Le 74).

Other industries also saw increased French investment. Beginning in 1900, forestry and the exportation of lumber begins to emerge as a significant industry (Cleary 2005), and soon thereafter, exploitation of Vietnam's extensive mineral deposits began. Home to extensive surface and deep-vein anthracite deposits (Miller 1947, 399), mining saw increased activity throughout the country, particularly in the north (Cooper 30, Le 19, Miller 398-400). Zinc, Tin, Chromium and a number of other minerals were also surveyed and exploited to varying degrees (Miller 404).

²⁶ This is, of course, pre-1929; investment everywhere slowed as the full effects of the Great Depression were felt.

To facilitate these burgeoning industries, the colonial government undertook extensive infrastructure improvements throughout Vietnam. Utilizing a combination of government and independent infrastructure budgets (usually comprised of local investors, and the colonial and metropolitan governments (Le 44)), a number of roads and, later, railroads, were laid down between major settlements. Vietnam's waterways also saw significant investment, with a number of channels being dredged (where possible) and multiple new dams being constructed (Le 18-19, Cooper 30). These efforts received another huge boost in the early 1930's with the completion of large-scale electrical power generation, which would increase overall efficiency in the primary goods sector, but also aided Vietnam's early industrialization.²⁷

The cities themselves were also overhauled. Ports were enlarged and made suitable for ever-increasing trade volume, and entire layouts were re-designed. Saigon, for example, would receive a drastic makeover, explicitly crafted in the image of Paris (Cooper 2001, Miller 219). These cityscape facelifts were as much a reflection of the French inhabiting the country as they were of the new urban class that had emerged by the 1930s. Not unlike the new landowning class that emerged in Cochinchina, urban areas also had begun to create a new class all their own. The old families of mandarins and wealthy landowners constituted a relatively small portion of the population that was increasingly isolated socially²⁸ (Le 74). The urban proletariat remained small, and the rural peasantry remained the vast majority of the Vietnamese population (Le 74), but a

²⁷ Leading up to the 20th century, the extent of manufacturing in Vietnam had been largely confined to the artisanal. By the 1930's, facilities for the processing of raw materials had begun to emerge, particularly in the north.

²⁸ A good deal of them would also be ruined during the depression and World War 2.

new class had been born over the last 30-40 years. The bureaucrats, teachers, clerks, police, doctors, and all manner of professionals, were the byproducts of the social migration and mobility brought on by the education system and the very presence of the French administration. Bureaucratization and capitalism had created a new "Vietnamese." At first, it was limited more to its capacity for consumption and material goods. An ever increasing amount of luxury goods were sought out and, with the proliferation of commercial advertising, this new class began to crave status goods (Henchy 2005). While many were still far too poor for many of the lavish items that the established, old elites and French expatriates enjoy, they still possessed a much greater purchasing power than the rural peasantry surrounding their cities.

However, as Vietnam enters the 1930s, despite its relative isolation, it could not completely escape the Great Depression that had begun to ravage much of the world. Conditions were even worse as the education system really had no mechanism in place to limit the number of enrollees or graduates. As the 1930's continued, opportunities for the newly educated class began to dwindle, which in turn helped feed an increased interest in nationalist and communist causes.

Despite this, in terms of raw development, Vietnam in 1940 would enjoy a relatively well-developed infrastructure, on par with British Malaya or Dutch Java. It served as a source of valuable income, conscripts, and a base from which to project power into East Asia, and leverage against the British in the region. However, if taken as a whole, Indochina's numbers for infrastructure are less impressive. This demonstrates broad range of investment and permeation of French presence that exists in the union;

indeed, while Vietnam had seen significant investment and development, Laos remained virtually unchanged since the day it had been annexed to the union in 1893.

The presence of an indigenous logistical capacity, agricultural focus on both food and cash crops, and early explorations of Vietnam's mineral and forestry resources created a region much more conducive to an active resistance movement in the 1940's and 1950's. Viet Minh, drawing membership from the ranks of the emerging intellectual and urban classes, were able to exploit the resources available and drive the virile independence movement. Similarly, after the Geneva Accords, the existing colonial infrastructure served as a vital foundation for the DRV.

Colonial Vietnam: In Review

Vietnam's colonial period is characterized by several distinct changes. Administratively, its gradual annexation and eventual restructuring into the Indochinese Union, created a unique scenario for the local colonial governments. Required to be self-sufficient, local levels of government continued to rely exclusively on direct taxation, often riding existing structures for collection. The federal level, however, would rely on excise taxes exacted on state-owned monopolies. Later, as economic conditions improved prior to the outbreak of war, new means of income were explored, but for the majority of the colonial period, remained only moderately diverse with two primary sources.

In terms of infrastructure and economics, Vietnam's success at self-sufficiency had promoted the colony as a target for investment, both local and metropolitan. This would result in a rapid build-up of logistical infrastructure (roads, rails, and waterways),

resource extraction facilities across multiple sectors, the expansion of port capacity, and electrification across Vietnam's urban areas. The improvements put Vietnam alone on par with its British and Dutch counterparts in Malaya and Java, respectively, but in a class all its own when intra-regionally compared to Cambodia and Laos, which remained relatively undeveloped. However, despite its target status for investment and relatively high development, infrastructural developments and resource extraction remained quite unbalanced and still limited to vital metropolitan areas.

Finally, education also proved to be a major catalyst for change. Historically esteemed as a path to prestige and a good life, schools were never at a loss for students or for debate over the appropriate curricula. The presence of the French colonial administration served as a major outlet for the ever-increasing number of graduates, who began to form a new urban class of professionals and intelligentsia, who gradually supplanted the existing elites (nobility and mandarins), and, ultimately, would form the core of many reform and independence movements.

The new leadership class that emerged differed from its predecessor in several key ways. While many of the individuals may have come from families rooted in the old elite, this new elite was not committed to the preservation of a cultural status quo. The Mandarins often attached their continued existence to the royal family and cultural reproduction, but the new intelligentsia found itself committed to the relatively new ideals of nationalism and Marxism. The colonial experience left them sensitive to the realities of the geopolitical situation, and the relative prosperity enjoyed by this class permitted them to prioritize and pursue intangible goods. This new class was committed

to the idea of Vietnam, first and foremost, and later, other ideologies would be embraced for their perceived ability to actualize that initial goal.

These new elites, however, would not enjoy the same relationship with their post-independence environment as, say, those in the Korean peninsula would. While there was extensive investment in infrastructure in and around the major urban areas, much of the countryside remained relatively disconnected from the grid. Road and rails ran to and from storage and processing facilities to urban areas and ports, not to the villages where a large portion of the population dwelled. Large swaths of the country would remain relatively untouched; this would be a source of both strength and weakness later.

Strength-wise, it enabled the leadership to conduct its resistance movement relatively successfully, and in the Second Indochina War would be exploited to help conduct the war effort. However, it was also a source of weakness, as it forced the leadership into a cycle of ad hoc economic arrangements that, while useful during war, would prove ineffective and a source of anxiety later, for fear of its destabilizing characteristics.

Faced with independence and war with both old and new super powers, the new elite with their fundamentally unique character would exploit their socio-political environment carrying with them the lessons learnt during the colonial period. Faced with an uncertain domestic and international reality in the face of their commitment to a new set of goals, the creation of a Vietnamese state, the new leadership would become scrupulous in their decision making processes, geared toward the creation of an independent (and unified) Vietnam, and the elimination of obstacles to that end. This preoccupation with achieving goals and survival, together, would create a security-

minded leadership class for who every party involved in their struggle is a potential threat, both internal and external. Thus, I typify Vietnam as a power-projection state; one with a powerful, policy-enacting apparatus that pursues security-oriented projects for the entire community, rather than a single class.

As a result, the new leadership, armed with education and experience, would seek out security projects that were necessarily large. These involve not only a focus on heavy industry and managing war weariness, but also less tangible projects as exemplified by their foreign policy. Externally, all parties involved, whether antagonistic, neutral or allies were perceived to be actual or potential threats to be dealt with accordingly. The Soviet Union, for example, could be embraced, but only as leverage against the Chinese, whose support was necessary as leverage against the United States.

We now turn to an analysis of the policy preferences of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam following independence. We will see the strength and reach of the party and its bureaucracy, and its focus on security-oriented projects, both tangible and intangible, that are intended to benefit the population at large.

Post-Independence Examination

In this section we will examine the policy agenda and decisions of Vietnam from 1954, the signing of the Geneva Convention, to 1986, the institution of the Doi Moi reforms at the 6th Party Congress. From 1975 to 1986, the primary actor being analyzed will be the united Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), while prior to unification the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam) will be the actor of analysis

(for reasons discussed prior). The chapter will demonstrate, through an analysis of the policy behavior of the state over a period of 32 years, that Vietnam can be classified as a power-projection state; a state possessing an independent policy agenda, a state that undertakes significant projects benefitting the country as a whole, and whose projects are geared toward security ends. First there will be a brief introduction to Vietnam's history from 1954 to 1986, beginning with Geneva and ending with Doi Moi. This is intended to help establish the broader historical context in which the referenced case examples can be nested in. Afterward, the chapter will analyze different policy examples, arranged by the three criteria for a power-projection state. This organizational framework will be different from the two later cases, organized more chronologically, because of the nature of the Vietnamese case. Unlike Cambodia and Laos, which pass through multiple regimes yet retain state type consistency, Vietnam possesses only one regime throughout the period examined. Without these predefined narrative breaks, a more thematic examination of the regime across the entirety of the period is most useful.

I classify Vietnam as a power-projection state. As stated prior, this classification is hinged on three characteristics of their post-independence behavior at the state level; the presence of an independent bureaucracy, of large-scale state projects benefitting the state in its entirety as a unit, and that these projects will be, by and large, security oriented. Below I discuss each of these three characteristics, and utilize policy examples from between 1954 and 1986 for analytical purposes.

The first of these will be the presence of an independent policy agenda. This can best be observed through an examination of Vietnamese state leadership (in this case, the

Politburo and bureaucracy). A brief discussion of the nature of the Vietnamese leadership and bureaucracy will be presented, before analyzing three different phenomena within the Vietnamese leadership; its relationship with southern party cadres, its predisposition toward consensual politics amongst its leadership, and bureaucratic self-awareness (as demonstrated through Doi Moi). These characteristics describe a state that is capable of internally generating a policy agenda, without rigid adherence to the ideology of a paramount leader, or one focused only on the welfare of a set class. In the case of Vietnam, decision making is often based on a coherent logic, rather than dogmatic commitment to ideology. Particularly during the Second Indochina War, there is less of an emphasis on Marxist economic theory than to winning the actual war. In addition, the diffused, more consensual decision making present amongst Vietnamese leadership exemplifies a de-personalized system that is less about the whims of a single leader, than the decision of the group. This greater degree of inclusivity is reflective of its historical roots in colonialism; the leadership has a greater sense of group identity, as opposed to allegiance to more sultanistic factions we see in Cambodia and Laos.

The second, the undertaking of large state projects, will be analyzed primarily through an examination of state economic and administrative policy. Three key policies will be used to demonstrate this; heavy-industry focus pre-1970, revised economic policy from 1970-1984, and the drastic changes made immediately prior to, and following, the institution of Doi Moi. This broader commitment to the nation as a whole characterizes a leadership that lacks the traditional focal points of social and political power, which would have been lost in the colonial period along with the traditional elites.

The third section, security-oriented projects, will start with a brief introduction to the historical and political context in which Vietnam, as a power player, is nested. Vietnam's links to the Indochinese Communist Party, the American "domino" theory on regional stability, and both American and Chinese allegations as to Vietnam's regional ambitions will be discussed here. As examples of security being prioritized by the state, three separate phenomena will be examined; the reintegration policies of the DRV immediately following unification, Vietnam's role in the success of the Pathet Lao in neighboring Laos, and Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (including the 3rd Indochina War and subsequent occupation). This preoccupation with internal security and projecting its interests on its neighbors stems from the inherent insecurities presented to leadership by unequal development and a less than fully developed colonial income portfolio.

This section will then conclude with an overview of the policy of Post-Colonial Vietnam, before proceeding to a broader discussion of the connections between its contemporary policy preferences and its colonial past.

An Introduction to Post-Independence Vietnam

For our purposes, our analysis begins in 1954, after the signing of the Geneva Accords.²⁹ The original agreement saw the withdrawal of French troops and cessation of

²⁹ Historical context: from 1946 through 1954, the Viet Minh had fought the French attempting to reestablish colonial administration following the latter's ouster at the hands of the Japanese during World War 2. This absence of French power, and the role of the Viet Minh as the primary anti-Japanese guerrilla group, created both popular support for the Viet Minh amongst the populace, particularly in the North, and also an extensive opportunity to hone administrative and military techniques by Viet Minh leadership. After a series of costly campaigns, most notable the siege of Dien Ben Phu by Viet Minh commander Vo Nguyen Giap, the French would concede their claims to Indochina.

military hostilities throughout Indochina (Final Declarations of the Geneva Convention, July 21st 1954, in Porter, Gareth. *Vietnam: A History in Documents*. 1979, 159-161), and laid plans for the establishment of an independent Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, a temporary two-state situation was created with the conditions of general, internationally supervised elections in 1956; the resulting regime would be responsible for the unification and subsequent administration of a united Vietnam.

In the south, elections were almost immediately ruled out following the ascension to power of Diem in 1955. With ever increasing military, financial and intelligence support, Diem would consolidate his rule in the south over the next several years, eliminating political opposition and alienating his regime from the populace in the south.³⁰ Dissatisfaction helped to facilitate the operations of the Viet Cong, communist insurgents in the south, which, in turn, was used for justification for more crack-downs.

By 1963, leadership among the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and intelligence services began to recognize that Diem's policies were unsustainable. Opposition forces consulted with the United States and, after having received their tacit approval, (Telegram from Act. Secretary George Ball to Amb. Cabot George, August 24, 1963, in Porter, Gareth. *Vietnam: A History in Documents*. 1979, 250), staged a coup. Diem was arrested and executed. A series of leaders, mostly drawn from the army, would cycle through for South Vietnam for the next several years.

³⁰ Diem and his family, staunch Catholics, were already at arm's length with the majority-Buddhist population. Subsequent discrimination and persecution only further cemented the populace's opposition.

Leadership in the north seems to have been wary regarding the prospects of unification under the peace agreement, but Ho Chi Minh was also quite aware of the North's ability to continue hostilities indefinitely with no industrial base or support from the international community (Report by Ho Chi Minh to the Second National Congress of the Vietnam Worker's Party, February 11-19, 1951 (Extract) in Porter, Gareth. 1979. *Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, Vol. 1*, 335). During the 1st Indochina War, support for the Viet Minh had been concentrated in the north, but there were numerous party cadres and guerrilla units spread throughout the entirety of Vietnam and, as a result, following the partition in 1954, left many of these elements active in the south. Despite pressures from the south, the DRV proved reluctant to become involved in an open conflict (Porter 1979, 187-192, 194-196).

During the 1960's, the 2nd Indochina war began to escalate as the United States, and its allies, began to funnel more military and financial support into the south. American involvement would reach levels of 500,000+ personnel in the field, in addition to thousands of aircraft. The ARVN, plagued by poor morale and training, proved an unreliable ally and the "frontline" quickly became dominated by the United States. During the course of the war, the United States would utilize an enormous amount of explosives, chemical agents and munitions in an attempt to suppress the insurgency.³¹ In response North Vietnamese leadership steeled in their determination to see the conflict out, determined to force the U.S to a settlement (Porter 318).

³¹ The amount of ordinance detonated over Vietnam is estimated by various sources at being close to the entire expenditure by the United States during World War 2.

In 1968, the Viet Cong (or NLF) executed the Tet Offensive; a nation-wide military operation launched on Vietnamese New Year. Though its military significance was marginal, it had the consequence of turning public opinion in the United States against the war. The Nixon administration would begin scaling down American involvement in the years following, culminating in a complete exit in 1973, after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords.

Without substantial American support, the Republic of Vietnam would collapse within less than two years. Following the recapture of Saigon in 1975, the DRV was renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and a policy of reintegration of the south into Vietnam proper was begun. An outright, unconditional annexation was overlooked in favor of an extensive reeducation campaign, during which amnesty for individuals associated with the previous regime was conditional upon the completion of time at a reeducation facility (Porter 1975, 232, SarDesai 1998, 94, 97-98). The approach bred continued distrust between the two sides, and a much slower integration of southern infrastructure into the north (Beresford 1989, 234).

Within a few years, the effects of another casualty of the 2nd Indochina War became apparent; degraded relations with the People's Republic of China. During its early post-independence, the DRV had carefully negotiated the ever deepening schism between China and the Soviet Union, in an effort to ensure material and financial support from both sides. By the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, support for Vietnam in China was at an all-time low, and Vietnam had steadily aligned itself with the Soviet Union. By the mid1970's, in neighboring Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge had sought

Chinese aide. This was readily given for two reasons; one, Chinese leadership saw Vietnam as part of a Soviet plan to hedge in their regional influence (Heder 1981, 50) and, second, the PRC had a distrust of Vietnam's ambitions in the region (Elliot 1981, 17).³²

Border conflicts between the two escalated to outright war in 1978-79, during which Vietnam invaded and removed the Khmer Rouge after a quick campaign. This would prompt the 3rd Indochina War with the PRC, which lasted for approximately 1-2 months in 1979, and ended with the withdrawal of Chinese forces.³³ Vietnam continued to exercise enormous influence in Cambodia for the next decade, despite the war ultimately establishing Vietnam as a global pariah state (Palmujoki 1997, 161, 168, Thayer 1983, 289).

Military costs, the damage done during three extensive wars, and poor economic planning came to a head during the early 1980's. Early attempts to remedy the issues proved insufficient, and more drastic measures began to take place as the Vietnamese bureaucracy began to adapt. In 1984, more extensive reforms were introduced, and in 1986, at the 6th Party Congress, Doi Moi (or "Renovation) was instituted. It was somewhat modeled on Deng Xiaoping's reforms in China earlier, and had the intention of creating a socialist-oriented economy. Ideological rhetoric was reprioritized behind economic performance, financial and property reforms were carried out. Whereas in China, state-owned enterprises would become a major economic actor, the absence of

³² This included, in no small part, Vietnamese support for the Pathet Lao in Laos which successfully seized the capital in 1975, shortly after the reunification of Vietnam. Vietnamese troops and political influence would remain in the country for years to come.

³³ The withdrawal was purposefully destructive, damaging much of what little recovery had been undertaken since US bombing stopped in 1973.

large-scale industry meant that Doi Moi's most significant new economic players would be individuals and collectives (or family-owned) enterprises and collectives.

Independent Policy Agenda

As stated prior, Vietnam's independent policy agenda can be accurately observed through the lens of the state's leadership/bureaucratic class. Vietnam has a long bureaucratic tradition, dating back several centuries. For much of its recorded history (from approximately 100 B.C.E to 1100 C.E), Vietnam's incorporation into China's political sphere meant a remarkable amount of cultural transmission between the two. One of the most prominent examples of such was the establishment of a flourishing class of Vietnamese "Mandarins," or bureaucrats. As discussed in the chapter on Vietnam's colonial history, these bureaucrats were often drawn from a traditional class of educated families. During French occupation, the Vietnamese proved themselves to be quick students of a new administrative style and were often utilized in the administration of other areas of French Indochina, such as Cambodia and Laos.

My first point, predisposition toward more diffused, consensual politics, demonstrates a diffusion of authority that grows decidedly more technocratic as time goes on. Particularly after the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, there are increasingly few prominent personalities that dominate decision-making and, instead, most policy is executed by the party's bureaucratic organs.

My second point concerns pragmatic decision making. Much of the early decision making process was carried out by bodies comprised of individuals from the ranks of the

Viet Minh and, later, the Lao Dong (Vietnamese Communist Party). Of these individuals, a large number (excepting a few of peasant-agrarian or expatriate backgrounds) were drawn from the emergent new intelligentsia that had supplanted the mandarin class of the pre-colonial era. The extensive structure of the Lao Dong and the existence of many parallel positions between the party and the state (as is the case with the People's Republic of China) may also seem problematic for the notion of an "independent" body, making decisions and carrying through policy. However, for my purposes, we will see that, in the years following independence, the leadership would make decisions based upon "on-the-ground" realities as opposed to a dogged adherence to ideology, party, or a designated state class (of the type we will see, later, in Cambodia). Here, policy is being made based upon realities independent of the agenda of the leadership or party, thus demonstrating a more technocratic approach. This is addressed in my first case, the DRV's early administrative years, as defined by its establishment of autonomous zones for indigenous peoples and its pragmatic war strategy with concerns to more aggressive party cadres in South Vietnam.

My third point, Doi Moi, will demonstrate bureaucratic self-awareness, responsibility-taking and responsiveness. The willingness and ability of a bureaucratic body to recognize error, accept and admit, publically, blame, and make radical adjustments would indicate a broader sense of responsibility to the state and people-at-large, as opposed to a particular class. It also indicates efficacy, which is another important characteristic of the power-projection type.

Early Decisions

The extensiveness of the Vietnamese bureaucracy, especially early on, is seen throughout the war and the period immediately following. There are two useful examples, which will be discussed here; the establishment and dissolution of Tay Bac and Viet Bac as autonomous zones for indigenous hill tribes and the bureaucracy as chief distributor of foreign aid and other consumer product price controls. These two cases demonstrate the Vietnamese bureaucracy's ability to conceive and execute state-level projects, outside of exceptional war-time circumstances.

In the case of the former, the rugged, mountainous interior of Northern Vietnam was, in 1953, the primary operating base of the Viet Minh. During the follow up to Geneva, and immediately following, the areas were established as an autonomous zone for Vietnam's indigenous tribes. Their establishment has two oft-cited reasons; ideological conformity and economic pragmatism. With regards to the former, the Vietnamese leadership, especially the rank-and-file, are distinct for their ardent commitment to communist ideology.³⁴ As such, early documents reflect a desire to emulate the sort of internationalist humanism that is rampant throughout the early Soviet Constitution; the hill tribes were, ultimately, another group that had been exploited by French colonialism.

From a less-ideological perspective, Vietnam also inherited a divided countryside. The mountainous interior of the nation had, aside from limited French expeditions into

³⁴ This was even more so than Ho Chi Minh, who immediately following World War 1, had been very practical in his pursuit of any sort of Western support for an independent Vietnam. Not unlike Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh's decision to pursue Soviet aid was as more motivated by recognition of political realities than any commitment to a sense of international Marxism.

ore extraction (Smith et al 1966, 25), been largely neglected and the vast majority of the population was concentrated on the coastal plains (Smith et al, 1966, 26-28). As the DRV began to undertake attempts at modernization, stretching already thin resources seemed undesirable, and so to delegate authority in these areas, over which they had limited capacity in the first place, was a relatively modest concession to make.

However, as hostilities grew with the Republic of Vietnam and the United States more openly, the autonomous zones proved problematic. Firstly, the region had been used extensively by the Viet Minh during the anti-Japanese and anti-French insurgencies, as the rugged terrain made targeting difficult. Secondly, the possibility of raw material extraction proved a tempting possibility, especially for the industrially-handicapped north. Finally, the concentration of the populace and limited industry into the easily-targeted coastal plains was not strategically wise and so began an extensive effort to de-authorize the autonomous zones and, instead, pursue a policy of population integration (Fall 1963, 149). By 1956, the region had been converted to military authority, and by the 1960's was seeing extensive attempts at population relocation and industrialization.

The role of the bureaucracy is clearly evident in its economic role during the war period. Its role in industrialization will be discussed at a later point, but during much of the war period, the bureaucracy was responsible, chiefly, for the acquisition and dissemination of foreign aid. Chiefly Soviet, initially, and later joined by aid from China and the rest of the Communist bloc, the bureaucracy had two primary recipients: the front, and the countryside.

The front, or the war effort against the South, was almost always the largest target. This is consistent with the much espoused, "All for the front" mentality adopted by Vietnamese leadership in the early 1960's that carried through the entire conflict. The bureaucracy, through coordination with the military, helped to allocate and transport supplies to the front, both the border and South Vietnam proper, through a variety of channels (Porter 1993, 49).

The bureaucracy was also concerned with supporting the population of the DRV. The bureaucracy would utilize a variety of tools to accomplish these ends, including direct distribution of food and other supplies, but also through a variety of finance and production mechanisms, i.e. price controls, quotas, etc. As a result, throughout the early years of the independence period, the leadership of Vietnam maintained a commitment to the war effort, but also made efforts to not neglect the populace. As predicted by its colonial past, leadership remained committed to all the traits of a power-projection state; an independent policy agenda, nationwide projects, and a security orientation.

Consensual leadership/Group Decision Making

A distinguishing characteristic of the Vietnamese state and its leadership since Geneva has been its predisposition toward consensual, non-violent internal decision-making. Decisions and their execution were, from the start, more diffused across multiple individuals than, say, we find in Maoist China or Stalinist Russia.

This is not to diminish Ho Chi Minh's role. The deference paid to his direction is abundantly clear throughout the early years, and his leadership never faces significant

internal opposition. What is telling, however, is that Ho Chi Minh seems to have achieved this level of authority without the need for extensive, bloody purges of the sort seen in Stalinist Russia, or the chaotic societal upheaval of the type employed by Mao in the 1960's. His position was strong enough that he was willing, and eager, to absorb potential threats into his inner circle through the recruitment of ardent nationalists who were, ideologically, staunchly anti-communist. Furthermore, Ho was very willing to cede decision making to those who were more specialized (such as his general delegation of military affairs to Giap).

Another example of this consensual decision making, and the lack of a single personality driving it forward, was the party-state's relationship with its southern cadres during the 1950's. While the Geneva Convention had been drawn along fairly concrete terms, with the north being the Viet Minh's traditional concentration of power, it also had ignored the cellular nature of the group and had, effectively, stranded dozens to hundreds of party cells in the southern region of the country. As calls for elections went unheeded, and Diem ascended and consolidated his power, leadership in the southern cells would continuously apply pressure to the north for direct action. The party, and Ho most prominently, was hesitant to engage the south in outright conflict (Porter 1979, 187-192, 194-196). After several years, and after it had become clear that Diem had no intention of conforming to the original intent of the Geneva convention, the north began active funding, training and support of these southern cells, which would form the heart of the Viet Con. Despite enjoying considerable local support in the south, which would be evident throughout the war, southern leadership elected to continue to defer leadership

toward the central leadership. Rather than be driven by singular leadership, the party diffused decision making, with local cadres prepared to defer to a distant authority.

However, particularly after Ho's death in 1969, the nature of Vietnamese leadership, as well as the party, state and bureaucratic structure became much clearer. Unlike in the Soviet Union or China, there were few prominent personalities that came forward to personify the state. Rather, decision making would be decided by a small collection of party veterans, the Politburo, and then executed by the bureaucratic organ, the Secretariat (Porter 1993, 101). The single instance of intense factionalism in the bureaucracy, with regards to the Sino-Soviet split, would be carried out largely behind closed doors, and decision-making ground to halt throughout the politburo and secretariat until its resolution in the early 1970's, at which point Pro-Chinese members of the politburo had either gone into exile, or been political marginalized. With consensus achieved, execution of the state agenda continued forward.

Doi Moi

War-time had, in many ways, simplified Vietnam's bureaucratic agenda. Focus on resolving the conflict in the south had turned the bureaucracy's chief functions into increasing the state's capacity to conduct war, primarily through industrialization and alleviating the conflict's impact on the populace. However, following the capture of Saigon and reunification, the state's economic policies, and the performance of its leadership at large, was now being measured by a number of different metrics that had not mattered as much as before. The chief concern of the bureaucracy, then, became

economic performance and general policy responsiveness. These economic policies will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. Instead, what is of importance here is leadership and bureaucracy's ability to recognize its own failures and self-correct through adaptive policy-making.

Vietnam's economy began suffering in the early 1980's.³⁵ While still perceived as manageable throughout the course of the second five-year plan (from 1976, following reunification, to 1980-1), it became increasingly clear that the country's problems were much deeper than previously understood (Vo 1990, 81, 126). More worrisome for leadership was the fact that the second plan had failed to improve the situation in any way.

In response, the state began to attempt piecemeal structural and economic reforms as part of the third five-year plan. However the reforms proved too little, too late, particularly as they came after a massive drop-off of international trade and the cutting of support from China. The reforms proved unable to make any significant change, and expectations quickly devolved from 'solution' to 'stopping-the-bleeding.'

As discussed prior, Vietnam's leadership were heavily ideological, and a good deal of the state and party, from the upper echelons of the politburo and down, were genuine supporters of Marxism. Leadership and bureaucracy drew much legitimacy from their performance and participation in the wars and investment in the old system. However, by 1984, it was becoming clear that the current policies were not working. The party recognized that change was necessary, despite commitment to Marxist principals.

³⁵ This was a by-product of the fallout of the 3rd Indochina War, as well as the results of the country's enforcement of command economics following reunification.

There is little doubt that reformist movements in the Communist Bloc provided a sort of ideological precedent for leadership, and the actual reforms undertaken had similarities as well. However, Vietnam's reforms possessed a distinctive character that differentiated them from the two largest members of the Communist Bloc. In 1985, Nguyen Van Linh, who had fallen out of favor following reunification, suddenly saw a dramatic resurgence in prominence. In keeping with the consensual approach to decision making, Nguyen was readmitted and promoted quickly to the party's top position in 1986.

Nguyen would publically admit, on behalf of the state, that leadership had "failed to recognize" Vietnam's economic problems and responded improperly (Vo 1990, 244). A series of extensive economic reforms were undertaken and, to execute them, the bureaucracy saw a large degree of turnover, with older, more ideological members being replaced by younger members who were decidedly more technocratic (Nguyen Van Canh 1983).

Whereas the old bureaucracy had been heavily burdened, post-unification, with ideological constraints and red tape, the new bureaucracy found itself suddenly able to operate much more quickly. Without military and ideological oversight, the bureaucracy would go about instituting a wide-range of economic reforms and, more importantly, were now, in many ways, more similar to their developmental counterparts in South Korea and Japan.

While China had flirted with political reform³⁶ and the Soviet Union had instituted a policy that permitted for wide channels of dissent from below, no such

³⁶ For example, there were various gestures at "openness" and democracy was allowed to spread at the village level.

policies accompanied Vietnamese economic reforms. While the bureaucracy, as an organ of the party, had been somewhat removed from criticism from below, before, this continued on even after their operational capacity was dramatically improved in 1986 and afterward, helping to better insulate them from politics (Vo 1990, 247).

Doi Moi, then, represented not just economic reforms, but also captured in a single moment the ability of the Vietnamese leadership and bureaucracy to recognize state-level issues. However, more significantly, it represented the ability of leadership and the bureaucracy to self-correct; realizing that previous attempts had failed, that the command-style economy and heavy ideological character of the state were hindering development and, as a response, dramatically restructuring its very character to meet these issues.

State Projects

Vietnam has, since its independence, been faced with a number of very difficult problems threatening, in many cases, its very existence. Examined here are three policies that exemplify the Vietnamese state's ability to carry out large-scale, nation-wide projects.³⁷ These projects are the push for heavy industrialization, immediate economic policy following reunification, and the economic reforms undertaken as part of Doi Moi.

The first is the push for Soviet-Style industrialization, prioritizing heavy industry and manufacturing that was Vietnam's economic plan from 1954 to 1969. This focus

³⁷ The administrative skill and leadership needed to coordinate a war effort against the United States for over a decade is considerable, however, the very fact that its existence was at risk may make this not terribly useful for analytical purposes.

initially was part ideological, part war-time decision making, though it would later be amended. The second example characterizes Vietnam's economic policies immediately following unification, whereby an extensive campaign of drawing international investment or restitution was carried out in order to acquire foreign capital, to facilitate agricultural and industrial goals. The third example discusses the sweeping economic changes carried out in the early-mid 1980's, in response to the failings/shortcomings of previous economic plans.

All three demonstrate the state's ability to undertake and execute large-scale projects across the entirety of its territory, even when constrained by war, finances, or political in-fighting (especially prevalent during the era immediately following the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960's).

Heavy Industry Focus

This section will demonstrate the ability of the Vietnamese state to execute large-scale projects, particularly on nurturing a heavy-industrial base.

North Vietnam inherited an agriculturally-dominated economy in 1954. There were only 7-10 large-scale industries in the North, mostly focused around mineral/ore extraction in the more remote areas of the country that had been previously utilized by the French and Japanese. The DRV's leadership was dominated by those who had been trained in the Soviet Union or Maoist China (Woodside 1968/69, 65) and were heavily influenced by their ideas for economic development (Vo 1990, 242).³⁸

³⁸ Such as those who attended numerous schools in the Soviet Union, such as the "Lenin" and "Stalin" schools.

As a result, leadership looked to Stalin's policies of forced industrialization in the 1930's and 1940's as a model to follow (Porter 1993, 48), particularly as they were faced with an increasingly hostile South Vietnam, supported by major industrial powers. Soviet successes would also, perhaps, blind them to the failures of the Great Leap Forward, as they would continue on with their heavy-industrial approach for nearly two decades.

Initially, the state's interest was most heavily focused upon Hanoi, the major metropolitan within their territory. Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, much of the aid being received from the Soviet Union and PRC was channeled into these avenues; numerous new plants were opened, ports had their capacities increased, and infrastructure began to improve for the area.

By the mid-1960's, the reality of the 2nd Indochina War made the previous approach to heavy industrialization impractical. Operation Rolling Thunder, an extensive bombing campaign carried out by the United States against the north, forced leadership to make adjustments. As aid continued to flow in from its allies, the DRV remained committed to the goal of heavy-industry and, instead, changed its regional focus. Industries were relocated farther and farther from the main cities, at first in the immediate, surrounding countryside and then, later, deeper into more inaccessible areas of the north. Even as the bombing campaign subsided and was eventually terminated, Vietnamese leadership remained committed to a more decentralized industrial policy until 1975.

There was some attention paid to the agricultural sector during the war-period, usually limited to redistributive land reform based on the Soviet model. These efforts

seem to have been largely driven by the necessity of food production as the war continued to ramp up, rather than any recognition of agriculture as the foundation for a future economy. As a result, Vietnam remained dependent on aid from the Soviet Union and China in providing for the more basic necessities of a productive agricultural sector.

The state's efforts remained concentrated on its industrial development, with agriculture largely relegated to a sort of "logistics" status; necessary for the war effort, but not something that could be relied upon to significantly affect the state's bottom line.³⁹ However, within the discussion of industrial policy alone, it becomes clear that leadership was less dogmatic than it may have appeared. Despite a commitment to industrialization, leadership was under no illusion that their policies simply would not work without amendments given the nature of the war. Decentralization of industry during war time represents a clear example of leadership's commitment to state-wide projects and a commitment to security, yet also reveals the technocratic pragmatism they, as a group, acquired during the colonial period.

Post-Unification Economics

Following 1975, Hanoi sought to address two key economic realities; the markedly different economic structure present in the south, and the lack of socialist "enforcement" throughout the country at large. The expansion of economic plans into the south, complimented by "ends" oriented foreign policy, demonstrates a state capable of

³⁹ This subordination continued despite the role of Vietnam's agricultural goods as its most vital, income-earning exports.

both complex negotiations and recognition of its own place within a larger international system.

The process of economic integration was complicated by two issues. The first complication arose from the fact that while the south, like Vietnam as a whole, was largely agricultural, it had also had permitted a more market-oriented system for the twenty or so years after Geneva. This meant the mechanisms for production, distribution and pricing were very different than those that existed in the north. The second issue was that, despite official policy to the contrary, enforcement of socialist structures in the north was not strict. This non-enforcement stemmed heavily from two war-time practices. The first was the presence of an enormous amount of, largely, unconditional aid coming from Communist Bloc allies. Second, war-time necessity meant that the general distributive efficiency enjoyed by market-oriented systems led it to be preferred on the ground. Throughout the war, the north was very lax on individuals, who still dominated crafts production as well as the agricultural sector, where numerous concessions were made (often explained away through technicalities.⁴⁰)

Thus, after the war, two major changes were initiated. The first was the rapid integration of the south into the North's economic plan; this involved widespread land redistribution and collectivization in both the agricultural and crafts sectors. The state issued edicts declaring a new commitment to agricultural policy, as well, with the goal of increasing overall state investment in these sectors. Secondly, the formerly lax attitude

⁴⁰ One such example is of a collective that had, for all practical purposes, privatized land ownership. As the collective was still producing its quota, and as the party cadre was still overseeing it, it was decided that it still fell within the category of socialist production.

toward the family/individual level private sector was replaced with much stricter enforcement and, thus, a greater reliance on the central planning of the secretariat.

In the immediate years that followed, despite the vocal commitment to agriculture, investment remained approximately the same and food-shortages would continue. Focus on heavy industry remained the de facto policy; however, Hanoi seemed to recognize that they would be unable to continue as the more 'self-reliant' approach to industrialization.

While they had enjoyed Soviet and Chinese aid during the war, the fall of Saigon marked a changing point in Vietnamese foreign policy. The Soviets were increasingly more assertive about expanding their cooperation with Vietnam to gain access to bases and warm ports in the Pacific, and relations with China had gone chilly and were worsening with every year. Thus, immediately following the war, Hanoi began to seek international recognition and trade with other partners, having seemingly abandoned the two-camp vision of global economics. Amongst these early new partners were Nordic (Sweden and Norway), and relations were normalized with Japan, in addition to the negotiation of war-time reparations.

Vietnam also began reaching out to Australia, Canada, and other western countries it had, until recently, nominally been hostile toward. Relations remained non-existent with the US, but Hanoi seemed keen on normalizing them as quickly as possible knowing that the amount of investment possible from the United States could solve their capital-shortage issues quickly. This flirtation outside the socialist bloc represented a potential source of income and investment, one that leadership was aware that it needed.

This need for an influx of foreign capital became particularly dire as the imperfections of Vietnam's prior economic policies began to manifest themselves in the late 1970's. Food shortages continued, and despite some gains, industrial growth quotas continued to be missed by several percent. Furthermore, Vietnam's need to rapidly industrialize required a good deal of infrastructure to be rebuilt and an enormous amount of industrial subsidization. After 1979, during which Vietnam would invade and occupy Cambodia, foreign investment and trade grounded to a halt as Vietnam was broadly condemned by the West and found itself isolated. What could not now be achieved through foreign investment, had to be done with aid from its communist allies or, as became the modus operandi of the late 1970's Vietnamese state, just to continue printing large quantities of money.

As a result, by the early 1980's, Vietnam was looking at inflation rates of several hundred percent (Vo Dai Luoc 1993, 107, Ninh 1989, 230) which could only be addressed by radical devaluations of the dong. These devaluations, while helpful, proved to be symptom-treating; the underlying problems remained, and soon were resurfacing within months.

Vietnam's failed internal economic policies, brought on by a domestic re-commitment to "socialist modes" of production and war-related costs, pushed the leadership to reach out to non-socialist trading partners that could provide raw capital investment (as opposed to material or technical based aid). However, as we have seen, its dedication to security oriented policies would directly interfere with the pursuit of a

broader developmental plan. This is as we would expect from a power-projection state such as Vietnam; prioritization of security projects foremost.

Doi Moi Economic Reforms

In 1986, at the 6th party Congress, the Lao Dong would publically admit to having failed at economic management since the close of the war. The admission was a dramatic one; an outright acceptance of responsibility of the state's failings, as opposed to more ambiguous, "need to adapt" style statements issued by Deng in the 1970's, and Gorbachev in the 1980's. Instead, Vietnamese leadership admitted to not only failing to perceive economic problems, but also to having misunderstood and misinterpreted Socialist theory in general.

While dramatic, the latter was necessary in order to carry out the set of fundamental reforms the economy seemed to need. In sum, the admission declared that Vietnamese leadership had attempted to arrive directly at a communist mode of production without having passed through the fundamental socialist mid-steps that Marx claimed was, in many respects, inevitable. In this way, the party was now able to be flexible in their policy-making, while continuing to adhere to the original ideology⁴¹ (and their ideological legitimacy). Furthermore, it also helped to frame the lack of political liberalization of the sort seen in the Soviet Union, by attempting to demonstrate the responsibility of leadership and its commitment to the people, thereby eliminating the need for a move toward democratic accountability.

⁴¹ It is interesting to note that Vietnam is one of the few Communist countries to make this serious of an effort to reconcile economic reality with actual Marxist theory.

The most fundamental shift in the economy was the ability and right of each citizen to now function simultaneously as an individual economic actor, as well as a voluntary member of a collective actor. This would help to contribute to the increased diversity in economic sectors⁴² and also helped to facilitate the transition from state-priced markets to market-oriented ones.

For example, in the mid-80's, the state sector, now encouraged to participate in the production of consumer goods, would serve as a large investor in various energy and fuel projects that helped to curb perpetual shortages. This, in turn, allowed for collectives to be far more productive, and the advent of individual-level economic activity (particularly in crafts and agriculture) would provide an environment in which Vietnam would see an enormous boom in the availability of goods.

The state, for its part, also remained committed to this project by addressing its pre-existing priorities that had been most destructive for Vietnam in general; its dogged commitment to heavy industry, its inflationary monetary policies, and the Cambodian excursion. In the case of the former, the state sector continued to remain committed to it, however, they now began to pursue these projects without forcing collective and individual level production firms to support their efforts, thus freeing the latter two to pursue consumer-oriented projects.⁴³

While attempts had been made to address inflation through devaluations, they had proven insufficient. However, after Doi Moi, the state would begin to pursue the use of

⁴² Individual, collective and state enterprises would, by the late 1980's, represent approximately 1/3 of the economy each.

⁴³ It should also be noted that Hanoi was anxious to see the state become involved in the production of consumer products, including the involvement of the state's R&D branches, and its armed forces.

other financial tools to help curb inflation. The primary means, particularly after 1989, would be the raising of interest rates above the inflationary rate. With the markets suddenly buzzing with more currency, the rising inflation rates helped to persuade local Vietnamese businesses and individuals to save, thus removing currency from direct circulation. Later, the in-flow of foreign capital would help serve as a balance, preventing the economy from grinding to a total halt while inflation was brought to relatively manageable levels.

Security-Orientation

The most distinctive feature of the power-projection state is its predisposition toward security-related items. Below, we will discuss three such examples where security was prioritized over, primarily, economic concerns despite an increased self-awareness that economic performance was suffering.

The first example is the policies of reintegration of the southern half of the country into Vietnam following reunification. Here, while most analysts agree a more holistic, unconditional integration would have been economically beneficial, the DRV elected to proceed with a gradual approach, utilizing painstaking reeducation for officials, bottlenecking human capital, and slow integration/reconstruction of infrastructure in the south (Vo 1990, 59-60).

Second, Vietnam's navigation of the Sino-Soviet split, that had become apparent by the late 1950's, is especially telling. Particularly during times of war, Vietnam pursued a role of "peacemaker" and "mediator" in the Communist Bloc for much of the 1950's and

early-mid 1960's. However, Vietnam increasingly aligned itself to the Soviet Union, which could provide enormous military, financial and technological aide. In contrast, despite the immediate proximity of China to its borders, it viewed its neighbor with increased suspicion and would, ultimately, be drawn into outright conflict.

Third is Vietnam's interventionism in Laos and Cambodia. In the former, Vietnam would be the primary backer of the Pathet Lao, who would succeed in gaining control of Laos in 1975, shortly after the reunification of Vietnam. In the latter, Cambodia, Vietnam would provide early aide to the Khmer Rouge, but later this would taper off after Pol Pot's ascension in 1975. In light of increased border skirmishes, and Chinese influence, Vietnam would invade Cambodia in late 1978/early 1979, removing the Khmer Rouge, and establishing a Pro-Vietnamese government. Despite Chinese intervention, in the third Indochina War, and subsequent international condemnation (including political and economic sanctions), Vietnam remained committed to its presence in Cambodia for nearly a decade.

Reintegration Policy

The capture of Saigon in 1975 marked the end of the end of hostilities and the political unification of Vietnam. As far as the international community was concerned, Vietnam was a single political entity yet, for Vietnamese leadership, unification posed a series of other problems. Leadership would choose a path of integration that would be most effective at solidifying domestic stability, as opposed to the methods that would be most conducive to economic concerns (or standards of living).

Despite the commonalities (massive war damages, population loss, etc.), the fact remained that north and south had been on radically different trajectories for the better part of the previous twenty years. There had been a massive flight of refugees fleeing from the south; however, an even larger proportion of the population remained behind. While top leadership may have fled the nation, and the peasantry either supportive or ambiguous, the bureaucracy and other instruments of the state left behind by the prior regime posed a serious issue for Hanoi.

On the one hand, the north was acutely aware of its shortage of resources, both material and human. Yet, they were still elements of the previous regime, regardless of their position in the hierarchy, and thus represented what they felt to be a security risk.

There were, generally, two directions leadership could have elected to take. The first was a general amnesty, lacking conditions, and the immediate reintegration of the south. This approach, carried out by the Secretariat (presumably) would have, its believed, helped to repair mistrust between the two groups, and at the same time facilitate the recovery of the Vietnamese economy (Porter 1975, 232-234, Porter 1976 210-212, Tri 1990, 59-64). Even outside the context of national reconciliation, there would have been the pragmatic benefits of an influx of human capital. Unlike neighboring Cambodia (Pre-Khmer Rouge) and Laos, the DRV's shortage of technical skill sets stemmed more from the strain of war with one of the world's super powers, than with general lack of education and training.

Instead, in early 1976, Hanoi announced that the reintegration process would be carried out by the military, and done in a two-track fashion, instead of uniformly. Firstly,

the south would be integrated rapidly into the North's economic system. Second, all individuals associated with the prior regime would be granted amnesty on the condition of the completion of a reeducation regimen.

Reeducation varied depending on position and rank in the former regime. For the lowest ranking bureaucrats and "beat" police, it was often sufficient to complete a weekend course, usually localized, but sometimes, if nearby, visiting reeducation facilities. For those who were in a greater position of authority, stays were longer, ranging from several days to months, even years for the highest former authorities (Porter 1975, 234). In a catch-22, officials from the previous regime were expected to renounce their former affiliations and pledge allegiance to the newly-christened Socialist Republic of Vietnam; however, those that switched too quickly were presumed to be acting in self-interest. Delaying one's completion of reeducation, that is to say, showing resistance or hesitance, was equally problematic, and so individuals were often left to find an impossible "happy medium" between the two extremes. In most cases, however, reeducation seems to have fostered a lasting mistrust (Porter 1976, 212, Ninh 1989, 214) and many of the former officials, especially higher-ranking ones, were relegated to less-vital, or outright insignificant, posts (Vo 1990, 62).

This approach, while guaranteeing loyal party members and supporters occupied critical posts in the unification process, also severely deprived Vietnam of access to vital expertise at a critical juncture in Vietnamese economic development. Lacking significant input from those bureaucrats and planners who had worked in the RVN government, Vietnam remained committed to its vision of centralized, bureaucratic planning. As a

result, instead of more pro-active, aggressive reforms, Vietnam would carry out piecemeal restructuring throughout the early 1980's, and ultimately be forced to make much more drastic restructuring in 1986.

Sino-Soviet Split

The DRV joined the Communist Bloc at a particularly sensitive juncture. For the several years after the close of World War 2, Soviet hegemony within the bloc went unquestioned. Soviet military might was unchallenged, its economy primed from war-time production, and the defeat of the axis powers had created a power vacuum which the Soviet Union had rapidly filled, in both East Asia and Eastern Europe.

When China joined the Communist bloc, soon after the conclusion of its civil war in 1949, Mao and Chinese leadership seemed willing to defer to Stalin's authority. For the same reasons as the European communist regimes, China found itself exiting a period of extensive warfare, and without the benefit of a galvanized war-machine (or atomic weaponry, for that matter). The Soviet Union and China cooperated on a number of ventures, particularly during the Korean War, with China often deferring to Soviet decision making. However, following the death of Stalin and de-Stalinization, China began breaking out on its own, more and more. The rift would later reach such a level that U.S and western foreign policy would begin to actively attempt to exploit it for strategic gains.

During the early period of the rift, Vietnam was in an odd position. The Soviet Union was the traditional leader of the bloc and, at least for the next several decades,

would remain its premier power. Ho Chi Minh, and others amongst the most senior leadership, would receive training and education in the Soviet Union. China was not a power that could be easily ignored. Its general proximity meant that it had been a base from which the Viet Minh leadership had organized and trained, and after Geneva, it would be a major channel through which aid would flow. Furthermore, for the early Vietnamese state, it represented a major security threat, as the PRC's ability to put dozens to hundreds of divisions on its border was unsettling from a strategic viewpoint.

As a result, Vietnam adopted a role of mediator and ideological preserver. At numerous conferences over several years, Vietnam would deliver numerous ideologically-laden speeches, lobbying the Soviet Union for patience from its younger bloc members, and China for deference. Vietnam became a sort-of self-appointed defender of the ideological unity of the Communist bloc, and was amongst the most vocal critics of Tito, delivering scathing rebukes when Yugoslavia would become actively involved in the founding of the League of Non-Aligned Nations.

Despite the ideological character of Vietnamese leadership, the approach had very real benefits; Vietnam could count on massive amounts of aid from both the Soviet Union and China, all of which were critical in the early years. While the majority of high-end technological aid and expertise was arriving from the Soviet Union (Woodside 1968, 65), China was a major supplier of more basic goods, such as foodstuffs, textiles and munitions. Vietnamese leadership, at least at this stage, remained acutely aware that they were playing a very delicate game and that each of their two beneficiaries had ulterior motivations for assisting them.

For the Soviets, Vietnam represented an opportunity to acquire warm-water ports, and project its power into the Pacific Rim directly, applying pressure on the US and its allies (Buszynski 1982, 274). Furthermore, whether intended or not, it provided an opportunity to enclose growing Chinese influence, not only in the region, but in the Communist bloc at large.⁴⁴

For the Chinese, Vietnam represented an opportunity to increase its sphere into Southeast Asia, which could have the added benefit of applying pressure on Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines. In addition, there was a certain historic claim to Vietnam in the popular mind of Chinese leadership, on account of a centuries-long occupation. How prevalent this was for the Chinese is debatable, but for the Vietnamese, this tension was always especially thick.

Despite the benefits, and previous success, of straddling the line between the two, Vietnam began to gradually drift toward the Soviet Union as its primary ally. The defining moment came in 1968, soon after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The invasion received harsh condemnation from China, with Chinese rhetoric beginning to classify the Soviet Union as just another sort of imperialist oppressor. Border hostilities were ramping up, and throughout 1969, would escalate to the point of outright hostilities between the two powers in the deserts and steppes of Mongolia.

⁴⁴ Certainly, later, the Soviets were more open about it after the Sino-Soviet Schism was complete, however, literature and documents seem divided as to whether or not this was part of the original Soviet agenda for the region. I am inclined to believe that the ability to hedge China in through Vietnam turned out to be more serendipitous than something planned, as the difference in real power between the USSR and China was much greater in the 1950's, and Soviet leadership lacked the Stalinist paranoia/foresight to plan twenty years in advance.

For the Vietnamese, 1968 represented an opportunity to cast all-in with the Soviet Union and increase the supply of much needed heavy equipment, all while helping to secure itself against the perceived Chinese threat. So, soon after the invasion, Hanoi issued a statement of support for the Soviet Union. This was not lost on Soviet leadership, and tangible support began increasing for the DRV soon thereafter.⁴⁵

At this point in the 2nd Indochina War, China was too heavily invested in the conflict, materially and politically, to completely abandon the Vietnamese. However, following 1968, this reality of a purely political arrangement, as opposed to any sense of ideological solidarity, was now explicitly clear. Aid began to taper off almost as soon as the war looked as though it were diplomatically a foregone conclusion. By 1975, with the Sino-Soviet split complete, rhetoric between China and Vietnam became increasingly hostile, and pro-Chinese members of Vietnamese leadership were being marginalized or forced into exile.

Vietnamese support of the Pathet Lao seemed to confirm Chinese fears that Vietnam was now actively extending their sphere of influence and, with the enlargement of Soviet bases in northern Vietnam, that the Soviet Union was actively hedging them in. In response, the Chinese would begin more actively supporting the Pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, which would worsen Chinese and Vietnamese relations even further.

⁴⁵ Brezhnev proved far more interested and willing to support Vietnam than his predecessors (Duiker 1986, 48) and the Vietnamese leadership was more than prepared to exploit this (Luthi 2008, 310).

Interventionism

Accusations of Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina more broadly date back to the early years of the 1st Indochina War. The Indochinese Communist Party had been the Comintern-sanctioned body for Indochina, despite its core leadership being almost entirely Vietnamese. Following its dissolution in 1945, and the reformation in 1951 of the same Vietnamese leadership as the Lao Dong, the ICP remained a historical point of proof, utilized by the French, US and, later, China alike to provide historical precedent for Vietnamese ambitions in Southeast Asia (Duiker 1986, 30).

Ho Chi Minh and other top ICP leadership did not seem to have been particularly concerned with Cambodia and Laos, outside of a very basic strategic sense, this early on (Duiker 1986, 28). However, particularly as the 2nd Indochina War escalated, Vietnamese interest in its neighbors began to increase significantly. Funneling supplies and manpower across the border into South Vietnam proved problematic, for a number of reasons, and alternate logistical routes were selected that complimented the nature of warfare in the south. These routes involved heavy movement of manpower and supplies through Cambodia and Laos, as rough, Jungle terrain blurred the borders and made it much more difficult to target. The US response was a series of military incursions attempting to cut off these vital supply routes, but results were mixed.

Aside from these 2nd Indochina War-related campaigns, Vietnam would be involved in two major interventionist episodes; Laos (from 1955 through 1975) and Cambodia (1978-1989).

Vietnamese involvement in Laos began very early on. Pathet Lao leadership was drawn from the ranks of the dissolved ICP, and during the 1st Indochina War, they functioned as, for all practical purposes, a wing of the Viet Minh (Duiker 1986, 30). Heavily dependent on its Vietnamese equivalent, the Pathet Lao would rely outright on Viet Minh military support through to the Geneva Convention. Afterward, despite the continued presence of Vietnamese forces, the Pathet Lao began to organize more effectively and conduct their insurgency with more indigenous troops, though remaining heavily dependent on Vietnamese supplies and expertise.

Several attempts at negotiation and concession were carried out by the Royalist Lao government; in 1954, during the early 1960s, and finally in 1973, as an addendum to the Paris Peace Accords. By this point, the situation in Laos had degenerated into outright civil war being fought between Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao rebels, and the Royal Lao army, supported by the West.⁴⁶

In 1975, the withdrawal of a meaningful US presence in the south enabled the DRV to reallocate its military resources to Laos, and soon after the capture of Saigon, the Pathet Lao seized Vientiane. Following the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Vietnam pressured the new government into permitting an extensive Vietnamese military presence in Laos (Stuart-Fox 1997, 186-207). With leadership bound closely to their Vietnamese equivalents, and a substantial military presence, Laos would dramatically close down their economic and diplomatic channels. By 1976, less than a

⁴⁶ For political reasons, this support came in chiefly covert forms, such as "Volunteers" from Thailand and the Khmer Republic, US Special Forces, and other pro-US peoples (i.e. Hmong, etc).

year after the Pathet Lao victory, Laos had been reduced, for all practical purposes, to satellite status.

For the next decade, Laos would rarely if ever deviate from Hanoi. Following Doi Moi and a re-prioritization of the national agenda by the Vietnamese leadership, Laos would gain some degree of autonomy, though to this day it remains closely bound to Hanoi.

Vietnam's interest in Cambodia is, in many ways, linked to two key events; the completion of the Sino-Soviet split, in 1971, and the conclusion of the 2nd Indochina War, in 1975. Following Vietnam's alignment to the Soviet Union, the PRC would begin to look for a means to check Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. As a result, they began to heavily support the Khmer Rouge insurgency in the early 1970's, through to their seizure of power in 1975. With the 2nd Indochina War over, Vietnam now had to reassess its political situation; bordered to the north by an ambiguously hostile PRC, and an increasingly unpredictable regime to the west.

Border conflicts between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam started early on, in both the contested Champa region (which had been awarded to Vietnam earlier on, but possessing a large Khmer population) as well as the dense jungle that characterized the majority of the border. Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge, despite what Vietnam considered infractions against their territorial integrity, became an increasingly sore spot in Sino-Viet relations. Indeed, a noticeable shift in rhetoric on both sides took place, with the Chinese being painted as imperialists, and the Vietnamese as war-mongering pawns of the Soviet Union.

In early-mid 1978, the Vietnamese managed to secure a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. This was interpreted by Vietnamese leadership as tacit approval of their plan to invade Cambodia, as well as insurance against Chinese retaliation. In late December of 1968, Vietnamese troops marched across the border. The Khmer Rouge, already outmanned and outgunned and weakened by years of poor logistics and politicized purges, crumbled in the face of the Vietnamese advance. Within weeks, the Vietnamese had firm control over the capital and had driven the Khmer Rouge into the jungles.

In 1979, the Chinese retaliated on behalf of Cambodia, pouring 200-300k troops across the Vietnamese border. The 3rd Indochina War would prove brief compared to its predecessors; lasting just short of a month. The Chinese enjoyed numerical and firepower superiority, however, they found that the Vietnamese were hesitant to commit to open warfare, instead opting to rely on time-proven tactics learnt over the previous 3 decades. Chinese casualties began to mount as the Vietnamese withdrew to stronger fortifications and began re-utilizing the guerrilla tactics that had served them well earlier. By March, the Chinese issued a declaration of victory and made a complete withdrawal. The goals of the Chinese are debatable, however, the results are not; little was accomplished strategically.

The Vietnamese continued to occupy Cambodia, helping to establish the People's Republic of Kampuchea, a pro-Vietnamese government. For nearly a decade afterward, the Vietnamese army would be actively involved in suppressing the Khmer Rouge insurgency, and later the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Despite an

active military presence, Vietnamese control over domestic affairs did not reach the same levels as they had in Laos.

International condemnation of the Vietnamese was pervasive throughout the west. Trade agreements with much of Scandinavia, Japan and so on were deeply cut, and economic ties with China almost completely so. Vietnamese trade was forced to quickly realign, with Poland and other East European members of the Communist Bloc becoming their primary trade partners. Economically, the invasion and continued occupation proved disastrous, siphoning off resources from a pool that was growing increasingly thin as a result of continued, poor economic policy and the recent decay of trade with the west.

Ultimately, following Doi Moi, Vietnamese leadership would begin to seek as quick an exit from Cambodia as possible, and by the early 1990's had withdrawn its military, concluding a decade of hostilities that had cost them heavily, and yielded relatively few gains.

Post-Independence Vietnam: In Review

Vietnam in the post-colonial era is defined by several key features. These include a virile state capacity throughout war and peacetime, able to execute a number of different large-scale projects that were designed to benefit the state population at large. The Vietnamese communist party demonstrated an ability and willingness to carry out these projects and, despite its domination of the political arena, the policy making and executing organ was defined by consensual decision making where political personalities were marginalized in favor of the collective decision making process. While a vision

espoused by other communist leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Vietnamese leadership, unlike Deng, did not permit individuals to dominate the decision making process.

These large projects were, as always, geared toward the security of the state. For Vietnam, its post-colonial history is defined by three separate large conflicts with colonial, hegemonic and regional powers. While nested in the very real political environment of the cold war, it is also true that the Vietnamese state was very much an active agent in its own destiny and, in many ways, its own policies helped to reinforce the security-challenged world that they perceived.

The Power Projection State

In this first case, we have examined Vietnam, our typological Power-Projection state. Following independence, the DRV state possessed a leadership drawn from a politicized, educated new elite with a strong sense of identity and ideological cohesiveness. This leadership's insecurity extended beyond the Second Indochina War, and influenced their policy making even after its conclusion in 1975. Despite security concerns, bordering on paranoia, the state demonstrated multiple times that it is capable of a number of large-scale projects geared toward national benefit. In addition, the agenda was generated internally by a bureaucracy characterized by pragmatism, self-awareness, and diffused, consensual decision making. The post-independence era was directly shaped by its colonial legacy.

During the colonial period, Vietnam was characterized by high levels of social mobility that marginalized the nobility and existing bureaucratic class, and replaced them

with a new professional class characterized by high educational attainment. These individuals were often tapped for administrative and functionary positions throughout French Indochina. Their heightened levels of education, and comparative affluence, afforded them the expertise and opportunity to mobilize socially and politically. These elites, while occupying much of the bureaucracy as their predecessors had, differed in key ways. First, the Mandarin elites had their authority tied to the legitimacy of a now dissolved system. Second, the bureaucracy that replaced the Mandarins was a Westernized one, with multiple institutions tied into it. This included not only the education system, but also health, commercial and so forth. Third, this new leadership class possessed an ideological cohesiveness that translated into a more consensual, diffused decision making process. Despite their ideological commitments, and security preoccupation, however, leadership proved more than capable of adjusting to realities on the ground. In addition, they were self-aware enough to recognize a series of failed policies and make adjustments. This is not a trait we find in Vietnam's neighbors, where elite legitimacy is tied to proximity to the nobility, rather than to performance.

These new elites, therefore, gained significant experience in working with different elements of the economy and increased their skill sets. Vietnamese experience with direct and excise taxation, as well as limited colonial exportation left in place a bureaucratic tradition that was more capable of adjusting to independence than its neighbors, though not sufficient enough to allow them to make the complete transition to the developmental state.

Finally, the institutions and infrastructure placed down by the French was far more extensive than that set down in Cambodia and Laos. For leadership post-independence, this meant there existed infrastructure and institutions that could be exploited by the new state as sources of income and national cohesiveness. In Vietnam, however, this was negatively affected by the division of the country in 1954, and by the extensive Second Indochina War. The experience and most skeletal framework of institutional-infrastructure remained with the leadership; however, it did increase insecurity for the state. Incomplete levels of infrastructure, particularly in the remote northwest and interior, defined both the war strategy for the DRV, as well as its decisions with regards to reintegration after unification in 1975.

As a result, the behavior of the Vietnamese state after independence was directly influenced by the nature of its colonial legacy. Colonial Vietnam was characterized by social mobility, rewarding the pragmatic, and the 'whole' of the Indochina Union. Following independence, the new elite class prioritized this pragmatism, pursuing security internal and external, in the drive to preserve and strengthen the 'whole' of Vietnam.

CHAPTER 3: CAMBODIA (CASE STUDY B)

For my second case, exemplifying a self-enrichment state, we will examine the Kingdom of Cambodia. This case will begin with a brief introduction to the case, including a brief history, before examining its colonial period (1863-1953) during which time the Kingdom of Cambodia was known as the Protectorate of Cambodia. Here we will pay special attention to the lack of indigenous elite mobility, income diversity and the moderate, yet lop-sided, infrastructure built during the colonial period and forward. Afterwards, we will examine Cambodia's post-independence period from 1953-1979, up until the establishment of the People's Republic of Cambodia. Post-Independence will be analyzed through three distinct periods; the Kingdom of Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1953-1975), the Khmer Republic (1970-1975) under Gen. Lon Nol, and Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) under Saloth Sar and the Khmer Rouge. During all three periods we will be able to observe the characteristic traits of a self-enrichment state: state projects with a narrow beneficiary (the designated state class, or DSC), the lack of differentiation of state instruments from the DSC, and rampant corruption, all of which are a function of the conditions set down by the French colonial administration.

Historical Context

In terms of history, Cambodia is our most complex case. As a result, it is of particular use to first establish a base history in order to understand the players that will feature centrally to our narrative.

Contemporary Cambodia and much of Southeast Asia, was the site of the powerful Khmer Empire, with its capital at Angkor. This empire was at its height during

the 1000-1200's, but by the 1400s was in steady decline at the expense of its neighbors, particularly Vietnamese tribes in the east and an emergent Thai kingdom in the west. As the centuries went on, the area on the Mekong Delta would gradually be ceded to Vietnamese invaders⁴⁷ while two large, "heartland" provinces, Battambang and Siem Reap, would be ceded to Ayutthaya and the successive Thai kings.⁴⁸ By the 1700s, Cambodian Kings were dependent upon their neighbors for their thrones (Martin 1994, 29-39). In this respect, King Norodom was no exception; he had relied upon Siam (Thailand) to put down rebellions and pretenders to the throne, and reinstall him in the capital at Udong. Norodom, however, was very wary of his neighbors and believed that, as time passed, they would need him less and less. As a result, he would voluntarily enter into protectorate status with France, in exchange for some internal security, but largely as a balance against the Vietnamese and Thai.

The early days of the protectorate are defined by a relatively hands off approach on the part of the French (Tully 2002, 59). Local officials and elites still maintained much of their existing power (Thompson 1968, 346). Gradually, the French began to assert their authority more and more, at the expense of local sovereignty. Indigenous elite mobility remained low, however, as nobility would retain their traditional authority and much of their great personal wealth until well into the 1920s. In addition, there would be no new classes of elites to emerge in Cambodia.

⁴⁷This area would later become Cochinchina, the first territory annexed by the French in the 19th century.

⁴⁸ Battambang is the rice-belt of Cambodia, even to this day. Siem Reap is actually home to the ruins of Angkor Wat; in effect, Thailand had captured the heart of Cambodian civilization.

As the French moved to assert themselves more and more, they became more active administratively and judicially, as well as beginning to make investments in Cambodia's infrastructure. This tended to be limited to resource extraction or facilitating tax-collection, as much of Cambodia's natural exports were funneled through ports in Cochinchina or Annam. While lower than neighboring Vietnam, and basic overall, it was better developed than Laos. Colonial income diversity, however, remained low, with the state dependent on direct taxation (whether in the form of capital or labor quotas) for the majority of its budget.

There would be a scattering of rebellions, but all largely reflexive, and Cambodians would remain relatively loyal to the French government. After 1940, however, with the Fall of France and the Franco-Thai war, which would shift Cambodia to Japan's sphere of influence, the region would become disaffected with French rule. The decline of French power, and their losing struggle in neighboring Vietnam, provided an opportunity for Prince Norodom Sihanouk to negotiate Cambodian independence at the Geneva Conference in 1953.

Sihanouk would remain the center of Cambodian politics, directly, for the next seventeen years, and indirectly for the next fifty. His early years are defined by a heavy-handed populism, but his penchant for self-indulgence, limited administrative capabilities and strict neutrality would permit the rapid growth in power of communist insurgents, the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer), under Saloth Sar (who would later take the name Pol Pot, or Brother Number One). This would trigger a coup by Sihanouk's palace rivals and General Lon Nol. Lon would prove even more ineffective and, following the American

exit from Vietnam in 1973, found himself fighting a losing battle that culminated in the capture of Phnom Penh in 1975.

Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge would initiate “Year Zero,” a policy of radically restructuring Cambodian society into a self-sufficient agrarian one. As a result of purges, executions, starvation and disease, the Khmer Rouge would be responsible for anywhere from 800,000 (Pol Pot’s own estimate) through to 2.2 million deaths (the estimate of multiple international organizations). The regime was toppled in 1979, following a brief war with Vietnam and completed with the establishment of the People’s Republic of Cambodia. This new state was widely condemned as a puppet of Hanoi, and was in perpetual opposition to an umbrella resistance consisting of Pro-Royalists loyal to Sihanouk, democrats, and Khmer Rouge remnants. A coalition government was negotiated in the early 1990’s, with Norodom Sihanouk re-crowned King and the integration of PRC and democrat elements into the government.

Through all three regimes (Royalist, Republican, and the Khmer Rouge) the state prioritized projects that benefitted a relatively narrow segment of the population. While specific individuals changed from regime to regime, they generally shared a similar background; members of the royal family and the expansive court.

Colonial Examination

While Vietnam had a brief history of independence before French imperialism, and Laos had been a collection of isolated petty kingdoms, Cambodia had once been the center of an empire spanning much of contemporary Southeast Asia; centered on the

large Temple-City complex Angkor Wat, just outside of modern day Siem Reap. By as early as the 15th century, however, the empire was in fast decline (resultant of both internal decay and ascendant neighbors) and by the 17th century had been reduced to a shadow of its former self. It passed between neighboring Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms as a client state, and foreign policy was defined by a King's ability to play one against the other (Corfield 2009, 24).

Despite this, domestically, the King was still regarded as the center and apex of Cambodian society. Unlike neighboring Vietnamese kingdoms, with its strong Chinese influence, Cambodian culture had India as its primary external influence. As a result, a large, meritocratic mandarin class never developed (Thompson 345); positions were assigned based on carried favor with the monarch, as opposed to talent. In addition, the King himself had few checks and balances, and was more similar absolute monarchs in the sub-continent than the Chinese emperor (Thompson 1968, 345). The King was the sole landowner, permitting his subjects to live on his property (Tully 2002, 39-40). Taxes and administration were arbitrary, subject to the whims of the King and relatively few nobles and bureaucrats and was, as to be expected, disastrous for the state of affairs in Cambodia domestically (Martin 29). Taxation could often take the form of appropriated labor, and different classes often owed different periods of guaranteed labor to the crown each year in lieu of currency or physical goods. Slavery, too, was rampant and, at varying points, nearly a third of the nation's population was legally defined as such. Slavery in

Cambodia was both potentially hereditary (there were often no clear rules) and, more often than not, a result of debts as opposed to war.⁴⁹

Still, despite this, there existed relatively little famine. Disease, warfare and, to a lesser extent, slave trafficking kept the population low. This meant that Cambodian peasants were rarely at a loss for land to grow rice, vegetables and fruit, and the local lakes, rivers and coast were well-stocked with fish. Life was slow, the average Cambodian a devout Buddhist with many regional superstitions and few vices; opium and alcohol abuse never become serious problems, prostitution a rarity, and even banditry was a seasonal pursuit. This would create a long-standing vision of Cambodia as an idyllic paradise, but also to intense criticism of the local population as “lazy,” “subservient,” “docile,” and much, much worse.

As we begin to analyze Cambodia in the colonial period, one more key difference between it and its neighbors is of note. While Vietnam’s annexation by France was a gradual, agonizing process that took several decades and proceeded in stages, the Cambodian King actively sought protectorate status. Paired with its highly traditional society, this reality would have lingering effects for many years afterward.

Our analysis of the colonial period begins in 1863, when King Norodom (not to be confused with Norodom Sihanouk) willingly signed a treaty that would turn Cambodia into a protectorate. As with our other cases, we will be examining three key variables: indigenous elite mobility, income diversity and institutional infrastructure. We will

⁴⁹ The one glaring exception was the slave trade dealing with the indigenous hill tribes. These were traded frequently and were considered quite valuable (Tully 2002, 43-45).

proceed through Cambodia's colonial period roughly historically, which will, fortunately, align approximately with these three variables in that order (IEM, ID and II). We will begin with the analysis of the preservation of the nobility and its traditional place in society, as well as the lack of a new, self-aware or ideologically-driven intellectual class of the type that we see in neighboring Vietnam. We will then proceed to a discussion of Cambodia's local income diversity, which will be highly dependent on direct taxation, and then a discussion of the extractive and administrative infrastructure put in place by the French. For purposes of my typology, I have classified Cambodia as a self-enrichment state; for the colonial period, this means we should expect to see limited to no indigenous elite mobility, limited income diversity, and no more than moderate institutional/infrastructure improvements. Our analysis will conclude in 1941, at which point France ceases to be a meaningful administrative entity for Cambodia.

King, Court and Status Quo

In this section, I focus on three periods: early years (1863-1883), post-revision (1883-1904) and Sisowath's reign (1904-1927). This will demonstrate the lack of indigenous elite mobility.

During the early years, the creation of the protectorate effectively stripped King Norodom of his ability to conduct foreign affairs and there were also to be efforts to reduce the powers of the government across the board. In addition, there were to be sweeping societal and legal reforms; this included the abolition of corporal punishment, the standardization of the legal system, and the formal abolition of slavery (Corfield 24,

Thompson 344). However, much of this remained strictly nominal. Many of these policies were not pursued, abandoned, or continued on despite the protests of the French administration and were scarcely felt in the countryside (Corfield 14, Martin 35, Thompson 263, 344, Tully 2002, 59). The protectorate, in theory, made concessions to the French but, for the first twenty years or so, it seemed as though Norodom was a master of diplomacy and had successfully stabilized his position. The Thai, despite their rage over the loss of their Cambodian puppet, would be unwilling to engage the French over it. Secondly, the unwillingness of the French to reign in officials meant that much of day-to-day life continued on unchanged. Religious concessions were made, as they were gained in neighboring parts of Indochina, but missionaries would never be able to produce the sort of results one sees in neighboring Vietnam.⁵⁰

Norodom's primary concern was with the maintenance of his position and the preservation of his existing lifestyle (Corfield 24). This lifestyle was one defined by excesses. Norodom, unlike the majority of the Cambodian populace, was an avid drinker and consumer of opium. Most problematic to the French, was the royal harem. As King in a legally polygamist society, he was entitled to legally marry multiple wives, however, there were no regulations on the maintenance of concubines, and as a result, Norodom would gradually accumulate a harem numbering on anywhere from 400-600 women. These women came from all walks of life and all over the country and he was even allegedly tied to kidnappings and human trafficking in Thailand and Vietnam.⁵¹

50 In fact, later, the few churches in Cambodia catered to Vietnamese immigrants.

51 In one case he was caught and forced to pay reparations to the family.

Maintaining such a large retinue would have required an enormous sum of money at any level, but Norodom was known for spending an inordinate amount of time with his harem and spending lavishly upon them. At varying points, total expenditures on the maintenance of the harem reached hundreds of thousands of piasters, the equivalent of tens of millions of francs.

French protests over the harem were numerous. There were moral arguments; the harem certainly did not endear Norodom to the local Catholic missionaries who were always espousing the benefits of monogamy. From a practical point of view, the harem was costing the protectorate a huge fraction of its annual budget. This was problematic as French colonies in Indochina were required to be economically self-sufficient. The harem, and Norodom's other adventures and whims, cost the protectorate dearly, and this cost was paid for, initially, by profits from neighboring Cochinchina. Eventually, the protectorate managed to coax Norodom into contributing sums to the maintenance of the protectorate himself, costs which were then promptly passed onto the peasantry (Tully 2002, 61-62).

French opposition to Norodom's spending remained chiefly in the domain of verbal complaints and only the occasional exercise of administrative oversight. It would not be until 1883 that the local governor would, at gunpoint, force the King to accept revisions to the original 1863 treaty. These would, more directly, strip the King and court of its official administrative capacities. The move was backed by the deployment of French troops and ships. However, there was a powerful backlash, as the peasantry was galvanized around an exiled prince. The symbolic power conveyed by the royal family's

presence lent a vital credibility that contributed to the strength and cohesiveness of the rebellion.

Despite French military might, they found the revolt nightmarish. Disease was rampant, logistical chains stretched thin, and the rebel leader, Si Votha, proved to be quite capable militarily (Tully 2002, 83). Ultimately, the French realized that they were ill-prepared to administer Cambodia directly⁵² and requested that Norodom intercede. Norodom's position as king commanded near-total obedience and his verbal requests that the rebellion cease were enough to seriously sap Si Votha of his base. Without the tacit approval of the King, the peasantry abandoned the rebellion and Si Votha was defeated soon after.

As payment, the French made several concessions with regards to the revised treaty, but the shift had already begun. The French resolved to take a more gradual approach to asserting their dominance, and would begin to play dynastic politics, favoring and disqualifying one aide after another. While the French began to seize more and more actual power in-country, the King continued to maintain his enormous harem and exorbitant spending. Opting not to seize the existing tax measures, the French would impose their own, over top of the royal dues, further burdening the peasants. Administratively, the Protectorate became part of the larger Indochinese Union in 1887, joining Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina and, later, Laos.

Still, the royal family remained the pinnacle of Cambodian society. With dozens of branches, the extended and distant family formed much of the nobility and many of the

⁵² This meant as either a separate protectorate or, as was considered at a later point, fused with Cochinchina.

officials in power, while now answering to the French, in theory, continued in their jobs, largely on the whims of their noble sponsors (Thompson 352-353).

With Norodom's death, the French choice for King, Sisowath, succeeded him in 1904. Like his predecessor, Sisowath retained a very large harem of his own (though of "only" about 200 or so women), and was prone to the same sort of personal excesses. However, Sisowath proved far more pliable than his predecessor, agreeing to a number of different concessions, both legal and commercial. Judicial reforms will be discussed later; however, for our purposes here, the most important concession was the abolition of crown lands in 1907. This process had begun in 1889, when King Norodom ceded rights to development in the new capital of Phnom Penh, and with it, the French had affected a major goal of theirs in Indochina.

Sisowath proved a true Francophile, and was an avid lover of all things French. Accordingly, he contributed handsomely, per capita, to the French effort in World War 1. This involved the conscription of 500 Khmer laborers, and 2,000 Khmer soldiers for deployment in the Western Front and Balkans (Tully 2002, 148-149).⁵³ In addition, Sisowath was enthusiastic for French-style education, and advocated educational reforms that would transform the traditional Buddhist Pagoda-centered, to a hybrid model incorporating the French lycée approach. The system was made complete with access to international education (chiefly France, of course) and local institutions of higher learning. Of greatest significance was the College Sisowath, who would count a good

⁵³ Oft criticized for his docility and resignation to suffering and abuse, the Khmer peasant now found himself praised and decorated for his ability to suffer through the horrid conditions of World War 1. Their affable attitudes through it all also made them quite popular with the locals, particularly young French women (Tully 149).

many of future power players amongst their alumni. Indeed, graduates of the college would remain central to the protectorate and post-independence politics for decades, despite having relatively few graduates.

This last part is telling, because it accurately describes the nature of education in Cambodia. Unlike Vietnam, where there had existed an analogue to the Chinese mandarin system, complete with schools, there was little institutionalized learning in Cambodia before or during the colonial period (Martin 36). The only source of education for the population at large tended to be provided by Buddhist monks at the many pagodas, however, these institutions were not, by any means, total analogues to the Vietnamese Confucian schools. Pagodas were part of the existing power structure; the King was, and remains to this day, central to many cultural and religious observances. It was not uncommon for Pagodas to exact dues, and very common (indeed, the rule) that Pagodas often kept slaves for labor purposes.⁵⁴

There was no middle-class in Cambodia prior to the French's arrival, and education remained the "exclusive right" of the royal class (Martin 37). Traditionalist mindsets amongst the population saw little reward in pursuing earthly concerns, as they were often very drawn up into a very conservative Buddhist world-view.⁵⁵ This was reinforced by a very real social order in which there existed little to no social mobility; as Virginia Thompson puts it, "life was determined at age 2" (Thompson 357), and so you

⁵⁴ To this day, Buddhist monks are observed with a combination of fear and reverence. Even in the United States they are a group shrouded in superstition by members of the Diaspora, even those born abroad.

⁵⁵ Multiple authors cite this as being part of the reason for the perceived Khmer docility and resignation to suffering and exploitation.

see very little jockeying for position. Even if one were to become educated, it guaranteed nothing.

As a result, education was more so a hobbyist pursuit of the royals and their respective favorites. In addition to the College Sisowath, many princes and royal bastards would attend schools abroad, particularly French military colleges where they often went on to receive military commissions before returning home. This stands in stark contrast to Vietnam, where education created a new intelligentsia that gradually supplanted their moralistic mandarin predecessors with western-trained and, later, ideologically driven technocrats.

There are few existing bureaucrats before and, despite the proliferation of education facilities, the Cambodians never show the same aptitude that their Vietnamese neighbors did. As a result, the French were “content” to import administrators from Vietnam to handle low-level functionary positions in Cambodia (Lancaster 70, Martin 36). Eventually, late in the protectorate’s days, there did form a small educated class. They, however, exercised little to no real power and, most certainly, never replaced French-appointed Vietnamese officials. They were, also, not particularly motivated by ideology; the Indochinese Communist Party found it difficult to recruit them (Martin 1994). Finally, another small group that would emerge appeared after World War 1. A number of decorated veterans were also educated, or would become so, and play the occasional key part in government or movements. However, they were few in number, and never achieved any sort of group identity.

Thus, throughout the Protectorate period, there was strikingly little social mobility in Cambodia at any level. The “middle-class” that emerged was largely imported; Vietnamese functionaries, Chinese merchants, French expatriates, and the transient stream of western tourists with expendable income. The majority of the population remained peasants, and the majority of elites remained as they were for the centuries preceding French arrival. Power and society was centered on the royal family, and it was an extensive one, and their hand-picked favorites. This mindset would continue on, well through World War 2 and into the post-colonial period. Norodom Sihanouk would, as we will see later, largely treat Cambodia as his own personal sandbox, dependent upon traditional reverence for his position in order to achieve and retain political legitimacy. While he wouldn’t reach Norodom or Sisowath levels of indulgence, he certainly wasn’t above it, nor was he above utilizing coercive measures to achieve his desires. Many of the power players that would fill the field for the second half of the 20th century were these same individuals; distant royals, nobles, and descendants of the tiny preexisting bureaucratic class. What little mobility there was typically centered on places like the College Sisowath. Two other figures central to Cambodian politics after independence, Lon Nol and Saloth Sar, would be members of this same elite; both were lycée dropouts, both had been from moderately wealthy families, and Saloth had familial connections to the royal harem.

French preservation of pre-colonial power structures enabled the Cambodian elite to continue on accumulating power, and left them in a central position after independence

to expand their influence. Most leadership, whether royalist, republican or communist, would be from this select group.

The Budget

In this section we will analyze the finances of the Protectorate of Cambodia from its inclusion in the Indochinese Union, until the Great Depression of 1930. This start point was selected because it represents the point at which the French become more intimately involved in the day-to-day administration of Cambodia. The end date, 1930, is chosen as it represents a point soon after the onset of the Great Depression, which would help to re-shape France's outlook on its colonies, particularly "second-rate" ones such as Cambodia.

We have already established that French involvement in the finances of the Protectorate were rather limited before 1883 revisions to the original protectorate agreement. From this point forward, French administrators become more concerned with enforcing the budgetary self-sufficiency required of its overseas colonies. Up until this point, the Vietnamese half of Indochina, and in particularly Cochinchina, provided a disproportionate amount of the budget. Reforms in the 1880's required the King to pay into the protectorate's treasury, largely to offset the enormous cost of maintaining the royal palace, court and lifestyle, however it was not until the 1890's that French administration truly began to be felt at the local level.

Despite promises of reform, which were to have consolidated and standardized the array of taxes and dues levied by the king, fiefdoms (usually assigned to a prince),

and local officials, the French found that it was more pragmatic to utilize existing structures and place a new level of dues on the populace. Taxation, which had already been heavy before, now became crushing and was extracted chiefly through direct modes of taxation, particularly preexisting ones (Tully 185). Local garrisons remained fairly small, and the majority of income was used for the development of public works and sustaining the royal family and French administration itself.

In Vietnam, there had been a number of market and other excise taxes that were utilized to supplement colonial income. However, in Cambodia, the French found very little market for such goods. The local peasantry, making up the vast majority of the population, often had neither the financial ability to indulge in taxable luxuries, nor the moral predisposition to. Despite this, there were attempts by local businesses and government to manufacture a market for these goods (Thompson 348). Such attempts were the earliest signs that the French colonial administration in Cambodia was, likely, far more predisposed toward corruption than their counterparts in Vietnam. Accusations pertaining to budgetary discrepancies were often shifted, with local officials being made scapegoats (Tully 186). When this proved insufficient, French administrators were forced to rely on the King, again, to disband the riotous peasants (Tully 186).⁵⁶

The attempts at creating markets for opium and alcohol largely failed. The small elite in the country remained the primary customers of both these products. Gambling

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Part of the “repayment” for this service was voluntary French collusion in the persecution and repression of the Cao Dai religious minority that had begun to appear. This is significant, because it demonstrates that, even decades into the Protectorate and years after the treaty revision and meddling of French governors into dynastic politics, they were still concerned with preserving the social status quo.

remained, too, largely, a tourist attraction and relatively underdeveloped. Tourism, centered on Angkor, was a source of additional income, but the colonial government remained dependent on direct taxes. These included the revocation of preexisting exemptions, such as those on students from the head tax, as well as the levying of new ones on Chinese merchants and, eventually, plantations that would be set up in-country. As a result, government monopolies remained fairly limited to only a few endeavors; there were a few others, gambling and prostitution, but many of these were either in the hands of private individuals and subject only to standard taxes, or were far too minimal to make any significant financial impact (as was the case with prostitution).

As far exports went, Cambodia never reached the levels attained by its neighbor, Vietnam. Its chief exports, at first, were rice, and the surplus was commonly sold locally in neighboring Cochinchina. Later, as the economy developed, new crops became more prevalent, but none more so than Rubber, which proved especially valuable in the interwar period.

Cambodian exports, however, never amounted to much more than a value of 6-7 million francs (Tully 125), which amounted to a fraction of the income being earned in Vietnam. This came despite brutal, exploitative conditions on rubber plantations which, as privately owned enterprises, were often as interested in skirting taxes and crippling the state as they were in bullying labor.

The result of all this created a situation in which the government remained highly dependent upon direct taxation. In the future, that would place an absolute premium on hard infrastructure and low-level functionaries, both of which Cambodia would lack not

only in the colonial period but afterwards as well. As a result, post-colonial Cambodia would find itself highly dependent upon being able to extract wealth or contributions from a population ill-prepared to provide it. This would severely constrain the state's behavior and, at the same time, create tension and hostility between the ruling elites and the population as the former, as we have seen, believed themselves and their agenda to supersede that of the peasantry in all cases. Later, when Norodom Sihanouk would reign over Cambodia from 1953-1970, he became increasingly dependent upon good will and international aide to provide the sort of particularistic goods that he believed necessary to garner public support. Lon Nol, by 1972, only two years into the Republic, would be almost entirely dependent upon American foreign aid.

French investment in Cambodia

The French government had long had a unique relationship with its colonies in Indochina. While Algeria had remained the number one priority, the reality was, by the 1920s, that its colonies in Southeast Asia were rapidly becoming more profitable and contributing an increasingly large share of colonial income. Despite this, the French attitude toward the area was one of never investing much more than was ever necessary (Tully 258). Here we will discuss the development of institutions and infrastructure in the Protectorate of Cambodia; focusing specifically on judicial/penal reform, basic infrastructure, health and education, and general economic investment.

The French had long sought to reform Cambodia's legal system. From 1863 on, they were adamant about abolition of corporal punishment (of which there was a macabre

variety) and of the institution of slavery. It took several years, but early in the 1900's they managed to extract these concessions, mostly from Sisowath in 1904. Soon after, by 1908, they managed to standardize the process for selection and appointment of judges and officials. These officials, by this point, were serving in a court system that dealt with all cases regarding and between foreigners of all persuasions, as well as those incidents between native Khmer and foreigners. This had been achieved by 1897, by which point indigenous courts were left only cases and suits where all parties were Khmer (Thompson 350). This was, of course, an oversimplification of the situation; many times official ordinances did not accurately reflect conditions on the ground and, more often than not, were nested in a certain moralism and French idealism with regards to identity (Thompson 263). Particularly as the 20th century went on, the legal system came to increasingly abandon these notions of "civilization" and "normalcy" and increasingly represented the interests of French economics and security; to claim that the system was heavy-handed would be a broad understatement. At times, the system was outright brutal, and ordinances passed were so extreme that they would be, as Tully puts it, "unthinkable for France outside of wartime (Tully 292)." Even those situations where royal and French interests overlapped, it often became extreme. With the case of the Cao Dai, French security forces would often arbitrarily beat and arrest followers, condemn or raze places of worship and conduct extensive propaganda campaigns against them.

In terms of basic infrastructure, French efforts were limited almost exclusively to economic concerns. This involved the construction of a limited number of roads and railroads, primarily for moving goods around the country or to Phnom Penh. These

became more extensive and trafficked in 1908, after the resource rich provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap were ceded to Cambodia by Siam. This necessitated a new network of telegraphs and roads linking the provincial centers to the capital, Phnom Penh, which was located on the Tonle Sap, a large lake laying on the Mekong river. An extensive dock system was set up there and the channels dredged to permit larger ships, however, all of this was ultimately shipped down river or across land and into Vietnam, from where it was shipped. The French would not create a deep-water port in Cambodia, believing it sufficient to provide links to Vietnam.⁵⁷ Tully says that, of anywhere, the clearest penetration of French investment in the Protectorate was the capital (Tully 126).

Electricity would be provided to the capital and major provincial centers, but it, like roads and rail, never penetrated past the administrative centers. Basic infrastructure was in place to satisfy the basest administrative and economic needs. The network would not reach the size or complexity of the sort seen in neighboring Vietnam, though, at the least, it would greatly exceed that which would be laid down in even more insular Laos, to the north.

French achievements in healthcare and education were mixed, as well. The education system has been detailed a bit earlier, but to recap, the system underwent a series of reforms in 1917-18, much like neighboring Vietnam. In Cambodia, this meant the reformation of the pagoda system to a hybrid system, and the creation of institutions of higher education, as well as channels for foreign study. Student enrollment, like in

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This is a strong testament to French faith in the perpetuity of their empire. Local nationalist or communist groups were barely on the radar at all for local French forces.

Vietnam, increased greatly in the ensuing years, but facilities and teachers remained relatively sparse. Progress of individual students remained stunted, and it was not uncommon for enrollees to graduate primary school well into their twenties. In addition, higher education remained the pursuit of the nobility, and most of the higher education facilities were filled with the extensive royal family and the relatively wealthy. Scholarships for study abroad were almost exclusively given to those coming from elite families. Literacy increased marginally, but without a developed local economy and little prospects for overseas work, all it served to do was create a pool of disenfranchised unemployed (Tully 220).

In healthcare, gains were a bit more tangible. The number of doctors per province tripled over the course of about twenty years, though the majority of these remained foreigners. Vaccinations were the exception; they were implemented broadly and contributed to the containment of disease in great part, despite the absence of well-developed sanitation systems that, often, remained primitive or non-existent (Tully 224-227).

Finally, with regards to general other investments, it could be characterized as rather low. It was not until the 1900's that the crown land institution was abolished, permitting for private enterprise. This was often limited to the tourism sector. Lodgings drove the construction industry, and there was significant investment in restoring Angkor and the other temple complexes⁵⁸. Some other investments approached the infamous;

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Tully and Thompson both find this a bit odd, since the direct tourism benefit seems to be outweighed by the amount of money put into it. Tully suggests that it may have been a prestige project for the French (Tully 258).

Bokor Hill station being the most significant. This large hotel-complex was intended to be a sort of pleasure palace and, at one point, its construction amounted to 20% the entirety of the protectorate's public works budget (Tully 295).

Plantations remained the largest economic structures. Of many different types, they were almost universal in their cruelty and suppression, to the point of receiving scathing reports from even French administrators. Outside of these, however, there were no factories constructed in Cambodia of any size or significance during the Protectorate period (Martin 37). The port in Phnom Penh remained the only export center in the country, and its primary destination was Vietnam (Martin 38-40).

As a result, institutional-infrastructure levels in Cambodia are categorized on my scale as "medium," though a definite low-medium. This is primarily due to its ability to the judicial/penal reforms and tourism investments. Compared to Vietnam, its infrastructure network, economic investment and institutional presence is considerably lower, though perhaps not a significantly larger gap than that which existed between Cambodia and Laos.

The limited infrastructure, selectively implemented throughout the country, would create the post-independence state's limits, in terms of capabilities. Cambodian leadership would be entirely dependent upon foreign aid, specifically when it came to large-scale projects regarding economic development and infrastructure improvement. Similarly, with large swathes of the country being effectively "off-grid," it provided a vacuum in which the future Khmer Rouge could operate and, in many ways, influence their push for an entirely agrarian society (thus avoiding the problem of international

dependence). With limited resources and technocrats, subsequent post-colonial regimes would be dependent upon foreign aid or income (be it currency or labor) from the majority peasant population.

Colonial Cambodia: In Review

As we have seen, the near century of French rule in Cambodia was initiated by the need, on the part of the elites, to preserve existing power structures and the system was defined, in later years, by French imperial interests.

Norodom, Sisowath and their successors signed away Cambodian sovereignty in exchange for security of their positions. The sprawling royal courts continued to live in luxury, boasting extravagant spending and enormous harems, despite their nations' limited resources. Education remained a hobby and privilege exclusive to this class; unlike in Vietnam where it served as a means of social mobility, education served the average Cambodian nothing. Despite treaty revisions and French encroachments, the elites preserved their positions well into the 20th century, and the same factions and players in the 1860s would be present in the 1960's. The royal/courtly class would remain the designated state class for years. In subsequent years, the class would, as we will see, change, but the patronage system would remain in effect.

French income diversity remained relatively low, piggy-backing off of existing structures. Excise taxes were never a considerable source of income, as there was no native market for opium, alcohol or gambling as a result of the combination of moral predispositions and financial inability. Cambodian exports, though slightly more

significantly later, remained a fraction of what Vietnam produced. This would cripple future leadership in terms of their capabilities and produce societal tension.

Finally, French institutional-infrastructure levels remained relatively low, often existing only to serve administrative and economic necessity. No heavy factories were ever built, mineral extraction was limited, and the country remained primarily dependent on agricultural exports funneled through neighboring Vietnam. Education was introduced at the mass level but had little practical use to the average Cambodian, and healthcare advancements were more successful, particularly with regards to vaccinations. This permitted for a growth in national population. However, like the lack of income diversity, this limited infrastructure and scant institutions would shape the behavior and strategy of post-independence regimes. Vast, untouched territories would serve as bases for future insurgencies, and the lack of facilities would impair the ability of all three subsequent regimes to defend themselves from internal and external security threats.

Post-Independence Examination

In this section we will discuss the policy preferences of Cambodia from 1953, independence, through to 1979, the establishment of the People's Republic of Cambodia. We will examine the policy behavior and preferences of the state which, according to the typology set forth earlier, should display the characteristics of a self-enrichment state; a limited beneficiary of state projects (the designated state class), significant overlap of the state decision making and DSC apparatuses, and widespread corruption.

This period of time, covering twenty-seven years, will be sub-divided into three distinct eras; the Kingdom of Cambodia under Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1953-1970), the Khmer Republic under Gen. Lon Nol (1970-1975) and Democratic Kampuchea under Saloth Sar (1975-1979). We will begin with a brief history of post-Independence Cambodia, before proceeding chronologically through the separate sub-sections, for purposes of establishing the context of Cambodia's colonial past and the 3rd Indochina Conflict that ends our examination.

Introduction to Contemporary Cambodia

Unlike neighboring Vietnam, Cambodia did not possess a significant armed independence movement. Its intellectual class remained relatively small and intimately connected to existing elite power structures, which in turn remained intimately bound to the French administration. After the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia, Cambodian elites became disenchanted with French power, but remained committed to the preservation of their existing social structures.⁵⁹ With the war's conclusion and the emergence of Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese independence movement, Sihanouk would begin agitating for increased local sovereignty in Cambodia, as opposed to outright independence. As the Viet Minh achieved several victories, particularly at the Siege of Dien Ben Phu, it became increasingly obvious that France had very little ability to reassert its will in the region and in 1953, under the terms of the peace accords ending

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Norodom Sihanouk was still very much committed to his playboy lifestyle throughout much of the 1940's (Martin 54).

the struggle in the region, Cambodia was declared one of the three independent states to be formed out of the Indochinese Union.

The Indochinese Communist Party wielded comparatively little influence in the area, and so many of the early years are defined by Sihanouk and his Sangkum government. Later, as hostilities escalated in neighboring Vietnam, local Communist resistance to the national government grew stronger as it became the beneficiary of Chinese and Vietnamese aid. Sihanouk, continuing the long-standing Khmer political tradition of playing powerful neighbors against one another, would maintain a nominal policy of neutrality and sought different mechanisms for appeasement of Vietnam during the Second Indochina War. Corruption, mismanagement and a rejection of American aid crippled the state's ability to control Communist guerrillas in the remote parts of the country and, in 1970, Sihanouk's opponents at court and Gen. Lon Nol (the serving prime minister) staged a coup that overthrew Sihanouk and established the Khmer Republic.

The Republic was rife with corruption, with family ties and loyalty serving as the basis for advancement. The regime also, very quickly, became overly dependent on American aide. This became especially problematic after 1973, which marks the exit of the United States from Vietnam. By 1975, the Cambodian communists, known as the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer), had gained control of much of the control and, mid-year, laid siege to the capital Phnom Penh as American forces evacuated their advisers and staff.

After the Khmer Rouge seized control of the capital, they began an immediate evacuation of major cities. The reasons for these are multiple; some suggest a strategic

reasoning (believing that the United States bombing campaign would continue), while others are convinced that it marks the beginning of the Khmer Rouge's eventual "year zero" vision for the country.

The Khmer Republic was dissolved and replaced with the Democratic Kampuchea, which then began its auto-genocidal policies. Over the next four years, anyone in the country with foreign training or influences (including the vast majority of the country's already limited technocrats and professionals), along with foreigners (both western and Vietnamese), were systemically imprisoned, tortured and executed. Ethnic minorities, including Vietnamese, Lao, members of Hill Tribes, and coastal Khmer (who made their living as fishermen) were purged next. The majority of the populace was moved to the countryside and forced to undertake agricultural labor. The population-at-large became the targets of the regime's ire, and hundreds of thousands would perish over the next four years.⁶⁰ As with the previous two regimes, however, advancement was dependent on association with the dominant social class (in this case, the party).

By late 1978, the regime had become paranoid with regards to its security, and would begin purging internal leadership, particularly amongst the military, and becoming aggressive in its dealings with Vietnam.⁶¹ Cambodia would seek out aid and security guarantees from the People's Republic of China and upped their aggression in 1978 with the invasion of Vietnamese islands and disputed territory along the border.

⁶⁰ Exact numbers for the Cambodian genocide vary. Saloth Sar, aka Pol Pot, would himself conclude with a number of approximately 800,000. Other sources put the number at closer to 2 million, though the most widely accepted number tends to be 1.2-1.5 million.

⁶¹ This was related to the Khmer Rouge's perception that they had been betrayed by their Vietnamese counterparts during the war.

The Vietnamese would retaliate in late 1978, sending 120-150,000 soldiers across the border. The Khmer Rouge armed forces, weakened by poor deployment, equipment and low morale, were over-run by the Vietnamese forces, which was comprised of veterans from the decade-long war with the United States and benefitted from artillery and high moral. The war would prompt a brief Chinese excursion into Vietnam around New Years; the PRC was unwilling, however, to commit to a long-term war.⁶²

The Vietnamese would create the People's Republic of Cambodia, a new government comprised mostly of Khmer Rouge defectors (Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, future and current power players today) and other disaffected groups. The regime was backed by the Vietnamese military until 1989, where it attempted to assert control over the entirety of the country. The Khmer Rouge would escape to the jungles where they would join with Pro-Royalist and Pro-Democratic forces and form an umbrella resistance.

Despite having secured the tacit go-ahead from the Soviet Union and evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities, Vietnam would become a political pariah until their eventual withdrawal in the late 1980's. In the early 1990's, the United Nations would broker a coalition government that included many elements of the former governments and Sihanouk, who had been in one form of exile or another since 1970, returned where he would become head-of-state in the reestablished Kingdom of Cambodia.

Saloth Sar would die in the jungles in 1997, after having been placed under house arrest by the remnants of the Khmer Rouge. A number of former Khmer Rouge officials were to be arrested in the late 2000's for war crimes, despite many having already died.

⁶² Chinese leadership had been confident but, rather quickly, they found Vietnamese resistance to be far tougher than expected and plans for a longer-term conflict were scrapped.

Kingdom of Cambodia/Sihanouk

Cambodia's peaceful exit from French colonial rule is often pointed to as one of Sihanouk's greatest achievements. Having sensed the world's changing political order, Sihanouk recognized that the French were no longer to be the preeminent power in the region and that Vietnam and Thailand were, once more, Cambodia's most immediate relationships. The Thai, emerging from World War 2 as a defeated Axis member, posed little problem. The true threat, for Sihanouk, was the Vietnamese.

Anxious to avoid Laos' fate, where the Pathet Lao were, for all practical purposes a wing of the Viet Minh, Sihanouk capitalized on the lack of indigenous support for the communists, and leveraged this position against the French in negotiations. Excluded from government as King, Sihanouk would resign his royal post and retake the title "Prince," which permitted him to actively engage in government⁶³. There, he formed the Sangkum, a political organization that would form the base of much of his early power. Sihanouk believed that the peasantry, and his ability to leverage his traditional position of authority, were integral to his continued dominance of Cambodian politics and, so, many policies and initiatives were decidedly populist (Martin 62, Becker 1986, 26).⁶⁴ With himself at the head of the organization, Sihanouk engaged in heavy-handed tactics to assure Sangkum's victories in early elections (Chandler 1991, 93-94, Kiernan 1985 159-

⁶³ Corfield notes that Sihanouk was likely very wary of the fate of Vietnam's Emperor Bo Dai (Corfield 47).

⁶⁴ The actual name, Sangkum, was a shortened version that essentially translates to, "Group for the people" or "commoners."

161, 162, Tully 137). Sihanouk would make use of his position and make public denouncements which would result in great public spectacles (Tully 2005, 137), not unlike the sort China would see during the Cultural Revolution later in China, but also engage in bullying and intimidation at the polls (Kiernan 159-160).

With power secure, Sihanouk's willingness to use physical force proved indicative of his political personality. He himself lorded over Sangkum, micromanaging every project and political reshuffling that he took interest in, and would routinely kill projects if he lost control over them (Martin 65). Sangkum itself was, largely, a tool for political mobilization and power-preservation. The upper levels of its leadership were comprised of, mostly, Sihanouk's relatives and other graduates of the lycée Sisowath (Becker 26), while much of the middle and lower-level leadership positions, including much of the Cambodian bureaucracy, were similarly members of the existing elites; extensions of the courtly class, the pre-existing bureaucracy (whom claim their descent from the "favorites" of the courtly class) and the occasional member of the wealthy-peasant class (those who were significant land owners and, often, had connections with the other elites). Corruption was rampant amongst this stratum of Sangkum, for whom the government position provided an avenue for self-enrichment (Martin 67-68) not available in the rest of the country.

This class was further reinforced by the introduction of a number of new study-abroad scholarships, sponsored by the state, for "promising" students. These, however, were usually the sons of existing officials or court figures (Etcheson 49). What little social mobility there was produced little in the way of administrative reform. Those who

entered into Sangkum and the state bureaucracy were often either already predisposed toward corruption, or were "swept up" into the system of exploiting position for personal gain (Martin 68).

The last distinct group in Sangkum was the mobilized youth, who essentially served as a means to alleviate youth unemployment, but also to serve as an honor guard for Sihanouk and other high ranking officials (Martin 64).

Sihanouk was a strong believer that his continued power rested on his ability to provide particularistic goods to the peasantry. Wary of the limited intelligentsia, with its links to communism, Sihanouk would embark on 17 years of what amounted to ribbon-cutting ceremonies. He invested heavily in education, opening multiple new universities in a relatively short amount of time. This overabundance (Martin 74) proved problematic for Cambodia had never fully developed a comprehensive primary education system and, as a result, many of these universities would either close, be consolidated, or possess skeletal enrollment comprised mostly of elites.

Similarly, the prince would preside over a number of new hospitals, clinics and pharmacies during his reign (Martin 70-71). However, like with education, these often went unfunded immediately following the ceremony and many of the nation's new doctors found no infrastructure in place to effectively administer care (Martin 70-71).⁶⁵

Attempts to execute other large-scale economic projects proved equally short-sighted. Agricultural reform was bobbled, and various engineering and industrial projects improperly executed. Cambodia had been the recipient of a good amount of international

⁶⁵ These facilities would sit idle, or often be turned into tourist lodgings (71).

good will, with multiple factories donated in full, often by members of the Warsaw Pact (Martin 77). However, the prince again insisted on personally overseeing their deployment, resulting in a number of failed projects. Amongst these was an improperly designed dam which, upon completion, effectively flooded multiple villages out of house and field. A deep-water port was constructed at newly-christened "Sihanoukville" in the south of the country; however, it saw relatively little traffic.

In effect, these projects often provided little tangible benefit to any of the population-at-large in Cambodia. However, it did have the effect of maintaining the illusion of an efficient state and, thus, kept Sangkum and Sihanouk in power for much of the immediate post-war era. This, in turn, was used as an opportunity to self-enrich. For low-level officials, it was an opportunity to benefit from position, but for the upper leadership, and Sihanouk especially, it became a vehicle to live out imitations of the grandeur of previous monarchs. A number of vanity projects were carried out at the expense of the population (Corfield 2009) and began to border on the absurd by the 1960's, at which the prince awarded himself a gold statuette after winning a state-sponsored film festival (Tully 2005, 148-49). Abroad and at home, the prince seemed to display a penchant for self-aggrandizement (Liefer 1968), and tended to neglect internal administration.

As the 1960's went on, a noted fatigue began to emerge amongst the peasantry and even Sangkum leadership with his expenditure and globe-trotting (Tully 148). Rebellions in the countryside were put down, but with increasingly limited efficacy (Etcheson 70). The prince and Sangkum would even begin to lose sight of certain

objective realities; Cambodia's dependence on foreign aid. As the 1960's went on, Sihanouk would become obsessed with maintaining nominal neutrality in the face of the growing war in Indochina. Believing colonial powers to be ephemeral, and that Vietnam was a permanent fixture on the political scene, aid from the United States and its western allies were rejected and a policy of appeasement pursued with Vietnam.

A blind eye was turned toward Vietnam's utilization of Cambodian territory as a supply line for its support of Vietnamese resistance in South Vietnam. In addition, though previously banned, state-run casinos began opening up to complement the tourist infrastructure (Martin 115). The benefits of the new institution's revenues would be felt by a relative few (Martin 98).

Rejection of American aid could not be compensated for by the Chinese or Soviets, and tourist income was increasingly limited as the country descended further and further into instability. The Cambodian communists, the Khmer Rouge, formerly an afterthought, were now-reemerging as a major threat to internal stability and the regime itself.

In 1968, in attempt to mollify opponents on the right, General Lon Nol was appointed to the position of prime minister and forced to remain there. Lon, described by multiple sources as an affable enough man, was very reluctant to carry out any sort of resistance to Sihanouk, despite the public's weariness with the regime. Finally, in 1970, at the goading of Sihanouk's court opponents, Lon Nol executed the coup, removing Sihanouk from any position of authority and establishing himself as the president of the Khmer Republic. Sihanouk himself would remain in exile, travelling widely.

The Prince's political tenure was defined by establishment of a political organization, comprised of relatives, fellow graduates of the lycée Sisowath, and other favored bureaucrats, drawn from the elite of Cambodian society. Health and education projects were seen as a means to an end; retention of popular peasant support, which Sihanouk sought to use to legitimize his own rule. However, ultimately, many of these projects were ribbon-cutting ceremonies, designed to provide positive public relations. The state would carry out a number of projects, all to the same end. Agricultural and industrial projects fell short, due to failed planning and execution. The projects that were successful were, ultimately, of the greatest use to leadership and bureaucrats and, ultimately Sihanouk himself. Appeasing the Vietnamese garnered Sihanouk access to Chinese and Soviet good will, which he saw as vital to maintaining his own position. Little effort was taken to reign in corruption, which was prolific at all levels of the state, with even the pettiest bureaucrat utilizing position for personal gain. Ultimately, however, Sangkum's purpose remained, primarily, to empower Sihanouk and the Cambodian elite.

Khmer Republic/Lon Nol

Descriptions of Lon Nol vary widely. Most accounts describe him as a man of little imagination, but at the very least, semi-competent and, of most importance for Sihanouk and the Sangkum, his loyalty was rarely called into question.

However, he was also from amongst a core of nationalist, right-leaning groups that drew their membership from the upper echelons of the peasantry (large landowners,

merchants). Despite his background, Lon Nol and many of his accomplices were all former members of the Lycée Sisowath, and had been intimately connected to the regime for nearly two decades.

After throwing the coup, Lon Nol established the Khmer Republic with three key objectives at the core of their agenda; the eradication of corruption, the maintenance of internal security, and guaranteeing Cambodian sovereignty.

To accomplish these ends, Lon Nol reversed course and began immediately accepting American aid. He also ordered an end to the Vietnamese presence in eastern Cambodia and began to pursue the Khmer Rouge cells throughout the country.

Despite being considerably more proactive, initially, than his predecessor, Lon Nol, and the Khmer Republic with him, lost steam and direction remarkably early. Increasingly, Lon Nol became more and more content to attempt to prevent further decay of the country at large (Martin 123). In its pursuit of internal security, the state's economy fell into further and further decline, and by 1971, the country had become almost entirely dependent upon US aid for its continued existence (Etcheson, 92, Martin 133). Food prices, already on the rise, began to sky-rocket and income stratification began to reach unseen levels (Etcheson 18-19).

Lon and the Khmer Republic did not receive the degree of peasant support they expected, and they proved unable to connect to the urban population (Etcheson 136), which was the logical alternative. What Lon could count upon, however, was the loyalty of the army, where he was popular amongst both officer and the enlisted (Etcheson 135). However, if the Republic had started out with lofty ideals, these were abandoned rather

quickly. Stemming the advance of the Khmer Rouge became the primary occupation of the Republic, and its actual leadership began pursuing more personal goals. Lon himself is not known to have reproduced the sort of self-indulgence his royal predecessors had, however, he is known to have connections to elements of the Cambodian black market.⁶⁶

At the more base level, officers in the army began feeding the black market with, at first, excess military goods and foreign aid. This eventually degenerated into the outright sale of equipment, and soon regular soldiers began engaging in the same trade. This sort of military corruption had actually been relatively minor during the previous regime, but it now joined the remainder of the state apparatuses as a means for the self-enrichment of its members.

Following the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam, aid to Cambodia became increasingly tenuous, and the Khmer Rouge was able to move forward, relatively unopposed. The Republican army was under-equipped and suffering from poor training and morale. The government also lacked popular support and legitimacy, for its overthrow of Sihanouk and the monarchy, but also for its inability to deliver on any of its promises.⁶⁷ By April of 1975, Lon deemed the situation hopeless and fled the country, with the capital falling into Khmer Rouge hands shortly thereafter.

The Republic was a relatively short-lived political entity. Despite its nominal agenda, its actual policies became affixed to its own survival; a reality that the populace seemed more than aware of. Its inability to build a significant base with the populace was

⁶⁶ His brother was the largest opium dealer in Phnom Penh. (Etcheson 135-136).

⁶⁷ Indeed, Becker notes that there was a feeling on the ground that the situation could only improve after the collapse of the Republic (Etcheson 35).

compensated for by preferential treatment for the military, which served as Lon's chief power-base. These military officials and soldiers engaged in extensive corruption, selling equipment and foreign aid, to enrich themselves, while the rampant corruption of the previous administration continued on. Indeed, the Republic even served to create more opportunities for corruption through the private and illicit sectors of the economy.

Democratic Kampuchea/Pol Pot

Khmer Rouge leadership was comprised mostly of the nation's petty bourgeoisie and royally linked, and also tended to be significantly better educated (Tully 2005 185). The group's leader, Saloth Sar (who had taken the name Pol Pot, also referred to as Brother Number One), had been born to a relatively well-off family; they were land-owning and had female relatives who were favored members of the King's harem. Pol Pot himself would attend the Lycée Sisowath, as many other Cambodian elites would, though he would be unable to complete his studies and dropped out. He later studied in Paris, alongside Ieng Sary (another top leader in the Khmer Rouge). Many of the former Khmer Rouge leadership had similar backgrounds, and held functionary positions in Cambodia after being educated; Pol Pot himself was a teacher.

The Khmer Rouge itself, despite its historical connections to the Indochinese Communist Party, was very much a distinct entity from the Cambodian wing of the ICP that existed in war-times. The Khmer Rouge were, however, highly dependent on the Vietnamese for training and supplies, a reality that did not sit well with its leadership. By 1973, an irreparable break occurred in the form of the Paris Accords. Khmer Rouge

leadership felt this to be a betrayal, that the Vietnamese leadership had sold them out and now condemned them to absorb the brunt of the American presence in Southeast Asia. Its leadership immediately put out feelers to China, as it believed the Soviet Union to be too deeply tied into Vietnam. New Chinese aid, prior momentum, and a decaying Khmer Republic (which itself was losing American aid), victory was inevitable.

In 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized the capital Phnom Penh and declared the Democratic Kampuchea. The cities were immediately evacuated for two key reasons; strategic and ideological. In the former, the Khmer Rouge, despite especially brash propaganda, seemed acutely aware that an outright conflict with the United States would be problematic and, having seen the bombing campaign in North Vietnam in 1969, sought to avoid that fate. The second part was more linked to their ideological bend (Etcheson 144-146).

The Khmer Rouge leadership seems to have genuinely been committed, at some level, to the notion that they were creating a new society with no historical precedent (O'Kane 1993, 735-748). However, they were also, at times, very pragmatic. Former leadership was immediately "liquidated," only days after the collapse of the Khmer Republic (Etcheson 144-146), and the Khmer Rouge reached out to Sihanouk, to occupy a ceremonial political role. This would enable them to garner the trust of the peasantry early on (Etcheson 130-133). Despite his fears, Sihanouk had vested interest in the success of the Khmer Rouge (it enabled him to regain some personal power and prestige), and he seems not only complicit (Etcheson 131) but, at times, enthusiastic about his role in the regime (Etcheson 131-136).

The Khmer Rouge had adopted a policy of self-sufficiency and "purity," and immediately embarked upon the creation of a new vision for the Cambodian state. "Year Zero" is the term commonly used to describe the new "society." The Khmer Rouge began a policy of internal violence that can best be described as an "auto-genocide." The regime would, at first, target those Khmer who possessed considerable foreign influence. This was not limited to those individuals who had been members of the previous regime, but also to those whom had extensive technical training. Doctors, bankers, teachers, engineers, lawyers, and a slew of other technocrats and professionals were singled out and purged for "reeducation" or outright elimination.

Ethnic minorities, including Vietnamese, Lao, Hill tribes, and other smaller groups were targeted next as the regime began hard-lining its ideological stance. Society was reorganized around the rice-paddy; the peasantry and urban dwellers were turned into forced laborers in agricultural communes. Those that did not fit this scheme were eliminated; this includes professionals, technocrats, minorities, but, eventually, other Khmer who dwelled on the coast and made their living from the sea.

After this string of purges, conditions became even worse for the populace. Conditions at the communes and labor camps are widely known but, in brief, can best be described as nightmarish. Hundreds of thousands of peasants would die of starvation, or be outright executed in the now infamous "Killing Fields." The atrocities committed by the regime are amongst the worst of the 20th century.

The country itself became increasingly isolated and dependent on China, and trade effectively ceased. The Khmer Rouge would, at least for the first 2-3 years,

demonstrate the ability to carry out state-level projects more effectively than its Republican predecessor. As Etcheson points out, the Khmer Rouge did seem able to feed those people that it decided it should feed (Etcheson 213). Furthermore, the military became a privileged class, receiving better rations, access to medical care, and lax oversight (Etcheson 215). Amongst those, the innermost circle, those that formed Pol Pot's personal guard, were the most privileged (Etcheson 215).

As the bulk of the populace languished, the military enjoyed some degree of freedom and privilege. This would prove important later in the regime's story. Sihanouk himself lived under house arrest, though his conditions were frequently much better than that of the populace; his utility had been largely expended. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge leadership would have much more lavish living conditions, and the bulk of the state's meager wealth went into security and the lifestyles of the upper echelon of the Khmer Rouge leadership.

Corruption was reduced, at least at the middle-levels of leadership, as there were fewer and fewer opportunities to engage in it. As the state and its treasury were largely at the disposal of the Khmer Rouge, it becomes difficult to differentiate spending, and the term "corruption" is perhaps not accurate, as corruption indicates that there is an understanding that the behavior is negative and illegal. In this Khmer Rouge context, such terminology seems trivial to the realities on the ground.

Democratic Kampuchea was a slightly stronger state, for the first two or three years, then its predecessors, though it's primary beneficiary remained a fraction of the population. Like their predecessors, leadership sought to maintain the privilege of the

elite class, without making meaningful enhancements to the prosperity of society at large. The state, indeed society at large, was perceived as a means to enrich the dominant social class. As with the Royalists and Republicans, much of the Khmer Rouge leadership had connections to the court and the lycée.

As the regime purged onward, there were fewer and fewer obvious opponents. Wealth was quickly exhausted, and the Khmer Rouge became self-cannibalizing. Paranoid, the upper levels of leadership saw Vietnamese aggression and agents everywhere, and began purging its own military officials. In some ways, this was a self-fulfilling prophecy; these military officers, who enjoyed some wealth, had the means to flee to Vietnam, where they lobbied Hanoi for assistance in toppling the regime.

After several years of famine and massacre, the Khmer Rouge found itself in a dangerously weakened state. Unable to put down rebellions on its frontiers, it began to lash out at Vietnam. This is not entirely, as one would believe, irrational. Pol Pot had been cultivating favor with China for several years, and seemed to believe that the Chinese would guarantee Cambodian independence and intervene should the Vietnamese ever move into Cambodia. For the Vietnamese, they had secured, in 1978, tacit Soviet approval to address their security concerns with Cambodia.

In late 1978, after several aggressive military incursions into Vietnamese territory, the Vietnamese army began to move to the border. Nominally, they were supporting a local resistance group, but the bulk of the actual armed forces were Vietnamese regulars. On December 25th 1978, the Vietnamese moved nearly 150,000 troops into Cambodia. These were amongst the best units in the Vietnamese army; they were battle-tested

veterans of the conflict with the United States, were well-trained, and possessed superior artillery and logistics. Opposing them, were the already shaken Khmer Rouge forces. Suffering from lack of artillery, outnumbered 3 to 1, and with little ammunition, food, and non-existent leadership, the Khmer Rouge army was shattered within days of the invasion. By early January, the Vietnamese had established the People's Republic of Vietnam, and the Khmer Rouge forces that remained, scattered to the jungles in the north of the country, which had remained untouched since before even the French colonial era. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge would, ultimately, join an umbrella resistance with pro-democratic, Royalist and other leftist groups that would wage an insurgency against the Vietnamese-backed government for the next ten years.

Lasting just over four years, the Democratic Kampuchea proved it was able to carry out large-scale projects; however, these were always in service of the Khmer Rouge's own strategic and ideological agenda. The Khmer Rouge as a group functioned as part of the designated state class, with the military forming the rest. Special treatment aside, the destructive policies of the state crippled their own ability to survive, creating divisions amongst themselves and, ultimately, planting the seeds for their own removal.

Post-Independence Cambodia: In Review

Over a period of 27 years, despite having passed through three separate incarnations of the state, the Cambodian state remained one defined by a self-interested, corrupt ruling class. From 1953 through 1970, Sihanouk carried out a number of vanity projects with little practical use to the Cambodian population at large, but a definite boon

to his own political organization, Sangkum, which he utilized, in addition to his traditional position as King, to maintain power and control over the state's instruments. While Sihanouk pursued his own projects, members of the political leadership, from high to low, utilized the state to pursue their own self-enrichment through a number of corrupt channels.

From 1970 to 1975, Lon Nol and the Khmer Republic would, similarly, utilize the state as a means for their own self-preservation and self-enrichment. Internally, the army, as Lon's powerbase, became a means of self-enrichment in a society where the usual economy had all-but collapsed. Finally 1975 through 1979, the Khmer Rouge leadership pursued their vision of "restarting" society. This involved the enrichment of Khmer Rouge leadership and, at least at first, the privileged position of the military, for several years at a crushing cost of human life and suffering.

In all three scenarios, narrow fractions of the population would benefit from the entirety of the state's resources. Official position served as a means for personal gain and the consolidation of power for the relevant regime, be it Sihanouk and Sangkum, Lon Nol and the Khmer Republic, or Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian case is especially tragic, because it demonstrates the full internal range of potential self-enrichment states; from the self-aggrandizing, to the murderous.

The Self-Enrichment State

In our second case, we have examined Cambodia, our typological Self-enrichment state. During the colonial period, we found Cambodia to have had a long-tradition of sultanistic kings who were concerned with the preservation of their own position. As a

result, they would enter into protectorate status with France as a power-check on its neighbors, and maintain opulent lifestyles that put a major drain on the colonial budget.

The court and its favorites formed the core of the Cambodian elites, and this group would remain in power throughout the colonial period and go onto play major parts in post-independence politics. Unlike Vietnam, which had a preexisting bureaucratic class and, eventually, developed an independent intelligentsia and middle-class, Cambodian society remained largely unchanged through its colonial period. What new institutions were put into place helped to reinforce existing power distribution. What miniscule social mobility there was tended to absorb newcomers into a system where corruption and self-enrichment was both the norm and the expectation.

The King and courtly class would play a prominent role in the post-independence era, where Sihanouk and his relatives would dominate political institutions and policy-making bodies for 17 years after independence. The majority of lower and mid-level leadership, as well as that of the Khmer Republic and Democratic Kampuchea, were all characterized by the same background; relatively wealthy, royally-linked, and educated at one of the country's few institutions of higher learning.

These elites were never forced into different sectors, and never became active proponents of any ideology. Even the leadership of the Khmer Rouge was largely comprised of elites who were seen as failures within their respective stratum of society, and became involved in political and armed struggle post-bellum and, in many cases, after independence. They were, however, more similar to the elites who dominated Sangkum and the Republic, than the peasants they supposedly represented.

The patchy infrastructure set down by the French during the colonial period helped define the armed struggle after the war. It was the untouched eastern frontier that served as the catalyst for Lon Nol's coup, and the wastes and jungles of the country's north and interior were both the staging ground, and eventual sanctum, for the Khmer Rouge in their rise and fall from power. The few institutions of learning produced spaces for elites to convene and reaffirm their position, but did little lift the common Khmer socially.

Finally, there remained a dogged commitment and overreliance on very basic forms of revenue generation. During the colonial era, faced with a lack of market for excise goods and limited exports, the French administration relied heavily upon modes of direct taxation; the few improvements they put into effect served only to increase their ability to collect these taxes. After independence, the state remained overly reliant on these and, when it became obvious that the populace could not actually support the budget of a contemporary post-bellum state, the Kingdom of Cambodia and Khmer Republic became dependent upon foreign aid. The notion of utilizing an export-oriented economy does not seem to factor in seriously for Sihanouk or Lon Nol. The Khmer Rouge was actively hostile towards the idea and, instead, pursued a reactionary course that would simplify tax collection. In this case, the Khmer Rouge actually reached further back than their predecessors, embracing a system a system of force appropriated labor.

Thus, as we have seen, the conditions set forth during the colonial period created the actors, the arena, as well as the tools used and prizes fought for in the post-independence period. We never see state projects pursued for the benefit of the populace

at large, whether economic or security-oriented, but instead, the projects that are carried out benefit a small segment of the population. Corruption remains rife and is almost an expectation amongst those who carry it out; remnants of the colonial elite whose position was guaranteed for them by the French administration. We never see the formation of an intellectual, entrepreneurial or new political class. Those who would stage revolution later were simply reacting to their own shortcomings within the set structure. It is for these reasons that I classify Cambodia as a self-enrichment state, a direct result of the policies of its colonial administration.

CHAPTER 4: LAOS (CASE STUDY C)

For my third case, illustrating a null state, we will examine the Lao People's Democratic Republic. This case shall begin with an examination of Laos' colonial history, from 1893-1953, during which we will note a near total lack of diversity amongst income sources, limited to no indigenous elite mobility, a lack of hard infrastructure and institutional permeation throughout the region. We will then examine Laos' post-independence history, from 1954-2010, stopping at near present-day. This analysis will be broken down into three distinct periods; 1954-1975, detailing the immediate independence era, civil war and Second Indochina War, 1974-1989, the period following the establishment of the LPDR, and from 1990-2010, examining policy after the initiation of reforms in the late 1980's. All three periods will demonstrate a lack of will, capacity, or both in terms of the state planning and executing state-wide projects, a reliance on external forces for support and guidance, and rampant corruption and inefficiency. However, unlike neighboring Cambodia, a designated social class never truly emerges to benefit from the state's small projects.

Historical Context

Laos' role in the region's history is defined by its remoteness. What follows is a brief historical overview, describing its pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence history. This will serve to establish Laos as a geographic and political backwater, as well

as provide a general guideline for a region whose history is complicated and crowded with a number of exogenous actors.

The region that comprises contemporary Laos falls almost entirely within the old borders of the long-extinct kingdom of Lan Xang. Originally founded in the 12th Century, the Kingdom included contemporary Laos, but also much of the Khorat plateau in contemporary Thailand, where even today the majority of the Lao people continue to live. The kingdom, even from its inception, was very much dependent on neighboring powers for its existence; its founder achieved unity in the region only after having secured the financial and military backing of the Khmer Empire to the south. Much of Lan Xang's early history is defined by this semi-client status, though it did enjoy the benefits of its central location in terms of trade. Even during this period, however, much of Laos' extensive highlands remained under the Lan Xang kingdom's control either nominally, or through a complex network of feudal alliances.

By the late 17th century, however, the kingdom had fallen into political disarray. The region's political vacuum, following the collapse of the Khmer Empire, had first been filled by the Burmese and, later, Siamese and Vietnamese kingdoms. By the dawn of the 18th century, the region that had once comprised the Kingdom of Lan Xang had disintegrated into a series of principalities (Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak) all of which were Siamese tributaries.

Local attempts to revive the ancient kingdom and drive out Siamese influence were short-lived and resulted in the sacking of principal city Viang Chan in 1827, and the enactment of a forced relocation policy for much of the population in the region. This

resulted in much of the local populace being moved west of the Mekong, leaving the areas on the eastern bank (much of contemporary Laos) sparsely populated (Stuart-Fox 1997, 1-20).

French interest in the region was built around commercial dreams of expanding trade in the region, not only with China, but also for their newly acquired Vietnamese territories (Stuart-Fox 20). A British desire to maintain a buffer state in the region (Stuart-Fox 1997, 24) prevented the French from expanding throughout the entire region and, instead, much of modern Laos was incorporated into the French Indochinese Union in 1893 (Stuart-Fox 1997, 25). The region was divided into the protectorate of Luang Prabang in the north, and a directly-administered region in the south.

Laos' geography, sparse population and fractious political scene were steep obstacles for local French administrators. The French Empire lacked the political enthusiasm for the colonial cause that Algeria enjoyed, ambitions for Laos were quickly scaled back. Eventually, it sufficed for Laos to remain merely financially solvent on its own, a goal which went unrealized. The region remained a backwater, with few French administrators assigned to it and much of the colonial bureaucracy comprised of transplanted Vietnamese officials educated at lycées in Laos' more developed neighbor.

The local elite were "small enough and dependent enough" to be co-opted into the system at relative little cost (Stuart-Fox 1997, 43). Education, for example, remained very much a hobby of the elite and few students without royal ties left Laos. As a class, their positions would remain unchallenged, and they remained politically ambiguous throughout much of the colonial period.

During World War 2, Japanese occupation of the region was, at first, of little direct consequence. As the war began to wind down, however, the Japanese encouraged the local King declare independence with the hopes of creating a shield of autonomous states in the region, easing the burden on the Japanese military as they were tied down in Burma with the allies. Crash courses on modernization for the local administration and military were provided by the Japanese and, in many senses, created contemporary Lao nationalism. Following the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, Prince Phetsarath and a group of supports formed the Lao Issara government, advocating an independent, nationalist Laos.

The venture would prove short-lived, and the French reasserted their power within a year (Stuart-Fox 1997, 61). The King and much of the royalty were more than happy to resume the pre-war arrangement, and the Lao Issara went into exile. These individuals would return to take part in the new government, autonomous within the French union, and later the post-independence government in 1953.

Laos' post-independence era is dominated by political unrest, a civil war, and the neighboring Second Indochina War. The Royal Government, whether led by rightists or neutralists, would remain dependent on the West and international aid for their continued existence, making several attempts to incorporate the communist elements within the country into the government. The communists, known as the Pathet Lao, were awarded what amounted to a base of operations in the north where they, like the Royal Government, would be dependent on foreign powers.

After a series of coups, Laos would settle into a decade-long status quo, whereby the Royal Government remained, for all intents and purposes, a puppet of the United States. The Royal Government's power did not extend over communist controlled regions, where the Pathet Lao operated largely as an extension of the Viet Minh.

Laos suffered greatly during the Second Indochina War. As North Vietnam supported operations in the south, it also provided military and logistical support to their Lao allies. North Vietnamese supply chains routinely crossed Lao territory. The United States, as part of their support for the Royal government, would carry out an extensive air campaign that would drop over two million tons of explosives on Laos (a sizeable portion of which remains there to this day).

After US withdrawal from the region in the early 1970's, Laos' collapse was inevitable. The Pathet Lao, with Vietnamese backing, overran the capital in 1975 and established the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The new government, like its predecessors, was defined by its dependence on allies and proved remarkable ineffective. Outside of a few basic political programs, much of the agenda failed and the region would begin to liberalize economically almost by default by the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, the Vietnamese withdrew outright from Cambodia and began scaling back their military and political involvement in Laos, permitting for greater autonomy in decision making on the part of the Laotian government.

Despite the passing of nearly two decades and the strengthening of international relationships, Laos remains critically dependent on foreign aid, and the government remains politically opaque, unreformed and inefficient.

We will now commence a deeper examination of Laos' colonial history (1893-1953), followed by analysis of its post-independence (1953-Current) policy. As a result of this underdevelopment and lack of financial security, the stagnant political elite would remain dependent upon external forces for its sustenance and agenda for decades following independence.

Colonial Examination

Pre-colonial Laos, for much of its recorded history, was a collection of petty principalities centered in the ruins of Lan Xang. The early Lao Kingdom had been formed through the assistance of the Khmer Empire, and exercised its authority in the region through a complex series of feudal relationships⁶⁸. The region was challenging to govern. Its geography was dominated by the highlands, populated by a hodgepodge of ethnically diverse hill tribes, and the lowlands around the Mekong, where the ethnic Lao lived. Frequent rebellions and court politics forced many early monarchs into the arms of neighboring powers early on to maintain their position.

By the 14th century the Khmer Empire had largely declined, and the political vacuum in the area was gradually being filled by a succession of aggressive neighbors. The struggle with the Burmese in the mid-1500s was especially bloody, resulting in the capture of the capital. Later, a succession of invasions by the ascendant Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms in the region began to fill the political gap. Unlike in Cambodia,

⁶⁸ This system is referred to as the Mandala system. It is essentially feudal, with smaller powers paying tribute to a more powerful, centralized one. These smaller powers, in turn, would often serve as overlord over more distant, weaker states, and so forth. This system would complicate French expansion into the region, as these satellites sometimes overlapped between two large kingdoms.

the local royalty showed little talent for playing one power off against the other, and by the late 1700's, following an extensive war with the Kingdom of Siam, Lan Xang had completely fractured into three tributary principalities; Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak.

Attempts to throw off Siamese domination resulted, in 1827, in the sacking of Viang Chan, a principal city and princely capital. Siam, determined to expand their influence over the area to check the expanding Vietnamese kingdom further east, enacted a policy of forced relocation for much of the ethnic Lao population. This moved the majority of the Lao people across the Mekong into the extensive Khorat plateau, and left much of the lowlands sparsely populated. This chronic under-population would prove a difficult, if not insurmountable, obstacle to later ambitions in the region.

French expansion in the area began in the mid-19th century, beginning with Cochinchina, which was to be directly administered by French directors. Cambodia would formally become a protectorate of the French in 1867 and throughout the 1870 and 1880's, Annam and Tonkin would be absorbed as well. The colonies were consolidated into the French Indochinese Union in 1887.

French ambitions in Laos were rarely for the region itself, but rather for its relation to other places (Stuart-Fox 1997, 20). Early on, it was seen as a potential hinterland for Vietnam (Stuart-Fox 1995, 112), a region from which Vietnam could draw natural resources for processing and export (in effect, a colony of a colony (Stuart-Fox 1995, 122)). Later, by the 1880s, Laos was seen as a potential trade route, via the Mekong, into southern China (Stuart Fox 1995, 112-115, 1997, 20). A brief war between France

and Siam carried out on the pretext of establishing law and order to the region (Stuart-Fox 1995, 116), ultimately led to a settlement whereby the region of Laos was to be split between the two powers. Although early borders were a bit hazy, it was generally accepted that lands on the Mekong and to the East belonged to France, while those on the west were given to Siam. This left the Khorat Plateau, and much of the ethnic Lao population, within Siam, an issue the French expected to resolve later. However, distractions at home, and a desire by the British to maintain a viable Siamese buffer state, led to little further expansion beyond a few relatively minor border adjustments in 1905 and 1907 (Stuart-Fox 1995, 120).

The region that was admitted to French Indochina was split in two. The northern portion was admitted as a protectorate, centered on the principality of Luang Prabang, while the southern panhandle region of Laos was directly administered by the French. The protectorate enjoyed some local autonomy though it was, like its predecessor, constrained by preexisting realities (ethnically diverse, sometimes hostile hill tribes, limited trade and resources), and the royalty there would be largely content to enjoy a relatively plush lifestyle⁶⁹.

The colonial analysis will be broken down into three broad categories, comprising the entirety of the colonial period (1893-1953). The first category, on elites, will discuss the role, character and lack of mobility that define Lao elites during the colonial period, as well as the implications of such within the colonial narrative and post-independence.

⁶⁹ This stands in contrast with the protectorates of Cambodia and Tonkin/Vietnam. In Cambodia, the King enjoyed a lavish lifestyle much on par (or even enhanced) with his life before. In Tonkin, the Emperor of Vietnam enjoyed a cushy lifestyle, but chafed much more harshly against French encroachment on his own political capacity.

The second category, on self-sufficiency, will detail the fiscal, tax and trade policies of the French colonial government. The third category, on institutions and infrastructure, will discuss the limited permeation of the French colonial administration into Laos.

We shall see that a lack of development in terms of institutions and infrastructure, budgetary diversification, paired with small, stagnant, yet socially secure elite, would lead directly to a scenario of dependency on foreign powers in the post-independence era. Without this external support, the local elites would not be equipped, financially, structurally, or institutionally, to create, much less execute, a meaningful, country-wide policy agenda.

Elites

In this section we will analyze the nature, behavior and role of the elites in colonial Laos. We shall see that there is practically no elite mobility, with most existing elites remaining at the core of political authority and rarely deviating outside of that sphere. Similarly, we see few elite classes disappearing and little to no upward mobility; that is, no indigenous elite classes emerging. Only a transplanted elite class, in the form of Vietnamese bureaucrats, would be added to the scene, though these would remain constrained by realities on the ground and more closely tied to Vietnam than to Laos.

Elites in colonial Laos were defined by their relative distance from the royal core. The royal family of Luang Prabang, and its numerous cadet branches, formed the bulk of the power holders in areas where ethnic Lao predominated. In the highlands and fringe

areas of the country, where Tai, Hmong, and other hill tribe peoples formed the bulk of the population, local chiefs and religious figures took center stage.

Tracking the later at the individual level proves near impossible, as a result of a lack of records and lack of state or governing presence in these regions. On multiple occasions throughout the colonial and post-independence period, individuals surface and may play an important political role (such as Ong Kaeo in 1901 and Hmong chiefs in the 1960s), but there never emerges a sustained class, dynasty or anything similar. Their mode of appearance is still very traditional; disgruntled peasants, would-be prophets, etc. As a result, discussing these hill tribe elites is most effective when discussing them as a broad group. Throughout the course of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence era, these elites remained approximately the same, bound to traditional models of social mobility and relationships⁷⁰. During the colonial period, they are vital for the maintenance of security in the highlands and frontier, and would remain so throughout the entirety of the colonial period (Duncannson 1970, Zasloff 1991, 5) and into the post-colonial period (Zasloff 1991, 5).

The bulk of the discussion here will focus on the ethnic Lao elites, as political power in the region has been disproportionately in their hands for most of recent history. Lao elites' importance hinged on their distance from the royal core; immediate relatives, held more sway than distant ones, those favored and close to the royal family enjoyed more privileges than those that did not, etc. However, unlike in Cambodia where the kingship held was decidedly sultanistic in character, the monarch of Laos possessed

⁷⁰ This excludes, of course, situations in which a group is subject to ethnic cleansing or other forms of systemic persecution. In these tragic scenarios, the decline in the number of elites is on par with the overall decline in population.

authority, but not nearly the degree of political, religious and cultural significance of his Cambodian counterpart. This stems in no small part from the fact that the royal family of Luang Prabang was always perceived as such; a family reigning over a distinct area, and was not recognized as monarchs reigning over the entire old Lan Xang kingdom.

Elites were concerned with dynastic politics and maintenance of their position and lifestyle, engaged in political in-fighting, which sometimes escalated to violence, exile and court shuffling; but, by and large, court elites remained a static element of society like their counterparts in the highlands. They were not often engaged in commerce, as this remained almost exclusively in the hands of Chinese merchant families⁷¹ (Stuart-Fox 1995, 122).

French attempts at extending education throughout Laos met with mixed results. Despite the creation of numerous schools and high enrollment, educational achievement remained markedly low. Laos did not possess its own lycée until much later, near the close of the colonial period altogether, and higher education remained the privilege of the highest elite⁷². Indeed, actual educational achievement remained notoriously low. The few technocrats trained during the area did not form a distinct class, but rather managed to benefit personally from a human-resource deprived region, particularly toward the later colonial years and early-mid post-independence period⁷³ (Halpert and Tinsman 1966, 499-507).

⁷¹ This was much to the consternation of the French administrators who would attempt to redirect trade away from Bangkok and to Hanoi.

⁷² Prince Phetsarath, who would feature prominently in the Lao Issara movement, was lycée educated and similarly studied abroad in France (Ivarson and Goscha, 2007, 58).

⁷³ This is a practice that remained in place well into the post-independence period.

Thus, there was little to no elite mobility in the protected Kingdom of Luang Prabang. In the panhandle, directly administered by France, the local administrators found themselves confronted with two key problems. First, the population was low, and there was a noted lack of elites readily available to co-opt into the system. There was no Lao equivalent of the mandarin as there was in Vietnam. As a result, there was insufficient labor to extract resources, and no technical expertise to organize or exploit it, even if there were. The second problem resulted from French perceptions of the Lao as a people. They found the Lao to be, like their counterparts in Cambodia, largely apolitical (Ireson 1996, 222), concerned only with the day-to-day concerns of the peasantry (Ireson 227). They were, at worst, lazy, ineffective, and ignorant, and altogether not suited for either bureaucratic positions or even for standard labor⁷⁴. There never emerged a significant indigenous nationalist movement (Stuart-Fox 1997, 52), nor was communism ever very popular amongst the peasantry at large (Stuart Fox 1997, 53).

The French solution to both problems was to import Vietnamese laborers (Gunn 50) for the few resource extraction facilities, and Vietnamese bureaucrats to handle middle and lower level administrative functions (Stuart-Fox 1995, 130). These Vietnamese transplants were far more engaged than the indigenous Lao, but they remained intrinsically tied to Vietnam, retaining close ties and language proficiency. A number of the Pathet Lao leadership were of mixed heritage, tied to both the petty Lao

⁷⁴ The French found the Lao to be unsuitable for their needs commercially and politically, though many of its administrators and expatriates found it be aesthetically and personally quite appealing. Lao women, for example, were described as "soft, adorable and playful," (extracted quote, Stuart-Fox 1997, 42) and the lifestyle was perceived to be quite appealing, with its slow pace and 'affable' populace, (Stuart-Fox 1995, 128-129). This highly romanticized view of the Lao is very similar to the attitude taken toward the Khmer, though it did not extend to the Vietnamese.

aristocracy and transplanted Vietnamese families. These served as a bridge to the Viet Minh late in the colonial period, but they do not truly represent a new social class, nor are they entirely 'indigenous.' Much of their 'elite status,' depends largely on their elevation to such by Vietnamese allies during the civil war period.

As a result, the gallery of elites for the ethnic Lao remained remarkably consistent throughout the period. Most were from the royalty or petty aristocracy, and there was no significant upward mobility from the peasantry. No educated class emerged, and commerce remained in the hands of a residing foreign Diaspora. Similarly, what technocratic class that did exist was largely Vietnamese transplants who remained more closely tied to Vietnam than to any notion of a 'Laos.' The few indigenous technocrats to emerge never coalesced into a single class, never became politically active, and rarely went beyond personal enrichment. Thus, at the close of the colonial period, when the Japanese forced the King to declare independence, those mobilized were of the existing nobility, led by Prince Phetsarath. After Phesarath's death, as we will see later, political movements in Laos were built around noble personalities; the rightists around Ban Oum, the neutralists around Souvannaphuma, and the Pathet Lao under his half-brother, Souvannavung.

Self-Sufficiency

As with all French colonies French Indochina, and all its components, were expected to be economically self-sufficient. This doctrine, a by-product of waning French interest in maintaining a colonial empire, was already in place almost from the start for

the union at large by the time of Laos' admission. Under-population and a lack of infrastructure, to be discussed later, meant that there were few channels of revenue open for the local government. The local colonial government remained heavily dependent upon direct taxation, both in the form of labor and of conscripted labor for execution of capital projects. Opium formed the bulk of the colonial government's profit, though this remained limited. These constraints and patterns would create a culture of dependency that would continue on into the post-independence age (with foreign aid replacing the poppy). In this section we will analyze the diversity of Laos' colonial income streams and how they affected local decision making.

Laos, as discussed previously, was admitted to the Union following the Franco-Siamese war. It was presumed that in the years following the war's conclusion, France would continue to expand into Southeast Asia at the expense of Siam. This included the inclusion of the populous Khorat plateau, where the majority of the ethnic Lao lived. However, soon after the inclusion of the lands east of the Mekong, enthusiasm at the higher levels of the French government began to wane as the costs of maintaining an overseas empire, and costly wars in Europe, began to take their toll. As a result, despite enthusiasm for it on the ground among local administrators and chiefs, the follow-up wars never occurred (Stuart-Fox 1995, 120).

Initially conceived of as a means of as a source of resources for refining in Vietnam, Laos' reality on the ground quickly stamped out hopes for an easy profit. Hopes for an easy road upstream to China never materialized, and downstream trade was firmly in the hands of Chinese merchants, who directed this to Bangkok. The French would

spend years attempting a railway connecting riverside ports to the Vietnamese coast, none of which would materialize (Stuart-Fox 1995, 126). These railways included a number of different plans, many of which were forced to cross exceptionally difficult terrain at the northern end of the country, or were long and unprofitable at the southern end. The river itself facilitated north-south trade within Laos, but all trade going further downstream moved on toward Siam, not a scenario that the French administrators wanted. As a result, infrastructure remained largely localized, as ad hoc solutions to local problems (Gunn 1990, 32-35). By the 20th century, it was already clear that it would likely never happen, though local administrators and merchants frequently discussed the railway as a sort of *Deus ex machine* that would solve all financial problems.

Laos' local wealth, meanwhile, was grossly exaggerated by the French to try and draw investors (Stuart-Fox 1995, 118). Some fortunes were indeed made in speculation (Gunn 1990, 30), but hopes for Laos to become a major center of commerce were a bust (Gunn 1990, 20-22). Outside of limited mining, there was little profit to be had easily in Laos. As a result, the local government was dependent upon two different sources of income. These were direct taxation, which manifested as either monetary or labor, and profits from an opium monopoly.

Direct taxation was utilized, by and large, to pay for the colony's maintenance and facilitate capital projects. Preexisting systems of taxation and administration were maintained (Christie 1979, 178). In the directly-administered south, the tax-burden grew increasingly heavy and slanted along discriminatory lines to support the sparse services provided by the colonial government (Stuart-Fox 1997, 32-33). While it caused some

problems, the Lao remained largely passive and even seemed to accept French imperialism (Stuart Fox 1997, 33) in much the same way that the Khmer had to the south.

Direct monetary taxation sufficed for the government's needs, precisely because it had so little to maintain. While the local populace tolerated it, chalking it up to another burden of peasant life, they were not so passive about their resistance to labor quotas. Like other institutions, this form of taxation involved the local populace owing the government a number of days per year labor. Peasants could buy their way out of service, but few had the practical means to do so. These forced labor quotas were often a source of violent revolt (Stuart-Fox 1995, 122). Despite French abolition of slavery in neighboring Cambodia, and a campaign against the practice labor quotas in Laos, the government's lack of exports and tax-base meant that they were often dependent upon these quotas for the execution of local capital projects as late as the 1920s (Stuart-Fox 1997, 44).

Taxation and labor quotas managed to cover local expenses, but any large-scale projects, including defense, had to be covered by the Union at large. This worsened over time, and at one point the budget was being supplemented by the Union at a rate of nearly 2:1 (Gunn 1990, 42). Most excise taxation, used more extensively in Vietnam, did not reap the same profits. Like Cambodia, a more austere lifestyle meant that much of the populace did not qualify as a potential market. The exception to this, and soon a major source of revenue for Laos' budget was opium. Production was, in large part, in the hands of the hill tribes, and sent downriver for processing at the few facilities in the lowlands. The primary destination for Laotian opium, however, was local consumption within the

French Indochinese Union, as part of a broader strategy to wean the area off of British opium imported from India. Production values never reached the levels necessary for broad export to more viable markets in China, however, the profits remained large enough for the colonial government to actively promote its use and the industry at large (Gunn 1990 44).

Following the onset of the Great Depression, local government budgets became even more constrained (Stuart-Fox 1997, 51). Greater dependence on opium and even thinner services characterized the local administration, though, on the ground, the average Lao was rarely impacted in a significant manner (Gunn 1990, 82-85). While taxation was heavy, and the labor quotas inconvenient, they were, rarely more than 2 weeks out of the year, and usually not utilized during harvest season. The average Lao, like the average Khmer in the south, did not suffer extensively from hunger or poverty in the industrialized sense of the word. Food was relatively abundant and subsistence an easy benchmark to reach.

As we have seen, local income sources for the colonial government remained dependent upon direct taxation and opium. Direct taxation was heavier in the south, but both regions made extensive use of labor quotas until late in the colonial period. Opium remained the only promising source of revenue otherwise, and even that was limited, forcing the administration to rely heavily on subsidies from the Indochinese Union at large. The local administration, as well as the local elites, became accustomed to this scenario, and following independence made little attempt to alter it. Direct taxation remained a major source of income but, following the abolition of a state monopoly on

opium, the local government became extremely dependent upon foreign aid. Lacking the experience, the expertise, and the structures on the ground to do otherwise, the stagnant local elites continued on with these policies, embracing a culture of dependency.

Road's End

For much of Laos, the presence of the French colonial state was very limited. Despite some debate, most of the literature and research suggests that the French colonial government did not (or could not) permeate much deeper than a strictly superficial level. Geography, population and a constrained government combined for an environment that was not conducive to extensive investment in the region and it was thus left to its own devices for much of its infrastructure and institutions. This lack of commercial and administrative capacity did nothing to alleviate dependency on unreliable, insufficient revenue streams during the colonial period or afterward. In this chapter, we will examine the limited, highly localized nature of French infrastructure in Laos, as well as the lack of investment in education, healthcare and legal institutions in the region, and its impact on post-independence policy.

As already discussed, the French had only a very limited interest in Laos to begin with. It was to serve as a means of bolstering existing colonies, or as a commercial hub. Neither scenario materialized. The Mekong proved unreliable for upstream trade, and downstream trade was out of the administration's control; it was dominated by Chinese merchants, and their links and loyalties were with Bangkok and the Siamese. The proposed solution had been to link the Mekong and its limited riverside depots, with the

Vietnamese coast. A variety of routes were scouted and planned, but did not materialize as a result of extraordinary cost, time, or distraction at home in France. With no connections to the rest of Indochina, and a disincentive to trade with Siam, Laos remained largely as it had been before the French ever arrived; a backwater, disconnected from the world.

Most commerce remained within Laos, including the government's major source of income, opium. Infrastructure on the ground was limited to localized solutions, designed to remedy particular problems, and as a whole, the region began to resemble a tapestry of short, unconnected roads serving only local needs. Large-scale projects were few and far in between (Gunn 1990, 39-42). The Mekong continued, largely unimpeded, electrical production was limited, and few major public buildings were ever built. Only a single line of rail was ever laid down, roads were of poor quality, and bridges and tunnels were rare, a reality that remained apparent as late as the 1950's (Gilkey 1958, 92).

If the French had been committed to major institutional reforms, this lack of infrastructure would have been problematic. However, by and large, the French committed little to the development of the region as a whole. Educational investment remained the lowest in Indochina by far (Gunn 1990, 37) and available only a select few (Gunn 1990, 38). The number of schools at the primary level did increase, along with enrollment, in the 1920s and 30's, however, this translated to very little as there were few economic opportunities for such a basic level of education. The limited technical and academic scholarships were largely the privilege of the elites, and the few upwardly mobile to be found were committed to their own betterment rather than some ideological

or social commitment. What Lao technocrats that did emerge found themselves a minority in a bureaucracy dominated by transplanted Vietnamese officials (Christie 148).

Medical investment also remained the lowest in Indochina (Stuart-Fox 1997, 44). As late as the 1910's, there were as few as a handful of western-trained doctors. Unlike Cambodia and Vietnam, where midwifery helped to compensate for this shortage, there was little else beyond traditional medicine available in the lowlands, and much of the highlands were still dependent upon shamanistic medicine.

In terms of security, the local garrisons had to be augmented frequently with Khmer troops from the south, and financed from profits garnered by the more lucrative Vietnamese protectorates. The garrisons were still understaffed, undertrained, and often required assistance in putting down a number of rebellions that sprung up during the early years. These were led by a motley assortment including disaffected princes, angry peasants, Chinese bandits, opium smugglers, agitated hill chiefs, and at least one rebel leader claiming to be a heavenly shaman-king, whose coming was foretold in legend. The French were fortunate that many of these rebellions were as much by-products of local rivalries or escalation of run-of-the-mill banditry (Gunn 1990, 101-103), and never really formed major threats. However, enough of them, such as the "Holy Man's Rebellion" stretched over at least a year as garrisons struggled to maneuver through rough terrain. That said, even after major incidents had declined, state permeation remained relatively limited, and in the highlands, there was barely a state presence at all (Duncannson, 23). It became increasingly dependent on local powerbrokers in the highlands and frontier to maintain order.

This lack of infrastructure had several effects. Firstly, it perpetuated the culture of dependency that had developed amongst Lao elites. With no capacity to exploit natural resources, income remained fixed on modes of direct taxation and an opium monopoly. When these would become insufficient, particularly in the post-independence era, the country was sustained largely through international aid and/or politically inspired support. This is a pattern that has continued through to this day, where a huge fraction of the Lao capital budget depends upon humanitarian aid. Another effect was that much of the country remained out of the administrative reach of the country's eventual successors. The Royal Lao government was disconnected from the populace (Christie 152), and an alienation from the hill tribes (Brown 2001, 26). Elites were moving in a limited arena that largely included themselves and few others. This political cultural and conceptualization of leadership's role remained consistent from the pre-colonial era, was reinforced and enhanced during the colonial period, and remained the go-to perception in the post-independence era by most of its leadership, be it rightist, neutralist, or even communist.

Colonial Legacy: In Review

In this section, we have examined the conditions and effects of the colonial period in Laos. There was little to no indigenous elite mobility, with most power remaining in the hand of the royal family and lesser aristocracy, or in the hands of chiefs and tribal leaders in the highlands. There was little social mobility upward from the peasantry, and little decay or lateral movement amongst existing elites. A transplanted Vietnamese

bureaucratic class did appear, but it always remained more intricately connected to Vietnam (indeed, it would serve as the gateway to the client relationship Laos would be part of in the post-independence era). Thus, many of the leaders we will see in the Post-Independence section will be princes, aristocrats, or well-off families with strong Vietnamese connections. These elites would only begin to even consider exercising an independent course of action after the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in the 1940s.

There was no colonial income diversity, with the local government dependent upon direct monetary taxation and labor quotas for the maintenance of the local government and execution of capital projects. The labor quotas produced much discontent, and the local tax base was insufficient to support the local government. Only opium, locally consumed, produced much of a profit and this was still insufficient to make up the budget shortfall. Highly dependent on opiates or subsidies from its neighbors, the local leadership had neither the capacity nor the will to diversify their income. This culture of dependence would remain with Laos for the rest of its contemporary history, with political aid substituting colonial and humanitarian aid eventually substituting this.

Finally, infrastructure and institutions on the ground in Laos remained the least developed in all of Indochina. Laos remained an administrative backwater for the entirety of its colonial history, and was one of the least developed regions in the world then, as it is now. A lack of infrastructure would cripple the local government from exploiting local resources, but also, as we will see, guaranteeing its territorial integrity internally or

externally. A lack of institutions, such as healthcare, education and courts, remained underdeveloped and either a luxury afforded the elites, or dependent upon local medicine or powerbrokers to guarantee security and peace throughout the territory.

The conditions and actors established during the colonial period were firmly entrenched by the 1940s, when the Japanese would seize the area from France during World War 2. At the close of the war, the Japanese would force the creation of independent states in the region, delivering crash courses in administration and modern military tactics, however, their most important impact was the notion of an independent Laos. As we will see, however, despite the brief interregnum, Laos' path was still very much determined by its colonial realities.

Post-Independence Examination

In this section we will analyze the policy preferences and behavior of Laos in its post-colonial period, extending from 1953 until present day. Laos is typified as a "null state," one lacking the will or capacity for large-scale state projects, or possessing one not independent of external actors. As we will see, Laos defines this category, possessing neither an independent agenda, nor the capacity to effectively carry out external actors' agendas for it.

This section will begin with a brief introduction to Laos' post-colonial history, and then proceed to analyze its policy preferences in three separate time periods. The first, 1953-1975, will detail the early years of independence, the civil war, and the Second Indochina War. The second, 1975-1990, will examine the establishment of the Lao

People's Democratic Republic and its attempts to create both a state and a nation. The final section, 1990-2010, will examine Laos' policy after 1990, following economic reforms internally, and a move from Vietnam's orbit in terms of foreign policy.

Introduction to Contemporary Laos

Laos' post-colonial history is a complex and tragic one, often overshadowed by the atrocities carried out in Cambodia in the 1970's. An early post-WW2 attempt at an independent government, the Lao Issara led by Prince Phetsarith, was short-lived and ineffective. By 1946, barely a year after its declaration, the French had reasserted themselves in the region, sending the upstarts into exile. Soon after, they were extended amnesty and invited to return home to participate in the new French-sanctioned Lao state, autonomous within the framework of the Indochinese Union. The King, and many of the elites, were content with a French return, though at least one disillusioned prince, Souvannavong, sought a more independent course and aligned himself with the emerging Pathet Lao; Vietnamese-backed Laotian communists. The Pathet Lao were able to secure enough leverage that they were mandated their own territory after the Geneva Conference that would confer independence on the former Indochinese protectorates.

The Royal Lao government, headed at various points by neutralist Prince Souvannaphuma and at other times by western-backed military officials or rightist Prince Ban Oum, found itself in perpetual contention with the Pathet Lao, legitimized by Souvannavong and backed by the Viet Minh and the communist bloc. Various attempts to

incorporate them into the ruling structure would draw western suspicion, distrust on all sides, and, beginning in 1960, a string of coups, counter-coups and an extensive civil war.

The war would run concurrently with the Second Indochina War, during which time Laos became a double puppet. In the capital and Royal Lao region of the country, the economy, military, and government would be propped up by the United States, while Pathet Lao regions were kept afloat by Viet Minh and Soviet aid. As the civil war intensified, the Vietnamese would routinely violate Lao territorial integrity and operate the Pathet Lao as an extension of their own capacity in central Indochina. In response, the United States would fund a 'secret war,' mobilizing and arming hill tribes in coordination with an unprecedented aerial campaign that would drop over 2 million tons of explosives on Laos.

In 1975, with American support withdrawn, the Pathet Lao rolled through the capital and established the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). Despite early attempts at nation and state building, the new government proved as ineffectual as its predecessor, failing at numerous large projects, such as cooperativization of farms and large-scale hydraulic projects, before resigning itself to strictly political projects that enhanced the power of its tiny leadership clique. This would have the effect of pursuing de facto market liberalization policies that would not coincide with political liberalization in the Soviet Union, or even making way for a new generation of leadership, as in Vietnam.

Following Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia following the Third Indochina War, and a general Viet scaling back of its forces and political intervention outside of

Vietnam, it was presumed that Laos would begin to follow a new course. However, in the years after, state-led attempts at modernization have continued to be painstakingly slow and stuttered, at best, its leadership remains exclusive, and it remains highly dependent on foreign humanitarian and political aid.

In the analysis that follows, we will see Laos' incapacity for pursuing even medium-sized projects, as well as its client status, first with the United States and Vietnam, and then later strictly Vietnam. It will conclude with a discussion of how its lack of agency and capacity is a direct result of its colonial period.

Turmoil

Laos' most tumultuous modern era is undoubtedly its first years of independence. Particularly from 1958-1962, there is a series of coups, counter-coups, coalition governments and political uncertainty. However, Laos' colonial past, with its socially stagnant aristocracy, underdeveloped institutions and infrastructure, and financial insecurity⁷⁵ creates certain simplicity to it, as well. Many of the actors are members of the aristocracy or from the Vietnamese immigrant community, the result of little to no social mobility. Undeveloped in every way and strapped for income, foreign interests drive almost all behavior of this little coterie of princes and transplants, domestic and international.

To better analyze Laos during this period, we shall split our examination into three parts; Laos at large, detailing its civil war and political inefficacy, the Royal Lao

⁷⁵ This, as we saw previously, is a result of its overdependence on an undiversified income portfolio.

government, detailing its administrative and economic shortcomings, and the Pathet Lao, discussing the movement's dependency on Vietnam.

Laos at-large

Laos' first flirtation with independence, the Lao Issara government in 1945, was brief and administratively uneventful. While important to the development of a Lao nationalism, the regime was in power for too short a period to enact any real policies of note. Laos was reabsorbed into the French sphere by 1946, and its fate was being decided elsewhere in Indochina. There was a general lack of enthusiasm and confidence for an independent Laotian state, shared by the King and most of the nation's elites. The exceptions to this had been Phetsarith, whose Lao Issara was now political marginalized, and Souvannavong, another prince of the Lan Xang royal family. Souvannavong had been closely linked to the Viet Minh early in and, in 1950, instead of returning to take part in the new government being set up for the French for Laos, joined with communist fighters near the Vietnamese border. This group formed the Pathet Lao, and they were deeply connected to the Viet Minh (Christie 150).

As the Geneva Conference approached, the Pathet Lao launched a Viet-Minh supported offensive with which they seized a portion of land bordering Vietnam. This granted them leverage during the conference (Stuart-Fox 1997, 83), enough so that they were permitted to retain this territory, and some additions, in order to consolidate their

forces for eventual integration into the Royal Lao government that was solely recognized as the sovereign governing body in Laos⁷⁶.

This process of integration remained one of the driving engines of political turmoil for Laos as a nation-state. Prince Souvannaphuma, who had emerged as one of the most prominent political personalities, was a neutralist, seeking the same sort of neutrality that Sihanouk had sought in Cambodia. As a result, he was conciliatory to the communists, led by his brother, and frequently sought to incorporate them into the national government. This was found to be problematic for the West and its allies, who were already concerned about North Vietnam and the possibility of the entire region going over to the Communist Bloc. Distrustful of Souvannaphuma, the United States supported the formation of a rightist government⁷⁷ that marginalized the neutralist prince in the late 1950s. The new rightist government began receiving massive amounts of aid (Stuart-Fox 1997, 105-107) as the US attempted to bulk up Laos against communism (Christie 150-51).

This strong push against the Pathet Lao led, ultimately, to a series of coups. The first, and arguably most important, was carried out by a young Captain, Kong Le, who commanded the government's elite paratroopers. Kong, trained abroad, sought the expulsion of all foreign parties in Laotian affairs and a government headed by neutralist prince Souvannaphuma. This neutralist push drove the United States to identify a strongman, General Nouvan Phumi, who led a counter-coup. Nouvan met early defeats,

⁷⁶ This government was formed by elites still present in Laos, as well as reintegrated Lao Issara officials (Stuart-Fox 1997, 66).

⁷⁷ Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDIN).

as Kong Le proved to be a fairly capable field commander. However, a Thai embargo on the government in Vientiane (Kong's government) and an increased flow of US support to Nouvan's rightists, meant the coup's success was rarely in doubt. With Vientiane's capture in 1960, Prince Buon Oum (a rightist from the Champasak royal family) was installed as prime minister. Souvannaphuma fled to Cambodia, while Kong Le conducted a fighting retreat to Pathet Lao controlled territory.

From then forward, a neutralist-leftist coalition, supported by increased aid from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, began making gains against Nouvan's rightist government.

The volatile situation now threatened to escalate a regional sideshow to an outright conflict between the world's super powers, and international mediation was called in. A new coalition government was announced, but by 1962, the country was once more effectively divided into three administrative regions (Stuart-Fox 1997, 120). By 1963, the neutralists who had occupied the center of the country were politically marginalized, and Souvannaphuma found himself prime minister, but isolated with few allies. By 1964, Laos was effectively split in two; the royal government operating out of Vientiane, and the Pathet Lao, controlling the northeast of the country.

This may paint, however, a rosier picture for indigenous Lao political power. Both regions were, essentially, puppet of their respective foreign benefactors (Stuart-Fox 1997, 135). Hanoi supported the Pathet Lao almost entirely, with some Soviet and Chinese subsidies. For the Royal Lao government, the United States and, to a lesser

extent, Thailand, propped the Vientiane government up for several more years, until the early 1970's.

During the first decade of Laotian independence, Lao elites remained entirely dependent on foreign powers to drive their agendas. These agendas, in turn, were often indistinct from those of their benefactors. Souvannavong, deeply entrenched with the communists, would continue to be a major player in the Pathet Lao for the next several decades. Buon Oum, Nouvan Phumi, and other rightists, similarly remained dependent on the west.

Those who attempted to act independently, found themselves constrained by the physical and political limitations set by the colonial period. For Phetsarath, Laos' proto-nationalist, and Souvannaphumi, the neutralist, it was the lack of a dependable power base. In Vietnam, the new intellectual and urban class formed the heart of the post-war leadership, but in Laos, education and social mobility rarely expanded beyond palace walls. Phetsarath was ousted by the French in a matter of months. Souvannaphumi was forced to drift between camps in a futile attempt to construct a powerbase. By the end, his position was completely marginalized and maintained only by his pre-existing elite status. Others, like Kong Le, found a lack of development and income confounding their abilities to exercise an independent policy agenda⁷⁸. In the end, he too was forced to subordinate himself to a foreign puppet in order to maintain political relevance.

Even these elites, however, represent somewhat of an aberration. The elites that comprised the early and later governments were all markedly similar in their social and

⁷⁸ Kong's own background is unclear, so it is difficult to discern whether or not he was descended from an elite family. He is, however, almost the lone exception, and so it is not problematic to the model.

educational background. They comprised the bulk, if not entirety of government, and conceptualized it as a vehicle for the maintenance of their position (Stuart-Fox 1997, 77), rather than ideological commitment (Simmonds 1961, 66). Exploitation by outside interest was an acceptable strategy if it meant the state could continue to serve their individual agendas (Simmonds 1961, 66). This stands in contrast with neighboring Cambodia, where there was a measure of solidarity and a self-recognition on the part of the dominant social class. While Cambodian elites would conceive of themselves as Sangkum or Khmer Rouge, Lao elites did not develop a comparable level of group identity.

Royal Laos

Following 1963, a stable, if violent, status quo fell over much of Laos. The Royal government remained the dominant body in the country in name, while the country's northern and eastern frontiers remained in the hands of the Pathet Lao. That said, as far as the Royal government was concerned, what little state capacity there was financed almost entirely by the United States.

While the government remained, nominally, the governing body, the United States operated within the borders of Laos with near-absolute independence (Stuart-Fox 1997, 138-39). The American bombing campaign, originally intended to cut supply chains from Hanoi into South Vietnam, were gradually expanded during the 1960's, in both geographic area and strategic scope. The panhandle region of southern Laos, much of the border area with Vietnam, as well as strategically vital areas like the Plain of Jars,

were targeted as the campaign expanded to target Pathet Lao forces as well. Combined with the CIA-funded "Secret Army," comprised mostly of Hmong tribesmen, the United States was, by 1964, essentially maintaining the position of the Royal Lao government by keeping the Viet-backed Pathet Lao at bay.

On the ground, US aid began to form a 'shadow government,' which mirrored nearly every department in the Royal government (Stuart-Fox 1997, 130).

Souvannaphuma was gradually accepted as the preferred public figurehead, on account of the stability his predictability brought (Simmonds 1968, 25). That said, outside the capital and the immediate surrounding regions, large swaths of the country were being administered outright by the US military and/or intelligence services. These were legitimized by a network of alliances and agreements with local power brokers (152).⁷⁹

While there are some hints at indigenous success at the local level,⁸⁰ the region under control of the Royal Lao government (and by extension, the United States), underwent a decade of false peace and prosperity. US aid supported artificial economies in major cities, and there was a brief flux of foreign visitors, with an increasingly large expatriate community, centered in the diplomatic areas of the capital. This brought with it jobs for the local urban population, some legal, others not. The massive bombing campaign, and the Special Forces ground war that accompanied it, kept the Pathet Lao from overrunning the country entirely and aid turned the major cities into artificial oases of western culture.

⁷⁹ Another potential reason for these shadow and secondary governments is lack of confidence by the US in the Lao government. During the 1950's, aid had been funneled directly to the Lao state, and was poorly monitored and utilized (Gilkey 1958, 93).

⁸⁰ Kerr discusses some modest, municipal level success by Lao administrators. (Kerr 1972, 510-51)

State-wide projects were rarely carried out. This was, in part, due to the state of civil war, however even in pacified areas, there was no significant improvement in state capacity. Those few projects that were undertaken, were often entirely foreign financed and executed (Dommen 1967, 74-80) and typically local in scope. Educational and health infrastructures remained underdeveloped, in some cases, almost untouched from their colonial levels (Ng 1991 161) and initiatives to alleviate these issues lacked scope and depth (Ng 162-163). With regards to healthcare, there actually seems to have been regression from the colonial period, as existing capacities were allowed to erode (Ng 170, 172). The ability to effectively collect taxation, like other institutions, eroded rather quickly (Gilkey 92).

Even military projects were subject to an ad hoc, patchwork strategy. The Royal Lao air force, for example, would be equipped with planes and combat helicopters, only to have more vehicles than officers or soldiers to operate them. Desertion and corruption were rife among the rank and file, and training was poor and inconsistent. The few military units of worthwhile combat strength, were typically small, and often loyal to individual commanders (such as Kong Le or Nouvan Phumi) rather than the government overall.

The Royal Lao government was able, through enormous foreign aid, to maintain some semblance of stability and order within its territory. Ethnic minorities were not persecuted but, rather, were often prioritized for aid and cooperation (as with the Hmong). While corruption existed there was, at least, a market for position to be sold on. As we will see, the Pathet Lao could offer little in terms of an alternative (Simmonds

1968, 22-23). The Royal Lao government could only be said to continue to exist during this period, and it existed without complete control of the country. The elites, who dominated the government, continued to use foreign support to maintain their colonial lifestyles. A lack of development on the ground, meant there were no commercial or political opportunities for the average Lao, and nothing outside of opium farming or combat for the average highlander.

Pathet Lao

From the Pathet Lao's inception, the Vietnamese had treated it as an extension of their own struggle and were deeply involved in its strategy and sustenance (Langland 1969, 631-647, Christie 153-154). Beyond basic strategy and logistics, the leadership of the Pathet Lao were almost always subordinate to their counterparts in Vietnam, if not as a result of their dependency, then certainly because of a broader ideological commitment to them. Most of the Pathet Lao's core leadership had been under the direct 'tutelage' of Hanoi, and were content to relegate themselves to supporters of Vietnamese hegemony (Kamm 1979, 279).

After 1962, from which point the US assumed all real power within Royal Lao territory, the Pathet Lao remained in command of much of the north of the country. Leadership was frequently in Vietnam, and the movement as a whole was dependent on Vietnamese logistic and military support to carry out the ever-deepening civil war. While American bombing campaigns kept the Pathet Lao from overrunning the country entirely, the communists did consolidate more power outside of the urban areas. With little

ideological support amongst a pre-capitalist peasantry, the communists were more dependent on supply lines running out of Hanoi than any regional power base (Christie 154). Despite their success at wresting control of much of the country from the Royal Lao government, the Pathet Lao did not offer much in the way of administration (Simmonds 1968, 22-23). Outside of combat zones and bases, much of the region continued on as it had before, only with the additions of extensive ground combat and constant air raids.

By the early 1970's, the Pathet Lao were in charge of the majority of the country. Further political attempts at integration of the communists into the national government were fruitless and the situation would fundamentally change after the withdrawal of the United States from South Vietnam in 1973. Like the Khmer Republican government to the south, the Royal Lao regime's days were numbered. Without American aid, the entirety of former Indochina was overrun. South Vietnam and Cambodia were overtaken by North Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge, respectively, in April 1975. Several months later, with experienced, well-armed reinforcements from Vietnam, the Pathet Lao swept through the remainder of Laos and seized the capital in November.

From their inception in 1950, through to their day of victory in 1975, the Pathet Lao remained intrinsically connected to their benefactors in Hanoi. Most of the Pathet Lao leadership was drawn from the transplanted Vietnamese population, with the lone exception being Prince Souvannavong. With no viable support base in Laos they, like the Royal Lao government, remained almost entirely dependent upon an external actor to sustain and direct their movement. Had the region, whether their own or Laos as a whole, been developed in any meaningful way, one could argue that the existence of income,

institutions or infrastructure may have enabled some modicum of independent direction.

This, however, was not the colonial legacy left to the Pathet Lao.

Socialist Growing Pains

Following the collapse of the Royal Lao government, the Pathet Lao established the Lao Democratic People's Republic, based upon the neighboring Vietnamese model. Like its predecessors, the new Laos is defined by incapacity and lack of an internal policy direction. Herein we will discuss the first 14-15 years of the LDPR, focusing primarily on three key policy points; economic development, foreign policy and trade, and internal/political security. In all three we shall see a lack of capacity and a lack of internal direction;

The Lao state from 1975-1989 can almost entirely be summarized in a single word; ineffectual. Despite a flight of human capital just prior to final victory, many government employees from the old regime would find themselves in their old positions relatively quickly (Bedlington 1981, 109). Economic policy, like most others, was handed down from Hanoi with a delay of several months (Zasloff 6), and decision execution was either painstaking or an outright failure. The state became increasingly dependent on Soviet technical advisers (Stuart-Fox 177, Thayer 1984, 54, 58, 59) for the most difficult projects, while nearly every other face of government was permeated by the Vietnamese (Stuart-Fox 177, Bedlington 105, Joiner 1988, 102). Amongst these earliest economic programs, mimicking those in Vietnam, were pushes toward agricultural cooperativization in 1978.

The logic here was one of prioritizing productivity. Laos had been largely self-sufficient in terms of food production, but had never been able to produce much in the way of surplus-for-export. The collectivization drive offered little incentives. Laos had no history of income stratification, particularly when it came to land; direct taxation forms supported the nobility, and the peasants led largely subsistence lifestyles.⁸¹ While some peasants did join the collectives, perceiving some personal benefit (Evans 1988, 235), but the tightening of intra-national trade began to undercut food output. Attempts to coerce the peasantry proved as ineffective as attempts to incentivize; the Lao state had no means to actually enforce the cooperatives they sought (Brown 1991 43-48). With no industrial base to fall back on, the nation's economy as a whole began to fail, and by 1979 the policy was rescinded, with peasants permitted to leave collectives with their land in tact (Stuart-Fox 180-182).

Later attempts by Laos' socialist bloc partners to improve, or even diversify, the Lao economy proved fruitless. The Soviet Union, for example, would attempt numerous infrastructure or industrial projects, all of which were muddled up with extraordinary inefficiency (Thayer 1984, 54). There is a wealth of other examples. Hospitals go un-built, despite the donation of equipment and volunteers from around the Eastern bloc, while its cement is used for laying down roads for celebrations (Zasloff 23). Chicken broilers are assembled incorrectly or not all, construction materials simply disappear (Zasloff 24-26)⁸² or go unused for years. The pattern is confirmed by delegates from not

⁸¹ As Stuart-Fox notes, it was impossible to stir up sufficient 'outrage' against landowners (Stuart-Fox 1997, 179). There simply weren't enough landowners of the exploitative strength.

⁸² Literally. The materials don't ever appear to have been used or even lost through corruption.

just the Eastern bloc but also the international community at large. The Lao government itself made no effort to deny its own incompetence (Zasloff 21)⁸³ or blatant favoritism for family members and friends in government (Zasloff 22). Bottlenecks in government formed, particularly with regards to development (Zasloff), with most technical officials committed to the procurement of foreign aid. Indeed, the state only seems to have been capable of mobilizing its resources for small, localized projects over a limited span of time (Zasloff 23). Attempts to indirectly benefit the economy were also limited⁸⁴. Education remained the privilege of the elite, as it had in the past during the pre-Revolution and colonial periods.

As it had in the colonial period, Laos proved to be incapable of producing much for export, and it remained deeply dependent on aid (Joiner 1988, 101) to compensate for its budget shortfalls. As much as 50% of the budget remained aid-related in 1977, (Brown and Zasloff 1977, 170)⁸⁵ and this had increased in nearly 80% by 1983 (Thayer 1984, 53). This forced the state to make more pragmatic strategies, becoming much more selective about where they spent their resources and what groups they associated with (Brown 1991, 43-48, Brown and Zasloff 1977, 171). Despite its position as a virtual satellite of Vietnam, Laos continued to receive foreign aid from some western and international sources, and cooperated with private contractors for the exploitation of

⁸³ In a very flippant manner; writing it off as cultural quirk.

⁸⁴ Joiner has a sobering anecdote with regards to this. At one point, Laos began sending its doctors to Mongolia, itself an administrative backwater on the periphery of the socialist bloc, for 'post graduate studies.' (Joiner 101).

⁸⁵ This is a decline of about 30% from the Royal Government, though the decrease stems not so much from economic development on the part of Laos, but rather from the inability to meet the same level of capital investment on the part of its socialist partners, as well as Lao focus on agricultural self-sufficiency by the close of the 1970s.

natural resources (Brown and Zasloff 1977, 171). This dependency strongly resembles the colonial dependency on the opium trade to supplement its budget shortfalls, and on labor quotas to execute capital projects.

Outside of aid procurement, Laos demonstrated a complete inability to differentiate its own foreign policy from that of Vietnam. Despite possible wishes by the leadership to not become involved in the 3rd Indochina War, Kaysone (Pathet Lao leader and LDPR Prime Minister) publically cast his lot in with Vietnam and the Soviet Union after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. This further demonstrated Laotian inability to carry out its own international policy (Joiner 102).

In terms of security, Vietnamese troops in Laos not only served as a tangible reminder of actual authority in the country, but were also necessary. Troops were utilized to put down lingering insurgencies from the civil war period, and also to facilitate in the internal purges by the Laotian government, one of the few areas in which the state demonstrated any sort of efficacy.

As we have seen, early Lao attempts at economic development were either directed by the Vietnamese, or dependent upon aid projects from the socialist bloc and west. These projects, even if they were external, were rarely completed and almost never met their goals, even when they were. The patchwork of aid that came in bottlenecked at several points in government, where the few remaining technocrats benefitted enormously at a personal level. Other attempts to alleviate this underdevelopment meant, effectively, starting from scratch as a result of the lack of a colonial base. Health, education, security and infrastructural apparatuses had to be constructed from nothing

and, as a result of Laos' poor state leadership, were often operating concurrently but never with one another. The same holds true of foreign policy and internal security; the state was only capable of small, localized efforts and simply could not independently carry out nation-wide projects. The local leadership made use of what fruits already existed, but this leadership clique is extremely small, and the fruits being divided are often decades old.

With no internal revenue streams, infrastructure or dynamic leadership, the internal situation of the LDPR reached critical mass in the 1980s. Some of the bleaker pictures suggest that, for all intents and purposes, the central bureaucracy itself was largely dissolved (or at the least, inactive) (Joiner 1988, 101). Almost all success stories were largely a result of the people being allowed to revert to an almost pre-colonial scenario, where the state and its disastrous attempts at reform were at an absolute minimum. During much of the mid and late-1980s, Laos reverted to a sort of marketization by default. The state simply had neither the will nor the capacity to suppress these efforts any longer.

An Independent Path?

As the 1980's drew to a close, Laos found itself at a historic crossroads. Following international condemnation of its invasion of Cambodia in 1979, Laos' senior partner Vietnam began to scale back its regional involvement. For Cambodia, this meant the establishment of an umbrella government under UN supervision. For Laos, this meant that its long-time ally was suddenly no longer actively pursuing a policy of deep

involvement in Laotian affairs. In this section, we shall see that despite Vietnam's withdrawal and two decades of nominal policy independence, the Lao state is still incapable and directionless. This analysis will be divided into two sections; political transformation and economic development.

Politically, the period since 1990 has been one of stagnation. The departure of the Vietnamese as an active agent in every-day management was gradual (Gunn 1991, 87-93), and among the first actions taken by the leadership was to attempt and open up relationships with its neighbors, particularly China and Thailand. Laos' own political insignificance had insulated it against retaliation by its stronger neighbors, (Brown and Zasloff 1979, 103-11), but the leadership had recognized that its success hinged upon cultivating closer relationships with the region at large. In addition to Thailand and China, leadership has facilitated in the recovery of the remains of war dead for the United States, helping to thaw relations between the two. Laos also pushed, fairly early, for admission into ASEAN, with hopes of economically integrating into the region at large and reaping the benefits of Southeast Asian development without over-dependency on Thailand and Vietnam.

However, outside of the accomplishments in foreign relations, the political environment in Laos remains very much the same. The same core of Pathet Lao leadership has remained in command (Howe 2013, 151, Thayer 1999, 38, Stuart-Fox 1997, 208), despite several different gestures toward potential change (Gunn 2007, 183-188). Kaysone and the others have all demonstrated that they are still predisposed toward

the status quo; gradual policy changes all with a decidedly pro-Viet tilt (Jonsson 2008, 201).⁸⁶

Economically, progress is limited and slow. The ghost of colonial underdevelopment still remains visible, sixty years after independence, with entire regions remaining deficient institutionally and in terms of hard infrastructure (Henderson and Singe 2000, 340-45). The same holds true of the scars of the civil war, with tens of thousands of tons of unexploded ordinance effectively rendering entire portions of the country off-limits to development.⁸⁷ Much actual development remains dependent on local initiative (Foppes and Phommannessee 2012, 200-204), rather than the ever-faltering state-led initiatives (Thayer 1999, 39). Despite decades of market-oriented policy (both de facto and state-sanctioned), production has only marginally improved (Fujita 2006, 197-199), and there seems to be no 'catching up' effect for Laos (Bedlington 176-177). Gains still remain limited, Stanley Bedlington describes the transition as 'not one of socialism to market, but of pre-capitalist to market (Bedlington 180). The country remains chronically underdeveloped, and still very much dependent on foreign aid for expenditures outside of basic internal maintenance.⁸⁸ Despite some marginal improvements, and a positive trajectory, Laos remains very much the same today, as it was at the start of the period.

⁸⁶ Jonsson also notes here that there is some promise amongst younger officials, who seem to have a more technocratic bend (Jonsson 2008, 201).

⁸⁷ The disposal of this ordinance has been the primary 'investment' of the United States in the region, a quid pro quo for Lao assistance in recovering war dead.

⁸⁸ As of 2008, aid remained 7% the national budget, 40% of national expenditure, and 60% of the state capital budget. (Jonsson 2008, 201).

Post-Independence Laos: In Review

The same colonial ghosts haunt policy-decisions in 2010 as they did in 1954. Leadership is dominated by either members of a transplanted population with ties to Vietnam (and, arguably, a commitment to the vision of Laos as an extension of its neighbor) or members of the aristocracy seeking to maintain their positions as they had for centuries earlier. Existing on the periphery of the periphery, Laos has offered no incentive for the elites to change until only the most recent generation. Content to be exploited, rarely do the elites display agency except when necessitated by the withdrawal of a benefactor (as in 1945, 1954, 1964, 1975, and 1989).

With an insufficient tax base to support their dependency on direct taxation, post-colonial Laos came to be dependent on foreign aid as it had been dependent on opium and budget subsidies from its neighbor. Capital budgets remained almost entirely comprised of this income source. Infrastructure and institutions remained cripplingly underdeveloped, hindering the state's capacity to carry out even the projects planned for it by the external agents that sought to control it.

As a result, Laos accurately portrays the 'null state,' perhaps more than any other case in the region possibly could. It has demonstrated, in its post-colonial period, a consistent inability to formulate even an agenda of its own, much less execute one. So crippled is state capacity, and so complacent its leadership, that foreign aid has contributed little to the alleviation of its status as '4th world.'

The Null State

We have thus concluded our analysis of Laos' colonial and independence eras. As described earlier, Laos is held to be an example of a 'null state;' one lacking either an independent agenda or the capacity to execute one, all while marred by corruption and inefficiency. This state, I have argued, is a result of a complacent, stagnant indigenous elite interested in the preservation of their own position (as individuals), who are acting within the fiscal and institutional realities of their environment. In this case, it is an undeveloped countryside with no state presence and no economic opportunity outside of direct taxation or outside subsidies.

Laos perfectly fits this scenario. Its colonial era is defined by its status as a colonial backwater that, for reasons of population and geography, never even materialized as a potential hinterland for a more productive colony. Instead, Laos remained fiscally dependent on direct taxation (both currency and labor), and was able to only barely sustain its thinly developed institutions. Economic activity was prohibited by lack of capacity, which itself was a direct result of lack of economic investment. Perpetually lacking in investment, development or even presence, the colonial government was never able to achieve budgetary solvency or diversity. It was also never able to alleviate its own non-presence, reinforcing poverty underdevelopment, and actively creating the regions that would define the civil war period. The elites of the colonial period, all members of the tiny aristocracy, remained stagnant, committed to their old positions and never, as a class, pursuing ventures in business, military or even politics. Instead, the indigenous elite mobility in the region remained low, with most

prepared to accept French reassertion. Those that didn't were more than willing to accept exploitative relationships with either the west, or the east, during the cold war. Laos, therefore, is scored as “low” for all three colonial variables (IEM, CID, and II).

This colonial legacy shapes the post-colonial era. The same elites, prepared to accept subordination for their own personal benefit, operate largely as clients of greater powers around them. In this way, they are markedly different from the new intellectual class that rises in Vietnam and forms the core of the Vietnamese leadership, or even the Khmer elites who, at the very least, pursued an agenda independent of their neighbors (with varying levels of success). These elites were split between artificial economies created by western aid, or desolate regions of the countryside supported by the Eastern bloc. The dependency of the colonial period continued on, perhaps to an even greater degree, and the lack of state presence prevented the Royal Lao, Pathet Lao, or LDPR, from ever offering a viable administrative body. This incapacity continued on for decades.

Only after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese in 1990, did the Lao state begin to truly exercise some modicum of an independent agenda. Its capacity is still hindered by underdevelopment stemming back a century plus, but with their client-status dissolving and a gradual market-transition underway, Laos may yet finally begin to depart 'null status' within our lifetime.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In this project I have explored how three different colonial variables (Indigenous Elite Mobility, Colonial Income Diversity, and Institutional-Infrastructure) have impacted post-independence state types in three cases: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. A four-category typology has been proposed to better illustrate the relationship between the variables and the character of states in the post-independence era.

The following chapter will address four tasks: summarizing our theory, typology and case study findings, discussing the broader utility of the typology, implications of this study's findings and theory, and goals of future study.

Summary of Theory

While other studies have proposed a more strict determinism or marginalization with regards to the effects of colonialism, I have proposed a multi-dimensional study of the impact of colonialism on post-independence state type. In the past, studies have emphasized the importance of the degree of direct rule or other single variables; I have proposed three, indigenous elite mobility (IEM), colonial income diversity (CID) and institutional-infrastructure (II). IEM refers to the dynamism of the most powerful segment of indigenous society and includes the creation of new elites, as well as the transformation or disintegration of existing elites. CID focuses on the number of income sources available to colonial administrations, and the extent to which they were used. Finally, II refers to the degree of physical and institutional infrastructure erected during

the colonial period. This includes road, rail, ports, electrical and telecommunications grids, as well as schools, hospitals, and judicialization. Unlike previous works that emphasize colonial intensity, my proposed variables describe the multifaceted colonial period more completely.

These variables, I argue, have a profound impact on the post independent state. I have proposed a four-category typology that serves to explain for the broad variation we see in Southeast Asia with regards to state-type. These four categories, developmental, power-projection, self-enrichment, and null, accurately describe all observed post-colonial outcomes in the region.

Where all colonial variables are high, the outcome is the developmental state (one which pursues a diverse portfolio of state projects, with an intended 'national' beneficiary). In these cases, local elites are dynamic and do not possess incentives to reinforce pre-existing social structures. These elites, often times, have acquired both academic education as well as technical skill sets. A diverse colonial income is an indicator of a scenario where the acquisition and application of human capital is understood as both necessary and most beneficial. Finally, the transitioning colonial domain possesses a sufficient institutional-infrastructure on the ground to permit for the execution of state projects with relative ease and heightened efficiency. This refers both to hard infrastructure, such as roads, rail, deep-water ports, and electrification, but also the extent of institutional penetration. This includes the routinized efficiency that comes with judicialization, as well as the presence of health and educational services to maintain and further develop human capital. This outcome has been well explored by previous

authors (such as Chalmers Johnson) and, thus, has not been subject to a case study in this project. However, East Asia possesses at least three readily identifiable former-colonial developmental states: South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.

In scenarios where IEM is high and CID medium or low, or vice versa, the outcome is the power-projection state (one where the state pursues security-oriented policies with a broad beneficiary). In these cases, elites may be as mobile as their developmental counterparts, but they lack the applied experience that comes with a diversified colonial budget. Similarly, they may acquire ‘on-the-job’ skill sets, but still retain entrenched elites from the pre-colonial era. Finally, there may be an incomplete institutional-infrastructure that does not permit for the ready execution of policy. In all three of these cases, the result is a leadership that develops deep insecurities to accompany a broad identity developed before or during the colonial period. These more pragmatic elites seek to resolve these insecurities before all else, resulting in policies that are security-oriented. This includes internal security as well as projecting the nation’s interests onto the international stage. This project utilized Vietnam as an example of a power-projection state.

In scenarios where IEM and CID are both low, the deciding factor becomes the degree of II. In scenarios where II is medium or high, the result is the self-enrichment state (one where the state becomes a vehicle for the enrichment of a specific social class). In the self-enrichment state, elite mobility is stagnant and technical skills low. However, there exists a level of institutional-infrastructure sufficient to permit for the accumulation of wealth for, at least, a narrow beneficiary in society. This social class need not

necessarily be exclusively political or social; however, there will be some sense of common identity among them. For this project, Cambodia serves as an example of a self-enrichment state.

Finally, in those scenarios where II is also low, the result is the null state (one lacking the will and/or capacity to execute, or even develop, an internal policy agenda). In these scenarios, elites have remained stagnant, possess little in terms of technical skills, and the domain possesses an insufficient infrastructure to support to the enrichment of any ‘class.’ Oftentimes, corruption benefits individuals or a handful of elites. Laos serves as the case example for the null state.

Table 6

Characteristics of Types

Type	Beneficiary	Policy Orientation	Colonial Legacy
Developmental	Broad/National	Diversified	High IEM, CID and II
Power-Projection	Broad/National	Security	High IEM or CID, Low or High II
Self-Enrichment	Narrow/Class Specific	Enrichment	Low IEM/CID, High II
Null	Narrow/None	None	Low IEM, CID, and II

Summary of Cases

Three cases were investigated in this study: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Each was studied for the duration of their colonial period (Vietnam 1862-1954, Cambodia 1867-1954, Laos 1893-1954). During this period, attention was paid to the three colonial variables of interest. Each of the three cases was then examined following independence (Vietnam 1954-1986, Cambodia 1954-1979, Laos 1954-2010), paying attention to the nature of their state type. This included observing for an independent policy agenda, the capacity and will to execute said agenda, and identifying the intended beneficiary of these projects.

Vietnam

Vietnam's colonial period is defined by high IEM, moderate-high CID and II. Vietnam formed the backbone of the French Indochina financially, and investment in its economy, institutions and infrastructures increased as time went on at a level not matched in Cambodia or Laos. The existing nobility and bureaucratic class were gradually marginalized as Vietnam was absorbed by the French Empire over approximately 20 years. As these old elites faded away, a new class emerged to take their place. These new elites were educated in the lycée system introduced by the French, were often urban-dwellers, and often served as functionaries and bureaucrats within the colonial administration. The French leaned heavily on these Vietnamese officials in colonial backwaters like Cambodia and Laos. This new class became increasingly ideological, oriented toward both nationalism and, more importantly for the long term, Marxism.

During World War 2, the Japanese occupied the region and provided a catalyst for the organization of a resistance. Led overwhelmingly by members of the new elite, this resistance formed the core of what would eventually become the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) as well as the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). French attempts to reassert control in the region following the defeat of the Japanese was met with staunch resistance. The First Indochina War reached its conclusion in 1954 with the dissolution of French Indochina and the establishment of four independent entities, including a divided Vietnam. This division led directly to the Second Indochina War (the ‘Vietnam War’) with North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and their Communist Bloc allies on one side, and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the United States, and their allies on the other.

This project chose the DRV as the subject of its analysis from 1954 through reunification in 1976. The DRV was chosen because of the degree of foreign involvement in internal policy was less than that of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). During the entirety of the post-independence period, the DRV (and, following 1976’s unification, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) demonstrated all the characteristics of the power-projection state. The Vietnamese Communist Party was predisposed toward consensual decision making, avoiding open factionalism, and pragmatic decision making. During war-time it pursued security-oriented policies, such as a focus on heavy industrialization. However, it was willing to forgo this later in the war as it proved less strategically sound given American military doctrine. In keeping with this, the DRV pursued a very careful strategy of navigating the Sino-Soviet split, managing to avoid choosing sides until the

late-phases of their own conflict. This helped guarantee a constant supply of aid from both the Soviet Union and China. When forced to select a side, they chose the Soviet Union as a balance to a perceived Chinese threat. After reunification, they pursued an aggressive 'reeducation' policy toward former South Vietnamese officials, and in their foreign policy, remained determined to ensure that Vietnamese interests were realized in the region. This included Vietnamese assistance to the Pathet Lao, who would seize control of Laos in 1975, but also led to the Third Indochina War. This conflict, initially, was fought between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge-led Cambodia), but grew to include a brief direct conflict between Vietnam and China. While the conflict with China was inconclusive, the war with the Khmer Rouge was quick and decisive, resulting in the ouster of Pol Pot, and the installation of a Hanoi-friendly regime. Despite international condemnation and isolation, Vietnam continued to occupy Cambodia for a decade. As the 1980's went on, however, the failure of economic policy from the post-unification period was creating a potentially disastrous scenario for Vietnam. As a result, in 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party executed a series of reforms, Doi Moi, which sought to liberalize the market and break from a command economy. Thus, over a period of 32 years, Vietnam maintained a powerful state, committed to security-oriented projects that were intended to benefit Vietnam broadly. Even the 1986 shift to focus on economics can be understood in this context; the state could not continue to maintain its security, internally or externally, if the economy were to collapse.

I have argued that Vietnam's post-independence behavior was shaped by its colonial experience. An intellectual and professional class emerged during the colonial period, replacing the nobility and existing bureaucratic class as the dominant social group. While they may have been closely related, physically, they were fundamentally different, as the new class lacked the deep connections to the nobility and preexisting social hierarchy. This new class found jobs as functionaries and low-level administrators throughout the Indochinese colonial bureaucracy. They would thus gain not only a sense of group identity and a sense of national identity, but also accumulated valuable administrative and organizational skills as a result of Vietnam's place as the backbone of French Indochina. French investment in the area was greater than in most colonies, though still not at the same levels as we might see in other colonial domains. The incomplete nature of its institutional and infrastructural development meant that, as the independence movement became militarized, its leadership became preoccupied with compensating for the insecurities created by the patchwork of semi-reformed institutions and extraction-oriented infrastructure.

Cambodia

Cambodia's colonial past, defined by low IEM, CID and low-medium II, differs from its neighbors in that the King of Cambodia actively welcomed French intervention. The French were seen as powerful leverage against the Vietnamese and Thai, between whom Cambodia had found itself caught frequently. In 1867, Cambodia accepted protectorate status that largely reinforced existing social order in the country. The King,

with his palaces, expansive harem, and exorbitant spending, remained the center of life in Cambodia for decades afterward. Even into the early 1900s, the French remained reluctantly dependent on the symbolic strength of the King to solve rebellions in the region.

Most indigenous elites remained those closest to the King, whether members of the royal family, the court, or their respective favorites. The few institutes of higher learning were almost exclusively populated by these individuals, and much of the leadership Cambodia sees after independence all share a similar educational and social background (including Lon Nol and Pol Pot). As a result, IEM remained low in Cambodia, pinned to royal connections and preferences. Cambodia never developed a capacity for exports and a lack of demand for certain luxury goods meant that administrators remained largely dependent on forms of direct taxation (either capital or labor). As a result of its low number of sources and high dependence on direct taxation, Cambodia's CID is scored as low. Despite a lack of French investment in the area, Cambodia did see the establishment of rudimentary health and education systems. While not as extensive as Vietnam, these systems were still present in the colony.

While Vietnam's colonial transition was violent, Cambodia emerged from Geneva relatively peacefully. Prince Norodom Sihanouk became the center of political life, strong-arming opposition and embarking on an extensive campaign of 'development.' Despite this, a number of these hospitals, schools and others were largely vanity projects that went underused or were abandoned soon after their completion. Sihanouk's symbolic power put him above reproach with much of the population at-large, but his ambiguous

cold war stance and Communist sympathies made him a target in the west. In 1970, with a communist insurgency growing in strength, military officer Lon Nol staged a coup, establishing the Khmer Republic. The new government, however, was predisposed toward corruption and inefficacy. Lon Nol's family and inner circle were the most direct beneficiaries. However, the state became increasingly dependent on Western, specifically American, aid to combat the Khmer Rouge. Following American withdrawal from Vietnam, aid began to dry up to Cambodia as well, and in 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized the capital Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge established the Democratic Kampuchea, and embarked on an ideologically-guided reconstruction of the Cambodian nation and state. While disastrous for the populace, the Khmer Rouge was able to execute at least some large projects, ostensibly to benefit the Cambodian nation. In effect, even more clearly than their predecessors, Pol Pot and the communist party were the direct beneficiaries. Once the limited capacity of Cambodia was exhausted, the Khmer Rouge began to cannibalize itself and became unstable, leading toward an increasingly belligerent stance toward neighboring Vietnam. This would prove its undoing. At the close of 1978, Vietnam overran the nation completely, establishing a pro-Hanoi government and forcing the Khmer Rouge into the jungles in the north of the country.

The predisposition toward self-enrichment by the ruling class is a feature that remains strikingly consistent despite three changes of regime. The state continued to serve as a vehicle for the enrichment and aggrandizement of a specific class, whether it was the traditional/royalists under Sihanouk, the military under Lon Nol, or the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot.

As with Vietnam, the Cambodia's post-independence behavior was directly affected by the colonial legacies it inherited. Unlike in neighboring Vietnam, there was little social mobility. The King and extensive court remained at the heart of the sociopolitical hierarchy. Seeking to preserve his position, the existing elites would utilize the colonial arrangement to preserve their lifestyle and position. The Cambodian King, possessing massive symbolic currency with the peasantry, commanded leverage his Vietnamese counterpart did not. Despite this, enormous resources were dedicated to preservation of the royal harem, palaces and so on. Reforms remained limited, and social mobility was largely confined to those with connections, however distant, to the court. French administrators in Cambodia pushed for reforms and investment in the protectorate's infrastructure and institutions but it remained largely rural and underdeveloped. A very basic infrastructure was maintained, often utilized to generate streams of revenue to feed the administration and court. After independence, leadership remained committed to the preservation of position. Sihanouk embarked on a series of prestige projects that had little real impact on the country outside of consolidating his support base. The Khmer Republic and Democratic Kampuchea that succeeded him remained committed to the same principals of preserving elite position. For the Republic, it was centered on Lon Nol and rival nobility. For Democratic Kampuchea, it was focused on the Khmer Rouge leadership, many of which had courtly connections (such as admission to one of the country's few institutions of higher education) or were members of the existing, "wealthy peasant" class. Despite ideological shifts, the behavior of the ruling elite remained committed to self-preservation above all else.

Laos

Laos' colonial history is defined by low levels of all colonial variables. Laos was added last to French Indochina, in 1893 (not counting some additions added after the Franco-Thai War). Historically remote, the region had long been politically fragmented and, in the decades immediately preceding French annexation, dominated by the neighboring Thai. Laos' difficult terrain and sparse population meant that, while pleasantly bucolic, remained political marginal during the entire colonial period. French administration in the area was sparse, involvement limited, and investment insignificant.

Elite mobility was limited or non-existent. Politics revolved around members of the nobility or royal family, and there was little room for advancement or even demotion; often relatives in exile were invited back to resume different or even the same positions as before.

The protectorate's administration was dependent, like Cambodia, relied heavily on forms of direct taxation. There was a lack of a market for excise-taxable goods, and the region lacked major export income. Colonial income diversity remained low throughout the colonial period. As to development, Laos remained Indochina's backwater that saw little French or indigenous investment. Even the modest goal of Laos as a resource hinterland for Vietnam went largely unrealized. Projects intended to move goods to Vietnamese ports, either via rail or the Mekong, were abandoned due to difficulty or cost and development of hard infrastructure remained insignificant or absent entirely. Even as technology advanced and investment in Indochina increased as time went on, the

French remained cool on developing Laos. Education remained strictly the hobby of the nobility and even this involved studying outside of the protectorate. Healthcare and legal facilities were extremely limited as well.

Laos was, almost immediately after independence, thrown into political chaos. Over the first six years of independence, a series of coups and political machinations, organized around three princes, plagued the country. By the 1960's, Laos was essentially two separate entities: the US-backed royal government in Vientiane, and the Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao in the north and east of the country. The Royal Lao government was, by the late 1960's, propped up almost entirely by American aid. Most of its territory was administered de facto by American agencies. American Special Forces, in concert with the highland Hmong guerrillas and an extensive bombing campaign, maintained the territorial status quo. On the other side, the Pathet Lao managed to maintain only an incrementally better administrative presence in their territory, though this was largely limited to the war effort. Like the neighboring Khmer Republic, the Royal Lao government could not sustain itself without extensive American aid and in 1975 the Pathet Lao (backed by veteran Vietnamese troops) overran the country. The new Laos bore many similarities to its predecessors. Particularly early on, Laos made very few decisions, especially with regards to foreign policy, that did not include Vietnamese consideration. The state proved incapable of even the most modest developmental projects, dependent on its Communist Bloc allies. Laos' own insignificance would protect it from reprisals from Vietnam's enemies, but its interests remained tied to Vietnam. Following the scaling back of Vietnamese interventionism in the late 1980's,

Laos would begin to make halting steps toward a more independent policy agenda. It remains, however, heavily dependent on foreign aid and technical expertise.

Over a period of over 40 years, Laos continuously exhibited the characteristics of the Null state. It was not until late after the Pathet Lao victory that it even became possible to pursue even modest self-enrichment projects, though these, too, often met with failure. This is, however, not strictly an issue of capacity. Frequently throughout the independence period, there is what could be described as a general lack of enthusiasm for government altogether. Such predispositions are often dismissed as cultural essentialisms. However this characterization is one observed by the French, by Americans, Vietnamese, Soviets, Poles, Hungarians, and even the Lao themselves.

In all three cases, the expected outcomes were realized. In Vietnam, high indigenous elite mobility, paired with medium or medium-high ratings in colonial income diversity and institutional-infrastructure, produced a dynamic, yet insecure, state that pursued security foremost. The difference in Cambodia and Laos proved to be basic institutional-infrastructure. In Cambodia, with some degree of extractive capacity, successive regimes pursued policies of self-enrichment despite ideological differences. In Laos, the state remained dependent on external sources of sustenance, as they had during the colonial period. Next, I will discuss the application of this typology across Southeast Asia and beyond.

As with Vietnam and Cambodia, the behavior of the post-independence state was shaped by the colonial past. A lack of elite mobility and colonial income diversity meant that elites remained simultaneously entrenched and insular. However, unlike its

neighbors, Laos possessed a fragmented pre-colonial organization for which its elites were unable to compensate. Limited colonial development meant that its extensive natural obstacles to development created a readily divisible countryside. Lacking institutions and an infrastructure capable of supporting a dominant social class, self-enrichment remained limited to a very narrow set of individuals. It is the United States and the Vietnamese who support the drive for a united Laos, with internal groups lacking the motivation, capacity or both.

Applicability of Typology

In this section I will explore the applicability of the typology in Southeast Asia as a region, through a brief survey of three non-case study nations: Malaysia, Indonesia and Burma (Myanmar). Afterward, there will be a brief discussion on the utility of the typology to the Asia-Pacific region more broadly.

Preliminary research into other Southeast Asian cases strongly suggests that the typology proposed in this project possesses a broad regional utility. In addition to the cases explored already, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the region also provides additional examples of all four categorical outcomes. In addition, other cases in the region help illustrate potential borderline outcomes, as well as categorical drift.⁸⁹ This section concludes with Table 6, categorizing hypothetical classifications for East and Southeast Asia as a whole, based on preliminary research.

⁸⁹ Categorical drift will be addressed directly later in this chapter.

Malaysia

Malaysia provides another example demonstrating the typology's capacity for complex colonial scenarios. Historically, British Malaya included three distinct political units. The first, the Federated Malay States (FMS) included much of central western Malaya. The Straits Settlements, including Singapore, comprised the earliest British territories in the region. The Unfederated Malay States (UMS) were a group of other protectorates under British control. All three were administered separately until late in the colonial period, and all three shared a number of characteristics. The population grew increasingly more diverse ethnically with the inclusion of Indian and Chinese immigrants. Educational investment and an increasingly liberalized society lent itself to the emergence of new intellectual elites (Owens 315) that joined existing noble, religious and mercantile elites. Combining the three constituent elements of future Malaysia, the region could be characterized as possessing high indigenous elite mobility, or a very strong-medium. As major exporters of valuable resource commodities, the Malay territories would develop the most diverse income portfolio in the region (Booth 70). Extensive use would be made of state enterprises, excise taxes and, in some areas (such as the Straits Settlements) direct taxation represented close to zero percent of government revenues (Booth 70). Colonial Income Diversity is, therefore, rated as high. Infrastructural development and institutional permeation were among the highest in colonial Asia, and is categorized as high. As a result, if we accept the basic proposed categorizations of high IEM, high CID, and high II, we should expect to see a developmental state.

In the first years following independence, Malaysia was beset with issues of national cohesion. Historically a collection of different political entities, its earliest policies were concerned with the creation of a Malaysian identity. This process was a complex and contested one that would see the expulsion of predominantly Chinese Singapore, led by Lee Kuan Yew, in an attempt to reign in its diverging vision for the future. Still, despite a dependence on primary resources, such as rubber (Mehmet 1986, 21-34), the Malay state remained committed to a vision of development with stated goals of poverty eradication (Naguib and Smucker 2009, 104). and economic diversification (Naguib and Smucker 105). State involvement in the economy, along with their extensive economic plans, saw the gradual diversification of the Malay economy away from the purely agricultural and toward the incorporation of manufacturing and services (Naguib and Smucker 105-6). While increased prosperity has also created opportunities for increased economic inequality, it has also had added benefits for the average Malay. Naguib and Smucker note that the Malaysia has achieved considerable gains across a number of quality of life indices (Naguib and Smucker 108). Malay achievements have, of course, been accompanied by a variety of new challenges, such as environmental and increasing income inequality. However, it has exhibited all the expected developmental state traits; a state with an independent policy agenda, capable of a diverse developmental portfolio benefitting society at large.

Indonesia

Indonesia possesses one of the longest colonial histories in the region. The earliest Dutch presence in the area was the Dutch East India Company, which made its first conquests and settlements in the region in the late 1500s. Dutch expansion across the massive archipelago was an extended process. Initially there were several wars with powerful local trade kingdoms and, by the 19th century, there were conflicts with the British as the latter had begun to expand into Malaya. Dutch power was centered on populous Java and radiated outward to the more sparsely populated and geographically difficult islands in the region, such as Borneo and Sumatra. Dutch policy toward the region remained relatively consistent for the first 200 years, remaining geared toward the export of local goods and the maintenance of trade. An extensive system of taxation, both direct and indirect, grew at this time, paired with developing export-oriented industries for the goal of making the colony both self-sufficient and a source of income for the Netherlands in an increasingly tumultuous Europe. Agricultural productivity was expanded under the colonial government for several decades during the 1800s, before gradually being phased over to the private sector after the turn of the century (Knight 1988 245-246). Sugar in particular was central to the cash-crop economy, and Java was among the world's leading producers during the 19th century (Knight 245).

As Dutch control solidified over the region, its rule became heavier and more direct. The dissolution of the nobility and other preexisting elites rendered the region, as Henry Benda refers to it, essentially “elite-less” (Benda 243).⁹⁰ As was the case with

⁹⁰ This is not a universally accepted truth. James Mysbergh emphasizes the cooperation of local nobility with the growing Dutch administration for the goal of preserving their position and lifestyle. (James

Vietnam, the new indigenous elites tended to be products of the Dutch education system (Benda 244) particularly later in the 1870s and 1880s. The experience of other non-Javanese elites were likely different, however. Early on, the local Chinese Diaspora, who were represented at a disproportionate level, were co-opted into the for-export system fairly early on as were other Javanese, lower-level officials. Similarly, there were little elites to fill the vacuum in the other islands of the archipelago. Indigenous elite mobility, therefore, is a bit more complicated in Indonesia than in the other regions; for the Javanese, there was a high degree of indigenous elite mobility. For other groups, including ethnic minorities' elites dominating key industries, such as the Chinese, mobility was lower. As a result, Indonesia could be graded as a very low "high" in terms of indigenous elite mobility.

Early in the colonial period, revenue was highly dependent on forms of direct taxation (particularly labor quotas). Later in the colonial period, revenue was derived from a diverse array of sources, including direct and indirect taxation. Furthermore, as the cultivation system expanded and exports increased, a significant amount of government revenue was derived from Java's agricultural exports (Booth 70). After the contraction of international trade in the 1880s, and again in the 1930s, taxation became an even heavier burden on the local population, and was a source of growing discontent. Thus, while levels of investment were more diverse at different periods than others, Indonesia was subject to Dutch administrative shifts and political realities. As a result, colonial income

Mysbergh 1957, 38) This would suggest a scenario somewhere in-between the complete monarchical disenfranchisement we see in Vietnam, and the cooptation of the monarchy in Cambodia. Mysbergh does admit that the co-opted officials were sometimes "liquidated" in favor of direct administration (Mysbergh 38), but stresses the continuity between old officials and new (Mysbergh 38).

diversity is set as medium. Investment in local institutions and infrastructure tended to be focused on the island of Java, where Dutch control was most concentrated. While there were attempts to expand Dutch influence and hard infrastructure, the outer islands remained the frequent spot of restive ethnic insurgencies and were comparatively underdeveloped (at least, in regards to Java). As a result, institutional-infrastructure is graded as medium (accounting for an average of Java vs. the rest of future Indonesia). Thus, based on the grades of high IEM, and medium CID and II, we should expect to see a power-projection state.

Indonesia's path to independence was similar to Vietnam's in that it was a contested exit from colonialism. Initially, local elites (drawn from the new Javanese intellectual class that had emerged as a product of the Dutch colonial education system) collaborated extensively with the Japanese. Following the conclusion of World War 2, the local independence movement waged a guerrilla war against the Dutch who were attempting to reassert their authority in the region. Eventually, under international pressure, the Dutch relented and Indonesia attained independence. The first years of independence were defined by the need to establish a cohesive, Indonesian identity where there had not been one. Javanese elites tended to dominate the new political order, as they had dominated the independence movements during the war period. The new Indonesian state, however, demonstrated the capacity for large-scale projects. This process of identity formation provides us a few interesting examples of this process. The first, demonstrating simply its goal of extending state presence throughout the entirety of the territory can be clearly seen in its push toward the expansion of the courts. Daniel Lev

describes the process of expanding the courts as beyond a purely economic good; rather, the expansion of the courts was both a dispenser of tangible goods (law, order) and a symbol of state legitimacy (Lev 1973, 1).

Indonesia also possesses the security-orientation we expect to see from a power-projection state. As with the policies of reeducation in post-unification Vietnam, Indonesia stressed unification. Unlike Vietnam, however, where there was a historic unity, Indonesia's case was essentially the Javanese intellectual elites attempting to create a national identity to which all ethnic groups in the archipelago were expected to embrace. Indonesia pursued a heavy-handed policy while enforcing this vision for the new nation (Aspinall and Berger 2001, 1003). There were a number of religious, political and ideological conflicts throughout the archipelago under Sukarno, the first Indonesian president (Aspinall and Berger 1006). When Suharto ascended to power, and the military took center stage as a political actor, military responses became quicker and more intense, leading to prolonged, bloody conflicts throughout the country. Two regions in particular have come to illustrate this martial predisposition. The first is the ongoing ethnic insurgency in Iraya Jaya (bordering Papua New Guinea). Local independence movements have been met with heavy military and police retaliation. Another example is East Timor, a former Portuguese colony occupying the island of Timor. Indonesia occupied the territory unilaterally in late 1975, administratively designating it another Indonesian province. The occupation was a brutal one that, much like the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, would draw international condemnation.⁹¹

⁹¹ Vietnam would receive a much harsher reaction, as it was both condemned by the western powers, as well as the Chinese, effectively limiting support for Vietnam to the Soviet bloc proper. Manipulation of

Thus, during the period following independence, Indonesia demonstrated that it was capable of an endogenous, nation-wide policy agenda. In addition, while there was economic development in Indonesia, the state remained committed to the idea of maintaining a cohesive national union, which involved brutal repression and security-oriented policies both during Sukarno's regime, and the successive (and far bloodier) Suharto regime. The army, particularly during Suharto's regime, remained the central political actor for nearly four decades.

Myanmar

Myanmar's colonial experience begins in the early 1800s, with the onset of the Anglo-Burmese Wars. Despite being very costly, British arms prevailed and Burma was gradually absorbed over a period of sixty years. By 1886, Burma's transition to colonial domain was complete and it became subject to what Anne Booth calls "double colonialism" (Booth 1997, 103). Burma was defined as a part of British India, and immediate policy was set by administrators there. However, the nature of British rule in Burma is complex; it has been characterized as both brutal and progressive. Early accounts, such as those presented by J.S. Furnivall, describe a progressive, liberalizing administration (Furnivall 1948), and describe a scenario in which fundamental changes to Burmese society take place, encouraging "individuality" (Owens 323) dissolving the monarchy and existing nobility (Owens 323) and creating a new bureaucratic class (Owens 210). There is often a presumption that British direct rule resulted in the

Cold War politics only continued to work until the early 1990s, during which Indonesian brutality outweighed the fading specter of international communism.

complete marginalization of local elites. This characterization has been subject to extensive criticism by subsequent authors. Robert Taylor, for example, discusses a large degree of synthesis between the two administrative systems, particularly later in Burma's colonial history (Taylor 1976, 161-163). Others stress the British utilization of inherited practices and institutions outright (Englehart 2011, 759). In his discussion of different colonial elites in Southeast Asia, Harry Benda classifies the Burmese civil service as part of a "Modernizing traditional regime," that itself is less an outright independent bureaucracy, and more an extension of preexisting elite groups (Benda 234). Depending on which characterization of Burma we accept, indigenous elite mobility could be described as either medium or high. With regards to conditions on the ground, preliminary research suggests that the Burma was regarded as a resource hinterland for British India. Trade flowed to other colonies, India chief among them (Booth 91), and investment in infrastructure was on par with much of Southeast Asia (Booth 80). While some institutions, like education, were better developed, it is also true that Burma remained a fundamentally fragmented society. Possessing numerous ethnic groups and a succession of insurgencies, Burma's institutional-infrastructure could be described as a high-low or a very low-medium. While IEM and II are complicated, colonial income diversity is more simplistic. Burma remained heavily dependent on forms of direct taxation (Booth 70). Thus, its colonial income diversity is graded as low. As a result, we should expect to see post-Independence Burma to either take the path of the Power-Projection State (High IEM, Low CID) or a very insecure Self-Enrichment State (Medium IEM, Low CID, Medium II).

Following independence, Burma entered a period of political uncertainty leading to a military coup by Ne Win in 1962. From that point forward, Burmese policy preferences have been both security-oriented, concerned with domestic repression of ethnic insurgencies and preservation of the regime, but at the same time committed to attempts large, “socialist” projects (Owens 498). The majority of these failed to achieve the sort of national development sought after (Owens 502), and power continued to concentrate on Ne Win and his military supporters. Thus, we see that Burma has, historically, been capable of carrying out at least some projects at the national scale. This eliminates the Null state as a possible categorization. The state’s focus on security has been more domestic, focused on repression at home and the preservation of the military’s rule for several decades. This suggests, then, what we would expect to see; a power-projection state that has gradually drifted outright into the self-enrichment category, or an exceptionally insecure self-enrichment state that has begun to drift toward the power-projection. In either case, the expected typological outcomes apply and the gap between the two is not very wide policy wise (as a result of the very close scores we see on IEM and II). These results are, of course, preliminary, and a more precise categorization could be discerned with more intense study.

Asia-Pacific

The typology proposed in this project can be successfully applied to any number of Southeast Asian post-colonial domains. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar all exhibit the expected state outcomes based on their inherited colonial legacies. In this section we

will briefly discuss the potential for application of this dissertation's theory to regions beyond Southeast Asia. In particular, we will focus on possible further study in East Asia and the Pacific. East Asia possesses a similar colonial timeframe and commonalities in the geopolitical situation post-independence, which helps to better isolate the effects of colonial legacies. The Pacific is a relatively understudied region whose outcomes may readily be explained by the typology, while also creating a scenario where we could additionally control for issues of scale.

Much of the literature addressed in this study is nested in broader colonial and developmental literature on East Asia as a region. East Asia has been the site of some of the world's best post-independence developmental stories and, at the same time, some of its most isolated and repressive regimes. The first cases that the typology could be extended to would be the Japanese colonies, Taiwan and Korea, as well as Mongolia, which saw a period of Chinese and Russian domination. This would be a valuable examination, as it would strongly any critiques of the typology that hinge upon the peculiar character of West European colonization. With Japan and Taiwan, we would be able to see the effects of an industrialized Asian nation. Similarly, Mongolia would offer both an example of non-Western imperialism, but also whether or not proximity (that is, overseas colonial empires) has any affect.

With regards to the Pacific, the post-colonial domains of Oceania provide interesting opportunities to isolate for scale, as well as possibly examine the post-independence impact of non-traditional colonial administrations (such as the U. N trusteeship). While overlooked for their size and relatively minor political impact at the

international scale, the Pacific actually yields several potentially interesting cases. Some of these could be the underdeveloped Papua New Guinea, the political upheaval we see with Fiji, civil war wracked Solomon Islands, or post-UN Micronesia.

Implications of Study

This study has implications for not only its selected case studies, but also discussions on colonialism (specifically with regard to ‘state type’), as well as revolution as a concept. Having already discussed the broad applicability of the typology to other regions, including the usefulness of its variables in a variety of historical and political contexts, this section will confine itself to a discussion of case-specific implications and revolution.

The typological classification of this study’s three cases has immediate and profound implications for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, as well as for the study of Southeast Asia as a whole.

For Vietnam, its security-oriented past is still relevant today. Military spending remains high and, despite steps toward reconciliation with Japan and the United States, tensions remain high with neighboring China. Territorial disputes remain a very real issue, particularly as China becomes more assertive in its foreign policy. With increased corruption at home and an ever-widening gap between current leadership and the war generation, a Vietnamese leadership that feels increasingly insecure may choose to reevaluate their goals (particularly if they feel China could be trying to ‘head off’ their development).

Cambodia's development remains stunted and unbalanced. It could be argued that Hun Sen and his administration are a continuation in a long-line of self-enrichment regimes, particularly with accusations of electoral fraud and human rights violations. Cambodia's reengagement with the world and NGOs has led to a scenario where we may be seeing 'compartmentalized' change.⁹² This means that a Self-Enrichment regime may see NGO's and their developmental work, as a means of acquiring a new source of 'enrichment.' However, NGO's may also be creating some of the same changes on the ground that French administrators failed to over a century ago.

In Laos, local leadership has proven willing to take on increasingly more ambitious projects as Vietnamese interventionism has phased out. This seems to reinforce the notion that real autonomy is a prerequisite for an effective state but, more than that, it is very much a crucible for developing new programs for the acquisition and retention of valuable technical and administrative skills.

Beyond local, applied implications, this project also speaks to two relevant social science concepts: the impact of colonialism and how political science engages revolution as a political phenomenon. With regards to the impact of colonialism, I have argued for a more complex, multi-dimensional examination of the lasting effects of colonial administrations on their post-independence successors. Other authors, such as Vu or Slater, have emphasized the importance of the moment of independence as being the most formative with regards to shaping the post-colonial political arena. However, many of the political actors being examined at the moment of independence had many of their

⁹² This refers to changes isolated to a specific sector of state and or society. So, for example, the development of tourist facilities need not necessarily result in broad infrastructural improvement.

priorities already determined, in some cases decades before they ever arrived at the negotiating table. The ability and/or willingness to compromise were determined before the moment of independence. For those that do accept a more powerful role for the legacy of colonialism, commitment to singular dimensional approaches, such as the importance of the relative degree of direct rule, can oversimplify the transitional narrative or miss vital mechanisms altogether. Rather than embracing purely economic or institutional explanations, I have proposed a combination of variables working simultaneously.

Finally, this study has important implications for the study of revolution as a concept. Revolution as a concept has become somewhat diluted through popular overuse. Within political science, however, the term has come to refer to an event which results in fundamental political and social change. Revolutionary France, Russia in 1917, and China in 1949 all represent what should be profound changes to the political and social orders. However, this study's findings suggest that political behavior, priorities and players may remain consistent, in practice, despite descriptive ideological shifts. While conditions for Cambodian peasantry in 1950 are not comparable to that which it endured under the Khmer Rouge, it cannot be ignored that the general structures remained fairly consistent. The Kings of pre-colonial and the protectorate were defined by their sultanistic character, treating the country, its inhabitants and resources as their own. This practice continued after de-colonization, itself a potentially revolutionary process, through three regimes and three distinct political ideologies.

In addition, it also seems to suggest that the actual revolutionary event itself might not be so abrupt or important. Rather, Vietnam suggests that it is part of a long-process, constructed over time as several variable values are realized. While the Vietnam War may have been a shock to the United States, it does not seem so surprising given the background in which the war has its roots.⁹³

Table 7

Preliminary Classification of East and Southeast Asia

Developmental Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan	Power-Projection Vietnam, Indonesia, North Korea
Self-Enrichment Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, Brunei	Null Laos, Papua New Guinea, Mongolia

Future Study

Future work with this study has two separate dimensions; scope (with regards to adding case studies and categorical frequency) and depth (regarding mixed-cases or borderline cases).

In Southeast Asia, we have great variation on state-type. In seeking to add a developmental case, we have two options: Singapore or Malaysia. Both have their strengths and weaknesses. With regards to Singapore, its scale is both an asset and a liability. It permits a much more focused potential study, but also is subject to outlier

⁹³ This has implications for security studies. Colonial variables might possibly identify conflict ‘hot spots,’ etc.

issues. Malaysia is a more complex case which eliminates the scale issue, but is also less clear as an illustrative case (as will be discussed momentarily).

Pursuing a greater scope would also permit a situation that allows for an examination of categorical frequency. The developmental state appears to be a relatively rare outcome, as does the null state. Preliminary research and a basic understanding of the extractive nature of colonialism seems to suggest that the self-enrichment state would be the most common type, as these former colonial domains had to at least produce some sort of profit for their respective empires. Similarly, prohibitive costs may likely have prevented widespread, extensive investment in the colonies at a level sufficient to produce developmental and power-projection states. This issue of frequency would, therefore, contribute to a broader question about the general effects of colonialism on the global political system.

If future work focused upon depth, there are two potential subjects for study; mixed/borderline cases and identifying the causes of categorical drift after independence. In this study we have focused on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. These cases illustrate exceptionally strong examples of their respective categories, but there will be cases that fall closer to the 'borders' between the cases. This can be attributed to the fact that the scale on which variables are measured is not strictly dichotomous (high or low), but rather represents a range with a number of increments in-between. So, Cambodia and Myanmar may both be classified as self-enrichment states, despite the martial nature of the latter. In this scenario, Myanmar may be a more inherently insecure self-enrichment state where the military has become the beneficiary social class as a result. Similarly,

Malaysia may be classified as a 'weak' developmental state, as a result of its extensive colonial background in export-led income, despite limited elite mobility and institutional-infrastructure. Further studies could identify patterns for specific sub-categories.

With regards to categorical drift, I have already stated earlier in this work that the theory presented here is not a completely deterministic one. Cases may drift over time. The nature of this drift, including whether or not it's present, to what degree, and in what 'direction' is of great interest. While in the very early theoretical stages, two characteristics that seem likely are that is both fluid and non-linear. That is to say, that conceptualizing state types in the narrative of state development is not useful; a power projection-state could "devolve" into a self-enrichment. However, this language is problematic considering the second likely characteristic of this drift; that it is non-linear. It may be possible to move from one type to any other type. Such movement, however, is not at odds with the theory at large, for the same reasons that mixed cases aren't; the variables are measured on a scale, not dichotomous. It may simply be that more dynamic, educated elites are willing to drift by their very nature.

Final Remarks

With this project I have sought to contribute to offer an alternative theory explaining the great variation we see in post-colonial state types in Southeast Asia. To do so, I've proposed a multidimensional examination of each domain's colonial history, and a typology to illustrate their relationship to post-colonial states. The implications for the field are numerous, both for area studies, as well as for broader discussions on issues of

revolution and state development. It also has a number of avenues for further research which would build upon this foundation to create an even richer contribution to the field.

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