RECONCEPTUALIZING INTELLECTUAL HISTORIES OF AFRICANA STUDIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

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Abstract

Properly understood, Africana Studies is a stand-alone “discipline.” One that goes beyond, and disengages the normative boundaries and understandings of Western disciplinarity. This work is premised on such an understanding of autonomy. It reifies such a proposition by compiling scholarly literature on the subject of Africana intellectual traditions as a point of departure for articulating a rationale for viewing Africana Studies’ disciplinary history as inclusive of the expansive tradition of Africana intellectual thought. It posits several generations of thinkers associated broadly with what can be referred to as Africana Studies have determined that African intellectual traditions should influence and often provide the methodological direction for disciplinary Africana Studies. It assembles much of the literature that attempts to contextualize disciplinarity firstly, and then those that theorize connections of Africana Studies disciplinary work to intellectual traditions arising out of the African experience. Through a process of culling the intellectual commitments of Western structures of knowledge from general intellectual historical texts and other disciplinary histories, this work situates its development of communities of thought and their academic and ideological legacies. From there it assesses how Africana thinkers understood these knowledge formations, a process Cedric Robinson considers to be the beginnings of a Black intelligentsia. The combination of all these reviewed literatures will be analyzed to reveal why and how, if at all, Africana thinkers have developed work that contributes to the construction of its own disciplinary space—with its concomitant methodological considerations.
Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of Jackson Wiggins and Edna Boles, who knew.
Acknowledgments

The inability to properly thank all those who have contributed to this project must firstly be acknowledged. A work of this magnitude nonetheless evokes the need to at least attempt to do justice to the many individuals, groups, organizations, communities—the human rhythm—that kept me from straying away from the intent behind this composition. I offer these acknowledgements, knowing full well that such an attempt to characterize their contributions will ultimately fail.

Obviously, as in all our traditions, pride of place must be given to the Creator, who though hidden, is the source of all life, power, and health, the first Ancestor. To thee I offer this work as a testament to the representation of humanity that was enlivened in me. The one who we try to reflect and become more like. And the ones—who represent all human capacities, essential functions of the natural world, and the possibilities of all other living things—thanks for the gift of good speech. To Djelewty, to Seshat, to Orunmilla, Aṣé.

This work is made possible by many who are now “in front.” The ancestors who laid down the standards, the way. Those who showed us how to live—our ideals of life. To those who I cannot name, I say medasi. To my bloodline ancestors, from whom the gift of life was bestowed upon me: may this work contribute a little something to the values you lived for, so that those who come after me, may also live. To those intellectual ancestors, to whom this dissertation chronicles: All praises and honor, for without your endurance, your fortitude, your memory of a better way, your unwillingness to be obsequious to values you did not share, your willingness to survive as “free peoples,” I
would not be. Without the suffering of those who came before me, this Ph.D. would represent mere academic licensure. Let this work be more. Let it be what W.E.B. Du Bois suffered for in Berlin and Cambridge, what Anna Julia Cooper endured at the tender age of sixty-six in Paris, what Cheikh Anta Diop was denied a number of times, let it be a testament of the importance of *Africans Studying*. Let it represent the struggle—but the beautiful struggle. Let it re-member the dismembered. Let it be what you made possible.

To those thinkers, dreamers, hopers, and avengers, who used what Cedric Robinson calls “the power of words”—in much the same ways as our earliest ancestors—I say Asé—and may the connections be strengthened.

To those family members that I can name, I say *asante sana*. To my parents, James Leroy and Joyce Marie Hodges Myers, thanks for not only the instrumental support, but for the expressive support that you have given me each and every year of my existence. May I represent—be—the extension of the long genealogies of character you represent. Your models of humanity represent ones that I hope to emulate. To my siblings, James Christopher and Jennifer Shonequa, thanks for your love and support, and for the ways in which you, too, carry the memory of who we are. To the scores of aunts, uncles, cousins, far too numerous to name, thanks for thinking of me, for checking on me, for wondering what it was I was doing. May your questions be answered! It is out of my bloodline ancestors that I am able to extend whatever it was that was given to me. To those who labored for very little (but for much), so that we can read, so that we can study, I say *medasi*. To those in this extended family, thank your for choosing to be educators.
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As the Civil War drew to a close, a group of White clergymen saw fit to design, and develop an institution for the training of Negro preachers, doctors, and teachers in the “liberal arts.” On March 2, 1867, this institution was chartered, as Howard University. What they perhaps could not foresee or intend, was what it became. For four years, I had the privilege of engaging in deep study in this special space—a space that has generated the best of the African intellectual tradition in the twentieth century. There is no question about it. Without the intellectual energy of Howard University, without the ancestral energy of its many alumni, there is no me. It is the only alma mater I will ever truly have. To the many Africans who entered its halls, named after Alain Locke, Frederick Douglass, Ira Aldridge, and many others, I say asante sana, for letting me sit with you. To those who experienced that journey with me, I say medasi. To my first classmates and brothers: Ricardo O. Johnson, Mario Antwine, Floyd “B.J.” Haigler, thanks for who you are. To my first Howard sisters: Paige Taylor, Larrica Hubbard, Brittany Nicole Triplett, Jahaan Shaheed, Portia Wilson and Evie Hightower, words cannot express what your friendship and love has meant. To others who have struggled, laughed, and lived that experience with me throughout my tenure at Howard, I say thanks: Kahlil Bus-Kwofie, Otis Christopher Buckner, Marcus Craddock, Nicholas Stewart, Terrell Pridgen, Daniel Ajo, Carrington Howard, Nicholas Owen, Kellen Moore, Austin Thompson,
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The connection between the foregoing and my time at Temple University is crucial. For it was these links which ensured that it “was gon’ be ok.” For Courtney and Ava, as well as for me and countless, we were blessed to have a father, not simply a department chair, advisor, or professor. This was none other than Nathaniel “Pop” Norment, Jr. Thanks for keeping the lights on, Pop. As well as a mother, Rosemarie Norment. Thanks for everything, Mom! The fight for disciplinarity continues. Temple has been central to that fight ever since its declaration of a space to graduate work in Africana Studies. Thanks to Molefi Kete Asante, C. T. Keto (maa kheru) and others who waged that initial fight. May the current graduate students and my colleagues endeavor to represent its meaning. To my sisters Ava and Courtney: the love you meted out to me in my first year, ensured that I would stay. To Courtney, thanks for representing to me what an African woman is and all that that means. To Ava: I do not blame you, I love you for your pushing and for your listening and for your feeling. To my brothers, who have ensured that this work continues in realms heretofore unimagined: Anyabwile Love and Heru Heq-m-Ta, I say asante sana. The vistas you will open for our abilities to comprehend our bodies and our culture will ensure our survival. To my sister, Amy Oppong Yeboah: I say medasi for you diligence. It is only through your sense of responsibility that the Graduate School officially recognizes me as a “graduate.” Your work in education is the extension of a sacred tradition. Thanks also to the undergraduate, graduate students, and alum, who have either listened, provided a forum, gave me a burst of energy, or engaged me on any number of the topics that I present in this dissertation: Brittany Lewis, Tanay Harris, Ifetayo Flannery, Rhone Fraser, Jimmy
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…in spite of their growing uneasiness and disenchantment with contemporary social science, which led to the organization of black professional associations and the founding of black journals, black social and behavioral scientists have been decidedly ambivalent regarding the source and nature of their disenchantment. They have not explored or traced their feelings to root causes. We have developed loyalties of varying intensities to our white mentors and to that corpus of “knowledge” which they have generated and passed on to us. We have not shown an inclination to question them (our white mentors) in their entirety, their total beings, nor have we demonstrated a willingness to question their knowledge in its totality.

-Mack Jones, “The Epistemological Vacuum in Black Critiques of Contemporary Social Science” (1976)

We can say at this point that the battle to liberate African thought from nonexistence has been decisively won! The African defenders and European saviors have demolished the fabricators and their collaborating African scholars on that front. Now we must rescue the victim from European philosophy and science. African Deep Thought must now speak for itself. Rather than set up an interview schedule containing the great issues of European philosophical inquiry, African champions must break the chain that links African ideas to European ideas and listen to the voice of the ancestors without European interpreters.


History is not objective. The meaning of history keeps on revealing itself through time. Like a text of infinite interpretability, history yields new meanings in relation to the eyes that behold it and the pressures of the times.

-Ben Okri, “Biko and the Touch Alchemy of Africa” (2012)
Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. iii
Dedication ............................................................................................................................ iv
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. v
Epigraphs .............................................................................................................................. xv
Preface: Africana Studies—Convening and Preserving Autonomous Intellectual Spaces ....xix

Chapter 1:
Introduction: Naming the Space: Concretizing Disciplinary Methodology and Intellectual
History ........................................................................................................................................ 1
   I. Africana Studies, Africans Studying: A Working Definition ........................................... 2
   II. Uniquely Real?: Questions of Disciplinarity and Disciplines ....................................... 6
   III. Illegitimate Stepsister(s): Methodology and Disciplinary Praxis ................................. 12
   IV. Whither Methodology in Africana Studies?: Key Moments in Disciplinary Discourse .... 17
   V. Africana Studies and the Construction of Genealogies of African Thought ..................... 35

Statement of Purpose ............................................................................................................. 44
Articulating Intellectual Genealogies: An Approach ................................................................. 45
I. Limitations of the Review ..................................................................................................... 57
II. Organization of Chapters .................................................................................................... 61
A Brief Note on the Significance of the Review ........................................................................ 67

Part I: Disciplinarity and Western Intellectual Traditions ..................................................... 69

Chapter 2:
Adopted and Bequeathed: The Cultural Sources of Western Disciplinary Traditions ........ 71
   I. The “New” University and its Genetic Makeup ................................................................. 71
   II. The Intellectual Contents of the Classical Tradition ......................................................... 74
      a. Graeco-Roman Pedagogical and Philosophical Foundations ....................................... 76
      b. The Latin Encyclopedists ............................................................................................ 119
      c. The Church Fathers and the Patristic Tradition ............................................................ 125

Chapter 3:
Expanding the ‘City of God’: Situating Disciplinarity in the Development of the European
University Culture .................................................................................................................... 134
   I. The Reforms of Western Monastic and Cathedral Schools .............................................. 136
   II. Scholasticism: The Transmission and Translation of Knowledge in the Studium Generale .............................................................................................................. 144
      a. The “New Method” Confronts the “New Studies” ....................................................... 153
      b. The “New Studies” and the Impact on the Curriculum ................................................. 156
   III. Dwarfs upon Giants?: Humanism and the Renaissance of Western Learning ............... 165
      a. Conceptualizing Renaissance Humanism ...................................................................... 167
      b. Humanism in the Universities ..................................................................................... 179
   IV. Disciplinarity and the Scientific Revolution ................................................................. 189
   V. The Enlightenment and the Emergence of Intellectual Euro-Modernity ......................... 199
      a. Again, What is Enlightenment? ..................................................................................... 200
      b. Tracing Enlightenment in the Disciplines ..................................................................... 220
   VI. Research Universities and Disciplinary Identity in Modern Europe ............................... 226

xvi
Chapter 4:  
Knowledge Bricoleurs and Academic Professionalization: The Patchwork Quilt of American Disciplinarity ................................................................. 241

I. The Process of Importation ........................................................................... 242
II. Sketches of American University Historiography .......................................... 244
III. The Maturation of American Disciplinarity ................................................ 249
   a. The Disciplines of the Humanities ......................................................... 254
   b. The Disciplines of the Social Sciences .................................................. 268
IV. Disciplining Knowledge: The Structure and Behavior(s) of Disciplinarity in America .............................................................. 286
   a. Conceptual Justifications ...................................................................... 286
   b. Sociological Characteristics ................................................................ 290
   c. Paradigms and Fractals: Intellectual Movements and Disciplines .......... 292
V. Interdisciplinarity and Interdisciplines ......................................................... 296
   a. Conceptualizing Interdisciplinarity ....................................................... 298
   b. Conceptual Boundaries and the Interdisciplines .................................. 306

Part II: Africana Studies and Disciplinarity ......................................................... 324

Chapter 5:  
Companions, Blood: Institutional Patterns of African Deep Thought .................. 326

Chapter 6:  
Have We Any Rivers?: Pan-African Thought in Conversation with Western Disciplinarity, 1879-1965 ................................................................. 344

I. Exemplars of African Thought in the Age of Euro-American Scientific Expansion .......... 348
   a. Martin Robison Delany ....................................................................... 350
   b. Edward Wilmot Blyden ..................................................................... 355
   c. Antenor Firmin .................................................................................. 360
   d. Anna Julia Cooper ............................................................................ 363
   e. W.E.B. Du Bois ............................................................................... 369
II. African Thought and Three Sites of Contestation the Early-Mid Twentieth Century .......... 401
   a. History and Historiography ............................................................... 403
   b. Between the Social Sciences and Radical Philosophy ......................... 426
   c. Humanities, Cultural Meaning-Making, and Criticism ......................... 451

Chapter 7:  
Toward a Black University or White Studies in Blackface?: The Genesis, Struggles, and Promise of Institutionalized Africana Studies Since 1965 .................................................. 463

I. Formative Moments and the Early Curriculum .............................................. 466
II. The Development of Africana: Insurgent Work in the Disciplines .................. 477
   a. Philosophy ....................................................................................... 479
   b. Cultural Meaning-Making ................................................................. 491
   c. History ............................................................................................ 513
   d. The Black Social Sciences ............................................................... 534
III. Toward Disciplinary Africana Studies ........................................................ 556

Part III: Africana Studies’ Intellectual Histories .................................................. 569

Chapter 8:  
Academic Black Power: Tracing Africana Studies Intellectual History in the Works of Noliwe Rooks, Fabio Rojas, and Martha Biondi .................................................. 570

Chapter 9:  
The “Integral Tradition:” Erecting a Foundation for Africana Studies .............. 586
Part IV: The Question of Approach ................................................................................. 594

Chapter 10: Anxious Confidence: Methodological Reflections in Western Intellectual History
........................................................................................................................................... 595

Chapter 11: “A First Order of Business;” Greg Carr and Approaches to African Intellectual Genealogy........................................................................................................................................ 605

Chapter 12: “Hands of Helpfulness;” A Conclusion............................................................... 632

Bibliography.............................................................................................................................. 635
Likewise, we do not say we know the truth; we are the truth; we are the living black experience and, therefore, We are the primary sources of information.
-June Jordan, “Black Studies: Bringing Back the Person”\textsuperscript{1}

We should not too quickly lose the values that self-sustaining works bring us. Despite the facility of Western capitalism in erasing any cultural formation that stands in its way, these works affirm, “I am still here.” They archive and validate traditions, perceptions, and practices and give them textuality and body.
-Clyde Taylor, The Mask of Art\textsuperscript{2}

Academic disciplines arise neither in a natural or social vacuum. They emerge in order to serve ranges of interests and purposes.
-Winston Van Horne, “Africology: A Discipline of the Twenty-First Century”\textsuperscript{3}

The specific character of disciplinary interfaces also affects both how, and the extent to which, Africana studies specialists are able to transform or translate discipline-generated constructs into forms appropriate to black/Africana studies. One consequence of these difficulties is that most subject matter investigations claiming multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary status are actually only loosely connected collections of studies performed by specialists in different disciplines. Such anthologies typically fail to present theoretical or empirical syntheses that unequivocally differentiate the product from discipline-based research.
-James B. Stewart, “Riddles, Rhythms, and Rhymes”\textsuperscript{4}

The intellectual tradition that initiated the dawn of Africana Studies is the literal continuity of the ways of knowing that predated as well as characterized what Lawrence Crouchett has termed, “the secret classrooms” during the era of African enslavement in

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xix
the Americas. The direct descendant of these classrooms is what Black Arts Movement poet and intellectual, Askia Toure, conceptualizes as the true origins of institutionalized Africana Studies—the extra-academic educational spaces in African communities in the United States during the 1960s. In a 2011 talk at Temple University, Toure explained that such “freedom schools” linked to the liberation movement were centers for the teaching of Africana history and culture. These community academic organizations became the envy of university students, particularly in Northern California, and the direct precursors to academy-based Black Studies. In Maulana Karenga’s work these and other African forerunners are considered to be part of a “pre-discipline” phase of Africana Studies. Similarly, much of the scholarship that considers Africana Studies’ intellectual history relegates these activities to “pre” status. While this does not automatically negate


6. He states: “I want to stress this. Africana Studies did not begin on college campuses. Africana Studies came out of the Freedom Schools of the Black liberation movement in Mississippi and other places, and so forth in Atlanta and other places…these were independent schools set up to teach our history and culture… teaching various subjects of what is now called Africana Studies in community centers and churches. Sonia Sanchez called me to join something similar that they had started in San Francisco and the word got out about what we were doing to the students... so we told them sisters and brothers, just come.” Toure testifies that weeks after his arrival, the famous Third World Strike had escalated. See Askia Toure, “Reflections on the Influence of Malcolm X,” (Guest Lecture, Temple University Department of African American Studies, Philadelphia, PA, April 6, 2011). Corey D.B. Walker, the chair of Africana Studies at Brown University, has recently correctly asserted the importance of remembering the contributions of Black Arts Movement thinkers like Toure, Sonia Sanchez, and Amiri Baraka to the early development of Africana Studies. These individuals were however, principally community workers. Toure’s discussion of community education institutions as the real vehicle for the implementation of Africana Studies is thus crucial. For Walker’s comments, see Corey D.B. Walker, “Discussant: “The Tide has Turned”: New Directions in African American Studies” (panel presentation at A Beautiful Struggle: Transformative Black Studies in Shifting Political Landscapes: A Summit of Doctoral Programs, Northwestern University, Evanston IL, April 13, 2012). See also Joyce Ann Joyce, *Black Studies as Human Studies: Critical Essays and Interviews* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 135-161.

their importance, the writing of responsible, if not accurate, intellectual histories of Africana Studies should be based on a foundation that allows these specific origins to frame the characterization of Africana Studies.

Perhaps the hesitance to do so originates from more ideological as opposed to intellectual reasons, given that these early formations of Africana Studies’ disciplinary praxis were based in convened Black spaces that were autonomous. The self-generated and self-authenticated African intellectual work and ways of knowing, which preceded and continued through Toure’s dating of Africana Studies’ origins are and should be the basis from which its disciplinary foundations, or what Lucius Outlaw, following Kwame Anthony Appiah terms, “the community of meaning,” can be articulated. An intellectual history framed this way views Africana Studies as part of Vincent Harding’s metaphorical “river,” as well as part of the collective intelligence of Cedric Robinson’s “Black radical tradition.” Further, it anchors current approaches to knowledge, while simultaneously

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8. At the onset, scholars were cautioned of the illegitimacy that advocating or being perceived as advocating “separatist” departments would engender. Many of these arguments appear in the many anthologies of the discipline. A representative position can be gleaned from Roger Fischer, who in November 1969, stated that in no uncertain terms, “separatism could well prove suicidal to the black studies program.” See Roger A. Fischer, “Ghetto and Gown: The Birth of Black Studies,” *Current History* 57 (November 1969): 294. Though in this quote, Fischer is responding to the question of white professor and student exclusion in the discipline, the spirit of autonomy discussed above speaks more to his earlier cited rationale that Black students wanted to assert control over “the nature and philosophy of the academic program.” Ibid, 293. This, of course, is equally important to the survival of the discipline.


10. Vincent Harding’s seminal work characterizes the struggle of freedom by Africans as a consistently flowing “river, sometimes powerful, tumultuous, and rolling with life; at other times meander and turgid, covered with the ice and snow of seemingly endless winters, all too often streaked and running with blood.” This river, “is people, but it is also the hope, the movement, the transformative power that humans create and that create them, us, and makes them, us, new persons.” See Vincent Harding, *There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1981), xix. Cedric Robinson in his seminal text on Black radicalism
revealing how these approaches contributed to the historical pursuit of knowledge—which determines how the worldviews that commanded the birth of the discipline in the 1960s could be compared to the discipline’s current status and intellectual imperatives.

This dissertation considers the nexus between intellectual history and disciplinarity as it relates to the articulation of a distinctly understood Africana Studies. This work is being authored at a time where scholars claiming affinity or membership within the Africana Studies tradition have surrendered the battle for both institutional and intellectual autonomy in obsequiousness to pressures from Western university sensibilities. The recent usurpation of institutional autonomy from Cornell University’s Africana Studies and Research Center is but one example of the latter. It reveals the frailty of a solely academic and professional foundation for the articulation of Africana thought, while at the same time revealing the West’s attempt to silence attempts to go beyond these limitations. The self-determining impulse that created the department via the takeover of Willard Straight Hall in 1969 has been incorporated over the past forty years, resulting in its current receivership status.11

Similarly, Temple University is currently embroiled in what can only be considered an attack on its autonomy, perhaps most saliently upon its conception and contextualizes it within the continuum of “an accretion, across generations, of collective intelligence gathered from struggle.” See Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), xxx. Both Harding and Robinson recognize the origins of Black resistance in African cultural ways of knowing.

constitution of a stand-alone Africana Studies. Its most apparent manifestation has been its recent denial by the academic bureaucracy of the opportunity to fill its vacant chairpersonship, which has resulted in outside control of the department. Temple’s receivership appears to be less about collapsing the program, as it has with smaller degree programs, and more about remaking Africana Studies into a discipline that explicitly relies on traditional disciplines and paradigms for its sustenance. A sleight-of-hand that may in fact be embraced by those willing to concede the question of intellectual warfare to the dross of mere survival, it seems that Temple is currently in a period of transition toward this end.

These and other examples to be discussed infra, necessitate the further articulation and historicization of Africana thought. Connecting it to an intellectual history, responsibly produced, will serve to broaden perspectives of the grounds on which Africana Studies stands as well as clarifying the rationale and importance of convened Black space(s).

The current status of Africana Studies as an academic discipline necessitates the imperative of June Jordan’s 1969 assertion of “bringing back the person.” Jordan’s essay, cited above, eloquently describes both the need to seriously consider the unique

experiences of Africana peoples and to develop theoretical language around their *familial* entrance into the discourse to democratize (or Africanize) the academy.\(^{13}\) Jordan poetically draws this metaphorical line of demarcation for Black Studies around the centrality of a discipline characterized by development of communal spaces for African American students. But she does not stop there, in fact, this was only the beginning. Central to this family gathering was a space geared toward the “knowing of the truth” of its origins, a practice Jordan views as linked to perseverance of Black personhood.\(^{14}\) One that all students—all humans, have continued to employ. If it is decided that the academy will remain a place for this discourse, Africana Studies requires the attention to these and other perspectives regarding the question and objective of autonomy.\(^{15}\)

Not only was this discipline premised on a sense of institutional autonomy, as Jordan intimates in her “entrance of the family” metaphor, it required a sense of intellectual autonomy as well. Thinkers like Toure and Jordan would not have queried as

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14. Jordan articulates the “potentiality of black studies” as the “studies of the person consecrated to the perseverance of that person.” Ibid, 36.
15. The Western academy is one of many places, and does not have to be the sole enclave of Africana Studies commitments and/or scholarship. While Jordan, of course, sees its special significance, the tradition which she writes has not always been housed in such a space. Organizations such as the Institute of the Black World, Harold Pates and Anderson Thompson’s Communiversity, or Wade Nobles’ Institute for the Advanced Study of Black Family Life and Culture are important examples of this, which will be discussed later in this work. For now let us consider, the Africana thinker, John Henrik Clarke, as a bridge figure who in many ways oversaw much of the transfer of Africana nationalist thought in the United States from the streets to the academy. Perhaps one of the last of a tradition of Earl E. Thorpe’s “historians-without-portfolio,” Clarke’s role in Africana Studies shows that it is not necessarily always and all times a purely academic venture. Africana Studies scholars should think critically about their role in the larger questions of Africana community development and how relationships to the academy affect these larger purposes. On Clarke and the question of academy-based African intellectuals see inter alia, Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era: Its Antecedents and Methodological Implications for the African Contribution to World History,” (PhD diss., Temple University, 1998), 3-7. On “historians-without-portfolio,” see the work of Earl E. Thorpe, *Black Historians: A Critique* (New York: Morrow, 1958), 143-144.
to whether or not this metaphorical (though, real) “family” could actually speak. It was assumed that they could. As such, there was not a question of Africans’ ability or the academic acceptance of their speech. Rather, it was the necessity of this speech in framing and reifying reality—as Africans understood them both historically and contemporarily. In other words, Africana Studies was not necessarily a post-colonial deconstructive project, as much as it was a project aimed at preserving Africana peoples memory and the their literal physical bodies in the face of that which had been “dismembered.”

This question of preservation was linked to “re-membering” and reconstituting knowledge foundations in the vast continuum of African ways of knowing and connecting them with contemporary intellectual practices, while explaining the continuities and how discontinuities emerged.

This is the same impulse that led Clyde Taylor, in the epigraph above, to consider the import of the “self-authenticating” narrative and how it preserves traditions—but also

16. This type of academic/intellectual posturing over the possibilities of the “non-elite” entry into academic discourse is discussed in the seminal work, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988), 271-313. Spivak’s work follows the philosophical lead of thinkers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Frederic Jameson, many theorists over the past thirty years have developed critical interventions and distinctions from normative Western inquiry regarding questions of knowledge. These attempts have been articulated under the rubrics of poststructuralist and/or postcolonialist discourse. Recent years have seen them elevated into nascent methodological advances in ethnic studies disciplines. See inter alia, the work of Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Press, 1999) and Bagele Chilisa, Indigenous Research Methodologies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2012). Though both can be considered by definition anti-Western (at least in ideology), Africana Studies has been approached in ways that search for new foundations as opposed to delinking the questions of all foundations in some ethnic studies methodologies. Further, important approaches in Africana Studies have emerged that articulate alternative (long-view) origins of consciousness, distinct from employing colonialism as a marker and point of departure that many ethnic studies thinkers, borrowing from Frantz Fanon, have employed. See Ibid, 75 and sections of Parts II and IV of this dissertation for extended conversations.

17. On the notion of dismemberment, see the work of Kenyan thinker, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance (New York: Basic Civitas, 2009).
how it can be used to offer alternatives to new (read: the “here and now”) problems out of these traditions. It is the type of practice that has allowed Yoruba scholar, Oyeronke Oyewumi to enter the “feminist debate” on completely alternative and relevant terms, showing how questions of feminism and gender equality revert back to Western theorizations which privilege the “body” as a site of analysis. This approach to knowledge has allowed Cedric Robinson to place Africana thought in a subjective space to compare and contrast its radical impulses, rituals, and practices to normative academic Western radicalisms. Africana Studies was created to categorize African human practices and build normative modes of inquiry out of these ways of approaching and understanding phenomena. Methodologically, it was founded to serve in many ways as Jacob Carruthers’ notion of an intellectual “weheme mesu.”

18. Taylor considers the possibilities in the case of the “self-authenticating” film, Yeelen, by the Bamanan filmmaker, Souleymane Cisse. Placing it within the context of Frantz Fanon’s critique of “culturalist intellectuals,” Taylor’s exploration of the film’s lack of explicit commentary on imperialism within the film leads to larger questions of the “liberative” role of culturally autonomous films. This larger question regards the ability of Bamanan culture, alone, to explain certain political contingencies as it affects them in a transnational context as well as its desirability. See Clyde Taylor, The Mask of Art, 243-249.


21. The ancient Kemetic (Egyptian) notion of weheme mesu, is a literal methodological concept, asserting that explaining current realities and/or moving forward is linked to the idea of the “repetition of birth.” For this reason, many thinkers have paralleled this idea with the idea of renaissance. Carruthers states that an intellectual (historiographical) weheme mesu, involves the search for and application of African speeches (philosophy) that have been silenced during the “Age of Europe.” See Jacob Carruthers, “An African Historiography for the Twenty-First Century,” in The African World History Project: The Preliminary Challenge, eds. Jacob H. Carruthers and Leon C. Harris (Los Angeles: Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations, 1997), 67-68.
Unfortunately, however, the question of intellectual autonomy that allowed the creation of these aforementioned works has been overshadowed over the past fifteen years by models which do not necessarily favor such positions. The normative interrogation of the West, not to mention the articulation of a self-authenticating Africana thought foundation, has been recently replaced by a conceptual refrain of an “inherently interdisciplinary” Africana Studies. The notion of an inherent interdisciplinarity is often inattentive to the development of the intellectual origins of disciplines, themselves. What, after, all is a discipline? The assumption of a universal categorization of human knowledges linked to this decidedly Western order of arrangements has resulted in Africana Studies’ recent conceptualization as a simple appendage to Western disciplines. This has come despite Winston Van Horne’s exhortation that the creation of “disciplines serve(d) ranges of interests” and are not necessarily empty vessels capable of serving whatever group can master their uses.²²

The thirteen-year period between 1988 and 2001 saw the discussion of ways of imagining an intellectual terrain beyond this impasse. Van Horne, along with the aforementioned Karenga and Outlaw but also thinkers such as Molefi Asante and the “Temple Circle” were involved in attempts to develop an autonomous disciplinary base for Africana Studies. The year 1987 saw the publication of Asante’s The Afrocentric Idea, and also the First Symposium on Africology held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, which sought to define and clarify the idea of Africology. At this meeting, these thinkers sought to distinguish Africology from mere Black Studies, characterized by

²². See note 3.
an attempt to create an autonomous disciplinary base on Africana cultural foundations. The next year saw the first graduate program to emerge in the discipline at Temple University, which lead to an extended conversation surrounding what the nature of Africological disciplinary work would be. Most of this work was linked to the ideas surrounding the importation of Asante’s notion of Afrocentric metatheory into the disciplinary practice of Africology, as seen in his *The Afrocentric Idea* and later *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* (1990). This intellectual movement became colloquially known as the Temple project and represented attempts to define a stand-alone Africana Studies, in both institutional and methodological terms.23

Further exemplifying this approach to Africana Studies/Africology’s makeup was the inaugural issue of the National Council of Black Studies’ scholarly publication, *The Afrocentric Scholar* in 1992. It was one of two very crucial moments in the evolution of NCBS and its attempts to clarify the foundations underpinning Africana Studies; the other being the summer institutes of the late 1970s which produced its core curriculum in 1980.24 William Little in introducing the volume stated that it was the objective of the periodical to develop an “alternative intellectual framework to the study of African people.”25 As many of the contributors expressed, this was to be done so with alternative

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23. See Asante’s recollection of this moment and clarification of this idea in his *The Afrocentric Manifesto* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 31-54; 99-104.
epistemologies drawn from the experiences of African peoples themselves, what Little might have named an “Afrocentric perspective.”

The early-mid 1990s also saw the peak of Africana Studies’ attempts to develop intellectual foundations in classical Africa. The arrival of Theophile Obenga, the protégé of Cheikh Anta Diop and intellectual giant in his own right, to the Temple University Department of African American Studies was a signal moment in the pursuit of a disciplinary foundation for Africology. Obenga’s knowledge of and ability to teach classical African languages and the linguistic heritage of all of Africa allowed for students to place emphasis on African thought as a methodological base to interrogate African phenomena. It was through this “linguistic turn” that the potential for the discipline to truly capture the fundamental rhythms which made Diop’s “cultural unity of Africa” thesis equipped to frame a true, and African-wide, conception of reality. During and after his tenure at Temple University, Obenga also developed a relationship to the community-based Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations, which included scholars such as Jacob Carruthers, involved in the creation of Diop’s “African human sciences” and the articulation of an African world history. An organic and community based, intellectual-activist organization, Obenga oversaw the dissertations of

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27. In a number of places Cheikh Anta Diop emphasizes the importance of cultural unity of Africa. See the extended work, L’Unité Culturelle de l’Afrique Noire (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1959).
the first group of ASCAC-trained scholars to obtain a PhD in African American Studies in 1998. This group along with other Temple scholars was charged with not only asserting an alternative and autonomous intellectual approach to Africana thought, but also of “operationalizing” it within the context of their dissertations. It was hoped that out of this paradigmatic conversation that a standard or normative approach to the discipline would be theorized. Along these lines several standard texts were produced during this era, which had and should continue to have ramifications for this idea. These include, but not are limited to Kariamu Welsh-Asante, ed., *The African Aesthetic* (1993), Marimba Ani’s *Yurugu* (1994), Jacob Carruthers’ *Mdw Ntr* (1995), Oyeronke Oyewumi’s *The Invention of Women* (1997), Michael Gomez’s *Exchanging Our Country Marks* (1998), Clyde Taylor’s *The Mask of Art* (1998), the reprinting of Cedric Robinson’s *Black Marxism* (2000), and the anthologies, *Out of the Revolution*, edited by Delores Aldridge and Carlene Young (2000) and *The African American Studies Reader* edited by Nathaniel Norment, Jr. (2001).

Though some of these texts did not explicitly mention the discipline of Africana Studies, each of them have had ramifications on the question of the autonomy of African thought and its ability to generate normative categories for explaining the human experience. Others are capsules which house the institutional conversations surrounding the development and paradigmatic approaches to Africana Studies. In these texts, the debate questioning the merits of autonomy can be accessed as well as the partial

resolutions (at the least) that were achieved, in many cases recommending that Africana Studies remain internally defined, rather than externally determined.

With the creation of other graduate PhD programs beginning at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in 1995, an alternative to the alternative was available for students interested in Africana Studies. There was no explicit “Afrocentric” approach institutionalized, though the department retained the idea of institutional autonomy and focused on the mastery of content. In a similar vein, the Department of African American Studies at the University of California-Berkeley offered the PhD with a focus on the worldwide African Diaspora in 1997. These efforts were followed up with the development of structurally interdisciplinary programs of Africana Studies at Harvard and Yale in 2000, Michigan State in 2002, and Northwestern University in 2006. Though they articulate their interdisciplinarity differently, these institutions created graduate studies for the most part, unconcerned with questions of autonomy. Recent departments developing PhD programs have generally followed this trajectory. The year 2010 saw the development of graduate studies at Brown University’s Department of Africana Studies and Indiana University’s Department of African and African American Studies, which are similar to the University Massachusetts-Amherst and Michigan State models, respectively. Interestingly, the Department of Africology at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, which had been at the vanguard of defining and articulating disciplinary space, instituted in 2010, a PhD program reliant theoretically on the

31. Harvard offers a standalone degree with faculty appointed in other fields. Yale offers a degree that must be coupled with a traditional discipline. Similar to Harvard, are Michigan State and Northwestern offering standalone degrees, with faculty drawn from other departments. Northwestern, however has a formal department, while Michigan State is more formally interdisciplinary.
traditional disciplines of knowledge. Over the past few years, important work has been done in spaces that have at this time not developed a PhD or the all-important post-doctoral fellowships within the discipline. These institutions include Georgia State University, Ohio State University, SUNY-Albany, and Howard University, among others. Other enclaves, many of which have been and/or are still being headed by elders of the discipline, have preserved small spaces to continue to articulate notions of intellectual autonomy that characterized the early entrance of Africana Studies.

With this noticeable shift in graduate studies in the discipline, even many recent Temple University dissertations have relinquished the responsibility of articulating the intellectual terrain of Africana Studies. As such, graduate education in Africana Studies has been reduced to a subject-matter discourse, accessible and open to interpretation from any intellectual foundation. This evokes the troublesome effect that “interfaces” with these areas can have, articulated in the last epigraph above from James B. Stewart. The National Council of Black Studies now welcomes presentations from a range of albeit dissimilar intellectual postures, displacing Little’s earlier notion of “an Afrocentric perspective” as one of many perspectives available to the Africana Studies community—notwithstanding the disciplinary “homes” of many of these other paradigms.32

Similarly, if the recent historic conferences on Africana Studies are any indication, the questions of disciplinarity, themselves, have remained unanswered—if asked to begin

32. See the recent calls for papers for the National Council of Black Studies accessed from http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/ncbs/ncbs12/index.php?Oyeronke Oyewumi asserts that Western paradigms such as feminism, Marxism, functionalism, structuralism, and poststructuralism are themselves part of “hegemonizing forces” when assumed that they could be applied universally. Notwithstanding its successes or failures, Little’s notion of an “Afrocentric” perspective was an attempt to move beyond Western hegemony. See Oyeronke Oyewumi, The Invention of Women, 16.
with. The Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture conferences in 2003 and 2010, respectively, offered very little on the questions of intellectual autonomy necessary to the training of undergraduate and graduate students in Africana Studies. The same could be said when presented with the proceedings of the 2006 Ford Foundation sponsored conference on the discipline in New York City.\textsuperscript{33} The 2012 summit of doctoral programs convened at Northwestern offered no extended dialogue on these questions, and focused instead on individual research agendas of both graduate students and professors in each department. The Stacey Patton authored \textit{Chronicle of Higher Education} article covering the summit sparked controversy as the right wing blogger, Naomi Schafer Riley, on the same website viciously attacked three of these research projects. What is clear from the dialogue resulting from this meeting that neither Patton nor Riley nor the responses offered by the students themselves seemed to be clear as to the long arc disciplinary history, foundation, and methodological distinctiveness that had and should continue to define Africana Studies.\textsuperscript{34} It is an open question as to whether it was the failure of Africana Studies...

\textsuperscript{33} These were published in a recent volume of the renamed National Council of Black Studies journal, \textit{The International Journal of Black Studies} 14 (Spring/Summer 2008). The contribution of Rhett Jones, “A Greater Focus on Methodology in Black Studies,” Ibid: 260-265 is perhaps the only article that approximates the above conversation.

\textsuperscript{34} The original article is a story on the first class of graduate students from Northwestern by Stacey Patton, “Black Studies: ‘Swaggering into the Future,’” \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education}, April 12, 2012, accessed May 15, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/Black-Studies-Swaggering/131533. It was followed by a response questioning the value of Black Studies by Naomi Schafer Riley, “The Most Persuasive Case For Eliminating Black Studies Programs? Just Read the Dissertations,” \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education}, April 30, 2012, accessed May 15, 2012, http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/the-most-persuasive-case-for-eliminating-black-studies-just-read-the-dissertations/46346. Important to note in both of these discussions are that the terms and lens of Black Studies are thought to be “raced” conceptions of American reality. While the responses from the graduate students are notable for revealing the often muted discourse surrounding white supremacy and its relationship to the academy, they fail to address Patton’s own misreading of the terms of Africana Studies’ disciplinary contestation. Perhaps it was these conceptual flaws which have engendered a debate that does not come close to approaching what Africana Studies has meant from a long-arc conception. See “Grad Students Respond to Riley...
theorists to follow-through on the potential of the 1987 moment discussed earlier or whether it was the institutional pressures of the Western academy, or both, which have contributed to the demise of this conversation within graduate programs. One is left to ponder whether a truly disciplinary Africana Studies, as envisioned over twenty years ago, is actually a possibility.

The aim of this dissertation is to explore that possibility. Though the preceding may be read as a bleak assessment, the prospects of disciplinary Africana Studies have not been completely incorporated into the Western theoretical abyss. In the larger context of thinking about how one should rearticulate the foundations of disciplinary Africana Studies, perhaps this small contribution will reawaken the conversations necessary to securing an autonomous space for engaging Africana thought. It is clear that survival, however defined, depends on the latter.

Chapter 1

Introduction: Naming The Space: Concretizing Intellectual History in Disciplinary Methodology

A very significant oversight in the published works of most of the defenders of African thought, as well as their opponents, is any account of one, long, unbroken tradition of African thought which raised practically every theme advanced by the former and every question asked by the latter.

-Jacob H. Carruthers, Jr., *Mdw Ntr*

Disciplines provide dreams and models both of reality and of learning. They give images of coherent discourse. They create modes of knowledge that seem, to the participants, uniquely real.

-Andrew Abbott, *Chaos of Disciplines*

As a new field, Africana Studies has boldly asserted what it intends to study, but has devoted little attention to the ways in which this study ought to take place.

-Rhett S. Jones, “A Greater Focus on Methodology in Africana Studies”

The future relevance of Africana Studies to the ongoing project of transcending and surviving the “Age of Europe” depends on the immediate call to intellectual arms of apprentice scholars to identify and utilize academic techniques which embrace the idea of Africana Studies as discrete academic discipline. This initial step must be linked to the articulation of a genealogy of Africana intellectual work which aligns disciplinary Africana Studies within a range of normative practices emerging out of that long-view genealogy.

-Greg Carr, “Towards an Intellectual History of Africana Studies”

The assumption underpinning this dissertation is that Black/African American/Africana Studies/Africology denotes a distinct academic endeavor; one based upon clear, though complex intellectual histories and premised upon well-defined

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5. These terms represent the discipline given institutional birth by the protest movements of the 1960s. While, they will be used interchangeably, the author prefers the nomenclature, Africana Studies for reasons explained infra. Further, the term Africology represents a significant shift, which also will be discussed within the context of the present work.
objectives. It is a discipline that defies the normative characteristics of the idea of academic disciplines themselves. It is also an enterprise requiring the continued clarification of that which makes it distinct. This clarity is a first-order practice essential to developing research projects, training scholars, and contributing to the millennia old project of Africans contributing to human civilization.

I. Africana Studies, Africans Studying: A Working Definition

The institutional birth of Africana Studies was the entrance of Africans into intellectual spaces that for various reasons had negated or blocked the terms for articulating and employing the Divine Conversation which had characterized African ways of knowing prior to its engagement with the West. Africana Studies is thus, a continuity of this Conversation—though complex, and both threatened and disrupted by troublesome historical contingencies. This conceptualization of Africana Studies draws

6. Following many African nationalist thinkers, the term, “African” will be used to refer those persons of African descent throughout the world notable for: 1) sharing common cultural traits and histories/memories based on these geographies; 2) sharing similar socio-political destinies in the face of modernity; and 3) creating similar ways of achieving a sense of humanity regardless of the particular contingencies thrust upon them. Many of the contributions to academic Africana Studies were achieved by Africans born in the United States and where appropriate, proper designations of geographical specificity will be made. This line of reasoning does not ignore the “constructedness” of the idea of “Africa.” See V.Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1988). It, however, is a conscious, cultural and political choice rooted in what W.E.B. Du Bois has written of as the “conservation” of the author’s (as well as the discipline’s) identity. See W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” in African-American Social and Political Thought, 1850-1920, ed. Howard Brotz (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 483-492.


8. Or in other words, its entrance into the Western academy. The consequences of which contribute to many of the issues to be discussed infra. The Divine Conversation speaks to the ways in which African thinkers comprehended reality with “divine speech.” Speech, conceptualized here as the basis from which knowledge was formed and transmitted. Jacob Carruthers views the Divine Conversation as “the fundamental orientation of a people.” Jacob Carruthers, Mdw Ntr, 5.
upon the work of a number of scholars who have understood the implications of a long-
view approach to African intellectual life.

The insights of the Kemetologist, Jacob Hudson Carruthers, Jr., quoted above
informs current attempts to frame how African intellectual genealogies central to the
development of a disciplinary identity have been articulated by scholarly attempts to
define the discipline. Greg Kimathi Carr, trained by Carruthers and others, applies this
specific methodological approach to defining Africana Studies as

an academic extension of what Cedric Robinson has called “The Black
Radical Tradition.” This tradition is notable for emerging out of a pre-
existing constellation of African intellectual work, shaped by millennia
of migration, adaptation, and improvisation. Through the central acts
of translation and recovery, Africana Studies seeks to theorize on the
basis of long-view genealogies of African intellectual work.9

Carr’s recent definition of course was premised on earlier definitions by thinkers
associated with the discipline since its inception. These definitions considered the
importance of subject matter as crucial to the shaping of an intellectual discipline, given
the relative absence of the African presence in academic curricula. For instance, Carr’s
definition, articulated in 2011, was preceded by Winston Van Horne, who conceptualized
Africana Studies as

empirical and normative inquiry and discourse pertaining to persistence
and change in the congeries of actions, events, things, objects, and
relationships, that have given form and substance to the life histories
and signal the prospects of peoples of primary African origin and their
descent, transgenerationally, transmillennially and universally.10

And preceding Van Horne was Vivian Gordon’s 1981 declaration that

10. Winston Van Horne, “Director’s Diary,” Kaleidoscope II: The University of Wisconsin System Institute on
Race and Ethnicity (Spring 1993) 2-3.
Black studies may be defined as an analysis of the factors and conditions which have affected the economic, psychological, legal, and moral status of the African in America as well as the African in diaspora. Not only is Black studies concerned with the culture of the Afro-American ethnic, as historically and sociologically defined by the traditional literature, it is also concerned with the development of new approaches to the study of the Black experience and with the development of social policies which will impact positively upon the lives of Black people._definitions such as Maulana Karenga’s 1982 idea of Black Studies as “the critical and systematic study of the thought and practice of African people in their current and historical unfolding,” and Robert Harris’ view, articulated in 1990, that “Africana Studies is the multidisciplinary analysis of the lives and thought of people of African ancestry,” show similar concerns as they relate to two important defining characteristics of an intellectual enterprise. As Gordon correctly points out, these are the ideas of the aforementioned introduction of new subject matter, but also of questions of methodology. While the former has been identified as associated primarily with an academic field of study, the latter are usually the terms from which engagements of the idea of a discipline are focused.

Academic disciplines distinguish themselves primarily by way of their methodological techniques, which will be discussed infra, among other key ideas. Components of the definitions above such as “new approaches” in Gordon’s definition, “normative” in Van Horne’s, and/or “theorize” from Carr’s conception, are terms that signify these questions of methodology. As Africana Studies matured, the more recent

definitions showed that there must be some theoretical anchoring of this methodology—perhaps in Harris’ notion of African “lives and thought”—as it became much clearer the “interests” that the traditional disciplines serve. The Divine Conversation, in all its iterations, had to be its intellectual basis.

The choice and general posture taken here is to use the denotation of Africana Studies, following both John Henrik Clarke, who believed this term “relates you to land, history, and culture,” and James Turner, who viewed the term as a signifier of the “interconnections” of African peoples. The foregoing necessarily connects the current dissertation to the necessary precursors important to articulating a guiding definition of Africana Studies, which as an initial undertaking, must be clarified.

The preceding definitions, with their concomitants of subject matter and approach, lead to the current decision to conceptualize the discipline as the contemporary arc of an extensive tradition of Africanders studying. The intellectual foundations of Africana


16. By rendering the nomenclature as a gerund, this work is informed by the active, still-going continuum of scholars of African descent involved in the pursuit of knowledge based on their own conceptions of reality. If we can stipulate based on Carr’s above definition that Africana Studies “theorizes on the basis of long-view genealogies of African intellectual work,” then the idea of Africana Studies = Africans Studying, literally anchors contemporary pursuits. This idea is based on the Dartmouth historian, Rashauna Johnson Chenault’s (née Rashauna Johnson) earlier work in Africana Studies entitled, “Blacks Studying: Modeling the Africana Intellectual Tradition” (Senior Thesis, Howard University College of Arts and Sciences Honors Program, 2004) and Greg Carr, “Inscribing African World History: Intergenerational Repetition and Improvisation of Ancestral Instruction,” in The African World History Project, Vol. 1: African Historiography, eds. Asa G.
Studies represent the latest improvisation of a long-view tradition of Africana intellectual thought. As such, Africana Studies is the progeny of generations of thinkers of African heritage, who, as a consequence of European modernity, are now spread throughout the world. As an intellectual enterprise formed to understand and extend these traditions, in the face of a modern world system that seeks to marginalize or negate them, Africana Studies scholars face the necessary task of articulating the constitutive sources of its disciplinarity.

II. Uniquely Real?: Questions of Disciplinarity and Disciplines

It is important, then, to briefly clarify the concept of disciplinarity. This idea generally refers to the study of the universal characteristics of disciplines that anchor their specific intellectual activities and/or processes. Many writers on the question have developed complex lists of these various characteristics which include notions of lineage, ideology, language, funding sources, and the like. Further, disciplinarity answers the questions of why disciplines do what they do while simultaneously understanding how specific disciplines are different from others. According to Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and David J. Sylvan, disciplinarity is the study of the academic discipline as a “historical form of producing knowledge;” one that has essentially monopolized how knowledge is comprehended—both outside and inside the academy.


The study of disciplinarity in the West, then, assumes *disciplinary* forms—ranging from historical studies of the emergence of discipline to sociological treatises on their behaviors.\(^{19}\) The historical studies such as the work of William Clark and John Higham show that disciplinarity developed due to specific historical contingencies. For Clark, this was the development of what he terms, “academic charisma” within the German seminarian traditions of the eighteenth century. Clark notes that this era saw an “epistemic” disciplinary self-consciousness emerge within the German philology seminars.\(^{20}\) Higham shows that in the United States, this tradition further demarcated intellectual activities in the academy once disciplinary specialization was molded to the already existent nineteenth century creed of professionalization.\(^{21}\) Sociological examinations, such as the work of Tony Becher and Andrew Abbott, show that disciplines act as the cultural clearinghouse for the development of academics. Once instituted as an inherent feature of the academy, these “tribes and territories” developed into

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20. These began in earnest with the famous Halle philology seminar taught by the charismatic F.A. Wolf, leading to the bureaucratic departmentalization and intellectual separation of the arts and sciences faculties. See William Clark, *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 141-143; 169-171. An earlier essay drawing upon preliminary research by Clark as well as others, shows that disciplinarity was the result of the seminar, but also of the French laboratory system and the English classroom. These three sites were instrumental in importing to the academy, new educational practices—writing, grading, and testing—all important to disciplinarity. See Keith W. Hoskin, “Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity: The Unexpected Reversal,” in *Knowledges*, eds. Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and Daniel J. Sylvan, 271-304. The context of the European disciplinary conversation is discussed more fully in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

21. Higham asserts that nineteenth century American intellectuals inspired by their European exemplars developed specialized knowledge formations within the academy that contributed to a shift in American academic and intellectual organization. Further, specialization was linked to professionalization. These are the origins of American disciplinarity. See John Higham, “Matrix of Specialization,” in *The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920*, ed. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 3-18 and Chapter Four of this dissertation.
communities with clear identities and traditions. These scholars point to various manifestations of the idea of the academic disciplines as the avenue toward human knowledge. Whether one studies their philosophical rationales, historical forms, or their contemporary attributes, studies of disciplinarity all revert back to the question of intellectual and cultural genealogies and lineages.

Through what Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan describe as “economies of value,” disciplines create cultural and intellectual lineages that mark their specific territories. The perpetuation of ways of generating prestige, funding sources, scholarly publication traits, and professorial appointments all contribute to a discipline’s disciplinarity, and according to Andrew Abbott seem “real” even though, as Janet Donald shows, they may not be epistemically necessary.

Thinking about disciplinarity becomes crucial for Africana Studies as it deals with questions of its own disciplinarity, but also, how it deals with the question of differentiation that determines how it has and will continue to distinguish itself from every other discipline. Answering these questions relies on an Africana Studies lens to the macro-query of what guides Western and other disciplinarities, in order to situate its specific emergence within and in relation to these knowledge complexes. Is Africana Studies


24. See the Abbott quote supra. According to Janet Donald and others, as disciplines initially organized themselves, oftentimes sociological characteristics outweighed epistemological differences between disciplines. See Janet Donald, *Learning to Think: Disciplinary Perspectives* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 7.
simply a “branch” or the “combination of different categories” of (Western academic) knowledge?

These insights and others should in the future lead to conceptualizations of Africana Studies that consider the uniqueness of its own disciplinarity, with metadisciplinarity and postdisciplinarity as two possible alternative conceptualizations of ways of producing knowledge. If Africana Studies truly seeks to remain an enclave of intellectual autonomy, the question of its status as a meta-discipline should command attention. Metadisciplinarity is the idea that certain intellectual endeavors or constructs are beyond the scope, specific methodologies, and professional identity of single and/or multiple academic disciplines. According to Richard Carp, in the West, the metadisciplines are the foundational areas of the arts, sciences, and humanities—which together constitute the “whole of knowledge.” Though he assumes these are universal knowledge categorizations, an examination of the African intellectual tradition may in fact prove otherwise. The broad strands of Africana thought constitute its own foundation, which is clearly inclusive of an overarching logic that determines different ways of categorizing knowledge, which would likely empty into different “meta-disciplines.” Thus, any notion of an African foundation for human knowledge, of which Africana Studies is an extension, must encompass more than the simple notation of

“discipline,” which in the Western corollary, is merely a branch of a larger whole “meta-disciplinary” whole.26

In grappling with Cheikh Anta Diop’s grand idea of the African human sciences, Jacob Carruthers has identified possible “disciplines” which could usefully be considered to be subsidiaries of an overarching “meta-discipline” of Africana Studies. These include: Divine Speech (Medu Netcher), Good Speech (Medu Nefer), Governance, Medicine, and Instruction (Sebayet).27

Similarly, the idea of postdisciplinarity is attractive, as it clearly disengages with the idea of the academic discipline, as it is understood normatively. Roger P. Mourad asserts that disciplines constrain knowledge because they operate as “pre-existing, persistent realities” which exist “independent of inquiry.”28 Alternatively, his project would have a post-disciplinary research agenda that is premised on inquirer-centered

26. Many of the scholar-activists who set the agenda for the institutionalization of Africana Studies were well aware of this. There were many calls for not only departments, but for entire colleges, as well as for entire universities. The earlier models suggested that the Africana experience could be clarified within separate interdisciplinary colleges/denations inside universities (i.e. Cornell’s Africana Studies and Research Center), while later models were premised on creating African universities. See inter alia, Donald Henderson, “What Direction Black Studies?” in Topics in Afro-American Studies, ed. Henry Richards (Buffalo, NY: Black Academy Press, 1971), 17-19, Ronald W. Walters, “Critical Issues on Black Studies,” in The African American Studies Reader, ed. Nathaniel Norment, Jr., 634, and Nathan I. Huggins, Afro-American Studies: A Report to the Ford Foundation (New York: The Ford Foundation, 1985), 48. See also the ideas behind and the proceedings of the “Toward a Black University” conferences in Negro Digest (March 1968) and (March 1969). Daudi Ajani ya Azibo suggests that this college should be developed by the National Council of Black Studies, see his “Articulating the Distinction Between Black Studies and the Study of Blacks: The Fundamental Role of Culture and the African-Centered Worldview,” in The African American Studies Reader, ed. Nathaniel Norment, Jr., 540. See also Ama Mazama’s discussion of Afrocentricity as a “meta-paradigm for African American Studies” capable of being more than just part of an negation to one of the “European Studies” but all of them in “The Afrocentric Paradigm,” in The Afrocentric Paradigm, ed. Ama Mazama (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), 23.


knowledge production. In this way those pre-existing realities outlined above, do not unduly limit knowledge.\textsuperscript{29}

Mourad’s work is based upon postmodern intellectual genealogies.\textsuperscript{30} Whether or not one agrees with the Kwame Anthony Appiah’s analysis of modernist and colonial intellectual legacies, the notion of “post-discipline” is similarly connected to the established theoretical and ideological logics of which postmodernism and postcolonialism are reactions against.\textsuperscript{31} As such, postdisciplinarity with an “alternative foundation” in Africana thought can be usefully understood also as post-Western.\textsuperscript{32} As such, the construction a post-discipline of Africana Studies properly situated on an empirically and solidly defined African thought at the core of inquiry, would be a welcome alternative to current conceptions of the discipline. While the ideas of metadisciplinarity and postdisciplinarity are important to consider and may indeed be more appropriate, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} In particular, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Richard Rorty, and Calvin Schrag. See Ibid, 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} See Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Is the Post- in Postmodernism the same as the Post- in Postcolonial?,” \textit{Critical Inquiry} 17 (Winter 1991): 336-357. Appiah contends that postcolonial art is arranged along a different set of contingencies than postmodern theory.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} There have been attempts to compare postmodern thought with Afrocentric thought. See for example Ana Monteiro-Ferreira, “Afrocentricity and the Western Paradigm,” \textit{Journal of Black Studies} 40 (November 2009): 327-336. However, the author agrees with Appiah’s assertion that the theory of postmodernism does not automatically challenge or inform the “cultural life” of Africa. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Is the Post- in Postmodernism the same as the Post- in Postcolonial?,” 356. In fact, devoid of an alternative to Mourad’s alternative, one found in different cultural matrices, much of postmodernism is a repositioning of the West and not a rejection of it. See Ibid, 346. In many ways the idea of a post-disciplinary Africana Studies as articulated above, is less an appropriation of postmodernism and more of an escape route toward alternate conceptions of knowledge. For as Oyeronke Oyewumi implicates, perhaps it is time to discontinue conceptualizing African thought as reactions to the West. See Oyeronke Oyewumi, \textit{The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 17-18.
\end{itemize}
term “discipline,” as is popularly used in Africana Studies will remain in use for clarity’s sake, but with the foregoing caveat.  

Perhaps the leading thinker on the subject of disciplinarity within Africana Studies has been Winston Van Horne. In developing the conceptual apparatus for the articulation of Africology, the disciplinary base for the study of the Africana experience, Van Horne asserts that the “grounding subject matter” and scope are what distinguish Africology from other disciplinary areas and earlier conceptions of Black Studies. Conceptualizing the discipline as a meta-knowledge of sorts, Africology is thought to develop modes of inquiry and tools for excavating the experiences and prospects of Africana people beginning in 5000 B.C. For Van Horne, then, Africology is not simply an area studies or an ethnic studies discipline, but a holistic study of African human phenomena unified by universalizing subject matters. What remains for scholars is to take Van Horne’s conceptualization and to develop appropriate methods for excavating how the experiences and prospects, as elucidated in his above definition of Africology, can be most appropriately accessed.

III. Illegitimate Stepsister(s): Methodology and Disciplinary Praxis

This dissertation asserts that of the four categories: 1) conceptual; 2) professional identity; 3) economies of value; and 4) progress, that Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan view as characteristics of disciplines, Africana Studies should focus primarily on

33. Though slightly different than the rationale explicated above, James B. Stewart, as early as 1981 had asserted the possible inappropriateness of the term “discipline,” based on his notion of an expansive model of Black Studies which developed new and utilitarian knowledges out of its own set of “indigenous standards of rationality.” This betrayed the usual activities and practices of “disciplines.” See James B. Stewart, “Alternative Models of Black Studies,” UMOJA 5 (1981): 20.
35. Ibid, 4-5.
the “conceptual” question. This does not necessarily limit the importance of the other three; it simply anchors them to a tradition.

The conceptual characteristic of disciplines is intimately linked to methodology—the idea of “how” one studies a particular subject, as elucidated in the above epigraph from Rhett S. Jones. Methodology, here defined as the undergirding principles and explanatory modality of a particular research inquiry, provides Africana Studies the space to engage the academy and the world on its own terms. However, in a 2006 talk, Jones lamented the status of methodology in Africana Studies in calling it the “illegitimate, ugly stepsister” of the discipline. The legitimate sister of course, being “theory.” In decrying the dearth of work done around methodology, Jones showed how methodology can lead to clarifying issues that were created by the barriers erected by Africana scholars trained


37. More concretely, methodology can be explained as the “branch of philosophy of science” that “takes upon itself the examination and critical analysis of the special ways in which the general structure of theory finds its application in particular scientific disciplines.” Peter Caws, “Scientific Method,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, Vol. 7 (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1967), 339. Martyn Hammersley’s recent monograph, Methodology: Who Needs It?, presents a useful typology for characterizing the many variations of the idea meant when the term methodology is used. For Hammersley, these three uses can be placed into respective genres which contain explanatory value for statements made around the term, methodology. These are: 1) methodology as technique- the literal “how-to” conduct research guides; 2) methodology as philosophy- the idea underpinning choices made with regard to methods; and 3) methodology as autobiography- statements made discussing methodological ideas developed in the context of doing research. See Martyn Hammersley, Methodology: Who Needs It? (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011), 20-30. Our discussions on methodology fall into Hammersley’s categories of methodology-as-technique and methodology-as-philosophy, with special emphasis on how the latter informs the former, as stipulated in the working definition articulated supra, but also in an early statement where the author defined methodology as, “the set of rules, procedures, and methods that govern a research project. It is the underlying theme or process that informs research inquiry and knowledge production. Along with these attributes, methodology also explains the context of the pursuit of knowledge as well as the distinct way in which meaning is assigned to findings in a body of research.” See Joshua Myers, “The Scholarship of Cedric J. Robinson: Methodological Considerations for Africana Studies,” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 5 (June 2012): 47.

in traditional disciplines, but also in the roles of community-building and curricular development. Though much of this order of arrangements can be attributed to the questions of whether or not Africana Studies is seen as its own entity, a substantial amount of the responsibility may in fact belong to the holders of PhDs in Africana Studies.

Temple University’s Department of African American Studies has heretofore been the leader in the effort to clarify the disciplinary boundaries of Africana Studies, and has produced most of its PhDs. The early students of graduate Africana Studies were considered committers of what had been termed, “disciplinary suicide.” This term was used to conceptualize those attempts of Africana thinkers to participate in the “architectonic roles in the discipline’s academic institutionalization,” by essentially disengaging their traditional disciplinary training. While the current effort does not study the dissertations to emerge in the discipline, some questions must be presented: Have Africana Studies scholars really committed disciplinary suicide? If so, why have these methodological breakthroughs not been standardized to the degree that the

40. See the preface of this dissertation for the discussion of autonomy in Africana Studies.
41. Not simply because it was the first department to grant the PhD, though this is crucial since the rationale for developing a new graduate program had to be based on some measure of the distinguishing nature of the discipline. Directly related to it being first, was the caliber of students who were attracted to developing the idea of Africology. According to the then department chair, Molefi Kete Asante, the first students had in effect attempted to “change the intellectual basis for African American Studies.” Both students and professors had to participate in an intellectual program that was not being done “anywhere else” to justify the existence of a doctoral program. Molefi Kete Asante, An Afrocentric Manifesto (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 103.
42. Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era: Its Antecedents and Methodological Implications for the African Contribution to World History,” (PhD diss., Temple University, 1998), 14. Asante asserts that there was also an onus placed on the professors to “commit discipline suicide from our old doctorates and work feverishly to flesh out this new discipline that was not African American history, not African American literature, nor Women’s Studies, not African American sociology, and not Studies in Racism.” Molefi Kete Asante, An Afrocentric Manifesto, 103.
question of methodology could be considered a “legitimate” part of the discipline? Further, has the “labeling” of methodological distinctions been substituted for the intellectual rigor involved in creating Edward Wilmot Blyden’s “methods” of our own? As Greg Carr stated in his own Temple University dissertation, it was up to these first generations of scholars in the discipline to “meet the dual challenge of explaining the sources of its technique while simultaneously applying and adjusting that technique in the pursuit of a research question.” This technique, of course, was supposed to emanate from an Africana Studies-specific intellectual and paradigmatic foundation. He continues stating that dissertations in the newly minted field must “for all practical purposes be two dissertations in one.” For Carr, “as a matter of responsibility” dissertation and graduate work, writ large, must “deal with the broad issue of the development of paradigms of Africalogy.” The majority of dissertations, however, have not. Much of the scholarship emanating from departments of Africana Studies has been tied methodologically to normative theory arising out of the traditional disciplines—though with the caveat of an “Afrocentric” or “African-centered” perspective. In fact, many Africana Studies

46. Ibid, 114.
47. Ibid.
48. A useful future study would compile dissertations in Africana Studies attempting to develop a normative approach to subject matter under the rubric of African-centeredness, Afrocentricity,
conceptualizations rely on what Maulana Karenga terms the “core fields” organization of the discipline. These areas, the social sciences and humanities, usually order the ways in which Africana content is approached in studies designated as Black/Africana Studies from both stand-alone departments and interdisciplinary formations. As such, Africana Studies’ disciplinarity has departed from the earlier intent of creating an intellectual space that attempted to “break the chains” linking African ideas to the West.

The question remains to what extent graduate work from the next generation will synthesize, critique, and build upon earlier models for Africana Studies’ disciplinary methodology. Why would this objective not be the intellectual foundation for graduate training? It is clear that Africana Studies cannot recede to the false choice of prioritizing research agendas over methodological questions for clarifying and applying these agendas. Despite key moments in claiming and creating space with the Afrocentric

49. See Maulana Karenga, Introduction to Black Studies (Los Angeles, CA: University of Sankore Press, 2010), 23 and Chapter Seven for a broader discussion.

50. Fabio Rojas’ research reveals that “Black studies programs hire from a wide range of graduate programs and academic fields. The kinds of texts that are widely read come from many sources [he includes cultural studies, the social sciences, and the humanities].” He continues stating that the “tendency of black studies professors to have joint appointments, training in various disciplines, and teaching duties in many departments suggest that black studies has highly permeable boundaries, although practitioners have esprit de corps.” See Fabio Rojas, From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 204.

51. Jacob Carruthers has written that it is time for Africana scholars and intellectuals to “break the chains that link African ideas to European ideas and listen to the voice of the ancestors without European interpreters.” See Jacob H. Carruthers, Jr., Mdw: Ntr, xviii. This contention is prefaced with the consideration that tools available to excavate wisdoms of African origin have been made increasingly available and their connections to contemporary ideas have been proven. Thus, this process does not link African thought to “the great issues of European philosophy.”

52. In the social sciences, the prioritization or urgency of research is often projected as reasons for devolving into anti-methodological discourse. The author is however not aware of to what extent this rationale persists among graduate training and scholarly work in Africana Studies, though it cannot be ruled out. See Martyn Hammersley, Methodology: Who Needs It?, 18, 30-32.
movement of the Temple Circle\textsuperscript{53}, the evaluations of this important movement by thinkers such as Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr. and James B. Stewart, and the idea of Africology, the work continues in facing the magnanimous challenge of effectively molding the methodological language to be able to articulate Africana Studies outside the bounds of the West.\textsuperscript{54}

IV. Whither Methodology in Africana Studies?: Key Moments in Disciplinary Discourse

Perhaps it is necessary then to re-member where we have been. While much of the scholarship of the Temple Circle has been premised on importing an Afrocentric perspective into the core fields of Western-understood human experiences (i.e. disciplinary constructs), there have been attempts to go beyond this method of intellectual production.

Molefi Kete Asante’s \textit{Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge} (1990) attempted to develop paradigmatic conceptualizations for categorizing knowledges while drawing upon an African-centeredness that is “framed by cosmological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic issues.”\textsuperscript{55} These considerations were articulated as part of the architectonic process of ordering inquiry and resolving the methodological questions of Africology and were considered the first-order conceptual groundwork necessary for situating all

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} On the existence and characteristics of the Temple Circle, see Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 139n11.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Greg Carr’s PhD dissertation contains an explicit attempt to link a study of intellectual history to the dictates and “assumptions of an afrocentric paradigm.” As such it maps out the terrain of this said paradigm as it had been articulated up until 1998. This informs certain parts of the foregoing analysis as it grapples with the process of developing a methodological foundation for Africana Studies/Africology. See Ibid, 112-149.
\end{itemize}
phenomena from an African subject position. For Asante, these involved nothing more than the theoretical anchoring of African phenomena with its “classical” foundation in Kemet—regardless of the specificity of the subject. From here, research projects were said contributes to an Africological paradigm by operating as Afrocentric discussions on concepts as understood functionally, categorically, and/or etymologically in the areas of cultural/aesthetic, social/behavioral, and policy. Each involved rethinking the conceptual foundations of Africana Studies’ disciplinary location by developing analyses which spoke to specific “needs, policy, and action” or “issues of schemes, gender, class, themes, and files” or developed a new way of dealing with language to define African phenomena.

Methodologically, this meant developing approaches to knowledge that located African phenomena through a process of “reconfirmation and delinking.” The former was

56. The term “classical” is meant to evoke a sense of what Asante terms, “Kemetic high culture” as grounding studies of African phenomena. See Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge, 14. Though he does not elaborate on the idea of “high culture,” there is the distinct possibility that this terminology was utilized to present an African corollary to the European classical tradition—notable for conceptualizing high culture in problematic ways within its aesthetic traditions. On the use of “high culture” by philosophers and classicists in the West, see Clyde Taylor, The Mask of Art: Breaking the Aesthetic Contract—Film and Literature (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1998), 41-52 and Chapter Two of this work. Another possibility is that Asante is responding to the usage of the term by the Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations (ASCAC). According to Jacob Carruthers, the term “classical” was suggested by Maulana Karenga, whom Asante also credits with helping to clarify the ideas of Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge in the preface of the work. See Ibid, v and Jacob H. Carruthers, “Reflections on the Founding of the Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations,” Kemet Voice 2 (March 1994): 7. Based upon the proposed uses of Kemetic knowledge foundations by Cheikh Anta Diop and its operationalization by select ASCAC thinkers, there is a clear difference between this appropriation and how the West appropriates its “classical tradition.” For many African thinkers, there is less of a focus on “high culture” and more of a focus on how African knowledge, concepts, and ways of approaching reality [what Carruthers calls Divine Speech] are based in Kemetic systems and how they emerge reciprocally with “basic Africa.” See Jacob Carruthers, Mdw Ntr, 39-87 and “ASCAC Research Methodology: Why Kemet?” in Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations: Study Guide: “Building for Eternity” Book 1, ed. ASCAC Foundation (Atlanta, GA: ASCAC Foundation, 2011), 20 as well as Asa G. Hilliard, III, “The Meaning of KMT (Ancient Egyptian) History for Contemporary African American Experience,” Phylon 49 (Spring/Summer 1992): 10-22.

57. See the discussion of these disciplinary paradigmatic and classificatory issues outlined in Molefi Kete Asante, Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge, 12-23.
premised upon the validation of Cheikh Anta Diop’s idea of cultural unity and continuity, while the latter simply implied a rupture with Western thought. Further, Asante was able to generate four ways of counteracting Western ways of interpreting African phenomena: 1) dual collection models of data acquisition; 2) interactive models; 3) introspection and retrospection; and 4) immersion.

Much of Asante’s considerations relied upon a reconceptualization of existing subject fields and their relationships to African phenomena. While *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* can be read as one of Asante’s contributions to Martyn Hammersley’s notion of “methodology-as-philosophy,” his later “Locating a Text: Implications of Afrocentric Theory” could be read as a contribution to an Africological “methodology-as-technique.” This technique applies Afrocentric theory to literary criticism, by showing

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59. Dual-collection methods involve the collection and evaluation of data by both the researcher and individual from the socio-cultural context. The interactive model of research is based upon the idea of a harmonizing intent, finding its strength in cooperation and integrative functions. Introspection and retrospection involves the questioning and re-questioning of the self in the pursuit if knowledge. Finally, immersion is the opposite of “scientific distance” from a research project. See Asante, *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge*, 25-27.

60. On “methodology-as-philosophy” and “methodology-as-technique,” see note 37 on the work of Martyn Hammersley. The context of “Locating a Text” was the application of Afrocentrically-located techniques to the criticism of literature and writing. This work initially appeared in *Language and Literature in the African American Imagination*, ed. Carol Aisha Blackshire-Belay (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 9-20.
through the conceptual tools of location and dislocation, how one should critique literary productions from an Afrocentric perspective.61

Another “methodology-as-technique” contribution emanating from the Temple Circle is a series of articles written by Terry Kershaw, who along with Sonja Peterson-Lewis, developed the first methods courses in Temple’s graduate program.62 The fullest articulation of Kershaw’s approach is his 1992 article, “Afrocentrism and the Afrocentric Method,” where he outlines certain implications for methodological approaches to Africana Studies. For Kershaw, an Afrocentric perspective, or centrism in general, is an important grounding technique for acquiring, characterizing, and operationalizing knowledges. This perspective, grounded in the intellectual validity of African experiences and issues, should however be utilized to affect change through the careful analysis of empirical realities.63 Following the philosopher Jurgen Habermas, Kershaw shows how categorizations of different forms of knowledge acquisition: technical, practical, and emancipatory, could be utilized in Africana methodologies.64 Out of these ways of understanding knowledge acquisition, or discovery, Kershaw develops a frame to shape research on Africana peoples, through what he terms an “Afrocentric emancipatory methodology.” Central to the steps involved in this process are the combination of

61. For Asante, techniques for logically deducing a writer’s location are through analyses of their language, attitude, and direction. The criteria for being Afrocentric are however loosely defined. See Ibid, 15-16.
62. Peterson-Lewis developed the first graduate Research Methods course. Kershaw would join the faculty after serving as a Visiting professor. Kershaw’s work during this period is more readily identified with the Temple Circle. The first articulation of his work within methodology was his “The Emerging Paradigm in Black Studies,” The Western Journal of Black Studies 13 (1989): 45-51.
64. Ibid, 164-165. The work of Habermas falls into the categories of thinkers associated with attempts to rethink positivist science in recent generations. Kershaw draws upon his Knowledge and Human Interests (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1972).
technical and practical knowledges gleaned from qualitative methods of study to rule out “apparent contradictions as well as convergence of the group understandings of ‘objective’ reality.” Also important to this formulation was the development of a “program of education and action” based upon the findings, before on to the next phase of possible research activities.

Kershaw’s work as a social scientist informs much of the theoretical and philosophical advances in the Afrocentric emancipatory methodology, while the idea of “location” is thought to inform how data generated from these tools can most effectively be utilized. This is similar to a recent article, authored by Serie McDougal, which argues for a greater use of quantitative science in Africana Studies. Both approaches view scientific tools and/or methods as neutral, while articulating that their necessary use in the best interest of Africana peoples is central to Afrocentric or African-centered methodologies.

The next major discussion on methodology to come from the Temple Circle would appear in the 2003 Ama Mazama edited, *The Afrocentric Paradigm*. Her lead essay

65. The first step in this technique is the acquisition of knowledge through practical knowledge acquisition (i.e. qualitative methods), followed by the identification of empirical relationships between the data generated from step one. This is followed by the identification of contradictions and convergences quoted above. Important to step one is Kershaw’s insistence that these practical knowledges be based on the subject’s understanding of them, citing John Gwaltney’s *Drylongso: A Self Portrait of Black America* (New York: Random House, 1980) as an exemplar. See Ibid, 165-166.

66. Ibid, 166-167. These are steps four and five.

67. McDougal’s analysis of research methods courses in graduate departments of Africana Studies reveals a very low (16%) percentage of “in-house” research methods course. His own analysis of the methodology conundrum reveals how very little has been gained in terms of the question of discipline suicide. Choosing instead to denote quantitative science (and science, writ large) itself as neutral, McDougal recommends elevating these investigative methods to their proper use in the discipline. In this construction, an Africana Studies methodology uses the same research methods, but does so differently than the West. See Serie McDougal, III, “The Future of Research Methods in Africana Studies Graduate Curriculum,” *Journal of African American Studies* 15 (2011): 279-289. Part II in general and Chapter Seven in particular discuss Africans’ responses to the “neutrality of science” argument.
reawakens some of the earlier conversations regarding Afrocentricity as a paradigmatic conceptualization. Drawing on the notion of paradigm, as articulated by Thomas Kuhn, Mazama notes that the central components of an organized way of approaching knowledge Afrocentrically, were commitments to questions of cognitive, structural, and functional aspects. The latter was added by Mazama to account for the discipline’s specialized commitment to the liberation of Africana peoples from Western physical and cultural dominion.

Though this article covers many conceptual issues ranging from Afrocentricity’s intellectual history to ways of developing action-oriented activities from intellectual work, the implications for methodology are derived from Mazama’s discussion of the second aspect of paradigms—the structural. Continuing part of the earlier contentions presented by the Temple Circle, Mazama positions Afrocentricity as the paradigm for Africana Studies before showing that its structural aspects explain how methodological considerations are formed. In this section, Mazama outlines the following considerations regarding methodology-as-philosophy, summarized in the following statement:

68. Ama Mazama, “The Afrocentric Paradigm,” 7-8. The idea of paradigm, correctly noted as “ambiguous” by Mazama has had a lengthy history in Africana Studies circles. Thomas Kuhn’s work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, appears in many Africana Studies works as a result. In the postscript to the second edition, there appear a number of definitions of paradigm. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 174-210. What Kuhn and readers of his work generally agree upon is that followers of specific paradigms only come into being to challenge and eventually overthrow “normative traditions” with “revolutionary” ones. For clarity, this term will be used here to denote a specific way of approaching intellectual work as understood by members of a coherent community of meaning. The question for Africana Studies is, and will continue to be, who constitutes this community of meaning—and how this will inform the intellectual work produced by the discipline.

69. Ibid, 23. While Mazama is correct to conclude that those advocating the existence of a multiplicity of paradigms in the discipline, either misuse the term, “paradigm,” or do not believe in the intellectual autonomy of African thought; another possible critique is that there are multiple avenues of developing ways of deriving meaning from the Africana experience that are responsible
The African experience must determine all inquiry; the spiritual is important and must be given its due place; immersion in the subject is necessary; wholism is a must; intuition must be relied on; not everything is measurable because not everything that is significant is material; the knowledge generated by the Afrocentric methodology must be liberating.\(^{70}\)

For Mazama, these methodologies should be informed by the operationalization of African worldview(s), which is a hallmark of the Afrocentric paradigm.\(^{71}\)

The contributions of the Temple Circle have had important implications for the construction of Africology as a disciplinary matrix and have yielded some important critiques from thinkers interested in the discipline’s stability. The works of Asante and Kershaw, and later Mazama, are essential to understanding how early practitioners of disciplinary Africana Studies understood ways of freeing African knowledges through methodological advances. Two critiques of Afrocentric knowledge production from outside of the Temple School (but within Africana Studies) have and should continue to have implications for questions of disciplinarity and methodology.

The first appears in the 1992 initial special issue of *The Afrocentric Scholar*. James B. Stewart’s “Reaching for Higher Ground: Toward an Understanding of Black/Africana Studies” is premised on viewing Africana Studies as a distinct intellectual endeavor. He anchors the article by outlining the two dominant issues at the heart of Africana Studies’ methodological concerns: 1) its relationship to the traditional disciplines and 2) the to its nature or essence. If these are not considered valid by the paradigmatic school of Temple Circle defined-Afrocentricity are they not useful to the discipline of Africana Studies? This dissertation asserts that before responsible discussions of paradigms can be used (or discarded), there must be clear and replicable examples of studies using Africana Studies approaches to knowledge developed and based on African foundations for knowledge. There are still methodological questions to be answered and applied.

\(^{70}\) Ibid, 26.  
\(^{71}\) Ibid. Also asserted in the seminal work of Daudi Ajani ya Azibo, “Articulating the Distinction Between Black Studies and the Study of Blacks,” 527.
evolution of Afrocentricity.\textsuperscript{72} In the context of explaining the former, Stewart suggests five rationales which were developed within Africana Studies to expose the limitations of traditional disciplines, and to “justify the existence of a distinct” Africana Studies approach.\textsuperscript{73} These are: 1) Value Added Rationales- based on the idea that Africana Studies can extend the “explanatory power of traditional disciplines;” 2) Rationale By Negation- based on a critique of the limitations of traditional disciplines and methods; 3) Multidisciplinary Rationales- based on conceptions of Africana Studies as a combination of disciplines: a “weak” multi- and interdisciplinary rationale “takes disciplinary structures as a given,” while “strong” multi- and interdisciplinary rationales attempt to transcend disciplines by focusing squarely on subject matter; 4) Western Philosophy of Science Based Rationales- based on an attempt to critique the traditional disciplines utilizing Western philosophy of science arguments; and 5) Rationale By Exemplar- based on extending intellectual genealogies of early Africana thinkers as examples of the distinct nature of the discipline. While they do not automatically constitute an approach to disciplinary methodology, these “early and contemporary” justifications for the discipline’s existence are inextricably tied to the ways in which knowledge is generated—or methodology.\textsuperscript{74}

For Stewart, the evolution of Afrocentricity is important to understanding how these early efforts were to be refined under the disciplinary matrix of Africana Studies. He asserts that the importance of Afrocentricity was its emphasis on the development of

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, 422. The following discussion is based on Ibid, 422-428.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 427- 428. Stewart notes that the first three rationales were early justifications, while the latter were more contemporary.
theories of inquiry for the discipline of Africology. However, in “reaching for higher ground,” Stewart suggests the synthesis of this theory of inquiry with the strengths of other perspectives that have generated a theory of history (Alkalimat and Associates) and of society (Maulana Karenga).\textsuperscript{75} This speaks to the construction of a methodological technique whereby through an “Afrocentric” frame, thinkers would discuss and develop research agendas that deal with contemporary societal and historical experiences. Out of this synthesis, Stewart outlines seven directions for the discipline of Africana Studies.\textsuperscript{76}

Writing some years later, Stewart shows that the evolution of the discipline was hamstrung by attempts to clarify the Africana experience through the bifurcated lens of social science and humanities disciplines. In arguing for a “jazz model” of Africana Studies and “inter-modal” research, he has contributed to the methodological conversation by placing extractive and explanatory power for Africana phenomena, not simply within disciplinary areas but based on the more complicated ways in which African peoples understand reality.\textsuperscript{77}

The other important critique was Lucius T. Outlaw’s “Africology: Normative Theory.” This paper read in 1987 before the First Symposium on Africology essentially

\textsuperscript{75} A chart comparing the three systems of thought is presented in Ibid, 432.
\textsuperscript{76} These directions have been oft-quoted and include: 1) the generation of a theory of history; 2) the articulation of a theory of knowledge and social change; 3) the delineation of a theory of race and culture; 4) an expansion of the scope of inquiry encompassed by the disciplinary matrix; 5) the expanded examination of the historical precedents to modern Black/Africana Studies; 6) the increased emphasis on applications of theoretical work; and 7) strengthened linkages to interests outside academe to minimize misappropriations of knowledge and improve information dissemination. The current work hopes to contribute to the fifth direction by relating it to the second.
\textsuperscript{77} See James B. Stewart, “Riddles, Rhythms, and Rhymes: Toward an Understanding of Methodological Issues and Possibilities in Black/Africana Studies,” in Ethnic Studies Research: Approaches and Perspectives, ed. Timothy Fong (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2008). He again shows how Afrocentric conceptualizations are linked to this discussion but nevertheless outlines ways of extending its scope to contribute to the methodological refinement necessary for the discipline.
explores how elements of Africana Studies’ disciplinarity can develop based on the experiences of an African-descended population now imbued with social constructions of raced identity.\footnote{According to Greg Carr, Outlaw, in this article asserts that “human society is the result of an ongoing discourse between individuals, hardened through time and circumstance into institutions, societies and civilizations. One of, if not the, most prominent and importantly socially constructed groupings of humanity in contemporary times are “races”. Africana Studies, then, is a “discursive affair, a methodology which pursues the discursive posture of offering ‘a critical mediation of competing normative agendas relative to the goals and objectives’ of African people.” Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 117. See also, Idem, “Toward an Intellectual History of Africana Studies,” 443.} The essay is largely concerned with how and through what process “norms” are to be developed and operationalized in order to “reconstruct” the disciplinary enterprise of Africology.\footnote{Lucius T. Outlaw, “Africology: Normative Theory,” in \textit{On Race and Philosophy}, by Idem (New York: Routledge, 1996), 98.}

He begins by presenting how knowledge complexes generate normative ideas utilizing the works of Michel Foucault and his work on the archeological and genealogical investigations of “fields of discourse” and Gerard Radnitzsky and the development of the notion of “sciences” and “X-ologies.”\footnote{Ibid, 100-101. As developed from Michel Foucault, \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language} (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) and Gerard Radnitzsky, \textit{Contemporary Schools of Metascience} (New York: Pantheon, 1984).} These thinkers are chosen for their clear attempts to understand how Western knowledge functions. For a discipline such as Africology, housed in the academy, Outlaw asserts that these sorts of insights are crucial to understanding how knowledge complexes are created, especially for disciplines formed within the crucible of critique. Thus, these discussions of how norms are generated
contribute to “efforts to refine” African American Studies’ “disciplinary practices and norm-setting power into Africology.”

From here Outlaw constructs an archaeological/genealogical criticist frame from which to evaluate the discipline of Africana Studies’ attempt to establish rules and methods for engaging in intellectual work. This frame is a synthesis of the critiques and insights of Foucault and Radnitzky, and includes: 1) a historicist postulate- based on the Foucauldian idea that disciplines must be understood in “contexts conditioned by their historical development”; 2) an anti-foundationalist postulate- premised on the Foucauldian assertion that these disciplines do not constitute a teleology based on an “original foundation” and the search for “identical” forms of discourse in the past; 3) “normative turns” via critical “suspensions”- guided by both Foucault and Radnitzky, recommending the temporary deferment of “ready made syntheses” which attempt to prefigure ways of accessing historical continuities which would engender a “turn” necessary for accurate examinations; and out of these, the formulation of an 4) exposed field- the objects, enunciative modalities, descriptions, concepts, strategies, and research programs which guide the internal steering field (disciplinary actors) and the impact of the external steering field (non-disciplinary actors).

Molefi Asante’s articulation of Afrocentricity and Maulana Karenga’s Kawaida theory are then described and analyzed under Outlaw’s criticist frame to understand how norms have guided and prescribed inquiry within the partisan venture of Africana Studies.

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81. Ibid, 101. He continues: “Thus an excursion through Foucault and Radnitzky will help to clarify the norms that do—or ought to—structure Africology, on the one side, and Africology’s concern to prescribe norms to guide intellectual and social practice, on the other.” Ibid, 101-102.

82. See Ibid, 108-109, for the full articulation of the criticist frame developed by Outlaw.
Outlaw chooses these thinkers in particular for their influence over the trajectory of the discipline. Outlaw shows, based on the works generated at the time, that neither “school” had developed stringent ways of extracting the collective logos of Africana peoples throughout time and space. While it has effectively remained historicist, the attempt to develop an African “originary” foundation has thus far foundered. Outlaw asserts that while battling against Western attempts to construct foundations, Asante and Karenga have proposed to replace it within a “telos of humankind” lodged in African anteriorsthat speaks to interests made necessary by contemporary history. Also, he problematizes how Africana Studies as a discursive field has utilized particularly ineffective techniques for conceptualizing historical realities based

83. Outlaw also references the works of Maurice Jackson, Nick Aaron Ford, Philip T.K. Daniel, and James Turner in contextualizing the early attempts to conceptualize Africana Studies. At the time of the delivery of this paper, Asante’s aforementioned, Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge (1990) had not been written. Thus, Outlaw was only able to base his analysis on the earlier, Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change (Buffalo, NY: Amulefi Publishing, 1980) and The Afrocentric Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). Outlaw outlines that the former attempted to develop an idea of an African cultural system while the latter contributed to the process of disciplinary contestation. Out of a synthesis of these works, Outlaw states: “Afrocentricity,” then may be viewed as a covering term for rules of construction for the disciplinary field of Black Studies—or ‘Afrology’—guiding the formation of enunciative modalities (statements and ways of speaking about objects and practices in the field) and inclusive of foreconceptions that provide the field’s boundary conditions and platform.” Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., “Africology: Normative Theory,” 118. This is very similar to Stewart’s contention that Afrocentricity constitutes a theory of inquiry. Outlaw then discusses the objectives for the discipline outlined in Maulana Karenga’s Introduction to Black Studies and the cultural principles gleaned from his Kwanzaa: Origin, Concepts, Practice (Los Angeles: Kawaida Publications, 1977). These constitute the bases from which Outlaw frames Karenga’s contributions to Black Studies in the areas of holistic, critical, corrective, and committed approaches to developing African society. For the synthesis of the ideas of Asante and Karenga, see “Africology: Normative Theory,” 121-122.

84. Outlaw uses this term to denote “the collection of constitutive logic(s) and practices, the “spirit” of Africa that in part, make up the “essence” of its peoples, this distinguishes them from all (subsequent) others.” This “logos” is thought to “guide” the discipline building of Africana Studies, and is what Jacob Carruthers might refer to as African “deep thought.” See Ibid, 101 and note 112.

85. This leads to misappropriations of African logoi or conceptual systems, when accessed and applied incorrectly. For Outlaw, the move to reassure “our ‘Afrocentricity’ through forms of Africanness or Africanity supposedly preserved in their essence across all cultural spaces and times” is an imprecise base for the recovery of the African logos. See Ibid, 123.
on its own historicist positions. Rules for discourse should be clear and replicable and based on responsible appropriations of the African past(s).  

For Black Studies to be elevated into Africology, then, Outlaw proposes that these rules be open, free, and replicable to anyone willing to practice disciplinary discourse, even when based on alternative (non-Western) cultural logics. Part of the enterprise of Africology must concern itself with both developing mechanisms to speak to the interests of Africana peoples, while maintaining standards of truth, as best can be achieved. As such, the easy, non-rigorous labeling of peoples, ideas, and concepts under the marker of “African,” while rhetorically appealing, must be approached “with particular care.”

Outlaw concludes by linking his critique of Asante and Karenga to the six first-order questions of disciplinary construction presented to him by then Chair of Africology at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Patrick Bellegarde-Smith. He suggests that scholars undertake the empirical examination of those “fundamental ontological assumptions” as they have functioned across time and space, “with no presumption that the assumptions have been the same for all throughout time—or that they have not been.” From here Outlaw recommends the “comparative surveys of the structures and

86. Ibid, 124-125.
87. Ultimately, Outlaw suggests that we should seek to develop transcendent norms—ones that are not “restricted to the cultural, historical life-worlds of particular racial/ethnic—or gender—groups.” Ibid, 128.
88. Ibid, 129.
89. These are: 1) “the fundamental, ontological axiomatic assumptions over time among people of African origins”; 2) “the discernment of the relationship between ontological assumptions and the ethical/moral precepts that are grounded in those assumptions”; 3) “the teleology of human conduct that emanates from 1 and 2”; 4) “the epistemology of human conduct as it emanates from 1 through 3”; 5) “criteria for the ascription of approbation and disapprobation”; and 6) the question of the roles of each of the above in the description, explanation, justification and prediction of human conduct.” Ibid, 99 and 218n1.
90. Ibid, 130.
practices constitutive of the life-worlds of the various African peoples…” especially as they exist on micro and macro levels of human living.\textsuperscript{91} In response to the Bellegarde-Smith’s third query regarding the “teleology of human conduct,” Outlaw offers that much of what African people regard as teleological is to “survive as free people.”\textsuperscript{92} Similarly, regarding the epistemology of human conduct as well as the “criteria for the ascription of approbation and disapprobation,” Outlaw suggests that theorists draw down upon the empirical data that encompasses how we come to know the ways in which African people participate in these activities. This privileges the actors in history as opposed to falling victim to “the historicity of our theorizing.”\textsuperscript{93} From here and only here does Outlaw suggest that recommendations be made for African “present and future life-worlds,” as “drawn” methodologically from our “constructive readings of African peoples,” responsibly approached.\textsuperscript{94}

How we generate and utilize data based upon Africana peoples, must not be devoid of normative criteria for acquiring and evaluating such data. “Africology: Normative Theory” raises important conclusions about Africana Studies methodologies through Outlaw’s notion of a “criticist frame” for the construction of these norms. This is a frame enlivened by instituting an “awareness of our historicity and of historical

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 130-131. Outlaw emphasizes the development of “interpretive-empirical inquiries” to guide this methodological consideration.


\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 132. He states further: “Here, too, there are no privileged epistemological positions. The character of our knowledge of the conduct of African peoples is provisional and open to constant revision, and can only come after empirical investigations of particular peoples.”

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, 133.
discontinuity and is supported by rules of discourse constitutive of democratic social-political praxis” and premised on achieving “the most complete understandings possible” of the logoi of African peoples.\textsuperscript{95}

The work centered on operationalizing Afrocentric methodologies does not hold a monopoly on the disciplinary discussion; neither does the Temple Circle hold a monopoly on Afrocentric methodologies.\textsuperscript{96} In fact, most graduate training within the discipline of Africana Studies (Temple included) have developed new perspectives within or rely solely on traditional methodologies—markedly different from the attempt to develop Africology. Perry Hall’s “Paradigms in Black Studies” offers a useful categorization of these attempts, showing that intellectual work in institutionalized Africana Studies fall into three paradigmatic camps: 1) integrative: utilizing traditional disciplines; 2) Afrocentric: theorizing based upon centeredness of the African experience; and 3) transformative: combining Afrocentric knowledge production with “factors of change.”\textsuperscript{97}

While a large component of work bearing the name “Africana Studies,” or one of its other nomenclatures, utilizes an integrationist frame, notable work has been generated from Hall’s idea of a transformative paradigm. The following represent some important transformationist paradigmatic and methodological discourse in the discipline.

Perhaps most influential in this “transformative” approach, has been the work of Manning Marable and Columbia University’s Institute for Research in African American

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Or on Temple University’s department itself, for that matter. Other departments of Africana Studies have developed particular approaches that are not necessarily endearing to Afrocentricity. See Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 139n11 and the preface to this dissertation.
Studies. For Marable, the discipline of Africana Studies was to be a “counterhegemonic intellectual space” purposed at contesting the white academic structure. Thought not a consistent author of grand methodological statements, Marable and other thinkers associated with the Institute for Research in African American Studies, are notable for their attempts to generate “a new Black renaissance” by rethinking issues of race, class, and gender. The general trajectory of Marable’s work largely relies on social scientific knowledge transformations necessary for socio-economic and political change in Africana communities.

Similarly, the sociologist by training, but Black Studies veteran, Abdul Alkalimat has developed what he terms a “D7” method. This method is grounded in an Africana Studies methodology that privileges Africana racial experiences as prefiguring questions of the constructions of knowledge based on human epistemology, history, social, and comparative logic. Marable, Alkalimat, and other thinkers such as Ronald L. Taylor,

100. In the introductions to both major volumes produced by this “school” on Africana Studies, Marable emphatically asserts the need to ensure that racially essentialized modes of thought do not cloud attempts to develop critical appraisals of Black life that seek to transform it. The following statement makes this idea clear and is a solid example of Hall’s notion of transformationism. According to Marable, the response to critics of the discipline resulted into a process whereby: “Greater emphasis was given within many curricula to issues of identity, cultural representation, and social lifestyles, largely divorced from any concrete discussion of political economy and social class stratification.” Manning Marable, “Introduction,” in *The New Black Renaissance*, ed. Idem (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2005), xii. In the earlier, “Introduction: Black Studies and the Racial Mountain,” republished as the introduction to *Dispatches from the Ebony Tower: Intellectuals Confront the African American Experience* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), Marable challenges the old integration versus nationalist tendency and conceptualizes Black Studies as a “methodology” that seeks the “transformation” of Africana lives. See Ibid, 25 as well as Idem, “Beyond Brown: The Revolution in Black Studies,” *The Black Scholar* 35 (2005): 11-21.
all view the centrality of methods leading to the conceptual “reformulation”\textsuperscript{102} and transformation of existing knowledge constructs as they relate to Africana peoples.

Thinkers such as Clarence J. Munford and John H. McClendon, III have pushed other transformative paradigmatic tendencies that advocate a historical materialist lens for the examination of Black life, in much the same way as Marable and Alkalimat. Munford’s *Production Relations, Class, and Black Liberation* (1978) attempted to influence the Marxist methodological technique to approaches to Africana life.\textsuperscript{103} The recent special issue of *Socialism and Democracy* (March 2011) includes attempts to further this discussion from John McClendon III, among others. McClendon’s work argues for the methodological influence of materialist, as opposed to idealist frameworks for the study of the African American experience.\textsuperscript{104}

Last but not least, the work emanating from Black feminist and Africana womanist circles deserves mention as key transformative paradigmatic work. The attempts to employ feminist/womanist paradigms within the discipline of Africana Studies have been led by thinkers like Delores Aldridge and Darlene Clark Hine. But the

\textsuperscript{102} This term is used by Ronald L. Taylor to characterize early attempts to operationalize a Black perspective in the social sciences. Acknowledging the difficulty of this idea, Taylor proposes greater emphasis on the interplay between all forces impinging upon the life chances of Black people from their own frames of reference. See Ronald L. Taylor, “The Study of Black People: A Survey of Empirical and Theoretical Models,” in *Black Studies: Theory, Method, and Cultural Perspectives* (Pullman, WA: Washington University Press, 1990), 11-15.


\textsuperscript{104} He views the work of “Afrocentric” thinkers, e.g. Marimba Ani and Molefi Asante as “idealist” and drawing upon methodological ideas that are non-tangible. These ideas often do not take into account the material realities of Africans and their status in the “social relations of production.” See John H. McClendon, “Materialist Philosophical Inquiry and African American Studies,” *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (March 2011): 74. On Afrocentric knowledge production as idealist, see also Sidney J. Lemelle, “The Politics of Cultural Existence: Pan-Africanism, Historical Materialism, and Afrocentricity,” *Race and Class* 33 (1993): 96.
work of Patricia Hill Collins and Clenora Hudson-Weems has attempted to develop arguably transformative ways of approaching questions of gender within academic work.

For Patricia Hill Collins, a seminal Black feminist thinker, this must rely on an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, guided by both African anteriors and the experiences of sexism in the West. From here non-traditional methods of inquiry such as concrete experiences and dialogue should serve as alternatives to positivistic knowledge validation, which is central to the traditional canon.105

Hudson-Weems’ work is similar to the work of the Temple Circle in that it establishes concepts and strategies toward “locating” African womanisms in literature as a mirror for understanding Black women’s experiences.106 Hudson-Weems’ construction of Africana womanism stems from the critiques of feminism as a decidedly Western theory of gender.107 In connecting the foregoing discussion of gender to Africana Studies, Valethia Watkins suggests the de-centering of feminism as a methodological tool for explicating the experiences and prospects of African women, given the monopoly of the concept in normative Women’s Studies.108

The foregoing discussion on methodological advances in Africana Studies, while not exhaustive, is in many ways indicative of the trends of the discipline. More often than not, these attempts do not stem from the ideal of “discipline suicide” and are not

purposed at generating a self-authenticating idea of Africana Studies. Inter- and multidisciplinarity (Hall’s “integrationist” paradigm) has become the norm and has gone unchecked—and in other cases, projects done under singular traditional disciplinary methodologies have been allowed to re-enter (or claim) Africana Studies via the qualifying criteria of subject matter or perspective. The pursuit of an Africologically informed, discipline suicide seems to be characterized more by rhetorical discussions than attempted practices. While important advances and contributions have been made under this banner, the work of sharpening the idea has foundered on its attempts to transcend or disengage Western categories of knowledge that yield particular ways of viewing the world. Renaming traditional disciplines under new concepts and in new categories to create “new” paradigms is not only an unacceptable solution, it most importantly, is not responsible to the intellectual genealogy of African thought. The questions of what this genealogy represents and why it is important to discussions of methodology in the discipline of Africana Studies is the concern of the next section.

V. Africana Studies and the Construction of Genealogies of African Thought

If part of the import of the Africological project was the attempt to derive a completely alternative, culturally-based, foundation for studying Africana experiences, then it has thus far met an impasse. This dissertation emphatically suggests that the clarifying of intellectual histories and traditions is one way out of this stalemate. While it may be argued that both metadisciplines and their disciplinary variants in the West have

109. Work generating from spaces exterior to Africana Studies has nevertheless contributed to the idea of developing autonomous modes of Africana thought. Many of these will be discussed within the context of the review. See Part II.
many common traditions, the importance of an intellectual lineage in specific disciplinary areas has been made clear in the work of thinkers studying disciplinarity.\textsuperscript{110} Though they are but one component of methodology and its concomitant disciplinarity, intellectual traditions can also provide fundamental understanding of the ways in which knowledge was contextualized, utilized, and approached by earlier African thinkers. In the context of African culture, tradition is essentially the passing of knowledge to solve problems and create identity, and as such, tradition relies on memory.\textsuperscript{111} As such, an understanding of these earlier modes of thought among Africana intellectuals allows scholars the ability to connect them to an even older, extended tradition of deep thought, which further contextualizes the ways in which Africana scholarship articulates a distinct view of the

\textsuperscript{110} These common traditions are of course lodged in the historical origins of Western philosophy, however constructed. That said, disciplines, as they emerge, assert specific precursors or founders as part of their intellectual tradition(s). See Arthur King and John Brownell, \textit{The Curriculum and the Disciplines of Knowledge}, 75-77. In Ellen Messer Davidow, David Shumway, and David R. Sylvan’s work, the thinkers considering the intellectual traditions of disciplines, are considered “genealogists” following the intellectual lead of Michel Foucault. See their, “Introduction: Disciplinary Ways of Knowing,” 4-9. The methodological technique followed here and developed by Foucault is a view of genealogy that is enlivened by particular discourses and relationships as opposed to the search for origins and grand unities of discourse. In this approach, genealogy becomes clear once thinkers achieve an understanding of how ideas are consequences of heterogeneous and discontinuous descents and emergences. These ideas can be found in Foucault’s intellectual influence, Friedrich Nietzsche. See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in \textit{The Foucault Reader}, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Random House, 1984), 76-100.

\textsuperscript{111} One such example has been chronicled by the Fulbe thinker, Amadou Hampate Ba, who shows how the idea of genealogy was linked the questions of memory and governance. The keepers of memory, or dielis, were thus central to the maintenance of society. The dieli were simultaneously part of an intellectual tradition and the preservers of these essential connections. See Amadou Hampate Ba, “The Living Tradition,” \textit{General History of Africa: Vol. 1: Methodology and African Prehistory}, ed. Joseph Ki-Zerbo (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 166-205. Karanja Keita Carroll correctly asserts the difference between Foucauldian uses of genealogy premised on uncovering ruptures and these kinds of African uses. See note 110 and his Temple University dissertation, “The Influence of Cheikh Anta Diop’s Two Cradle Theory on Africana Academic Discourse: Implications for Africana Studies,” (PhD diss., Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 2007), 108. Further, “tradition” was also one of the critical terms that Outlaw, in the development of his criticist frames suggests be suspended until clear ways of examining and tracing it become practiced. On this see the discussion supra and note 85. The current effort hopes to contribute to this clarity.
world. To truly embody this approach, Africana Studies’ methods and methodologies for approaching reality must emanate from a different cultural base than that of the West; a technique for connecting intellectual history and traditions provides a useful foundation for this practice. If we can stipulate that the base for an intellectually autonomous Africana Studies is its intellectual tradition, then how do we access and apply it to matters of disciplinary contestation and training?

Much of the impetus of the current work is derived from earlier contributions in the discipline of Africana Studies, many of which have been mentioned above. Of those mentioned, this dissertation responds most directly to the contribution of Greg E. Kimathi Carr. His 2006 article, “Towards an Intellectual History of Africana Studies: Genealogy and Normative Theory” places the onus among apprentice scholars to develop from “a set of normative practices” ways of “identifying and theorizing genealogies.” Carr, a 1998 graduate of Temple University’s Department of African American Studies, brings the foundationalist perspective to Africana Studies and

112. “Deep Thought” refers to the corpus of African ideas which have originated from ancient African foundations, with regards to what the West has termed “philosophical” questions. Jacob Carruthers and other Africana thinkers prefer this particular term because it speaks to a distinctly African way of approaching knowledge, while stripping away conceptual confusion around the term, “philosophy.” See Jacob Carruthers, *Mdw Ntr*, 35-36. Theophile Obenga, Ayi Kwei Armah, and Jacob Carruthers’ collective works, inter alia, represent the perspective that Africana intellectual genealogies are part of a continuum, or what Greg Carr has termed, an “unbroken chain.” This approach to intellectual genealogy presupposes that deep thought traditions, wherever they are found in African contexts, are easily seen as connected to the first evocations of these traditions that are available, usually in classical Africa. For the unbroken genealogy approach see Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not,” 181.

113. Greg E. Carr, “Toward an Intellectual History of Africana Studies,” 439. These range of normative assumptions are suggested by Carr within the context of the article and discussed infra.

identifies intellectual genealogy as the means from which to clarify “models of inquiry and normative assumptions” founded upon African thought within the discipline.\textsuperscript{115} He then, elucidates the central methodological considerations inherent in understanding how intellectual genealogies should be utilized while suggesting “a narrative frame for theorizing a working genealogy of disciplinary Africana Studies.”\textsuperscript{116}

By contextualizing Africana Studies as a distinct discipline, much in the same way as in his definition quoted above, a foundation is established to begin the process of creating the conceptual space from which usable intellectual genealogies of the field can be constructed. Following Daudi Ajani ya Azibo, Carr explains that the beginnings of visible Africana intellectual genealogies are essentially their appearance, which coincides with the manifestation of African worldviews.\textsuperscript{117} Azibo’s 1992 article, “Articulating the Distinction Between Black Studies and the Study of Blacks,” posits that the discipline of Africana Studies must develop a normative approach to understanding Africana experiences through the “usage of the conceptual universe afforded by the African

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, 439.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
worldview.”  Although Carr, Azibo, and others have contended that changes in circumstances in the Africana experience have somewhat altered the surface appearance of this “conceptual universe;” their fundamental nature, elsewhere termed “deep structure,” as well as the ways in which collective understanding is mediated and interpreted remain tied to “processes and institutions” that are influential because of their consistence throughout history. The durability of these worldviews have consistently been linked to ideas of cultural meaning making, but their durability to other forms of intellectual work have often been questioned. For Carr, these are due to “political, not cultural” crises.

Further, one of the challenges for the construction of disciplinary genealogies for Carr is the challenge of time and space, a challenge, which he asserts has been addressed through African forms of improvisation. While most ideas of genealogy have been linked


119. Azibo’s explanation of “deep structure” of culture relies on the model of African-centered psychologist, Wade W. Nobles: “The deep structure of culture is a popular term used imprecisely (with various meanings) in Black Studies circles. Nobles’ model of culture affords a more precise definition and explication, due to its development as a scientific construct. The primary level of culture consists of the “cultural factors,” which are cosmology, ontology, and axiology. The secondary or intermediate level of culture consists of the “cultural aspects,” which are worldview, ideology, and ethos. Again, the primary and secondary levels together make up the cultural deep structure. Therefore, based on Nobles’ model, a people’s cultural deep structure is seen to be their conceptual universe as it emerged in response, to or in answer to, the notions of the three cultural factors and the three cultural aspects.” Ibid 528. For Nobles’ discussion see Wade W. Nobles, “The Reclamation of Culture and the Right to Reconciliation: An Afro-Centric Perspective on Developing and Implementing Programs for the Mentally Retarded Offender” in The Black Mentally Retarded Offender: A Wholistic Approach to Prevention and Habilitation, eds. Aminifu R. Harvey and Terry L. Carr (New York: United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, 1982). Attempts to tie the notion of “deep structure” to approaches to explicating Africana thought has been led by the African-centered psychologists, see inter alia, Linda James Myers, “The Deep Structure of Culture: Relevance of Traditional African Culture in Contemporary Life,” Journal of Black Studies 18 (September 1987): 72-85 and Chapter Seven of the current work.


to “history” as a field, the work remains in constructing ways of accessing African past(s) unhampered by Western historical methodologies, a concern also articulated by James B. Stewart. Here, and in other writings, Carr suggests that repetition and improvisation can serve to generate new ways of understanding and accessing memories, employing the Bakongo/Ki-Kongo cosmogram. Placing emphasis on circularity, this way of orienting reality is utilized to show how human life-worlds, constitute a series of events guided by constancy (repetition) and dynamism (improvisation) and given force by particular ways of knowing (worldview). This way of framing human realities—past present and future—relies on ways of knowing the past that are cyclical rather than linear. This tethers culturally specific ways of accessing and utilizing intellectual genealogies to the development of methodological innovations in Africana Studies.

122. Ibid, 440. James B. Stewart asserts that the “absence of efforts to critique the overall philosophy of history that guides historical research, the tendency to research small topics as opposed to the construction of grand historical narratives, the linear approach to historical research that ignores cyclical patterns in human affairs, and limited use of simulation techniques to investigate alternative historical scenarios” have rendered traditional (disciplinary) historical research “problematic for Black/Africana Studies.” See his “Africana Studies: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century,” The International Journal of Africana Studies 4 (December 1996): 7. These and other considerations have grounded the foundationalist approach to generating new and accurate historical narratives.


125. Carr also links these ideas to ancient Kemetic thought: “The classical African [Kemetic or Egyptian] concept of ‘Mekhet,’ a word which can be translated as ‘after’ in the sense of ‘before, alongside, or preceding,’ conveys a similar sense of the distinct yet interrelated dimensions of human experience,” Idem, “Toward an Intellectual History of Africana Studies,” 440-441. See also, Idem, “Inscribing African World History,” 12.
The forms of this improvisation in the face of the “Age of Europe” have created complicated terms for naming and clarifying them. In other words the, “here and now” is not obfuscated by a more complete historical memory. Carr proceeds by quoting Michael A. Gomez, who has outlined some specific episodic challenges that have arisen at the behest of the modern world system: 1) the suppression of language, cultural texts, and practices; 2) the creation of “blackness” as the primary marker for power relationships; and 3) the intellectual bifurcation between European and non-European knowledges.126 These episodic challenges are also directly linked to the construction of an “epistemic” of Africana Studies127; as it is a discipline charged with both extending and understanding the ways in which Africans have “generated improvisational responses” to them.128 Each episodic challenge has generated a response among Africans in the United States that has

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126. Ibid, 441. Michael A. Gomez, a scholar of African Diaspora Studies, has considered in his many works the notion that development of identity throughout the genealogy of African-descended groups is many cases based upon the foundation of an African antecedent. His 1998 study, *Exchanging Our Country Marks* outlines the process by which Africans of different ethnic groups improvised culture to fashion identity as they were brought to a race-conscious North American society. The three challenges that Carr extracts from Gomez’s text are challenges that have historically inhibited this fashioning and contribute in some way to what Gomez concludes as the emergence of divisions among African descendants in America. See Michael A. Gomez, *Exchanging Our Country Marks: The Transformation of African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 291-292. See also Gomez’s study of the genealogy of African Muslims in America, which follows a similar trajectory, *Idem, Black Crescent: The Experience and Legacy of African Muslims in the Americas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

127. Russell Adams discusses the notion of an epistemic of Black reality that he posits should inform the discourse when analyzing the Africana experience throughout the world. Adams asserts that Black academics must grasp the way in which Africans understand themselves in relation to the world order under which they find themselves, a perspective also advanced by Lucius Outlaw, discussed supra. See Russell Adams, “Epistemological Considerations in Afro-American Studies,” in *Out of the Revolution: The Development of Africana Studies*, eds. Delores P. Aldridge and Carlene Young, 39-58.

been linked to the idea of preservation—a point shared by, among others, the Kenyan writer, Ngugi wa Thiong’o.\(^{129}\)

Carr then turns to Lucius T. Outlaw’s “Africology: Normative Theory” to explore the necessity to elevating his ideas toward Outlaw’s argumentation for the generation of norms to guide inquiry in the discipline.\(^{130}\) Quoting Outlaw’s concerns elsewhere, where he questions whether or not a disciplinary enterprise can be formulated based simply upon the “similarities and commonalities” in a people’s experiences, Carr’s “Towards an Intellectual History of Africana Studies” concludes with the articulation of a specific agenda for the construction of Africana Studies genealogies and a frame for enlarging African-centered knowledge production to a systematic way of analyzing all experiences.\(^ {131}\) With regard to the process of wedding Africana Studies methodology to the “preservation of the collective being” in Robinson’s formulation, Carr has outlined that for setting norms in Africana Studies,

\(^{129}\) As Carr explains in his work, the notion of systems of cultural meaning-making as examples of African continuities has been widely confirmed. Ngugi, inter alia, extends this idea to the preservation of African iterations within “New World” languages. See Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance (New York: Basic Civitas, 2009), 44-49.  


\(^{131}\) Quoted in Ibid, 444. See Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., “African, African-American, Africana Philosophy” in African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions, ed. John Pittman (New York: Routledge, 1997), 63-93. Carr then quotes the first-order questions guiding the study of human experiences, taken from his and other thinkers involved in the development of Lessons in Africana Studies (Philadelphia: Songhai Press and School District of Philadelphia, 2006). These questions are an attempt to free scholars/teachers up to draw connections between human experiences and ways of understanding and studying them that are not necessarily linked to predetermined disciplinary methodologies. These questions are: 1) What is/are the social structures(s) in place for the people discussed? 2) How did the Africans (or any other human group) organize themselves during this period? 3) What kinds of systems did Africans develop to explain their existence and how did they use those systems to address fundamental issues of living? 4) What types of devices were developed to shape nature and human relationships with animals and each other during this period and how did it affect Africans and others? 5) How did/do Africans remember this experience? and 6) What specific music, art, dance, and/or literature/orature did Africans create during this period? See Ibid, 17.
an ordering agenda and set of strategies must be identified and pursued. The agenda has been identified above: nothing less than Jacob Carruthers’s “breaking the chains” evoked in the opening epigraph to this article; the rejection of what Cedric Robinson has called elsewhere the ‘terms of order’ in favor of an embrace of the long-view and expansive African intellectual tradition.132

Clearly, this embrace must be based on replicable tools for excavating, analyzing, and operationalizing the ideational and fundamental touchstones of these traditions. In other words, Carr does not favor, and neither should the reader assume that substituting a haphazard collection of Africanities could constitute an approach for employing genealogies of thought in contemporary intellectual work. The development of sound ways of accomplishing these tasks will lead to a resulting formation within the Western academic of a site of contestation and controversy. This is not a new phenomenon, for Africana Studies, broadly conceptualized, has historically served as the philosophical dimension of larger socio-political struggles for Africana peoples.133 The foregoing process contributes to a long struggle that has included attempts to reveal academic knowledge production as essentially a product of Western worldviews and conceptualizations as opposed to an objective space to analyze and understand reality.134

What is left to be determined is to what extent intellectual genealogies of Africana peoples can be projected as methodological exemplars for the intellectual work carrying

133. Robert L. Allen, inter alia, has discussed the idea that Black Studies, during its infancy had been attacked for a number of reasons, chief among them its political orientation. See idem, “The Politics of the Attack on Black Studies,” The Black Scholar 6 (September 1974): 2-7. See also, Nathaniel Norment, Jr. “Introduction to Section VI” in The African American Studies Reader, ed. Nathaniel Norment, Jr. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 565-567. This is the introduction to a section entitled, “Political Perspectives.” The essays that follow also give context to the notion discussed above.
134. This has been consistently articulated by Africana Studies scholars, see inter alia James Turner, “Foreword: Africana Studies and Epistemology,” x, where he states: “Research is a social product, and the values and assumptions of the investigator are more usually than not, congruent with the dominant ideas and prevailing forces that govern the status quo.”
the name, “Africana Studies.” This work, in part chronicles these and other attempts to understand concretely how Africana Studies has and should employ intellectual traditions and intellectual histories in concert with the creation of what Outlaw has termed its “disciplinary norms.”135 Along with Carr, this dissertation asserts it is the only way to truly position the discipline of Africana Studies in both academia, but more importantly in the other relevant sphere of influence, the community of meaning from which these ideas are generated.

Statement of Purpose

This dissertation compiles scholarly literature on the subject of Africana intellectual traditions as a point of departure for articulating a rationale for viewing Africana Studies’ disciplinary history as inclusive of the expansive tradition of Africana intellectual thought. It posits several generations of thinkers associated broadly with what can be referred to as Africana Studies have determined that African intellectual traditions should influence and often provide the methodological direction for disciplinary Africana Studies. By collecting the ideas of various scholars in a bibliographical essay form commonly associated with the PhD dissertation, this effort will examine the ways in which scholars have understood the origin and role of disciplinary traditions.

The objective of the current effort, then, is aimed at assembling much of the literature that attempts to contextualize disciplinarity firstly, and then those that theorize connections of Africana Studies disciplinary work to intellectual traditions arising out of the African experience. Through a process of culling the intellectual commitments of

Western structures of knowledge from general intellectual historical texts and other disciplinary histories, this work situates its development of communities of thought and their academic and ideological legacies. From there it assesses how Africana thinkers understood these knowledge formations, a process Cedric Robinson considers to be the beginnings of a Black intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{136} The combination of all these reviewed literatures will be analyzed to reveal why and how, if at all, Africana thinkers have developed work that contributes to the construction of its own disciplinary space—with its concomitant methodological considerations.

\textbf{Articulating Intellectual Genealogies: An Approach}

\begin{quote}
Ankh pu peret. (Life is a cycle.)
-A Debate Between a Man and His Ba\textsuperscript{137}

There is the undeniable continuum that has its roots in African rhythm; there is the undeniable genealogy of African rhythm in the New World.
-Jon Michael Spencer, \textit{The Rhythm of Black Folk}\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

For Africana Studies, approaches to developing intellectual history must be rooted in the ways in which African people make sense of the world. Kwasi Wiredu, Marimba Ani, Oyeronke Oyewumi, Bagele Chilisa, and many others, have gestured to the importance of linking techniques for theorizing and discussing Africana phenomena to

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\textsuperscript{136.} Cedric Robinson, \textit{Black Marxism}, 175.
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concepts which can be organically extracted from their cultural foundation. Oyeronke Oyewumi asserts:

> It is precisely because African intellectuals accept and identify so much with European thinking that they have created African versions of Western things. They seem to think that the European mind-set is universal and that, therefore, since Europeans have discovered the way the world works and have laid the foundations of thought, all that Africans need to do is to add their own “burnt” bricks on top of the foundation.

This theme has reverberated throughout this chapter and in Africana Studies discourse writ large, but this dissertation as an exemplar of disciplinary Africana Studies, should include an articulation of how it attempts to exemplify culturally determined methods for producing knowledge.

The technique for generating the following literature review relies on an interpretive format that is reified through various exemplars and rooted in the emphasis on the theme of connectedness, as understood through the concepts of repetition and improvisation, and finally linked to the idea of “re-membering.” These, we shall term “methodological principles,” and will discuss below. Before discussing them however, the outer framework for the approach employed in this dissertation will proceed as follows.

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139. On the use of exogenous cultural ideas in African-centered knowledge production see inter alia Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1996), 45-153. Marimba Ani has provides perhaps the most comprehensive work surrounding the use of Western tools to guide and explain African phenomena in her seminal text, Yurugu: An African-Centered Critique of European Behavior (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1994). Oyeronke Oyewumi, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) and Bagele Chilisa, Indigenous Research Methodologies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012) have applied these various impulses to important ideas in gender discourse and research methodologies, respectively. An extended examination of other texts within this vein will be included in Chapter Seven.

140. Oyeronke Oyewumi, The Invention of Women, 19.

141. See note 42.
This overarching methodological orientation borrows heavily from Cedric Robinson’s analytical reading of Black radicalism, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (1983). This dissertation only reviews relevant literatures in the development of a schema for articulating a unique Africana Studies intellectual history and is therefore not an in-depth analysis of neither Western nor African intellectual traditions. The review, however, is premised on Robinson’s method of first clarifying elements of Western intellectual traditions, before exploring the characteristics of African cultural thought and practice. Many of the intellectual histories authored over the course of the last few centuries with Africans as their subjects have relied too heavily on Western structures of knowledge, while disciplinary histories of Africana Studies have relied too heavily on its assumed indebtedness to traditional (Western) disciplines. The practice of situating Western concepts, including its disciplinary history as autochthonous and a distinct range of practices, contingencies, and environments, will allow us to better understand the African confrontation with it. As Robinson does for Western radicalism, this work attempts to clarify some of the origins of Western disciplinary and intellectual traditions.

The other major methodological influence is Robinson’s anchoring of individual intellectuals to group consciousness and worldviews. In *Black Marxism*, the explanation of

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142. In the preface to this volume, Robinson telegraphs the methodological approach which grounds the work stating that the work sought to show that the impetus for Black radicalism was much more than the simple negation of capitalism. Therefore, it was important to suspend the idea of Black radicalism as a simple “construct of historical materialism” and to examine it on “its own terms.” See, Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism*, xxxv. See also the author’s discussion of this idea in Robinson’s work elsewhere, Joshua Myers, “The Scholarship of Cedric J. Robinson,” 50.

143. This involves but is not limited to attempts to fit rhythms of African deep thought into disciplinary conceptual boxes. These studies will be explored in Parts III and IV of this dissertation.
the Black Radical tradition is first rooted in “folk” traditions and the intelligentsia is understood as a symbiotic relationship to the former. As Africans encountered Western structures of knowledge, they encountered them not as *tabulae raeae*. They brought their own deep thought systems with them, ultimately changing the nature of the various modes of inquiries and methodological approaches. Similar to Robinson’s use of exemplars, thinkers explored in this literature review will be anchored to a community of meaning and their relationships to academia will be understood in the context of their attempts to either understand more fully or act as representatives of this community. In other words the African intellectual workers discussed here are understood to be literal representatives of the attempt to embody the character of larger swaths of African cultural/intellectual work, what Ngugi wa Thiong’o calls, “the collective griot, the keepers of communal memory.”

Fundamental to our understanding of this macro-approach are the other three principles which derive directly from African ways of knowing and interpreting phenomena. In discussing the relevant literatures, these three ideas will be drawn upon to frame the presentation of the various ideas to be discussed in these sources. These principles represent what Amadou Hampate Ba calls “the living tradition” of Africana

144. On these exemplars, Robinson writes: “But always we must keep in mind that their brilliance was also derivative. The truer genius was in the midst of the people of whom they wrote. There the struggle was more than words or ideas but life itself.” *Black Marxism*, 184. See also, Joshua Myers, “The Scholarship of Cedric J. Robinson,” 58-63.

145. It will be argued over the course of this review that most early thinkers understood this to be their raison d’être. The importance of these sorts of exemplars in Africana Studies is forcefully argued and applied to W.E.B. Du Bois and Anna Julia Cooper in James B. Stewart, “The Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois for Contemporary Black Studies” and Shirley Moody-Turner and James B. Stewart, “Gendering Africana Studies: Insights from Anna Julia Cooper,” *African American Review* 43 (Spring 2009): 35-44.

intellectual work; they are ways of knowing directly related to techniques for acquiring knowledge that are still vibrant among Africana communities.\textsuperscript{147}

The first principle underlying this approach is the notion of connectedness—an idea animated by the notion that everything in the universe is linked. While not the first to articulate the importance of this idea, this work must directly follow the lead of Ayi Kwei Armah, who links the theme or concept of connectedness to methods of African knowledge production. His memoir, \textit{The Eloquence of the Scribes} (2006), shows the operation of this concept in many different epochs and genres of African literary production.\textsuperscript{148} Connectedness does not operate solely in what Western thinkers would consider, the practice of literature; it orders consciousness on a more structural level, contextualizing various knowledges ranging from the very pragmatic to the abstract, the material as well as the ideal. As such, Africans have understood the need to rely on and ensure that “all beings and things in the universe, visible and invisible” were connected to establish order.\textsuperscript{149} It is a principle that seeks to generate knowledge by understanding how the germ of a topic or problem is connected to the soil in which it is planted.

\textsuperscript{147} Encapsulated in the title of Ba’s work is that idea that the role of dieli as an intellectual worker is indeed a tradition that has survived colonization. See the discussion of this seminal article in note 111. Michael Gomez, among others, contends that these traditions survived the Middle Passage, while Greg Carr and other foundationalist thinkers have asserted that the ideas grounding them still survive in the contemporary moment. See Michael Gomez, \textit{Exchanging Our Country Marks}, 280-281 and Greg Carr, “Inscribing African World History,” 21. A more detailed examination of Carr, Gomez, and Cedric Robinson’s approaches to Africana intellectual traditions will be examined in Chapter Eleven.


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, 211. There are various ways in which Africans ensured that these connections were intact. Armah takes the example of African funerary practices as well as the Famine Stele of Kemet. In his discussion of the dieli, Ba discusses the importance of connectedness [actualized via speech] in
This dissertation grapples with the plausibility of applying this technique for understanding phenomena to various “conceptual” universes and intellectual soils. In this dissertation, the historical literature on disciplinary construction and African intellectual thought is presented with an analysis of how particular ideas, problems, or innovations are connected to antecedent traditions to explain how they have emerged in the “here and now.” More important than discussion arguing for a connection is the literature that attempts to explain how these ideas are connected. The question of how divulges the epistemological norms and methodological techniques that have survived and are important to contemporary discussions, as well as future ones.

The current effort applies Armah’s notion of connectedness in a manner that should not be conflated with tendencies within Western approaches to intellectual history (or “history of ideas”\textsuperscript{150}) to emphasize connections or lineages only to construct a genealogy of Western thought—an approach which also includes tendencies for constructing the same genealogies by emphasizing the uniqueness of intellectual movements as “history-less” or “self-generated.”\textsuperscript{151} What should be taken from Armah’s discussion is

\textsuperscript{150} On the differences which amount to essentially the unit of analysis, see Maurice Mandelbaum, “The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy,” \textit{History and Theory} 5 (1965): 33-66.

\textsuperscript{151} Within the disciplinary confines of Western intellectual history, the search for connections is more or less the identification of the origins, \textit{zeitgeist}, and social relations necessary to identify particular ideas, disciplines, or movements. According to Leonard Krieger, the approaches to intellectual history are linked to two broad traditions represented by a socio-historical approach and a philosophical approach. Thus, the five dominant contemporary schools of intellectual historical
that within African cultural logic, intellectual precursors (ancestors, but also divinities and deities) have very real and clear roles to play in the perpetuation of conscious attempts to fashion societies.\textsuperscript{152} Connectedness gives us access to the ways in which particular concepts were originally conceived, adapted, and context for their contemporary appearances.

This frame, regardless of the society or group being discussed, generates the following first-order query: How do thinkers appropriate or rely on these sorts of connections to both establish identities and resolve problems (of knowledge)? Such a question goes a long way to contextualizing how “historical forms of producing knowledge” (to use Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan’s terminology) are similar and dissimilar throughout various epochs and cultural transitions, while clarifying their origins.\textsuperscript{153}

This theme, gleaned from Armah’s own search for intellectual clarity, guides

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\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{152} Western traditions have emphasized purely secular approaches to the history of thought since the early modern era, see Leonard Krieger, “The Autonomy of Intellectual History,” \textit{Journal of the History of Ideas} 34 (Oct.-Dec. 1973): 499-516. Western traditions have emphasized purely secular approaches to the history of thought since the early modern era, see Leonard Krieger, “The Autonomy of Intellectual History,” 501-502. While the role of the “unseen” is clearly no longer part of the enterprise, the methodological ascription of the role of precursors in establishing continuity has increasingly become an option, see notes 110 and 131.

For the African intellectual historian, neither can be questioned. Armah takes the example of the role of the intellectual, Imhotep and the deities Khnum and Hapi in solving the problem of the inundation of the Nile. Ayi Kwei Armah, \textit{The Eloquence of the Scribes}, 215-217. In another variation of African intellectual traditions, (and one which can be considered more germane to this dissertation) books [the intellectual production of individuals] themselves are considered ancestral monuments—important markers for not just personal memories, but didactic and philosophical purposes. See the ancient Kemetic text entitled, “The Immortality of Writers,” in \textit{Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings Volume II: The New Kingdom}, ed. Miriam Lichtheim (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 175-178.

\item\textsuperscript{153} As stated earlier, following Ellen Messer-Davidow, et al., a “discipline” is only one form that production of knowledge has assumed in human history; not an assumed entity that has always existed. See note 18.
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the current analysis of literatures that trace the birth of disciplines and contextualizes African intellectual thought.

Secondly, with regard to the discussion of African thinkers, this dissertation relies on the approach to cultural memory discussed in the section above: repetition and improvisation. Fully articulated in Greg Carr’s forthcoming, “Inscribing African World History: Intergenerational Repetition and Improvisation of Ancestral Instructions,” this idea will ground attempts to characterize African thought as a long-view, macro-conversation. Thus, it takes the current period (for Africans, the *maafa*) as an episodic challenge, one fraught with many challenges, namely the disruption (albeit, temporal) of autonomous systems and institutions of African thought and meaning-making.\(^{154}\) Stated another way, the present episode in the Africana experience has been what Immanuel Wallerstein has called, “the age of Europe.”\(^{155}\) The reduction of cycles of human history into “episodes” clarifies historical trajectories and allows for greater flexibility in generating discussions about and comparing major events in world history. For Carr, the “European incursion” generated a “macro challenge” with resulting “micro-episodic challenges,” many of which led to the transition of Africana Studies into the academy—a clear improvisation of earlier cycles of *Africans studying*.\(^{156}\)

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In this dissertation, the intellectual work of Africans which was generated within the context of the rise of the West will be understood and linked to earlier modes of thought—or other episodes of the African experience—showing how they both repeat and improvise upon an African foundation. This is similar to the first principle articulated above, but implicit in repetition and improvisation is the mechanism for contextualizing certain disruptions. These disruptions or “micro-episodic challenges” often make necessary the form of improvisation.

Many thinkers have contributed to this idea, including the aforementioned Cedric Robinson and Michael Gomez. Also important to this idea is the work of the Kongolesse thinker, Kimbwandende Kia Bunseki Fu-Kiau. His *African Cosmology of the Bantu-Kongo* (2001), which explores notions of life cycles, will be applied to the current discussion of intellectual productions among Africans in the contemporary era. In presenting the cosmological foundation of the Kongo peoples (graphically represented in the Kongo cosmogram), Fu-Kiau shows how this foundational idea is applied to all aspects of life, including marriage, social organization, and community development.157

He summarizes the Kongo orientation to life in the following manner,

> A human being’s life is a continuous process of transformation, a going around and around, Muntu ye zingu kiandi I madiedie ye nzungi a nzila. The human being is a kala-zima-kala, a living-dying-living-being. A being of continuous motion through four stages of balance between a vertical force and a horizontal force.158

According to Fu-Kiau, the horizontal forces which constitute and determine this process are the forces which order the lives and interactions of the living community members, 

157. On this aspect of the work of Fu-Kiau, see note 124.
while vertical forces determine and order the ancestral and “higher energy” ties to the community. In the current discussion of African intellectual productions, various generations of thinkers will be understood collectively as going through their own processes of transition (or episodic challenges) on both micro and macro and vertical and horizontal levels of analysis. Their collective kindoki (accumulated knowledge) will be understood as the product of the kala (birth/becoming), tukula (growth/maturity and acquisition of knowledge), and luwemba (descent and transmission of knowledge) process of various iterations of Africana intellectual genealogies.\textsuperscript{159} The “life” under examination will be the collective “life” of African thought; utilizing various measures (i.e., time, space, paradigm shifts) to determine the transition from the living and spiritual realms in various micro-episodes.\textsuperscript{160} Each iteration, each genealogy repeats, but it also improvises. In his discussion, Carr, in “Inscribing African World History” asserts that repetition embodies the practice that all members of the genealogy “do;” while improvisation embodies the unique contributions of individual thinkers and/or generations.\textsuperscript{161}

The use of Kongolese ways of understanding this particular topic is not arbitrary, given the importance and spread of their cosmological worldviews among Africans.

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\textsuperscript{159} These three cycles operate on both the realms of the living and the spirits (\textit{ku mpemba}) after one crosses the \textit{kahunga} line. Knowledge is acquired and transmitted in both arenas. See this discussion in \textit{Ibid}, 31-35.

\textsuperscript{160} Like many African traditions, the Kongo believe that there are records of these events: “The Kongo believe that individual people and nations have rolls of life [tuzingu] in the form of tapes that hold (imprint) records of all their deeds. Because of these rolls hidden in their beings, their past can be revealed, i.e. read like a book [zingumunwa],” Kimbwandende Kia Bunseki Fu-Kiau, \textit{African Cosmology of the Bantu-Kongo}, 36. The accumulated knowledge (kindoki) is a record of both individual and ancestral experiences. See \textit{Ibid}, 37-38. Clearly, this can applied to provide a literal example of how to understand [read] specific generations of African thinkers.

\textsuperscript{161} Repetition is literally and in the Ptahhotepian sense, “Repeating the speeches of those who have heard” and improvisation is using these speeches to “guide behavior.” See Greg Carr, “Inscribing African World History,” 12.
\end{flushleft}
throughout the Western hemisphere as well as the resonances with these ideas found throughout the continent of Africa. One such important resonance is the Kemetic tradition, embodied by the epigraph taken from the text, “A Debate Between a Man and His Ba.” While this text has been applied to various ideals and concepts, the idea implicit in the statement, “Life is a cycle,” is tied directly to the Kongo worldview as understood in the cosmogram.

The third and final principle relates directly to the nature of the “current improvisation” of Africans studying. This dissertation conceptualizes much of this tradition as an intellectual life cycle predicated on and characterized by the deliberate act of “re-membering.” Borrowing from Ngugi wa Thiong’o, in his *Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance* (2009), this idea reflects the need to re-member the dismembered. This involved the re-attachment of the fragmented, though still vibrant, African systems of knowing, history, and languages. Re-membering visions then are the quest to develop “out of the fragments and the observance of proper mourning rites” the “wholeness of a body re-membered with itself and with its spirit.” This is a need that has so occupied contemporary African intellectual movements and “has underlain African struggles since

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163. On this, Mario H. Beatty remarks: “But this forward movement is that each generation must respond to the unpredictable historical circumstances of their day and apply their own cultural principles to new historical situations, sometimes subtly transforming them in the process. But as the Ancient Egyptians say – and this text, “A Debate Between a Man and his Ba” says – life is a cycle. A basic nominal sentence: Ankh pu peret. Life is a cycle. That means that things are in constant motion; things are moving all of the time; we are all moving collectively together and our ancestors are part of that cycle with us.” See his, “To Whom Shall I Speak Today;” 9. On this text, see James P. Allen, *The Debate Between a Man and His Soul* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2011).

the slave trade.” Though Ngugi contextualizes this quest for wholeness within the modern era, it also has antecedents in other “times of trouble” in African history. The modern era of enslavement and colonialism is not, and Ngugi would likely agree, the first time that Africans were in need of “re-membering” or a renaissance. Jacob Carruthers in his work shows that there was a precedent for other renaissances (the weheme mesu), showing that there is much to gain in emulating these earlier iterations.

This predominant objective [renaissance] characterizes attempts by early, “pre-disciplinary” communities of thinkers operating within [Western] disciplines, to operate under different socio-political imperatives as well as the attempts to disengage these disciplines all together—in the liberation of African cultural thought. Intellectual work for the Africana intelligentsia, especially Robinson’s “radical intelligentsia” can be said to contribute to this purpose: it simply meant more. Thus, Africana Studies intellectual histories can be usefully construed as a re-membering vision.

This dissertation employs the latter three principles to guide the inclusion and analysis of the thinkers to be discussed in the balance of this work and Robinson’s methodological approach orders the general direction of both looking at Western thought and conceptualizing the origins of African influenced thought.

165. Ibid.
166. On other “times of trouble” in African world history and the cultural responses to them see Mario H. Beatty, “To Whom Shall I Speak Today,” 9-15.
168. Robinson’s text includes a lengthy quote from a conversation between C.L.R. James and Aime Cesaire which encapsulates the impulse to participate in practices which Ngugi wa Thiong’o would consider re-membering visions. Understanding their indoctrination in Western languages and culture was yoked to their capitalist oppression, the need to go beyond Western culture and re-member African culture became essential. See Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism, 183.
I. Limitations of the Review

Just as simple chronological ordering of African thought is fraught with some conceptual flaws, the approach outlined here has several potential drawbacks. Obviously in developing the approach, the author has attempted to mitigate these various limitations. It is important then, to briefly articulate them and discuss how they have been addressed.

First, is the expansiveness of the review. While the techniques outlined above are designed to militate against the impossible task of developing an in-depth analysis of every piece of information available, the potential to miss an essential component still persists. In the academy, the idea of taking the “intellectual traditions of Africa” as a conceptual starting point for the Africana experience has generated problems for many scholars.\(^{169}\)

Many of these stem from the racist assumption that African knowledges are somehow inferior. The manifestations, however, of this assumption are charges of “anti-intellectualism” or “essentialism” among thinkers attempting to define and apply studies of the African world experience to contemporary realities. Notable attempts to charge these sorts of works as “anti-intellectual” or “anti-historical” are: Clarence Walker, *We Can't Go Home Again: An Argument About Afrocentrism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Stephen Howe, *Afrocentrism: Mythical Pasts and Imagined Homes* (London: Verso, 1999), Yacov Shavit, *History in Black: African-American in Search of an Ancient Past* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), and Tunde Adeleke, *The Case Against Afrocentrism* (Oxford, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2009). More pertinent are the critiques of African-centered knowledge production which analyze these works under the assumption that Africa can indeed be the conceptual starting point for African-based intellectual work. These critiques are approached under a different banner and include: Kwesi Otabil, *The Agonistic Imperative: The Rational Burden of African-Centeredness* (Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, 1994), Lucius T. Outlaw, “Afrocentricity: Critical Considerations,” in *The Companion to African American Philosophy*, eds. Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2003), 155-167 and Joyce A. Joyce, “African-Centered Scholarship: Interrogating Black Studies, Pan-Africanism, and Afrocentricity,” in *Decolonizing the Academy: African Diaspora Studies*, ed. Carole Boyce Davies (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), 125-148. Of these works, perhaps it is Otabil’s which contributes an important analysis of how African-centered work could meet the rational demands of “world-building,” utilizing Kemetic foundations and other autonomous sources of African deep thought: “The point is that Kemeticism is not only rationally commendable in terms of mental economy; it is also strategically fitting. For it carries the polar potential for sustainable world-building.” Kwesi Otabil, *The Agonistic Imperative*, 22. By outlining the “loose ends of Afrocentrism,” this work goes a long way in clarifying paths to African-centered praxis, in the spirit of Cheikh Anta Diop, among others. Finally, normative academic practice necessitates the conceptual beginning of knowledge in an

\(^{169}\) Many of these stem from the racist assumption that African knowledges are somehow inferior. The
While it is clear that the fight to assert that Africans were in fact, human, has been a mighty battle, the larger war which has generated more confusion revolves around the basic question: What sorts of humans are they? The potential limitation of casting too wide a net or the projecting of a monolithic or composite African may initially be of concern. However, charges of essentialism aside, this dissertation necessarily posits that in answering the question quoted above, none other than Jon Michael Spencer’s evocation of the consistent rhythm of African cultural unity provides conceptually the constitution of African deep thought—the starting point. The possibility of defining specific cultural manifestations, emerging out of the native traditions of African thought will frame the discussion of intellectual work in different generational episodes. Reified, many of these cultural manifestations may appear to be different, and have been considered such in traditional disciplines.

Relatedly, this dissertation does not assert that biology determines the nature of intellectual work. Rather, the identification of cultural norms which are often implicated in various texts (written or performed) and can be accessed and defined, are what

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constructed Western intellectual genealogy, beginning in Greece. History has shown that any practice going beyond this conceptual box, was and continues to be deemed academically suspect. The appropriation of an “essentialized” Greece is rarely questioned. On this idea see inter alia, Clyde Taylor, *The Mask of Art*, 20-22; 41-52. The trajectories of these various ideas will comprise sections of this dissertation.

170. These are the ideas of Cedric J. Robinson. See *Black Marxism*, 125.
172. Jon Michael Spencer argues that what forms the core of African American humanity—how they make sense of the world—is the idea of rhythmic confidence. Based on the creolization of African precursors, the idea of rhythm is applied to not only to Black music, but to the entirety of African intellectual work. Spencer’s non-essentialist reading of African culture relies on rhythm as not the origin of “negritudnal” African sensuality or unreasoned thought, but the exact opposite, the force which allowed African Americans the ability to resist. This collective character of resistance seen in the New World African is the combinations of various African ethnicities, which suggests a cultural unity of the African continent. See Jon Michael Spencer, *The Rhythm of Black Folk*, 1-45.
determines its nature. Clearly, as John Henrik Clarke has stated, the notion of an underlying strain of continuity does not suggest the sameness of all African peoples. This work of identification and definition is ongoing, but preliminary work suggests that the evidence of such unities is there. The assertion and application of cultural unity is not simply an exercise in claiming Africanness, rather it is a methodological technique which can ground approaches to acknowledging and distinguishing the constituting rhythms of African deep thought and also how they affect notions of reality. This dissertation is an attempt to clarify this rhythm of deep thought, as it exists in Africana intellectual work in order to contextualize the discussion of continuity and change in the expansiveness that is the intellectual tradition of Africa and her children abroad.

Secondly, the author is not proficient in the necessary amount of languages. As such, this review relies mostly on secondary texts in English. Much of the works which constitute important primary renderings of formative ideas, are, however based in a range of languages including Greek, Latin, the Romance languages, Medu Netcher (Ancient Kemetic), and Ki-Kongo, among others. With regard to African languages this is especially important, given the inability of English to fully clarify the rhythms, which speak to the important continuities that characterize Africana intellectual work.

173. Jacob Carruthers, Greg Carr, and Robert Farris Thompson are among the thinkers involved in attempts to access and define these cultural norms. Carruthers has linked them most closely to the question of contemporary [the past two centuries] intellectual work. See his Mdw Ntr, 14-31, as well as Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 156-192, which extends this analysis to historical thought, and Robert Farris Thompson, African Art in Motion: Icon and Act (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 1-45, which develops a sense of how they manifest in cultural meaning-making systems.


175. Ngugi wa Thiong’o, inter alia, has long asserted the insufficiency of colonial languages. Calling first for the resurrection of the uses of African languages, then for translation between these
Without an African lingua franca, the easy move to connect African thought to the language of common academic use, and the cultural imperative and lexicon which grounds it, is often made. As a consequence, this dissertation relies heavily on sites of non-academic discourse as sources for generating meaning as well as on thinkers who have studied and written in multiple languages. The former provides a means of proximity to African deep thought, especially among the “common folk,” while the latter provides access to important comparative studies as well as non-English texts.  

This is directly related to the third limitation, which is the usage of certain terminologies. Many concepts are rooted in certain particularities which render the application to other contexts, sometimes tenuous, other times ineffective or inappropriate. This dissertation attempts to grapple with many of these concepts by articulating clear working definitions of these troublesome ideas where necessary. Relatedly, it does not replace European words with African words without the needed context necessary for the use of African terms. This is not a dissertation that searches for the African corollary to languages and others, and the development of multiple centers for global exchange—on the native speaker’s terms. See Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature (Oxford: James Currey, 1981), 27-30; Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance, 78-98; and Globalactics: Theory and the Politics of Knowing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 44-62. Kimbwandende Kia Bunseki Fu-Kiau explains: “Africans, including those of African descent, must love the study of their languages if they wish to talk honestly about themselves and about what they are, for all systems’ codes of their society are coded (tied) in these languages. [makolo mama ma bimpa bia kimvuka kiau makangwa mu ndinga zozo]. These languages should be studied and used as languages of instruction in order to prove their scientific capacity [lendo kiau kianzayila].” (Emphasis mine), African Cosmology of the Bantu-Kongo, 9. The “scientific capacity” of African American Vernacular English (as well as other languages including Spanish, French, and Portuguese) is included under this rubric. See inter alia, Lisa Green, African American English: A Linguistic Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

On “common folk,” see Greg Carr, “Inscribing African World History,” 21. The scope of the African world is of course much larger than Anglophone territories. The work necessary in translating across these spaces has been usefully articulated in Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Something Torn and New, 78-98.

European knowledge traditions. It takes African deep thought as a self-generated set of particular knowledge foundations, and then attempts to apply these to later generations of African intellectual work in shifting landscapes, but with similar and common rhythmic properties.

The last limitation is related to the first three in that many ideas which constitute the review rely on thematic or conceptual categorizations that delink their appropriate character(s). As such, categorizations of various thinkers and institutions under disciplinary or ideological rubrics are employed more as a heuristic device than as signifiers of their raison d'etre. This is not a search for Africana contributions to established orders of knowledge. Rather, it is a reconceptualization of Africana contributions to human knowledge in general and Africana traditions in particular.

II. Organization of Chapters

This dissertation reviews various texts that congeal around the convergence of Africana Studies, intellectual genealogies, and disciplinarity in general. Its four parts are linked to the these four broad questions:

1) What guided academic disciplinary construction in the West/Europe?

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178. One of the more obvious of these categorizations and, one that figures immensely in the current effort, is the idea of “discipline.” Ellen Messer-Davidow, et al., states: “For only two centuries, knowledge has assumed a disciplinary form; for less than one, it has been produced in academic institutions by professional trained knowers. Yet we have come to see these circumstances as so natural that we tend to forget their historical novelty and fail to imagine how else we might produce and organize knowledge.” See Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, David J. Sylvan, “Preface,” vii.

179. As the quote in the previous footnote shows, it should not be assumed that current knowledge categorizations are universal or natural. They are established. Part of the project of Africana Studies is to resist the easy impulse to “reinscribe existing knowledge orders.” See Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not,” 188.
2) What was the epistemological nature and objectives of approaches to knowledge undertaken by Africans in the European modern era?

3) How have Africana Studies’ intellectual histories been approached?

4) What approaches from general African intellectual histories have implications for Africana Studies?

   a. Literature recounting the emergence of academic disciplines

   In Part I, “Disciplinarity and Western Intellectual Traditions,” the author will review works that provide context to the idea of academic disciplines within the Western academy. This is necessary for situating the emergence of disciplined thought in the West, showing its specific evolution and foundation. Texts that expound upon the emergence of the academy in general will serve as the general background to understanding that literature which undertakes the explanation or theoretical philosophy behind the structuring of categories of knowledge in the West. Chapter Two, “Adopted and Bequeathed: The Cultural Sources of Western Disciplinary Traditions,” reviews texts that expound on how foundational ideas were extracted from earlier civilizations and/or cultural configurations prior to the formation of Western university structures in the twelfth century B.C.E. Chapter Three, “Expanding the ‘City of God’: Situating Disciplinarity in the Development of the European University Culture,” explores works which detail how these foundational ideas were meshed with Christendom [and other traditions] at the birth of the university, and how that process led to the establishment of clear categories of knowledge as the university matured through the nineteenth century. Next, Chapter Four, “Knowledge Bricoleurs and Academic Professionalization: The
Patchwork Quilt of American Disciplinarity,” explores key texts that examine the relationship between these generative Western knowledges and American universities. With an understanding of the context and/or setting for the formulation of ideas in the West [the academy] and the structuring/demarcation of content areas, Chapters 2-4 will also proceed to discuss texts that serve as the general histories of the emergent academic disciplines exploring how thinkers have linked them to specific eras and/or geographical locations. In addition, Chapter Four will explore texts that attempt to provide the genealogical foundation to disciplines that have emerged on the heels of the traditional disciplines. These include but are not limited to Area Studies, Cultural Studies, American Studies, Gender Studies, and/or Ethnic Studies. It also examines works theorizing interdisciplinarity, its foundations and theoretical constructs. Africana Studies continues to be understood, in various circles, as the interdisciplinary application of social science and/or humanities disciplines to African content as well as one of the aforementioned new disciplines.\footnote{See Fabio Rojas, \textit{From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline} (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 184-206.} It is therefore necessary to understand their emergence vis-à-vis the traditions of Africana Studies.

b. Literature theorizing Africana Studies’ relationship to the disciplines

The idea of Africana Studies’ “inherent interdisciplinary” stems from the facile positioning of the enterprise as an extension of the Western academy. Though there is a substantial amount of secondary sources that attempt to understand how Africana content has been approached by various disciplines, Part II of this dissertation, “Africana Studies and Disciplinarity,” conceptualizes the African engagement with disciplinary
boundaries as a site of confrontation, the terms of which, in varying ways, stem from conceptual postures lodged in cultural particulars. Chapter Five, “Companions, Blood: Institutional Patterns of African Deep Thought,” creates a frame for understanding the roots of Africana (anti)disciplinary thinking in the West, by interrogating the works which seek to understand institutional sites of training and developing the basis for African ways of knowing as central to African intellectual praxis. This sets up our understanding of texts that reveal the nature of this confrontation, in Chapter Six, “Have We Any Rivers?: Pan-African Thought in Conversation with Western Disciplinarity, 1879-1965.” This chapter will explore works that examine individual thinkers, collective responses, and institutional imperatives that interrogate whether or not methodological tools of traditional disciplines can accurately reflect the experience of Africana peoples. This chapter will explore these sources, as they in many ways capture the idea that intellectual work within Western disciplinary boundaries often distorts the ways in which ideas about Africans are explained or analyzed. These discussions have long roots in the Africana intellectual experience. Though Chapter Six begins the discussion in extra-academic sites in the nineteenth century, it views this process as central to understanding Africana Studies’ institutionalization. Beginning with a discussion of the development of “Black” traditions in the disciplines in the 1970s, Chapter Seven, “Toward a Black University or White Studies in Blackface: The Genesis, Struggle, and Promise of Institutionalized Africana Studies Since 1965,” discusses attempts by Africana Studies to organize these areas (sites of confrontation) into a coherent paradigmatic unit. These emergent paradigms contain ideas about how to best situate the role of traditional disciplines within
Africana Studies. The institutionalization of Africana Studies created a space both entrusted with this tradition and burdened with its difficult implementation in a hostile environment. The works which accompanied this institutionalization are associated with the Afrocentric movement of the 1980s-forward, interdisciplinarity within Africana Studies, and other African-centered paradigms that attempt to de-center Western modes of inquiry within Africana intellectual work. These texts will be analyzed to ascertain their understanding of how traditions and genealogies of ideas influence the development of notions of disciplinarity in academic settings, ultimately revealing how these familiar intellectual formations attempted to offer alternative paradigms to Western constructions of knowledge within Africana Studies, in ways that were rooted in the earlier attempts discussed in Chapter Six.

c. Current Africana Studies intellectual and disciplinary histories

Academic disciplines within the academy generally have created narratives that recount their emergence into the academy as well as the articulation of a tradition (usually ancient) from which it is anchored. Part III, “Africana Studies’ Intellectual Histories” will compile the literature that has done so within Africana Studies. Chapter Eight, “Academic Black Power: Tracing Africana Studies Intellectual History in the Works of Noliwe Rooks, Fabio Rojas, and Martha Biondi,” will review the recent book-length quasi-histories of Africana Studies, which are attempts to place the protest movements of the 1960s into historical context, linking them to academic machinations and social movements theory, rather than expanded intellectual genealogies. Chapter Nine, “The “Integral Tradition:” Erecting a Foundation for Africana Studies,” expands
this literature by reviewing the scholarly articles that fit this bill, but also earlier articles that have attempted to expand the chronology of Africana Studies. These works in some respects imbibe the idea that intellectual tradition is wedded to an understanding of Africana Studies’ disciplinarity and how its relationship to the traditional disciplines is conceptualized. While general histories provide specific context as to how disciplines enter the academy, and more importantly the rationale for their entrance, works are reviewed in Part III to ascertain the level of importance given to the way in which the histories of the emergence of Africana Studies give credence to some of the intellectual traditions explained in Part II.

d. General intellectual histories of Africana thinkers

Part IV, “The Question of Approach,” will review works which seek to understand both Western intellectual history as well as works not explicitly tied to Africana Studies as a discipline, which are linked to various approaches of African intellectual genealogy. The former texts would suggest the complications resulting from too close a connection with Western methodologies within intellectual history, while the latter works will be reviewed as many of these texts could be utilized to explain the traditions from which Africana Studies emerged within academic institutions. Chapter Ten, “Anxious Confidence: Methodological Reflections in Western Intellectual History,” discusses works which conceptualize the practice of intellectual history from largely Western intellectual bases and assumptions. Chapter Eleven, “A First Order of Business: Greg Carr and Approaches to African Intellectual Genealogy,” adopts a typology extracted from Greg Carr’s 2011 essay, “What Black Studies is Not: Moving From Crisis
to Liberation in Africana Intellectual Work.”\textsuperscript{181} As a first order matter in delineating what Africana Studies is by disengaging what it is not, Carr begins with a useful frame for understanding how the African intellectual experience has been conceptualized. Works out of the five categories\textsuperscript{182} constructed to define these attempts will be clarified, extended, and evaluated in terms of their abilities to capture the meaning inherent in Africana intellectual traditions and their saliency for scholarship in Africana Studies. This dissertation and overarching work seeks to create out of the general postures of these current ways of writing Africana intellectual history, a theory by which to situate the different approaches, discussed by Carr within the disciplinary norms of Africana Studies.

**A Brief Note on the Significance of the Review**

There are currently no extended studies of the ways in which Africana Studies, as a discipline, can utilize African intellectual traditions in order to inform its theoretical and methodological considerations. This work is however, not the first to assert that we need more than ever, the methodological clarity and ways of approaching knowledge that makes the difference between Africana Studies and every other intellectual endeavor precise. Scores of thinkers, many of which comprise the balance of the work itself, have repeated this claim.

The significance of the current work lies in the fact that it is the first effort to bring these ideas together. The attempt to review literatures that link to an objective of viewing genealogies of African thought from which to extract these foundations in Africana


\textsuperscript{182} Ibid, 180-181. They are: The Black Radical Tradition approach, the Emic/Etic approach, the Alternative Epistemology approach, the Unbroken Genealogy approach, and the Sui Generis Approach.
Studies has not been attempted in the manner in which it will with this dissertation. This work contributes to the development of not only an Africana Studies intellectual history, but also as mentioned above, the conversations surrounding research methodology and disciplinarity. It is an Africana Studies dissertation; but one that seeks to “name the spaces” the discipline inhabits.

Finally, this dissertation and its accompanying bibliography can ultimately serve as a starting point for scholars seeking to understand the intersection of Africana Studies’ disciplinarity and intellectual traditions. These ideas are explicitly linked to the overarching task of generating methodological norms for engagement with African “deep thought” for the solving human problems; a collective contribution, which is still in the process of being made with many thinkers associated with and only loyal to the disciplinary project of Africana Studies.
Part One: Disciplinarity and Western Intellectual Traditions

Part I of this dissertation investigates works which reveal the nature of the methods and modes of inquiry, classifications, and philosophies that characterize discipline-based knowledge. This is important to both situating and contextualizing the emergence of institutionalized Africana Studies within already existing Western structures of knowledge. By framing disciplinary conventions as part of a long-view Western tradition, the emergence of Africana Studies as a distinct intellectual endeavor can be appreciated. The genesis of the Western intellectual system is often conflated with or as a universal system(s) of knowledge, despite the particular events that caused its emergence. As stated in Chapter One, many academics assume the universality of discipline-based structures, oftentimes not aware of its very short history.¹

Possibilities for generating and appreciating knowledge from non-academic (university-contrived) sources become more apparent once the foundations for the current academic forms of producing knowledge are clarified. Africana Studies, itself, has challenged the avowed familiarity with the existing classifications of knowledge, often defying and/or proving difficult for university administrators to classify it. This idea, however, is more of an ancillary outcome of the current inquiry; as it is clear that for Africana Studies to truly be such, a rationale for developing [new] ways of generating knowledge outside of Western strictures is synonymous with its rationale for existence.²

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2. Many thinkers, including Vivian Gordon, William Little, James Turner, Molefi Kete Asante, and James Stewart have linked Africana Studies to this “[new] way of generating knowledge.” Though
The larger purpose of Part I boils down to understanding how theorists, commentators, and the academic structure writ large, historically identify, in particular, how knowledge is classified and organized, so that the appearance of academic disciplines in Western intellectual traditions can be better understood and later contrasted with Africana Studies’ representative intellectual traditions (or disciplinarity) in not only the academy, but wherever these knowledges were/are generated and used. In other words, the question is not simply what necessitated the creation of disciplines, though this is crucial. But more broadly, it is the interrogation of the assumptions about knowledge and reality that were sustained and cemented via the development of these disciplines.  

What, then, are the key moments and movements which writers have identified as providing the theoretical and foundational thrusts to classifications of knowledge and meanings of reality in the present-day academy?

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3. They articulate it in different ways, it is clear, as Greg Carr asserts, that Africana Studies does not exist to “re-inscribe existing knowledge orders.” Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not: Moving from Crisis to Liberation in Africana Intellectual Work,” *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (March 2011): 188. See Chapter One and Part II for these discussions.

3. This necessarily engages with the macro-question of what David Oldroyd has termed “metascience” in the West. In his usage, the term denotes the “history of the philosophy and methodology of science.” Disciplinary construction and identities are in many ways indistinguishable from the dynamism within Western metascience. See David Oldroyd, *The Arch of Knowledge: An Introductory Study of the History of the Philosophy and Methodology of Science* (New York: Methuen, 1986), 2.
Chapter 2
Adopted and Bequeathed: The Cultural Sources of Western Disciplinary Traditions

The cultural and pedagogic tradition of antiquity and of the early Middle Ages bequeathed to the universities, along with this rigid classifications of the disciplines, the idea that there was a hierarchy among the disciplines themselves.
- Jacques Verger, “Patterns”

I. The “New” University and its Genetic Makeup

There are many works that attempt an understanding of the process by which Western intellectual traditions emerged, as well as how this tradition was envisaged by way of the creation of academic disciplines. The latter is more closely associated with the history of universities. Disciplinariness, the social and epistemological classifications and territorial boundaries of knowledge, though influenced by important precursors, has its genesis in the studium generale and the universitas, which became dominant by the thirteenth century.  

While inextricably linked to Western philosophy, the emergence of academic disciplines is traced to the development of higher education in the West. As Walter

5. Verger explains that the term universitas was the more common term, as opposed to studium generale, the latter being a form of higher education, which derived its status from papal or municipal authorities. There were a number of forms of higher education that could be considered studium generale. The universitas however, was a corporate body of students (universitas scholarium) or students and teachers (universitas magistrorum et scholarium) organized specifically for higher education. They were distinguished in a number of ways from the cathedral, municipal, studia of the mendicant order, and private law schools in that they had the right to confer qualifications, among other characteristics. See the discussion of Jacques Verger, “Patterns,” in Ibid, 35-38. The universities of Bologna, Paris, Oxford, Montpellier, Padua, and Cambridge, have been consistently shown to be crucial early models. See Ibid, 47-55.
Rüegg, the general editor of the multi-volume *A History of the University in Europe* explains, it was the university idea that not only has transmitted the entire corpus of methodical intellectual disciplines, but also the institutions which housed the development of the European intellectual tradition as well as intra-European identity. Commissioned by the Conference of European Rectors, the multi-volume *A History of The University in Europe*, edited by Hilde De Ridder-Symoens and Rüegg, is a series of essays devoted to understanding aspects of the history of European university construction. Each volume in this history includes a section that assesses the impact of the curricular and disciplinary models as they emerged in the university.

The first volume of the series (1992) treats the evolution of the university during the Middle Ages, the era, which according to the contributors is its birth. What seems to be an academic consensus is Walter Rüegg’s assertion in “Themes,” that essential features of the university’s “intellectual substance” but not necessarily their “organizational form,” were borrowed from antiquity and early Christendom. This contention is echoed in the following chapter, “Patterns,” by Jacques Verger as well as the chapters on the seven


liberal arts, authored by Gordon Leff and John North. Verger’s “Patterns” explores university creation within the context of the extensive tradition of the *studium* and *universitas scholarium* or *universitas magistrorum et scholarium* in medieval Europe. Turning to the university’s structure during this period, Verger explains the nature of the four faculties, asserting that they were “structured in terms of pedagogic conceptions and classifications of knowledge which the twelfth century had bequeathed to them and which were often of a much more ancient provenance.”

Of the traditional four faculties, which also included law, medicine, and theology, it was the arts and philosophy faculties that set the foundation from which the humanities and social sciences would emerge in the modern era. A more recent essay by Steven P. Marrone, appearing in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (2003) explains that this “foundational” faculty “developed out of the traditional trivium and quadrivium but including a more varied selection from what would be thought of today as philosophy and natural science…”

Much of the scholarship on medieval university curriculum concurs with Verger’s conclusion that both twelfth century influences and an “ancient provenance” provided the medieval schools with an idea of how to classify, organize, and conduct intellectual work within a fixed list of disciplines. The edited volume, *The Seven Liberal Arts in The Middle Ages* (1983), devoted to the explication of the aforementioned *trivium* and *quadrivium*, is one such scholarly work. Edited by David L. Wagner, this text devotes a chapter each to the seven liberal arts, bracketed by theoretical treatments of their role within the

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evolution of Western intellectual thought in the medieval era. Wagner’s introductory chapter establishes fundamental ideas about the arts, their origins, and the intellectual machinations that propelled their extension into the medieval era.\textsuperscript{14} In this chapter entitled, “The Seven Liberal Arts and Classical Scholarship,” Wagner charts the genealogy of the seven liberal arts through antiquity to the high Middle Ages, showing the various transitions and roles of the intellectuals and academics who in many ways attempted to carry forth the tradition of ancient philosophy to the university. From Wagner’s work we can glean three broad currents of activity that allowed the “ancient provenance” in Verger’s terms, to set the foundation for the study of the arts in the medieval university: 1) the development of Greek and Roman philosophy and pedagogic structures; 2) the dissemination and initial preservation of these ideas by Latin encyclopedists; and 3) the infusion of ancient scholarship with the doctrines of Christian theology.\textsuperscript{15} The following is a discussion of texts that treat these three formative stages as sources for the study of the arts and later the development of academic philosophy—the foundation and source of most disciplines—while offering brief treatments of the original texts and thinkers that set this foundation.

II. The Intellectual Contents of the Classical Tradition

The ideational development of Western intellectual thought relies upon its relationship to what many scholars have for a number of reasons called, “the classical tradition.” While variously defined, our working idea of “classical” relies on the combined

\textsuperscript{14} David L. Wagner, “The Seven Liberal Arts and Classical Scholarship,” in Ibid, 1.

\textsuperscript{15} Wagner’s chapter is divided into five sections to provide an in-depth analysis of the history of the arts. Under the broad, three-part outline explained above, two sections in Wagner’s text are devoted to development of Greek scholarship (part one) and two are devoted to the infusion of ancient scholarship into Christian philosophy (part three).
perspectives of the editors of the recent *The Classical Tradition* (2010). In the preface to this research guide, the editors, operating under the assumption that Graeco-Roman antiquity has been misunderstood as well as the need to reimagine its post-classical world, view the classical traditions as “not only the texts, but also the images and objects, the ideas and institutions, the monuments and cultural artifacts, the rituals and practices that have so profoundly influenced the Western world and some non-Western ones.”\(^{16}\)

As James I. Porter outlines in the overview to the edited work *Classical Pasts* (2003), what actually counts as classical is a question both “overdetermined (it is contaminated, historically with layers of attempts to put the question)” and “undetermined (no, answer, empirical or theoretical, can ever satisfy the demand, so to speak, that is written into the question).”\(^{17}\) As an “insoluble” definition, it is perhaps most useful to implicate, not definitions of the classical, but how the these definitions have been “made and remade, how they came to be conceived, institutionalized, and in various ways challenged.”\(^{18}\)

Regardless of the group under question, narratives of intellectual evolution and genealogy


\(^{17}\) James I. Porter, “What is ‘Classical’ About Classical Antiquity?” in *Classical Pasts: The Classical Traditions of Greece and Rome*, ed. Idem (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 3; 10-11. This “inherent inarticulateness” or “nonlocability” is according to Porter, a cultural and ideological imperative that relies on the “self-evidence” of artifacts, texts, et al. as classical. See Ibid, 11; 22-26. He further states: “One possibility is that both the allures of high culture and the aims of the political realities underlying them are *facilitated* by the aesthetic qualities that are conferred upon them through the classical, and in two ways. At times the aesthetic connotations may serve to deflect from the ideological pressures of classicism and the classical: busying ourselves with timeless beauty, we are permitted to ignore the contingences that make this perception possible. At other times classical aesthetics serves precisely to enhance our experience of what is at bottom an ideological formation, which now can be felt as uplifting, sublime, sacred, and so on.” Ibid, 11-12. Clyde Taylor in an earlier text discusses these cultural and ideological ramifications of the “classical” in aesthetically formulated, and later, racial hierarchies. See Clyde R. Taylor, *The Mask of Art: Breaking the Aesthetic Contract—Film and Literature* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 23-52.

necessarily occupy important places in the constructions of intellectual identities. For what we have been calling “the West”—the knowledge complex centered on and influenced by (Western) European thought—this intellectual genealogy includes the Graeco-Roman philosophical foundation as well as the early Christian philosophical traditions, as outlined by Jacques Verger.

a. Graeco-Roman Pedagogical and Philosophical Foundations

While the Graeco-Roman model of approaching and executing intellectual work has been emulated across Western institutions of knowledge, it must be clarified here that it is neither the sole preserve of the West or an indigenous contributor to the idea of Europe. The German scholar Helmut Heit explains the propensity for the West to adopt the Graeco-Roman classical tradition in the following manner:

Western culture likes to see itself as the legitimate beneficiary and caretaker of certain cultural achievements, which are Greek in origin but are of universal value; and it bases its identity to an important extent on this belief. The Greeks defined themselves in the binary mode of Us and Them, and the West has adopted this classificatory system. Whereas the Greeks are understood as the resourceful creators of the Western tradition, the non-Greek cultures were kept outside as barbarophoni, unintelligible.

19. As will be shown, what Western scholars have termed the classical tradition had been extended in other parts of the world in both antiquity and the centuries that followed. Perhaps the key evidence supporting this idea of “constructedness” is the relationship between modern (Enlightenment era) Greece and the rise of the West. The shifting boundaries of that which constitutes the idea of Europe only belatedly incorporated modern Greece, though it continued to claim ancient Greece as part of its heritage. Further, Greek nationalists of the Enlightenment era were able to garner support for their fitness to be European based on their own (hereditary) claims to the traditions so cherished by the Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers. On the relationship between contemporary Greece and modern constructions of European nationalism(s) see Stathis Gourgouris, *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996) and Peter Bein, “Inventing Greece,” *Journal of Modern Greek History* 23 (October 2005): 217-234. On the idea of the construction of “the West” and Europe, see inter alia Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (London: Verso Books, 1988) and Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of the Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

Heit’s work suggests that the evolutionary flow of reason from Greece, is more a ideological construction, one necessarily rooted in claiming the “Eurocentric” origins of reason. Graeco-Roman civilization, then, is part of what Jacob H. Carruthers has termed “tri-continental antiquity,” and a Mediterranean civilizational complex, which has been both a beneficiary and donor of various important philosophical ideas. Its donation to the West has been constructed as more than simply “foundational;” as Heit and other shows, it is seen as natively and culturally yoked to European civilization.

21. The idea of borrowing does not suggest that the worldviews of peoples on all three “continents” were the same or similar. On “tri-continental antiquity,” See Jacob Carruthers, “An African Historiography for the Twenty-First Century;” in The African World History Project: The Preliminary Challenge, eds. Jacob H. Carruthers and Leon C. Harris (Los Angeles: Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations, 1997), 55. Helmut Heit asserts that there are three tendencies among challengers to the Western construction of Greek identity. Of these is the assertion that Greek culture is derivative and not exceptional. See Helmut Heit, “Western Identity, Barbarism, and the Inheritance of Greek Universalism,” 735. African thinkers have long made this assertion and its recent explosion in the United States’ culture wars is overblown. Scholars as far back as David Walker in 1829 and including recent examinations such as those of George G.M. James, Cheikh Anta Diop, Henry Olela, and finally Martin Bernal show the intellectual debt Greece owes to Africa. Jacob Carruthers, elsewhere, however gives important context to the particularities of the debate and the hastily asserted idea of an African origin of Greek thought, stating that while Greeks may have “borrowed or stole” ideas from Africans regarding “history, the wisdom of governance, the philosophy of speech, the commitment to wisdom, mathematics, and the immortality of the soul,” they were not “brought lock, stock and barrel into the Greek and Eurasian formulations, rather they were culled, deformed, and rearranged [even deconstructed] to advance the projects of the Eurasians.” See Jacob Carruthers, Mdw Ntr: Divine Speech: A Historiographical Reflection of African Deep Thought From the Time of the Pharaohs to the Present (London: Karnak House, 1995), 36.

22. Heit clarifies the meaning and origin of what he, following others, terms, “Phil-Hellenism” in the following manner: “The story of the universal cultural achievements of Ancient Greece has been retold in the Western tradition ever since and, moreover, was used to construct a significant and superior cultural identity. Namely, the Romans in times of the Empire, ethnic Barbarians by definition, established the non-ethnic but cultural and normative reading of “Greeks” and “Barbarians” in order to attribute “Greekness” to themselves: being Greek by education and culture rather than by heredity. Such positions became dominant throughout the Western tradition. Hegel and his follower Eduard Zeller played an important part in constructing a continuous rational progression of Western thought that systematically excludes other cultures. Although there were always some who argued against it, the Eurocentric attitude dominated the scene, right from the beginning of modern handbooks on the history of philosophy in the early nineteenth century. Not later than these times Phil-Hellenism was used to construct a European, Occidental or Western identity.” Helmut Heit, “Western Identity, Barbarians, and the Inheritance of Greek
While appropriate hereditary and cultural links apply to Western intellectual histories the closer to the Middle Ages and the further West geographically one is situated, attached to most Western genealogical studies are extended examinations of Graeco-Roman thought and heritage, with little regard to the complexities which oversaw the transfer of these ideas to European universities in the Middle Ages. This methodological impulse has not only included the effective, socio-politically driven “whitening” of the arts, it has led to what Heit has described as the West’s self-appointment as the heir apparent to the rationality of Greek thought within Western intellectual histories.23 By exercising an exclusive claim to rationality, European thinkers had to also claim all other anterior “rationalist” knowledges. Many of these Western intellectual histories, which operate in this manner, are contained in the standard histories of Western philosophy.24

While more recent texts have modified the rhetoric asserting an intellectual, by virtue of a cultural and “hereditary” connection, as David Roochnick’s 2004 effort, *Retrieving the Ancients* exemplifies, they still unanimously view Greece as the “intellectual

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ancestors of the West.” 25 Roochnick’s text is a short discussion of the dialectical relationships between the West and of Greek philosophy, linked to the grounding assumption that Greek thought, as the West’s intellectual precursor, “may still have much to teach us today.” 26 This work has important ideological links to older perspectives of the innate relationship between the West and Greece such as John William Draper’s nineteenth century two volume, *The Intellectual Development of Europe* (1876), Bruno R. Snell’s *The Discovery of the Mind* (1948), Richard B. Onians’ *The Origins of European Thought* (1951), Ernest Hutten’s *The Origins of Science* (1962), Newton P. Stallknecht and Robert S. Brumbaugh’s *The Spirit of Western Philosophy* (1950), and David C. Lindberg’s *The Beginnings of Western Science* (1992). 27 Contemporary studies such as the popular 1991 works: Richard

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26. Ibid, 3. Roochnick develops an origin for rationality in Greek thinking viewing the European “moderns” and the Presocratics as the antithesis of Aristotelian thinking and concurrently, the postmodernists and the Sophists as the antithesis of Platonic thought. Part of recovering the ancients stems from a need to avert the crisis of what Edmund Husserl terms a “misguided rationalism” characterized by an overly mechanized conception of reality. See Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity,” quoted in Ibid, 3-5. Husserl’s contribution to early twentieth century philosophy began the process of re-inserting some sense of understanding phenomenon beyond the rote rationalism, which had characterized Western natural philosophy. See Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
27. In addition to the works listed in note 24, Draper’s 1876 study established basic continuities between Greek philosophy and Western thought that remain firmly entrenched in Western intellectual history. See John William Draper, *The Intellectual Development of Europe* (2 vols.) (New York: Harpers, 1876). The work of the German philologist Bruno R. Snell, the British classicist Richard B. Onians, and the British philosopher of science Ernest E. Hutten, cohere around the imperative narrative fusion of the Western intellectual tradition with ancient Greek thought, understanding the latter as its origin as opposed to its inspiration. The subtitles of each text encapsulate this notion (with the exception of Onians text, which includes it in the actual title). In differing ways and on different topics, these texts then locate an origin of a modern-European understood notion of Western notions of science within Greek first-order knowledge structures. See Bruno R. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* cited in note 24; Richard B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, The Mind, the Soul, The World, Time, And Fate* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1951); Ernest H. Hutten, *The Origins of Science: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Western Thought* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962); Newton P. Stallknecht and Robert S. Brumbaugh, *The Spirit of Western Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1950).
Tarnas’ *The Passion of the Western Mind* and Charles Van Doren’s *A History of Knowledge*, as well as Peter Watson’s 2006 comprehensive history entitled *Ideas* offer more nuanced approaches in their sweeping analyses of the complicated origins of European thought, though in many ways, the assumption of a relatively unbroken link remains intact.  

The actual terms of the European borrowings from Greece are important to consider. The foregoing works often served as methodological exemplars for more specialized studies of Greek and Roman thought. In this category, are works that serve to show the unique relationship between the nascent university model and Verger’s assertion of an “ancient provenance” of Graeco-Roman knowledge categorizations. In conceptualizing how this provenance may have operated in context, studies of education in antiquity can shed some light.

The evolution of Greek philosophy serves as the background for the study of the ways in which ancient Greek centers of learning were conceptualized and how they were operated. The most prescient studies of Greek philosophy include the standard works by William K.C. Guthrie and Reginald E. Allen, among countless others. In addition to expositions upon the ideas of philosophy in antiquity, these texts include examinations of

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the connection between Greek philosophy and Greek and Roman educational institutions.  

There are studies, however, that cover specifically how knowledge was organized and transmitted in ancient Greece and Rome. The literature which covers this era within the context of macro-histories of Western education is rather voluminous and include the seminal 1905 *A Text-Book in the History of Education* by Paul Monroe, the single-volume *A History of Western Education* (1947) by Harry G. Good, and Volume One of James Bowen’s three-volume, *A History of Western Education* (1972).  

Perhaps the most specialized and widely cited text of the twentieth century on the topic of classical education is the 1945 history authored by Henri I. Marrou. Translated into a number of languages since its initial publication in French, Marrou’s *A History of Education in Antiquity* is a comprehensive examination of educational institutions going as far back as the earliest evidences of systematic Greek pedagogy. Methodologically, the text asserts a civilizational trajectory enlivened by an educational transition from “warrior to scribe” that begins in a Greek lineage starting with Homer, and encompassing a

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29. These texts include profiles of ancient Greek philosophers and/or examinations of the connection between Greek philosophy and Greek and Roman educational institutions. William K.C. Guthrie’s six-volume work was composed over the course of nineteen years, and is the most comprehensive work in English on the history of Greek philosophy. Situating his exploration of Greek philosophy as the beginning of Western “rational thought,” Guthrie’s work is the systematic synthesis of the well-researched topic. Guthrie through the six volumes, traces Greek philosophical thought to the fifth century B.C.E Milesian schools through the Neo-Platonist era. See W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (6 vols.) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1962-1981.) A brief overview of the intellectual terrain of Greek philosophy can be found in Ibid., Vol. 1: *The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, 3-25. A brief overview can also be found in the introduction to Reginald Allen, ed., *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 1-23.

documented “unbroken” cultural tradition, though its final form does not occur until the end of the classical period (4th century B.C.E). The text is comprehensive in that it focuses broadly on all aspects and levels of education and expansive in that its scope is continuous from Homeric times to the end of the Roman Empire. Emphasizing the continuity of classical education, Marrou’s text is divided into three parts: 1) The Origins of Classical Education from Homer to Isocrates; 2) Classical Education in the Hellenistic Age; and 3) Classical Education in Rome.

*Greek Educational Structures: The Sophists, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle*

In Part I of *A History of Education in Antiquity*, we learn about the “ideal education” as it existed in Homeric times before a discussion and comparative analysis of the two cardinal poles of Spartan and Athenian educational thought. Marrou does not greatly modify the widely held contention that classical Spartan educational systems created “doers” (i.e. an emphasis on athletic and military education), while Athenian education would eventually move away from this standard to cultivate “thinkers” (i.e. an emphasis on the literary and liberal arts). Though Western thinkers value both of these traditions, our concern here is with the development of pedagogical and philosophical thought that

31. Henri I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), xiii-xv; 21. Marrou explains that despite the complexity of development “the subject is, however, more unified and more closely defined that we should expect, for the ancient Mediterranean world knew only one classical education, only one coherent and clearly defined educational system.” Ibid, xiii.

32. Ibid, 35-75. Mark Griffith, following other classicists, has more recently shown that the differences between these two ideal types has been perhaps overstated, in terms of their systemization. The similarities between classical Spartan and Athenian education, and Greece writ large were lodged in the common aristocratic ideology of Greece at the time. See Mark Griffith, “Public and Private in Early Greek Education,” in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 23-84.
the Athenian system (or thinkers in Athens) incubated. Of course, as Marrou as well as Martin L. Clarke’s *Higher Education in the Ancient World* (1981), inter alia indicate Athens was not the birth of educational or philosophical reflection. As is routine in ancient philosophical histories, histories of education in antiquity begin with discussions of the followers of Thales of Miletus as well as the Pythagorean “school,” although they distinguish these institutions from schools, in the later sense of the term. These nascent and informal institutions provided early homes to the Greek intellectual disciplines and were the direct precursors to the group of thinkers known as the Sophists, who were responsible for the shift in Athenian thinking.

This Athenian revolution in educational thinking wrought by the Sophists has been viewed as central to more than just educational theory. The voluminous literature on the Sophists links them to the genealogy of Greek philosophy as well as the disciplinary founders of one of the seven liberal arts: rhetoric. Concerned with and brought into being in large measure for the development of statesmen and civic needs in the changing

33. Classical Greek theorists (5th Century B.C.E.) were never able to institutionalize their ideas. This would only happen much later in Greek history. See Mark Griffith, “Public and Private Education in Early Greek Education,” 24.


35. On the Sophists as early practitioners of rhetoric, see George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition: From Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 29-36 and Henri Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 84-87, and Martin L. Clarke, *Higher Education in Antiquity*, 28-29. While scholars show that in antiquity, the practice of philosophy was distinct from the practice of rhetoric, the Sophists are routinely included in histories of Western and of Greek philosophy. These genealogical constructions seem to precede the recasting of Sophistic thought beyond simple rhetorical commitments (to be discussed infra), and cannot be said to have roots in that debate. See for example, Volume I of Frederick Copleston’s *A History of Western Philosophy*, and Volume III of Robert Guthrie’s *A History of Greek Philosophy*, discussed in notes 24 and 29, respectively.
Athenian landscape, the Sophists created a systematic educational structure based on the lecture, of which pupils were required to pay a fee.

Historians of classical Greek education, Frederick A.G. Beck and Werner Jaeger, along with Marrou and Clarke view these schools, linked to individual Sophists (akin to “collective tutoring”), as the dominant form of higher education during the classical era of Greece (5th Century B.C.E.).36 A general paucity of primary sources of the writings of Protagoras, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Critias, Prodicus, Antiphon, and Hippias has led historians to rely on informants from antiquity to determine precisely what the Sophists taught and how. These informants, who include Plato (Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, and Phaedrus), Aristotle (Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics), and Aristophanes (Clouds), are notable for being in many ways, “anti-Sophistic” and hyperbolic, and in the case of Aristophanes, satirical. However, relying on the Platonic dialogues Beck and Marrou show that the Sophists were able to generate respectable mechanisms for educating aristocrats beyond the elementary and rudimentary stages of primary schooling.37 Scholars have generally closely linked these thinkers to development of rhetoric and oratory as literacy became more widespread throughout Athens, and the civic and national concerns more prominent.38


The tendency to view the Sophists as the originators of rhetoric can be traced to the work of Heinrich Gomperz, whose *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (1912) has been extended by the likes of Mario Untersteiner’s *The Sophists* (1954), William K.C. Guthrie’s *The Sophists* (1971), G.B. Kerferd’s *The Sophistic Movement* (1981), George A. Kennedy’s *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition* (1980) and John Poulakos’ *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece* (1995), to name a few of the important works. In relation to the historical overviews discussed above, these specialized works establish more foundation for the content and approach of teachers of ancient rhetoric revealing their teaching methodologies and philosophical assumptions. They are an attempt to collectively establish a theory of Sophistic rhetoric.

The explosion of an already expanded bibliography on the Sophists in the 1970s and 80s, yielded even more studies on the subject. Some of these more recent works such as Susan Jarratt’s *Rereading the Sophists* (1991), Thomas Cole’s *The Origin of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (1991), and Edward Schiappa’s *The Beginning of Rhetorical Theory* (1999) have rethought the idea that rhetoric was the singular motive and raison d’être of the sophists.

This rethinking is largely premised on recasting Plato, Aristotle, and Aristophanes’ critiques of sophistry, themselves derivative of the famous *tete-a-tete* of Socrates and the Sophists, under a new light. 40

Historians largely present Socrates, a contemporary of the Sophists, as the counter to the claimed Sophistic ideal of persuasion as the engine behind effective argument/speech. As Marrou and others have pointed out, this was lodged in Socrates’ belief in the larger questions of absolute truth. 41 In the more recent scholarship, mentioned above, the Sophists are presented as, at the very least, aware of these larger, grand questions and at most thinkers concerned with the larger issues of *episteme*. The terms of this debate is important in understanding perhaps Socrates’ most famous influence, Plato the creator of an important educational institution in its own right.

In Marrou’s *A History of Education in Antiquity*, the philosophical school of Plato is given pride of place as an important achievement in Greek education. After time away...

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41. According to Henri Marrou, Socrates, “faced with the fundamental utilitarianism of the Sophists’ education, the narrow anthropomorphism which sees every branch of study as an instrument, a means to increased power and efficiency, Socrates asserted the transcendent claims of Truth.” Idem, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 91. This of course is part of what Edward Schiappa terms the “standard account,” that he and others have challenged. Susan Jarratt does so armed with Derridan deconstructionism. See Edward Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, 3-13 and Susan Jarratt, *Rereading the Sophists*, 63 and passim.
from Athens pursuing political agendas, Plato’s founding of the Academy in the year 387 B.C.E., on a grove devoted to the god, Academus is considered by Marrou to be one of two moments yielding toward the perfecting of the classical tradition.\textsuperscript{42}

Beyond its prestige as the first philosophical school, the remnants of what actually occurred at the Academy during Plato’s time reveal little new insights in terms of educational theory; Plato’s writings about education, on the other hand, have garnered considerable attention.\textsuperscript{43} Though scholars have consistently suggested that Plato was not able to develop these methods in their fullest form as articulated in his the Republic and Laws,\textsuperscript{44} these works provide a theoretical vantage point into certain Greek ideas about the relationship between the state and education.\textsuperscript{45} In these works, primarily the Republic, we get an understanding of the philosopher’s ideas of what constituted the best education of rulers and officials of the ideal state, the Guardians. Central to these is for Plato, the search for a truth, parallel to an understanding of the highest form of knowledge, and one that is aided by a range of disciplines [most notably, mathematics], which are

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\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, 95.
\textsuperscript{43} The lack of evidence has lead to much scholarly conjecture about the content of the studies based on readings of the Republic. See Fredrick A.G. Beck, Greek Education, 450-350 B.C., 227-233. See also for instance the work of Harold Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1945), which questions the ways in which the Academy had been characterized in light of the paucity of evidence.
\textsuperscript{44} This text includes a revision of the earlier idealistic conclusions of the philosopher, wrought by inabilities to implement them and a sense of practicality. See Rupert C. Lodge, Plato’s Theory of Education (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1947), 1 and Frederick A.G. Beck, Greek Education, 450-350 B.C., 199.
\textsuperscript{45} There is general agreement among all sources that Plato’s pre-eminent concern was the maintenance of the ideal state. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century projections of Plato as the first philosopher in both educational theory and political philosophy [and political science] may explain his persistence in intellectual genealogies of Western thought in these two areas.
\end{flushleft}
propaedeutic to this enlightenment. This education begins with a basic primary education that was similar to the older Greek traditions, before inculcating an education rooted in the mathematical sciences, which were thought to open the mind to the study of dialectics. Plato's five-year course of dialectics was thought to prepare the Guardians to engage in the "higher insight" necessary and essential for the maintenance of a society, which has led them to be called "philosopher-kings." Plato, who has been depicted as indifferent at best and hostile at worst to the rhetoricians, clearly aimed to develop minds away from the art of argument and toward pure knowledge.

The exposition of these basic attributes of Plato's educational thought is a topic that was already "well-worn" by 1880. However, twentieth century works on the subject have unsurprisingly placed emphasis on Plato's thought as an ancient exemplar for modern philosophical questions. The basic sources for the exposition of Plato's thinking in education include Richard Nettleship's *The Theory of Education in the Republic of Plato* (1880) and Rupert C. Lodge's *Plato's Theory of Education* (1947). Lodge focuses on the entire system [i.e., vocational studies, art, gymnastics, etc.], which was not exclusive to the Guardians, and integrates a discussion of the philosophical rationales, which guided the inclusion of various subjects in the program. Others have traced the origins of twentieth century educational thought and philosophical ideals to Plato in order to construct paragons for various contemporary theories; these include Robin Barrow's *Plato*,

46. Henri I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 110-114. In this of course, Plato is highly unoriginal. Marrou suggests an affinity with the Sophists, namely Hippias, on this matter, and asserts that both followed the ideas and curriculum of Pythagoras.

Utilitarianism, and Education (1975) and the sequel, Plato and Education (1976). In these works Barrow responds to the critique of philosophers who suggest that Plato’s theories were undemocratic, and only aimed at an elite, by portraying Plato’s thought as utilitarian. Though the “moderns” have been the most consistent adopters of Plato’s thought (evidenced by the colloquial use of “academy” in contemporary universities), its influence in both the abstract [his writings] and concrete [the Academy’s physical presence] were felt in the subsequent eras of antiquity.

Founded in 393 B.C.E., Isocrates’ school of rhetoric is considered the other signal moment in the perfecting of the ancient system. For Marrou, Isocrates’ impact was the addition of what Plato neglected: the practical aim. While Plato gravitated toward pure knowledge, Isocrates sought to develop pupils well trained in speech and civic responsibility. These ideals can be gleaned from his Antidosis and his critique of the sophists, Against the Sophists. In these works, Isocrates establishes the pre-eminence of the virtues of speech, as opposed to an almost unobtainable Platonic truth, which in turn led to the popularity of his school. The edited Takis Poulakos and David Depew edited Isocrates and Civic Education (2004) is successful in reimagining Isocrates’ twin virtues of rhetorical excellence and civic responsibility. Contributors to the work deal with Isocrates’ ideas on their own before comparing and contrasting him with other theorists

of Greek educational thought.\textsuperscript{50} This is very similar to George A. Kennedy’s treatment of Isocrates in \textit{Classical Rhetoric \& Its Christian \& Secular Tradition}, which anchors him as a clear descendant of the Sophists and at the same time a theorist of a new form of education centered on larger questions than speech. For Kennedy, Isocrates’ system was an educational system that purported to be based on virtue as a pathway toward responsible statesmanship.\textsuperscript{51} Finally, Marrou, Beck, and others have presented the dualisms of Plato’s and Isocrates’ school as “two columns of the temple,” or in other words, two parts of the whole of classical Greek education.\textsuperscript{52} Though both were highly concerned with the question of the state, their methodology for educating statesmen were polar opposites, and it can be argued, based on conflicting philosophical rationales.

In Clarke’s \textit{Higher Education in the Ancient World}, other important philosophical schools are discussed. Particularly important was the Lyceum of Aristotle founded in 335 B.C.E. Also important are Aristotle’s prior twenty years at Plato’s Academy, which may have served as home base for the development of the Aristotelian theory of education, fragments of which would survive for centuries informing in part what would eventually become medieval theory.\textsuperscript{53} In Clarke’s reconstruction and John Patrick Lynch’s \textit{Aristotle’s School} (1972), the Lyceum, home of the Peripatetics, was interestingly a center of the teaching of both the sciences and rhetoric, though very different from the Sophistic

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\item \textsuperscript{50} Takis Poulakos and David Depew, eds., \textit{Isocrates and Civic Education} (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{51} See George A. Kennedy, \textit{Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition}, 38-42.
\item \textsuperscript{52} The temple metaphor is found in Henri I. Marrou, \textit{A History of Education in Antiquity}, 135-136. See also Frederick A.G. Beck, \textit{Greek Education, 450 B.C.-350 B.C.}, 304-305, passim.
\item \textsuperscript{53} See the discussions of the importance of the Aristotelian translations infra and in Chapter Three.
\end{itemize}
Aristotle’s School provides a much needed discussion of the Lyceum, a topic which prior to its appearance was left out of major studies, such as Marrou’s *A History of Education in Antiquity* and Beck’s *Greek Education*. Alongside the traditional gulf between the Socratics and philosophers, the Lyceum, according to Lynch’s study, featured both influences and ruptures with the Platonic ideal and practice (as well as older Greek thinkers). The similarities were largely organizational and administrative, owing to Aristotle’s twenty-three years as an Academician. The ruptures, however, include an emphasis on knowledge by experience, linked to a wide study and application of the natural sciences, as well as an emphasis on writing. Pedagogically, Aristotle’s school featured a lecture model in contradistinction to the discussion model in the Academy.  

Aristotle’s “ideal education,” however, provides a more complicated picture. For the clarification of Aristotle’s educational theory, we are led to his *Ethics* and *Politics*. In these texts, we see a similar emphasis on education as the harbinger of morality, but this was intimately linked to reason. For effective moral training, men, especially those trained to be rulers, had to develop their capacity for virtue and rationality. Much of this is revealed in the works attributed to Aristotle revolving around the identification of that

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55. On these see Ibid, 75-96. In the latter part of this section of the text, Lynch argues that Aristotle’s status as a non-Athenian by birth may have led him to concentrate on subjects pertaining to less political matters than would have been discussed in the Academy.
which constituted the “liberal arts.” Reason was attached to thinkers with the ability to think unimpeded by what the Greeks called banausic concerns.56

Randall R. Curren’s Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education (2000) deals substantively with a number of Aristotle’s educational and political purposes including the instilling of virtue and the expanding of educational opportunity to neglected members of the polis.57 Carnes Lord’s Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (1982) is a study detailing and celebrating Aristotle’s understanding of the importance of liberal culture in Politics.58 Both of these works, inter alia, contribute to our understanding of the Aristotelian idea of the practical and liberal arts, an idea which was to undergo subsequent variations throughout antiquity and the medieval era. Outlined in Book VIII of Politics, Aristotle’s program encompassed the practical activities (writing, drawing), the virtuous activities (gymnastics), and the leisure activities (music), which were to lead toward the opening of the mind’s capacity to inculcate reason on the highest levels, or contemplation. Richard Kraut’s Aristotle and the Human Good (1989) argues that latter was construed by Aristotle as (the preferred) an end in itself.59

56. The term encompasses those who earned “a living by plying a trade or craft that involves the use of the hands.” Andrea Wilson Nightingale, “Education in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics,” in Yun Lee Too, ed. Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, 134.
57. Other purposes include the idea of instituting a constitutional requirement for education, see Randall R. Curren, Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); 80.
58. This argument is premised largely on correcting modern interpretations of the divergence between arts/culture and socio-political concerns. On this, specifically, see Carnes Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 17-35.
The disciplines that accompanied these activities began with the *organon* before moving to physics, metaphysics, politics, rhetoric, and poetics. This was an educational system that intended to encompass every facet of reality aimed at producing true rulers and citizens inculcated with intellectual “freedom.” This freedom, however, as Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s contribution to Yun Lee Too’s *Education in Greek Antiquity* (2001) argues, included two different types; one grounded in politics and the other in the “contemplative life.”

Thinkers, such as Lord, Curren, and Nightingale, have portrayed the system as encompassing this range of disciplines designated as “useful” (i.e. knowledge for socio-political aims) and “useless” (i.e. knowledge for leisure), with much debate as which of these was considered Aristotle’s ultimate goal. The Aristotelian ideal system had an important impact. Its comprehensiveness and scope has led to Aristotle’s ideas being depicted as the foundation of not only every Western discipline, but with the idea of disciplinary categories and hierarchies themselves, especially in the work of contemporary educationalists.

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60. These include the teaching of method in the texts, *Categories, Prior Analytics, On Interpretation,* and *Posterior Analytics.* These are crucial to understanding Aristotelian logic which was inextricable to his educational theory. See Richard Bauman, *Aristotle’s Logic of Education* (New York: Peter Lang, 1998).

61. She states: “In sum, Aristotle identifies two different kinds of freedom in *Politics:* one which enables a man to rule over free and equal men and keep clear of menial or banausic activities, and one which is grounded in an activity which is completely “useless” and nonproductive and never done for the sake of anyone or anything beyond itself.” Andrea Wilson Nightingale, “Education in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics,” 166.


63. See also section IV of Chapter Four.
Greek classical era educational thought has been historically reconstructed as highly theoretically significant to the development of a “Western” idea of pedagogy. It must be reiterated here as, Andrea Wilson Nightingale, among others have shown, that much of this actually represented the ideal structures of education proposed by specifically, Plato and Aristotle. However, these and other writings had the impact as serving the function of institutional memories for the various philosophical schools as ideas were reified at home and exported abroad. As Clarke indicates, the schools at the Academy and Lyceum continued for some time, and were not the only philosophical schools in existence. Followers of Epicurus and the Stoics eventually gained wide ascendency, the latter during the all important-Hellenistic era.

Gross Educational Structures: The Hellenistic Era

Part II of Marrou’s *A History of Education in Antiquity* focuses on the Hellenistic period of Greek antiquity. According to his historical analysis, this period saw the assuming of the “classical and definitive form” of the earlier Greek system. In fact, Marrou suggests that in this period it crystallized into the final form of the classical tradition that would be transmitted throughout every subsequent Western intellectual movement. While this may be crucial for the purposes of constructing an unbroken Western genealogy of education, the practices of the Hellenistic era should be scrutinized on their own, before connecting them to their precursors and torchbearers. The complicated process by which philosophical practices and pedagogical approaches were

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64. Many others including our informants on the various philosophical schools have stated this fact. See Andrea Wilson Nightingale, “Education in Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics,” 133.
altered or stabilized is clear once the fragmented nature of the evidence of what actually occurred during this period is brought to light. Thus, the following discusses literature in three interrelated areas where these can be accessed: 1) the philosophical schools; 2) the study of grammar and rhetoric; and 3) the Alexandrian Mouseion.

If it is true, as James Bowen asserts, that the Stoic philosophical school enunciated the “chief doctrine of the Hellenistic era,” then it is important to conceptualize its approach to knowledge vis-à-vis other doctrines during this period in Greece. The philosophical school at the Stoa, founded by Zeno of Citium in 310 B.C.E. and the Garden of Epicurus founded in 306 B.C.E., were two schools that competed with the Academy and the Lyceum in the period after Aristotle. Bowen shows how both doctrines appropriated components of Aristotelian concepts about the constitution and function of matter, but moved them into different areas, such as the role of Providence and mysticism.

These ideas must have figured heavily into the approaches to education and classification of subjects. Unfortunately, however, the primary sources which could yield the elaborations of how these ideas were transposed into a structure for the Stoics and Epicureans remain lost. In place of this lacuna, an important source that compiles and analyzes the ancient secondary sources attempting to construct a philosophical picture of the Hellenistic era is *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999), edited by Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield. This volume adds

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substantially to our knowledge about how these philosophical schools organized and theorized the nature of knowledge in many areas. It includes sections which back-map the Stoic and Epicurean perspective on “philosophical rhetoric” as well as what would come to be designated as the “three philosophies:” 1) metaphysics; 2) natural philosophy; and 3) moral philosophy. Much of what would characterize later philosophizing in the Roman Era was based upon the Stoics and some Epicureanism, as Bowen’s text and Tizio Dorandi’s contribution to *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* reveal. Therefore, understanding their collective ideas of educational and philosophical thought is important in uncovering sources for the Western adoption of the classical tradition.

The philosophical tradition was but one component. The most consistently studied subjects that constituted the *enkyklios paideia* (“complete education”) were not “philosophical,” as the subjects of grammar and rhetoric dominated the secondary and postsecondary schools. According to Marrou, the instruction of grammar developed a highly rigid structure with the publication of Dionysus Thrax’s grammatical handbook in the first century B.C.E., which would be used as the basis for later grammars produced in

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68. See Ibid, Part II for philosophical rhetoric, and George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, 93-95 for a definition of the concept during this period. For the “three philosophies” see Parts IV and V. This text also includes a contribution on philosophical scepticism, which saw its rise also in the Hellenistic era. According to Jacques Brunschwig, there was an epistemological shift that moved “from the question “What is knowledge?” given that there was such a thing, to “Is there a knowledge?” Jacques Brunschwig, “Introduction: the Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology,” in Ibid, 230. This appears in Part III on epistemology.


70. The term was used most consistently from the first century B.C.E. to denote the educational system of antiquity. See Teresa Morgan, *Literature Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33-38.
antiquity and the Christian era. Dionysius’ *Techne* initiated a conceptualization of grammar based on the dual practice of textual criticism of major Greek poets, which approximated the modern discipline of philology, as well as the technical practice of understanding language, which closely resembles the understanding of grammar in the modern sense.71 Raffaella Cribiore’s *Gymnastics of the Mind* (2001) includes a survey of how this system was practiced in Greek Egypt, tracing the influence of Dionysus Thrax’s handbook in the teaching of grammar in the schools.72

The study of rhetoric having followed from the period dominated by Isocrates and Demosthenes and others chronicled in Ps-Plutarch’s *The Lives of Ten Orators*, would emerge as an unparalleled subject during this period. The stabilization of the practice was achieved by rhetoricians who, according to most thinkers, became less concerned with the broader Isocrates ideal and more concerned with public service functions and prestige.73 As a result, the practice became more precise. Its importance to statecraft may have contributed to its status as perhaps the most dominant form of higher education in the Hellenistic age, outpacing the philosophical schools.

According to Marrou and Clarke, methods for institutionalizing the orator’s education process crystalized with the introduction of the important pedagogical

73. Martin L. Clarke states: “The tradition of Isocrates survived in that rhetoric became a recognized part of a liberal education; it failed to survive in that the rhetoricians of the Hellenistic age for the most part lacked his wide culture and high ideals and, like the ‘sophists’ whom he criticized, put their faith in rules.” *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, 30. Marrou views this as the elevation of “eloquence” above all else. See Henri Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 269.
techniques of the *progymnasmata* and the *controversiae* and *suasoriae*. John Vanderspoel as well as Andrew Erskine’s contributions to *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (2007), shows how these rhetorical practices were central to educational goals geared toward the sharpening of institutional apparatus of the Greek state and how they appeared in forms of education that were created throughout the Greek world in the Hellenistic era. Centers for the study of rhetoric appeared in not only Greek centers of learning but throughout the Mediterranean. And as Vanderspoel asserts, as rhetoric spread and grew, it also “came of age.” Other contributions to the Ian Worthington edited volume expound upon how the practice of rhetoric contributed to a peculiar, and also widely unacknowledged conception of higher education in the ancient world.

Another text, Teresa Morgan’s *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman World* (1998), utilizes a methodology for understanding the forms of educational practice that is premised on readings of the Egyptian (Ptolemy-era) schooltext papyri against the ideas of the rhetorical and grammatical theorists. In addition to other important revelations, Morgan’s work shows that one of the cardinal features of the educational system of the Hellenistic era was the implantation of Greekness, via readings of the literary canon, to the subjects (and future politicians) of the empire. Education in the liberal arts, then,

74. The former were early exercises in composition while the latter were used to prepare pupils by developing arguments known as declamations. See Henri Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 270-281 and Martin L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, 25; 39-45. For a commentary and examples of the *progymnasmata* see George A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Composition Prose and Rhetoric* (Leiden: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003). On declamations see the works cited in note 101.


76. On this methodological technique, see Teresa Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman World*, 5-8.
encouraged less original thought and more rigorous indoctrinations into Greek culture, useful for the development of effective orators and perhaps, politicians.\footnote{77} Morgan summarizes her study by showing that grammar was understood as the practice of learning how to write “correctly,” while rhetoric constituted speaking using “correct” language. “Correctness” led to effective state leadership; thus, the character and forms of knowledge that dominated Hellenistic higher education.\footnote{78}

One final element of Hellenistic higher education was the Mouseion of Alexandria. Founded in the cultural capital of the Hellenistic empire in 295 B.C.E., the Mouseion was in many ways an “academy” devoted to the Muses, much like Plato’s Academy.\footnote{79} Historians such as Marrou and Bowen have considered this institution and its library as important to the study of the natural and mathematical sciences in this era, including what the Middle Ages termed, the \textit{quadrivium}. They show that in addition to supporting a research center which housed the likes of Euclid and Strabo and many medical thinkers, the institution archived some of the great works of earlier Greek

\footnote{77} Scholars have asserted that Greekness was assumed to be acquisitive for non-native Greeks and thus non-racial. Education made this acquisition possible. Teresa Morgan states: “Both the acculturating and the differentiating functions of education are maximized by the fact that its most strongly acculturating element—the core of education which is also the core of Greek literature culture with the strongest links to Greek identity—is to the forefront right from the start.” Teresa Morgan, \textit{Literature Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds}, 78. Andrew Erskine shows rhetoric’s importance as an “entry point” in the context of the dualism between Greek identity and barbarism. See Andrew Erskine, “Rhetoric and Persuasion in the Hellenistic World,” 281-282.

\footnote{78} See Teresa Morgan, \textit{Literature Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds}, 177-182; 234-239.

thinkers, serving as a midwife for Greek thought to later generations. The latter, according to Bowen led to the organization of an early form of philology as an academic discipline which combined rhetoric, grammar, and logic.

Much of the scholarship around the Mouseion focuses on its status as an example of an ancient library, that was also famous for its burning. The contributors to the John MacLeod edited, The Library of Alexandria (2000), however, go beyond this mystique, interrogating inter alia, its foundations in Aristotelian science, its use as a repository for Greek culture, as well as how it set the stage for the Neoplatonist movement. Other writers have lauded the Mouseion as a key piece in the genealogy of Western models for university and/or higher education. As the last component of this tripartite discussion of the Hellenistic educational history, this institution established many key continuities that together with philosophy and the enkyklios paideia standardized the disparate modes of earlier models of instruction in antiquity.

*Educational Structures in the Roman Era*

The third and final part of Marrou’s *A History of Education in Antiquity* explores the dynamic of education in Roman antiquity. In discussing this portion of the Western construction of its educational philosophies, scholars have generally relied on the accepted conclusion that what the Romans accomplished was the more or less “copying”

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81. James Bowen, *A History of Western Civilization, Volume I*, 148. This was linked to Dionysius Thrax’s involvement in Alexandria as a grammarian. The “logical” component of philology was derived from Stoic philosophy. See Teresa Morgan, *Literature Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 153-154.
82. See the contributions to John MacLeod’s *The Library of Alexandria*, cited in note 79.
83. For example, see Constantine Cavarnos, *Cultural and Educational Continuity of Greece: From Antiquity to the Present* (Belmont, MA: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1995).
of the Hellenistic mode of education. Marrou does not greatly alter this account, neither
do other important examinations of Western higher education, which appeared after
Marrou’s such as Clarke’s *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, Bowen’s *A History of Western
Higher Education*, and the contributions to the Yun Lee Too edited *History of Education in
Greek and Roman Antiquity.*

Similarly, discussions of specific subjects such as grammar or rhetoric rely on
exhuming the Greek model in order to fully appreciate the Roman continuity of
education during both the republic and the empire. Examinations of the Roman
adoption of the subjects of the *enkyklios paideia* such as Teresa Morgan’s aforementioned
*Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* and Raffaella Cribiore’s *Gymnastics of the
Mind* show how the interests of the Greek empire in civic education dovetailed with the
Roman imperial ambition. Their sources, Cicero, Libanius, and Quintillian among
others were products of this dual heritage, which has come to be known as the collective
“Graeco-Roman” classical heritage.

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84. See Henri Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 391; Martin L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the
Ancient World*, 14; James Bowen, *A History of Western Education*, 171-177. Marrou and Bowen include
a chapter and extended discussion on the “old Roman way,” respectively, before distinguishing
this idea from the Greek borrowings as Romans adopted components of the Greek system. Yun
Lee Too asserts the need for a rewriting of this component of the narrative, among other
tendencies in the writing of education in antiquity. See her “Introduction: Writing the History of
Ancient Education,” in Idem, ed., *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, 1-20. One reviewer has
contended that the despite the lofty ambitions of breaking the static and standard historiography,
*Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* does not greatly alter the trajectory, specifically when it comes
to the Greek influence on Rome. See Teresa Morgan, “Ancient Education Revisited,” *The Classical

85. See the work of Teresa Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, cited in note
70. Cribiore covers a similar terrain as Morgan and pursues a methodology that considers the
socio-political discontinuity from Greek to Roman Egypt as important but not an obviating factor
in the continuity of the educational system. Both Morgan and Cribiore assume the unity of the
*paideia* in these periods. See Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind*, 8.
The works of Marrou, Clarke, Bowen, Morgan, and Cribiore, as well as the ideas on which they build, routinely de-emphasize in large measure the pre-Hellenistic influences on the Roman worldview. The recent *The School of Rome* (2011) authored by W. Martin Bloomer attempts to challenge this structured view of the Roman educational model, arguing for greater examination of the Italic influences of Roman models prior to the assumed “decisive cultural transfer” of Greek training. This text extends the seminal work of Stanley Bonner whose 1977 study, *Education in Ancient Rome*, established the particularities and uniqueness of the Roman approach.

Keeping Bloomer’s work in mind, the question for our purposes remains the extent to which the Greek philosophical and pedagogical approaches influenced the construction of the Roman model for education and how this model influenced approaches to learning as the idea of *studium generale* gained wide currency in the medieval era. It appears from established opinion that this influence was located most solidly in the study of grammar and rhetoric, with the latter serving as the standard form of higher education.

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86. For Bloomer, “a classical *paideia* was a shifting construct, and the school of Athens (or better, the many schools of the Hellenistic cities from North Africa to the Black Sea) was not the school of Rome.” W. Martin Bloomer, *The School of Rome: Latin Studies and the Origins of Liberal Education* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011), 3.

87. Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). This work remains one of the more standard treatments of the subject, and is notable for following the genealogical and methodological impulse that situates the origins of literate knowledge in Greece.

88. With the advent of the Roman imperial project, philosophy never gained the headway it achieved in parts of the Greek-controlled world. While the Athenian schools remained in existence, their importance was subsumed by the rhetorical schools. Similar was the fate of the Alexandrian research center, which was burned by officials of the Roman Empire. On the former see inter alia, Martin L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, 85-108 and on the latter, Robert Barnes, “Cloistered Bookworms in the Chicken-Coop of the Muses: The Ancient Library of Alexandria,”
According to Marrou and Bonner’s discussions of the practice of grammar in the Roman Empire, the practice did not substantially alter the earlier Hellenistic practices exemplified by Dionysius Thrax.\textsuperscript{89} Perhaps the most important works on grammar from a early imperial Roman thinker comes from a rhetorician, Quintilian, whose \textit{Institutio Oratoria} showed the symbiotic relationship between effective grammatical education and rhetoric as well as from Sextus Empiricus’ satirical, \textit{Against the Grammarians}. During the Roman era, as Morgan and Cribiore suggest, the lines between rhetoric and grammar became increasingly blurred. As grammar became more technical, it encroached upon many of the functions of the rhetor, including the teaching of composition; it is important to note, however that the two functions remained distinct.\textsuperscript{90} The putative role of grammar however remained unchanged, the simple addition of a Roman canon to the Greek standards, via the works of Virgil and Horace and others defined the Roman iteration of using grammar to inculcate a sense of cultural identity.\textsuperscript{91}

Bloomer’s \textit{The School of Rome} adds to the foregoing scholarship by examining the works of the grammarian beyond the stated functions of the theorists, and in a similar manner to that of Morgan, by adducing a sense of what the teachers of grammar actually achieved by studying “exercises” that “focus on the transformation of the child’s

\textsuperscript{89} See Henri Marrou, \textit{A History of Education in Antiquity}, 371-373. Bonner in fact suggests that grammar, or nothing approximating the Greek level of grammar existed in Rome prior to its adoption, choosing to discuss Roman grammar by first exploring Greek. See Stanley F. Bonner, \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, 47-64.


\textsuperscript{91} Teresa Morgan, \textit{Literature Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds}, 94-100.
expressive abilities.”\textsuperscript{92} Robert Kaster’s study of the function of the grammarian, \textit{Guardians of Language} (1988) explores the professional imperatives of the grammarian in late antiquity. At the close of the Roman Empire, the handbooks and commentaries produced by Donatus (\textit{Ars Minor}), Servius, Pompeius, and Priscian, would gain ascendancy in not only the Empire but in subsequent generations in the West.\textsuperscript{93} 

While grammar served an essential propædeutic function, the Roman student only learned to fly once the wings of rhetoric were acquired.\textsuperscript{94} Rhetoric assumed the pre-eminent form of higher education in Rome for a number of reasons, but perhaps chief among these were the demands of the republic and the empire for a strong intellectual class versed in a cultural and political knowledge necessary for maintaining control over the functions of government and private interests.

Histories of rhetoric in Rome include Martin L. Clarke’s standard, \textit{Rhetoric in Rome} (1953) and George A. Kennedy’s \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in Rome} (1973). Both of these texts, as well as Bonner’s treatment of rhetoric in \textit{Education in Ancient Rome}, show how the particular introduction of this discipline into Roman life was appropriated with the adoption of Greek precursors.\textsuperscript{95} The historical narrative specific to rhetoric in the Roman context

\textsuperscript{92} W. Martin Bloomer, \textit{The School of Rome}, 118. Bloomer’s study examines the “unity of the curriculum” by showing how grammar taught methods for composition and construction of narratives which were central to the orator as well as other literate professions.


\textsuperscript{94} This metaphor is taken from the work of Raffaella Cribiore, \textit{Gymnastics of the Mind}, 221, itself derived from the oft-neglected thinker Libanius, a fourth century, B.C.E. Greek rhetor in the East, see Ibid, 6-8.

\textsuperscript{95} Anchored by Clarke, this perspective suggests that the Greek idea of rhetoric was unknown prior to the second century B.C.E. This is largely gleaned from the writings of Cicero. See Martin L. Clarke, \textit{Rhetoric at Rome: A Historical Survey} (London: Cohen and West, 1953), 10-12. Kennedy and Bonner largely follow this trajectory, though both deal with precursors such as Cato the Elder (as a representative of the older Roman tradition) only to show the divergence between pre and post-
then continues the normative approach to understanding the Roman contribution to education. A third historical narrative written in 1995 and revised in 2008 is Richard Leo Enos’ *Roman Rhetoric*. This particular text keeps the standard narrative intact but focuses more on the Roman context, and how cultural and environmental forces, necessarily pushed the Romans toward the adoption of rhetoric.

The narrative exemplified by the foregoing usually begins in the Roman republican era, and focuses on the persona of Cicero. Clarke, Kennedy, and Bonner briefly mention the pre-Ciceronian rhetorical traditions in Rome, and all three then continue by focusing squarely on the phil-Hellenistic thinker, orator, and official. Cicero’s training in Athens in philosophy and rhetoric serves as a metaphor for the standard Roman narrative of education mentioned above. His contributions, which include a number of orations and speeches, but also theoretical tracts such as *De Inventione* and *De Oratore*, emphasize the best practices of rhetoric and oratory, gleaned from his life experiences as an official. After moving from Cicero, these historians often emphasize the

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96. In the preface to the volume, Enos states: “This volume emphasizes the social and cultural environment within which those activities took place in order to provide a better understanding of their context. This volume’s task is to help readers “situate” rhetoric within Roman society during a very important period in her history: a period of enormous transition.” See Richard Leo Enos, *Roman Rhetoric: Revolution and the Greek Influence* (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2008), xviii. Along these lines, in addition to including the Greek influence, Enos devotes a chapter to the possible influence of the Etruscans.


98. Jacques Verger places his contribution alongside that of Aristotle in his “Patterns,” 41. Teresa Morgan and others show how during the empire Cicero’s speeches were recommended to be read alongside other classical sources in the *paideia*, see her *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 97; 317.
work of Quintilian, whose *Institutio Oratia* in twelve volumes, became the most complete handbook for the training of orators. Its heavy emphasis on both the theoretical and technical imperatives of rhetorical education, shows the importance of the discipline to intellectual life in Rome. In fact, Quintilian’s contributions to the discipline have often been synonymous with the characterization of Roman rhetoric itself. Of its many accomplishments, the massive work of Quintilian conceptualized rhetoric and its educational outcomes within the larger context of the Roman worldview, connecting the theoretical to the technical and the practical. 99

The two focuses of rhetoric were the aforementioned *progymnasmata* and the declamation, both of which encompassed an extended period of training. The *progymnasmata* was a set of standard preliminary exercises that oriented the student toward the practices of composing and speech-making. The work of Stanley F. Bonner details this practice and show how the student was able to begin with the practice of composing fables, before graduating to stories and narratives, which were often literary and historical. 100 The declamation has achieved considerable attention from scholars. The practice of declaiming was the final stage and was characterized by the development of speeches in two main genres, the *controversiae* and *suasoriae*. The former was purposed at providing training in how to advocate on the behalf of a certain party, while the latter was the speech that offered advice based upon historical or moral precedents. Both of these

99. For treatments of Quintilian, see Martin L. Clarke, 109-129 and George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in Ancient Rome*, 487-514. See also Teresa Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 226-234 and passim. Morgan’s work considers *Institutio Oratia* has a key text which developed a theoretical conception of the meanings and uses of rhetoric (and grammar) in the Roman world.

styles of declamation were central to three main types of rhetoric: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. On declamation, the works of Bloomer and Cribiore among many others, including Stanley F. Bonner’s *Roman Declamation* (1949), have endeavored to derive from it the content and pedagogical technique involved in the training of rhetoricians.\(^{101}\)

A final and familiar purpose of the study of rhetoric was its cultural imperative. Teresa Morgan’s *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* shows that rhetoric served the purpose of cultural education. Her work explores the papyri that show the practice of paraphrasing important speeches in the past. These were taught to orient the student to rhetoric writ large as well as to show the proper methods for oratory and composition.\(^{102}\) In comprehending rhetoric, it is important, as the editors to *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric* (2007) suggest, to understand that Rome during its rise and rule was a speech-making culture. While rhetoric throughout its larger history vacillated from focuses on persuasion to focusing only on style, its role in Rome was felt in arenas from the courts, to the theater, and back to the political realm. For the elite who performed these functions, it was higher education, par excellence. The contributors to this volume

\(^{101}\) Clearly, the declamation has received more attention than the *progymnasmata*. Standard sources include, Stanley F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire* (Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1949). For a more comprehensive listing see Teresa Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 198n38. In W. Martin Bloomer’s and Raffaella Cribiore’s studies of the Roman school and the Roman system in Egypt in particular, declamation is given pride of place. See W. Martin Bloomer, *The School of Rome*, 170-191 and Raffaella Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind*, 231-244.

\(^{102}\) As Morgan sees it, rhetoric went beyond the art of persuasion to the idea of developing virtue, which was the necessary for governance. This was based on a reading of Quintilian. See Teresa Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, 226-239.
explore this dynamic as the idea and practice of rhetoric filtered throughout every area of intellectual culture.\textsuperscript{103}

The fate of philosophy was most solidly carried forward during the Roman era by the Neoplatonists. The continuity of the Academy was the impetus to the development of a variant to the Platonist approach beginning with the philosophizing of Plotinus in the fourth century C.E. Intellectual historians have advanced the important idea that the term “Neoplatonist” was not coined until the nineteenth century, when it was suggested that Plotinus was both an extender of Platonic doctrine and an original thinker. In fact, before the availability of the Platonic dialogues, modern thinkers relied primarily on the works of the Neoplatonists for an understanding of Plato.\textsuperscript{104}

The contributions of the various philosophical schools of Neoplatonism, was however the elaboration of the meaning and uses of the Platonic idea of “the One.” It was the Neoplatonists, beginning with Plotinus’ idea of the Hypostases, which attempted to bring clarity to the idea of beingness. Philip Merlan’s \textit{From Platonism to Neoplatonism} (1953) which considers the importance of this school of thought whittles the philosophical assumptions of Neoplatonism down to five, which all cohere around the problem of the nature of being, the relationship to supreme beings to inferior ones, and the indeterminate force which gives the supreme being its character. In his idea of the Hypostases, Plotinus asserts that three interrelated forces, soul, intelligence, and the One,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item On Rome as a speech-making culture, see William Dominik and Jon Hall, “Confronting Roman Rhetoric,” in \textit{A Companion to Roman Rhetoric}, eds. Idem, 3. On the vacillation between art of persuasion and style see George A. Kennedy, \textit{The Art of Rhetoric in Ancient Rome}, xv and passim.
\item Many of the works of Plato were not recovered until the Renaissance and many more until the nineteenth century. Neoplatonism however as shown infra, is not a simple espousal of Plato. For a discussion of the distinctions see also Philip Merlin, \textit{From Platonism to Neoplatonism} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953), 6.
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together explain all of reality. His *The Enneads* is the best source for his philosophy. Porphyry (Plotinus’ biographer), Iamblichus, and Proclus, who, in many ways were distinguished thinkers in their own rights, succeeded Plotinus. It is out of this group that we get important discussions of the role of ontology in the study of mathematical sciences and other philosophical subjects such as metaphysics and natural philosophy.

Interestingly, Neoplatonism found some resonance with the school of philosophy indebted to Aristotelian thinking. Along with Merlan’s text, R.T. Wallis’ seminal introduction, *Neoplatonism* (1972), the A.H. Armstrong edited, *An Introduction to Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (1954), and a brief introductory volume, *Philosophy in Late Antiquity* (2004) by Andrew Smith, provide necessary outlines to the philosophies of ancient Neoplatonists. Their works expound upon the complicated dynamics of this school of philosophy while detailing how their views of philosophy would impact later thinkers. An important area of this influence was in the development of Christian philosophy and the medieval philosophical faculties, a topic that will be discussed infra.

**Ancient Metascience and Disciplinarity**

In addition to studies that consider the structure, organization, and socio-political rationales that attended the philosophical and pedagogical approaches to knowledge in ancient times, there is a volume that considers the timelessness and/or contemporary relevance of Neoplatonist thought. R. Baine Harris, ed., *Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought* (2 vols.)(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002). These volumes include many essays which link their ideas to the dominant areas of modern philosophy such as aesthetics, social philosophy, and spirituality.
the Graeco-Roman classical tradition, it is essential to consider the ways in which philosophies of science and cultural worldviews shaped these structures. David Oldroyd’s *The Arch of Knowledge* (1986) characterizes these sorts of queries as “metascience,” which denotes the historical study of philosophies and methodologies of science. An earlier study, Ernest Hutten’s *The Origins of Science* (1962) similarly traces the standards of scientific inquiry considered axiomatic in the contemporary era to their suggested foundations in Greece. These questions are intimately tied to the idea of disciplinarity, thus tracing their possible precursors is crucial to understanding the organizational and pedagogical side of disciplinarity as we know it today. We will briefly consider some representative works in this well-developed topic.

Oldroyd begins his examination of Western philosophies and methodologies of science with “the ancient tradition” of Plato and Aristotle. Utilizing the metaphor of

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108. Oldroyd’s text is cited in note 3 and Hutten’s in note 27.
109. Plato is considered the founder of philosophy, and by extension along with Aristotle, the founder of science. According to intellectual historians, this does not preclude the fact that there were other thinkers before him. However, they generally conclude that without his systematization of the precursors’ contributions there would be no philosophy or science in the sense that it is understood today. See David Oldroyd, *The Arch of Knowledge*, 6-7 and Richard Kraut, “Introduction to the Study of Plato,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Idem (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1 where Plato is characterized as the “head” of the Western philosophical tradition and the first to deal with it as “unitary” subject. It is important to consider how both Plato and Aristotle themselves understood their work vis-à-vis the origins and meanings of knowledge. Jacob Carruthers has masterfully weaved through many of their declarations showing both their stated relationships to other Greek thinkers prior to the “classical era” (5th century B.C.E.) as well as other intellectual traditions. Carruthers largely concludes that their works suffered from a “metaphysics of alienation” wrought by successive generations’ adherence to intellectual standards which had poor conceptual ties between both speech and reason among other key alienations. He further shows how Plato and Aristotle both recognized the Egyptian contributions to knowledge and how much of the Greek traditions unceremoniously ruptured that aspect of their intellectual tradition much to its peril, and much to Aristotle’s chagrin. While Plato and Aristotle have been constructed as the “fathers” of Western science (read: all of science), their own understanding of intellectual history complicate this. As Carruthers suggests, the “metaphysics of alienation” has roots which began before the Greek “classical era.” See Jacob Carruthers, *Mdw Nf*, 95-101. On the notion that Western science was the “only science,” see Ernest Hutten, *The Origins of Science*, passim.
the arch of knowledge to denote the process of inductive and deductive reasoning.\textsuperscript{110} Oldroyd shows how conclusions about the nature of matter and the categorization of matter, have their roots in Plato’s theory of the forms, as seen in the \textit{Republic} and Aristotle’s ideas about categories, gleaned in large part from his \textit{Organon}. Conceptualizing the former’s work as the search for the explanation of “continuity and change,” which had been long underway in the contributions of Milesian school, Oldroyd points to the origin of syllogistic reasoning in the Aristotelian contribution.\textsuperscript{111} While Plato’s work suggested that conceptualizing “forms” superseded the illusory functions of the senses in apprehending knowledge, Aristotle’s work was premised in many ways on sensory perception. According to Oldroyd’s analysis, Aristotle’s contribution further set the foundations for a Western scientific tradition, in using the senses to construct categories for matter, and thus all of reality.\textsuperscript{112}

Similarly, Michael Finkenthal’s \textit{Interdisciplinarity} (2001) advances a similar Greek origin of scientific thought or what he terms, “disciplinarian thinking” which led to a

\textsuperscript{110} Utilizing the Platonic idea of the divided line, Oldroyd constructs the “arch of knowledge,” premised on the idea that there is knowledge to be acquired “on the way up” (inductive) which will aid on the downward descent (deductive). It is important to include here that the ideas about this arch were not always the same. For some philosophers in fact the inductive and deductive processes were reversed. This however, does not lessen the force of Oldroyd’s use of this metaphor to explain first-order philosophical thought about the scientific method and the sources of knowledge on the ascent up the arch and the meanings of truth on the descent. He explains: “There is supposedly an ‘upward’ movement from the information concerning ‘particulars’ received by the sense, to general concepts and first principles (of mathematics, or perhaps some other science). And also there is a ‘downward’ deductive ‘pathway’, supposedly carried out in the realm of Ideas in Plato, but not necessarily so in later writers—who, however, were pleased to employ the same general model for the ‘structure’ of knowledge and its method of acquisition and deployment.” David Oldroyd, \textit{The Arch of Knowledge}, 13.

\textsuperscript{111} On the last three points, see Ibid, 7-26

\textsuperscript{112} He states: “Aristotle was concerned to show that being resides in individual objects perceived by the senses—not transcendent universals.” Ibid, 17.
“broken continuity” by the period of the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth century.\footnote{For the discussion of Greek disciplinarian thinking, see Michael Finkenthal, \textit{Interdisciplinarity: Toward the Definition of a Metadiscipline?} (New York: Peter Lang, 2001),18. Finkenthal suggests that the impulse to specialize in one area of knowledge begins with Plato, though there are important precursors among the Pre-Socratics. However, it was not until Plato’s ideal to search for truth, that the idea of classification and categorizations of knowledges continued by Aristotle and supported by his preference of empiricism, did the roots of disciplinarian thinking emerge.}

The other components of Oldroyd’s “ancient tradition” include the Stoics and the Neoplatonists whose contributions to the scientific method included the sharpening of the discipline of logic and the process for developing useful categories for analysis.\footnote{David Oldroyd, \textit{The Arch of Knowledge}, 26-32.} In many respects the contributions of the ancient philosophers and their schools revolve around clarifying and operationalizing the “how-to” of philosophy and science; the hallmark of which was an early variant of both systematization/categorization and empiricism/sensory perception as avenues toward truth. This hallmark was extended in the Hellenistic era by the likes of Euclid and other mathematical thinkers (contributors to the \textit{quadrivium}) at the Mouseion. Hutten considers that these two hallmarks, were two of three of the known “theories of truth;” coming from the ancient contributions of Plato (coherence) and Aristotle (correspondence).\footnote{A third, pragmatic truth, was a modern creation. Hutten shows that it is only through the marriage of the Platonic ideal of truth as the verification of systematic and coherent bodies of knowledge and Aristotle’s notion of truth as the correspondence of facts with senses, that the drawbacks of both are assuaged. Interestingly, Hutten implies that there are no magical or religious elements of the ancient conceptions of truth as elucidated by Plato and Aristotle; the absence of which makes them “scientific.” See Ernest Hutten, \textit{The Origins of Science}, 184-194. While the postmodern movement has challenged most of this conceptual ground, it is necessary to state this influence on modern scholarship and the development of scientific disciplines, which has not transcended it.} While this does not represent en masse the aspects of ancient thought, it seems to be those components from which historians derive the “precursors” necessary to constructing genealogies of the Western tradition. For more on Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoic traditions of metascience, the Cambridge histories and

There are in addition to these, a number of historical studies of Graeco-Roman science that have been produced, some of which provide helpful understanding of the connection between their conceptions of knowledge and that which would enter the university. These include Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd’s *Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle* (1970) and *Greek Science After Aristotle* (1973), Marshall Clagett’s *Greek Science in Antiquity* (1955), Benjamin Farrington’s *Greek Science* (1953), and William H. Stahl’s *Roman Science* (1962). 117

Close readings of the methodological orientations of Graeco-Roman philosophy provide further understanding of its central role in the development of the Western scientific methodologies and its corollary disciplinarities. These ideas are explored in Michael Frede’s *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (1987), Alan C. Bowen’s edited *Science and Philosophy in* 

116. Clearly, as the above shows, the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato have received much attention. See *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, cited in note 109 and Jonathan Barnes, *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for representative treatments. Less attention has been given to the Stotets, Epicureans, and skeptics. An important volume which does so is *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, cited in note 67.

117. Lloyd’s two-part history of Greek science begins with the philosopher, Thales, while the second volume continues his historical analysis through the Hellenistic period to the period of the philosophers, Ptolemy and Galen. See G.E.R. Lloyd, *Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970) and Idem, *Greek Science After Aristotle* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973). Marshall Clagett’s 1955 study is also useful, including not only an overview of Greek science in the well-documented Hellenistic era, but includes an overview of Roman science, as well as the forms of science that would directly influence the medieval era. See Marshall Clagett, *Greek Science in Antiquity* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1955). A similar task is the objective of Benjamin Farrington, whose work encompasses the entirety of the Greek experience, attempting to paint a picture of science not tinctured by history of philosophy approaches. See Benjamin Farrington, *Greek Science: Its Meaning for Us* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953). Finally for a historical analysis of Roman science, see William H. Stahl, *Roman Science: Origins, Development, and Influence to the Later Middle Ages* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962). On many of these discussions, see also David C. Lindberg’s *The Beginnings of Western Science*, quoted in note 27.

Frede’s text is a collection of his essays that attempt to understand both Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, ranging from methodological beliefs to how knowledge was categorized in various early disciplines. His emphasis is on the aforementioned subjects of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, but also on Hellenistic logic and medicine, subjects which for him provide greater understanding to the complex world of ancient philosophy. Importantly, this text also includes essays that analyze the divergences and convergences of different Greek schools of thought as related to how knowledge was legitimized and how notions of truth were methodologized and conceptualized.119 Bowen’s volume includes contributions that clarify the theoretical nature as well as the procedural nature of the works of Aristotle and Plato, but also of the mathematical contributions of Euclid. The inclusion of Euclid reveals the putative mutual appearance of science and mathematics in histories of science and philosophy.120 Gentzler’s volume is a collection of


119. In the introduction to the volume, Frede suggests that the trend towards historicizing the philosophical ideas of the Stoics, skeptics, and other key philosophical trends in the Hellenistic era are crucial to formulating a broader picture of ancient philosophy. The essays follow this trend and include discussions of Aristotelian and Stoic logic, an essay on the distinctions between the Stoics and the skeptics, and essays on medicine, an area which Frede understands as a philosophical discipline in antiquity. See Michael Frede, “Introduction: The Study of Ancient Philosophy,” in Essays in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Idem, xx-xxi.

120. Charles Kahn’s introductory contribution discusses mathematics as a key “innovation of Greek science.” Thus the volume includes the elaboration of mathematical tendencies of Plato and Aristotle, but places greater emphasis on Euclid. See Charles Kahn, “Some Remarks on the
contributions from historians of philosophy aimed at understanding how Greek philosophers conceptualized method and reasoning. Gentzler explains that “self-conscious reflection on methods of reasoning marks the beginning of philosophy in the West,” and the following contributions attempt to trace these instances of reflection in primarily the works of the Plato and Aristotle, with scant attention given to the Presocratics and the Epicureans. 121 This volume reflects the clear emphasis, among fourteen prominent methodologists and classicists, on Plato and Aristotle as key thinkers on questions of ontology and explanation and other building blocks of modern empirical science.

The work of Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd in this topical area is seminal. Methods and Problems in Greek Science is a collection of essays developed over his thirty-year engagement with the topic. A useful companion volume to his general histories, this volume examines a number of subjects under the broad heading of Greek science, ranging from Platonic mathematics to physiology to the precursors of Greek thought in the Near East. A valuable contribution, this volume includes discussions of specific disciplinary methodological precursors as well as general discussions of “first-order” philosophical ideas such as cosmology and observation. While this volume contains a “heterogeneous mixture of studies,” it nevertheless provides some sense of what it means for theorists in antiquity to conceptualize as “an inquiry into nature.”122 This text also serves as an important guide to many of the scholarly debates in the field in the latter half of the

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twentieth-century as each essay is introduced with a review of the scholarly debates it engendered.

In addition to the foregoing edited works and single-authored compendiums of essays, is Hankinson’s focused history, *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought.* Comprehensive in scope, this volume traces the Greek trajectory of explaining causality from the Presocratics to the Neoplatonists. The analysis is based on the transition from explanatory methods based on religious (and/or magical) ideas and those developed to explore “scientific” explanations. For Hankinson, the latter was premised on the development of laws and regularities (he importantly suggested mathematics need not be the only lens).\(^{123}\) While important work regarding these ideas can be found in the works of philosophers prior to Plato, the primacy of the latter and Aristotle, again assume pride of place.\(^{124}\) Much like Frede’s collection, however, they are read against the dominant Hellenistic influence of the Stoics and skeptics, but also against the earlier contributions of the Atomists. Finally, the trajectory is extended to the Neoplatonists who had to reconcile notions of causality and explanation in the context of the adoption of Christianity. Though various differences abound, Hankinson concludes that scientific thinkers in Greece sought to explain by inquiry, “the nature of things.”\(^{125}\)

Regarding the nexus between science and philosophy, these sources represent some of the more dominant studies on the subject. They are important to establishing a Western genealogy of scientific inquiry, one that is premised on, by all intents and

\(^{123}\) Jim Hankinson, *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought*, 3.

\(^{124}\) Plato is characterized as providing “the first (surviving) genuinely philosophical reflection on the nature of cause and explanation, and their relations with other fundamental metaphysical concepts.” Ibid, 124.

\(^{125}\) Ibid, 6.
purposes, the now axiomatic idea of observation. In the introduction to *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Michael Frede explains that what (should) characterize(s) the pursuit of the history of ancient philosophy are those important ideas which scholars assume and/or believe are important to the development of subsequent ideas, as well as the other components of history that are central to the formation of that idea. Context cannot be subsumed under the premise of autonomy of the philosophical contribution. Clearly, regarding the philosophy of science, historians project the ancient period of mostly Greece, as foundational to the pursuit of (universal) knowledge and choose components of these ideas that were linked to the “how-to” of science. While the sources discussed reveal the complexity of Greek scientific thought (e.g. the shifting contexts, parallel developments in so-called non-scientific praxis, rival conceptions of science), the presumption of a unified ancient tradition of Greek science (i.e. the preeminence of empirical observation and the development of natural laws) has nevertheless filtered into Western intellectual histories, themselves the building blocks of methodological and disciplinary histories.

Turning to the Sophists and the much wider rhetorical tradition, the technical studies that show how these thinkers conceptualized reality, serve a similar metascientific

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126. Frede distinguishes between the study of philosophy and the study of the philosophy of the past (history of philosophy). Frede suggests that the latter advances the ideas that certain thoughts “had a considerable philosophical influence on later philosophical thought” and seeks to understand the terms of that influence. In the sense that a philosophical idea has had resultant effects in particular historical events, however, is not enough to explain its philosophical importance. That can only be achieved by adding historical context to the idea and also by explaining its relationship to advances in other fields. Frede suggests that this historical context be included, since philosophy, alone cannot explain why a particular idea was chosen or projected. Relatedly, the history of philosophy traces ideas in the context of the societies which develop them. This does not negate the philosophical importance (or philosophical rationalizations) of the single idea, it merely adds flesh to it. See Michael Frede, “Introduction: The Study of Ancient Philosophy,” xiii-xix and the discussions in Chapter Ten of this dissertation.
function. While the grammarians, with their later Stoic influences, may be more appropriately considered scientific, the assumptions of the rhetorician’s pursuit of “right language” has implications for the development of “truth” in the disciplines which would develop on the heels of rhetoric. In addition to a brief treatment in Hankinson’s *Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought*, the works of George A. Kennedy and Teresa Morgan include discussions that allow us to understand the construction of truth and meaning out of the worldviews of the rhetoricians. We see from these works, the general assumption that truth was a function of persuasion, though in the view of Quintilian, a truly educated rhetorician did so through virtue.127

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The necessity of linking organizational and educational structures discussed previously, to these metascientific ideas is crucial in providing the links between ancient thought and disciplinarity. The contributions to David Wagner’s *The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages* allow us to see how that transition may have emerged at the end of antiquity. The idea of a “seven liberal arts,” however, was not an idea that operated in any of the structures discussed above (i.e. the *enkyklios paideia*). It is important then to examine briefly the ideas of whom Wagner calls the Latin encyclopedists as well as the Christian theorists to discuss the terms of this transition and the process which brought ancient ideas to the Middle Ages.

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b. The Latin Encyclopedists

While the socio-political implications of the dissolution of the Roman Empire would engender a disruption of classical learning, the process was laid by the general culture of intellectual decline at the close of Roman antiquity. Scholars have hotly debated the nature of this decline as well as the appropriateness of the idea of “decline” to characterize this period. However it is clear, utilizing any number of metrics, that transition was afoot. One of these metrics was a decline and/or shift in publications.

The work of Robert R. Bolgar chronicles the fortunes of the intellectual movement he denotes, “the classical heritage,” in his 1954 work of the same title, but also of “its beneficiaries.” This work is an introductory history of the trajectory of philosophy and educational thought which begins at the close of antiquity and continues through the European Middle Ages and the creation of the university coinciding with cultural idea of “the West.” This roughly nine hundred year focus includes among other discussions, historical analyses of early Christian Rome, the Byzantium era (construed as “distinct” from the West), the Carolingian Age, the era of the Scholastics, and finally the Renaissance, covering the process which saw the cultural “West” emerge on the shoulders of the classical, pagan heritage, but through the frame of Christendom.128

During the intellectual decline of Rome, there was an intermediary group that oversaw the preservation of the Graeco-Roman intellectual heritage in the fifth to the seventh centuries C.E. This key group of thinkers labeled, “theorists of antiquity” by Jacques Verger, and “the Latin encyclopedists” by David Wager, were essential bridge

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figures for the intellectual gulf between antiquity and the European Middle Ages. Along with the development of what has been called “the handbook tradition,” the encyclopedists were products of both the Hellenistic and Roman era and their contributions included the compilation and archival of earlier forms of the classical pedagogical tradition as well as of the theoretical and philosophical ideas of earlier ages. More compilers and commentators than original thinkers, Bolgar states that the encyclopedists “embodied for the medieval world and to a great extent also for the Renaissance the teaching of the ancients on literary history and literary criticism and helped to determine how the classical authors were interpreted.”129 He later asserts that their importance lie not in their relevance to their contemporaries and neither to the comprehensive views of knowledge they attempted and failed at providing, but to the provision of an educational ideal. It was the collective contribution of a view of “general education” that was more practical than that of Quintilian, and one which was suitable to the emerging universities down the road, which makes their work seminal.130 The system of education gleaned from their compilations became the foundation for the seven liberal arts. Both the aforementioned chapter by David Wagner in The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages along with Bolgar’s text provide general information on the role of these commentators.

The Latin encyclopedists, of course, were not the first to attempt to classify and archive the whole of knowledge. In the Roman era, this achievement belongs to Marcus Terentius Varro, whose Nine Books of the Disciplines was essential for later theorists of the

130. Ibid, 37.
seven liberal arts. Similarly, Wagner asserts that the handbooks of the Greek thinkers Posidonius and Nichomachus (*Introduction to Arithmetic*), the commentary on Plato authored by Chalcidius, Pliny’s *Natural History*, and the Roman grammatical scholars, Donatus and Priscian are all thought to have prepared the ground for the emergence of the encyclopedists. Perhaps the other key trend was the widespread influence of Neoplatonism, and its “all-embracing” and other-worldly conception of knowledge.\(^{131}\)

Bolgar and Wagner discuss as seminal to the Middle Ages, two Neoplatonist thinkers responsible for developing the sorts of compilations mentioned above, Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius and Martianus Capella in the fifth century C.E. The two extant works of the former prefigured the separation of the language arts (*Saturnalia*) and the mathematical arts (*Commentary on the Dream of Scipio*) that would become standard in university curricula. In addition, Bolgar asserts that the latter’s methodology of combining “elucidation with systematic exposition” would become an influential standard.\(^{132}\)

Considered by some an obscure thinker, one of the few works in English that reads Macrobius’ work as important is Thomas Whittaker’s *Macrobius* (1923).\(^{133}\) While language arts and mathematical arts were important to separate, at least pedagogically, Martianus Capella’s famous allegory suggests a marriage between the two. His *The Marriage of Philology and Mercury* represented the necessity of viewing the arts as an “all-embracing”

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131. See David L. Wagner, “The Seven Liberal Arts and Classical Scholarship,” 14-18 for these ideas.
132. As well as a further contribution to metascience. See Robert R. Bolgar, *The Classical Heritage*, 44.
133. Thomas Whittaker, *Macrobius, or Philosophy, Science and Letters in the Year 400* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1923). The work has been challenged by later thinkers for being too sympathetic to Macrobius, as Whittaker views him as more than a simple compiler, but a thinker who demonstrated mastery.
tradition as the doctrines of Neoplatonism gained momentum. It utilized Varro’s scheme of organizing knowledge in the seven liberal arts.\(^{134}\)

The figure of Saint Augustine of Hippo (b. 354) would prove instrumental to this tradition as well. While his work has been considered a part of the patristic tradition to be discussed infra, his attempted compilation, though never completed, provided some of the same outcomes as the other encyclopedists. Augustine, born in North Africa and trained in the \textit{enkyklios paideia}, was in effect, a polymath, and his prolific writings contained much of the intellectual corpus of the classical heritage.\(^{135}\) Another important Christian thinker in the encyclopedist tradition was the sixth century thinker, Cassiodorus. His \textit{An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings} was a compilation purposed at recognizing the importance of the classical tradition to Christianity. A key bridge figure, Cassiodorus’s monastery founded on the educational materials developed in this, and many other texts, can be thought to have served as a model for the monastic schools of later centuries. Finally, the work of Isidore of Seville (b. 560 C.E.) served an important archival function. \textit{Etymologies}, which attempted a comprehensive introduction to knowledge, devoted a large section to the idea of the liberal arts.\(^{136}\)

Of the encyclopedists, perhaps the thinker considered the most important figure is Ancius Boethius (b. 480 C.E). One of the “founders of the Middle Ages,” Boethius transmitted much of the ancient Graeco-Roman intellectual and philosophical tradition by translating and commentating on a number of extant works that served as the

\(^{134}\) See David L. Wagner, “The Seven Liberal Arts and the Classical Tradition,” 19 and Robert R. Bolgar, \textit{The Classical Heritage}, 42-44.

\(^{135}\) According to Bolgar, this emphasis is seen in the surviving text, \textit{Retractationes}, see \textit{The Classical Heritage}, 53.

foundation for his *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, a work that achieved seminal status for centuries. This work and his translations would serve as the cornerstone for particularly, Aristotelianism, as it was the only translation available in Latin for some time. For this, Boethius is widely considered a seminal thinker and one for which the West is indebted for ensuring the survival of these texts for posterity. Margaret Gibson’s edited volume, *Boethius: His Life, Thought, and Influence* (1981) is a collection of intellectual-biographical discussions of Boethius and the relationships between his commentary to philosophical orientations that would eventually inform university education.138

Along with Gibson’s volume, there are a number of other works that treat the individual contributions of the encyclopedists and provide clarity on the roles each played in ushering in components of the classical traditions to the rest of Europe during the decline of the Roman Empire. On Macrobius see the volume by Thomas Whittaker mentioned above, which relies on many non-English commentaries.139 The scant information we have on the life of Martianus Capella as well as a commentary on his work and its impact can be found in William Stahl, Richard Johnson, and E.L. Budge’s *Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts* (1971). The literature on St. Augustine is immense and will be discussed infra. Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville’s impact are discussed in the biographies: James J. O’Donnell’s *Cassiodorus* (1979) and John

138. See Part Two of Ibid, 73-214. Boethius’ influence, which will be discussed more in the current study, is mostly seen in the study of the mathematical sciences, or the *quadrivium*.
Henderson’s *The Medieval World of Isidore of Seville* (2007), respectively. In terms of a collective view of this group, important insights can be gleaned from A.H. Armstrong’s edited *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* in addition to the works of Bolgar and Wagner already discussed.

For the purposes of the present effort the relationship between the Latin encyclopedists and the classical heritage allows us to faithfully determine the trajectory and character of the West’s intellectual lineage as well as how scholars have constructed it. The domain of these thinkers is usually covered only in piecemeal fashion, if at all, by non-specialists and unfortunately obscures an essential segment of intellectual history. If there is a true source of the idea of classifications of knowledge in the way that most Western thinkers would today find intelligible and practical, it may be found in the works of the encyclopedists, who along with the church fathers, reveal the inapplicability of the standard representation of a stable, unbroken tradition of “Western” educational thought, beginning in antiquity and identifiable at the dawn of what has been considered the “Dark Ages.”

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141. *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, includes discussion most prominently of Saint Augustine, Boethius and Isidore of Seville, with a brief examination of the impact of Martianus Capella. See Ibid, 337-419; 538-564; 576-578.

142. According to Bolgar: “Their summaries of the various branches of knowledge erred on the side of a jejune brevity; and it has been said that wishing to cover too much, they ran the risk of omitting everything of genuine interest. Certainly as guides to knowledge they left much to be desired. To their major fault of condensing too much, they added the further sin of not always following the
c. The Church Fathers and the Patristic Tradition

Historians have asserted that the end of antiquity was coterminous with the end/decline of Rome and/or the embrace of Christianity. Christianity is widely considered the antithesis, at least religiously, of the pagan, classical tradition and highly oriented toward segments of the population less enamored by the Graeco-Roman imperial acculturation. For these groups, Christendom provided an alternative. The embrace however of this new theology would cohere around other aspects of the pagan tradition, ultimately creating a twinned epistemology of Neo-Platonism and Christianity. The bifurcation between Christendom and the classical heritage would engender a transition from what Wagner terms a “this-worldly attitude” found in the latter to an “other-worldly philosophy” characterized by the former. For this reason, the Christian era and the tradition of patristic philosophy importantly reveals the changes in how educational systems, classifications of knowledge, and understandings of reality, fed the coming university system. The challenge for the Fathers of the Church was to effectively

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143. Bolgar asserts: “All the pagan works, with the possible exception of the novels, have their roots primarily in the culture which grew up in the city states. The Christian literature, on the other hand, in spite of its affinities with this pagan tradition, belongs in its deepest essence to that later world of rabbit-warren towns and monster autocracies, to despair born of chaos.” Robert R. Bolger, *The Classical Heritage*, 26.

articulate Christian ideas within the normative boundaries of established philosophy. That is, to articulate a Divine (but Christian) reading of knowledge, writ large.¹⁴⁵

This trajectory however begins before the fifth century C.E., the almost universal dating of the “close” of antiquity. Within the seminal collection of essays, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Henry Chadwick gives pride of place to Philo (b. 20 B.C.E.), a progenitor of what may be more accurately called the Judeo-Christian pursuit of knowledge. Philo, a Jewish contemporary of Saint Paul, was an educational theorist well versed in both Jewish and Hellenistic knowledge foundations. According to Chadwick, he initiated the idea of philosophy ordered primarily by a Judeo-Christian theology, both in place of and in relationship to Greek thought.¹⁴⁶ He further asserts that it was Philo who initiated the idea that Platonic concepts such as The One or *logos* could be read as components of Christian thought, God and his image on Earth, respectively. Faith was however the main determinant, and in Philo’s writings, philosophy served the all-important propaedeutic function to theology.¹⁴⁷

Chadwick continues in the next chapter of the section and adds that very similar to Philo, was Justin Martyr (b. 100 C.E.), who was a famous apologist advocating for the syncretism between the two traditions during the early introduction of Christianity. Like

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¹⁴⁵. Many Greek thinkers converted to Christianity while retaining many of the normative Platonic philosophical ideas, by reading Plato’s *Timaeus* as the Biblical/Pentateuchal book of Genesis, the Platonic “One” as Yahweh/God, and Plato’s *logos* as the tenets of the revealed word of God and/or his divine image. This also worked in reverse for those thinkers “born” into these religious teachings but wanting to learn/apply Platonic thought. See the discussion which follows and in more detail the work of A.H. Armstrong and R.A. Markus, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy* (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1960).


¹⁴⁷. Ibid, 139-144.
Philo, Justin’s religious-philosophy, attempted a reconciliation with intellectual and religious doctrine. In Chadwick’s representation of Justin, we get perhaps the first Christian thinker to attempt within his work framed as apologies and dialogues, to find resonances, if not the origins, of Greek cosmological and theological worldviews in Christian corollary texts, with faith being the “linchpin” for all knowledge.¹⁴⁸

The Alexandrian Christian Platonists discussed in both this volume and in Robert Bolgar’s text are the famous thinkers, Clement (b. 150 C.E.) and Origen (b. 184 C.E.). These philosophers in different ways attempted to establish a symbiotic relationship between the Greek pagan tradition and the emergent Christian theology. Clement’s method was to suggest a theological tradition, interpreted as inherently Christian, already at work within the Greek traditions. According to Chadwick, Clement was interested in utilizing the discipline of logic to show how reason and revelation could be reconciled, while expanding Justin’s rejection of Greek forms of polytheism. Clement’s works include, among others, *Stromateis* and *Paedagogus*.¹⁴⁹ Origen, on the other hand has been considered a strong Neoplatonist, but according to Bolgar, one that disparaged the epistemological sources of Neoplatonism, itself. In Chadwick’s view, Origen recognized the importance of Platonic thought, but did not believe Christianity needed it to be a system in its own

¹⁴⁸. For the “linchpin” statement, see Henry Chadwick, “The Beginning of Christian Philosophy: Justin: The Gnostics,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong, 163. Justin provides the “optimistic” to the Gnostic argument also prevalent during this era which saw the material world as putatively evil. Gnosticism was “dark” syncretism between Christianity and Hellenistic philosophy. See Ibid, 166-167.

Many have credited Origen as the originator of a Christian Platonism, which attempted to link philosophical knowledge to a theology of personal responsibility and redemption. Both Clement and Origen retained and reworked certain elements of Christian and Greek philosophical first-order knowledge foundations, drawing equally from both.

A more wide-ranging discussion of the latter three thinkers is Chadwick’s *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (1966), which assesses their important contributions, elucidating their metaphysical and scientific theories in relationship to the pagan tradition. Importantly, Chadwick shows that their attempts at syncretism did not preclude attacks from more conservative Christian thinkers, with Tertullian as perhaps the most virulent of this ilk. According to Bolgar, these early thinkers are important to understand in ultimately comprehending the Christian philosophers who would emerge later during the Roman Empire.

Neoplatonism’s further rise and continuity in the later centuries engendered a deeper engagement with the thought of Plato, Plotinus, and their successors as representative of the Greek intellectual and classical heritage. Christian thinkers could not escape its grasp. Perhaps the most important of these thinkers were Saint Jerome, Saint Augustine, Saint Gregory of Nazianzen, and Saint Basil of Caesarea. All four in different

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150. He states: “Nothing for Origen is true because Plato said it, though he thinks that Plato, being a clever man, said many things that are true. What Origen claims is not an affinity with this or that philosophy, but the right to think and reason from a Christian standpoint.” See Henry Chadwick, “Origen,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, 185. Origen according to Chadwick, is “prickly” to the classical tradition (Ibid, 186) and has points of disagreement with it, despite the resonances that other fathers were apt to point out.

151. See Ibid, passim. Also, see the sources in note 162.


ways sought to liberate Christianity from the “this-worldly” tradition of paganism. Continuing the methodological advances of Clement and Origen, the fathers of this era were intent on articulating a Christian vision of the world that was predicated upon showing either the Christian origin of and/or adaption to the dominant strains of Neoplatonist philosophy. The story of Saint Jerome (b. 347 C.E.), the author of the Latin Bible is well known. In *The Classical Heritage*, Bolgar recounts Jerome’s transition from a lover of Graeco-Roman thought to ultimately a thinker that sought to establish the Bible as the sum of knowledge and the initiator of a Christian rhetorical tradition, par excellence.154

Saint Augustine has been the subject of much more academic discourse.155 Richard A. Markus shows that Augustine was able to contribute a prolific bibliography replete with philosophical, metascientific, and religious assessments which would serve to initiate the Christian thinker into the canons of Graeco-Roman thought and vice versa.156 In addition to attempting to develop an encyclopedic compendium of knowledge as discussed in the previous section, his *The Christian Doctrine* sought to establish in some sense the best way to remain a Christian and a scholar in the face of a system for producing scholars, that was not Christian. In an effort to resist throwing out the proverbial baby with the bathwater, Augustine is credited with seeking to retain the best elements of paganism, in the development of a Christian philosophy. While Saint Augustine was not

the first to do so, he is considered a dominant figure as his work most effectively ushered into acceptance the dualism between the two traditions, which embraced paganism insofar as it was understood in terms of the pre-eminence of Christianity. Eugene TeSelle’s intellectual biography attempts to cast Augustine as primarily a theological thinker, which in many ways corroborates Bolgar’s claims that Augustine’s methodology would influence the construction of the medieval university’s hierarchy of knowledges. Bolgar also discusses the similar approaches that developed among some of Augustine’s contemporaries.

Known as the Cappadocian fathers, Saint Gregory of Nazianzen (b. 330 C.E.) and Saint Basil of Caesarea (b. 330 C.E.), were trained in the Athenian traditions, but ultimately sought to subsume these traditions into the religious corpus of Christianity, continuing the trend developed by Clement of Alexandria. The strongest advocate for

157. Bolgar explains the ultimate resolution of this issue: “Augustine represented in this matter the midpoint of the Christian attitude. Those Greek Fathers who were humanistically inclined like Basil and Gregory Nazianzen were prepared to allow pagan literature to be taught in the schools to Christian children because they regarded it—the obviously gross writers apart—as a suitable introduction in both form and subject-matter to the study of theology. Jerome was prepared to allow it to be taught, because of its beauty; and blinkered by his artist’s viewpoint he too failed to make any clear distinction as regards subject matter. These writers stood at one end of the scale. Against them were arrayed men who like Ennodius and Claudius Victor who were ready to blame all the misfortunes of the age on the reading of Virgil and Ovid, and men like Paulinus of Nola were prepared to flee into solitude. Augustine took up a position half-way between the contending parties. He never considered the possibility of a sudden break with Graeco-Roman culture, but he dismissed the arguments of Jerome and attenuated those of Basil, making it clear that while a limited amount of borrowing from paganism was vitally necessary, the amount could be limited.” Ibid, 54.

158. Bolgar states that Augustine along with Jerome, “decided the educational future of the West.” The Classical Heritage, 50. TeSelle’s reading of Augustine’s thought as putatively theological suggests that the appearance of theology as one of the four main faculties in the medieval university, and in fact, “the queen science,” may owe much of its appearance to the philosophical ideas of Augustine. See Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) and Chapter Three on the four faculties of the medieval university.

159. R.R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, 50. An important examination into the genealogy, intellectual domain, and the religious-philosophical assumptions of the Cappadocian thinkers is, I.P. Sheldon-Williams, “Part VI: The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the
a clear break was Saint Gregory the Great (b. 540 C.E.), who according to Bolgar, thought that Christian philosophy and theology could be serve as the only foundation for a laymen’s education given the rise in literatures on the topic in his lifetime. His contribution seemingly was the logical transition of the early church fathers’ attempts to crystalize the two traditions into a Christian humanism that remained solidly within the bounds of religious doctrine.\textsuperscript{160}

In Bolgar’s work and more expressly in the contributions to \textit{The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy}, the assertion is that the patristic tradition, which these church fathers embodied, laid down important precedents and had real ramifications for the studies of the “pagan tradition” and its relationship to an evolving Christendom. While Armstrong’s edited work remains seminal, other texts which cover this topic of Western intellectual history include the edited collections, John M. Rist’s \textit{Platonism and its Christian Heritage} (1985) and Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey’s \textit{The Relationship Between Neoplatonism and Christianity} (1992).\textsuperscript{161}

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Clearly, Christendom would provide an important contribution to the universities that would begin to rise in the Middle Ages. As the formation of the European world nexus was initiated, the fusion of political economy and religion made Christianity’s role

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 54-57.

in Western higher education a mainstay. Reconciliation and retrenchment between the pagan tradition and later science with the Christian theological foundations in the church would serve as a major theme in the construction of Western knowledge for the next one thousand years and beyond.

Thus, the cultural sources of Western intellectual thought as they existed before the Carolingian reforms and before the vaunted idea of disciplinarity and its rough, sharply delineated, categories of knowledge. In mapping this trajectory, we have discussed works which have as their objective the construction of an ancient source for contemporary Western knowledge and educational theories, but also of all knowledge. While the West was experiencing a “Dark Age” the classical heritage for which it would later claim sole heirship, was reformulated throughout the rest of the world. Knowledge was not the sole preserve of those geographical areas which have been constructed as the cultural West: arguably the emergence of the first university on the “Western” model was constructed in Constantinople in 425 C.E., the advent of Beirut as a center for the study of law also began during the period, and the emergence of Islamic philosophy throughout the medieval, too name a few, were all located outside of both this geographical and cultural locus. Certainly, the African intellectual traditions did not “decline” during this period.162 The formation of a “European” tradition is in many ways a product of the consequences of migration and/or borrowing of the ideas of these thriving centers and/or

162. See Chapter Five.
transformations of knowledge whether one is focused on Greek, Eastern, “Near Eastern,” or African intellectual histories.

While intellectual historians have asserted that the emergence of Europe out of the Dark Ages was both politically and intellectually, a gulf between the old and new, the ancients and moderns, that is the birth pangs of the European tradition out of this rut, the reality is that much of what constituted the curricula, philosophy, and knowledge of the new Europe were in fact exalted borrowings and adoptions from a half-understood, piecemeal embrace of a complex assortment of Graeco-Roman and Christian thought. The next chapter discusses those works that trace the emergence of Europe’s intellectual “recovery” amid the decay and decline of not only the Roman socio-political edifice, but the transfer of “the classical heritage” to other parts of the world and Europe’s resultant adoption of this tradition to mould the early studium generale.
Chapter 3
“Expanding the ‘City of God’: Situating Disciplinarity in the Development of the European University Culture

But now the time had come to carry the spoiling of the Egyptians once step—indeed several steps—further, in the realms where the practice of the Fathers could offer no guidance. The self-styled pygmies of the Middle Ages were faced with the task of wresting from paganism a contribution to the City of God that the greatest of their authorities had been afraid to contemplate.
-Robert R. Bolgar, *The Classical Tradition and its Beneficiaries*

The very emphasis on education and practical instruction, which was a fulfillment of the principle of the enlightenment of the human race, required that all educational institutions should be increasingly brought into its focus.
-Notker Hammerstein, “Epilogue: The Enlightenment”

Whatever fragments left of the patristic tradition after the “barbaric” invasions that created the boundaries of modern Western Europe, became the cultural and intellectual terms, which guided the intellectual lives of the precursors to the university. The future of Saint Augustine’s “City of God,” enlivened by the putative fusion of Christian thought with the intellectual graces and political structures of the Graeco-Roman classical heritage, was in great peril. The European Dark Ages oversaw the subcontinent’s alienation from the great cultural contact [but also political and economic] with the Mediterranean, which had so characterized and defined the societies of Greece and Rome. With the economic poverty of the European Dark Ages came an intellectual poverty, and a further distancing from the intellectual world that would later be claimed

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3. Saint Augustine’s *City of God* was one of many writings on the relationship between Christianity and society. This work views as necessary a usage of earlier models of statecraft found in the Greek and Roman theorists.
as its own. The “barbarous tribes” which had come to populate and then destabilize the Roman Empire, were left with the task of creating a civilization out of its ruin. This is the story of the European Dark Ages, but it is also a story of transition that can be applied to later ages. In utilizing Augustine’s metaphor of the children of Israel taking the spoils of the Egyptians as they fled to apply to the post-Dark Ages era, Robert R. Bolgar, in effect articulates a metaphor that in many ways explains the emergence of intellectual culture in Europe in subsequent periods. One of the primary questions in European intellectual history was, and arguably still is, the fusion of her religious and philosophical cultures to meet shifting societal demands. This imperative, during the period that Bolgar narrates, would be needed again and again, as the West constructed its religious and intellectual nerve centers amid a socio-political expansion into the outer world. The dualism of Christianity and philosophy/science cited in many discussions of Western intellectual history was perhaps underpinned by the necessity of embracing a system of all-encompassing knowledge, necessary to the maintenance of a European world order under construction. It was a dualism that necessitated both a revision and expansion of the known methods for classifying and approaching knowledge—a “pagan”-infused expansion of Augustine’s idea of a “City of God” to the creation of an idea we call

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“Europe.” The birth of disciplinarity in that “Europe” was a product of this dynamic. The migration of peoples, the translation of extant texts, and the formulation of a distinct way of approaching intellectual work out of this context are just some of the forces that initiated its emergence. The rest of this complex story is the collective contribution of the following works.

I. The Reforms of Western Monastic and Cathedral Schools

Between the end of antiquity and the birth of the medieval university, the dominant educational force was Christendom, and its most consistent supporting institutions were the monastic and cathedral schools. Again, here, the work of Robert Bolgar is instrumental. The dominant educational problem was the training of officials for the church. The laborers of the vanquished Roman Empire and its transition to an emergent feudal structure had very little need for an educated general public or serfdom, so it was the elite that were primarily concerned with the projection of a Christian educational system. From the year 450 C.E. until the beginning of the twelfth century, this need occupied many of the educational theorists of the Middle Ages. Their ideas have been summarized by many thinkers including the work of the aforementioned Bolgar, but also in the broad discussions of Western education such as, inter alia James Bowen’s *A History of Western Education* (1972). It is out of these discussions that we get the figures, and concomitant individual works, responsible for the development and reform of

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the educational system to meet the overarching demand of an educated Christian priesthood.

Due in large part to its insulation from the vagaries of the disintegration of the Roman empire and its bastions for classical learning, important centers for knowledge acquisition would emerge on the British Isles beginning in the sixth century C.E. According to Bolgar, the creation of institutions first in Ireland and then in Anglo-Saxon controlled areas provided the impetus that would systematize the curricula of the monasteries and cathedrals, the latter which was to emerge later.6 Through a process that included attracting migrants from the continent and exploratory visits by natives to traditional learning centers, the monks were able to establish an important intellectual tradition. The early schools of Iltud and Gildas in Ireland were later supplanted by the schools instituted by Theodore and Hadrian, and his successor, Aldhelm in England.7 A dispute as to the best method for acquiring knowledge of the Christian literary tradition, led to the eventual establishment of the two main arteries of theological thought in the Dark Ages, at Jarrow and York.8 The most famous schoolmasters of these institutions were the Venerable Bede (b. 673) and Alcuin (b. 735).

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6. On the emergence of Ireland in the context of barbarian incursions into the Roman Empire, see Ibid, 91-92.
7. The Irish monasteries of Iltud and Gildas are famous for developing an appreciation for learning that would become a more systematic impulse with Theodore’s reform of education in England. Theodore, a transplant from the Mediterranean learning system elevated the earlier approaches to the more disciplined use of the classical learning and Christian thought. See Ibid, 99-101. See also S.J. Crawford, Anglo-Saxon Influence on Western Christendom, 600-800 (Cambridge: Speculum Historiale, 1966), 89-100.
8. This dispute was between the Irish Celtic tradition of learning and the more Roman tradition. It regarded the question of the use of Latin in both the schools and the parish. See Robert R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, 98-99.
Bede, a veritable polymath, was one of the most prolific writers during this period. Along with overseeing one of the most successful educational institutions at the time, succeeding Benedict Biscop (b. 623) and Ceolfrith (b. 642), Bede was also a proto-historian, scientist educational theorist, and a Christian exegete. It is in each of these areas that modern Bedan scholars have endeavored to trace his influence. The approach to the contributions of the Scott Degregori edited, *Innovation and Tradition in the Writings of Bede* (2006), takes these categories as important but attempts to analyze their “cross-fertilizations.”\(^9\) Perhaps this view of Bede supports his own self-definition as elaborated by Roger Ray’s contribution to *Innovation and Tradition in the Writings of Bede*, as well as contributions to *The Cambridge Companion to Bede* (2010) that reveal his attempt to impress upon Christian learning better mechanisms for its elucidation, utilizing the remnants of the earlier *enkyklios paideia*, or in more certain terms, the continuity of the patristic tradition.\(^10\) Bede’s famous exegetical writings are buttressed by not only history (*Ecclesiastical History of the English Church*) and biography (*Life of Ceolfrith*), but also works on the arts (*The Art of Poetry* and *The Figures of Rhetoric*) and science (*On the Nature of Things*), to name but a few. In addition to *The Cambridge Companion to Bede*, the standard work edited by A. Hamilton Thompson, *Bede* (1935), the single-authored examination of Peter Hunter

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Bede’s influence on the English conversion to Christianity.

Alcuin of York was perhaps the most important successor to the school made famous by the archbishops, Egbert and Ethelbert. Also a prolific writer, the impact of Alcuin is most consistently seen in his method for sharpening the training of Christian priests and bishops. Historians have consistently linked Alcuin to the extension of the Augustinian idea of Christian education. According to works such as Andrew Fleming West’s *Alcuin and the Rise of the Christian Schools* (1909), Alcuin was concerned with the classical heritage, but only as it related to the framing of Christian thought. The schools at York exemplified this particular method. However, Alcuin is most popularly linked to his involvement with the Carolingian reform of education. David Wagner, whose work we discussed in the previous chapter, along with Bolgar show his importance to this particular movement characterized by Charlemagne’s attempt to standardize and extend

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12. This early intellectual biographical text links Alcuin to the “seven liberal arts” beginning in late antiquity and also explains the emergence of his work in the Frankish empire, see Andrew Fleming West, *Alcuin and the Rise of the Christian Schools* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909). A more elaborate work of this period that views Alcuin with the context of the overarching history of the English church is C.J. Gaskoin, *Alcuin: His Life and His Work* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1904). This text is able to establish some basic continuities between the monasteries on the British Isles and the intellectual genealogies which they spawned. The life of Alcuin is the extension of the works of not only Bede and Egbert but of the monasteries founded at the beginning of Christianity’s foray into the area in the fifth century, C.E.
the models Alcuin developed at York to the wider Holy Roman empire. Other works that detail its emergence include Luitpold Wallach’s *Alcuin and Charlemagne* (1959) and Elizabeth Shipley Duckett’s *Alcuin, Friend of Charlemagne* (1951). These works detail the development of the Palace School, which though technically secular, inculcated imperial officials with an understanding of the Christian intellectual tradition. This largely included a preparatory reading of the liberal arts (via the fathers of the Church) with Biblical exegeses. Importantly, it was a system linked solely to elite education, but one which would become standard, as Alcuin’s system was replicated throughout the areas of Europe under the control of Charlemagne. Alcuin, himself, would dedicate his life to the spread of this pedagogical tradition.

The importance of the monastic and cathedral traditions lie simply in their embrace of Latin traditions, not necessarily (dependent of course on one’s vantage point) for the reasons of this embrace, which were chiefly Biblical. Latin (and to a lesser degree, Greek) was the language of the Christian tradition, so it had to be learned. As Robert Bolgar shows, it was Alcuin who helped bring a certain discipline to this process. The differences in approach can be gleaned from the methodology for learning the classical heritage exemplified by Alcuin’s predecessor in the court of Charlemagne, Peter of Pisa.

Less a teacher in the English tradition established above, Peter’s unsuccessful, more

“Roman” approach, centered on a love for the beauty of language as opposed to the rote Anglo-Saxon tradition of learning “correctness.” ¹⁵ For Alcuin, the Christian system was the only “true” way; he was no lover of the pagan tradition. However, the arts provided a mode to transmit methods for teaching Latin, many of which (e.g. the interpretation and the commentary) would constitute the foundation for the universities, which still were on the horizon. This largely propaedeutic conception of the arts is evidenced in Alcuin’s writings on education, some of which include a treatise on the trivium subjects— grammar (Ars Grammatica), rhetoric (Disputatio de Rhetorica et de virtutibus sapientissimi Regis Karli et Albini Magistri) and logic (De Dialectica).¹⁶ These were linked to among other developments, a new round of anthologizing of the “classics.”¹⁷

The classics were added to the curriculum of the cathedral schools, the successor of the monastic schools in terms of institutional development. Though still not constituting the university forms in any real sense, these schools, the most famous of which were in France, were commissioned to provide theological training to a much wider swath of clerics than the monastery could provide. These well-known schools were at Rheims, Laon, Paris, Wurzburg, and Chartres, and featured “masters” well-versed in the classical heritage. Still, their readings of the ancients were filtered through the works

¹⁶. On Alcuin’s conception of these subjects, chiefly rhetoric, see Wilbur Samuel Howell, The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne (New York: Russell and Russell, 1941), 33-64. This section of the text places Alcuin in direct “conversation” with earlier theorists of rhetoric discussed in the previous chapter, including Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.
¹⁷. While conceding that it would not be accurate to characterize this moment as a Renaissance, Bolgar shows that the classical heritage was resuscitated by both the anthologizing of classical sources but through the informal institution of adding these thinkers to the curricula that began as a result of the work of Alcuin and others. It shows in some senses the continuity of the work began by the encyclopedists. See Ibid, 123-126.
of the fathers of the Church. It is however, in the cathedral schools where we see the orthodoxy begin to break and the Christian philosophical tradition utilize new methods for explicating the revealed truth. The stories of the tenth and eleventh century thinkers, Gerbert of Aurillac, Berengar of Tours, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Damian, Anselm of Canterbury, Bernard of Clarivaux, Thierry and Bernard of Chartres, and St. Bonaventure, at the cathedral schools is recounted in Bolgar’s effort, but also in the more targeted treatment of C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels* (1994).

In this text, Jaeger fills the gap of the eleventh century, left vacant by Western intellectual historians due to the paucity of writings produced in the period. His reading of the cathedral tradition represented by the schools of medieval Europe places its primary objective as the teaching of virtue. His contribution to the scholarship surrounding this period elevates such a reading of these schools as providing instruction in “letters and manners.” To utilize Jaeger’s metaphor, virtue and ethical teaching “colonized” the liberal arts. As such the writings that were produced (e.g. Hugh of St.

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19. On the idea of “letter and manners,” see C. Stephen Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels*, 2-4. Jaeger draws parallels to decidedly pagan traditions of virtue, seen in figures such as Cicero and Quintilian. Others, however, have linked this idea older genealogies of Christian ethical thinkers. See for example, Arthur F. Holmes, *Building the Christian Academy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001), 36-46, which uses a much smaller sample of cathedral educators than Jaeger. While it is clear that these tendencies may reflect the author’s ideological leanings, perhaps the different viewpoints also reflect the notion that at this stage of development of the West as a cultural complex, it was still undergoing the construction of its own identity. Was the intellectual genealogy responsible for the contemplation of reason (and by extension the rationalization of a civil and political order), a product of the collective contribution of an identifiable range of thinkers or a reading subordinated to the contemplation of reason only through the Divine? Though not as rigid as the above question implies, much of the scholastic tradition, to be discussed infra, was reduced to this intellectual question.

Victor’s *Didascalicon* and Thierry of Chartres’ *Heptateuchon*) give a sense of how the arts were to be categorized and the approaches to study for which they were to prepare students.

While Jaeger’s text has garnered much attention, studies such as Olaf Pederson’s *The First Universities* (1997), contextualize these schools as setting the ground for the scholastic tradition as well as the rise of the universities as “the town” and its concomitant secular knowledge became important to medieval living. As the particularities of society changed, a theme so prevalent throughout the Middle Ages, town life engendered the necessity of schools that were not completely technical but not aloof from practical needs, as the monasteries generally were. For Pederson this context begins to explain the emergence of the scholastic tradition, a movement in which cathedral schools were central. After all, it was out of the discussions in the cathedral schools that led to the emergence of the controversial Peter Abelard.21

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The rise of “pagan” interest in the ninth through twelfth centuries throughout the European world ushered in a new era; it was however an interest linked to the birth pangs of a new society. The development of Europe out of the ruins of “barbarian” decay required a sense of worldly knowledge for which the Biblical tradition could not

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completely fill.22 It is here that the epigraph above of Robert Bolgar became important: the Christian exegetical tradition needed expansion.

II. Scholasticism: The Transmission and Translation of Knowledge in the Studium Generale

The direct predecessors of the medieval universities were the monastic and cathedral schools of which the foregoing discussion was devoted. As the character of European society changed, the center of its intellectual edifice underwent what Anders Piltz terms, “the new learning.”23 Piltz’s The World of Medieval Learning (1978) claims Peter Abelard (b. 1079) as “the first academic,” and he along with John of Salisbury (b. 1120) are regarded in Arthur O. Norton’s Readings in the History of Education: Medieval Universities (1909) as the two important figures of a “twelfth century renaissance”—the embrace of the classical learning as a propaedeutic to understanding revealed knowledge.24 Both products of the cathedral schools, it is these thinkers who are generally believed to have stood between the earlier monastic and cathedral educational systems and the important transition to the universities. Along with scholars who advanced the study of the law and medicine, the “pre-university” teachers, Abelard and John of Salisbury inaugurated a new method for learning in the arts and philosophy: a movement that has been come to be known as scholasticism—which elevated the importance of logic and philosophy in the studium generale, while inculcating other areas of study into an attempted methodological

22. Ibid, 130-140.
reconciliation between the Christian tradition and increased awareness of pagan learning. This method laid the groundwork for the partial recovery of Aristotelian thought which had been “long disused.”

Historians of this era generally point to the importance of Abelard in this process. Abelard has been characterized by his early biographer, Joseph McCabe, and in subsequent works as an important challenger to the established orthodoxy of the cathedral school, and a logician par excellence. Both his *Sic et Non* (*Yes and No*) and his *Dialectica* were attempts to systematize theological thought with logic. *Sic et Non*, an early example of the scholastic literary genre of *quaestiones*, established logic as essential to theology by pairing certain arguments with propositions for and against, in attempt to show the authority of the text under question and the process by which logic could extract truth. This would prove essential to the methods of instruction in canon law (Gratian’s *Decretum*) and theology (Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*).

While these beginnings of scholasticism are shrouded in the controversy of the cathedral schools, their extensions are to be located in the *studium generale*, and its later

27. On this approach, see Ulrich G. Leimle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 61-65. Along with the “questions” method, the “sentences” and *summa*, the sermon and lecture, as well as the disputation would constitute methods of writing and instruction seminal for the production of knowledge in the medieval university. See Ibid, 33-73.
manifestation, as the *universitas*. This institution, the successor to the cathedral schools, was built from a collection of different professional guilds, brought together by the association of students and teachers under one institutional umbrella. The association of scholars and masters organized as guilds, were made into the four faculties and organized into the medieval university. The scholastic method found an institutional home as thinkers of different “national” backgrounds associated with the study of Roman and canon law, theology, medicine, and philosophy were granted special liberties under by both civic and papal authorities to incorporate themselves in various towns across Western Europe.\(^{28}\) As such, an understanding of the histories of medieval universities and their birth provide further context to the origins of disciplinarity and its relationship to scholasticism—often seen as more a method of instruction than a doctrine.

Regarding studies of this period of university history, the oldest and most oft quoted text is Hastings Rashdall’s *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, initially published in 1895.\(^{29}\) His three-volume work deals with the creation of a commissioned body of students and scholars committed to the intellectual training of professionals, influenced by the Graeco-Roman tradition and the patristic pedagogic influences discussed in the previous chapter, but most of all, by the twelfth century thinkers. The earliest universities developed in the context of a still-going dynamic of the age-old religious-secular schism

\(^{28}\) On these specific institutional frameworks see, Walter Rüegg, “Themes,” 6-20 and Olaf Pederson, *The First Universities*, 137-154 which conceptualizes the nascent university as an intellectual variant of the medieval institution of the guild. Both sources, as well as those which will be discussed infra show the importance of special privileges granted by law to the university, which gave them the ability to stabilize themselves in the towns in which they emerged.

(in both knowledge and civic power) amid the emergence of a Europe grappling with the contentious existence of a feudal order that had begun during the era of the cathedral schools.\textsuperscript{30} It is out of this context that Rashdall in the first volume of the text is able to situate the emergence of the medical school at Salerno and the law school of Bologna from its origins and closer contact with the classical heritage on the Italian peninsula. A similar process was at work in Paris regarding the study of theology. The birth of the University of Paris was made possible by the most advanced cathedral schools, which were all centered in the area. Rashdall’s second volume takes up the discussion of the smaller universities in Italy and the Iberian Peninsula before traversing to the schools of the Germanic lands which emerged in the thirteenth century. Finally, the balance of the third volume discusses the English universities of Oxford and Cambridge, centers for the study of theology and philosophy, that would eventually rank as pre-eminent institutions for the study of these subjects.\textsuperscript{31}

Before recounting the emergence of each individual university by country, Rashdall cites as important the work of the twelfth century thinkers (e.g. Abelard, Peter Lombard, and John of Salisbury) who reconceptualized and inserted the teachings of

\textsuperscript{30} On this milieu, see Olaf Pederson, \textit{The First Universities}, 122-124. Pederson argues that the needs that developed to rationalize the creation of cathedral schools were exacerbated, necessitating the need for specialization. These specialisms among the non-artisanal class were chiefly law, medicine, and theology.

\textsuperscript{31} Rashdall attempts at the very least a brief discussion of each of the schools with extant records. A list of known medieval universities is given in Volume I of the text. See Hastings Rashdall, \textit{The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages: Volume I: Salerno, Bologna, Paris}, xxviii. For a more recent list, see Jacques Verger’s, “Patterns,” 62-65.
classical writers into the curriculums as these universities began their ascent. This idea, which is echoed in subsequent histories places supreme importance on the rush of knowledge that began to pour in from translations of classical sources. The cathedral scholars had only access to a limited amount of the works of Aristotle, many of which was via the work of Boethius, as well as of the works of the Neoplatonists and the Roman thinker, Cicero. As such, translations which enlarged secular knowledge became essential to university education. Each university, regardless of specialty, would use these translations to strengthen the study of the arts and later philosophy, which in turn aided the higher disciplines.

While Rashdall’s is the most comprehensive text, more recent works develop his ideas based on sources that may not have been available to him. Alan B. Cobban updates Rashdall’s work by extending his analysis into areas that he considered lacked “their deserved prominence. His The Medieval Universities (1975) focuses on the early Italian universities, the University of Paris, and the English universities. While Part One

32. For Rashdall’s discussion of the twelfth century renaissance, see The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages: Volume I: Salerno, Bologna, Paris, 25-68.
33. Ibid, 68-72. Pre-translation works were called “the old logic” and post-translation works were called the “new logic.” See Gordon Leff, “The Trivium and the Three Philosophies,” 313-314. An elaboration of the specter of these translations will be discussed infra.
34. These are “social and economic data, the European collegiate movement, and medieval student power.” See the preface to Alan B. Cobban, The Medieval Universities: Their Development and Organization (London: Methuen & Co., 1975), ii.
35. In addition, he has written two major works on the English universities. See Alan B. Cobban, The Medieval English Universities: Oxford and Cambridge to c. 1500 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988) and Idem, English University Life in the Middle Ages (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 1999). Chapter Six of the former study offers a broad sweep of the academic perspectives of late medieval thinkers at Oxford and Cambridge. There are a number of individual histories of medieval universities that cover the same conceptual ground that Cobban does for the English universities. The seminal study of Stephen Ferruolo deserves mention here as it shows how the University of Paris served as the incubator to many of the ideas which will be discussed infra.
of *The Medieval Universities* traverses much of the same ground as Rashdall, the second part of the text provides a socio-historical examination of student power within the larger academic and civic communities, showing how the idea of university education came to garner its position in the European social order.

Finally, Olaf Pederson’s *The First Universities* contextualizes the emergence of the university within a genealogy of learning that extends back to antiquity. This text is a more compact introductory study that asserts, along with Cobban’s *The Medieval Universities*, the importance of showing the actual, as opposed to superficial links between earlier forms of universities and those ultimately constituting the institutions familiar to the contemporary observer. \(^{36}\) What his work reveals is that the uniqueness of the *studium generale* was its accretions of scholars and students from different nations and its role in developing intellectuals for professions as opposed to the simple clerical functions of the precursor institutions. Pederson’s volume links an understanding of the general currents of European history to the pragmatic birth of universities to fulfill the needs of a European society which increasingly came to rely on both secular and Christian ways of knowing. \(^{37}\) These works along with the aforementioned, contributions of Walter Rüegg

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36. In the preface to the volume, Pederson asserts that the assumption that medieval universities were thought by “late medieval historians” to be “identical with the famous schools of antiquity in Athens and Alexandria” is “naive” but nevertheless contains a “grain of truth.” Many of the traditions developed in antiquity “exerted an influence.” As such, Pederson’s volume includes these in the construction of his narrative. See Olaf Pederson, *The First Universities*, xi. See also Alan Cobban, *The Medieval Universities*, 21-22, where describes the medieval university as indigenous to the Western European cultural complex and distinct from the schools of antiquity, the Arab world, etc.

and Jacques Verger in *The History of the University in Europe: The Middle Ages*, constitute a viable historical record of the construction of the university.\(^{38}\)

While these works give the historical context, texts which expound specifically on the idea of scholasticism helps us to understand its implications for the intellectual content which came to be taught in the universities. According to Maurice de Wulf, writing in his *An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy* (1907), early definitions of scholastic philosophy often revolved around nominal and/or extrinsic emphases on either methods or on the medieval era as a historical-conceptual way of knowing.\(^{39}\) While this early work makes a conscious distinction between scholastic philosophy and scholasticism, nineteenth century definitions still hold sway in some contemporary definitions.\(^{40}\) This aside, most contemporary definitions cohere around a conception of scholasticism as a method for wedding all-knowledge via the arts and philosophy to its ultimate goal: the revealed truth of God.\(^{41}\) This clearly hearkens back to the works of the Neoplatonists and the patristic tradition.

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38. See Chapter Two, notes 5 and 6.
39. According to de Wulf, these nominal and extrinsic definitions all fail to give an “intrinsic” definition of scholastic philosophy. In addition to definitions premised simply on method and medieval periodization, de Wulf lists definitions which conflate scholastic philosophy with theology, ancient philosophy, and medieval science, which had also contributed to the confusion around a true conception of scholastic philosophy, as an autonomous philosophical system. See Maurice de Wulf, *An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy: Medieval and Modern* (New York: Dover, 1956), 12. This edition is a reprint of 1907 translation of de Wulf’s *Introduction a la Philosophie Neoscolastique*.
40. A cursory review of major religious and/or philosophical encyclopedias reveals that de Wulf’s early concerns have not been systematically corrected. See for example, the definitions for “scholasticism” in recent editions of *The New Catholic Encyclopedia* (Detroit: Gale, 2003), *Encyclopedia of Religion* (Detroit: Macmillan, 2005), and *Philosophy of Education: an Encyclopedia* (London: Routledge, 1996). De Wulf’s need for the articulation of an “intrinsic” definition has not yet become the norm.
41. Though scholasticism and its cultural baggage are indeed the province of Western Europe, Jose Ignacio Cabezon and the contributors to his edited, *Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural Comparative
While many works, prominent among them, Josef Pieper’s *Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy* (1960) and Etienne Gilson’s *The Beginnings of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (1955), approach scholasticism through its intellectual genealogy, our purposes in uncovering the sources of Western disciplinarity necessitates examining sources that organize scholasticism differently. After achieving a foundation with the work of Anselm of Canterbury, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Abelard and others, scholasticism would enter the university and develop along proto-“disciplinary” lines. What has been termed “high scholasticism” was a university achievement. Following Maurice de Wulf, the studies of Robert R. Bolgar, Gordon Leff, John North, Edward Grant, author of *God and Reason in the Middle Ages* (2001), Robert Pasnau and Christian van Dyke, editors of *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, and James Weisheipl, author of a series of important articles, organize the influence of scholasticism as it impressed upon

1. Traditionalism - thinkers consider themselves upholders of a genealogy of thinkers that have created a standard; 2. A basis in a text/language - thinkers are beholden to a text and believe language can communicate truth; 3. Proliferativity and 4. Completeness and compactness - the truth can be extended to areas not covered in the text, i.e. all-knowledge; 5. Epistemological accessibility - thinkers assume/believe that everything in the world can be known; 6. Systematicity - thinkers assume/believe that the world is orderly; 7. Rationalism - thinkers are committed to reason; and 8. Self-reflexivity - commitment to understanding how the previous tenets contributed to first-order discourse (commentaries), via the development of a second-order discourse (reflection on commentaries). See “Introduction,” in Ibid, 4-6. It must again be reiterated that in what is generally understood to be (Western) scholasticism, these tenets operate under the aegis of Christianity. Each of these can be gleaned from the production of the scholastic thinkers, whether one is focused on either of the four periods of scholasticism. These periods are Prescholasticism (800-1050 C.E.), early scholasticism (1050-1200 C.E.), high scholasticism (1200-1350 C.E.) and late scholasticism, (1350-1500 C.E.). See *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. Berard L. Marthaler (Detroit: Gale, 2003), s.v. “Scholasticism.”

42. They should however be consulted for important biographical information and for the contributions to Western knowledge of individual thinkers. See Josef Pieper, *Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960) and Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955).

43. See note 41.
the faculties. As such, the discussion of sources here will consider the evolution of academic disciplines as wedded to the contributions of thinkers involved in the development of the scholastic method within the four faculties.

Of these faculties, it is most important for our purposes to chart the development of the arts and philosophy, as it was important not only as the foundation to the “higher” professional studies, but it served as the foundation from which the modern academic disciplines would be developed. However, as Ulrich G. Leinsle has demonstrated in his Introduction to Scholastic Theology (2010), it is important to view these thinkers as more than “philosophers” as many were Christian thinkers attempting to develop a theological view of the universe—a combination of reason and revelation.\(^{44}\) As discussed supra, Christianity served as the foundation from which much of the intellectual life of the period was premised. If the pagan authorities were to be consulted they were as “companions” and not as ecclesiastic authorities. The arts and philosophy aided theology—or at least this was the objective at the outset. As the work of de Wulf reveals, scholasticism would eventually engender a conception of philosophy as parallel or autonomous with respect to the higher studies.\(^{45}\)

\(^{44}\) Leinsle’s anchors this idea with Augustine, showing its continuity through the cathedral schools. As such, the patristic tradition provided a method which could be replicated and extended in the newer schools; one, however, notable for its conservatism. This conservatism would lead to prominent controversies as the arts began to develop at universities. See Ulrich G. Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, 12-28.

\(^{45}\) De Wulf charts the development of scholastic philosophy in relationship to scholastic theology. Intellectual issues that emerged and were beyond the scope of theology, began to be relegated to the arts/philosophy faculty, especially with the introduction of the new logic to be discussed infra. De Wulf, then asserts that philosophy was not subordinate or a handmaiden to theology at this point. See Maurice de Wulf, An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, 53-78.
a. The “New Method” Confronts the “New Studies”

Edward Grant’s *God and Reason in the Middle Ages*, as a general study of medieval theology, devotes almost half of his text to the impressions that the Arabic-Latin translations of secular knowledge had on the state of knowledge in important disciplinary areas. 46 This event clearly constituted the main theme of the era, as the main artery of activity within the medieval arts and philosophy faculty was the introduction to the wider corpus of Aristotelian philosophy made possible by the influx of the translations of his work from the Arabic world via the Iberian peninsula and other points south. This burgeoning faculty and its related “higher” science of theology, in many respects relied on, or was forced into a controversy surrounding the translations, commentaries, and renewed interest in specifically, Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy. 47 The ideas of Aristotle (as well as the Neoplatonists) and the Greek and Roman philosophical foundations discussed in the last chapter, are in this manner, connected to what would comprise the study of the arts and philosophy as a result of these translations. In the era of Peter Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor and John of Salisbury, scholars only had access to what was known as the “old logic.” As more of the Aristotelian corpus became available, the “new logic” would be introduced and paired with Aristotelian natural philosophy, in what we can be designated as the “new studies.”

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47. See Olaf Pederson, *The First Universities*, 122. Most recently, Rega Wood has suggested that scholasticism may not have “arisen” without these translations. See Rega Wood, “The Influence of Arabic Aristotelianism on Scholastic and Natural Philosophy: Projectile Motion, the Place of the Universe, and Elemental Composition,” in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau and Christina Van Dyke (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 247-248.
A study devoted to understanding these translations as well as the commentaries that accompanied them is Richard Rubenstein’s *Aristotle’s Children* (2004). Rubenstein treats the history of the rediscovery of Aristotle in the Latin world as the fulfillment of the West’s intellectual heritage, framing the discussion within the faith-reason problem which confronted European intellectuals during the time. The bourgeoning universities were thus confronted with translations of Aristotle’s works brought from the southern cities of Baghdad, Toledo, Cairo and Cordoba and the commentaries of Muslim thinkers such as Al-Kindi (b. 801), Avicenna (b. 980), and Averroes (b. 1126) and the Jewish scholar, Moses Maimonides (b. 1135). These ideas were utilized, questioned, and extended by thirteenth century scholastic thinkers such as Albertus Magnus (b. 1193), Thomas Aquinas (b. 1225), and William of Ockham (b. 1288). By shedding light on this process of recovery, Rubenstein’s work situates conceptualizations of Aristotelian thought within the work of the early university thinkers, a claim we see reiterated consistently. Not only were scholars introduced to more of the Aristotle’s corpus, they were affected by its


49. Ibid, 6-7. Rubenstein declares that the oft-quoted stories of Copernicus or Galileo were not the first challenges to the Church’s doctrines. His text frames Aristotle’s “pagan” ideas as challenges to the Church’s role in European life, but in a peculiar way that was not always purely heretical. The battle over the extent of Aristotle’s influence in Christianity actually took place within the Church. This battle would influence the direction of the curriculum in concrete instances; the sources discussed infra explain its impact.

50. Ibid, 4. Rubenstein contends that Western scholars do not place emphasis on this aspect of the West’s intellectual development because it occurred largely via the role of non-Europeans Muslims: “For those anxious to establish the superiority of Western culture to all other traditions, the story of Europe’s first intellectual revolution is something of an embarrassment. Not only was the chief transmitter of these advances ideas a non-European civilization, it was the civilization that Christians long considered their nemesis: the Muslim empire that occupied the Holy Land, dominated the Mediterranean Sea lanes, and challenged Europe militarily for almost a thousand years.” Ibid, 6. Further discussion on the Arabic origins of medieval philosophy (specifically on Al-Kindi) can be found in Dimitri Gutas, “Origins in Baghdad,” in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau and Christina Van Dyke, 11-25.
concomitant: the philosophical commentaries and speculations of Muslim and/or “Eastern” thinkers that accompanied them.

Fernand Van Steenberghen’s earlier *Aristotle in the West* (1946), supports this notion. His text on Latin Aristotelianism, is partly an attempt to “sketch the main stages of the philosophical movement in the first seventy years of the thirteenth century, taking as concrete cases the universities of Paris and Oxford.”\textsuperscript{51} Tracing both the influence of Christian humanism within theology and the “secular” philosophy of Aristotle, Van Steenberghen’s work is one in a long line of commentaries on the thirteenth century scholastic tradition of synthesis embodied by such thinkers as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales (b. 1185), Robert Grosseteste (b. 1175), and others. It was these scholars who either directly or indirectly attempted to develop syntheses amid the dual intellectual traditions represented by Christian and pagan thought, the latter understood through the crosshairs of Islam. The differences in approach are explained in detail in Van Steenberghen’s text, and seem to form the balance of most standard discussions of scholastic theology and philosophy.\textsuperscript{52}

Similarly, the second volume of James Bowen’s *A History of Western Education* (1975), frames this particular period as dispute along theological lines between the ideas of explanation as *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The traditions of Neoplatonic Augustinian thought represented the former, the Aristotelian corpus the latter. The central problematic was


\textsuperscript{52}. For instance, this general approach is repeated in the works of James Weisheipl to be discussed infra and the aforementioned work of Robert R. Bolgar, *The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries*, 202-235 and Edward Grant, *God and Reason in the Middle Age*, 121-206. The latter extends the discussion to late scholasticism.
whether or not the two traditions could be fused, effectively explaining phenomena via secular methods of empiricism and explanation in such a manner that did not deviate from or challenge the word of God.\textsuperscript{53} Rubenstein, Van Steenberghen, and Bowen all point to the roles of the religious groups, the Franciscan and Dominican orders, as crucial to the discussions and writings surrounding these problems. More than “heresy hunters,” which many assumed their initial role to be, the friars would initiate important theological and philosophical discussions surrounding the influence of secular thought. Indeed, as Paris had advanced the teaching of the propaedeutic arts and faculty geared toward theological training, it was the members of these orders that served as the initiators and framers of the curricula.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{b. The “New Studies” and the Impact on the Curriculum}

The relationship between the previous traditions and the development of the new studies within the structure of the faculties is the concern of Gordon Leff and John North in their respective contributions to \textit{A History of the University in Europe}. They both in some respects rely on the work of James A. Weisheipl who deduces from the available evidence three sources for the ideas that served as the foundation for the conceptualization of the arts and philosophy faculties. His “Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought” (1965), provides an extensive overview of the systematization of the faculty via three historic events, which we have already mentioned: 1) The Greco Roman heritage; 2)  

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\bibitem{53} See James Bowen, \textit{A History of Western Education: Volume Two: Civilization of Europe Sixth to Sixteenth Century} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975), 144-145.
\bibitem{54} Of these, the most developed discussion can be found in Richard Rubenstein, \textit{Aristotle’s Children}, 173-203.
\end{thebibliography}
Boethius’ translations and treatises; and 3) the translations from the Arabic and Greek. These sources were the basis from which the arts faculty (at primarily Oxford and Paris) generated what Weisheipl calls the three philosophies emanating from the older tradition of the seven liberal arts and the Aristotelian corpus, respectively. This transition and extension of ideas, however, was not a smooth and/or simple process. According to Weisheipl, it would emerge based on a borrowing and modifying that occurred across many centuries of the syntheses of Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, and Hugh of St. Victor. As a result, the histories of the curricula of the arts and philosophy faculties show the complex interplay at work between older conventions and the impact of the newer approaches and texts.

Leff’s chapter, “The Trivium and the Three Philosophies,” is an exploration of the consequences that attended the infusion of rhetoric, grammar, and logic (the trivium) into the medieval universities, showing how moral, natural, and metaphysical philosophies (the three philosophies) came to influence and subsume the former. Like

56. For these various schemes, see Ibid, 62-68. The epistemological origins of philosophy as construed from Boethius, Cassiodorus, and others, were based on the studies that had been recommended by Aristotle. These are accessed in the schemes which Boethius had passed down, but the actual studies themselves, were unavailable prior to their translations into Latin. Elsewhere Weisheipl explains: “We might note here that although early medieval writers frequently followed the division of philosophy presented by Augustine, namely logic, ethics and physics, or the division preserved by Boethius and Cassiodorus, namely physics, mathematics, and metaphysics for speculative philosophy, and ethics, economics and politics for practical philosophy, the prescholastics and early scholastics were unable to give content to anything but the known seven liberal arts. In other words, although a division of philosophy was frequently presented, it was meaningless except in terms of the trivium and quadrivium already known. The other branches of philosophy could not be filled in until the Aristotelian books were translated into Latin.” James A. Weisheipl, “The Structure of the Arts Faculty in the Medieval University,” in British Journal of Educational Studies 19 (October 1971): 264.
Weisheipl, Leff charts the trajectory of the arts and their uses in both Greek antiquity and 
Roman life, showing that their use as propaedeutic to higher knowledges is both an 
ancient idea and a medieval borrowing that explains the pre-eminence of the arts in 
certain universities in the Middle Ages. According to Leff, it was in this era that what 
could be considered “disciplines” with established canons were constructed along 
heterogeneous lines (i.e. there was no common unity among the arts).57 Along with 
Weisheipl, he discusses the bodies of knowledge culled from both older texts and in the 
increasing number of commentaries that would begin to initiate the standardization of the 
subjects of the trivium and the three philosophies.58 This is also the period where we see 
both increased activity and the crystallization of controversy in two of these “disciplines:” 
logic, the dominant approach to knowledge in the scholastic era; and natural philosophy, 
the epistemological challenge to traditional scholasticism, writ large.59 In the one hundred 
years between 1230 C.E. and 1330 C.E., the old logic [Aristotle’s Categories and 
Interpretation, both components of the Organon, and Boethius’ translation of Porphyry’s 
introduction to Categories, and his commentaries on both and Cicero’s Topics] would be 
buttressed by the new logic [Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Sophistical Refutations] the libri

58. Ibid, 324. For a wider discussion which includes much more context to this discussion, see Gordon 
Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional and Intellectual 
59. According to Leff, logic superseded rhetoric in terms of importance in the Northern universities. 
See Ibid, 308. Linked to this is logic’s use in theology, a fact discussed in the works by Robert R. 
Bolgar and Ulrich Leinsle, mentioned supra. This does not mean grammar and rhetoric were 
absent. Grammar served as the elementary stage of education and rhetoric enjoyed prominence in 
the Italian universities, which were closer to the classical heritage, and where rhetoric was useful in 
the study of law. Rhetoric in the theologically-oriented Northern universities was used in the 
practices of sermon writing and letter writing. The development of grammar and rhetoric is 
discussed in Jeffrey F. Huntsman, “Grammar,” in The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages, ed. David 
naturales [Aristotle’s *De Anima*, and *Physics*] and works such as Aristotle’s *Politics*, *Ethics*, and *Metaphysics* and the pseudo-Aristotle, *The Book of Causes*, all of which had previously been unavailable. This assimilation of the new studies inside the universities provided a new “framework for each of the recognized branches of knowledge,” but perhaps more crucial to the thinkers of the period, it initiated yet another “redefinition of Christian belief in the face of philosophy.”

Through the machinations of the church, Paris and Oxford enjoyed the exclusive rights to confer the degree of theology, and as such, the former remained somewhat of a bulwark to the influence of both the new works of Aristotle and its Eastern philosophical concomitants. While the controversial bans of the teachings of the natural philosophy at Paris were based upon the methodological implications mentioned above, the result was the limiting of the studies of certain subjects in certain locales.

Along with Leff’s discussion of the bans of 1210, 1215, 1228, 1231, and later in the 1270s, the text, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (1998), authored by Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen, places them with a general context of the Parisian intellectual environment in the centuries to follow. For Leff, this environment contributed to the uneven development of the arts and philosophy faculty with Paris specializing in the metaphysical components of theology and Oxford, the natural

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60. For the first quoted statement see Gordon Leff, “The Trivium and the Three Philosophies,” 318 and for the second Ibid, 311.
62. J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). Unfortunately, there is not much on the bans of Aristotelian philosophy before the 1270s, which saw the works of Thomas Aquinas and Siger Brabant come under attack. Importantly, however, Thijssen shows the continuity of the papal authority’s attempts to censure secular learning.
components, a bifurcation responsible for the emergence of new variants of scholasticism.\footnote{Leff, “The Trivium and the Three Philosophies,” 308. This “uneven development” was due to shifting authorities granted by papal power to the universities at Paris and Oxford. They were granted exclusive rights to teach theology, which necessitated the need for a strong arts and philosophy faculty department, given their propaedeutic value.} As the scholars at Paris, mired in the theological controversies and beholden to the mendicant orders, began to theorize, they would do so under the influences of scholastic thinkers such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and others who attempted to responsibly fuse the Christian tradition with the best of Aristotelian logic. Their works constituted a unique synthesis, which according to Monika Asztalos in her \textit{A History of the University in Europe} essay on the faculty on theology, contributed to the autonomy of the arts and philosophy faculties, a point also made by de Wulf in his conception of scholastic philosophy.\footnote{See the discussion of de Wulf in note 45. Monika Asztalos, “The Faculty of Theology,” \textit{A History of the University in Europe: Universities in the Middle Ages}, Vol. 1, eds. Walter Rüegg and H. De Ridder-Symoens, 243.} Asztalos’ history of the faculty of theology in this period emphasizes another series of controversies that accompanied the close of the century revolving around the advances made in the work of Thomas Aquinas and Siger Bribant regarding the question of Averroist readings of science and philosophy.\footnote{Ibid, 427-428.} By now, however, much of the banned writings of the previous era had spread throughout Paris and were unerringly part of the new university curricula.

In a series of focused studies appearing in the periodical \textit{Mediaeval Studies}, James Weisheipl’s concerns are directed to showing concretely how Oxford University became one of the centers for liberal arts training in the fourteenth century. In “Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century” (1964), Weisheipl discusses
how the arts faculty organized the course of studies as well as how teaching methods were carried out. In charting this trajectory, Weisheipl includes a listing of the texts in use at Oxford, which shows how well integrated the new logic, and other works representative of the age of translations, had become in the fourteenth century. The pre-eminence of logic remained evident as it comprised over half of the arts curriculum, but there was a clear integration of the many of the controversial works of natural philosophy by the beginning of the fourteenth century.

In “Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century” (1966), Weisheipl continues this discussion. With increased publications, more attention was given to the study of natural philosophy, the quadrivial sciences, and some semblance of a fusion developed between the former two and the study of logic. The Oxford thinkers set forth a conception of mathematics that placed it as the “handmaiden” of natural philosophy. This had long been set in motion, thanks to the works of thinkers such as Robert Grosseteste and Robert Kilwardby (b. 1215), who years earlier developed syntheses that were cognizant of Aristotle but were based on a natural philosophy that greatly resembled Neoplatonism. In his aforementioned, “Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought,” Weisheipl asserts that it was at Oxford where the developments in

natural philosophy were meshed most strongly with the *quadrivium* subjects. Elsewhere terming this tradition as “Oxford Platonism,” Weisheipl shows that in the *quadrivium*, the question was largely to what extent the observations of the natural world can be made via the mathematical sciences both of which would be ultimately understood as manifestations of the Divine—in a synthesis with metaphysics.70 Grosseteste did so through understanding the manifestation of light, which became the study of optics under the umbrella of geometry, while Kilwardby was concerned with the classifications of the sciences (physics, the *quadrivium*, and metaphysics) in terms of levels of abstraction.71 Clearly, the full articulation of natural philosophy based on Aristotle, that would take place by the fourteenth century at Oxford, was made easier by the commentaries of these thinkers. Finally, John North’s “The Quadrivium” adds to Weisheipl’s assumptions by expounding upon similar developments in medieval arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy, with a focus on the practical aspects of the latter two.72

As the foregoing works show, the period that oversaw the assimilation of Aristotle, Arabic philosophical speculation, and the development of the curriculum in the medieval arts and philosophy faculty were largely influenced by Magnus, Aquinas, Grosseteste, Kilwardy and others that set the terms of scholastic intellectual inquiry. Their ideas about

70. According to Weisheipl, these thinkers, which also includes the Grosseteste disciple, Roger Bacon, were involved in the “the depreciation of purely natural science, the appeal to mathematics for an explanation of natural phenomena and the approach to metaphysics through mathematics.” Ibid, 80.


how to order knowledge served the function of institutionalizing these various disciplines in the emergent universities and their rationales for doing so would be ingrained into the practice of university life. As the fourteenth century emerged, late medieval scholasticism saw this baton passed to John Duns Scotus (b. 1266) and William of Ockham, and the ideas of nominalism and realism. The intellectual environment of theology (and as such, the arts and philosophy) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries revolved around the differences in approach between realism and nominalism. Writing on this period in his *The Arch of Knowledge*, David Oldroyd shows the continuity between the precursors and medieval advocates of realist and nominalist arguments. But he also asserts that it is important to understand this as a medieval phenomenon.\(^73\)

Realism, premised on the idea that matter and/or phenomena existed as that which signifies them as such (essences actually exist), was based upon the theological readings of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, the latter spawning the movements of Thomism and Scotism, respectively.\(^74\) Nominalism, which regards matter and/or phenomena as existing independent of the names assigned to them, had as its chief proponent, William of Ockham but also included John Buridan (b. 1300) and others.\(^75\)

The late medieval scholastic era is sometimes regarded as the story of these two tendencies. According to Monika Asztalos’ reading of this era, the realist movement was

\(^73\) One such continuity is the nominalism of John Locke. See David Oldroyd, *The Arch of Knowledge*, 32-33.

\(^74\) The resurgence of these forms of scholastic thought would envelop nineteenth century Western philosophy. See Gerald McCool, *Nineteenth Century Scholasticism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989).

\(^75\) For an extended discussion, see Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, 489-520.
regarded as the *via antiuqa* and the nominalist movement was regarded as the *via moderna*. Along with the important study of Meyrick Carre, *Nominalists and Realists* (1946), a crucial contemporary discussion that takes the conceptions of the medieval understanding of the two *viae* to task is the 1987 symposium in the periodical, *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, aptly entitled, “Ancients and Moderns.” The contributions to this symposium clarify many of the assumptions of earlier scholars and develop further the intellectual history of the fifteenth century thinkers in theology and the arts.76 Their works show how the two *viae* crystallized out of the various intellectual debates into clear ways of approaching and classifying knowledge that would determine the future roles of the disciplines. Despite the varying natures of what it meant to belong to either of these two groups, it is clear, however, that the complexities of both arguments were to influence the future development of science, to come in the seventeenth century and beyond.

The philosophical and theoretical pursuits of scholastic thinkers, then, based on the collective conclusions of the reviewed sources constituted the foundation of university knowledge. The known world was construed in ways that were amenable to both the

emergent arts and philosophy and the older Christian conception of reality. Though seemingly at odds, the synthesis engendered by the scholastic worldview created the foundation out of which the main categories of Western knowledge would be most solidly constructed. As the fifteenth century closed, the movement toward humanism coming from Italy would impact these same faculties at the important French and English universities as well as other smaller universities in the North.

III. Dwarfs upon Giants?: Humanism and the Renaissance of Western Learning

Jacob Burckhardt’s seminal study of the Renaissance, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, first published in 1860, has generated a substantial dialogue within Western intellectual historiography. The debate responds to the central question raised in Burckhardt’s work, which is the nature of the Renaissance’s break from medieval models of life and knowing and its construction of a world modeled on the ways of the ancients, premised on the view that moderns were simply “dwarfs on the shoulders of giants [ancients].” While the “main lines of Burckhardt’s picture” have been subjected to considerable debate over the extent to which the Renaissance constituted such an exaggerated difference between medieval thought as well as over the necessity of viewing it as a “rebirth” at all, the boundaries (both chronologically and epistemologically) drawn around the Renaissance figure prominently when one considers the evolution of the

77. This dictum perhaps reveals, quite simply, the malleability of Western intellectual historical periodization, as it has been used to characterize various intellectual movements, including the periods of scholasticism (Bernard of Chartres) and the scientific revolution (Isaac Newton). Theoretically, it is most closely linked to Renaissance thought. A recent edition of *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* was published in 1990 by Penguin.
university and the disciplines of knowledge.\textsuperscript{78} (And not to mention the still standardized assumption that the Renaissance is a “period” in Western history, epitomized in almost every history of the Western world). During the Renaissance (c. 1350-1600), select Western intellectuals began to focus more intently on the areas of grammar and rhetoric, eventually constructing what has come to be known as the \textit{studia humanitas}. Humanism, a variant of Renaissance thought (the latter is a broader idea\textsuperscript{79}) represented a vibrant

\textsuperscript{78} According to De Lamar Jensen writing in a centennial retrospective: “The main lines of Burckhardt’s picture—at the least the traditional interpretation of them by succeeding generations—go something like this: The fundamental feature and central focus of the Renaissance was individualism, which expressed itself in a greater awareness of personality and nature, in a consciousness of beauty and art, and in revolt from religious orthodoxy. In all of these traits the Renaissance represented a definite break with the pattern and characteristics of the Middle Ages, and marked the beginning of the modern world.” See De Lamar Jensen, “Burckhardt’s Renaissance: A Centenary Appraisal,” \textit{Western Humanities Review} 15 (Autumn 1961): 311.

\textsuperscript{79} Paul Oskar Kristeller is among the more erudite intellectual historians on the subject. In clarifying the nuance between Renaissance philosophy and the idea of humanism he states: “In other words, humanism does not represent, as often believed, the sum total of Renaissance thought and learning, but only a well-defined sector of it.” See Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Humanism,” in \textit{The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy}, ed. Charles B. Schmitt (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 114. This “sector” had very different imperatives than other components of Renaissance thought such as the artistic traditions represented by Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael, the political work of Niccolo Machiavelli, or other “Renaissance” traditions such as cartography and navigation, wholly different from what would be considered \textit{humanism}. Humanism’s particular objectives, to be discussed infra, however cannot be divorced from the various milieu that marked these other Renaissance traditions’ appearance. On this, see inter alia, Myron P. Gilmore, \textit{The World of Humanism, 1453-1517} (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1952). Interestingly, this text devotes much attention to the context of a changing Europe than to a detailed examination of humanism. A more recent text that includes discussions of humanism as well as artistic and socio-economic discussion of Renaissance Europe is John Jeffries Martin, ed., \textit{The Renaissance World} (New York: Routledge, 2009). This volume discusses the Renaissance as more than simply an intellectual and/or artistic movement, but as a broad movement in European society, notable for its increased human, material, and intellectual “mobility” and as a precursor to modernity. The contributors range from discussions of culture to the creation of state power and religious concerns. Expounding a reworked, but standard view of the era, Martin asserts in the introduction that: “The Renaissance was, as a movement,—or, perhaps better, a cluster of interrelated movements in architecture, astronomy, botany, cartography, engineering, historical writing, painting, poetry, and so on— the cultural expression both of an expanding and increasingly commercial dynamic continent and of new patterns of conception and competition for prestige in the courts (from the papacy to the households of dukes and cardinals) and other centers of power (republican governments, guild halls, and churches) whose patronage elevated artists,
intellectual movement that may have generated the conceptual base for the further
development of the disciplines.

Whether one takes the standard or contextualist/genealogical approach to this
period is not our concern, as scholars have generally placed emphasis on the Renaissance,
as a crucial element in the evolution of the West. Whether real or constructed, the idea of
humanism—the conscious use of ancient sources as models of literary and cultural
education—concerns the current effort. The scholars to be discussed have labored to
show its character, and as a result, a discussion of this dynamic will reveal implications for
the idea of Western disciplinarity.

a. Conceptualizing Renaissance Humanism

Near the middle of the twentieth century, intellectual historians began to
challenge the assumptions embedded in the Burckhardtin notion of the Renaissance.
One of the innovative ways of viewing the Renaissance was situating humanism as a

architects, and astronomers to loftier, more influential perches within society than they had held
80. The following discussion of humanism relies on the working definition provided by Paul Oskar
Kristeller: “the study and imitation of classical antiquity which was characteristic of the period and
found its expression in scholarship and education and in many other areas, including the arts and
antiquity is discussed roundly in Robert R. Bolgar, The Classical Traditions and its Beneficiaries, 265-301.
81. According to De Lamar Jensen, who was writing in 1961: “Scholars are no longer satisfied with
the rigidity and exclusiveness of the Burckhardtian picture, and some have even advocated
abandoning it altogether. Many students of the period have noted the gaps and omissions in
Burckhardt’s description, while others have attempt to correct his mistakes in facts and
See also the introduction to Wallace K. Ferguson, The Renaissance (New York: Holt, Reinhart and
Winston, Inc., 1940). He points out that many “Burckhardtian” notions were actually not his
ideas, but the ideas of those who would follow him.

167
distinct intellectual movement that existed alongside scholastic philosophy (rather than replacing it), all the while influencing the larger intellectual environment.

A leading proponent of this view of humanism as encompassing a distinct movement rather than a domineering alternative to the “darkness” of medieval scholasticism, was Paul Oskar Kristeller, widely considered one of the most important intellectual historians of the period. In a number of studies including, *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains* (1955), *Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and the Arts* (1965), *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (4 Vols.) (1956-1996), *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance* (1964), *Medieval Aspects of Renaissance Learning* (1974), and *Renaissance Thought and its Sources* (1979), Kristeller systematically interrogated and attempted to resolve the main problems in the interpretation of humanism.82

The first iteration of *Renaissance Thought* is anchored on the central theme that what distinguished humanism was intellectual work, largely literary, within the *studia humanitas*, a conception of the arts faculty, which included the disciplines of rhetoric, grammar, poetry, history, and moral philosophy.83 In the development of the *studia

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83. Kristeller consistently distinguished the work of humanists from those of the philosophers (with the exception of moral philosophy). The *studia humanitas* relied largely on the study of literature and the
humanitas, the humanists elevated the study of rhetoric and grammar, disciplines concerned with speech and literature in the study of the classics, against the dominant scholastic disciplines of logic and natural philosophy, which had led intellectual historians to suggest a war between ideals. In fact, both traditions seemed to borrow from Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, but it was the increase of Greek language instruction and the new manuscripts brought from Constantinople, which helped to place a linguistic foundation under the studia humanitas. As Kristeller relates, the humanists brought to the study of these disciplines an approach to classical and literary education rooted in the search for a new (but ancient) standard of morality, eloquence in speech, and right-living, underpinned by a focus on man and not (only) the Divine. In their co-edited collection of primary source materials, Kristeller, John Herman Randall, Jr., and Ernst Cassirer assert that humanism developed a “philosophy of man” via literary study of the classics as use of classical texts and the rhetorical tradition to educate. The humanist was one who taught from this foundation. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 9-10. For an additional analysis of Kristeller’s conception of humanism, see Ronald G. Witt, “The Humanism of Paul Oskar Kristeller,” in Kristeller Reconsidered, ed. John Monfasani, ed. 257-268. For Kristeller’s challenge to this idea, see his seminal, “Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance,” Byzantium 17 (1944-45): 346-74. Also in Idem, Renaissance Thought, 92-119. See also the introduction to Renaissance Philosophy of Man, eds. Idem, John Herman Randall, Jr., and Ernst Cassirer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), where Kristeller and Randall assert: “Yet the polemic of the Humanists against the teaching of the schools was largely a struggle between one field of learning and others and not, as if often appears, between a new philosophy and an old. On the other hand, the oppositions to medieval logical and natural philosophy found in many of the Humanists was far from being an opposition to the Church or to the Christian religion.” Ibid, 4. Much of the idea of a dispute between scholasticism and humanism is rooted in the so-called father of humanism, Petrarch’s critique of Aristotelian thinkers. James Hankins characterizes this critique as in reality, the “discovery of an ideological niche where the new literary studies could survive and flourish.” See James Hankins, “Humanism, Scholasticism, and Renaissance Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Idem (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39. Critical of the intellectual debate around scholastic issues, Petrarch’s “objection to scholastic Aristotelianism, beyond its triviality, uncertainty, and impiety, is that it is useless and ineffective in achieving the good life, the life of happiness and virtue.” Ibid, 42. Humanist education was purported to instill the ancient idea of virtue that scholasticism implicitly lacked.

the mark of the “highest level of human achievement.” It seems implausible that these highly idealistic characteristics of humanist intellectual work could translate into practical learning outcomes in the midst of a “world in motion.” And it goes without saying that this objective constituted a major challenge, as even the very models that they imitated (e.g. Cicero and Quintilian) experienced similar problems of implementation. Humanists’ attempts to draw down on an ancient humanistic education to develop individuals imbued with practical knowledge is chronicled in more recent studies.

One such study, authored by Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, From Humanism to the Humanities (1986), is a step toward further conceptualizing the impact of humanism on Western learning. Anchoring their discussion on the trajectory from “the zealous faith in an ideal” (humanism) to a “a curriculum training a social elite to fulfill its predetermined social role (humanities),” Jardine and Grafton employ primary source material to explain and enhance our knowledge of the key issues confronted in the intellectual work of humanist thinkers. Of these, a prominent theme ensued, which suggested that the lofty aims of humanism, replete with moral and intellectual objectives, were never actualized due to the specter of civil and secular careerism which existed in various European societies. According to Jardine and Grafton, the latter had more of a

87. The metaphor of a “world in motion” characterizes the era of Renaissance in the conception of John Jeffries Martin. See note 79.
89. Chapters Two and Seven provide interesting discussions on this dynamic. The second chapter, entitled, “Women Humanists: Education for What?” utilizes the humanist educations of select women as tests, so to speak, of the educational objectives of the humanist movement. The lives of
use for a trained elite than for Ciceronian modeled morally educated men and women. Whether it was the original schools in Italy or the diffusion of humanist education to Northern Europe, the net effect was the same. The changing dynamic of Europe reflected a need for “chancellors and secretaries” able to effectively craft language, which resulted in only a few statesmen, officials, and princes able to acquire the wider vision of moral and classical education envisioned by humanists such as Guarino Guarini.90

Despite the failures to inculcate the grand goals humanism, the creation of the humanities did engender some important outcomes with regards to the forward movement of Western education. Based on Jardine and Grafton’s study, we can deduce that these included a new approach to grammar and rhetoric which attempted to place emphasis on textual criticism, the learning of Greek, the teaching of moral philosophy or ethics, the elevation of method in language and literature study (which included concomitant pedagogical techniques), and the development of ways for educating an elite, among others. Similar to Paul Oskar Kristeller’s conclusion in his contribution to The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (1988), Jardine and Grafton show that humanism

women like Isotta Nogarola reveal that humanism provided an education that could only be useful within an ideological setting that allowed it to flourish. The ideal, then, could only be achieved if humanistically-educated individuals were put into positions where they could embody them. In the absence of these, humanism only provided arguably value-less attributes associated with virtue. The acquisition of a humanist education did not necessarily contribute to the opportunity to apply the attributes of virtue, and in many ways this applied only to men. See Ibid, 43-57. Chapter Seven, a discussion of Petrus Ramus’ sixteenth century program of practical humanism, is an examination of how it responded to the gap between humanist accomplishment and professionalism. In the place of the lofty goal of producing “original scholars and philosopher-kings” his program of classical education aimed to “produce effective writers and active participants in civic life.” Ibid, 197.

90. For Guarino, classical education should involve the “formation of character as well as the training of the mind” a la Quintilian. Ibid, 1. For the professional outcomes of humanism, which included a class of chancellors and secretaries, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought II, 5.
had both direct and indirect influences on the trajectory of Western academic and intellectual history, in these particular areas.\footnote{Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Humanism,” 135-136. The new approaches to grammar and rhetoric and the teaching of Greek were seen as direct influences of humanists, while methodologies in the study of texts and elite training were for Kristeller, an indirect influence. In Renaissance Thought, he includes a “greater knowledge of historical and critical methods” as other important humanist influences. See, Ibid, 101. The discussions of Jardine and Grafton of these influences appear passim, but especially within chapters three through seven.} Along with the oeuvre of Kristeller and the important work of Jardine and Grafton, two more recent Cambridge companions offer accessible discussions of the issues to which the preceding scholars devote their attention. These are the James Hankins edited The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy (2007) and the more narrow conceptualization of humanism in the Jill Kraye edited The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism (1996).\footnote{James Hankins, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jill Kraye, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).}

Before discussing the scholars whose work deals with the impact on university of curricula, it may help to briefly discuss how the foregoing authors deal with the intellectual genealogy of Renaissance humanism. Humanists would contribute to Western traditions in different ways than scholasticism, as the latter was linked to methodological conventions in argumentation, while the former was premised on the text itself. Genealogies of humanist inquiry then revolve less around the disciplines themselves, and more around how specific scholars contributed to the advances in textual study, that cut across the studia humanitas.

Kristeller in his more prominent works organizes the various humanist thinkers under their particular intellectual linkages with Aristotelian, Platonic, or Christian
traditions. Jardine and Grafton, on the other hand, view the various humanist thinkers as purveyors of particular pedagogical or methodological techniques. Among the earliest humanist thinkers discussed in these texts (similar to most literature), is Francesco Petrarch (b. 1304) who along with Coluccio Salutati (b. 1331), were important Italian thinkers arguing for a more critical reading of the ancients against the dominant scholastic commentaries which were most prominent in the era. Coterminous with the rise of humanism in Italy was the existence of the schools of Guarino Guarini (b. 1374) and the pedagogical methods of Cristoforo Landino (b. 1424) and Giovanni Pietro. Jardine and Grafton show the importance of these figures and in particular the distinction between Landino and Pietro regarding their methods for the interpretation of classical texts. A similar debate can be seen between later generations, perhaps the most crucial being that of Lorenzo Valla (b. 1407) against the received humanist opinions represented by Poggio Bracciolini (b. 1380) and others. Essentially, Valla helped to orient the humanist method toward what he viewed to the more “ancient” use of dialectic in philological study. A scholar at the University of Rome and a follower of Quintilian, Valla viewed humanist inquiry and classical education as a “self-contained alternative

93. Kristeller considers Petrarch one of the first “representatives” of humanism as opposed to its founder. He is notable for his polemical attack upon Averroism and tendencies within scholastic natural philosophy. On Petrarch, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance*, 1-18.

94. The basis of this exchange was over the proper way to read a text. On the one hand, humanists read texts for the understanding of the minutiae of grammar and usage (Landino’s school), on the other, they attempted to develop an understanding of the context and issues which were being resolved, or a total understanding of the text (Pietro’s school). See Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, *From Humanism to the Humanities*, 58-66. The rough outlines of this debate still persist. See Chapter Ten of this dissertation.
education” able to go beyond the rough formalism of scholastic dialectical inquiry as well as the simple reading of texts for the understanding of particular words. Valla attempted to develop a method for understanding the text as a means for understanding larger intellectual problems. In other words, Valla advocated a return to not simply to the ancients in the study of language and literature, but a return to their entire educational system, rooted in an understanding of the classical languages.95

Other important contributors to the Italian humanist tradition along with Valla, included Politian (b.1454), who also was concerned with classical philology and Leonardo Bruni (b. 1370), widely considered to be among the first humanist historians. Ultimately these humanist personalities would contribute to an intellectual environment that began to embrace the “new” conceptions of classical thought enlivened by the study of Greek. As a consequence, Kristeller is able to recount the stability of Aristotelianism in figures like Pietro Pomponazzi (b. 1462) and of Platonism in figures like Marsilio Ficino (b. 1433) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (b. 1463).96


Though Italy was an important center for humanist inquiry, Jardine and Grafton show that these ideas would eventually spread to Northern Europe. What they call “methodical humanism,” or the projection of a method for humanist inquiry, became one of the contributions of two key figures in the North: Rodolphus Agricola (b. 1444) and Desiderius Erasmus (b. 1466). The former developed a crucial method for teaching and conceptualizing texts based in part on the classical *progymnasmata*, while the latter attempted to formulate this into a standard method for the disciplined reading of texts. Their advances in the study of literature are considered to be seminal and representative of the sixteenth century humanism in general. Jardine and Grafton end with a discussion of Petrus Ramus, the humanist responsible in their view for the transformation of the humanist ideal into the humanities, or an organized system for training individuals for civil careers. The Ramist method was synonymous with this agenda.

Agricola, Erasmus, and Ramus in many ways represent what Kristeller calls “the diffusion” of humanism into northern Europe. In a revealing essay reprinted in *Renaissance Thought II*, Kristeller shows the process by which humanist knowledge production entered into the intellectual heart of an emergent Europe from its base in Italy. This process included the transfer of both people and ideas via the movement of scholars and texts across Europe. In this article, Kristeller shows that the spread of humanist ideas impacted

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97. In the Low Countries, these scholars would contribute to the question of method, as scholars attempted to develop and organize humanism (by creating textbooks and other learning aids) for classroom instruction. According to Jardine and Grafton, Agricola and Erasmus were “pedagogic reformers who were influential in forming the ideals of humanists of the south into a programme of education suitable for the pragmatic north.” Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, *From Humanism to the Humanities*, 125.

heavily the localities of England, France, Germany, the Low Countries, and the Iberian Peninsula. 99

These locations provide the organization of two major edited volumes which take up the problem of the character of humanism as it was transmitted throughout Europe: the Anthony Goodman and Angus Mackay edited The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe (1990) and the earlier Heiko A. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady edited, Interarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations (1975). Both volumes begin with introductory discussions on the nature of humanism (and in the case of the Goodman and Mackay volume, a discussion of the humanistic impact on particular areas of knowledge) before engaging the important discussion on the nature of the continuity of humanism in these areas, something Kristeller did not endeavor to accomplish. 100 As Peter Burke in the anchoring essay to The Impact of Humanism in Western Europe indicates, each of these major centers of knowledge received (Italian) humanism in different ways, which explains the need to examine and explicate their receptions and resultant traditions. 101 The importance lies in how the various locations engendered

99. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought II, 69-88. The article, entitled, “The European Diffusion of Italian Humanism,” first appeared in 1962. The focus on these locations is perhaps a political choice resulting to the ubiquitous pride of place often given to Western Europe. This, however, does not indicate an absence of humanism in parts of Eastern Europe; a point made by Peter Burke in the work quoted in note 101.


101. He states that it would be a “mistake” to “assume that the package of concepts, methods and values we now call ‘humanism’ was accepted or rejected as a whole.” Peter Burke, “The Spread of Italian Humanism,” in The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe, eds., Anthony Goodman and Angus Mackay, 20.
particular conceptions of humanism which may explain both the local disciplinary traditions and general approaches to knowledge in the humanities that would characterize subsequent periods in Western intellectual history.

In addition to these texts, localized studies of this phenomenon include Robert Weiss’ *Humanism in England in the Fifteenth Century* (1957), James H. Overfield’s *Humanism and Scholasticism in Late Medieval Germany* (1984) and select contributions to the Sergio Rossi and Dianella Savoia edited *Italy and the English Renaissance* (1989) and *Humanism in France* (1970), edited by A.H.T. Levi. Finally, a single-authored text which takes a panoramic view of this issue is the seminal work of Denys Hay, *The Italian Renaissance in its Historical Background* (1961).

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102. In the Low Countries, humanism assumed a direct connection to the Italian tradition of Latin language study, but fused this with a strong impulse toward Christianity, aided immensely by the emergence of popular scholars and book printing. France may be seen as the middle ground between Italy and the Low Countries, notable for its currents of hostility toward the Italian tradition, despite its embrace of important aspects of humanist thought. England and the territories of the Iberian Peninsula began to develop traditions of vernacular humanism with less emphasis on the study of language and on the political uses of humanist inquiry. This was more exaggerated in the Iberian Peninsula, while England retained enclaves that contributed to the study of philology at its important universities and stabilized humanism in the post-Reformation era. Finally, it was Germany that may be considered the closest replica of the Italians. However, it was not an exact replica as Germany had already begun to develop an “indigenous” tradition rooted in classical and/or philological study of the ancients. This phenomenon has been elaborated more frequently in non-English sources. For these sources, see the bibliographies and footnotes to these texts: Robert Weiss, *Humanism in England During the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957); James H. Overfield, *Humanism and Scholasticism in Late Medieval Germany* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Sergio Rossi and Dianella Savoia, eds., *Italy and the English Renaissance* (Milan: Edizioni Unicopli, 1989); A.H.T. Levi, ed., *Humanism in France at the End of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970). On the Low Countries, see Jozef Ijewsijn, “The Coming of the Humanism to the Low Countries,” in *Itinerarium Italicum*, eds., Heiko A. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, Jr., 193-301 and James K. Cameron, “Humanism in the Low Countries,” in *The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe*, eds., Anthony Goodman and Angus Mackay, 137-163. And on the Iberian Peninsula, see Jeremy N.H. Lawrence, “Humanism in the Iberian Peninsula,” in Ibid, 220-258.

By the sixteenth century, what Warren Boutcher in his contribution to the
*Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism* calls “late humanism” saw a shift in the
process and purpose of humanist education. His “Vernacular Humanism in the Sixteenth
Century” suggests that as humanism began to impact Northern Europe, it assumed the
role of providing a mediating source of resolution to political and diplomatic issues.\(^\text{104}\) It
was no longer important to understand the linguistic force of Greek and Latin, but to
articulate the ideals, and in some cases the appropriation for political use, those concepts
which classical knowledge imparted in one’s own language. The mastery of the message
superseded the mastery of the language and this mastery was utilized in the increasing
vitality of pan-European political dealings.\(^\text{105}\)

Humanism, then, became the basis for education in the “soft” disciplines of
practical usage in the emergent nation-state structures in Europe. While based on a
foundation in the ancient traditions of civic morality as a means for providing effective
leadership, the *studia humanitas* would assume a more targeted focus at the dawn of the
European modern era. The ethical, historical, and literary formulation of humanist
knowledge became the intellectual force behind the idea of (European) civilization itself.

\(^{104}\) Utilizing an example drawn from England, he states: “All the emphasis is on finding and disposing
the material which is most useful, as in the operation of an intelligence service, not on the link
between classical literary language and good morals.” Warren Boutcher, “Vernacular Humanism

\(^{105}\) Boutcher summarizes: “High-level, pan-European diplomatic and commercial relationships were,
then, transmitted in this mid-century period through the culture of eclectic, polyglot and
pragmatic humanism. In terms of interest and demand the progenitors of this culture were the
diplomats and advisers surrounding the monarch. One of the core trends in its development is the
increased interest in multiple vernacular versions of classical literature and the greater
intermingling of generically heterodox materials, including chivalric romance.” Ibid, 193. This
seems to substantiate claims about the character of the “humanities” (as distinct from humanism)
made based on the primary literature analyzed by Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, discussed
supra.
It simply enlarged the parochial and localized aims of scholastic inquiry by embracing a wider conception of what European knowledge could encompass. As such, framers of university curricula embraced humanist approaches to knowledge categorization.

b. Humanism in the Universities

The exploration of the impact that the spread of humanism had throughout European universities requires us to return to A History of the University of Europe. The milieu out of which humanism emerged is discussed in the epilogue to the first volume. In this essay, entitled, “The Rise of Humanism,” Walter Rüegg contextualizes the intellectual impact of humanism within the changing socio-political character of university education, and of Europe writ large. For Rüegg, the latter is an important force which impinged upon the material impact that humanism would have upon the European world, which he characterizes as experiencing an “existential menace.” This was a world which needed new “symbols of security” that humanism attempted to provide in the form of the literary study of the ancients as “human models for their own moral education.”

Here Rüegg simply reiterates the dominant strands of intellectual history concerning humanism, but continues by discussing the effect of humanism on all the


107. Ibid, 445. He states: “The rise of humanism occurred during a period of severe political and economic crises, the Great Schism, the Hundred Years War in the west, the decline of the imperial house and the conflict for supremacy among the various territorial powers in the Empire itself, in Burgundy, and in Italy, and the Turkish menace in the east. All these took place against the background of a cessation of economic growth, financial crises, famine, and not least, the Black Death.” A concomitant to these was also the emergence of a bourgeoisie different from those merchant classes which dominated the previous centuries. See especially Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism, 18-21 as well as Myron P. Gilmore, The World of Humanism, 56-60.


109. Ibid, 446.

179
different faculties of the medieval university. While its impact on medicine and law was important, humanism’s effect on the arts faculty, he asserts, had far reaching methodological and epistemological consequences.\textsuperscript{110} The humanist influence would filter through non-university structures, including the genealogical imprint of Salutati and others to enter the universities of Padua, Bologna, and Pavia, in the fourteenth centuries, before becoming firmly entrenched throughout Europe by the mid-fifteenth century.

According to Rüegg, not only did the humanist influence generate university chairs of new disciplines like poetry, history, Greek, and moral philosophy and a recharged approach to grammar and rhetoric, it contributed to a new way of understanding that would become standard in the university—the idea that resolution of social and political problems could be actively considered utilizing the dialogic tools of literature and history.

In his concluding thoughts to this essay, and in the beginning to his opening essay to \textit{Volume Two of A History of the University in Europe} (1996), Rüegg asserts that the humanist moment opened the door for Europe’s more “modern” achievements, acting as the intellectual transition period between the two ages.\textsuperscript{111} This “transition” was marked

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 452-456.
\textsuperscript{111} Rüegg states: “Humanism is a phenomenon of the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times. Humanism, especially in the universities, was built on medieval foundations. The emphasis which the humanists laid on the differences between themselves and medieval intellectual methods and beliefs shows how deep the medieval imprint was on them; they felt themselves nearly overwhelmed by it and found it very difficult to go their own way, especially in the universities. In so far as they placed at the centre of their intellectual the understanding, which human beings have of themselves and the worlds, and the social activities of human beings as potential sources of conflict, they opened up a new epoch in the history of universities. In this new epoch, human experiences and its translation in verbal and mathematical form became the task of the ‘scientific revolution’—or, more precisely expressed, the substantive extension, empirical deepening, methodological reformation, and conceptual systematization of the results of scientific and scholarly research and their communication through teaching.” Ibid, 467. This theme is continued into his introduction to the next installment. See Walter Rüegg, “Themes,” in \textit{A History of the University in Europe}.
by the shifting social role of the university and the advent of a “republic of learning” with humanism as its intellectual force. The broad character of humanistic inquiry spawned a “changed conception of time and the world and the parallel change in the image which humanistically educated individuals had of their own professional role and of their powers and obligations in society.”

Important markers of transition, events, which caused thinkers to alter their conceptions of time and change, which have consumed Western intellectual histories were the fall of Constantinople and the discovery of America. As Europe began to encounter the “new,” a humanist historical self-consciousness began its necessary ascent, and novelty became an intellectual pursuit. This affected the social status of the university, by declaring the role of the studia humanitas in the new Age of Europe, the facilitator of ideas and the space where thinkers working to conceptualize the important needs of this new epoch (the vita activa) found their home.

The second volume covers the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, and at the beginning of this periodization, Rüegg asserts the influence of humanism on the new disciplines of cartography, cosmography, and navigation and on the older disciplines of natural philosophy, rhetoric, and theology as driven by the close study and dissemination of

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*University in Europe: Universities in Early Modern Europe 1500–1800, Vol. 2, eds. Walter Rüegg and H. De Ridder-Symoens, 4-6.*

112. Ibid, 5.
113. Ibid. In addition to these events, he adds “the poetry of Dante and Petrarch” and the “invention of printing.”
114. Ibid, 6-8.
115. Ibid, 8. Later, he asserts: “These persons were not interested in the vita contemplativa, in knowledge for the sake of knowledge; they were rather interest in the vita activa, in knowledge for the use of the civil community. What was a welcome by-product of the teaching and learning of intellectual methods in the medieval university became in the sixteenth century the main task of the university, namely, the training of clergymen, priests, physicians, lawyers, judges and civil servants.” Ibid, 30. This idea will prove useful in our subsequent discussions of “functionality” in academic work as a particular or more widespread ideal in Parts Two and Three of this dissertation.
classical texts.\textsuperscript{116} These texts generated “an encyclopedic” view of education, and Rüegg suggests that that the incubator of this discussion were scholars who increasingly came to associate themselves with the university—an institution “conquered” by humanism.\textsuperscript{117}

With regards to curriculum, the contributions to Volume Two by Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Laurence Brockliss, and Olaf Pederson allow us to continue to trace the development of disciplined thought in this period. While Volume Two covers the early modern era, 1500-1800 C.E., the influence of humanism can be felt early on in particular areas of the university and in Western intellectual life in general. In addition to these works, Ann Blair’s contribution to \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy} endeavors to understand how knowledge was organized in terms of both the classification of disciplines and within the construction of taxonomies of knowledge during the Renaissance. In giving a framework for understanding the “ambition of implementing the perfect organization of knowledge,” the humanist impulse gave way to an influx of new information to add to the known world through both “eclectic integration” and the discovery of natural and historical knowledge.\textsuperscript{118} As Blair shows, these ideas would begin

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid, 14-33.
\item \textsuperscript{117} On the entrance of humanism into the universities, see Ibid, 34-41 and Olaf Pederson, “Tradition and Innovation,” in \textit{A History of the University in Europe: Universities in Early Modern Europe 1500–1800}, Vol. 2, eds. Walter Rüegg and H. De Ridder-Symoens, 451-488. Both contributions discuss the extra-university institutions that at times dominated the humanist discussion. In other words, the “conquering,” which Rüegg evokes (Ibid, 38) was a complex process. Pederson’s scope goes beyond humanism, but it shows that once humanism entered the university it created friction between subsequent intellectual movements (e.g. the scientific revolution), that caused them to retreat to non-university institutions (e.g. the scientific academies).
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ann M. Blair, “Organizations of Knowledge,” in \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy}, ed. James Hankins, 287. This “eclectic integration of new or newly invigorated disciplines” was associated with Renaissance philosophy: “Humanists often used their classifications to support new claims for the centrality of the disciplines they favored, whether grammar, dialectic, history, or mathematics. A fine example of this strategy, widely circulated in its time and well studied today, is
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to claim intellectual homes within the European imagination before universities organized themselves to meet the new demands of knowledge.

Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann establishes at the outset of his *A History of the University in Europe* chapter, the primacy of the faculty of philosophy in not only shaping the study of the higher faculties of law, medicine, and theology, but also the “intellectual coherence of the university.” This is an idea that has echoes in previous iterations of Western educational systems dating back the medieval era, however as Schmidt-Biggemann articulates, the dynamic of the intellectual work of philosophers in the university and their institutional role in the emerging modern European state bureaucratic structure must be explored. “New Structures of Knowledge” is an examination of the various philosophical models that oriented the pursuit of scientific knowledge in the university from the sixteenth century on, covering the intellectual-religious movements of the Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment. At the beginning of this trajectory, as Rüegg had acknowledged, was the influence of humanism. Schmidt-Biggemann begins by defining the four orientations and their various developments: 1) Aristotelian sciences- guided by the study of objects; 2) Unitary sciences-


120. Ibid, 490. Similar to other conceptions of the role of philosophy, this idea would become more important as philosophers became more active participations in the social order. The stakes for philosophy, then, were much higher. See the discussion of the *vita activa*, supra.
guided by a metaphysical basis for the study of all disciplines; 3) Hermetic- Platonic sciences- guided by scientific revelation; and 4) Ciceronian- guided by historical and philological study.\textsuperscript{121} The largely humanist-inspired synthesis of these approaches resulted in the separation of the discipline of philosophy into an updated version of the theoretical and practical sciences, a separation premised on Boethius’ and later medieval theorists’ reading of Greek philosophy.\textsuperscript{122} At various times, any of the four traditions outlined by Schmidt-Biggemann exacted the primary influence on the other faculties.

The two most important for the universities were the Aristotelian, linked to scholasticism, and the Ciceronian, linked to humanism. Schmidt-Biggemann’s discussion of the evolution of the Ciceronian sciences then allows us to trace the humanist impact on the university. According to his survey, the approach to knowledge linked to historical and philological work had by the beginning of the seventeenth century begun to give coherence to the study of jurisprudence, despite its weaknesses, and to generate a new encyclopedic tradition that attempted as Blair demonstrates, to organize all-knowledge.\textsuperscript{123} This would prove essential, as jurisprudence became the basis for the construction of a European code that governed both domestic and international affairs as the beginnings of the modern era began to take shape.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See Ibid, 491-500.
\item See the figure in Ibid, 499.
\item Schmidt-Biggemann explains: “To the extent that it considered itself a university science, jurisprudence took Roman law as its basis. Thus, since the rediscovery of Roman law, a broad Ciceronian historical type of science had emerged, not oriented towards the Aristotelian scientific system but which, using philological and historical methods, circumvented the strict scientific method of late scholasticism and by doing so also reconstructed the system of sciences.” Ibid, 498.
\item See Ibid, 509-517 and the discussion of this dynamic infra.
\end{enumerate}
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Laurence Brockliss’ chapter covers the discussion of the appearance of these conceptions and classificatory schemes within the actual curricula of the university. In explaining this, he asserts that although the research in this area had been minimal (in 1996), the potential for exploring the curricula of the universities from 1500-1800 C.E., remained promising for our understanding of the continuity and change in the arrangement of the courses in the main faculties.\textsuperscript{125} Humanism, of course would have the greatest impact in the faculty of arts/philosophy. The discussion of the curricular changes and, what he describes as a “variety”\textsuperscript{126} of offerings depending on the university, is organized into the following disciplinary areas: 1) languages; 2) history and geography; 3) philosophy; and 4) mathematics.

In languages we learn of the centers for the study of Latin, but also the important language of Greek, as well as Hebrew and Arabic.\textsuperscript{127} Many key universities were able to establish colleges for the purpose of language study. The influences of individuals discussed supra such as Lorenzo Valla, Rodolphus Agricola, Desiderius Erasmus, and Petrus Ramus, regarding the humanist study of texts, would impact the \textit{trivium} disciplines and lead to the development of classical philology, which were also housed in universities.\textsuperscript{128} Brockliss briefly discusses the approaches championed by the major centers for the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[126.] Ibid, 564.
\item[127.] Ibid, 570.
\item[128.] Brockliss explains that a new form first appearing the Parisian educational centers emphasized the need to become “proficient classical stylists” as opposed to the logic-guided studied of grammar practiced previously. This approach was one where “students were not merely introduced to the grammatical rules but gained a real understanding of their usage through studying appropriate classical texts, performing oral exercises and producing prose-compositions.” See Ibid, 571.
\end{footnotes}
study of this discipline and classics writ large: The University of Paris (in the 16th century),
where they took the new form of humanist inspired language instruction and formulated
the *modus Parisenesis*, and later the University of Leiden (in the 17th century).\(^\text{129}\)

The impact of humanism was also felt in the emergent discipline of history. Brockliss’ examination includes an examination of the study of history (and geography as a related cognate area) as they began to emerge in the various university curricula and university chairs were found in the discipline.\(^\text{130}\) Spawned from the intellectual practices of rhetoric, historical material began to be read as “moral instruction” as opposed to the study of literary or stylistic concerns. As Brockliss shows, this impetus was not unrelated to political motivations.\(^\text{131}\) Further discussion of the impact of this discipline in the Renaissance era can be found in Donald Kelley’s contribution to the *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*. His “The Theory of History” posits that the study of history can be linked to an earlier humanist impulse that would eventually empty into a largely French-pioneered “method” which was inclusive of the tributaries of humanist philology, the

\(^{129}\) See Ibid, 572-574. The *modus Parisenesis* was the name given to the pedagogical system; Brockliss names the intellectual genealogy of instructors in this method in Paris at the time. See also his *French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Cultural History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

\(^{130}\) According to Brockliss, the universities at Maryburg (1529) and Vienna (1537), were the first to establish chairs in history. By, 1627, Cambridge would become one of the last major universities to establish a chair. See Ibid, 574. Alternatively, Ann Blair contends that “history was left out of Renaissance educational curricula because it was considered not complex enough to require instruction and too bulky to include.” Ann Blair, “Organizations of Knowledge,” 293. While Blair seems to have limited her focus to France, this contention raises an important concern: Does the establishment of a chair in a discipline constitute inclusion in the curricula of the university? Perhaps the continued examination of these issues, a pursuit which Brockliss asserts should command more energy, will clarify these issues.

\(^{131}\) Brockliss gives the example of the historians’ approach to Tacitus, who “became a starting point for a study of the art of contemporary politics and a peg on which to hang a defence of absolutism.” This way of viewing ancient works was pioneered at Leiden by Justus Lipsius and at Strasburg by Matthias Bernegger. See Laurence Brockliss “Curricula,” 575.
universalist methodology of Protestant historiography, and civil law.\textsuperscript{132} He asserts that this sort of “philosophical” approach began to elevate the study of history into a “position of eminence” and a defined discipline and field of study in the European republic of letters.\textsuperscript{133}

The humanist interpretation of Gordon Leff’s “three philosophies” is discussed next in Brockliss’ chapter. Brockliss’ states that the course of philosophy was organized during the Late Middle Ages into: logic, ethics [politics & economics], metaphysics [natural theology & psychology], and physics [natural sciences]. While many have argued that ethics (moral philosophy) was itself a contribution of the studia humanitas, this arrangement was Aristotelian, as discussed in the previous section. Yet, it came under attack by humanists for its sole emphasis on Aristotle; they wanted to make philosophy more inclusive of other ancient sources.\textsuperscript{134} The shifting ground (and stability) of certain philosophical problems is discussed at length by contributors to Part II of the James Hankins edited \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy}.\textsuperscript{135} In the university curricula, however, Brockliss discusses the fate of Aristotelian conceptions of science during the early modern period, showing its evolution and synthesis with the mechanical sciences in the seventeenth centuries and finally with the Enlightenment ideas that spread


\textsuperscript{133}. Ibid, 759.

\textsuperscript{134}. Laurence Brockliss, “Curricula,” 578. See notes 83 and 135 on ethics in the \textit{studia humanitas}. On the medieval and late medieval course of philosophy, see also the discussions of Gordon Leff and James Weisheipl supra.

\textsuperscript{135}. It includes contributions from scholars tracing the dynamics of logic, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, political philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. This text is a lengthier, in-depth engagement with the subject than Brockliss’ chapter. See also note 92.
throughout the European universities in the eighteenth century. Before this evolution, however, the discipline of philosophy vacillated between two traditions of Aristotelians: the Paduan and the Parisian. Brockliss points out that humanists writ large, only had a partial impact, asserting that the work of the humanist and university professor, Petrus Ramus may have had a lasting impact on the empirical study of phenomena which was to characterize later iterations of Western thought.

The last disciplinary outposts during the era within the arts/philosophy faculty were the mathematical sciences. The components of the ancient quadrivium as well as the studies of optics and astrology, continued to be the focus of various university curricula. The emphasis of Brockliss, is however on the humanistic resurrection of classical mathematicians in the early modern era and the debate over the continued separation of the mathematical sciences and natural philosophy [physics]. Brockliss briefly recounts the debate, concluding that the development of new sciences based on mathematical inquiry would eventually become a force to be reckoned with. One of the figures involved in this sort of intellectual activity was Galileo Galilei, a professor at the University of Pisa.

136. After explaining how Aristotelianism was challenged by humanism, Brockliss explains how differing conceptions of Aristotelianism that withstood these confrontations came to occupy centers in Italy and France. The role of Cartesian mechanical sciences is then discussed as a challenge to Aristotelian notions of the study of science. Emphasizing “matter and motion” the mechanical sciences were formulated in a unique way by thinkers such as Isaac Newton. Brockliss then gestures to the consequences of these changes as thinkers such as Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant enter the conversation. For this discussion see Ibid, 578-589.

137. Brockliss states that the Paduan school aimed to know the “essence” of Aristotle, while the Parisian school sought to uncover, “what Aristotle ought to have concluded.” Ibid, 580.

138. He asserts that Ramus’ “importance lay in his revolutionary approach to the study of logic, where he rejected the late medieval (and Aristotelian) belief that the subject was a science concerned with the rules of right reasoning and insisted instead that it was merely the practical art of locating and marshaling evidence.” Ibid, 581.

139. Ibid, 589-593.
and later at Padua. In charting the intellectual sources for his conception of science, Mark A. Peterson in his *Galileo’s Muse* (2011), suggests that to understand his mathematical ideas, one must understand his interest in the arts and humanism.\(^{140}\) Peterson considers Galileo’s conceptualization of classical mathematics as aided by the humanist environment and central to the evolution of his experimental method.\(^{141}\)

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The easy trap of articulating Western intellectual movements as having clear beginnings and endings is exposed by an examination of humanism. What emerged as an intellectual movement in Italy would spread and impact many conversations, and at the same time be confronted with resistance. However, humanism is responsible for the creation of new disciplines. Not only is this true, it is clear that in the Western knowledge complex, humanism opened doors for more flexible understandings of human reality and the natural world, and as Walter Rüegg and Anthony Grafton assert, its continuities with the period known as the Scientific Revolution are evident.\(^{142}\)

IV. Disciplinarity and the Scientific Revolution

The Scientific Revolution has commanded much attention by chroniclers of Western intellectual history, with many works pointing to it as the final iteration of a

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141. Peterson rightly distinguishes classical mathematics from the mathematics that had been taught in universities prior to the scientific revolution. The former was imbued with a heavy practical aspect, whereas the latter was more philosophical and abstract. The split was between Platonic conceptions and Aristotelian variants of the discipline. Interestingly, the “new science” of Galileo would rely on the former and not the dominant Aristotelian. See Ibid, 33-65.

“modern” trajectory of knowledge. While Alan Crombie’s *Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science* (1971), suggests that these beginnings may be found as early as the novel work done by the aforementioned Robert Grosseteste in the thirteenth century, the normative periodization of a revolution in science is assigned somewhere between 1500-1700.\(^{143}\) For most intellectual historians, this was an era that witnessed the rise and eventual popularity of a new way of understanding and writing about the external world. This represents what can be termed, the “standard narrative,” and has been asserted strongly by a coterie of intellectual historians who have projected modern science as originating with the principal intellectual innovations of seventeenth century revolutionaries. These studies include Herbert Butterfield’s *The Origin of Modern Science* (1949), A. Rupert Hall’s *Revolution in Science* (1954), Alexandre Koyre’s *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (1957), and many of the texts authored by Richard S. Westfall, such as *The Construction of Modern Science* (1971) and *Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton* (1980).\(^{144}\)

In these and other works, the standard narrative of the Scientific Revolution coheres around the notion that modern science commences with the new interpretations

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and methodological breaks with scholastic (Aristotelian) inquiry within the field of natural philosophy. This idea can be usefully summarized in the often quoted passage from the preface of Butterfield’s *The Origin of Modern Science*, where he states that

> Since that revolution overturned the authority in science not only of the middle ages but of the ancient world—since it ended not only in the eclipse of scholastic philosophy but in the destruction of Aristotelian physics—it outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christendom. Since it changed the character of men’s habitual mental operations even in the conduct of the non-material sciences, while transforming the whole diagram of the physical universe and the very texture of human life itself, it looms so large as the real origin both of the modern world and of the modern mentality that our customary periodisation of European history and has become an anachronism and an encumbrance.¹⁴⁵

With these words, Butterfield and others placed this moment in Western intellectual history as the fulcrum of the history of science, a status that has yet to be eclipsed, if recent works like Peter Watson’s *Ideas* (2005) and Thomas Crump’s *A Brief History of Science* (2001), among others are any indication.¹⁴⁶ Other works such as the seminal *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) of Thomas Kuhn and *Revolution in Science* (1985) by I. Bernard Cohen use the conceptual delineations of revolution to then guide subsequent theories of innovation in science and the characteristics therein. They both in differing ways develop a conceptualization of the character of revolutionary science, and then apply these ideas

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¹⁴⁶ See Peter Watson, *Ideas: A History of Thought and Invention, from Fire to Freud* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 474-495 and Thomas Crump, *A Brief History of Science: As Seen Through the Development of Scientific Instruments* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2001), 35-76. These are representative examples of the larger trend that can be investigated within the historical materials utilized in scientific instruction. The origins of the historiographical tradition from which both Watson and Crump draw upon are discussed in the massive study of H. Floris Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). This work chronicles the articulation of the idea of a scientific revolution over the last three centuries.
to the concept of paradigms (Kuhn) and to the historiography of modern science (Cohen).147

The standard narrative, however, continues to be questioned by both scientists and historians of science. Two volumes to appear over the last two decades have demonstrated perhaps, the simplicity, of the historiographical analysis behind the concept of a Scientific Revolution. The David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman edited *Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution* (1990) and the Margaret J. Osler edited *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution* (2000) both include contributions centered on conceptualizing and in some cases challenging the standard narrative just outlined.148 The Osler volume includes articles written in dialogue with the seminal challenge of Betty J.T. Dobbs, whose “Newton as Final Cause and First Mover” (1993), questioned the cloak of “modernity” placed upon the work of Isaac Newton.149 In her introduction to the volume, Osler asserts that underpinning this challenge was the light cast upon histories of science and the scientific revolution that were based on exploring only the “canonized” disciplines. In other words, Osler’s essay gestures to the idea that the scientific revolution was a construction developed in the nineteenth century by scientists only concerned with those aspects of the work of Isaac Newton which aided their intellectual objectives (e.g.

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149. The title suggests as Dobbs explains that Newton has often served as both “Aristotelian the final cause” and the “first mover” of nineteenth and early twentieth century science. See, B.J.T. Dobbs, “Newton as Final Cause and First Mover,” in *Rethinking the Scientific Revolution*, ed. Margaret J. Osler, 29.
mathematical physics), to the exclusion of what are now, non-scientific disciplines, such as alchemy and theology—an act of intellectual appropriation.\footnote{150} For the revisionists, such as Dobbs, there was no scientific “revolution” at all, but this does not mean that there were not changes in the era around which this revolution was constructed. These changes, however, need not be linked to a self-evident transition to “modernity.”\footnote{151}

The major changes, as recorded in both standard and revisionist narratives, revolved around conceptions of natural philosophy. As Laurence Brockliss in his aforementioned work indicates, the humanist aversion to certain elements of Aristotelianism in the humanistic disciplines, also led natural philosophers to begin to question the Aristotelian approach to natural philosophy. Building upon Brockliss’ essay, a useful working definition of the Scientific Revolution would characterize it as the changes wrought by the study of mathematical physics, a recalibration of the heavens and of motion, and the reduction of knowledge of the natural world to experimentation and observation.\footnote{152} This was different from what had previously characterized the approach of scholastic thinkers, which was a descriptive approach to phenomena. In what Olser

\footnote{150. See Margaret J. Osler, “The Canonical Imperative: Rethinking the Scientific Revolution,” in \textit{Rethinking the Scientific Revolution}, ed. Idem, 1-12.}

\footnote{151. The idea that this was not a revolution is based on the lexical analysis of the term “revolution” in I. Bernard Cohen, \textit{Revolution in Science}, 51-53. Dobbs challenges the idea that the scientific revolution as discussed in the standard narrative was “sudden, radical, and complete.” See Ibid, 51 and B.J.T. Dobbs, “Newton as Final Cause and First Mover,” 31-33. Margaret J. Osler states that “to contextualize the canon is not to deny the reality of historical change. Despite historical continuities and the appropriation of ideas from ancient, medieval, and Renaissance source, the period from 1500 to 1700 witnessed major changes in natural philosophy.” Idem, “The Canonical Imperative,” 8. The rejoinder to Dobbs is provided by Richard S. Westfall, “The Scientific Revolution Reasserted,” in \textit{Rethinking the Scientific Revolution}, ed. Margaret J. Osler, 41-55.}

\footnote{152. See this discussion in Laurence Brockliss, “Curricula,” 583-593 and the more in-depth examinations of Richard S. Westfall, \textit{The Construction of Modern Science}, passim.}
calls the “received narrative,” this idea is explained through the genealogical lens of the work in astronomy of Nicolaus Copernicus (b. 1473) and of Johannes Kepler (b. 1571), the work of Galileo Galilei (b. 1564) in the theory of motion, the mechanical philosophy of Rene Descartes (b. 1596), and its revision in the realm of mathematical physics with Isaac Newton (b. 1642). Other prominent figures included in this genealogy are Francis Bacon (b. 1561), Robert Boyle (b. 1627), and William Harvey (b. 1578). All these thinkers and their contributions are considered, in the standard narrative, to cohere around the principles of the acceptance of the new astronomy (a heliocentric orientation) and the new mechanics (the external world as systematic), and the role of method (investigation and observation) in knowledge. In addition, one of the assertions of Peter Dear’s 1995 text, Discipline and Experience, is that mathematical physics would serve an important function in crystallizing these new approaches to natural philosophy. Indeed, the Newtonian physics provided for these chroniclers, the apex of the revolution.

More and more, the innovations of the Western intellectual tradition found alternative sites of articulation and practice. Olaf Pederson’s “Tradition and Innovation,” another contribution to the second volume of A History of the University in Europe explores the growing number of institutions that emerged outside of the university, which as a

154. See their discussion in the sources cited in note 141. The work of David Oldroyd already discussed in previous chapters provides accessible profiles of the imminent figures of what he calls “the new science” and their contributions to the philosophy of science. See his The Arch of Knowledge, 48-84.
156. Dear’s is a study of the scientific revolution’s embrace of the experiment and its mathematically-guided epistemology. See Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Dear’s work emphasizes the importance of understanding the ways in which the “physico-mathematical” vanguard was established within natural philosophy, which is according to him is rooted in a “milieu of academic scholarly endeavor.” See Ibid, 9.
result of the latter’s inability to adapt to changing circumstances, became essential parts of the academic and intellectual community. These academies became the research apparatus of the educational system in Europe, housing such specialized disciplines as the applied sciences of cartography, navigation, mechanics, and military sciences.\footnote{Olaf Pederson, “Tradition and Innovation,” in \textit{A History of the University in Europe Universities in Early Modern Europe}, Vol. 2, 464-474; 480-487.} These academies and societies developed along the lines of both the humanities and the sciences.\footnote{Ibid, 457-474.} The latter would have an impact on the Scientific Revolution and generate yet another debate as to how central the universities were in it.

This question grounds Roy Porter’s objective of properly locating the role of the university in this important intellectual movement in his contribution to \textit{A History of the University in Europe}, “The Scientific Revolution and Universities.” Presenting both the traditional argument that the role of the university was minimal as well as the revisionist argument that attempts to debunk this theory, Porter concludes that universities were “not oases of science, neither were they utter deserts.”\footnote{Ibid, 533.} Advocates of the traditional school include the work of many of the standard narrative bearers discussed supra, but also Eric Ashby’s \textit{Technology and the Academies} (1958). According to this school, the universities were too steeped into Aristotelian rigidity to be the instigators of the Scientific Revolution. As a result, their curriculum could not allow it as their object was the teaching of a tradition and not the revision of it. Thinkers tied to the Scientific Revolution that were tied to the university, were autodidacts and eventually moved away from the
universities, forming independent research academies which furthered the scientific movement.\footnote{160} Porter then summarizes the revisionist view, championed by among others, Mark Curtis in his study of the English schools, \textit{Oxford and Cambridge in Transition} (1959). This view situates the origins of the scientific revolution in the general context of university education. According to its proponents, many of the instigators of the scientific revolution were not autodidacts, but trained by scholars who espoused some of its ideals early on. In effect, they constituted \textit{de facto} universities within universities, as the traditional curriculum would not allow such revolutionary ideas.\footnote{161}

The question of whether or not the universities were the initiators of the Scientific Revolution however seems to be subsidiary to the larger implications of its introduction of the changes that would eventually alter the ways in which disciplinary thought patterns would develop. In fact Porter posits that the scientific revolution was only successful in those disciplines that were directly tied to the university.\footnote{162} This recalls the work of Osler and others, who have considered the notion that the scientific revolution in effect, canonized the disciplines.\footnote{163} The work of thinkers instrumental to the Scientific Revolution, like Isaac Newton would begin to make mathematical physics, among other “absolute” disciplines, standard posts within the university, an important methodological

163. See Margaret J. Osler, “The Canonical Imperative,” 12n22.
distinction from what had occurred previously. Further, physics and other quantitative disciplines’ relationship to other fields were given pre-eminence, and according to Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, this movement helped to situate the study of philosophy’s (both natural and moral) autonomy.

The Scientific Revolution also helped to usher in the systematization of a unique method, one that still reigns supreme. This crystallization is Michael Finkenthal’s idea of “disciplinarian thinking.” According to his analysis while disciplinarian thinking has its Western roots in the Greek way, the origins of disciplinarian thinking as we know it can be traced to the Galileo-Newton (or “scientific”) revolution, with thinkers such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza (b. 1632) and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (b. 1646) as the founding fathers. Disciplinarian thinking assumes a specific “pattern of thought” that first emerged with the scientific revolution. In other words, whether in the contemporary or historical moment, the West’s entire process of producing and categorizing knowledge (now understood as discipline-based intellectual work) cannot be separated from the first-order conceptualizations of knowledge newly articulated by the purveyors of the Scientific Revolution. The ability and/or approach to understand the natural or external world had resulted in a reductionist approximation of knowledge

164. Laurence Brockliss states that the separation of physics from the philosophical sciences was an “epistemological” imperative: “From the moment that Newton’s cosmology came to be taken seriously in the continental universities, the physics course had to be prefaced by detailed tuition in mathematics. Thus in many universities, in the space of two or three decades a new generation of physics professors appeared who taught a solidly mathematical physics, irrespective of whether they were supporters or opponents of the Newtonian universe.” Laurence Brockliss, “Curricula,” 593.


166. On this connection, see Michael Finkenthal, Interdisciplinarity: Toward the Definition of a Metadiscipline? (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 43-60.
whereby scientists became “specialists.” This “pattern of thought,” according to Finkenthal, “permeated all of the domains of knowledge” and ended up not only rationalizing the creation of newer and narrower disciplines, but also ordering the ways in which knowledge was presented and understood in areas beyond natural philosophy.

In addition to technical specialism (scientific methodology), there emerged a more “disciplinary” specialism, that C. P. Snow famously labels “the two cultures.” In his brief published lecture, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (1959), he asserts that natural scientists, ostensibly, out of the same process that spawned the Scientific Revolution, erected a wall between them and intellectuals he considers non-scientists, the genealogy of literary humanism. While this view has been challenged as too rough a characterization, the gap seems to persist. As natural philosophers and humanists began to diverge, many moral philosophers sought to take the burgeoning revolutionary

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167. Ibid, 9. This persistence of this intellectual reductionism in disciplinarian thinking has led to Finkenthal’s subject, the idea and need for interdisciplinarity.

168. He states: “It is true, science assumed the reality of an absolute truth; it is true also that the new science requested verification through repeatable experimentation in all possible cases. Moreover, it also tended to restrict itself to the domain of the “physical.” But beyond all these there was a certain methodology and well-defined operational concepts which were developed to cope with its objectives. In time, this mixture of specific concepts and specific methodology became a pattern of thought…” Ibid, 3.


170. The first response was from Robert Leavis, *Two Cultures? The Significance of C.P. Snow* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962). For a fuller discussion amid the emergence of “the science wars” see Jay A. Labinger and Harry Collins, eds., *The One Culture? A Conversation about Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001) and Richard E. Lee and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *Overcoming the Two Cultures: Science Versus the Humanities in the Modern-World System* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2004). Both of these works include contributions that challenge Snow’s prescriptions as either misguided or as a truism with implications. According to Jerome Kagan, the social sciences, to be discussed infra, constitute a third culture. See his *The Three Cultures: Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities in the 21st Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Snow’s idea of a gulf between the sciences and humanities need not be elaborated here, in many ways it continues to constitute the norm within the modern university. Perhaps its roots lie in the appropriation of seventeenth century natural philosophy in the development of disciplinarity in the nineteenth century, gestured to supra.
work and methodologies of the natural philosophers (scientists) and apply them to the study of humans and society, creating in fact, a third culture. This third culture became a chief tool in the period of European history known as the Enlightenment.

V. The Enlightenment and the Emergence of Intellectual Euro-Modernity

The period of European intellectual history, which spans the eighteenth century, dubbed both the Age of Reason, to denote the earlier designation, and the Enlightenment, the more contemporary moniker, has perhaps a clearer relevance to the question of disciplinarity in Africana Studies than other eras. While it was indeed the period that saw the emergence of newer disciplines associated with the idea of the science of society (which for some may be synonymous with Africana Studies\textsuperscript{171}), it also represents the prevailing rhythm of intellectual life during period where Europe both defined itself and escalated its exportation of both ideas and systems of control to non-Europeans.

Into this orbit, long set in motion, were African people who were increasingly thrust into a newer and different relationship with “Europe” than that which characterized these relationships before “modernity.”\textsuperscript{172} Enlightenment intellectual work helped to marshal a shift from largely church controlled matrices of power into secular mechanisms such as the nation-state, which oversaw and determined how African people, along with other “subalterns,” were reduced to servitude in service of Europe’s grand

\textsuperscript{171.} Certain practitioners working under the aegis of Africana Studies are wont to reduce the discipline to the science of society, as it effects people of African descent, largely in the Western hemisphere, usually in the United States of America. These are those who view the discipline as an “interdiscipline” focusing on such subject matter. See the Preface and Chapter Seven of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{172.} See inter alia, Cedric Robinson, \textit{Black Marxism}, 82. In affixing “modernity” to the moment of fifteenth and sixteenth century history, Robinson’s informs much of the periodization utilized here.
mission. It was a new conception of society that served as the other side of the coin, where liberalism and reason were the foundation of a new world system which at the same time, often justified and empirically reified the oppressive social organizations of this new epoch. As European nations began to organize themselves, replete with motives and ambitions of imperial power, the Enlightenment as an intellectual force continued what Werner Schneiders calls a transition from “metaphysics to the problems of knowledge and from natural religion to ethics.” 173 The very processes that variations of Enlightenment thought developed and practiced, were then, ironically the contextual foundation which called into emergence “the latest improvisation of Africana Studies” 174 —a binary which embodies W.E.B. Du Bois’ confrontation between “two warring ideals.” 175

a. Again, What is Enlightenment?

While most thinkers involved in conceptualizing Enlightenment thought would not disagree with the consensus, usefully articulated in Peter Gay’s seminal *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation* (1966), that Enlightenment represented a mode of thought


175. W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Signet, 1995), 45. Du Bois’ idea of twoness or duality certainly fits the predicament of African confrontation with Europe, especially once the idea of race is foisted onto the relationships of power in the New World. Racial categorizations and their links to power are part and parcel of Enlightenment philosophy.
that marshals the ideas of “secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism,” and many essential freedoms to allow man “to make his own way in the world,” many question its “universal” value.\textsuperscript{176} While Enlightenment represented a range of thought, Gay suggests that this range constituted a “philosophic family” and/or an army united around a “coherent philosophy” rather than a hodgepodge of irreconcilable differences—they were in effect united by their secularism and the appeal to antiquity.\textsuperscript{177} Among Western intellectual historians, this “coherence” was generally represented as universally applicable, despite the fact that it was largely the collective ideas of Western European philosophes, an obvious fact and a long discussed critique. As such, how these Enlightened thinkers viewed the character, quality, and essence of human life as well as its recommendations for society, has been challenged and placed under direct assault, especially since the 1970s, from thinkers both adjacent to European intellectual traditions as well as those explicitly articulating positions endeavoring to go beyond the West.

In various ways and representing wholly different intellectual traditions, the Frankfurt School, the postmodernism of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, and others, and the feminism of Sandra Harding, amid the work of Samir Amin, Edward Said, and critical to Africana Studies, of Marimba Ani, Jacob Carruthers, Molefi Asante, Oyeronke Oyewumi, Lucius Outlaw, and Emmanuel Eze, have all questioned the role of Enlightenment as the purveyor of universal reason, and just as well, its role in the


\textsuperscript{177} Ibid, 3-8.
intellectual subjugation of non-European peoples. Critique of Enlightenment has grown such that in many areas of Western philosophy, it is considered brave and mission-

178. The early twentieth century critiques of the Enlightenment by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory highlighted the role of Enlightenment in the emergent crises of democracy, capitalism, and the other global upheavals which accompanied the European war years. For these thinkers, Enlightenment was partly to blame, for it created the systems of power that converged upon the common citizens during this turmoil. See the 1944 work of Frankfurt School thinkers, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). Linked to the Frankfurt School were the various traditions of postmodernism. Where Horkheimer and Adorno linked oppressive qualities to Enlightenment politics, postmodernist thinkers linked them to knowledge more generally. Specifically, the intellectual disciplines organized and rationalized the limits of knowledge set by those in power. Enlightenment, linked to modernity, served to appropriate reason toward the dictates of power. On this idea, see specifically the 1966 work of Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1970) as well as classic studies of postmodernism, which generally articulate a critique of the Enlightenment, Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) as well as Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), inter alia. Feminist critique has also emerged to discuss specifically the androcentric assumptions imbedded into the philosophies which underlay the Enlightenment, positing that it is at this foundation that patriarchy emerges into forms that necessitated the rise of feminism. The question of whether or not women were rational was in fact a consistent theme with diverse views during the Enlightenment. The consequences of its resolution have been discussed by not only Sandra Harding, mentioned above, but also in the works of Jane Duran, Donna Haraway, and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Harding, however, places emphasis on the idea of European modernity as the origin of both the Enlightenment and colonialism, highlighting these as crucial for the production of so-called “universal” knowledge. See her *Sciences From Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), the earlier classics, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge: Thinking From Women’s Lives* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and *The Science Question in Feminism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), as well as Jane Duran, *Philosophies of Science/Feminist Theories* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) and *Toward a Feminist Epistemology* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990). The idea of postcoloniality has found a welcoming presence in the works of both Duran and Harding, which may in fact be due to the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose works speaks to both tendencies. See inter alia, her seminal *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (London: Methuen, 1987). Postcolonial studies interpret Enlightenment as the cultural domain of colonialism and imperialism. What emerged as questions of freedom and liberty, were to the colonized, opposites of these ideals. Traditions of postcolonial thought represented by Edward Said and Samir Amin have thus questioned the idea of Enlightenment’s universality and the extent to which its political apparatus in fact constituted human “progress.” See inter alia Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1979) and Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (London: Verso, 1988). Finally, and most closely related to Africana Studies, are those African thinkers who have been able to critically interrogate the role of Enlightenment in the denigration of African thought, via racial slavery and colonization/imperialism. By examining what she terms the European cultural asili, Marimba Ani is able to locate the intellectual origins of European attitudes toward the African. Part of her discussion challenges Enlightenment ideas of reason and progress, among other hallmark concepts of the era. See Marimba Ani, *Yurugu: An African-Centered Critique of European Behavior* (Trenton, NJ):
critical to defend the Enlightenment—as both a universal and teleologically “reasonable” project. While certain thinkers, such as Michel Foucault, in what seems a reverse of previous positions, have attempted to rescue the concept of best of Enlightenment thought from this sort of project, many defenders continue to place its evolution as the foundation of modernity, in response to thinkers like Foucault and others. These


In one of his final contributions, “What is Enlightenment?,” which is a reconsideration of Kant’s Enlightenment statement, to be discussed infra, Michel Foucault articulates a position which Erhhard Barh calls “permanent Enlightenment.” The idea here being not to the concede the idea that reason can be acquired (a position many accuse postmodernists of taking), but to continue to search for it, while not assuming the universality of whatever one finds, i.e. an intellectual should be in a state of permanent Enlightenment. Foucault calls this the ethos of modernity, and cautions against too facile a notion of choosing to be a postmodernist or a modernist (associated with the Enlightenment ideal). In this manner, Foucault ends up preserving parts of his “archaeology of knowledge” methodology while retaining the best of the Enlightenment ideas of Immanuel Kant—the attitude that reason can be critically attained. Foucault characterizes the project as: “criticism that is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental and its goal is not that of a making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological—and not transcendental—in the sense that it will no seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the
include recent titles like Robert Bartlett’s *The Idea of Enlightenment* (2001), Louis Dupre’s *Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modernity* (2004), John Robertson’s *The Case for the Enlightenment* (2005), and Charles Wither’s *Placing the Enlightenment* (2007). These works form an important point of departure, for the most recent addition to this genre, the massive three-volume homage, the latest emerging in 2011, authored by Jonathan Israel, which continues the project to defend the best of Enlightenment thought against the vagaries of its detractors. In the latest and final installment, *Democratic Enlightenment* (2011), Israel includes an overview of his approach and main argument of the three volumes, asserting that the Enlightenment was indeed the most important transformation in the Western world, intellectually and socio-politically, while at the same time characterizing its detractors as acceding to or wishing the ultimate “death of reason and moral universalism.”

possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking, what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 45-46. For Bahr’s idea of permanent enlightenment and the context of Foucault’s essay amid the debate with the German philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, see Ehrhard Bahr, “In Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas,” *German Studies Review* 11 (February 1988): 97-109. In addition to this article, see Amy Allen, “Foucault and Enlightenment: A Critical Reappraisal,” *Constellations* 10 (2003); 179-198 and the contributions to Michael Kelly, ed. *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).


As Christopher M. Gray’s insightful review essay, “Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenments” (2004), reveals, Enlightenment historiography has a long and greatly instructive lineage. In this essay Gray outlines the critical construction of Enlightenment histories of the twentieth century, showing how certain conventions were established and their impact on our understanding of the eighteenth century in the West. Understanding Enlightenment historiography becomes crucial to the project of Africana Studies, as it reveals how the former was the final wing in the “creation” of a Western intellectual edifice—the fount of the human sciences—which continues to theoretically limit the most visible iterations of Africana Studies—those tied most closely to these “traditional” disciplines.

Peter Gay’s aforementioned definition of the Enlightenment, in *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, represented a conception that in 1965 was years in the making as well as one that has been recently revised, though its central elements have not been abandoned. The earliest attempts to define the period were those attempts made by intellectuals of the eighteenth century. The James Schmidt edited *What is Enlightenment?* (1996) collects these discussions and provides a view of their eighteenth century conceptualization (by German thinkers) and their later twentieth century readings. Of these, perhaps the most influential has been the discussions of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Moses...
Mendelssohn (1729-86), with much more attention given to the former.\textsuperscript{184} Kant characterizes Enlightenment as the transition from intellectual immaturity to adulthood, suggesting that Enlightened thinkers must make their mark in the public sphere (convened intellectual spaces) in an effort to spread Enlightenment to the greatest masses of people.\textsuperscript{185} Mendelssohn views the Enlightenment as essentially the negotiation of a civil compromise between man’s ability to act as “man” and his simultaneous role of “man as citizen;” the resolution of which results in a balanced and enlightened society.\textsuperscript{186} These two German thinkers, writing at the end of the Enlightenment era (late eighteenth century) were concerned largely with the spread of a civic ideal, that was rooted in earlier Enlightenment ideas and their projection in the Enlightened reign of Prussian monarch, Frederick II from 1740-1786.\textsuperscript{187}


In Schmidt’s introductory essay, he shows that responses to the French Revolution and its relationship to Enlightenment ushered in a second phase of Enlightenment conceptualizations in the nineteenth century. Three thinkers and three resultant tributaries of Enlightenment critique are said to be premised on a negative (“dark”) reading of the ultimate results of Enlightenment thought as it manifested in late eighteenth century France: 1) the idea of the denial of tradition in the work of Edmund Burke; 2) the idea of terror and reason in the work of G.W.F. Hegel; and 3) the notion of dominance and power in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Schmidt, each of these would have reverberations in the work of Hans Georg Gadamer, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, and Michel Foucault, respectively. However, Schmidt argues that almost all involved either improperly understood or did not attempt to cite the eighteenth century conversation on the subject which may have led to their negative critiques. 188

The foregoing critiques, while highly influential and pervasive, did not however represent the consensus on the Enlightenment as expressed in the major intellectual histories of the twentieth century. Christopher Gray points to a number of texts which in many ways concretized the view of Enlightenment as a positive force in the creation of a modern world. The work of Peter Gay mentioned above certainly falls into this category, as do a few important texts that preceded his. According to Christopher Gray, an important group of works took an “idealist” approach to the period highlighting the

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importance of “men and ideas.” He includes among this group Ernst Cassirer’s *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1932), Carl Becker’s *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (1932) and Paul Hazard’s *The European Mind* (1935) and *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1946). Distinguished by the weight placed on various Enlightenment ideals (i.e. empiricism, rationality, freedom) and by geographical focus (i.e. Germany, France, etc.), these studies, written amid a crisis in European-American history, cohered around the need to look back to the eighteenth century for clues for the resolution of the question of the state and of modern knowledge. This was an impetus that also informed their successors.

By 1966, the Enlightenment, still considered a simple, though coherent intellectual and socio-political period was thought to be reducible to a single, comprehensive text. This changed with the evolution of the idea of what Gray and others term “many Enlightenments.” As a result, Gay’s two-volume, *The Enlightenment: an Interpretation*, would be the last of its kind until perhaps the aforementioned trilogy of Jonathan Israel. The “many Enlightenments” thesis was generated from a proliferation of works that suggested that Enlightenment ideals and socio-political contexts were different based on location. Regional histories of the Enlightenment began to appear

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which often conflated Enlightenment itself or placed preeminence on either the French rationalist approach to Enlightenment, the English ideal based on empiricism, the German bureaucratic and/or idealist approach, or the moral approach of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Though not limited to these areas (some works include Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, the Netherlands, and America), a large swath of representative texts sought to determine the nature of Enlightenment as it operated in these main contexts.

This regional variation also helped to inform the contributions to the fairly recent, Knud Haakonssen edited The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy (2006). Cautioning us of the dangers of conflating eighteenth century philosophy \textit{in toto}, with the idea of Enlightenment, Haakonssen and other contributors acknowledge that the eighteenth century shift from knowing by subjects and systems to understanding by ideas and judgments was determined differently in different regions.\footnote{Knud Haakonssen, “The History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy: History or Philosophy?” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Idem, 1-7.} While organizing his discussion utilizing regions, Werner Schneiders in his contribution to the volume shows that there was unity of thought across these disparate regions characterized by the mode by which they broke from tradition, in each area thinkers sought to extricate reason by reducing the study of the entire world of ideas to a method of philosophy influenced by the Scientific Revolution.\footnote{Werner Schneiders, “Concepts of Philosophy, 26-27.}

While the idea and contestation around “many Enlightenments” has assumed many forms, appearing in Franco Venturi’s political history, The End of the Old Regime in Europe (1991), and others, here we will simply outline the key works which deal with the
regional Enlightenments in Western Europe, *a la* the model set forth in the Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich edited, *The Enlightenment in National Context* (1981).\textsuperscript{195}

In Great Britain, the main influence of the movement was John Locke (1632-1704) and his empiricism, which led to the work of the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and eventually David Hume (1711-76). A useful history of this tradition is Roy Porter’s *The Creation of the Modern World* (2000). Especially important in this region was the emergence of Scottish thought. The Scottish Enlightenment was characterized by the scepticism of David Hume toward rationality and attempted to develop philosophy on moral grounds. According to Jane Rendall, by being able to respond quicker to the novelty of Enlightenment than others, in addition to a peculiar theological crisis cum opportunity, Scottish thought was able to flourish during this era.\textsuperscript{196}

The role of the broader conception of Scottish Enlightenment is usefully summarized by Aaron Garrett in his contribution to *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment* (2003), as the philosophical analysis of human nature and the ‘empirical’ analysis of human societies, human history and the natural world merged in a distinctive synthesis


\textsuperscript{196} Jane Rendall has stated that the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh were able to respond to the new science in a quicker and more progressive way than their counterparts in other areas of Europe. See Jane Rendall, *The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 1. According to M.A. Stewart, there was a loosening of theological control of the Scottish system, which allowed freer inquiry, leading to the philosophical development in this area. See M.A. Stewart, “The Curriculum in Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies,” in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy*, ed. Knud Haakonssen, 104.
that led to the rise of the human and social sciences.” The Scottish philosophical school was led by Hume, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), and Thomas Reid (1710-96), which led to the development of moral philosophy and the “proto” social sciences by thinkers like Adam Smith (1723-90), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) who all applied the Enlightenment thought of David Hume concerning human nature and history to establish concrete theories about political economy. As chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, Smith would prove instrumental in its transformation toward a modern social science. These and other ideas are discussed in detail in Rendall’s *The Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment* (1978) as well as Alexander Broadie’s *A History of Scottish Philosophy* (2009) and Arthur Herman’s *How the Scots Invented the Modern World* (2002).

If the thinkers of the British Isles embodied the idea of empiricism, it was the non-academic and sometimes anti-clerical and anti-state *philosophes* of France who are widely considered to be Enlightenment’s rationalists. Indeed the Age of Reason, has been many times conflated with the specific machinations of French thinkers, who conceptualized the era as *siècle des Lumières*. The intellectual environment of the French salons, the production of the *Encyclopédie*, and the philosophical foundations of the French Revolution are


200. Arthur Herman, *How the Scots Invented the Modern World* (New York: Crown, 2002); For Rendall’s work see note 196; for Broadie’s work see note 199.
evidence of the intellectual revolution wrought by the reimagining of philosophy as a system whereby the whole of human knowledge could be contained and extended via reason for the good of society.\footnote{201}{As Frederick B. Artz’s 1968 study, \textit{The Enlightenment In France} asserts, “reason was God.”\footnote{202}{Just as crucial, the French thinkers are many and recognizable—Voltaire, Bayle, Fontenelle, Montesquieu, Turgot, Diderot, d’Alembert, d’Holbach, Rosseau, Condillac, and Condorcet.\footnote{203}{Without an academic base, these thinkers were able to influence the trajectory of Enlightened thought through the idea that there could be \textit{a priori} knowledge, which was standardized in the \textit{Encyclopedie}, the brainchild of d’Alembert, Diderot and others of the second generation of the French Enlightenment. Contemporary intellectual historians including the aforementioned works of Becker, Hazard, Gay, Artz, and Israel have placed much emphasis on their ideas, especially by mid-century. Added to these studies are two general volumes, R.J. White’s \textit{The Anti-Philosophers} (1970) and the seminal work of Daniel Roche, \textit{France in the Enlightenment} (1998). The former interrogates the unique position of the \textit{philosophes} relative to...\textit{Concepts of Philosophy},” 60-61, Jonathan Israel, \textit{Enlightenment Contested}, 1-15 and Frederick B. Artz, \textit{The Enlightenment in France} (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1968), 30-49, as well as the sources to be discussed infra.\footnote{202}{Ibid, 32.\footnote{203}{Francois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694-1778), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune (1721-81), Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717-83), Denis Diderot (1713-84), Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach (1723-89), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), Marquis de Condorcet (1743-94), Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-80). On these figures, see the work of Frederick B. Artz, cited in note 199 and Ira O. Wade, \textit{The Intellectual Origins of the French Enlightenment} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971) as well as in the sources to be discussed infra.}}
to the normative “philosophy” of the time, while the latter places Enlightenment political thought in the context of the revolutionizing of the French monarchical state.\footnote{This is a theme also explored by Jonathan Israel in another work entitled, The Revolution of the Mind (2010), where following Margaret Jacob in her Radical Enlightenment (1981), he asserts that at its base, proponents of what they term “radical Enlightenment” helped to usher in modern conceptions of knowledge and socio-political thought through contestation with political power. This idea suggests that the impetus toward this action, which ultimately led to political revolutions was inspired by Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), and other radical thinkers whose philosophical ideals went against the liberal factions of the philosophes. While Jacob and Israel do not focus exclusively on France, many of the thinkers covered participated in the intellectual culture of the salon. A similar “dialectical tension” between the philosophes, and the thinkers to the right of them (Spinozism, et.al, according to Israel: “Radical Enlightenment is a set of basic principles that can be summed up concisely: as democracy; racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, expression, and the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and education; and full separation of church and state.” A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), vii-viii. In this work and more extensively elsewhere, Israel asserts that the clash between Radical Enlightenment figures and the more conservative types are largely responsible for ensuring the depositing of the most egalitarian principles routinely associated with the best of Enlightenment thought. In a more complex characterization, Israel asserts: “The radical wing who scorned all such dualistic systems (i.e. ‘Cartesian dualism, Lockean empiricism,’ and other ‘methodologies of compromise’ between theology and rationality), and attempts at adjustment, may have been a tiny fringe in terms of numbers, status, and approval ratings, among both elites and in popular culture, but they proved impossible to dislodge or overwhelm intellectually.” Enlightenment Contested, 11. The premise of his even earlier, Radical Enlightenment, was that this tension was absolutely essential to modernity, despite its “fringe” status during the era. These works are cited in note 181. See also Margaret Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons, and Republicans (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981).}
were to the left), the anti-philosophes, is nevertheless, seen by Darrin McMahon in his *Enemies of the Enlightenment* (2002), as the fount of modernity. This work is but one representative example of how the historiography of the French Enlightenment, in addition to shouldering the weight of the early studies, has been most consistently geared towards understanding the French origins of modernity and the contemporary world. In addition, and as corollaries, French Enlightenment intellectual history has concentrated on the origins of contemporary political ideologies, science and intellectual culture, the idea of French thought as the base for other regional Enlightenments, imperialism, and that ever-present bugaboo of race, women, and general “otherness.”

The other major sphere in Western Europe, Germany, and more concretely, Prussia, has ironically received the less attention despite the fact that as Schmidt indicates, it was the only region which actively engaged the question in the midst of the era, as well as the origin of its current moniker, *Aufklärung.* Where it has received attention, the Enlightenment in Germany has been conceived a complex tradition, with components of French and some English precursors that manifested in the early period in the work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and to some extent Christian Wolff (1679-1750), on the one hand, and in Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) on the other, and then the most celebrated synthesis of the dualism that emerged in Immanuel Kant. Despite its influences from abroad, it was however, according to Henri Brunschwig writing in his

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Enlightenment and Romanticism (1947), a “wholly original crop from this new soil.” For Brunschwig, the Enlightenment, or Aufklärung, cannot be understood without a comprehension of the religious and political upheavals emanating from the Thirty Years War and the resulting political configuration of the Germanic Lands. This provides the context and form of the philosophizing tradition of the era.

As Schneider’s contribution to The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy asserts, it was in Germany where Enlightenment thought was most consistently linked to the university, as the latter were tied to the bureaucratic structure in place. He terms the German version, “an academic Enlightenment.” This idea is discussed at length in William Clark’s Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University (2006), a discussion of the transition from the original, traditional university to the modern, research university, a Protestant Germany innovation. Along with Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, other central figures included Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), and though sometimes not included in the Enlightenment proper, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Ernst Cassirer’s The Philosophy of Enlightenment, mentioned above is premised on the

210. Schneiders explains: “An important feature of the German territorial system was the necessity of separate administration in each state and territory. Given the confessional divisions, it was necessary to have separate, denominationally linked territories, in which to educate the required lawyers, physicians, and pastors.” Werner Schneiders, “Concepts of Philosophy,” 38. For “academic enlightenment,” see Ibid, 39.
understanding the trajectory from Leibniz to Kant, and other works on the Enlightenment in Germany seem to follow this general outline.\textsuperscript{212}

Kant has been considered the key thinker of the late Enlightenment, and in some ways the resolution to the problems of the age, though he himself answered in the negative to his own query as to whether his age was indeed an Enlightened one.\textsuperscript{213} His work, as Schmidt relates, is more familiar to the English speaking world, but at the same time it indicates the existence of a wider conversations which had taken place in both the universities and in secret societies.\textsuperscript{214} Alongside the more famous universities, these societies sprang up largely in Prussia and became important spaces for the debate and dialogue, as well as for, according to Richard Van Dulmen, the rise of the middle class. His work, \textit{The Society of the Enlightenment} (1992), examines the roles of these clubs.\textsuperscript{215} With the recent memory of both Enlightened Despotism and the French Revolution, the development of modern political thought emerged in Germany at the close of the eighteenth century, amid the declining faith and/or belief in reason. The idea of the state as civic organization and reason as a philosophical principle, once hallmarks of the an Enlightened era, began to be more firmly criticized. Frederick Beiser explores this trajectory in two works, \textit{The Fate of Reason} (1987) and \textit{Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism} (1992). As discussed above, thinkers involved in this critique, interrogated the fortunes of these ideas amid the shifting context set in motion by the French

\textsuperscript{212} See Christopher M. Gray, “Enlightenments and Counter-Enlightenments,” 180. This text is cited in note 190.
\textsuperscript{213} Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,” 62.
\textsuperscript{214} James Schmidt, “Preface,” ix. The context of his famous essay is discussed supra.
Revolution. Along with political philosophies, an essential piece to the German story is the question of culture. In Michael C. Carhart’s *The Science of Culture in Enlightenment Germany* (2008), he indicates that this question was placed at the apex of the broad Enlightenment-initiated philosophical discussion that led to the germination of new approaches within the disciplines in the academy.

A work that captures the overall Germanic intellectual environment is Peter Watson’s *The German Genius* (2010), a text which puts the role of German scholars in the construction of the research university and Enlightenment philosophy into sharper focus. Watson’s text is in many ways a composite biography of German thinkers and philosophers from about the middle of the eighteenth century on. While this text ranges very broadly, Watson’s engagement with a number of thinkers necessarily leads to discussions about a number of disciplines, which had at the forefront, the German conception to the construction of knowledge. The eighteenth century saw the pioneers of biology, archaeology, and history among others emerge from German intellectual genealogies.

Watson, echoing William Clark and others shows how the University of

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216. The resulting philosophical responses to the French Revolution by German thinkers are gestured to supra. An extended conversation can be found in these particular works, Frederick C. Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) and *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790-1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).


218. See Peter Watson, *The German Genius*, 65-151. The chapters within these pages reveal the German contributions to the study of biology, history, archaeology, philosophy, literature, and art. Watson shows how Germans built upon the shoulders of the precursors of Western thought, a unique approach to knowledge in these various areas, exemplified by scholars such as Christian Wolff, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Johann Joachim Winckleman, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Moses Mendelssohn, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Johann Christoph Schiller, Johann Gottfried Herder and
Gottingen seminars offered one of the most advanced centers of research-driven learning in Europe, which led to many of these developments.\(^{219}\)

In Peter Gay’s seminal work, he suggests that “there were many philosophies in the eighteenth century, but only one Enlightenment.”\(^{220}\) While this view has been since challenged, as discussed above, the idea of a unity of purpose can be gleaned with some satisfaction—the purpose was to liberate rather partially or completely, human thought.

In Carl Henrik Koch and Reinhard Brandt’s contributions to *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy*, we can extricate some unities surrounding the questions of the objective and methods utilized by eighteenth century philosophers across the board. Investigating the development of philosophy out of the bowels of the seventeenth century, Koch seems to suggest that what was at stake was the creation of a coherent philosophical anthropology—the proper study of man—as the true carrier of reason.\(^{221}\) In Brandt’s contribution this unity of purpose seems to cohere around the methods developed to carry out the objective outlined by Koch. He traces the genealogy of the ideas of *mos geometricus* and *mathesis universalis*, as philosophers across Western Europe attempted to grapple with the question of metascience and the study of humankind.\(^{222}\)

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\(^{219}\) Immanuel Kant. According to Watson, both the intellectual advances throughout Europe throughout the era and the German cultural concept, *Bildung*, inspired these thinkers.

\(^{220}\) The importance of the University of Halle should also be mentioned here. See Peter Watson, *The German Genius*, 49-55 and William Clark, *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University*, 158-179. The seminar can be understood as the precursor to the contemporary academic department.

\(^{221}\) Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment*, 3. On this statement, see also Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, 10-11, which states that there were always two Enlightenments—one was enlivened by reason alone and the other by the limiting of the scope of reason with tradition.


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\(^{222}\) See Reinhard Brant, “Philosophical Methods,” in Ibid, 139-142.
objectives and methods were then utilized to determine the nature of humankind, a
discussion which Aaron Garrett takes up in his contribution to the volume. The
Enlightenment rested upon a coherent idea of what constituted a human, as the latter was
both the subject capable of Enlightenment and the objects capable of study. Garrett
examines the definitions of humanity and importantly shows the dialogue which
attempted to define that which was not human, introducing us to an eighteenth century
conversation that considered the question of animals, race, and women. The
complications of the Enlightenment’s considerations of (and judgments of) humanity,
would certainly have reverberating effects in the identity of Western life and culture.

It is out of these foregoing works, the early dialogue, the regional histories and
variations, and the question of unity of purpose and ambition, that we grasp the
prevailing scholarly conventions that Jonathan Israel in Democratic Enlightenment is able to
capture in his representative characterization of the Enlightenment as both a construction
of historians and a viable historical and socio-political intellectual position. He further
defines the Enlightenment as:

Garrett outlines four important and “common theses”: 1) that the scientific analysis of man is
critical to the success both of science as such and enlightenment; 2) that human activities and
human creations are central to the analysis of man; 3) that the human sciences are systematic in
intent and universal in scope; 4) and that human nature is everywhere uniform and unites
humankind both as objects of study by the sciences and as subjects capable of enlightenment.” See
Haakonssen, 160.

Garrett spends a considerable chunk of his essay on this question. The views of the philosophers
were complex, however the prevailing themes suggests that Western man was related to but
distinguished intellectually from animals, other races, and from Western woman. See Ibid, 161-224. Other studies have reached similar conclusions, see Kaija Tianen Anttila, The Problem of
Humanity: The Blacks in European Enlightenment (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1994), the
contributions to Harold E. Pagliaro, ed, Racism in the Eighteenth Century (Cleveland: Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973) and Lieselotte Steinbrugge, The Moral Sex: Woman’s Nature in the
the quest for human amelioration occurring between 1680 and 1800, driven principally by ‘philosophy,’ that is, what we would term philosophy, science, and political and social science including the new science of economics lumped together, leading to revolutions in ideas and attitudes first, and actual practical revolution second, or else the other way around, both sets of revolutions seeking universal recipes for all mankind and, ultimately in its radical manifestation laying the foundations for modern basic human rights and freedoms and representative democracy.225

Such were the terms for the birth of the human (social) sciences and as we will see in subsequent chapters—their critique.

b. Tracing Enlightenment in the Disciplines

The intellectual ferment which oversaw the transition of the organization of disciplines had of course preceded the Enlightenment. The retrogression and reclassification of certain disciplines and the rationalization for newer ones had been long underway, as the contributions to Donald Kelley’s edited History and the Disciplines (1997) indicate.226 While these contributions attempt to discern some general themes beginning with Renaissance humanism and continuing with the Enlightenment, a discussion we began in previous sections, the unique fortunes of the disciplines in the Enlightenment itself have received special attention.

For the university historians in the second volume of The History of the University in Europe, these changes must be considered amid the interactions and shifting dominance of the faculties. As scholars endeavored to embody the Enlightenment values of practical knowledge, they exerted influences on the faculties of theology and law that eventually necessitated the birth of new disciplines (or at least their precursors) in the eighteenth

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century as both civic officials and thinkers attempted to wield political influence via the university. According to Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, as the new influences of scientific approaches were being translated to the higher sciences, namely jurisprudence, their explanatory and pedagogical foundation in philosophy made the faculty of philosophy itself the most important of the faculties by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The epilogue of Volume Two authored by Notker Hammerstein treats the emergence of the Enlightenment more closely. University thinkers and affiliated theoreticians valued those actions that were the thought to transform Europe in service of the grand Enlightenment value of “social amelioration.” Hammerstein thus offers the preceding as the context through which law would supersede the theological sciences, with philosophy occupying a close to equal status. Important, however, to this discussion is what Hammerstein has described as the changing emphasis on the particular disciplines in the university. His conclusions are that the Enlightenment era elevated the notion of the usefulness and equality of the philosophical subjects into a scientific praxis, which effectively secularized the university, leaving the theological faculties to languish in

227. Schmidt-Biggemann discusses the various reasons behind theology and jurisprudence’s role as leading science in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, respectively. He is able to contextualize the role of the university thinkers within the political milieu of the period. Ways of knowing or understanding as actualized in the higher sciences were the *modus operandi* in intellectual and political life in the early modern period. See Ibid, 500-517.

228. Ibid, 527-529. See also Ibid, 501.


230. Ibid, 624- 625; 629.
obscurity.\textsuperscript{231} Tracing the emergence of a distinguishable tradition of cosmopolitanism within the different locales, Hammerstein is able to pinpoint the areas where Enlightenment ideals held sway early in their development, as they attempted to free themselves from their various theological strongholds.\textsuperscript{232} In some cases, particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, and Scotland, the Enlightenment philosophizing outlined above would be inserted directly into university teachings.

Two key contributions to \textit{The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy} further provide some sense of the sorts of intellectual work which accompanied this academic transition. The first considers the question of the social sciences (or human sciences). Its author, Robert Brown, examines the main philosophical conundrum which beset disciplinary practitioners in this era, by rooting their theoretical approach in the philosophizing of their earlier Enlightenment precursors. The attempt to apply the Newtonian, and other systematic methods to the study of social problems was practiced by among others, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Turgot.\textsuperscript{233} However, the theoretical and methodological discussion which underpinned the social sciences were contingent upon the extent to which human nature could be understood as uniform, social laws could be extracted to explain moral principles and social regularities, and the problem of method,

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\textsuperscript{231} Ibid, 630.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid, 630-639. Hammerstein’s chapter concludes with brief discussion of the Enlightenment’s effect on the universities and academies in France, Germany, the Netherlands, England, Scotland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy.
the latter capitalizing on the work of Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Newton.\textsuperscript{234} In
addition, there was an attempt to make economics autonomous and self-regulated, and
the probability of human actions reducible to calculus—the work of Francois Quesnay
(1694-1794), Turgot, and Condorcet.\textsuperscript{235} The synthesis of all of these discussions was
housed in moral philosophy, which gave birth to the totalizing social science of political
economy. According to Brown, its split into “subspecies” (i.e. the separation into the
disciplines of political science, economics, and so on) was the direct result of practical and
administrative rationalizations, as much of the work was expressly problem-centered.\textsuperscript{236}

The second article, “The Philosophical Reflection of History,” by Dario Perinetti,
considers the role of history in the discovery and evolution of social theory. For
Enlightenment thinkers, what would become the discipline of history, was a necessary
meta-conversation which needed to inform the rationalization of moral and political ideas
and interests. Perinetti asserts that against the earlier humanistic and theological
approach to history, Enlightenment philosophers were concerned with securing objective
facts and reconstructing universal history without the traditional fetters of providential

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{234} Brown devotes considerable space to discussing the question of the uniformity of human nature
and the relative importance of method as they both relate to the question of the derivation of the
social laws upon which the social sciences would ultimately work toward. He states: “The social
thinkers of the eighteenth century discussed, and cast some light on, at least six central topics
concerning the nature of social science. One was the uniformity of human nature; a second was
the distinction between empirical social laws and moral principles; a third was the use of the
hypothetico-deductive method; and a fourth was the difference between empirical social laws and
mere social regularities and customs of various kinds.” See Ibid, 1096.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{236} For Brown, the exemplar of a “unified, and thus single, social science” work of the era is Adam
Smith’s \textit{The Wealth of the Nations} (1776). See Ibid, 1100. He continues: “The causes of the
independent growth of subdisciplines—or of the failure of a unified social science to main itself—
arise from a variety of historical, practical, and administrative factors rather than purely
intellectual ones.” Ibid.
\end{itemize}
history. In other words, history too must be scientific.237 The earlier Enlightenment thinkers are considered by Perinetti, “historical pyrrhonists,” a form of scepticism that deconstructed the traditional methodologies, and opened the door for the development of a general philosophy of history that was at once systematic and reducible to the en vogue experimental method.238 Again, as Perinetti shows, the philosophers had to grapple with the question of human nature, which for Hume and Montesquieu helped to contextualize physical and moral causation as factors in history. The larger philosophical conversation for historians was then whether or not human nature could be understood independent of history. For Rosseau, Lessing, Kant, and Turgot, there was an objective basis from which to understand human nature that did not require historical facts. For the Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico (1688-1744), Johann Herder, and Adam Ferguson, historical data was essential.239

As the eighteenth century closed, the lines of demarcation began to be drawn around the earlier reflections, with the first instances of what would later be known as “political science, economics, sociology, linguistics, history, history of culture/science, ethnology, psychology, anthropology…” and others at least visible in some form. As John

237. He explains that the “normative function of history as a ‘teacher of life’” was imbued with a measure of speculation that Enlightenment philosophers of history attempted to uproot by “objective” facts that would reconstruct “universal history.” See Dario Perinetti, “Philosophical Reflections of History,” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen, 1107-1108.

238. On the idea and legacy of historical pyrrhonism, see Ibid, 1108-1116. On the systematic (i.e. history was larger than individual actions) pursuit of philosophers of history and the experimental method, see Ibid, 1117-1121.

239. See Ibid, 1121-1134. Perinetti reviews statements from Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins on the Origins and Basis of Inequality Among Men (1755), Lessing’s Education of the Human Race (1780), Kant’s Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), and Turgot’s On Universal History (1751), Giambattista Vico’s The New Science (1744), Herder’s Another Philosophy of History (1774), and Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767).
Christie explains, the assertion of a disciplinary (understood in our sense) background in the Enlightenment to these areas may be imprecise.\textsuperscript{240} However, following the seminal text on the origins of the human sciences, Michel Foucault’s \textit{The Order of Things} (1966), it is important to consider the nature of the moment, from 1775, as one which witnessed a discernible difference in the conceptualization of boundaries of knowledge, replete with both intellectual and socio-political prescriptions and ramifications; or in other words, a manifestation of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{241}

The reception of Enlightenment engendered responses which ranged from uncritical acceptance to rejection in favor of Romanticism. That said, arguably, the material apparatus of power that characterizes modern society is firmly rooted in the philosophies of the Enlightenment. Further, what the Enlightenment set in motion was a continuity, ironically by rupture, of the attempt by thinkers in Western Europe to use intellectual work to order their lives in the immediate context. Gone were the notions of philosophical distance, which, though important to practical ends, had characterized earlier tendencies. Enlightenment, of course took many forms—radical and moderate, French, German, and English, or theoretical and despotic—it however revolved around a

\textsuperscript{240} The list of disciplines is a partial list providing in John Christie, “The Human Sciences: Origins and Histories,” \textit{History of the Human Sciences} 6 (February 1993) 1. Throughout this piece, Christie interrogates the study of the history of human sciences, showing its promises and challenges through the seminal work of Michel Foucault mentioned infra.

\textsuperscript{241} According to Christie in Ibid, 5. The work occupies what would otherwise be a “blank foundational space.” See Michel Foucault, \textit{The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences}, 355-387, where he discusses the “model” human science disciplines, biology, economics, and philology, and the ways in which they developed into more recognizable social science disciplines of the current era. In addition to this standard, see Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler, eds., \textit{Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth Century Domains} (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).
central outcome. This was a conception of knowledge that greatly expanded Europe’s self referentiality, by attempting to develop universal standards of reason—whether all Europeans agreed upon them or not. The rub was that the synthesis of this push-and-pull was an attempt to concretize knowledge about the world, by effectuating what it assumed to be the best means of achieving social betterment—or order.

VI. Research Universities and Disciplinary Identity in Modern Europe

The preceding examination of the ideas generated from the movements of scholasticism, Renaissance humanism, the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment are all central to how ideas of disciplinarity would evolve in recognizable forms in the nineteenth century—the era of the research university. Each of what would constitute in contemporary parlance, “the traditional disciplines,” were products of the combined influence of each of these late medieval and early modern intellectual movements, themselves the products of earlier iterations of Western thought. As they crystallized into organizational forms in the nineteenth century university, the precursors to the traditional disciplines were the intellectual clearinghouse of such philosophical and scientific contributions as those of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), Charles Darwin (1809-1882), and August Comte (1798-1857), which allowed them to assume modalities that represent the continuities that characterize the academy today. With regard to our notion of disciplinarity, if the foregoing discussion on both the sources and development of Western ideas denote the content, then certainly the nineteenth century university assumed the form.
William Clark views the approaches to knowledge that characterize the early formulations of the university, namely in England, Italy, and France, as the “traditional” approach to university education. In his *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University* (2006), Clark discusses the split from the traditional approach and the emergence of research traditions that occurred primarily in the German universities and reverberated throughout the West. Before the emergence of the research university, however, there was in fact a competing model that commanded respect through the West. As discussed in the second of Charles Coulston Gillispie’s two volume *Science and Polity in France* (2004), the end of the French Revolution saw the reorganization of higher education into what became special colleges under the aegis of Napoleon, concerned with technology and engineering among other practical sciences. As the British schools retained some modicum of tradition, the continental models characterized by the German thinker Wilhelm von Humboldt’s research tradition and the Napoleonic model would compete for attention. The German idea was the ultimate victor.

The story of this victory and the resulting impact on the university is the subject of the third installment of *A History of the University in Europe* (2004). The lead article, “Themes,” is again authored by Walter Rüegg, and anchored in a discussion of the French and German model, prefiguring how the latter was able to gain such wide ascendancy, transforming European higher education. For Rüegg, this was an

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extrapolation of the “scientific spirit” to not only affairs of the intellectual world but in the development of a bureaucratic edifice for the university. 244 Secularization of the university led to a bureaucracy that demanded a professional elite, which the universities could provide—not the least of these was the occupation of university professor. 245 As this model developed it was extended to other major locations in Europe ultimately replacing the dominant traditions in places like England and Italy, and after a long delay, in France. 246

The character of the research university is explored more in depth in the work of William Clark. The text surveys in large part the historical evolution throughout the Germanies of a distinct way of approaching university education wedged in between the extremes of the Jesuit and Oxbridge models of higher education. 247 From Clark’s work we are able to trace the theme of secularization and bureaucratization, mentioned by Ruegg. That is, the prevalence of the Enlightenment-influenced “ministry and the market,”

244. Ruegg explains that not only was the scientific spirit responsible for the “introduction of students to research in university or para-university seminars, laboratories and institutes, the scientific content of doctoral theses, the foundation of specialized scientific journals and societies, as well as the organization of national and international conferences by discipline…” it was also responsible for “the interaction between the growing autonomy of the universities and the public authorities.” This rejection of the French model led increasingly to academic freedom as the German research model spread throughout the West. For these quotations, see Ibid, 13-14.

245. The main avenues toward bureaucratization, where the wresting of control from the church to state-sponsored ministries of education—the result of which according to Ruegg, was the professionalization of “university careers.” Ibid, 6-7. This would prove essential to the thesis of William Clark’s aforementioned text, to be discussed shortly.

246. See the discussion of the diffusion of the model in Christophe Charle, “Patterns,” in A History of the University in Europe: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Vol. 3, ed., Walter Ruegg, 36. This chapter discusses the nineteenth century institutional developments throughout Europe in greater detail.

247. Clark explains: “As noted, the German lands constitute the center of the analysis, for which Jesuit and English academics offer interesting points of comparison and contrast. In the plot of this book, the Jesuits will play the most radical rationalizers, while the English strive to uphold the tradition.” William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University, 21-29.
which represented the German civic authorities of the time, and how they spawned new developments in curriculum, such as the discipline of cameralism.\textsuperscript{248}

Clark then situates the origins of the research university on its own terms—providing the historical origins and uses of such university creations as the lecture and disputation, the doctor of philosophy, the seminar, and the examination.\textsuperscript{249} The importance of each of these forms was that they indicated a tradition that was informed by the objective of achieving “academic charisma” based on one’s intellectual work. In his explanation of the charisma, Clark builds upon the idea of Max Weber, who had suggested that charisma speaks to a near “magical” power in the imaginations of religious and political heroes. Further, this mythic idea, has the power to “inhere properly only in persons” as myth filters down to tradition and later into the bureaucratic order. Clark connects this idea to the professorship, which being part and parcel of the rationalization of the state order, was thus a carrier of this Weberian notion of charisma. For the professor, their active role in the research university as central figures (i.e. producers of original work) was different than that of any other type of higher education at the birth of this model.\textsuperscript{250} Research replaced the traditional idea of simple repetition of established tradition. New knowledge became the hallmark of the university; Enlightenment found a stable home. In addition, the development of the accouterments of disciplinarity

\textsuperscript{248} See Ibid, 6-14.
\textsuperscript{249} In addition to these, he explores the lecture catalogue, the process for appointing a professor, and the library system.
\textsuperscript{250} See Clark’s explanation in Ibid, 14-19. He importantly indicates that Weber never wrote a treatise on the topic, despite the fact that it appears in several of his seminal works including his seminal, \textit{Economy and Society} (1922) and \textit{The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism} (1905). For current translations see (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978) and (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), respectively.
(autonomous research traditions as evidenced by academic journals, conferences, etc.) were initially housed in the academic seminar. Clark projects this development as the precursor to the academic discipline, as an administrative and sociological unit.251

Elsewhere, scholars have generally pointed to seminars, such as F.A. Wolff’s philology seminar in Halle, as leading to the birth of disciplines. Donald Kelley’s contribution to the aforementioned History and the Disciplines talks about the idea of disciplinarity as the cultivation of a master-disciple relationship.252 Nowhere was this most crystallized than the philological seminars which began to appear in the latter half of the eighteenth century at Halle and Gottingen and continued into the research university at the turn of the century at Berlin. In their Reinventing Knowledge (2008), Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton explain how the “high priests” of knowledge, the professors, were able to build the idea of academic disciplines out of the seminar, which capitalized on the master-disciple configuration. Knowledge was to be “disciplined” into the pupil, but also what was cultivated was the means from which to develop one’s own inborn capacity to contribute to knowledge.253 Along with other bureaucratic and administrative ideas, the notion of coming to university to study and/or specialize in one topic, which the seminar created, has its roots in the period of the research university.254

251. See William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University, 166-176.
252. Central to this relationship was the idea of the transmission of knowledge. See Donald R. Kelley, “The Problem of Knowledge and the Concept of Discipline,” in History and the Disciplines, ed. Idem, 14-16.
254. One such bureaucratic idea was the origins of “publish or perish” out of this same historical process. See Ibid, 191-203 and William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research
Returning now to *A History of the University in Europe*, the entire nineteenth century for Walter Rüegg in “Themes” was anchored in the establishment of the Humboldtian University of Berlin (c. 1810), for in its foundation we see a model of knowledge acquisition and pedagogy that, as discussed above, was replicated across the West.\textsuperscript{255} Rüegg’s second contribution to the volume, “Theology and the Arts,” further examines the impact of secularization on the university and its resulting academic formations.\textsuperscript{256} By the nineteenth century, it is clear that the arts/philosophy faculties were advancing beyond their traditional propaedeutic role and were developing toward equal footing with the other university faculties.\textsuperscript{257} While the key intellectual movements already outlined (the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment) were instrumental in their development, the nineteenth century research idea further grounded their equal status. Rüegg informs us that the nineteenth century university thinkers in Germany viewed the discipline of classical philology (an outgrowth of traditional art of rhetoric) as under the rubric of *Geisteswissenschaft*, of which the closest equivalent in English is the *humanities*. Rüegg traces the development of classical philology, that he defines as the “philosophical study of the spirit which had first been made objectively manifest in the world of the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{258} This discipline required a mix of language and historical tools, in an attempt to reconstruct

\textit{University}, 259-261. On the initial appearance of the “modern epistemic notion” of the major, see Ibid, 169.

\textsuperscript{255} Walter Rüegg, “Themes” in Ibid, 13.

\textsuperscript{256} Rüegg discusses the role of the church in framing discourse about the role of arts and sciences. He links the Catholic church to the position of ultramontanism, while Protestant universities housed thinkers who were freer to engage in scientific inquiry. The research university would flourish in these settings. See Walter Rüegg, “Theology and the Arts,” in Ibid, 395-414. See also Thomas Howard, *Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern University* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid, 453-457.

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid, 420.
how human beings made sense of the entire theoretical world, much in the way that natural scientists of the era attempted to utilize tools to understand nature.  

According to Rüegg, the German scholars’ ascendancy as the leading thinkers associated with classical philology was a direct result of the Berlin seminar model where students were encouraged to seek “new knowledge” as opposed to the rote repetition of what was already known. Rüegg then connects the classical philological studies to the development of modern philology. Thinkers at Berlin, such as Philipp August Bockh (1785-1867) were able to apply some of the same theoretical ideas developed in classical philology to literatures written in modern vernaculars. Thus, the study of modern philology leads directly to the study of literary criticism and the linguistic disciplines that are now studied throughout the humanities. Rüegg traces their first appearances in Europe, showing how each language study developed, including those language groups not indigenous to Europe. Rüegg then shows how German concepts of philology would spread throughout the universities in Europe. The chapter closes with a discussion on the status of philosophy. Philosophy was seen as the essential force from which disciplines in the humanities were derived and informed scientific inquiry especially within the Berlin mode of thought. Rüegg places less emphasis on the ways in which it was organized institutionally, showing concretely how it manifested itself intellectually within the

259. Ibid, 417.
260. Ruegg shows how German institutions anchored the scientific study of classical philology and how its model transferred to other parts of Europe, gaining ascendancy by the beginning of the twentieth century. See Ibid, 420-428.
261. Ibid, 429-453. Ruegg takes us through the modern philological studies of the Romance, Slavonic, and English languages. He then explains the context that led to Egyptological studies, African language studies, and finally the comparative philological studies of the Oriental languages.
different subjects.\textsuperscript{262} One can however surmise from Rüegg’s rendering that the philosophical ideas not covered in the areas that would branch off into their own disciplines, remained the domain of the philosophy seminars.\textsuperscript{263}

While the philological disciplines would remain conceptualized as \textit{Geisteswissenschaft}, a separate branch of the philosophical faculty would emerge under the rubric of \textit{Sozialwissenschaften}, the German designation of the social sciences.\textsuperscript{264} Asa Briggs’ “History and the Social Sciences” chronicles their expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, beginning his discussion by relating the consequences of the historical disciplines’ shift from a humanist driven inquiry to one that was driven by socio-political affairs.\textsuperscript{265} Quoting Lord Acton (1834-1902), Briggs shows that nineteenth century historical conceptions were utilized to frame inquiry in other disciplines, while it remained itself a distinct academic area.\textsuperscript{266} Briggs sees Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) as one of the key initiators for the search for an authentic historical methodology, concluding that his long-term contribution, amongst an array of German thinkers, was the most influential. Ranke, the founder of the idea of \textit{Historismus}, was the thinker who suggested that historical scholarship should endeavor to “to report what actually

\textsuperscript{262} For this discussion see \textit{Ibid}, 453-457. Ruegg shows that within humanist culture, philosophy was utilized for “logical rules and moral philosophies.” The German model, however, elevated philosophy as a science. \textit{Ibid}, 456.

\textsuperscript{263} Mattie Dogan and Robert Pahre have termed philosophy a “residual” discipline that continues to cover areas that did not branch off into separate disciplines including logic, ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. See Mattie Dogan and Robert Pahre, “The Fragmentation and Recombination of the Social Sciences,” \textit{Studies in Comparative International Development} 24 (Summer 1989): 61.

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Ibid}, 417.


\textsuperscript{266} According to Lord Acton, the English historian, history was not simply “a particular branch of knowledge, but a particular mode and method of knowledge in other branches.” Quoted in \textit{Ibid}, 459-460.
happened” instead of passing judgment on events. Further, his methodology attempted to group together “the ideas which shaped events.” This seemed to be a further attempt to develop an “objective” universal history *a la* the Enlightenment philosophers. Separate chairs would appear near the end of the century in Britain, and it was France where we see the intersection between the social sciences and history more clearly the closer we get to the contemporary moment.

As Briggs shows, leading up the 1900s, academic life was marked by a characteristic specialization within the social sciences, as they acquired “current relevance in war, further revolution and depression”—the overriding contexts of European internal changes and imperialism. The remainder of the chapter is a cursory journey through the social sciences including economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology revealing how they impacted the evolution of thought in the university via their relationships to specific institutions and individual theorists.

From these roots, the disciplinary development of the humanities and social sciences, with history wedged in between, would develop throughout the century. In addition, by this point, what had been in the medieval period, “natural philosophy” was specialized into its own subspecies as moral philosophy had done, and increasingly unfamiliar terrain abounded between the two areas. As a result of this movement, the

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267. Ibid, 466-467.
269. Ibid, 459. He continues: “Economics in particular, became a recognized academic discipline direct related to policy-making. In the forefront rather than in the background were more powerful state structures.” Ibid.
270. Ibid, 479-489.
sciences were poised to command attention as they directly impinged upon Africana Studies.271

Of the model studies that Foucault outlines, philology was among the first to organize itself. As shown above, the philological seminars in Germany were consistently developed to understand the nature of language. Regarding classical philology, the standard studies of this phenomenon are John Edwin Sandys’ *A History of Classical Scholarship* (1903) and Rudolf Pfeiffer’s *History of Classical Scholarship* (1968). Both place the nineteenth century developments in broader contexts, useful to understanding the development of the study of linguistics and literature.272 To understand the “why” behind the study of philology, we must consult additional sources. Philology, and the humanities, writ large have been seen as by historians as the human search for identity and meaning. Classical philologists, by the nineteenth century attempted to understand the origins and development of language, as a determinant of the character of human reason. Studies such as Maurice Olender’s *The Language of Paradise* (1992) and Haruko Momma’s *From Philology to English Studies* (2012), help to uncover this theme in the work of nineteenth century thinkers like Friedrich Max Muller (1823-1900) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892), among others.273 Finally, the Sean Gurd edited *Philology and its Histories* (2010), collects

271. This does not mean that the conceptual ground within these disciplines was not considered by African thinkers. The scope of our discussion in Part II will consider some cases where the natural sciences garnered important attention.


273. See Maurice Olender, *The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and Philology in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Haruko Momma, *From Philology to English*
contributions which attempt to map the complex relationship between the practice of philology and the nature of its own historical inquiry.\textsuperscript{274}

Ernst Breisach’s \textit{Historiography} (1983) is a broad history of Western historiographical production. This text traces historical traditions beginning in antiquity and continuing on to the twentieth century. Breisach’s treatment of the nineteenth century allows us to again see the importance of the changing conceptions and growing disciplinarity of historical inquiry. Breisach traces the influence of the German school whose thinkers included the aforementioned Ranke, and Hegel, as well as Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), and Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903). Breisach also takes us through the French schools led by Jules Michelet (1798-1874) and the national historians of the French Revolution, the English school led by Thomas Macaulay (1800-1859) and later William Stubbs (1825-1901), and finally the American historians, which included George Bancroft (1800-1891). The strength of Breisach’s approach is the ways in which he connects the historians of the nineteenth century to their direct antecedents in the Western traditions. However, this period was distinct. For Breisach the nineteenth century was historiography’s “golden age,” as historians attempted to solve complex national problems, establish national identities, and advance science through the understanding of the past.\textsuperscript{275} Breisach’s discussion views this complex understanding of


\textsuperscript{274} Sean Gurd, ed., \textit{Philology and its Histories} (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2010).

the past as the force which allowed history to separate itself as discipline with its own methodology in the nineteenth century.276

Other authors agree on the important work of nineteenth century historians and the idea of a historiographical golden age. Writing on the historical conceptions of select nineteenth century thinkers, Hayden White in *Metahistory* (1973) attempts to understand the deep structure of their historical imagination in order to relate their varying styles to one another as “elements of a single tradition;” these elements are reduced to the language, style, in short, the “poetics” of historical knowledge productions.277 His work usefully conflates the whole of historical knowledge in the West with the ways in which Hegel, Ranke, Michelet, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), and Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), inter alia understood and conceptualized what constituted historical thought—as a proto-disciplinary idea.278 This is then connected to the philosophers of history, such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Karl Marx, whose work prepared the ground for the contemporary challenges to historical knowledge production that would emerge in the twentieth century.279

The first part of the Peter Lambert and Phillipp Schofield edited, *Making History* (2004), also provides the institutional and methodological context of the development of

276. Ibid, 264.
278. See the preface [Ibid, ix-xii] for the discussion of how White frames the singularity of the tradition. The thinkers profiled by White are generally considered the disciplinary founders of history. See also the work of Herman Butterfield, *Man on His Past: The Study of The History of Historical Scholarship* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1955), which frames how historians have approached the study of historiography and includes studies of the German historical school and Lord Acton.
historical inquiry in Germany and the United Kingdom. The contributors to this discussion contextualize the shifting academic approaches within European institutions as well as the importance of the establishment of methodological rigor as key prerequisites to a clear conception of history as a discipline. For the framers of the new method, history had to have clear and accepted scientific standards in order to be authentic.

The social sciences, as shown above, emerged from a number of different sources and conceptions of knowledge. While nineteenth century thinkers, like August Comte, resolved to create a unitary science of society, the vectors of thought moved in many directions. What we now know as the social sciences was a complex transition that became more and more recognizable at the turn of the century. The first part of the Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross, edited The Modern Social Sciences, the seventh volume of the Cambridge History of Science (2003), includes contributions that discuss this phenomenon. Their introduction to the volume discusses the attempt to congeal a historical narrative from the disparate conversations around the nature of social science in nineteenth century Europe.

Lynn McDonald constructs a similar history of the social sciences in her The Early Origins of the Social Sciences (1993). Concerned in large measure with the expanding critiques of empiricism by postmodernist theories, McDonald’s work traces the

emergence of empiricist or positive inquiry in Western intellectual traditions, in order to ascertain the validity of said critiques.283 Her project traces empiricism, beginning with the Greek and continuing to the nineteenth century, where she discusses the most important iterations of social science inquiry, imbued with the idea of positivism. This chapter proceeds by outlining how sociology came into existent through the pioneering work of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and Karl Marx (1818-1883). In addition, extensive treatments of the foundational thinkers, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Max Weber (1864-1920), and many others form the balance of McDonald’s examination. The thinkers included here represent the late nineteenth century explosion of social science inquiry and the founders of the main disciplines of the social sciences—an explosion McDonald believes should not be uncritically accepted but argues against its abandonment.284 Terry Nichols Clark’s earlier monograph, Prophets and Patrons (1973) places this discussion in the context of late century French thought.285 By the twentieth century, philosophers of history and social scientists would begin to apply methodological language that allowed them to borrow from each other in the examination and scientific study of specific events.286

284. Ibid, 315-319.
285. Terry Nichols Clark, Prophets and Patrons: The French University and the Emergence of the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 162-195. Of the three social and intellectual groupings he discusses Clark suggests that it was the Durkheimian mode of sociology that would impact the university. See Ibid, 2.
Faced with the task of developing an intellectual apparatus to facilitate the development of a coherent, yet practical means from which to organize “the idea of Europe” in addition to the whole of human knowledge of reality, Western intellectual created methods for knowing that were pushed into increasingly stricter conceptual boundaries. The imperative of recovering ancient traditions essentially meant the erecting from scratch, a system from which to extract them efficiently, while the church remained arbiter of what constituted their proper use. When the recovery of those traditions seemed inefficient, and when the church alone could not provide an emerging Europe with its intellectual, and thus, socio-political needs, a new intellectual culture had to emerge. Modernity was linked to this new intellectual culture and exported it throughout the world. Western Europe generated its own ideas not only of what knowledge was, but also of the means from which to procure it. The results of this grand process were deposited into the Western hemisphere—the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Knowledge Bricoleurs and Academic Professionalization: The Patchwork Quilt of American Disciplinarity

Tradition—good and bad—is a stabilizing force; America, for better or worse, has practically no traditions either to retard progress or to uphold cultural ideals. Over the flat plains of the new world, breezes blow unchecked; no windbreak stops them or lessens their force.
-Abraham Flexner, *Universities: American, English, German*¹

The resilience of American colleges and universities over the centuries, especially their capacity to add and absorb new constituencies, new institutions, and changing fields of teaching and research, endures as a remarkable heritage. Yet the ambiguity and uncertainty displayed in recent years with respect to societal roles indicates a drift in mission and character.

The context for American disciplinarity was universities unbound by the traditions and memory that were the source of the construction of knowledge for European thinkers. As Abraham Flexner, writing in 1930 had seen, the American university was both unfettered and ungrounded in the extended traditions of the major European universities. America had no Paris, no Berlin, no intellectual epicenter its own. Aside from their strong religious moorings, American intellectuals, much like the Roman empire’s invaders, the creators of modern Europe, would too have to appropriate their own classical heritage.³ These, along with the socio-political environment of the New World, had consequences for the nature of intellectual work to emerge on its soil—as well as the means by which it was organized. As in Europe, the American knowledge tradition is a product of the *zeitgeist* of the era. Its roots, however, are much more abbreviated.

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3. On this earlier appropriation see the discussions summarized in Chapter Two.
Drawing from traditions extricated primarily from the English and German, American knowledge structures would move from an early Christian-centered training ground to become a complex blend of “Enlightened” knowledge production and romanticist Americana humanism. The myriad of contradictions built into the purported freedoms of American life—among them, religious orthodoxy, the vagaries of settler colonialism, the education of women, and the continuity and aftermath of the institution of slavery—would all contribute to the complexities of American institutions.\(^4\) The role of the university, professional identity, and a number of socio-political crises are the foundations out of which questions of disciplinarity would emerge, assembled anew from other sources, in United States institutions. Further, the absence of an ingrained tradition was an opportunity for new and innovative disciplines and modes of inquiry, as John R. Thelin, writing in *A History of American Education* (2004) indicates in the epigraph above. But as we will see, the aforementioned contradictions, would limit these. The following works discuss these ideas and more.

I. The Process of Importation

Included in the first and second volumes of *A History of the University in Europe* are chapters that discuss the consequences that attended the spread of the European university model to other parts of the world—a byproduct of colonization, a phenomenon William Clark calls its “most insidious phase.”\(^5\) John Roberts, Agueda Rodriguez, and

\(^4\) Though his seminal history does not explicitly consider these contradictions, they nevertheless emerge in some form in the work of John R. Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 1-109. The cited chapters constitute the history of the American university from its inception in colonial America until 1890.

Jurgen Herbst’s “Exporting Models,” appearing in Volume Two on the early modern period, chronicles the initial establishment of colonial universities in the Americas. According to these historians, the development of universities was based on the Spanish and British/French models in Central and Latin America and North America, respectively. The North American (British) schools, as a result of their being linked to the Protestant educational ethic were seen to be more academically creative. In “The Diffusion of European Models Outside Europe,” appearing in Volume Three, John Roberts and Edward Shils explain that until the late nineteenth century the development of the North American colleges followed the traditional Oxbridge models, and the smaller English colleges and increasingly the models exemplified by the Scottish universities. The colonial colleges, among them, Harvard (c. 1636), Yale (c.1701), William and Mary (c. 1693), and Princeton (c. 1746) were characterized by a liberal arts education that was premised upon the development of a cultural elite class a la the British institutions. With the increase of American nationals studying at the universities in nineteenth century Germany, Roberts and Shils show that by the 1890s, German ideas were widely present.


7. The authors suggest that the early Protestant-oriented universities in the United States allowed for a greater diversity of knowledge and academic freedom due to the characteristic religious tolerance of the settlers. See Ibid, 281.

8. Traditional Ivy League institutions (e.g. Harvard) strictly followed the Oxbridge model (traditional liberal arts education) and had religious affiliations, while state institutions (e.g. University of North Carolina, University of Georgia), increasingly added to these models some of the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment (moral philosophy, practical sciences) and dissolved their religious affiliations. See John Roberts and Edward Shils, “The Diffusion of European Models Outside Europe,” in A History of the University in Europe: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Vol. 3, ed., Walter Riegg and H. De Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 165 and John R. Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, 8-12.

9. Much like traditional England: “Clearly, a main purpose of the colleges was to identify and ratify a colonial elite. The college was a conservative institution that was essential to transmitting a relatively fixed social order.” John R. Thelin, A History of American Higher Education, 23.
in American universities, resulting in the construction of new universities created on such models. These include such exemplars as The John Hopkins University (c. 1876), Clark University (c. 1887), and the University of Chicago (c. 1890), which were all built on the research model borrowed from Germany and formulated as proto-graduate education institutions in the United States.\(^\text{10}\)

### II. Sketches of American University Historiography

A comprehension of the essential elements of American disciplinarity is aided by an understanding of the more general histories of the American University. As the contributions to the Alexandra Oleson and Sanborn C. Brown edited, *The Pursuit of Knowledge in the Early American Republic* (1976) indicate, the context for the development of knowledge was not always the university. The pre-university knowledge communities consisted of learned societies, private and public, and research institutes such as the Smithsonian.\(^\text{11}\) However, by the post-Civil War formative period of the modern university, the emergence of disciplines and attitudes toward the uses and categorizations of knowledge would be almost completely housed inside them. The historiography of these developments is vast, beginning in earnest in the nineteenth century and continuing

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10. See Ibid 167-175. Roberts and Shils discuss specific similarities and differences between the German university and the ideas which spread to American universities in the 1850s. The importations included the research seminar, the notion of academic freedom, and the unity of teaching and research functions among faculty. According to Abraham Flexner, the German influence was the best thing that could have possibly happened to American higher education. See *Universities*, 73-85.

into the early twentieth with works like Charles F. Thwing’s *A History of Higher Education in America* (1906).\textsuperscript{12}

While general histories like Thwing’s were being published, the great majority of works on American university histories were the institutional studies commissioned by the universities themselves. John R. Thelin labels these, “vertical” histories, hagiographic studies focused only on the singular greatness of particular universities, and works built on Thwing’s model, “horizontal” histories, attempting to draw parallels between universities across the board.\textsuperscript{13} One such horizontal history that would emerge as the definitive study of the twentieth century is Frederick Rudolph’s *The American College and University: A History* (1962). This work synthesizes the vertical histories to develop a coherent story of the American university, beginning with the heritage of the colonial college, continuing to the modern era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and into the expansion of the American university in the first half of the twentieth century. Rudolph’s work covers all aspects of the university, including student life, the physical plant, extracurricular activities, and most importantly for our purposes, the development of disciplinary identity among the professoriate.\textsuperscript{14} The post-1960s period is placed in conversation with the subject matter of Rudolph’s work with the more recent volume authored by John R.

\textsuperscript{12} Charles F. Thwing, *A History of Higher Education in America* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1906). Thwing arguably sets the methodology that would characterize subsequent histories; his trajectory of university historiography will be discussed infra as it is generally replicated in other major works. For an extensive bibliography compiled by Frederick Rudolph and supplemented by John R. Thelin, see Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University: A History* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 497-525.


\textsuperscript{14} In a chapter entitled, “Academic Man,” Rudolph discusses the emergence of academic professionalization, academic freedom, hierarchy, and the development of journals, organizations, and other concomitants with respect to disciplinarity. See Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University*, 394-416.
Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education* (2004), which includes the stories of nontraditional universities, such as historically Black colleges and universities and community colleges, combining this with a methodological approach to historicizing higher education that takes seriously the probability of drawing upon more nuanced interpretations of historical data.\(^{15}\) Examining the main issues of mass enrollment, adequacy of resources, and curriculum reform from the 1960s on, Thelin recommends an expanded role of institutional memory in the resolution of issues of higher education in the twenty-first century.\(^{16}\)

Both Rudolph and Thelin’s studies however, due to their breadth, do not zero in upon the academic cultures most responsible for development of an American “republic of learning.” The seminal history of these academic cultures is Laurence Veysey’s history of universities in the United States, *The Emergence of the American University* (1965), a study of American higher education during the age of its transition from the traditional college to the modern university. This text provides broad outlines of the approaches to education in the all-important late the nineteenth century, further clarifying the emergence of various disciplines in America.\(^{17}\) His general thesis is that at the zenith of the American universities’ development in the 1890s, three general impulses were absorbed: the idea of

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17. Laurence R. Veysey and other historians of the American academy generally agree that the decades following the Civil War were periods of intense academic reform that attempted to make the American university system relevant on a global scale. Many scholars have shown that peak of these reforms came in the last decade of the nineteenth century. See Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 2-3. See also Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University*, 241-286 and John R. Thelin, *A History of American Higher Education*, 110-154.
utility; the research tradition; and the liberal arts—each of these ideas competing with and/or fusing with the earlier American sensibilities toward the values of discipline and piety. Veysey explains that the latter two were European borrowings, linked to traditional British or French university education and the German research tradition, respectively, while the utility was a distinctly American contribution. What Veysey terms the liberal tradition is many ways synonymous with the humanities, and the research tradition is generally linked to the sciences. Utility, on the other hand, was a category that served to orient students’ to an ultimate purpose in their studies. This idea of practicality of knowledge, with origins in agricultural and mechanical training, would be superimposed upon the liberal arts and research traditions, creating a distinct American professionalism.

The German research tradition in particular, would spawn a unique influence with the American versions of the academic department and the PhD, all underscored by

18. On these three academic cultures and the idea of discipline and piety, see Part One of Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*, 20-259. Members of the early school of American higher education historiography have consistently asserted its borrowings from Europe. Charles Franklin Thwing has also authored an extended study of the aspects of German education that would enter the American academy. See Charles Franklin Thwing, *The American and German University: One Hundred Years of History* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928). On Veysey’s discussion of the origins of traditional-liberal culture and the university see Ibid, 181. Andrew Fleming West, writing in 1907 explains the English influence on the liberal arts educational system in his *Short Papers American Liberal Education* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907).

19. On the blending of these models, see Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*, 342-438. According to Andrew Abbott, departments along disciplinary lines emerged as a result of the rapid expansion of the German model (graduate training) and its infusion with the existing British model (undergraduate training). They were sorely needed to give some internal structure to the disciplines in a democratic fashion. See Andrew Abbott, *Chaos of Disciplines* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 125. The tendency to “do something” with knowledge emerged from a distinct American impulse, a kind of intellectual vocationalism with roots in the early universities that has continued to the present. In fact, the “intellectual” or cultural component has been increasingly expendable. Nevertheless, its more “noble” precursors are the American utilitarian tradition, discussed supra. On contemporary attitudes toward intellectual development in American higher education institutions, see inter alia, Richard Arum and Josipa Roska, *Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010).
academic freedom, topics explored in Veysey’s work as well as the seminal Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger study, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (1955).

The importance of this late nineteenth century transition is a hallmark of American higher education historiography, though its historiographical status has more recently been called into question, as in the contributions to the Roger L. Geiger edited, *The American College in Nineteenth Century* (2000). As with all areas of historiographical inquiry, these old standards are being rethought and revised; the standards however provide some sense of how self-constructed memories strengthen identification with the academic cultures that nevertheless remain in place. In other words, Veysey’s standard separation of these various cultures may continue to inform how American academics see themselves, train others, and legitimate the very traditions they identify with.

Other horizontal histories with implications for the nature of American disciplinarity are Christopher Jencks and David Riesman’s *The Academic Revolution* (1968) and Julie Rueben’s *The Making of the Modern University* (1996). The former studies the American university in both sociological and historical terms, necessarily fingerling over the broad academic cultures discussed by Veysey. Ultimately, Jencks and Riesman find that an academic revolution signified a move that altered the nature of the academic

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20. Much has been said of the American adoption of *Lehrfreiheit*, the German idea of academic freedom. This concept would allow for the proliferation of original research and the protections from the otherwise inhibiting pious orthodoxies. See Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University*, 127-128, as well as Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University*, 395-405, on its relationship to the academic department and the PhD Finally the most robust historical work on academic freedom remains, Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

profession, which altered the institutions of higher learning, themselves. Reuben’s work, however, is a discussion with direct implications for the proper conceptualization of academic culture. Her work suggests a reconceptualization of the idea of university secularization in America, showing that the dialectic between science and religion would have reverberating effects for American knowledge communities as professionalization and specialization necessitated the creation of disciplines. Reuben’s intervention is to view the agenda of university education through the lens of morality—the idea of how to live properly; religious education, scientific work and method, and other concepts only served to house this overarching agenda. In a way, this links the purpose of education back toward the classical and medieval objectives discussed in earlier chapters.

III. The Maturation of American Disciplinarity

The discussion of the works above gestured to the great changes afoot within American higher learning in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A “constellation” of forces conspired to transition the universities from an ossified, religion-oriented training of select elites, to a modern knowledge factory, capable of accommodating a wide contingent of American’s best and brightest. Of these changes were new ways and means of organizing the development of these various knowledges—whereupon universities

22. The authors state that they use the term, “academic revolution” to denote the “rise of the academic profession.” This theme according to Martin Trow permeates the volume. See Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), xxii. Trow’s comments appear in the “Foreword” to this edition, Ibid, viii.

23. As such, she departs from Veysey’s discussions of research, utility, and liberal culture as the “reform” of religious piety. See Julie Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 12.

24. For her working definition of morality, see Ibid, 4. This project, according to Reuben constituted the reform, not rejection of religious education, the development of a scientific morality, and a humanities capable of providing moral education—a distinct, but related purpose of the *studia humanitas* discussed in the section on humanism in Chapter Three.
uniquely seized upon the monopoly of housing America’s institutionalization of intellectual work.

The Alexandra Oleson and John Voss edited volume, *The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America* (1979), collects essays which explore “the disciplines, applied fields, and institutional forms that provided the social and intellectual setting for learning, the vehicles for specialization and professionalization, employment opportunities, funds for research and the means of communicating scientific and scholarly ideas to the wider public.” Their introduction to the volume places American intellectual and institutional changes at the apex of the introduction of these newer forms of organization. The expansion of the university, which was engineered by a complex integration of foreign ideas, was coupled with an industrial economic boon, itself engendering philanthropic efforts, which are for Oleson and Voss instrumental to understanding this period, and by extension the nature of American university culture.

In the first two contributions to the volume, we immediately begin to see the connections. John Higham in his “Matrix of Specialization,” opens the volume explaining that of the key influences that shaped the advancement of departments and disciplines, the specter of specialization was most prominent. Anchoring the discussion of

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27. On the emerging specialization in America in the nineteenth century, Higham writes: “The matrix of specialization was built by people who were deeply dissatisfied with the status of science and scholarship in American and who set out deliberately to remodel their own situation along European lines. Their object was to partly elevate men of science and men of letters to the dignity of a European elite. At the same time they sought to purify science and scholarship (as well as art and literature) by making those enterprises more rigorous and sophisticated and thus removing them from common understanding and participation.” See John Higham, “The Matrix of
specialization within the American embrace of its European precursors, the most famous perhaps being Adam Smith, Higham indicates that it emerged in part as a response to the American “everyman” ideal, which looked to Francis Bacon’s ideas as evidence that scientific knowledge was available to all who had their “senses.” The matrix of specialization however ran somewhat counter to this notion and improvised upon a system of professional identity that relied on one’s ability to master specific content—of course, only after being introduced to a broad center of knowledge. Reformers, like the sociologist, Herbert Spencer were among the advocates of this newer system, which for Higham ushered in a “strengthened PhD degree, the departmentalization of universities, the funding of research universities, the funding of research agencies with non-research purposes, and the development of reference tools designed to open the latest specialties to outsiders.” All of these were contributions that would help disciplines form their own identities.

Of course none of this would have been possible without a home. Edward Shils’ “The Order of Learning in the United States: The Ascendancy of the University” investigates how the university was able to become the center of this ferment. Shils’ work embraces the idea that what set the university as the preeminent destination for the advance of knowledge was its deliberate attempt to displace other institutions as the home

Specialization,” in *The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920*, eds. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss, 9.


29. Ibid, 15.
for research.\textsuperscript{30} Although liberal arts traditions persisted, without the proliferation of the sciences it is doubtful if the universities would have garnered the levels of intellectual productivity and prestige as citadels of learning that we now dare not question.

The fortunes of the liberal arts are discussed in Laurence Veysey’s contribution to the volume, “The Plural Organized Worlds of the Humanities,” which gives an account of how professionals attempted to mold those disciplines which were “nonscientific” and not “utilitarian.”\textsuperscript{31} In this time period, Veysey asserts, American academics associated with humanistic disciplines such as philosophy, fine arts, history, and modern languages were concerned with both culture and research, which had been developed in places outside of the university.\textsuperscript{32} Veysey outlines the ways in which these disciplines increasingly became autonomous, by way of academic journals and professional organizations unaffiliated with the universities, but nevertheless, with an impact, on the humanities’ attempt to orient their approaches to their subject. The humanities, perhaps as a result of their non-scientific character, would become the last category of disciplines to organize in recognizably disciplinary/department based forms.

\textsuperscript{30} He explains: “More young persons wanted to do research than were able to support themselves from their own private means, and the knowledge of how German universities had turned such aspirations into reality increased the number of American aspirants to careers in college and university teaching. Thus the amateur tradition was bound to yield, just as a much more productive amateur practice in Europe had yielded, to competing academic institutionalization or—as Max Weber would have called it—academic bureaucratization.” See Edward Shils, “The Order of Learning in the United States: The Ascendancy of the University,” in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920, eds., Alexandra Oleson and John Voss, 21. Research was also a means from which to engage a “national and international” audience to showcase university scholarship. See Ibid, 42.

\textsuperscript{31} Laurence R. Veysey, “Plural Organized Worlds of the Humanities,” in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920, eds. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss, 56.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 53-54.
Dorothy Ross’ “The Development of the Social Sciences” is similarly constructed recounting the late nineteenth century emergence of the social science disciplines: psychology, anthropology, economics, sociology, and political science, all of which in 1865 had no “independent existence.”\(^{33}\) The early iterations of academic treatments of these areas are discussed and emptied into a broader discussion of the flowering of these disciplines by young American scholars educated abroad who would return to establish their prominence in the American academy. Ross adds to the ideas put forth by many that what emerged in American social science was an approach to knowledge initially based on antecedent systems of knowledge dating back to the philosophical faculties of Europe.\(^ {34}\) The American social science project during this period grappled with the extent to which they could cohere around a rigorous standard set by the dictates of scientism.

What the contributors to *The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America* are able to establish are considerations of the context for the development of American disciplinarity. This leaves us with how these historical narratives contribute to questions of methodology and approaches to knowledge. In their 1983 edited work, *Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories*, Loren Graham, Wolf Lepenies, and Peter Weingart explore the ways in which memories of a “disciplinary” past or tradition work to rationalize the existence and practices of a discipline. The introduction and epilogue of the volume (the majority of the


\(^{34}\) Ibid, 111.
text is contributions organized by discipline) show that these legitimating practices\(^{35}\) have been increasingly called into question with the rise of studies which had begun to unmask the ideological nature of historical works in general.\(^{36}\) For Loren Graham, a balance between critiques of progressivism and objectivism, tinctured, but not subsumed by social constructionism and relativism, would start the process of “the creation of reliable knowledge” of the roles of these histories.\(^{37}\)

The next works, organized by discipline, stem from both impulses, and as such are windows into the constructions of tradition and forays into ways that they may revised in the future. The synthesis of which still continue to in some ways reinscribe the necessity of their existences—and of their permanent status as universal categories of knowledge to which all phenomena can be examined. Here, we only examine the histories of the dominant traditional disciplines to emerge in America at the turn of the twentieth century in the humanities and social sciences.

a. The Disciplines of the Humanities

The vast majority of commentators on the subject have generally acknowledged that the humanities disciplines incubated and oversaw the development of core Western values, taste, and cultural norms, as the representatives of the “liberal culture” idea within the university. As such, this conversation is much more expansive than the development

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35. Graham outlines the functions of these historical legitimating practices: “to strengthen a particular approach to science; to glorify the achievements of great scientists; to identity a new discipline; to justify a particular political order; to establish links with antecedent philosophical systems; to herald a conceptual overturn; to laud sciences as the only progressive activity; and so forth.” Loren Graham, “Epilogue,” in *Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories*, eds., Loren Graham, Wolf Lepenies, and Peter Weingart (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), 291.

36. On the idea of legitimation and the conceptualization of the new history on histories of disciplinarity, see Wolf Lepenies and Peter Weingart, “Introduction,” in Ibid, ix-xi.

of disciplinarity in these areas, as alluded to in the essay by Laurence Veysey mentioned above. However, the scientism of the research tradition rendered the humanities disciplines vulnerable, as they too were called upon to develop theoretical and methodological standards for knowledge production, and more recently to create practical avenues geared towards students’ and the university’s “bottom line.” Among the recent discussions of this phenomenon are Louis Menand’s *The Marketplace of Ideas* (2010) and Martha C. Nussbaum’s *Not for Profit* (2010), among an increasing number of polemics amid the changing nature of the academy. This particular context as it relates to the future of liberal education, represented by the following disciplines, must then be kept in mind, when one considers their development in the American context over the last century.

**Philosophy**

The historiography of philosophy in America is generally constructed along two contours: the proto-philosophical work of amateur thinkers and the work of professional philosophers beginning in the late nineteenth century. The early “speculative thought” of groups of thinkers oriented toward religious reflection, the work of transcendentalists, and the common sense philosophical approach are the foreground for the more bookish,
university-oriented work. The germination of American philosophy is distinguished from other Western traditions, in this manner, as their institutional homes were different—philosophers in America were not in the beginning, central figures in the houses of higher learning. The histories of Elizabeth Flowers and Murray G. Murphey in their two volume, *A History of Philosophy in America* (1977), Morton White’s *Science and Sentiment in America* (1972), and Bruce Kuklick’s *A History of Philosophy in America* (2001), all begin their discussion of American philosophical thought in these non-university sites and characterize these early traditions as dominated by both technical and spiritual/religious concerns which had arisen with the formulation of the American socio-political project.39

As professionalism began to characterize American social norms, the practice of philosophy inside the universities took shape, eschewing the older avenues which had been open to philosophical reflection. Bruce Kuklick’s earlier effort, *The Rise of American Philosophy* (1977), chronicles the importance of Harvard University’s department in the development of academic philosophy—a story that “epitomizes the professionalization of

39. See the first volume of Elizabeth Flowers and Murray G. Murphey, *A History of Philosophy in America*, (2 vols.) (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977); Morton White, *Science and Sentiment in America: Philosophical Thought from Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 30-119; and Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America, 1720-2000* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 1-94. Kuklick organizes the earlier thinkers into three groups, the amateurs, divinity school theologians, and the university thinkers. On the latter, he suggests: “The philosophical component of the speculative tradition was provincial. Until after the Civil War, American colleges were small, sleepy institutions, peripheral to the life of the nation. Their leaders, including philosophers, participated in the shaping of public discourse but were generally undistinguished. Their libraries were inadequate, their education mediocre, and the literary culture in which they lived sentimental and unsophisticated. Europe barely recognized these philosophers, except when they went there to study. Yet the philosophers found senior partners in transatlantic correspondents and were on an intellectual par with the other Americans [the amateurs and theologians] previously mentioned.” Ibid, 2.
the academy in twentieth century America.” Philosopher in the “the Metaphysical club” such as Francis Bowen (1811-1890), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) Josiah Royce (1855-1916), William James (1842-1910), and George Santayana (1863-1952) built upon Unitarian and transcendentalist traditions in early American philosophy by increasingly adapting philosophical ideas from Enlightenment thinkers within the genealogy of Scottish realism. In discussing the disciplinary terrain of academic philosophy by the all-important 1890s, Kuklick concludes that departments of philosophy relinquished the discussions of social problems to the emerging social sciences, while the philosophy department focused primarily on speculative thought. Speculative philosophical thought patterned upon the rhythms of American social reality became the almost the exclusive domain of university philosophy departments and professional academic organizations, a characteristic that in many ways continues to define these departments in the contemporary era.

Along with Kuklick and Menand, James Campbell’s A Thoughtful Profession (2006), examines the role of the American Philosophical Association (c. 1900) in the promulgation of a uniquely American philosophy construed through the articulation of approaches to knowledge and manifesting as professional identity. It is of course out of

41. Ibid, 5-21. In addition to these traditions, the Darwinian paradigm would reveal itself as a philosophical force to be reckoned with among American thinkers.
42. Ibid, 243-248. The whole of Part 3, covering the “Golden Age at Harvard” discusses how notions of departmentalization along disciplinary lines in Harvard philosophy emerged in the 1890s. This not surprisingly, developed during the same periods American universities adopted graduate schools and research driven inquiry.
43. Of those approaches leading to new identities was the disciplinary separation of psychology form philosophy. See James Campbell, A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American Philosophical Association (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), 39-51.
professional philosophy that Morton White, writing in *Science and Sentiment in America*, concludes that pragmatism, deduced in part from the writings of William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey (1859-1952) were original American contributions to philosophical thought.\(^{44}\) This trio is considered the eminent group of American thinkers. Theirs was an original contribution to the “modern” (i.e. post Civil War) philosophical orientation that characterized the American project, a thesis which guides the 2001 text, *The Metaphysical Club* by Louis Menand.\(^ {45}\)

The golden age would transmute into the contemporary philosophical context, and of the works discussed above, only Bruce Kuklick’s *A History of Philosophy in America* details its expression in the latter half of the twentieth century. The nature of the philosophical inquiry that followed in this era, was what Kuklick’s describes as a “cacophony of voices,” and could conceivably be traced to traditions of pragmatism and common sense philosophies that had emerged previously, but tailored to the social concerns of the day (i.e. the upheavals of the 1960s) as well as on questions of scientific objectivity. Among more recent American philosophers, he includes Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) and Richard Rorty (1931-2007) as concerned with these ideas.\(^ {46}\)

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46. Bruce Kuklick, *A History of Philosophy in America*, 259. In addition to Kuklick’s history, a more recent text that recasts the genealogy of contemporary American philosophy as a continuation of the pragmatist philosophizing tradition is Carlin Romano, *America the Philosophical* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). Romano, in addition to asserting as inaccurate view of the American philosophical project as impoverished, enlarges the idea of “philosophical” by embracing the pragmatic aspects of modern technological culture as substantiations of the early philosophies. See particularly, Ibid, 21-23.
European traditions, disciplinary or professional philosophy has continually been divorced from its classical role as the foundation from which the entire intellectual universe was understood—in America it arguably never played that role.

*History*

Like academic philosophy, historians of historiography trace its disciplinary developments to institutional settings. In the aforementioned work, *Historiography* (1983), Ernst Breisach outlines the approach to history exemplified by such early American writers as George Bancroft (1800-1891) and Richard Hildreth (1807-1865), whose work, prior to the academic development of history lacked the scientific rigor that would emerge in the late nineteenth-century. 47 Breisach’s text suggests that historical disciplinarity depended largely on the existence of academic departments, scholarly journals, and professional organizations, which were able to create standards for historical practice based largely upon the German historical school’s standards of objectivity and precision. 48 This formulation coheres with earlier work such as William Stull Holt’s *Historical Scholarship in the United States* (1967) and the more recent Peter Lambert and Phillipp Schofield edited *Making History* (2004). Holt, like Breisach, emphasizes the importance of the establishment of the research university and the American Historical Association’s establishment in 1884 as the watershed moment in the development of a


48. Ibid, 286-290. Here, Breisach explains the process of give-and-take that characterized American adoption of foreign models of inquiry. While many consider it a symbolic gesture, the link to German research ideas was manifested in the selection of Leopold von Ranke as an honorary member to the American Historical Association. See Ibid, 287.
conception of scientific history. In the first part of *Making History*, the contributors state that the conception that would make history “scientific” was a methodological one that converged the German conversation with a uniquely American approach to the scientific investigation of objective facts in archival documents for the elucidation of historical meaning.

For the seminal works on American historiography, John Higham’s *History: Professional Scholarship* (1989, 2nd ed.) and Peter Novick’s *That Noble Dream* (1988), the dominant figures at this pivotal moment included, J. Franklin Jameson (1859-1937), Herbert Baxter Adams (1850-1901), Albert Bushnell Hart (1854-1943), John W. Burgess (1844-1931), and William Dunning (1857-1922), among others. These thinkers were influenced by the adoption of inductive-objective scientific models that approached the past through the lens of the nation-state as the force behind historical movement. A clear adoption of the German method, this idea was further transmuted in America into the idea of “the frontier” in the work of historians like Frederick Jackson Turner (1861-1932), and progressivism in the works of Charles A. Beard (1874-1948). Further,

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historians of history have considered the global upheavals that beset the Western world after the Second World War as a force that seriously altered the ways in which knowledge was approached, spawning the development of both social history and the methodology of consensus. Timothy Paul Donovan’s *Historical Thought in America* (1973) addresses the ways in which the discipline of history adapted to these changes, emphasizing its evolution from scientific history to history as linked to the concerns of the day. In addition to these shifting ideas as historiography developed, the editors of *Making History* imply that the discipline’s greater relationship with social science disciplines would characterize historical inquiry in the later stages of the twentieth century.

Allied to the application of historiographical inquiry in service to socio-political objectives are the current debates around methodology and the increasingly visible self-evaluation of the constitutive norms of historical work. The emergence and continued development of specializations, such as philosophy of history, history of ideas, universal history, and public history and concerns of race and gender have dovetailed with the


53. While they focus broadly on twentieth-century Western historiography, Lambert and Schofield posit: “Yet if the intellectual economy of history was at first autarchic, with borders closely patrolled to stop anyone smuggling in cultural imports from other disciplines, it became far more open in the course of the next century. Its borders became not barriers but sites of interchange.” See Idem, “Introduction,” in *Making History*, eds. Idem, 4 and Part III of the text. See also the earlier effort, David S. Landes and Charles Tilly, eds. *History as Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971).
traditional regional and/or statist approaches to the discipline. Perhaps the signal contribution in this vein that outlines the relationship between nature of historical inquiry and methodology and these disciplinary developments is the aforementioned Peter Novick’s *That Noble Dream*. He organizes the discipline in America into four broad generational impulses: 1) the founding of the discipline and the establishment of objectivity as the foundation of historiography; 2) the development of the relativist critique within American history; 3) the response and recalibration of the historical profession in response to the relativist critique; and 4) the contemporary moment which has developed into the “confusion, polarization, and uncertainty, in which the idea of historical objectivity has become more problematic than ever before.” The ongoing conversation on American history, then, reveals the broadening of the discipline and some retrenchment from the Enlightenment-era assumptions of historical knowledge as the rationalization of the state and its interests—a welcome, but not nearly complete rupture with the domineering and ideological apparatus which conspired to birth the discipline.

*Literary Studies*

The American embrace of philology followed the same trajectory which saw the rise in prominence of the research university in the 1870s. The seminal *Professing Literature* (1987), authored by Gerald Graff traces this development which occurred against a stubborn traditional conceptualization of literary studies that had characterized the

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54. Each of these sub-fields and orientations has developed further into sub-disciplines, with their own fields under the broad rubric of history. We are in an era of hyper-specialization.
classical college, wherein mental discipline was the function of study. The story of English language literature study is the attempt to develop a common disciplinary home for both traditions; one representing the older, humanist-oriented “generalist” tendency where the value judgments of a literary piece inhered in the text itself and the newer “investigator” tendency which building upon the earlier philological work, attempted to reduce literary studies to a science of criticism.

Along with Graff, Richard Ohmann’s earlier *English in America* (1976) shows how American literary studies were organized along these differing orientations toward the work of the English department: the teaching of composition and/or the training of research scholars in the tools of criticism. Ohmann’s text in part reveals the nature of the professional identities which emerged around these activities. It was in fact, professional organizations, the most influential being the Modern Language Association that housed debates between these two factions, and in *Professing Literature*, Graff recounts the continuities between these two positions throughout the twentieth century. The


57. See Gerald Graff, *Professing Literature*, 1-15, for an overview of how the field was constructed on these terms at the outset. The genealogy of the generalists goes back as far as Matthew Arnold (1822-1888), who exemplified the idea along with important figures such as James Wendell Barrett (1855-1921) and Irving Babbitt (1865-1933), and a score of others. The investigators emerged from the German-trained intellectuals, such as James Francis Child (1825-1896), who though born in America, were intellectual acolytes of nineteenth century approach to modern philology. They intended to bring those methods to the American university context through the mechanism of original research and graduate study. On the push-and-pull of these two groups in the early phase of American literary disciplinarity, see Ibid, 55-118. On its earlier intellectual genealogy, see the discussion of humanism in Chapter Three of this dissertation.


59. For the discussion of the ways in which this basic bifurcation was re-blended throughout the debates of the twentieth century, see the citation of *Professing Literature* in note 57. The actual historical discussion can be found in Ibid, 145-208.
contributions to the Jeffrey L. Williams edited The Institution of Literature (2002), discuss these later twentieth century aspects of the discipline in more depth, but along the lines set by Graff and Ohmann. As Williams states in the introduction, the study of literature has assumed and developed “institutions” around the various traditions of criticism which succeeded apace along the earlier “break” discussed above at the turn of the century.60

That cleavage was transmuted into the more formalist New Criticism, which was to emerge in the 1930s and 40s represented by John Crowe Ransom (1888-1974) and his students, Cleanth Brooks (1906-1994), Robert Penn Warren (1905-1989) and Allen Tate (1899-1979) and displaced by thinkers influenced by the deconstructionist work that emerged over the past forty years, represented by the overarching ideas of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), and others.61 These vectors, though not as neat as the preceding implies, are the terms out of which disciplinary work in literary studies continues in the present, buttressed by the birth of an American literary theory ushered in by the likes of Murray Krieger (1923-2000), E.D. Hirsch (1928-), Paul de Man (1919-1983), and Harold Bloom (1930-).62

A rash of works in the historiography of literary criticism contextualize the twentieth century as the continuity of this dualism through new formations (e.g.

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60. Williams discusses the various ways in which “institutions” can be used as both an actual location and metaphor for the ideational force out of which literary studies emerge. See Jeffrey J. Williams, “Introduction: Institutionally Speaking,” in The Institution of Literature, ed. Idem (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 2-3.

61. According to Miranda Hickman, the literary thinkers inspired by the latter group rejected the formalism of the new critics, as the latter were “understood as unfortunately insensitive to authorial intentions and readerly response; to the historical conditions of literary production and reception; and to the cultural relevance and political significance of literary work.” See her “Introduction: Rereading the New Criticism,” in Rereading the New Criticism, eds., Miranda Hickman and John D. McIntyre (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2012), 2.

62. On these four thinkers, see Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 212-346.
historicism, Marxism, cultural studies, and feminism, among many others), but under this older, broader rubric. These include, but are certainly not limited to volume four of Rene Wellek’s *A History of Modern Criticism* (1986), M.A.R. Habib’s edited, *A History of Literary Criticism* (2005), Christina Knellwolf and Christopher Norris’ edited, *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* (Vol. IX) (1989), and Terry Eagleton’s *Literary Criticism* (1983), *After Theory* (2003), and *The Event of Literature* (2012). In addition to discussing the broad contours, these works cohere around the articulation of a historically-informed future for the discipline, amid the milieu and spirit of change which characterizes contemporary literary studies and its conversion into cultural studies over the past three decades. They, like Eugene Goodheart’s *Does Literary Studies Have a Future?* (1999) reveal a measured level of uncertainty with regard to the impact of postmodern theory on the study of literary texts.

*Classics*

Classics is intimately tied to the other humanities disciplines, though much of its intellectual force, which could have more concretely set the pace for American approaches to knowledge, has been subsumed and ossified under the aegis of mental discipline and its successor, the Great Books system. In tracing the beginnings of the

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64. See this discussion in Eugene Goodheart, *Does Literary Studies Have A Future?* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1999).

65. Graff’s *Professing Literature* touches on the study of classics, particularly Greek and Latin, within American universities. While it is clear that this was in some ways, an imitation of renaissance
conversations around antiquity, intellectual historians have examined the value placed upon Greek and Roman ideas by aristocratic society in the colonial and the young American nation. Scholars such as Carl J. Richard in *The Golden Age of the Classics in America* (2009) and Meyer Reinhold in *Classica Americana* (1984) discuss the broad reach of classical knowledge among elites within American society in the antebellum and revolutionary periods, respectively.\(^{66}\)

More substantively, Caroline Winterer’s *The Culture of Classicism* (2002) shows the curricular attachment to classical knowledge throughout the nineteenth century. Like Graff, Winterer details the early American university’s emphasis on classical education, stating that even the university itself was synonymous with classical culture.\(^{67}\) Her work revolves around the transformation of the classics amid the development of newer, research oriented disciplines. According to Winterer, the transformation was essentially the classicists’ attempt to preserve notions of high culture within the university as the specter of specialization and departmentalization of knowledge gained wider ascendancy in university culture. Interestingly, there seemed to be less importance placed upon the humanism still in place in English universities, Graff intimates that studies of the classics were embarked more substantively under the aegis of mental discipline. See Gerald Graff, *Professing Literature: An Institutional History*, 30-31 and note 49. The Great Books system emerged in the middle of the twentieth century and was thought to introduce students to the “classics” of the West—many of these texts included works from antiquity. The Great Books conception went one step further than mental discipline by stipulating the use of the best of the classics as the development of the liberal mind sharply attuned to the problems that have beset humanity. On this idea see inter alia, Robert Maynard Hutchins, *Great Books: The Foundation of a Liberal Education* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954) and for context to the development of this system, Louis Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas*, 32-43.


role and ability of classical knowledge to frame the discussions on science, an idea which could have unified the “two cultures.” This epistemological conversation gave way to issues such as the elitism attached to the classics, relevance to contemporary times, as well as classical thought’s fit within the new research university model, issues which in place of more fruitful forays into the construction of knowledge based on ancient thought, characterized the discipline’s development in the late nineteenth century. In this way, knowledge extracted from antiquity would become a field on its own by in some ways separating itself from its important potential ramifications for the wider fields and disciplines of human inquiry. It was only in the fields of classical philology and archaeology that the more concrete connections between the research university and classical antiquity were met. Winterer states that amid the decline of instruction in Latin and Greek in the late 1800s, the classics were able to wield influence via its conceptual importance to these fields. Essential to this process were the classicist-oriented thinkers like Basil Gildersleeve (1831-1924) in “new colleges” such as the John Hopkins University. The nation’s leading classicist, Gildersleeve’s inclusion in the faculty of classics departments at American universities was according to Ward Briggs “a signal event for classics in the United States” for it led to the professionalization and departmentalization of the classics within the new university model.

69. Ibid, 6; 131-132; and 157-163. Winterer is able to link conceptually these disciplines to the classics by relating them on the bases of the nature of knowledge as well as via the practical applications of said knowledge.
While, philosophers continue to wrestle with the question of relevance of the discipline in the age of science, a number of classicists still emphasize their importance to human cultural development. It seems that the professionalization process, by simultaneously dismembering the power of classical thought from other disciplines and working on problems of unitary scope, only served to limit the function of the classics. The result was that classics remains what could be described as a “museum” field—a Wunderkammer for the American classical imagination.  

b. The Disciplines of the Social Sciences

The social sciences are much younger than the preceding disciplines. It is clear, however, that a synergy persists between the two when one considers that their emergence coincided institutionally with the disciplinary self-definition of the preceding humanities disciplines—and in some ways the former precipitated the latter. Nevertheless, collective histories of social sciences are fewer. The seminal text on their construction in America is Dorothy Ross’ The Origins of American Social Science (1991), where she gathers the stories of the development of three of the five social science disciplines discussed below. Her more recent The Social Sciences (2003), co-edited with Theodore Porter, part of the Cambridge History of Science series, includes essays which consider the

71. Works to emerge in the aftermath of the “culture wars,” include Victor Davis Hanson and John Heath, Who Killed Homer?: The Demise of Classical Education and the Recovery of Greek Wisdom (New York: The Free Press, 1998) and E. Christian Kopff, The Devil Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1999). Both works lament the rise and specialization of what have been conveniently termed the STEM disciplines and emphasize the continued pursuit of knowledge in American universities undergirded by an “ancestral” connection to Greek and Roman thought. This sort of connection is largely superficial and is reminiscent of the idea of the German Wunderkammer, a “cabinet of curiosities.” The works of the classics remain simply reminders of the past, and in America they have only rarely served as ways of understanding the present. On the idea of the museum and Wunderkammer in the Western institution, see Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton, Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2008), 142-145.
depth of the American social sciences up to the contemporary era comparing them to their counterparts in Europe. Other works that include these historical discussions are Peter Manicas’ *A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (1987), Roger Smith’s *The Norton History of the Human Sciences* (1997), the contributions to the Peter Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock and Richard Whitley edited *Discourses on Society* (1991) and the more recent Roger E. Backhouse and Phillip Fontaine edited *The History of the Social Sciences Since 1945* (2010).

Along with the work of Ross, these texts attempt to show the complex arrangement of forces, both intellectual and societal, which ordered the development of the social sciences. Those intellectual forces included the attempt to develop a methodological apparatus modeled on the natural sciences to meet the ideal of objectivity, a process Ross and others call “the engineering” approach, and the societal forces revolved around the uses of knowledge, and in the social sciences these ranged from civic and/or state advocacy to reform initiatives. Both trajectories are according to Mary O. Furner’s *Advocacy and Objectivity* (1975) and Thomas Haskell’s *The Emergence of Professional Social Science*.

72. Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds., *The Modern Social Sciences, Volume Seven: The Cambridge History of Science*, ed. David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Of the disciplines discussed in the latter text, this dissertation does not consider the discipline of geography. This does not suggest that this discipline is not important to questions of Africana Studies and intellectual traditions. It does however suggest that geography has not been construed as a cognate area within studies of the African experience, responsible for the crystallization of Africana Studies in the academy. Questions of geography and demography have been conceptualized by Africana Studies thinkers utilizing tools from other social science disciplines and history.


74. On the engineering model, see Dorothy Ross, “Changing Contours of the Social Science Disciplines,” in *The Modern Social Sciences*, eds., Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross, 219-220. On the idea of societal uses of knowledge, see Ibid, 229-234. Also see the sources below.
(1977), the terms from which professional identity emerged in these disciplines. Finally, the regional differences are crucial. While the origins of these disciplines are linked to Western Europe, their development after 1945 was Americanized, with the consequences being a rather exceptionalist approach to knowledge which has resulted in exceptionalist readings of many of their histories. For Ross, this had led to distinct and vibrant self-understandings of their disciplinary beginnings in the imaginations of practitioners of each of the disciplines in America, with consequences for the character of the work produced.

**Psychology**

Until the early twentieth century, the key theorists of psychological inquiry were academic philosophers operating methodologically within the realm of speculative thought and medicine. The general histories, Kurt Danziger’s *Constructing the Subject* (1990), Richard Lowry’s *The Evolution of Psychological Theory* (1971), and John C. Malone’s *Psychology* (2009) all map the “social and cultural relations” that determined psychology’s separation from these two mother disciplines. Crucial to psychology, especially, are the

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76. Focusing on sociology, economics, and political science, Ross understands the unique character of the social sciences in America stems from an ideology that America was itself a unique creation because of its “republican government and economic opportunity.” Amid America’s rapid expansion, the need to examine the processes of history that caused changes within society kindled a desire to study and approximate the sciences of society. Framing her discussion as a critique of the American exceptionalist ideology, Ross is able to show the exaggerated uniqueness, yet important differences in the American social sciences. See Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, xiv. In addition, Peter Manicas, inter alia, links this process to the periods of European world wars, which rendered American social science stronger than those formations in Europe. See Peter Manicas, *The History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 213-237.

ways in which it explains its origins. Richard Lowry’s *The Evolution of Psychological Theory* places the development of the discipline within an intellectual genealogy of mechanist thought most prominently linked to Rene Descartes, while Malone anchors the discussion to the sixth century B.C.E. with Pythagoras. The discussion of psychology as understood in the contemporary sense would not begin until the “new psychology” of the German scholar Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) and the influence of Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) evolutionary biology on psychological theory. Danziger, Malone, Lowry, and Bruce Kuklick’s aforementioned, *The Rise of American Philosophy* show that many American scholars were trained in the “new school” of Wundt and in the German laboratories in general. The integration of philosophical ideas with the laboratory was pioneered and advanced in America as a result of the work and influence of William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Hugo Munsterberg (1863-1960).

The American psychological ideal endeavored to develop a science of the mind that was at once different from its philosophical forbearers and pragmatic. For Lowry and

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78. Descartes’s attempt to explain the mind-body problem within a mechanist framework represents for Lowry the first attempts to deal with psychological questions under the “new beginnings” which saw ancient ideas as untenable. See Richard Lowry, *The Evolution of Psychological Theory*, 3-12. Malone prefers to link the Western psychological practice to Pythagoras and Ancient Greece, following what has become a normative process in Western intellectual history discussed in Chapter Three. See his *Psychology: Pythagoras to Present*, 17-52. On the importance of dating “origins,” especially amid the understanding of the divorce of psychology from philosophy, see Peter Manicas, *The History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 168-190.

Malone, these developments were linked to the rise of the “schools” of psychology within American and Germany in the first half of the twentieth century: behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, and psychoanalysis. Malone’s work concludes that American psychology developed first as a non-applied science with thinkers such as Edward Titchener (1867-1927) and developed further into a social and behavioral science with thinkers such as Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and John B. Watson (1878-1958), the precursors to contemporary psychology and thinkers responsible for the “engineering” model’s supplanting of philosophical theory.\textsuperscript{80} It is out of these traditions that psychology was able to develop as a science, replete with the advantages that their applications (e.g. intelligence testing), were sorely useful to and/or needed in the postwar American social context. According to Mitchell Ash, writing on the subject in Ross and Porter’s \textit{Modern Social Sciences}, the American propensity toward behaviorism coupled with its prominence in the postwar era served to establish itself as the disciplinary norm—one which coupled with an increasingly technocratic society melded well with the social norms of the era as well as of today.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{Sociology}

The idea that “society” exists independent of government, and as such constitutes an important, if not the “highest” level of knowledge of human reality and organization, explains the earliest conceptions of sociology proffered by Auguste Comte (1798-1857)

\textsuperscript{80} The major contention in Gestalt psychology was that consciousness was framed by an understanding of larger structures. Behaviorism and neo- behaviorism asserted that human actions could be measured and predicted. Psychoanalysis attempted to measure the subconscious. On the development, collaboration, and cleavages between these schools see Mitchell Ash, “Psychology,” 262-267.

\textsuperscript{81} See Ibid, 273-274.
and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). These ideas, rooted in traditions of Enlightenment thought, would inform the beginnings of academic sociology in the United States pioneered by the contributions of Lester Ward (1841-1913) and William Graham Sumner (1840-1910) within the bourgeoning the research universities of the 1880s. Ross’ *The Origins of American Social Science* places its professional origins with the establishment of the American Sociological Society (c. 1905) and the contributions of four thinkers: Albion Small (1854-1926), Franklin Giddings (1855-1931), Edward A. Ross (1866-1951), and Charles H. Cooley (1864-1929) at the turn of the century. These thinkers dealt largely with the changes to American society linked to industrialization. Thomas Haskell’s *The Emergence of Professional Social Science*, a history of the American Social Science Association in the nineteenth century contextualizes the rise of academic sociology in the 1890s, distinguishing the latter from the social inquiry advanced by the ASSA. For Haskell, the sociological pioneers of the 1890s were concerned with a systematic rendering of social problems as opposed to and/or in addition to the humanitarian objectives of the ASSA. The new methodology offered by American thinkers like Franklin Giddings and Albion Small attempted to fuse the debate between positivism and idealism that characterized the academy at the turn of the century.

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83. See Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, 219-256. Ward and Sumner are considered founding fathers and were trained in a wide array of areas. Small, was trained in Germany and was the founder of the department of sociology at the University of Chicago. What Small was for Chicago, Giddings was for Columbia. Ross at the University of Wisconsin and Cooley at the University of Michigan went one step further toward what Dorothy Ross considers a liberal-exceptionalist model of social inquiry. Moving away from the historico-evolutionist approach of Small and Giddings, these thinkers gravitated toward a sociology of “social control.”

Bruce Mazlish in his *A New Science* (1989) and Robert Bannister in his *Sociology and Scientism* (1987) discuss the methodological and philosophical history of sociology. While Mazlish’s text does not focus explicitly on the discipline in America, his profiles of thinkers such as the German thinkers Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936), Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Weber (1864-1920), and the Frenchman, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), are important for their clear influences on the construction of American sociological thought within the post-1890s iterations. It was these thinkers who took to be the arrangement of society, the existence of particular social structures (e.g. communities, churches, schools, etc.) Their establishment of methods for carrying out the study of such structures was replicated in the United States.85 Bannister’s *Sociology and Scientism* focuses on these periods of gestation as well as the second generation of thinkers, which includes Luther Bernard (1881-1951), William Ogburn (1886-1959), and Robert Park (1864-1944). After 1940, according to Bannister elsewhere, Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), and Robert Merton’s (1910-2003) ideas helped drive the field. The two strands ranged from the foundation-driven, quantitative oriented study of urban communities with the “Chicago school” to the “Harvard school” era approach of functionalism and multidisciplinary research of society. According to Bannister, the second generation of sociologists was more scientifically oriented than their predecessors, centering their research on the “measurement and tabulation of environmental change and of responses

85. According to Mazlish, the revolutionary sociologies of Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) and Karl Marx (1818-1883), in some ways prepared the ground for the academic sociology of Ferdinand Tonnies, Georg Simmel, and Emile Durkheim. In trading the practical approach to a pure, theoretical approach, Mazlish asserts that these thinkers provided the vocabulary of what would become modern (and disciplinary) sociology. See Bruce Mazlish, *A New Science: The Breakdown of Connections and the Birth of Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 162 and Robert Bannister, “Sociology,” 336-341.
to change.” Though their ideas about society, the systems in which it is organized, and the like, did not constitute a theoretical monolith, Bannister concludes that these thinkers established disciplinary and/or methodological norms in sociology including but not limited to empiricism, quantification, and value neutrality.

In Bannister’s contribution to *The Modern Social Sciences*, he anchors the post-1960 period as the attempt to resolve the critiques of C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) and Alvin Gouldner (1920-1980) of the profession and practice of sociology on the one hand, and on the other, the broader philosophical message of postmodernism and poststructuralism. For Bannister, and other contextualist intellectual historians of sociology, the hallmarks of value-free objectivity and the philosophical critique of the existence of a measurable “society” to study have contributed to an “uncertain” future for the discipline.

**Political Science**

Political science, the study of the complexities of the state and of democracy, was the synthesis of a number of philosophical and historico-scientific traditions in the United States. As with other disciplines, there were “proto” traditions within the study of politics whereby thinkers sought to understand political processes that impinged upon society. The development of a discipline of political science was achieved with its institutional

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emergence from moral philosophy. Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus’ *The Development of American Political Science* (1967) trace the disciplinary development of political science to John W. Burgess and the “Columbia school.” Burgess was trained at Gottingen and Berlin and sought to influence the American political science school with the approaches learned in Germany. Somit and Tanenhaus explain that for Burgess and the emerging Columbia school, the proper method for the study of political processes was the historical comparative approach, which sought to explain political reality through extant written records. Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) and others would expand this explanatory method to include the examination and study of “real people, real life, and real political events.” For these thinkers political science, was essentially the study, aided by historical precedent, of the best ways in which to administer democratic ideals.

Ross’ chapter on the discipline in her *The Origins of American Social Science* is also centered on the creation of a scientist orientation toward political science. After explaining its origins in historico-politico studies, Ross concludes that the discipline of political science attempted to frame the understanding of political processes within a realist framework. Influenced by positivism and common sense realism, liberal historians attempted to develop a political scientific method developed from “observed facts rather

91. See Ibid, 30-33.
than from preformed generalizations.” 92 By the 1910s with the formation of the American Political Science Association’s realist ideology firmly entrenched, political science would further distance itself from history as they attempted to establish norms within political science. The historians were tasked with excavating knowledge about the political past while political scientists observed and analyzed the realities of the day.93

Raymond Seidelman and Edward J. Harpham’s *Disenchanted Realists* (1985) examines the development of these methodological proclivities in the discipline through the lens of their use with questions of political reform. For them, thinkers such as Burgess and Wilson represented the statist tradition in that they “exalted the values of a bureaucratic order” at a time where radical academics were severely critical of society.94 In Seidelman and Harpham’s view, two traditions informed both the scientific and social advocacy activities of political scientists: 1) the intuitionalists: those who had faith in the current system and attempted to perfect it; and 2) the radical democrats: those who advocate impromptu and flexible systemic processes. Focusing on the Progressive era and the New Deal era, they show how political scientists attempted to develop theories of the current state and society to be employed by governmental entities.95 These traditions

92. Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, 261. Thinkers such as Frank J. Goodnow and Jesse Macy become increasingly interested in “administration and the opportunities it opened to act as experts on the problems of government.” Ibid 282.
93. For this discussion, see Ibid, 282-297.
95. Ibid, 60-148.
emptied into what James Farr’s discussion in Modern Social Sciences names the statist and pluralist traditions of early political science.96

In examining the development of Ross’ realist orientation, both Disenchanted Realists and The Development of American Political Science conclude with the discussion of the behavioralist methodologies in political science, as scholars attempted to systematically study political attitudes.97 Contemporary political science is ordered on the behavioralist orientation to knowledge grounded in the ideas of Charles Merriam (1874-1953) and David Easton (1917-), scholars who would emerge mid-century. According to Farr, Merriam’s “Chicago school” attempted to develop a “new science of politics” that was "broadly identified with a plea for quantitative methods of research into contemporary political behavior found paradigmatically in voting, legislatures, and secondary associations outside government."98 This idea not only supported the exportation and legitimization of American-style democracy to the international disciplinary public, it provided a base from which political scientists would serve the “activist” function of governmental and private interest collaboration. The behavioralists, by studying the ways in which democratic processes could be modified and appropriated, acted as functionaries to the various power interests, by attempting to map the actions of what they considered rational actors in the political system.99 For Farr, the reaction to this tendency is against

99. Ibid, 320-326. See also Raymond Seidelman and Edward J. Harpham, Disenchanted Realists, 60-186 for a broader conversation around the idea of “activist” political science and its retrenchment (or reformulation) with behavioralism.
the behavioralist conception of a “rational man” and characterizes what he calls a “post-
behavioral condition” in political science—a condition engulfed with the vexing issue of 
understanding the nature of democracy in a contemporary environment rife with 
complexities.100

Economics

While the classical American college included courses on political economy based 
on Scottish enlightenment ideas, like the other social sciences, the origins of economics as 
a discrete discipline are in the late nineteenth century.101 Joseph Alois Schumpeter’s 
classic History of Economic Analysis (1954) details four broad periods of economic theorizing 
in the West: 1) the moral philosophical school; 2) the classical school, 1790-1870; 3) the 
specialized schools of thought [formation of organized disciplines/departments/schools of 
thought]; and 4) a futuristic approach that combined elements of historicist and 
sociological trends.102

While American thinkers had engaged with the two earlier periods, Dorothy Ross 
begins her examination of American economics’ disciplinarity in the third. In her Origins of American Social Science, Ross shows how emerging socialist ideas influenced the thought of 
academics within the social sciences and informed economic theories in the pre-

disciplinary era. She postulates that in the early-going, thinkers having engaged in German historicist schools began to articulate a working class consciousness within economic theory-building. Theirs was an intellectual resistance to a laissez-faire classical economics and an embrace of a flexible, evolutionary historicist model. With the establishment in 1885 of the American Economics Association, the historicist thinkers saw the problem of economics as a “conflict of labor and capital.” Ross’ text uncovers how these models, initially seen as socialist threats to American exceptionalist ideas were quickly subsumed into four theoretical areas that attempted to explain economic realities within the burgeoning discipline: 1) the marginalist school headed by John Bates Clark (1847-1938); 2) the E.R.A. Seligman (1861-1939) version of historical economics and the variations headed by Simon Patten (1852-1922); and 3) Thorstein Veblen’s (1857-1929) historic-evolutionist school. This restoration of American exceptionalist ideology, according to Ross, made possible for disciplinary economics to partially eschew historicism and adopt the more deductive marginalist thought and its derivatives, effectively distinguishing itself by the use of tools, from the earlier “theoretical” school.

Wesley C. Mitchell’s *Types of Economic Thought* (1969) also dates the emergence of American economic thought with John Bates Clark and the marginalist school. This intellectual history of economics details the ways in which other thinkers such as Frank A.

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104. Ibid, 110.
106. Ross explains that James Bates Clark’s retreat to more deductive modes of thought from his earlier historicist leanings would have broad implications for the discipline. The development of marginalist theoretical currents that Clark would employ was being practiced in Europe conterminously. See Ibid, 118.
Fetter (1863-1949), Patten and Veblen attempted to scientifically examine economic realities. The work of Veblen, somewhat of a fusion of socialism with other social scientific ideas, was considered to be the most progressive of the traditions outlined, and seemed to never have gained wide ascendancy. The acceptance of the ideas of Clark, Seligman, Patten, and their successors ushered in the paradigmatic conception of neoclassical economics, which combined the two earlier schools linking them to both macroeconomic and microeconomic data.

Mary S. Morgan’s contribution to The Modern Social Sciences asserts that the twin phenomena of the mathematizing of economics and the birth of econometrics coupled with the historical events, (e.g. The Great Depression) provided avenues for the professional development of the discipline. Econometrics, the use of modeling, provided the basis for a the discipline’s objectivity, ultimately changing the way economists thought and bestowing upon them the added claim of “being scientific.” The contemporary evolution of all these ideas within the disciplinary purview of economics aided the increasing need to understand economic cycles, essential to the applied work of economic governance, a function Morgan traces to the ideas of John Stuart Mill, and continued in its application to nation-states of the ideas of John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), Milton Freidman (1912-2006), and the Chicago School.

### Anthropology


While Robert Launay in the introduction to his edited *Foundations of Anthropological Thought* (2010) has constructed genealogies that link notions of anthropological thought to earlier intellectual periods dating back to Herodotus, most anthropological scholars posit that Enlightenment thought influenced the ways in which knowledge about “the non-European man and civilization” was to be approached in the modern era. The discipline of anthropology has antecedents in the American context dating back to the antebellum studies of indigenous American populations. Linked in some ways to British conceptualizations of Darwinian evolutionary biology and the French embrace of Durkheimian sociology, anthropological disciplinarity was most visibly advanced in America largely through the work of the German born, Columbia professor, Franz Boas (1858-1942). Sydel Silverman’s “The Boasians and the Invention of Cultural Anthropology” frames the genealogy of anthropology in America and its foundations in the contributions of Franz Boas and his students, Ruth Benedict (1887-1948), Margaret Mead (1901-1978), and Edward Sapir (1884-1839). According to Silverman, thinkers associated with the Smithsonian, the Peabody Museum at Harvard, and the American Museum of Natural History dominated the anthropological world that Boas would inhabit and would have to reckon with. Silverman concludes that these early demarcations of disciplinary anthropology in America were contentions between...

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“evolutionary to historicist models, racialism and cultural determinism, and fixed types to plasticity.”

In his discussion on the discipline in *The Modern Social Sciences*, Adam Kuper shows the role these dualities would play in the disciplinary development of cultural anthropology in the United States and in social anthropology in Great Britain. The British social anthropological tradition, with its, to use Silverman’s terms, “evolutionism, racialism, and fixed types,” forms for Kuper, the other side of the American Boasian coin—a functionalist/structuralist approach allied to British/French colonial ambitions.

While American anthropology was not necessarily free of these imperial motivations, its historiographers have consistently linked its development to the cultural relativism of the Boasian and neo-Boasian approach. The work of George Stocking provides perhaps the most accepted characterization of American anthropology. His seminal, *Race, Culture, and Evolution* (1968), along with other works like *The Ethnographer’s Magic* (1992), includes essays which considers the development of anthropology in America and its complex origins. Similarly, Regna Darnell’s *Invisible Genealogies* (2001)

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112. See Sydel Silverman, “The Boasians and the Invention of Cultural Anthropology,” in *One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology*, eds. Fredrik Barth, Andre Gingrich, Robert Parkin, and Sydel Silverman (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 261. This volume presents the disciplinary traditions in Britain, Germany, France and the United States. In many ways the shifting approaches to the discipline represent specific nationalist tendencies.


frames the evolution of Americanist anthropology within the Boasian tradition, in an attempt to break with the normative notion of discontinuity that characterizes some elements in its intellectual history. For Darnell, the Boasian character of the Americanist tradition is defined by its interpretive theories, which often “remain invisible, below the surface of awareness.” This formulation suggests that the continued efforts of “interpretive anthropology” in the work of Clifford Geertz (1926-2006), and others, is but a renewed effort to make good on the promise of earlier American cultural anthropology. Geertz’s methodological approach involved a more integrated, and for Kuper, a “humanist” view of culture. This coupled with the “native” critiques of outsider anthropology, characteristic of postcolonialist thought, informs the contemporary disciplinary conversations in anthropology. The questions of culture—who determines its nature and function and how it is valued—are increasingly being returned to the peoples who create the cultures themselves. At the same time, this process is complicated by the still vibrant neo-colonial and imperial ambitions of the West, which still occupy some connections to the discipline.

115. Regna Darnell, *Invisible Genealogies: A History of Americanist Anthropology* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 307. Darnell states in the preface that: “The objective of this work is to deconstruct the ‘rhetoric of discontinuity’ characteristic of contemporary anthropology in North America, with a view to illuminating theoretical, methodological, and ethnographic persistences from prior Americanist work.” Ibid, xvii. Stocking’s work mentioned above would place these persistences squarely in the contributions of the Boasian school: “Although German-born and deeply rooted in the intellectual traditions of his homeland, Franz Boas more than other man defined the ‘national character’ of anthropology in the United States. There has been debate over whether it is appropriate to speak of a Boas ‘school,’ but there is no real question that he was the most important single force in shaping American anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century.” See “Introduction: The Basic Assumptions of Boasian Anthropology,” in *The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911: A Franz Boas Reader*, ed., George W. Stocking, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 1.

The preceding disciplines characterize the American social science and humanities disciplines from the explosion of research in the late nineteenth to the beginnings of the contemporary intellectual environment. By considering how these disciplinary histories consider the foundations of their specialized intellectual work, we understand the motivations, rationalizations, and bureaucratization of knowledge, which distinguishes contemporary academic intellectual work from its precursors in medieval and Enlightenment-era Europe—and extended throughout the world through the mechanisms of colonization and influence.117 The modern discipline then is a unique creation of Western society, drawn from its institutions and from the interstices of its understandings of the “Great Conversation.”118

Questions of theory, methodology, insofar as they are considered disciplinarily informed and reified, are products these particular events. The trajectory of discipline-bound knowledge production once developed, would continually undergo scrutiny from both internal (Western and Western-trained) and external (non-Western and Western-trained) commenters, a discussion which will be considered in a later section. Before embarking upon a discussion of such work, we will now turn to the ways in which the discipline-based system was considered central to the process by which knowledge would be forever advanced and taught—a conversation whereby the system was assumed to be both normative and rational.

117. On this notion, see William Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University, 29.
118. This metaphor is taken from the ideas of Robert Maynard Hutchins, to denote the origins of intellectual ideas of the West. The mode of a great dialogue continues to define how disciplinary histories are remembered—for Hutchins a “dialogue” that continues to the “present day.” See Robert Maynard Hutchins, Great Books, 26-27, and passim.
IV. Disciplining Knowledge: The Structure and Behavior(s) of Disciplinarity in America

The development of disciplinary structures in the American academy initiated many conversations about the nature and benefits of this particular way of structuring knowledge, which in turn led to certain behaviors that disciplines as collective groups began to exhibit. These conversations served to substantiate and rationalize the existence of disciplines, by assuming that the structure and their behaviors were either legitimate or appropriate ways for organizing and advancing knowledge of the world. Many of the works to be discussed appeared in the middle of the twentieth century (1950s and 60s) amid the rethinking of the intellectual objectives of the academy and secondary education in America. It was in this period that we began to see the emergence of mass higher education, “big science,” the expansion of graduate education, and the further streamlining of the university offerings to meet the requirements of the American workforce.119 Aided by these factors, professional identity only became stronger with the further demarcation of C.P. Snow’s “two cultures” in this era.120

a. Conceptual Justifications

Arthur R. King and John A. Brownell’s *The Curriculum and the Disciplines of Knowledge* (1966) gives historical background to the emergence of disciplined thought and knowledge structuring, while providing an exhaustive list of the characteristics that disciplines embodied. Part of their larger purpose of elucidating the role of curriculum in the education system, they show the historical relationship between philosophy and the

sciences, positing that the mid-late nineteenth century creation of disciplines was the elaboration of “the processes and products of man’s symbolic efforts to make his experience with the world intelligible.”\(^1\)\(^2\) After examining the ways in which “Western” thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Rene Descartes, Giambattista Vico, Immanuel Kant, and Auguste Comte organized the areas of knowledge, they conclude that the development of the sciences ceased to be “directed” by philosophy by the twentieth century.\(^1\)\(^2\) Relying in part on Ernst Cassirer’s *The Problem of Knowledge* (1969), they attempt to determine the impact of the decision, made in previous areas and discussed above and in Chapter Three, to develop disciplines centered on new “problem(s) of knowledge” and different from medieval and early modern conceptualizations and categorizations.\(^1\)\(^3\) After stipulating that the autonomous emergence of disciplines throughout the Western world was based on the resolutions of this particular discourse, King and Brownell demonstrate how this process helped to create recognizable characteristics of the disciplines of knowledge. These include conceptualizations of disciplines as a(n): 1) community; 2) expression of human imagination; 3) intellectual domain; 4) tradition; 5) syntactical structure; 6) conceptual structure; 7) specialized language; 8) heritage of literature; 9) valuatative and affective stance; 10) instructive

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\(^2\) See Ibid, 40-50. The Latinists and church fathers of the middle centuries (between antiquity and Descartes) also constructed organizations of knowledge. For these conversations, see Chapters Two and Three of this dissertation.

\(^3\) See Ibid, 52. Brownell and King quoting Ernst Cassirer show that knowledge began to be approached differently during this era. While the philosophy informed the other disciplines “epistemologically,” they separated themselves and created autonomous methodologies. See the work of Ernst Cassirer, *The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy Science and History Since Hegel* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969) and Chapter Three of this dissertation.
community. Discussion of these ten qualities rely primarily on a number of journal articles produced during the decade that theorize how specialization of academic disciplines holistically advanced the production of knowledge.

The first of these is Giorgio Tagliacozzo’s “The Tree Of Knowledge” (1960), which is an attempt to produce a taxonomy of human knowledge. The different branches of the tree represent disciplines, of which Tagliacozzo asserts are “a mosaic of variously old, often radically different (especially in fundamental assumptions) strains of thought, which have little in common beyond a supposedly analogous subject-matter and a name.” He later states that these “strains” must be understood as ideas, emphasizing their relationships to the intellectual trends from which they have appeared, providing an approach to knowledge that would “unify all disciplines.”

Philip Phenix’s “The Use of Disciplines as Curriculum Content” (1962) emphasizes that for disciplines to be intellectually vetted as useful for curriculums, they must be “instructive.” He establishes three criterion for their instructiveness: 1) analytic simplification; 2) synthetic coordination; and 3) dynamism. Joseph J. Schwab establishes ideas about what structures of knowledge within disciplines constitute. His “The Concept of the Structure of a Discipline” (1962) asserts that disciplinary objectives are informed by a structure “that consists, in part, of the body of imposed conceptions which define the investigated subject

126. Ibid.
matter of that discipline and control its inquiries.”¹²⁸ These conceptions according to Schwab also inform both the methods and how, by way of conceptual and syntactical structures, disciplines reach their particular objectives.¹²⁹

The proceedings of the Phi Delta Kappa conference on the subject, Education and the Structure of Knowledge (1964), edited by Stanley Elam, are further attempts by educationists to understand how disciplinary knowledge should be organized and taught. Schwab’s “Problems, Topics, and Issues” develops the ideas presented in his article mentioned above, examining conceptions of the organizations of knowledge gleaned from Auguste Comte, Plato, and Aristotle before connecting these with Francis Bacon’s notion of practical sciences and concluding with his earlier ideas about how syntactical structures and substantive structures inform a discipline’s approach to knowledge.¹³⁰ Philip L. Phenix’s contribution, “The Architectonics of Knowledge,” explains how offshoots of established intellectual traditions emerge in the face of the need to expand or grow knowledge.¹³¹ He then creates an architectonic of the disciplines that is based upon what he terms, a “structural resemblance.”¹³² From Schwab and Phenix we are presented with the ideas that disciplines, though organized for professional reasons, have exhibited

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¹²⁹ The substantive structures relate to the questions one seeks to ask and the data and/or experiments which are formulated from those questions. Syntactical structures speak to how disciplines generate ways of verifying knowledge. See Ibid, 200-204 and Joseph J. Schwab, “Problems, Topics, and Issues” in Education and the Structure of Knowledge: Fifth Annual Phi Delta Kappa Symposium on Educational Research, ed. Stanley Elam (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), 8-11.
¹³⁰ This source is cited in note 129.
¹³² These resemblances are related by their substantive dimensions: extension (quantity) and intension (quality). Extensions can be singular, general, and comprehensive, while intensions can be driven by fact, form, and by norm. For this discussion see Ibid, 54-62.
intellectual structures that distinguish the ways in which knowledge is imbibed, performed, and interpreted.

The conceptual and intellectual justifications for the structure of knowledge is a process which attempted to stringently define what disciplines do and how teachers and educators should approach education, based on subject matter delineations. The preceding discourse between educationists and curriculum developers reveal important ideas about the nature of these disciplinary characteristics. Bromwell and King, Tagliacozzo, Phenix, and Schwab’s works suggest that autonomous disciplines are justified, insofar as they provide specialized, distinct, and teachable segments of the whole of human knowing. For these thinkers, what makes a discipline a discipline is the nature of their contribution to this holistic edifice.

b. Sociological Characteristics

The compartmentalization rationale of disciplined knowledge—the idea that knowledge is most effectively produced among specialists—is consistently re-asserted through each discipline’s professionalizing structure, as thinkers associated with disciplines are initiated in such a way that preserves their central conceptions, objectives, and methodologies. In the humanities and social sciences, especially, the creation of the academic major along disciplinary lines in the graduate and undergraduate systems allows training and immersion in a specialized area of knowledge for successive generations. Many social scientists point to the ways in which these disciplinary boundaries act as communities in the sociological and psychological sense.
Utilizing the metaphor of “tribes and territories,” Tony Becher’s study of the subject attempts to make the point that the nature of knowledge coming from disciplines are reflections of the ways in which academic departments are constituted. His *Tribes and Territories* (1989) explores the characteristics of disciplines and frames relationships between them and their associated knowledge communities in order to theorize patterns that persist among the different areas of knowledge.¹³³ For Becher, these patterns may explain how the academy confirms and/or advances research and legitimizes knowledge.¹³⁴ Elsewhere, Becher shows how academic cultures derived from disciplinary bases have influenced the lens through which thinkers conceptualize similar topics. Through a rigorous professionalization process that has established norms since the late 1800s, Becher shows how different ideas about nature of knowledge filter through four disciplinary groupings/cultures: 1) pure sciences; 2) humanities; 3) technologies; and 4) applied social sciences.¹³⁵

These same characteristics may be found among undergraduate students. John C. Smart, Kenneth A. Feldman, and Corinna A. Ethington’s *Academic Disciplines* (2000), is a comparative study on the disciplinary influences on both professors and undergraduate students. Regarding the students, they uncover that their most consistent concern in choosing and studying a discipline is stability, which has various levels of influence in

¹³⁴ Becher states: “The disparities which have been identified within subjects and segments, disciplinary communities and networks have significant effects on judgments of academic quality, and in particular on the standing accorded to disciplines and specialisms in virtue of their epistemological and sociological attributes.” Ibid, 160.
terms of how students self-select their areas, are socialized within them, and the level of person-environment congruence that is actualized.\footnote{136}{John C. Smart, Kenneth A. Feldman, and Corinna A. Ethington, \textit{Academic Disciplines: Holland’s Theory and the Study of College Students and Faculty} (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), 51-55.}

Finally, Janet Donald’s \textit{Learning to Think} (2002) explores the role of disciplines in the formulation of the cognitive development of their particular practitioners. This work suggest, among many conclusions, that the various ways in which disciplines order and practice intellectual work as well as the methods and modes of inquiry which order disciplinary approaches knowledge, are key in understanding how people within those disciplines develop reasoning and critical thinking skills.\footnote{137}{Janet Donald, \textit{Learning to Think: Disciplinary Perspectives} (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002).}

These and other texts show how the creation of a structural complex has affected how academicians are socialized to understand reality. While the previous section considered those works which discussed how structure of knowledge theories seek to rationalize the creation of distinct departments, the works discussed here show that it is certainly also true that disciplinary identities created through such structures help to harden the idea that boundaries between knowledge are both real and permanent.

c. Paradigms and Fractals: Intellectual Movements and Disciplines

Philosophers and sociologists of disciplinarity have also contributed literature which explains and historicizes the nature of intellectual movements. By far, the most influential of these is Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigms.\footnote{138}{On Kuhn, see inter alia, Bruce Kuklick’s connection of him to American philosophy in his \textit{A History of Philosophy in America}, 269-272.} In his \textit{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions} (1962), Kuhn characterizes the nature of intellectual movements as the process
through which we experience the replacing of an old paradigm (i.e. normal science) with a completely distinct and purportedly better paradigm (i.e. revolutionary science). The metaphor of revolution coheres around the complete erasure of earlier systems of science that “revolutionary” paradigms replace. Though linked to movements in the broader contours of metascience, his work nevertheless includes the idea that scientific bodies of knowledges and/or disciplines help to birth new communities of discourse and methods for approaching intellectual work. Part of this new birthing of the paradigm is this idea that new disciplinary communities essentially seek to replicate their paradigm as it is the authority of not only that which are admissible subject matters and methodologies, but the research objectives themselves. This process explains the creation of some disciplines. By conceiving the nature of intellectual work in this manner, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* has ramifications for understanding the behavior of disciplinary

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139. Kuhn’s process follows thusly: “Sometimes a normal problem, one that ought to be solvable by known rules and procedures, resists the reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the group within whose competence it falls. On other occasions a piece of equipment designed and constructed for the purpose of normal research fails to perform in the anticipated manner, revealing an anomaly that cannot, despite repeated effort, be aligned with professional expectation. In these and other ways besides, normal science repeatedly goes astray. And when it does—when, that is, the professional can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice—then begin the extraordinary investigation that lead the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science.” See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 5-6. This second edition includes a postscript that clarifies his idea of a paradigm. Kuhn states: “On the one hand, it [paradigm] stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.” Ibid, 175.

140. Kuhn states: “The new paradigm implies a new and more rigid definition of the field. Those unwilling to unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in insolation or attach themselves to some other group. Historically, they have often simply stayed in the departments of philosophy from which so many of the special sciences have been spawned. As these indications hint, it is sometimes just its reception of a paradigm that transforms a group previously interested merely in the study of nature into a profession or, at least, a discipline.” Ibid, 19.
communities and the nature of knowledge inquiry which they oversee, while also prefiguring how “revolutionary” advances in knowledge are or may be received and incorporated.

The idea of incorporation of intellectual movements is considered in the 2001 text, *The Chaos of Disciplines*, authored by sociologist Andrew Abbott. This work offers a further perspective on the social and theoretical nature of intellectual movements within the boundaries of particular disciplines. Relying on an explanatory model that employs the use of fractals, Abbott is able to show that intellectual movements often overthrow older programmatic assumptions but end up in the process re-inscribing much of the essential qualities of the vanquished ideas. Abbott works explores the dichotomization that occurs when bodies of knowledge “fractionate” into competing programs, showing that the victorious side usually ends up in a “destructive sliding of the core concepts on which victory was built.” His also work looks at the role of departmentalization, professionalization, and its relationship to disciplinary stability, despite intellectual and paradigmatic shifts. Abbott’s work considers the continuity of concepts, ideas, and

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141. On the fractal relationships within disciplinary movements, Abbott states: “A fractal distinction thus produces both change and stability. Any given group is always splitting up over some fractal distinction. But dominance by one pole of the distinction requires that pole to carry on the analytic work of the other, so the endless subdivision that we label by the word differentiation does not seem possible. There results a continuous bending of terminologies that breaks down the original metaphors that produced dominance.” See Andrew Abbott, *The Chaos of Disciplines*, 21.

142. Ibid, 34. Abbott discusses a number of different ways in which fractal cycles occur. They are often linked to examples that are associated with the fractal dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. See Ibid, chapters 2-4.

143. In a chapter entitled “The Context of Disciplines” Abbott explains how disciplines were created in America, relying on much the same material already overviewed. He then his applies model of fractal ordering in a more precise manner to disciplinary social structures concluding: “Disciplines borrow from each other endlessly, but train scholars more or less within consistent lineages. Fractal cycles within disciplines generate a lot of random motion, with the result of much serendipitous contact between disciplines in odd places over odd things. Incentives for thievery are high; of the
other components of disciplinarity that persist despite what may seem to be revolutionary moments within knowledge production.

Not only are disciplinary ideas relatively stable, the idea that existence of “disciplines” is stable has been raised elsewhere by Andrew Abbott, in an essay entitled, “The Disciplines and the Future” (2002) and by Louis Menand in *The Marketplace of Ideas*. What they both in different ways suggest is that despite the rhetoric of the “end of disciplines” knowledge communities which get their epistemological structure from the West, have not been able to successfully move away from the ontological, explanatory, and/or methodological character of discipline-based knowledge. *The Marketplace of Ideas* explores the humanities in the contemporary university, showing that the many critiques which were grounded in an attack on their relevance lead to the development of cultural and gender-based studies. These studies, according to Menand, however, ultimately never betrayed their foundational logics in the disciplines of literature, history, and philosophy. Menand posits that the same set of events that influenced the changing demographics of the university in the postwar period were responsible for the shifting of the humanities disciplines, yet their stability however was never totally subverted. Abbott’s “The Disciplines and the Future” posits that the notion that postdisciplinarity or

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145. Louis Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas*, 81-87. Menand explains that incursions into established academic departments were often incorporated, as insurgent intellectuals became “rulers of the towns they set out to burn.” Ibid, 87.

146. Ibid, 73.
interdisciplinarity will subsume the current traditional structure ignores the hard and fast implications of the social and cultural foundations of disciplines. His essay suggests, among other ideas, that despite the intellectual rigidity and loose cultural structures within disciplines, the current structure will likely remain intact due to control exacted by departmental elites with identities tied to disciplines, who influence the development of new ideas.\footnote{147}{Andrew Abbott, “The Disciplines and the Future,” 225-227.}

Though intellectual movements have characterized twentieth century intellectual life, much of the ways in which knowledge is structured and reified have not been uprooted. In addition to the intellectual rationalization for discipline-based work and the socio-behavioral characteristics of disciplinarily trained academics, these movements suggest the sturdy foundations of American disciplinarity. This is especially true in the natural sciences, where the laboratory is the unmatched standard way to produce knowledge. Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton predict that technology may lead to some retrenchment in the model, but for now “the discipline” remains the indomitable way.\footnote{148}{Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton, Reimventing Knowledge, 270-274.}

V. Interdisciplinarity and Interdisciplines

The structures of knowledge of the American academy remain wedded to the process by which they were birthed in the nineteenth century. The works reviewed above mapped how these structures are continuously rationalized and/or understood. While the stability gestured to above has persisted in the administrative realm, challenges from intellectual movements like postmodernism, poststructuralism, and the like have emerged
to contest the idea of the discipline. In addition to these challenges, attempts to meet the shortcomings of the traditional disciplines have been met by the projects of interdisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, and transdisciplinarity.

The most popular of these is interdisciplinarity which is usefully characterized as an approach to knowledge that uses the language of one discipline to solve a research problem or answer a question traditionally linked to the subject matter of another. Multidisciplinarity is the second-most popular and attempts to solve a research problem or answer a research question utilizing two or more academic disciplines. Least popular of these is transdisciplinarity which deals with research problems and answer research questions that range across two or more academic disciplines.149

The most challenging projects related to the rethinking of disciplined knowledge are the ideas of postdisciplinarity and metadisciplinarity; the former which erases disciplined-based knowledge, while the latter is the emptying of the traditional disciplines back toward their earlier homes (i.e. art and philosophy). These particular projects are related to the intellectual climates brought forth by continental European philosophy over the last forty years. In an attempt to rethink modernity, many philosophers have linked the bureaucratic rationalization of disciplines to this very project and have thus evoked the “end of disciplines” as ancillary to the existence of a “postmodern condition” and as prolegomena to what Marcus Peter Ford in his Beyond the Modern University (2002) calls a

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149. These definitions are paraphrased from Michael Finkenthal, Interdisciplinarity: Toward the Definition of a Metadiscipline? (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 79-87.
“postmodern university.” While, the contours of the critiques of disciplined knowledge represent distinct avenues, American critics have generally reframed the entirety of these conversations under a broad constellation of ideas emanating from the debate on interdisciplinarity.151

a. Interdisciplinarity Conceptualized

Our objective in thinking critically about the origins of interdisciplinarity is to reveal to what extent theorists of this complex intellectual movement recognize ways in which their intellectual work reflects disciplinarily oriented ideas. As stated above, American thinkers have generally emptied the diverse ways of correcting or revising the barriers erected by knowledge boundaries into the literature of interdisciplinarity—which is simply one of many projects to chose from. This has engendered a complicated literature to correspond to a decidedly complicated subject.

Mapping these contours is Lisa Lattuca, whose 2001 text Creating Interdisciplinarity shows the myriad of ways in which thinkers have conceptualized cross-discipline knowledge production. Lattuca relies on primary interview to data to construct a useful typology of interdisciplinarity work as practiced through teaching and research since the

150. According to Ford, the rethinking of knowledge boundaries would necessitate the rethinking of the university itself. His work suggests a “postmodern university” characterized in part by restructured boundaries. He concludes that: “If academic disciplines undermine the very possibility of a coherent worldview, distort what they seek to explain because of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, and are incapable of addressing real-world problems, then the university if it is to be of real service to society, must find some alternative to this way of organizing knowledge. The postmodern university will have to adopt a postdisciplinary or nondisciplinary curriculum.” Marcus Peter Ford, Beyond the Modern University: Toward a Constructive Postmodern University (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 51. For a philosophical bent on what this may portend for higher education and disciplinarity, see Roger P. Mourad, Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1997), 91-108.

1970s, a moment where these projects experienced an intense upswing. This typology includes: 1) Informed Disciplinarity - where knowledge is pursued and questions are formed from one or more disciplinary base; 2) Synthetic Interdisciplinarity - where thinkers address gaps in knowledges between disciplines; 3) Transdisciplinarity - where thinkers search for overarching knowledges and truths across disciplines in order to transcend them; and 4) Conceptual Interdisciplinarity - where thinkers answer questions with no disciplinary “home” from more than one disciplinary base.\textsuperscript{152} Lattuca includes an extended discussion of poststructuralist, postmodernist, and feminist discourse as an aspect of conceptual interdisciplinarity that challenges the norms of traditional disciplinary work. Lattuca regards poststructuralist, postmodernist, and feminist knowledge complexes as attempts to redefine the ontological and the epistemological assumptions of disciplines.\textsuperscript{153} Lattuca’s discussion of interdisciplinarity includes this attempt to construct some epistemological divergence between these interdisciplinarian endeavors and traditional disciplinary work; a notion she explains was relatively absent in earlier literature on interdisciplinarity. In other words, the work of conceptual interdisciplinarians may in fact be completely distinct, and even at odds with the other characterizations of interdisciplinarity discussed in most of the literature.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152} See Ibid, 80-104.
\textsuperscript{153} On this idea, Lattuca states: “For some scholars in these areas, the redefinition of knowledge might logically conclude in integrated disciplinary perspectives. However, for many feminists, poststructuralists, and postmodernists, the redefinition project is about dismantling disciplinary perspectives, not maintaining and integrating them.” Ibid,15. Lattuca ponders what this portends for the creation of truly accurate definition of interdisciplinarity. Ibid, 18.
\textsuperscript{154} The literature that emerged in the late 1970s rarely discussed “epistemological, political, and cultural factors on scholarship,” but the more recent work, including that of Julie Thompson Klein, discussed below, is more balanced. Ibid, 19.
This literature is particularly vast. Three works of Julie Thompson Klein, an important thinker in the field, may serve to characterize conceptions of interdisciplinary knowledge production over the last thirty or so years. An introductory text, Interdisciplinarity (1980) establishes Klein’s working definition of the concept. It not only traces the history of interdisciplinary theorizing, this work frames the contemporary discourse and comments on select examples in the academy. Interdisciplinarity seeks to conceptualize how approaches to interdisciplinarity have congealed around attempts to access and present knowledge between disciplinary bases.\textsuperscript{155} Showing the historical continuity of interdisciplinarity beginning with the Social Sciences Research Council, the development of general education and through government funded programs, Klein places interdisciplinarity within both a genealogy of thought that continues to search for a grand unity within human knowledge as well as the scholarly attempt to use languages from other disciplines to solve unique problems.\textsuperscript{156} The remainder of the work assesses how different understandings of interdisciplinarity have appeared as complex problems of knowledge have continued to be pursued in the academy. Klein is concerned with how

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\item\textsuperscript{155} Klein places the evolution of interdisciplinarity within the twentieth century. After undergoing shifting emphases prior to the 1970s, Klein notes that by this decade there were at least two ideas that achieved grounding: “They are ‘bridge building’ and ‘restructuring.’ The first, ‘bridge building,’ takes place between complete and firm disciplines. The second, ‘restructuring,’ involves changing parts of several disciplines. Bridge-building seems more common and is less difficult, since it reserves disciplinary identities. Restructuring is more radical and often embodies a criticism of not only the state of the disciplines being restructured, but, either implicitly or explicitly, the prevailing structure of knowledge.” Julie Thompson Klein, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 27.
\item\textsuperscript{156} Ibid, 24-25.
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interdisciplinarity knowledge structures are defined, organized, and actualized in concert with the objectives and rationales that they purport to embody and address.\textsuperscript{157}

*Crossing Boundaries* (1996) builds upon the earlier *Interdisciplinarity* by “developing a conceptual framework for understanding, studying, and supporting interdisciplinary practices.”\textsuperscript{158} This work approaches the idea of interdisciplinarity through the “rhetoric of boundaries.”\textsuperscript{159} Thompson’s objective in this text is to show that despite the saliency of boundaries there exists a persistence of interdisciplinary work of various types including hybridization, the integration of disciplinary methods into other disciplines, and the creation of “new and differentiated sites” of disciplinary work.\textsuperscript{160} The work then theorizes the conceptual process of “boundary crossing” before showing specific cases of its development inside Western knowledge structures.\textsuperscript{161}

The final work, *Humanities, Culture, and Interdisciplinarity* (2005), examines both the origins of the study of humanities in the United States and the emergence of interdisciplines, those new disciplines which have combined approaches of the traditional disciplines to new, or formerly ignored areas of knowledge. This work traces their histories and their attempts to reconcile the problems and prospects of developing new

\textsuperscript{157} Her work concludes that a broad discussion of interdisciplinarity whether it be contextualized by “a short-range instrumentality or a long-range reconceptualization of epistemology” is essential to understanding how disciplines in and of themselves may be insufficient in explaining complex phenomena. Ibid, 195-196.


\textsuperscript{159} According to Klein, boundary work “defines and protects knowledge” while boundary crossing “stimulates the formation of trading zones of interacting, interlanguages, hybrid communities and professional roles, new institutional structures, and new categories of knowledge.” Ibid, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 5-7.

\textsuperscript{161} Chapter Four is dedicated to showing the implication of boundary work and interdisciplinary studies within environmental studies, urban studies, area studies, women’s studies, and cultural studies. The intellectual development of these fields will be discussed in the current work. Chapter Five is an extended examination of literary studies.
languages to deal with the cultural and humanistic projects of asserting non-Western and/or gendered knowledge productions, and how interdisciplinary knowledge production has attempted to frame these issues.162

The foregoing work of Klein and Lattuca in part relies on theoretical discussions led by thinkers in the 1970s. These are important for understanding how earlier considerations construed the project and how the works discussed above dovetailed and diverged from these efforts. These works include the Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif edited *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences* (1969), the Leo Apostel edited *Interdisciplinarity: Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities* (1972), and Joseph J. Kockelmans edited volume, *Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education* (1977).163 These anthologies were early attempts to define and operationalize interdisciplinary work in both research and teaching. They combined both historical and philosophical disciplinary perspectives before attempting to theorize the nuts and bolts of interdisciplinary work. William Newell’s edited *Interdisciplinarity: Essays From the Literature* (1998), a later anthology, examines the progress of early interdisciplinary projects as well as focuses on the

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163. See Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, eds., *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Group, 1969); Leo Apostel, ed., *Interdisciplinarity: Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1972); Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., *Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979). While the former were the results of a seminar by CERI, the latter was a production of interdisciplinary seminar of graduate students at Pennsylvania State University. The earlier *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences* includes the oft-cited Donald T. Campbell, “Ethnocentrism of the Disciplines and the Fish-Scale Model of Omnisience,” in Ibid, 328-348. Campbell’s piece has been used to vitiate the idea that disciplinarity alone can advance knowledge of complex problems. His work looks at disciplines as overlapping, yet independent bodies of knowledge. Campbell’s and the balance of work represented by these three volumes is predicated on the idea that disciplinarity is the foundation from which interdisciplinarity can manifest.
implementation and institutional structures of interdisciplinary projects. Newell’s volume collects “classic” essays and includes a broad range of topics within interdisciplinarity spanning issues from administration and teaching to the development of specific interdisciplinary bodies of knowledge such as environmental studies and multiculturalism. 164 His own contribution establishes a research agenda for interdisciplinary studies scholarship.165

Seminal works included in this volume are Clifford Geertz’s essay, “Blurred Genres,” first published in 1980 and Stanley Fish’s “Being Interdisciplinary is So Very Hard to Do,” first published in 1991. Geertz frames his discussion on interdisciplinary work in the social sciences within the conceptual bounds of three theories: game, drama, and text, showing how interdisciplinary work formerly tied to scientist knowledge production has been altered by imported concepts from the humanities. His work suggests the need for further collaboration between humanists and social scientists.166 Writing about ten years later, Stanley Fish places the evolution of interdisciplinary work upon the contours of right-left political formations in the academy. Situating postmodernist critique with the left, he questions whether or not interdisciplinary work attempting to break free from epistemological constraints can do so as long as it remains

165. Newell outlines challenges to the interdisciplinary enterprise such as “its nature, outcomes, the roles of disciplines, and the nature of integration.” See William Newell, “Professionalizing Interdisciplinarity: Literature Review and Research Agenda,” in Ibid, 529-563.
both conceptually and administratively tied to the disciplinary project it is attempting to escape.167

Along with these important anthologies are critical single-authored works which have critiqued and/or mapped out process by which interdisciplinary will be successful. In his *Interdisciplinarity* (1998), Michael Finkenthal centers the discussion of the concept through a long-view consideration of what he has termed “disciplinarian thinking” in the West. Beginning with Greek antecedents, Finkenthal shows how disciplinarian thought was actualized via a conceptual constellation of knowledge bequeathed by the Galileo-Newton revolution.168 This turn engendered the “creation of a general methodology and the establishment of a unique purpose for the intellectual activities we call ‘research,’ common to all disciplines.”169 From this foundation, Finkenthal then posits that interdisciplinarity “transforms the concepts belonging to a given discipline and recreates them, so that they become operational within a new discipline.”170 This he distinguishes from Stephen J. Kline’s concept of multidisciplinarity, articulated in his *Conceptual Foundations for Multidisciplinary Thinking* (1995) and the French thinker, Basarab Nicolescu’s idea of transdisciplinarity, articulated in his *La Transdisciplinarite* (1996).171 The remainder of the text is devoted to examining historical successes and failures of both

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167. See Stanley Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary is So Very Hard to Do,” in Ibid, 239-249.
169. Ibid, 74.
170. Ibid, 83. Finkenthal illustrates this using the example of Erwin Schrodinger who as a physicist “analyzed a problem in biology using the concepts and laws of his discipline, physics.” Ibid, 81-82.
interdisciplinary and disciplinary scholarship in the context of scholarly attempts to make sense of reality. Finkenthal, who is a physicist, is concerned primarily with the long genealogies of ideas within the West and their various manifestations within disciplined thought and the implications therein for interdisciplinarity. He concludes largely that the prospects of interdisciplinarity rely on more critical understandings of what interdisciplinarity implies, buttressed by the methodological rigor inherent formulating serious critiques of disciplines that go beyond the strictures of disciplinarian thinking.\footnote{172}{Finkenthal employs examples of “botched interdisciplinarity” and a reading of the Sokal hoax to illustrate this point. See Ibid, 109-118.}

Similar points have been raised in the work of Andrew Abbott and Louis Menand discussed previously. Abbott’s *Chaos of Disciplines* shows how many interdisciplinary objectives are problem-specific and are thus reduced to his model of fractal ordering.\footnote{173}{Abbott situates the emergence of interdisciplinarity within communities looking to solve problems. For him a problem-centered academic inquiry would prove difficult to change current disciplinary structures due to academic labor markets and more importantly for him, the fact that there are far more problems than disciplines. See Andrew Abbott, *Chaos of Disciplines*, 134-135.} Menand states in *The Marketplace of Ideas* that work attempting to subvert disciplinariness cannot be considered interdisciplinary, as they themselves require a notion of disciplinariness to exist. He concludes that interdisciplinarity as currently constructed and theorized falls into a theoretical categorization that in many ways only restructures or reforms, and ultimately continues, *disciplinarity*.\footnote{174}{Discussing the notion of anti-disciplinarity among interdisciplinarians, he states: “Interdisciplinarity is disciplinarity raised to a higher power. It is not an escape from disciplinarity; it is the scholarly and pedagogical ratification of disciplinarity.” Louis Menand, *The Marketplace of Ideas*, 96-97.}
b. Conceptual Boundaries and the Interdisciplines

To conceptualize American forms of interdisciplinarity, it is clear that disciplinarity itself must be considered. Also one must place under consideration the ways in which the behaviors or appearance of visible characteristics of the discipline have been transmuted, obscuring their more obvious fingerprints. In tracing the emergence of what may usefully be called interdisciplines, we encounter how American thinkers, some building on foreign models, have constructed new areas of knowledge to “cross boundaries.” The interdisciplines to be discussed here range across Lisa Lattuca’s typology mentioned above.

Cultural Studies

Cultural studies is an interdiscipline that encroaches most consistently upon the disciplinary turfs of literature, history, and anthropology. Much of the work here follows the approaches of literary criticism but applied to so-called “low cultures.” Toby Miller’s edited *Companion to Cultural Studies* (2001) and Cary Nelson and Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar’s edited *Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies* (1996) include theoretical considerations for knowledge production in cultural studies.175 Nelson and Gaonkar’s introductory essay places the emergence of cultural studies within the context of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the late 1960s, as British thinkers attempted to include studies of working class communities in normative discourse, reflecting socio-economic and political objectives. Spurred by thinkers such as

E.P. Thompson (1924-1993), Richard Hoggart (1918-) and Stuart Hall (1932-), contemporary cultural studies employs an interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary approach to the study of popular culture, subcultures, as well as how cultural influences through hegemonic institutions shape power relationships toward subaltern groups, or postcoloniality. The other contributions to Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies then take the disciplinary practices to task to assess their successes and challenges in fulfilling the broad objectives of producing intellectual work responsible to these groups. Nelson and Gaonkar explain how cultural studies challenges the norms of academic inquiry, but end up ultimately reflecting “long-term methodological continuities” with the current disciplinary-intellectual approach, despite their challenging of aspects of its structure.

Miller’s introductory essay links cultural studies’ “mode of analysis” more stringently to the disciplines of “economics, politics, media and communication studies, sociology, literature, education, the law, science and technology studies, anthropology, and history.” Reflecting this general position, contributions to A Companion to Cultural Studies also include discussions of cultural studies’ engagement with the current disciplines


178. For Miller: “Cultural studies is animated by subjectivity and power—how human subjects are formed and show they experience cultural and social space. It takes its agenda and mode of analysis from economics, politics, media and communication studies, sociology, literature, education, the law, science and technology studies, anthropology, and history, with a particular focus on gender, race, class, and sexuality, in everyday life, commingling textual and social theory under the sign of a commitment to progressive social change.” Toby Miller, “What it is and what it isn’t: Introducing… Cultural Studies,” in A Companion to Cultural Studies, ed. Idem, 1.
and these essays indicate a “dissent to disciplinarity” that is fundamentally rooted in challenging and expanding, but not replacing, Western intellectual norms.  

John Hartley in *American Cultural Studies* (2000), edited by him and Roberta Pearson discusses the consequences of the importation of cultural studies knowledge frameworks inside American universities. He concludes that confrontations with existing American Studies scholarship uniquely shaped how cultural studies would enter the academy in the United States. The fusion between British type cultural studies and the existing interdiscipline of American Studies, then are important to the development of both areas of study in the United States.

**American Studies**

American Studies was part of the historical process of academic expansion in the postwar United States university. In “‘Paradigm Dramas’ in American Studies” (1979), Gene Wise connects the pre-disciplinary genealogy of American Studies within the corpus of intellectual work produced by Vernon Louis Parrington (1871-1929) and Perry Miller (1905-1963), who attempted to “grapple with materials of American experience” in differing ways. Wise then shows how a conception of American Studies as a field of inquiry, built upon Parrington and Miller’s work, was institutionalized in departments

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179. In his contribution to *A Companion to Cultural Studies*, Douglas Kellner states that cultural studies should employ methods of philosophy and the critical social theories of the Birmingham and Frankfurt schools to interrogate “relationships within the three dimensions of: 1) the production and political economy of culture; 2) textual analysis and critique of its artifacts; and 3) study of audience reception and the uses of media/cultural products.” For Kellner, Cultural Studies is a “transdisciplinary” enterprise. See Douglas Kellner “Cultural Studies and Philosophy: An Intervention,” in *A Companion to Cultural Studies*, 143.


across the United States in the early 1940s. These early formations attempted to apply to the American context an “intellectual-historic” synthesis of the American experience, employing a humanistic methodology of culture gleaned from the disciplines of history and literature and eventually approaches from the social sciences. Wise’s discussion then turns to the challenges of this paradigm in the context of the socio-political upheavals of the 1960s as previously underrepresented groups challenged the exceptionalist vision of American Studies.

Paul Lauter in “Reconfiguring Academic Disciplines” (1999) and Janice A. Radway, Kevin K. Gaines, Barry Shank, and Penny Von Eschen, editors of American Studies: An Anthology (2009) further discuss the resulting configuration of interdisciplinary American Studies. Lauter contextualizes American Studies as a discipline-altering intellectual enterprise and suggests that it approaches under-researched aspects of the American experience in new methodological languages. His article outlines these methodological alterations to existing ways of knowing within history, literature, as well as social science disciplines like sociology and anthropology. The employment of these methodologies seem to range across disciplines and reflect what may be considered a transdisciplinary project in American Studies. Janice A. Radway, et al., in the

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182. Ibid, 304-312. Wise lists the general assumptive principles of the “intellectual-historic synthesis” as understood by American Studies thinkers in the postwar-1960s period. These assumptions are centered on an idea that there exists a distinctive “American mind” that can be studied in much the same way as other great thinkers and canonical literature was studied in the university. The 1950s saw groups of thinkers attempt to employ social scientific methods to the American experience.

183. See Paul Lauter, “Reconfiguring Academic Disciplines: The Emergence of American Studies,” American Studies 40 (Summer 1999): 26-29. Lauter outlines five methodological principles: 1) historicization of content; 2) textual analysis; 3) comparative analysis; 4) Gramscian hegemonic analysis; and 5) interdisciplinary analysis, showing how American Studies can uniquely employ them.
introduction to *American Studies: An Anthology* (2009) posit that contemporary American Studies is sustained in large part by a critique of the classical monolithic, or as termed by Wise, the “symbol-myth-image” view of American Studies scholarship. They, along with many American Studies scholars of the past twenty years, focus on a shift within the American academy that deconstructs traditional narratives by adding different voices which had been excluded in traditional disciplinary work.

This approach however, as Russ Castronovo and Susan Gillman have pointed out, has in many ways remained bounded by traditional modes of inquiry. In “The Study of American Problems,” their introduction to their edited volume, *States of Emergency* (2009) they suggest that a new methodological approach rooted in what they term a spatiotemporal orientation to American “objects” would challenge the exceptionalist vision of traditional disciplinary bases and their influence in normative American Studies. Much in tow with Lauter’s recommendation, the contributors to the volume work “from specific disciplinary constellations” but apply them in different ways to project a unique American Studies derived methodology. What informs this new thinking

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185. They express that the “familiar American pantheon that included people like Jefferson, Adams, Lincoln, Hawthorne Melville, and James was enlarged and transformed by the addition of intellectuals like Margaret Fuller, Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Jose Marti, Marcus Garvey, Anzia Tezierska, and Abraham Cahan.” Ibid, 3.

186. Russ Castronovo and Susan Gillman, “The Study of American Problems,” in *States of Emergence: The Object of American Studies*, eds. Idem (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 7-10. Relying on the philosophy of history of Walter Benjamin, Castronovo and Gillman explain that a methodologically sound American Studies should translate “the study of American problems into times and places that fail to abide by the regularities of U.S. history, the U.S. literary archive, or even the traditional interdisciplinary pairing of literature and history.” Ibid, 8. They use the term “object” to imply a sense of the thing studied as well as the method of studying it, while later offering a third sense, that of signaling disagreement with norms. See Ibid, 3-4; 13.
is the idea that space and time should orient the study of objects. Finally, as “interlopers” to the field and interdiscipline of American Studies, the contributors offer unique approaches to the subject matter at hand.

Both cultural studies and American Studies are interdisciplines that consider alternative and nuanced interpretations of subject matter, traditionally bounded by disciplinary areas. For both of these interdisciplines, the focus of study and interpretation is connected very prominently to Western and/or American “objects” in both the physical geography and conceptual horizon. While the latter may characterize most interdisciplinary work, the physical geography of the West does not characterize the work under the aegis of area studies.

**Area Studies**

Space, or geographical and political boundaries, represents the disciplinary axis of area studies. Another of the postwar intellectual movements, area studies is the study of geographic entities that are usually associated in some way with United States political interests. The comparative studies of non-Western societies was initiated by university thinkers associated with the disciplines of anthropology, economics, political science, and linguistics. David L. Szanton recounts these origins in his “The Origin, Nature, and Challenge of Area Studies in the United States,” included in his edited *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines* (2004). In this essay, he implies that area studies emerged to “deparchoialize U.S. and Euro-centric visions of the world in the social

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He outlines that although this was the purpose at the outset, it has largely failed and asserts that the challenge for area studies is redirecting its purpose to being effective mediums by which to translate knowledges between cultures, in effect, creating a global knowledge community. Contributions to this volume explore the work done in this area with regard to studies of modern non-Western societies primarily in Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America. With regard to the geopolitical sphere, the current direction has shifted away from Cold War politics to the politics of globalization and the rise of non-Western superpowers in the East. The resulting retrenchment in Western guided area studies has ensued.

The volumes, *Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World* (2003), edited by Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver and *Remaking Area Studies* (2010), edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Jon Goss, acknowledge the origins of area studies as principally a tool of U.S.-based foreign policy interests. Contributors to these volumes connect the decline in funding to the waning of Cold War politics. As funding (often from governmental and philanthropic entities) and popularity have in effect dried up, these essays offer recommendations rooted in reimagining the discipline of area studies as a globalized multi/interdisciplinary space that for Wesley-Smith and Goss should come

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189. Ibid, 3.

from epistemological grounding in the culture being examined. Wesley-Smith and Goss’ volume advocates a rethinking of the discipline in terms of its policy-oriented concerns, bringing the unique perspectives of indigenous populations living in US-controlled areas in the Pacific. Mirsepassi, Basu, and Weaver suggest a trajectory for area studies that link it closer to the cultural studies approaches which take their cue from postcolonial ideologies and methodologies. For now, however, as Szanton echoing most of the scholarship in area studies indicates, area studies is considered a “family of academic fields and activities” centered around traditional Western approaches to knowledge—in some respects more multidisciplinary than interdisciplinary.

Women’s Studies

Western constructions of gender and/or sex have their roots in broad historical and philosophical discussions. The prevailing approaches to the understanding of the attempts by women to achieve status and/or role equality with men in any given society are discussed under the rubric of feminism and historiographically within and framed by particular “waves.” The interdiscipline of Women’s Studies is both a contemporary manifestation of the broad discursive thrust and political movements around the question of gender and a collection of modern disciplinary approaches to the study of women. It is considered the product of second wave feminism and the continued pursuit of knowledge in the interdiscipline (i.e. the development of theory) has generally been linked to third wave feminism. The Florence Howe edited The Politics of Women’s Studies (2000) considers

191. Ibid, xvii. They nevertheless state that this shift is the “most difficult to achieve.”
192. Ibid, xv.
the birth of the interdiscipline, bringing together “the founding mothers” many of whom were initiated into radical politics by the women’s liberation movement and the New Left. These founding influences determined early approaches to the discipline. Marilyn Jacoby Boxer’s institutional history, *When Women Ask the Questions* (1998) includes the history of women’s studies in the academy and its development over the last forty years. Boxer updates much of the earlier literature chronicling also the attempts of feminist theorists and women’s studies scholars over the last twenty years to expand their studies of women to include women of different races, ethnicities, and of the Third World. Beverly Guy-Sheftall’s more succinct, *Women’s Studies: A Retrospective* conceptualizes the evolution of the discipline through four phases including its initial institutionalization in 1970, its influence on traditional disciplines, challenges from underrepresented women, and its new directions.

The historical work on Women’s Studies suggests an approach that guides discipline-based knowledge production to a perspectival consideration of the varied experiences of women. This methodological approach has been practiced widely in the field of literary criticism, which is perhaps one of the strongest disciplinary contributors in the interdiscipline. The development of a philosophically feminist approach to the reading and critique of literature produced by and about women has


Literature, however, is not the only field of interest. In critiquing the philosophical basis of disciplines, many Women’s Studies thinkers have determined that their particular approaches to knowledge are inherently flawed with regard to women’s experiences. This has led to movements that consider the prospects of a feminist epistemology to animate disciplinary subject matters. The need for an epistemological grounding has been the concern of thinkers who have gone as far as to impose a feminist interpretation on the “core subject areas” of Western philosophy, or in the case of the feminist philosopher Sandra Harding, to understand philosophical questions from a gendered standpoint. Essentially, for these theorists, scholarship in Women’s Studies should be animated by “women’s ways of knowing,” the title of the 1986 work of Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nany Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck.

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201. See Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby, “Introduction,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy*, eds. Idem (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4. In this volume contributors assert that there have been and can be feminist interpretations of philosophy. These readings suggest that women’s ideas can be rooted in the same conceptual core of Western knowledge, that had previously been connected only to men; ideas like ethics, logic, or aesthetics.
Harding is one of the more prolific thinkers in this area, her scholarship ranging from the co-edited with Merrill Hintikka, *Discovering Reality* (1983), to the co-edited with Jean F. O’Barr, *Sex and Scientific Inquiry* (1987), and continuing with the more recent, *Is Science Multicultural?* (1998), *Sciences from Below* (2008), and *Science and Social Inequality* (2006). She has reflected on the late twentieth century debates on universality in science and how post-Kuhnian practices can also privilege the views of science approached from different epistemological bases. Further, Harding’s work considers both the ramifications of women’s ways of knowing on Western science but also of how these are linked to communities considered “other” or “subaltern.” It is out of these communities that the most potent challenges to the Western epistemological foundations of feminism have been advanced. The interdiscipline is characterized today by the ways in which these voices have shunted the universality of the Western experience—a similar approach to those of scholars in ethnic studies.

**LGBT and Queer Studies**

Closely allied to Women’s Studies are certain trajectories of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) studies. In many cases LGBT studies work is housed in departments which also house Women’s Studies, sometimes naming these departments

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204. On these relationships see Sandra Harding, *Science and Social Inequality*, 1-10, and passim and *Sciences from Below*, 130-170, and passim.
“gender studies.”205 The contributions, approaches, and general ideological flavor of many of the prominent readers in the discipline, like the Theo Sandfort, Judith Schuyf, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Jeffrey Weeks volume, Lesbian and Gay Studies (2000) and the Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David Halperin edited The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader (1993), suggest that LGBT studies coheres around the inclusion of the LGBT experience in the traditional disciplines, either structurally or theoretically.206 In other words, LGBT studies ranges across disciplines carrying the subject matter of the LGBT experience, devoid of a common theoretical position or methodology.207

Queer studies, on the other hand, attempts to frame knowledge itself utilizing the unique and politically charged notion of queerness. Queer theory is strongly linked to the feminist epistemological approach to decentering male knowledge, suggesting that the languages which inhere in these knowledges (i.e. hetero-normativity) obscure the unique positions of queerness. According to William B. Turner’s A Genealogy of Queer Theory (2000), these ideas were premised on the work of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler (1956-), and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1950-2009). For Turner, queer theory, based upon the idea that queerness does not fit established categories, “indicate(s) the emergence of new forms of thought.”208 Both LGBT and queer studies and the ways in which they converge upon

each other and upon Women’s Studies are challenges to the received knowledge generated by the traditional academic disciplines.

*Ethnic Studies*

Finally, the interdisciplines that scholars have connected to each of the foregoing areas are the collection of studies on non-European peoples in the United States, known as ethnic studies. Thinkers associated with these interdisciplines have dated its emergence to the changes in the Western academy largely actualized through the socio-political upheavals of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{209} While these are their institutional roots, areas of study which consider the experience of indigenous American, Asian, Chican@, and/or African peoples all have roots that lie outside of the academy as well as in different forms inside the academy (e.g. anthropology). The latter consideration must be read with caution, for the approaches to knowledge and praxis assumed qualitatively different forms once these groups created their own spaces in the university.

Timothy P. Fong, editor of *Ethnic Studies Research* (2008), outlines four main characteristics that separate the ethnic studies disciplines from the traditional disciplines: 1) the centrality of the “community” studied; 2) their reinterpretive and protective agendas; 3) their challenge to the question of objectivity; and 4) their advocacy for social change.\textsuperscript{210} Fong gestures toward tendencies within these various disciplines to conduct multi/interdisciplinary work that explicitly challenge prevailing norms among traditional


\textsuperscript{210.} Ibid, 2-5.
disciplines as well as elements within these disciplines that attempt to establish epistemological norms derived from the cultures they represent.

Generally speaking, when one mentions ethnic studies they could be referring to any of the politically motivated self-defined fields of Asian American Studies, American Indian (or Indigenous American) Studies, Chicano Studies, and/or African American Studies—each with their own voluminous bodies of literature. Attempts to read these areas together, such as the Fong’s *Ethnic Studies Research*, and earlier edited volumes such as Johnella E. Butler’s *Color-Line to Borderlands* (2001) and her and John C. Walter’s *Transforming the Curriculum* (1991), show that at their core, institutionally-bound ethnic studies formations all derive from political and social movements that increasingly attempt to provide a basis for interpretation of knowledge that is self-determined—often times based upon confrontation and reimagination of the humanities and the social sciences. Johnella E. Butler has linked the work done to institutionalize Africana Studies to a larger conversation characterized by attempts to include experiences/perspectives of all non-European groups in the United States, while envisioning ethnic studies matrices within the logics of the traditional disciplines.211

211. See Johnella E. Butler, “Introduction: Color-Line to Borderlands,” in *Color-Line to Borderlands*, ed. Idem (Seattle: Washington University Press, 2001), xi-xxvi and “Ethnic Studies as a Matrix for the Humanities, the Social Sciences and the Common Good,” in Ibid, 18-41. This impulse is perhaps linked to the multiculturalism movement which ranged in scope from inclusion of non-white experiences in K-12 education to questions of their legal and political citizenship during the era of the 1980s and 90s known as the “culture wars.” This suggests that studies of these groups could cohere together because their common oppression has yielded similar situations for these groups. On the relationship between the ideational influence of multiculturalism on attempts to bridge ethnic studies, see Thomas J. La Belle and Christopher J. Ward, *Ethnic Studies and Multiculturalism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) and Avery F. Gordon and Christopher Newfield, eds., *Mapping Multiculturalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
In *Transforming the Curriculum*, R.A. Olugin’s “Towards an Epistemology of Ethnic Studies” takes these ideas to suggest that an epistemological approach that connects African American Studies and Chicano@ Studies is possible, flowing from a critique of individualistic objectivism and an embrace of organic and collective approaches to knowledge.\(^{212}\) Similarly, Manning Marable in *From Color-Lines to Borderlands*, draws parallels between different “ethnics” around the “twin problems of “cultural amalgamation and racial essentialism.”\(^{213}\) For Marable and many of the other ethnic studies thinkers included in *Color-line to Borderlands*, the discipline(s) of ethnic studies attempt(s) to understand the experiences of different ethnicities within the United States in a non-assimilationist and transformative manner that creates a better society for the whole of humanity.

The different approaches to ethnic studies flow from the broad categorizations of knowledge production and the far-reaching scope of Western racial and cultural hegemony allied to white political supremacy in the United States. As such, traditional disciplines have been challenged, but that challenge has not been univocal. These challenges include all four of Lisa Lattuca’s ways of characterizing interdisciplinary work in spaces devoted intellectually to the ethnic studies. Parts of the remainder of this dissertation focuses in on this conversation in Africana Studies. One should, however, realize that the enduring effect on Western hegemony has produced similar conversations


about knowledge, authenticity, and cultural autonomy in Asian American Studies, American Indian Studies, and Chican@ Studies.

According to the literature, then, the interdisciplines—a direct result of the idea that traditional disciplines could not solve complex problems—are built on norms that extend Western intellectual traditions, albeit to places they had heretofore never ventured. The various forms of interdisciplinarity to emerge continue to reify norms of disciplinarity, though there have been attempts to create postdisciplinary intellectual space. The collection of sources here should serve to clarify these persistences; the way disciplines constitute knowledge is unique in this era, yet consistent with iterations of Western approaches to knowledge.

Part I of this dissertation considered the ways in which the entire complex of Western knowledge has been conceptualized and memorized via the university model. This arrangement of all-knowledge was most systematically emptied into the academic discipline, the hallmark institution for the training of Western thinkers. Knowledge was and continues to be rendered and organized efficiently for both wide and limited consumption within the constellation of intellectual practices associated with disciplinarity. What the sources reviewed in Part I reveal is that a study of academic disciplinarity shows how the creation of disciplines served intellectual, social, as well as administrative interests for the groups for which it developed. Intellectually, the disciplines began to create historical memory and orient future projects for workers within
an organized field. Socially, they served to initiate thinkers into knowledge guilds. Administratively, they provided the academic organization of the university. It is in all these realms that the assumptions which order knowledge are made manifest in the public and academic spheres. These assumptions cannot be delinked from the process of discipline-building. Further, these philosophical assumptions cannot be understood to be neither normative nor universal. For Africana Studies (and other so called “ethnic studies”), the interrogation of these knowledge arrangements should serve to clarify the central problematics inherent in Western knowledge production with regard to the animation of the African global experience, both vertically and horizontally.

The questions which remain for the Africanization of discipline-based knowledge in Africana Studies (or its own “disciplinarity”), must in part be answered by understanding where the West has been. These questions cannot simply be wished away through philosophical language or by the search for corollary ideas in construed African contexts. In understanding Western bases of knowledge, the works discussed consider this complicated trajectory, outlining the many foundations of discipline-based intellectual work, showing the many conversations in the West responsible for the recognizable appearances of knowledge foundations in the modern academy. The following parts will consider how the confrontation with these foundations among Africans was conceptualized, remembered, and retraced in order to engage the long-view conversations of African deep thought as they were in conversation with other knowledge

214. If the reader is not aware by now, it should be reiterated that this dissertation supposes that Africana Studies must be informed by authentic knowledge foundations built upon the complex ideas of African people across time and space as a mechanism for informing its disciplinarity. See Chapter One for this philosophical perspective.
complexes. It is out of these discussions that we can properly contextualize Western knowledges and remember and reassert the praxis that inheres in decidedly complex African thinking traditions.
Part Two: Africana Studies and Disciplinarity

We have now reached a moment in the current effort where we must responsibly interrogate the long-range considerations of the discipline of Africana Studies as a broad critique of the knowledge complex of the West. Following Cedric Robinson’s characterization of Black radicalism, the conceptualization of the West as a collective enterprise, discussed in Part I, often served as the springboard, but not the inspiration of the thinkers operating under what we can broadly conceive as the contemporary iteration of global African thought.1 Its specific emergence over the past two hundred years has been labeled many things: the historiographical weheme mesu, the African renaissance, and the Black radical intelligentsia, to name a few.2 Regardless of how this moment is named, the work of connecting it to earlier cycles of African (and human) intellectual work remains the motive force behind the current effort, and other efforts to anchor Africana Studies work in more appropriate intellectual domains.

As such, Part II begins by orienting the discussion of Africana Studies, first with the rhythmic impulses and conceptual foundations which characterize African deep thinking and thought generally. This expansive conceptualization allows us to connect the

1. Robinson states: “The social cauldron of Black radicalism is Western society. Western society, however, has been its location and its objective condition but not—except in a most perverse fashion—its specific inspiration.” Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 72-73.

work of more recent torchbearers to earlier world historical actors and events—a longer and clearly influential genealogy. By the late nineteenth century, then, what we witness is an upsurge of African thinkers utilizing these foundations to interrogate the West. That initial confrontation lead to an increasingly stringent analysis—one which would eventually require autonomous settings to properly formulate and extend African knowledges. Its crystallization was the 1968 moment, when it was complicatedly inserted into the interstices of the Western academic matrix. The remainder of Part II brings all of these strands together, showing how African thinkers and intellectuals have written about and challenged the ways in which knowledge was organized and used and linking these to the post-1968 “academic” conversation that attempted to map knowledge of the world back to earlier conceptions of African intellectual traditions in a systematic, if not disciplinary fashion. The position taken here is that this broad conversation must order how one should perceive the discipline of Africana Studies. The review now considers the discourse around these various ideas.
Chapter 5
Companions, Blood: Institutional Patterns of African Deep Thought

Scholars selling their ignorance as expert wisdom about Africa have told you here that there are no schools for the training of traditionalists. They lie thinking they know. We have schools within schools.
-Djiely Hor in KMT: In the House of Life

... the first truth a people needs is the truth about themselves and the nature and possible meaning of their own existence. And when a community shares the African heritage of three-dimensional historical existence, when past, present, and future are in constant, sometimes ecstatic, conversation, then each dimension of the people’s being must be addressed. For the people are their fathers and mothers. They are their children. Just as they are themselves.
-Vincent Harding, “The Vocation of the Black Scholar”

The future relevance of Africana Studies rests on the ability of those struggling under its aegis, to restore the ways in which Africans think about reality and phenomena to prominence in the fashioning of its disciplinarity. The introductory chapter, having already articulated the current state of this discussion, began the process of understanding to what extent authentic African ideas presently animate the discipline’s intellectual-methodological conventions. This chapter reviews works which give background to alternative foundations for African knowledges and the institutions which have existed historically to support them.

In attempting to map the contours of an African-centered vision for Africana Studies, scholars have hotly debated the question of the discipline’s origins. James Stewart’s “The Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois for Contemporary Black Studies” (1984)

suggests that we stretch this evolution to the nineteenth and early twentieth century work by historical precedents of Africana Studies “whose primary efforts included the clear delineation of a research program or paradigm.”5 Lawrence Crouchett’s seminal “Early Black Studies Movements” (1971) places the origins of the discipline even further back in history, in the “secret classrooms” created by enslaved Africans, which developed across the plantations in the antebellum South.6 Daudi Ajani ya Azibo and others, in their attempts to pinpoint an origin have gone much further, asserting that the origins of Africana Studies are most securely fastened in the classical African schools of education—the schools discussed by Djiey Hor, a traditionalist in Ayi Kwei Armah’s KMT: In the House of Life (2003). Specifically, in his “Articulating the Distinction Between Black Studies and the Study of Blacks” (1992), Azibo dates the origin of Africana Studies as the moment when Africans in the Nile Valley “coalesced the manifold dictates of the African worldview into a systematic epistemological base and applied it in an extant pedagogy.”7 Maulana Karenga, representing a trend which is becoming normative in the historiography of the discipline, asserts in his Introduction to Black Studies (4th ed., 2010) and “Black Studies and the Problematic of Paradigm” (1988) that despite the importance of these precursors, a true discipline of Black Studies does not begin until the organized pursuit of knowledge in the 1960s. For Karenga, what makes this moment a

“disciplinary” one, is that until the 1960s, there was no “self-conscious, organized, system of research and communication in a defined area of inquiry and knowledge.”

It seems that this discussion could benefit from a conception of knowledge more concerned with genealogy than with chronology. The nature of intellectual work embarked upon in Africana Studies, has clear precursors and its contours can be traced to many conceptual origins. However, more important than the origins themselves are our relationships to those systems, institutions, and individuals that have been created and extended by African people throughout time and space. The work of John Henrik Clarke (1915-1998), Jacob Carruthers (1930-2004), and Greg Carr (1965-) suggests that unbroken genealogies should be the lens from which to view subsequent iterations of African intellectual traditions. William Banks’ The Black Intellectuals (1995) as well as Michael Gomez’s Exchanging Our Country Marks (1998) suggests that knowledge communities and the institutions which helped to form them were merely transformed and reformed to fit new contexts during the maafa.

The nature of this transformation and its continuities and discontinuities with other formulations should replace conversations that seek to find “origins” as such. This discourse, as a matter of responsibility, should assume that Africans have always thought

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9. On this approach see Chapter Eleven.

and done intellectual work in a systematic fashion. Following Kimbwandende Kia Bunseki Fu-Kiau, this work suggest Africana Studies should attach itself to cycles of intellectual work, or *tuzingu*, that complicatedly, but vibrantly represent African traditions.\(^{11}\) Cycles have no beginnings, just points of entry into an ongoing conversation, and just as importantly, they have no end. This sort of interpretation is more appropriate than linear conceptions of beginnings, starting points, and origins. As the above words of Vincent Harding reveal, this is a lens, which understands a particular instance or institution as linked to both the past and future of African deep thought, and one that is more representative of the character of African conceptions of reality in general. The challenge remains of placing emphasis on the relatedness of recognizable strands of African thinking and intellectual work to less recognizable forms, when academic conventions assumes that these same ideas must be connected to Western ideas and intellectual traditions for their legitimacy.

Freed from the need to suffuse Africana Studies into conceptual boxes reified through the resolution of a single origin, we can use various instances of African intellectual traditions and institutions as exemplars for the continuity of African deep thought traditions. Exemplars, following James Stewart, constitute the basis from which African intellectual work can be conceptualized and understood, but also continued.\(^{12}\) Further, exemplars can be both individual and institutional. The following works consider some institutional exemplars that can serve this function for the contemporary


manifestation of Africana Studies, as it wrestles with the potential of creating more appropriate ways of categorizing and using knowledge.

The Per Ankh

This dissertation dismisses, as does Cheikh Anta Diop, the tendency to de-link the historical record of ancient Africa from the contemporary era, or modernity, as “ignorant, cowardly, and neurotic.”13 That said, there must be a certain clarity as to why the study of ancient African civilizations benefits Africans in particular, and humanity in general. The aforementioned Jacob Carruthers provides perhaps the clearest rationale particularly, for the study of Kemet (Egypt). In his “Why We Study Kemet” (1991) Carruthers explains that among other ideas, the study of Kemet should not be done in isolation from other civilizations and that the preponderance of cultural materials and writings left in Kemet should be used to understand other African cultural groups, as Kemet did not develop in isolation from them.14 In other works, such as his 1995, Mdw Ntr, Carruthers utilizes primary source readings and translations of Kemetic writings to uncover the nature of Kemetic spiritual traditions, social and political structures [“statecraft”], and educational systems which supported this complex society.15 Carruthers and other thinkers associated with the Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations (ASCAC) (c. 1984) offer an approach to the study of classical Africa that answers the call of Diop to conceptualize Kemet in relationship to Africa in much

the same way that Greco-Latin culture is used to frame the West. Scholars in ASCAC employ methodological rigor, including language skills and historical approaches, which focus on extracting knowledge hidden in African civilizations, to animate our understanding of Africa on its own terms and to contribute to processes of reframing African futures with these knowledges. This should not be confused with attempts to develop mythological or romantic histories of ancient Africa, with the purpose of proving what ideas antedate others or for purposes of self-esteem. These are arguably misreadings of the terms out of which Africans have embraced ancient Africa for hundreds of years.

Neither should Kemet be read through philosophical and socio-economic frames which reduce it to materialist analyses of power, and then dismissed for failing to meet standards of egalitarianism espoused by leftist ideologies. The ideas that animated Kemetic social

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16. In one of his more famous dictums, Diop states: “Far from being a reveling in the past, a look toward the Egypt of antiquity is the best way to conceive and build our cultural future. In reconceived and renewed African culture, Egypt will play the same role that Greco-Latin antiquity plays in Western culture.” Cheikh Anta Diop, *Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1991), 3.

17. On the nature of this embrace, see Jacob Carruthers, *Mdw Ntr*, 15-21. This is not to deny that many thinkers of African descent have misappropriated African civilizations and ideas to empty them into forms of engagement with the West that are either irresponsible or tenuously connected to other more systematic and methodologically sound connections. Arguably, these are the ideas which are construed as normative approaches to Egypt in works that attack “Afrocentrism.” On this see Jacob Carruthers, *Intellectual Warfare* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1999) and note 169 of Chapter One. These discussions notwithstanding, in his important work, Greg Carr asserts that: “Africana Studies is not a surrender of the difficult work of recovering and connecting African historical memories to the idea that such works amounts to “romanticizing” or “mythologizing the past.” He continues by stating that what lies beyond such contentions is the work of rejecting “this discounting of foundational moments by stating the essential first-order requirement of translation and recovery. This requirement has been modeled by the handful of scholars currently equipped with the requisite skills to undertake comparative analysis of African life, language and culture over the arc of long-view genealogies.” See Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not: Moving From Crisis to Liberation in African Intellectual Work,” *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (March 2011): 188.

18. These ideas are found in two representative articles. See Melba Joyce Boyd, “Afrocentrists, Afro-Elitists, and Afro-eccentrics: The Polarization of Black Studies Since the Student Struggles of the Sixties,” in *Dispatches from the Ebony Tower: Intellectuals Confront the African American Experience*, ed. Manning Marable (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 204-209 and Stephen Ferguson,
structures are far more complex and deserve deep study, with deep considerations of Kemetic language and culture. Contrary to these popular notions about the African study of Kemet, the employment of Kemet by scholars associated with ASCAC and other more representative thinkers such as Ayi Kwei Armah, rely on the use of Kemetic ideas and values as a repository of knowledge and as a cultural exemplar—a way to think through the vestiges of Western ideas from more familiar and/or representative cultural traditions.

An exemplar of the cultural complex of ancient Africa regarding educational structures is the per ankh (the house of life), the training ground for the sesh (scribes), and the swnw and wabw (priests). Egyptologists have differing reads of the function of the per ankh. Of the earliest to comment on its nature is Alan H. Gardiner in his “The House of Life” (1938) published in the Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. Gardiner argues in introducing the per ankh, that attempts to characterize the per ankh as a training college or a university are “a grave mistake.”19 Gardiner’s reading of the ancient Egyptian texts lead him to the conclusion that these institutions were for the “productive aspects” of Kemetic life; a space where learned individuals and priests came to discuss intellectual issues relevant to society.20 Following Gardiner is the work of Labib Habachi and Paul Ghalioungui. Their co-authored “The House of Life of Bubastis” (1971) uses historical and textual analysis to comment on the existence and nature of the specific per ankh in the city of Bubastis.21

Ghalioungui’s House of Life: Per Ankh (1973) is a look at the ways in which various per ankhs

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20. Ibid, 76.
practiced what Kemetic thinkers have been translated as terming, “the necessary art” of medicine. This work examines the medical science found in the famous papyri for their relative magical and scientific content and how the various *per ankhs* supported these endeavors. Ghalioungui’s work does not consider in detail the other “disciplines” which were covered in the *per ankh*, but he does indicate that there were other areas of training encompassed in this institution.\textsuperscript{22}

In fact its coverage was so broad, that contra Gardiner’s claim, Y. G-M. Lulat in his *A History of African Higher Education* (2005), begins with the *per ankh*, showing that it was perhaps one of the earliest forms of higher education to exist in Africa. While Gardiner may be correct to claim that it was not a university (in the Western sense), Lulat anchors the discussion of African knowledge systems with the *per ankh* before showing how it was indeed natural to place the library at Alexandria in Egypt given its history of education—a claim rarely uttered in histories of the library, as historians, indicated by the discussion in Chapter Two, connect this institution only to its Greek precursors.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} See Paul Ghalioungui, *House of Life: Per Ankh: Magic and Medicine in Ancient Egypt* (Amsterdam: B.M. Israel, 1973), 65-66. Here he mentions the work of Askel Volten, who in his *Demotische Traumdeutung* (1942), viewed the *per ankh* as a “collegia of learned people” with thinkers that ranged across all disciplines. Volten is quoted in Ibid, 65. See also Labib Habachi and Paul Ghalioungui, “The House of Life of Bubastis,” 59. The impetus to examine (only) magic and medicine with regard to the *per ankh* may stem from the work of Gardiner. See his discussion of these ideas in his “House of Life,” 176 and passim.

\textsuperscript{23} Lulat’s characterization of the *per ankh* in the context of other higher educational systems is instructive. He asserts: “At the same time, the *per-ankh* was also a higher educational institution of sorts that like other higher educational institutions that were to emerge in other parts of the world thousands of years on, combined religious education with secular education. For the Egyptians, as would be the case for many other peoples in millennia to come, knowledge did not neatly divide into the religious and the secular; to them each flowed seamlessly into the other—as is so clearly indicated in that masterly synthesis of evidence from a host of papyri...” He continues: “therefore those destined for the professions (scribes, doctors, lawyers, architects, astronomers, etc.) received their education alongside those who ere to join the priesthood in the *per-ankh.*” Y. G-M. Lulat, *A History of African Higher Education from Antiquity to the Present* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 45-46.
Other characterizations by African-centered thinkers extend the institutional and social importance of the per ankh. Writing in his *The Maroon Within Us* (1995), Asa Hilliard declares that in the per ankh, and other institutions devoted to education, “the ultimate aim of education in Egypt was for a person to become “one with God.” In other words, there was a deep spiritual emphasis on the Divine which animated the per ankh. For Jacob Carruthers, who more deeply analyzes these ideas in his *Mdw Ntr*, education was linked to governance and was held together by medew nefer (good speech), the domain of human interaction, and medew neter (Divine speech), the highest domain, which construed in the West might approximate philosophy and metaphysics. In his understanding of the role of the per ankh, Carruthers endeavors to show its relationship to the development of individuals trained in good speech as the operational base of knowledge, and as such the operational base of society. Reading primary documents concerned with first principles in Kemetic deep thought, Carruthers arrives at the conclusion that within the per ankh one of the most important genres of literature was the *Sebayet* (Instructions), where pupils were instructed in the ways of conduct toward other human beings and the larger cosmos.

As stated in the introduction of this dissertation, Carruthers, elsewhere views the *Sebayet* as one of the main “African disciplines” along with the aforementioned medew neter,

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25. For definitions of medew neter and medew nefer, see Jacob Carruthers, *Mdw Ntr*, 39-40. The link between speech, education, and governance animates the entire book. Carruthers states: “We can expand this Kemetic discipline of “education” to include the stories about Good Speech, especially Khun Anup and the Book of Neferti mentioned above. These latter texts emphasize the problems of achieving justice (Khun Anup) and national integration (Neferti) They articulate not only the wisdom concerning governance, but also the process through which the knowledge is acquired, i.e., through Good Speech.” Ibid, 54.

medew nefer, medicine, and governance.\textsuperscript{27} Writings produced in these areas, such as “The Satire of the Trades,” “The Immortality of Writers,” and “The Teachings of Ptah-hotep” are among many examples of literature that indicate the role of writing, knowledge, and the \textit{per ankh} in Kemetic society.

Another important thinker in the conceptualization of the \textit{per ankh} is Ayi Kwei Armah. In his memoir, \textit{The Eloquence of the Scribes} (2006), Armah discusses the important processes of training that characterized life in the \textit{per ankh}, linking this scribal training to an extended literary tradition in African societies, notable for important thematic emphases on connection and questions and power and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{28} In his fictional work, \textit{KMT: In the House of Life}, Armah dramatizes the role of the \textit{per ankh}, showing how it emerged as an intellectual space concerned with large questions of reality and how it eventually became a source for advice and counseling for the royal families.\textsuperscript{29} The scribes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} See Jacob H. Carruthers, “Kush and Kemet: The Pillars of African-Centered Thought,” in \textit{Contemporary Africana Theory, Thought, and Action: A Guide to Africana Studies}, ed. Clenora Hudson-Weems (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007), 53 and Chapter One. Carruthers is speaking more broadly than “disciplines;” he seems to mean categories of knowledge. Clearly, these areas would not be considered disciplines in the sense discussed in Part I of this dissertation. Attempts to frame categorizations of knowledge in non-Western societies as disciplines only end up re-inserting previous notions of “discipline” into the framework for understanding these societies’ conceptions of knowledge. Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton attempt to do so for the Indian idea of \textit{sastras}, but end up using Western requirements for what a discipline constitutes to search and then frame them as a corollary to the idea of the discipline. It should seem quite obvious that every culture has developed categories of knowledge. However, many times the absence of such recognizable forms (discipline) lead commentators to conclude that no such categories exist, especially when one considers whether or not a given culture has “literature” or “philosophy.” On the \textit{sastras}, See Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton, \textit{Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet} (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2008). 185-191. On the ways in which philosophy has read been read into other cultures, specifically the Africans’, see Jacob Carruthers, \textit{Mdw Ntr}, 10-15.
\item \textsuperscript{28} See Ayi Kwei Armah, \textit{The Eloquence of the Scribes: A Memoir on the Sources and Resources of African Literature} (Popenguine, Senegal: Per Ankh Books, 2006), 211-224.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Part Three of the novel (cited in note 3) includes fictional vignettes written by Kemetic scribes that emanated from the House of Life. In these vignettes, Armah dramatizes a conflict between members of the \textit{per ankh} who remained aloof from the royal dictates of Kemetic society (people of the sphere) and those who became counselors and allied to their power (people of the pyramid). It was the people of the sphere, who were concerned with the major questions of human existence,
\end{itemize}
in the *per ankh* are termed by Armah, *companions*, to indicate the common objectives and camaraderie which existed in this space of intellectual work.

For Hilliard, Carruthers, and Armah, then, the temple complexes which housed the *per ankh* were important spaces that oriented scribes, priests, and other officials to the life of the mind, underpinned by the spiritual ideas which animated Kemetic society.

*The Traditionalists*

Armah’s work also discusses another exemplar in the African intellectual tradition, the traditionalists of Northwest Africa. In the popular literature, this group continues to be known as *griots*, a French term which nevertheless reduces them to storytellers. In *The Eloquence of the Scribes*, Armah not only clarifies their role as the cultural lifeblood of the societies in which they live, he links them historically to knowledge communities that had migrated across the continent, originating in the Nile Valley.  

The single most important contribution to our understanding of the traditionalists is Amadou Hampate Ba’s “The Living Tradition” (1981). In this essay appearing in UNESCO’s *General History of Africa*, Ba places emphasis on the varied and essential roles of the *doma*, translated as “knowers.” The intellectual culture that they represented and with the cultural memory of the society. In *The Eloquence of the Scribes*, Armah intimates: “The artists who produced what we now call ancient Egyptian literature were not primarily interested in literature *per se*. They were not blind to literary values, but they thought of themselves as participants in a more important process, the maintenance of vital connections between parts of a universe in which connections meant life, disconnection death. It would thus be accurate to think of ancient Egyptian literature as the record of a long ritual involving members of a community of affection so extensive as to embrace living members in present time, members who had lived and died by those memory it was the responsibility of the living to keep alive, and members yet to come, who would inherit the common memory and manage its flow into the future.” Ibid, 195.

30. See Ibid, 171-190 and passim.
included not only oral-historical and musical traditions, but was broadened to other areas such as governance, medicine, and agriculture. As Ba states, this “African tradition” did “not cut life into slices and the knower is rarely a specialist.” These thinkers would not have belonged to a “discipline,” as they were practitioners of “total knowledge.” As a result, the institutions that trained them were highly sophisticated. Much like the sesh, or the companions, the doma were crucial to the functioning of society. In fact, the group of doma responsible for the memory and genealogy of the society were called, dieli, translated as “blood.” According to Ba and Armah, as blood circulates throughout the body, removing impurities and cleansing organs, so should the dieli do for the societies in which they serve. Ba continues by explaining the training and schooling required for this practice, showing how organized institutions were organic developments in the context of these “pre-colonial” West African societies.

The practices of the traditionalists have been considered by an array of Western commentators, historians, and anthropologists. The most important are the works of Marcel Griaule, which include Conversations with Ogotommeli (1965) and The Pale Fox (1965), co-authored with Germaine Dieterlen, which attempt to get a handle on the various ideas encountered in Dogon cosmology. Other Western contributions include Thomas Hale’s Griots and Griottes (1998), Barbara Hoffman’s Griots at War (2000), and Jan Jansen’s The Griot’s Craft (2000). These works all explain the multifarious practices of the traditionalists,
adding more to the existing literature than characterizations that only discuss their storytelling functions, as well as showing the import of their work for power structures in various social structures. In addition, in Francophone Africa, there is important work emerging that uses traditionalist intellectual work to discuss the histories of migrations among Africans in the region. Of these, the two-volume *La Grande Geste du Mali* (1991), co-authored by Wa Kamissoko and Yousuff Tata Cisse should command attention.

Also linked to these traditions were the great West African learning complexes of Sankore at Timbuktu and Djenne. The aforementioned *A History of African Higher Education* by Y. G-M Lulat mentions these important institutions. Also seminal is the John Henrik Clarke article published in the *Western Journal of Black Studies*, “The University of Sankore at Timbuctoo: A Neglected Achievement in Black Intellectual History” (1977), and the various translations of works completed during this era by John O. Hunwick, including *Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire* (2003). Institutions like Sankore created a “cosmopolitan” atmosphere, embracing many different foundations for knowledge stemming from Arabic and Greek language traditions, but never neglecting the foundations that rested upon indigenous African ideas.


As Ba asserts, when discussing the idea of the traditionalists, we must remember that the tradition is “living.” As such, the continuity of these old practices and their transmutation to new contexts must be considered.

*The Societies*

An important institution based on the foregoing models is what Michael Gomez in his *Exchanging Our Country Marks* calls the “societies of men and societies of women.” The importance of rites of passage into these societies was not only the passage to manhood or womanhood, but also the passing down of knowledge of the world.³⁸ In his seminal commencement address at Fisk University in 1933 entitled the “Field and Function of the American Negro College,” W.E.B. Du Bois remarks on the “perfection” of the “bush school” suggesting that this model of education be embraced by African peoples throughout the world as a culturally appropriate model.³⁹ Other Africans throughout the diaspora have both discussed and embraced the idea, as the notion of rites of passage continues to be one of the most vibrant cultural continuities among Africans in the Western hemisphere.⁴⁰ Scores of works have emerged that offer ways to re-member the African based rites of passage systems to meet the needs of contemporary society on the Western side of the Atlantic.⁴¹

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³⁹. W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Field and Function of the American Negro College,” *Fisk News* 6 (1936): 410. In characterizing the system, Du Bois gives us a conception that is similar to the ideas expressed in the other institutions discussed above. He states: “Thus education was completely integrated with life. There could be no uneducated people. There could be no education what was not at once for use in earning a living and for use in living as life.” Ibid.


⁴¹. See inter alia, Kwame Agyei Akoto, *Nationbuilding: Theory and Practice in Afrikan Centered Education* (Washington, DC: Pan Afrikan World Institute, 1992); Kwame Agyei Akoto and Akua Nson
The Studiers

This propensity to form societies for specific purposes was translated into study groups and reading circles in the New World during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. The notion of “literacy for freedom” that Heather Andrea Williams explores in her *Self-Taught* (2005) and that Peter Murrell points to as a historical legacy in his *African-Centered Pedagogy* (2001) could be conceived as more than practical. Connected to the ideas discussed above, they can also be understood as cultural imperatives. In Williams’ text, she shows how Africans in the United States linked the idea of literacy to freedom; this is quite similar to the way that earlier African intellectual traditions linked knowledge to ways of ordering and governing their own societies for the continuity of life.42 Murrell’s reading of the historical fights for literacy serve to pinpoint the need to develop pedagogies based on upon the same cultural logic which made reading and writing fundamental to Africans’ quest for equality.43

Not only did Africans in the United States and other parts of the diaspora fight for literacy, they developed institutions. In her *Forgotten Readers* (2002), Elizabeth McHenry explores the development of reading circles in African American communities. These traditions were contemporaneous with American learned societies, providing Africans

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42. See Heather Andrea Williams, *Self-Taught: African American Education in Slavery and Freedom* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). Williams’ work shows that the exceptionalist narratives of Frederick Douglass and others were actually part of a widespread continuum that characterized Africans’ fight for literacy during and after slavery.

with the means by which to understand the (new) world in which they lived. Along with McHenry’s work, important documentation of African intellectual institutions devoted to study can be found in Alfred Moss’ *The American Negro Academy* (1981) and in Greg Carr’s contribution to *The African World History Project: The Preliminary Challenge* (1997). Of particular importance is how these reading societies were conceived as measures of resistance, and according to Carr the formation of nationalist identity. Many of these thinkers involved were self-trained, and not connected to universities, and if they were, they were part of the faculty at historically Black colleges and universities. Important to their sustenance were informal networks of book collectors, librarians, and bookstores. These are discussed in Elinor Des Verney Sinnette, W. Paul Coates, and Thomas C Battle’s edited *Black Bibliophiles and Collectors* (1990) and Donald Joyce’s *Gatekeepers of Black Culture* (1983). Also predating these informal institutions was the African-led political fight to implement public education in the Reconstruction South outlined first in W.E.B. Du Bois’ *Black Reconstruction in America* (1935) and more recently in the seminal work of


If we can stipulate the continuity and vibrancy of these particular patterns of African institutions, then what remains is the responsibility of exploring the links between African thinkers and intellectuals to the these communities of meaning. Michael Gomez explores the ways in which “race” in America essentially made necessary the development of an almost singular community, which had been previously made up of different ethnicities. Of course, social stratification was also part of such formations. In his work as well as in the work of Cedric Robinson, including the aforementioned *Black Marxism* and his *Black Movements in America* (1997), the development of two strands of African American social and political thought began to emerge by the nineteenth century. Those of the privileged sector traditionally linked their fortunes to the “dominant American creed.” But there were also those who saw value in the various African communities from whence they came. Increasingly, these members of what Robinson terms the “renegade intelligentsia” began to turn their back on their training and toward their cultural origins. In many ways, they saw the importance of re-linking themselves to forms of cultural and intellectual development that were central to African communal processes: the church, educational institutions, the social and civic clubs, and

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49. Ibid, 96.
in organizations geared toward the folk. These are the exemplars of the Black radical tradition, the individuals largely responsible for the development of Africana Studies. As they are products of both internal forces, the institutional patterns discussed above embraced and extended by New World Africans, and external forces, that is, university training and Western knowledges—they represent the current dilemmas of contemporary Africana Studies. By showing us how representative swaths of these thinkers gravitated more and more to the cultural mean of the African community, Cedric Robinson’s intellectual history offers that perhaps we too, can see like they did, the hopes, dreams, and meanings of what it meant to be African in the world and to use these meanings to orient our work. By exploring pre-existing modalities of African intellectual work, the current chapter helps to envision Africana Studies’ intellectual history in ways that go beyond the normative practice of channeling their ideas into Western philosophies.

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51. See Ibid, 167-184 and Chapter One of this dissertation. In his work on Black radicalism, Robinson asserts that Black revolutionary theorists would abandon Western radical theory and embrace the revolutionary ideas that grounded African revolts throughout the new world. What grounds the current work is that the same could be said about African ideas in general. In other words, Africana Studies must link itself to the various intellectual traditions that represent African communities.
Chapter 6
Have We Any Rivers?: Pan-African Thought in Conversation with Western Disciplinarity, 1879-1965

...we may sense that the river of black struggle is people, but it is also the hope, the movement, the transformative power that humans create and that create them, us, and makes them, us, new persons. So we black people are the river; the river is us. The river is in us, created by us, flowing out of us, surrounding us, re-creating us and this entire nation.
-Vincent Harding, *There is a River*¹

I've known rivers:
I've known rivers ancient as the world and older than the flow of human blood in human veins.
My soul has grown deep like the rivers.
-Langston Hughes, “The Negro Speaks of Rivers”²

Have you any rivers that seem uncrossable?”
-African American spiritual

The metaphor of river encapsulates both the struggles and hopes of Africans living under the aegis of Western controlled intellectual and geopolitical spaces. As the above epigraph from Harding indicates, rivers can at once represent the continuity of struggle, and as the lyrics of the spiritual reveal, they can also represent some impediment to its continuity. These ideas of course are not novel. In the spiritual world of the Ki-Kongo, the Akan, as well as the Kemetic people, the metaphorical (or real) importance of the river again emerges. In each of these traditions, the river represents some crossing, some movement from one stage to another.³ This meaning was not lost on Harding, as in his usage of the river, African ideas and struggle represented a necessary movement toward a

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better world. Transition, is thus an important way of understanding African ideas; it, despite representing movement, does not always indicate, however, the total destruction of collective memory. As Greg Carr asserts, Africana Studies “translates and recovers” the foundations out of which these fundamental ways of knowing ourselves can be used to generate methods for engaging in the best forms of intellectual praxis. The river out of which Africana Studies flows represents an extended genealogy of ideas that when merged with the flow of Western knowledge generated a rough, tumultuous confluence. This (alternative) stream has often been muted, relegated to insignificance, despite the fact that it has generated an important silt of ideas necessary for not only African people, but for humanity. Though the terms from which they emerged and can be captured are decidedly complicated, the institutional traditions discussed in Chapter Five were emptied into the various tributaries of knowledge that created intellectual genealogies in Pan-African communities as they developed throughout modern era. The current chapter investigates the attempts to understand the life cycles of these groups, their genealogical relationships to other groups, and finally, the ramifications of the former for contemporary Africana Studies.

Chapter Six picks up the discussion in the late nineteenth century fully cognizant that previous life cycles, previous ripples of the river, have determined largely the

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4. Echoing the articulated hopes of thinkers like W.E.B. Du Bois, Harding states: “I write, trusting that some parents and grandparents and teachers will read aloud and share this with the children, will become new sources of memory, will remind one another that our destination has always been a new, transformed humanity, a new humanized society (not “equal opportunity” in a dehumanized one), will remember that we have come this far at great cost.” Vincent Harding, There is a River, xxv.

trajectory of this particular moment. The figures to be discussed below cannot be delinked from African-generated institutions like the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the National Equal Rights League, trade unionism in the Caribbean, the still vibrant rites of passage formations on the African continent, and the many named and unnamed secret classrooms and social organizations throughout the Diaspora. Nor can they be considered distinct or different in any fundamental way from many of their contemporaries who could have equally commanded sections in their own rights: William Wells Brown (1814-1884), James Theodore Holly (1829-1911), John Mercer Langston (1829-1897), James William Charles Pennington (1807-1870), Frederick Douglass (1817-1895), Frances Ellen Watkins Harper (1825-1911), George Washington Williams (1849-1891), Alexander Crummell (1819-1898), Hosea Easton (1798-1837), John Jacob Thomas (1841-1889), Pauline Elizabeth Hopkins (1856-1930), Timothy Thomas Fortune (1856-1928), Ida Bell Wells-Barnett (1862-1931), and countless others, to whose struggles a single work could never dream to give justice.

Clearly, then, this work considers the intellectual dimension of the Black radical tradition, what Cedric Robinson terms the “renegade intelligentsia,” but widened somewhat to include those “native thinkers” who may not be have considered “leftist,” yet nevertheless participated in and contributed to the flow of the river. It would be demonstrably naïve to suggest that within this wide swath of intellectual activity among

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Africans across the world there developed identical approaches to problem solving and resistance. While there have been reactions against the use of binary classifications like nationalist/integrationist to characterize streams of intellectual and political thought in African communities, these broad ideas and their variants may possibly represent two poles on a long continuum that include between them the various positions that African people have taken in the face of Western oppressions.

Improvising somewhat upon the work of Harold Cruse, Jacob Carruthers, and Anderson Thompson, the current examination of thinkers involved in various levels of resistance to Western knowledges, loosely categorizes their ideas to contest and confront it by utilizing the poles of *insurgency* and *reimagination*. The insurgent tradition represents a strand that confronts the universal and the moral truth generated by Western intellectual traditions and impugns their validity or questions its range. In many ways their initial break with the West prepared the ground for the reimaginative strain. This impulse continues the work of the insurgent tradition, but adds more. The idea of reimagination suggests that confrontation was not enough, and that the rehabilitation of African intellectual work requires a reconnection with African history, language, and deep thought traditions to show not only its present vibrancy but to ensure its future.

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7. Carruthers states: “When Harold Cruse in his *Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* identified the two streams of thought among African Americans, he aptly captured the essence of the worldwide African debate. For him the integrationist and the nationalist streams represented the most fundamental division among us.” See Jacob Carruthers, *Mdw Ntr: Divine Speech: A Historiographical Reflection of African Deep Thought From the time of the Pharaohs to the Present* (London: Karnak House, 1995), 1. Carruthers continues by revising these streams into “champions of African Deep Thought” (nationalists) and “authentic African philosophers” (integrationists). Carruthers and historian Anderson Thompson have taken this “divide” as the difference between groups of vindicationists, those who attempt to assert the basic humanity of Africans, and foundationalists, those that attempt to develop an autonomous and culturally appropriate historiography to elucidate that humanity.
preservation. While Class, ideology, and region have been used in recent African intellectual histories as the fundamental lens from which to understand various positions taken, the ideas of insurgency and reimagination within African intellectual work often cut across different class and ideological orientations, as understood in the normative sense, while also transcending region. Therefore this dissertation proposes a different lens, one which conceptualizes the ways in which Africans have preserved their fundamental orientations to reality in whatever forms appropriate, as constituting the primary characterization of different modes of resistance. The river is its own mode of inquiry and way of knowing—the underlying rhythm for understanding African intellectual history.

I. Exemplars of African Thought in the Age of Euro-American Scientific Expansion

It cannot begin with history and get to Negro history. It cannot begin with sociology and get to Negro sociology.

-W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Field and Function of the American Negro College"

By the middle of the nineteenth century, as the works reviewed in Chapters Three and Four indicate, the organizational transformation of Western universities helped to

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8. See Part IV for a discussion of some of these works.
9. For one formulation of this rhythm, see also Jon Michael Spencer, The Rhythms of Black Folk: Race, Religion, and Pan-Africanism (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1995). In response to the critiques hurled at the work of Cheikh Anta Diop and other African-centered thinkers, John Henrik Clarke has countered that “if you read Cheikh Anta Diop’s The Cultural Unity of Africa, he never said that all African cultures were the same. But he said there’s a strain running through Africa that gives Africa a kind of unifying development in spite of the diversity and the difference between one part of Africa and another.” See John Henrik Clarke, “Debate Between Dr. John Henrik Clarke and Dr. Cornel West,” (Paper presented at The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, February 1995). This is also discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation.
initiate the rise of an increasingly theoretical, research-driven, discipline-based, scientific framework. Here is as good a choice as any to see clearly how African thinkers began to distinguish their approaches to knowledge, as Western ideas became increasingly systematized and linked strongly to the rise of industrial power and the contemporary nation-state. African thinkers of this era were assuredly aware of evolving paradigms in the new philosophies of science, as many were trained at universities which embraced these new ideas. Notwithstanding their training, the ways in which many of these theorists conducted their research sought to question, at the very least, and many times, challenge the supposed infallibility of dominant ways of approaching intellectual work seeking to accurately reflect the true nature, character, and experiences of non-Europeans in general, and African people in particular. As professional academic organizations began to rise at the close of the nineteenth century, the ideas of insurgency and reimagining became necessary responses by African thinkers to the increasingly normative approaches that were being used to prove the scientific inferiority of the non-European, the development of a society that recognized and affirmed this inferiority, and the disciplinary theories and methodologies that made the former possible—ideas which ranged across the social and physical sciences and the humanities. Here we will review the works that chronicle attempts by five representative exemplars who would write important treatises challenging normative foundations of science during and after this watershed moment: Martin Robison Delany (classics, ethnology), Edward Wilmot Blyden (humanities), Joseph Antenor Firmin (anthropology), Anna Julia Cooper (social sciences, history), and William
Edward Burghardt Du Bois (social sciences, history), before exploring a range of early twentieth century exemplars.

a. Martin Robison Delany

The legacy of the African American thinker, Martin Robison Delany (1812-1885), has been variously and accurately conceptualized as one of a theorist primarily concerned with the advancement of the African “race” through methods of political maneuvering, economic development, social advocacy, as well as cultural and scholarly production. Born in Charles Town, West Virginia, but based in Pittsburgh before moving throughout the world, Delany was dubbed by many, “the father of Black nationalism.” Toyin Falola has considered Delany part of a group of thinkers in the mid-nineteenth century that attempted to underpin race-work with the more important ideas of civilization, nationhood, and culture—ideas prevalent among African intellectuals and religious leaders, as Delany himself was trained in an AME church sponsored school.11 In addition to his writings on emigration, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States* (1852) and *Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party* (1861), his novel, *Blake, or the Huts of America* (1852),12 and his many speeches and editorials, Delany


the polymath, would offer an important work which considered the importance of placing before Africans a sense of their world historical significance and a cultural consciousness important for any future political movements, while uprooting dominant Western ideas of Africans’ race, culture, and history. This was his 1879 tract, *Principia of Ethnology: The Origins of Race and Color*.

The most recent Delany biographies, such as Robert Levine’s *Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass and the Politics of Representation* (1997) and Tunde Adeleke’s *Without Regard to Race* (2003) correctly conceptualize *Principia of Ethnology* as a continuation of his earlier *Condition and Blake*, filtering the discussion into Delany’s ideas about race and nationalism. They, however, fail to consider the import of *Principia of Ethnology* as a challenge to the dominant strains of Western thought regarding race by not systematically addressing the process, methodology, and importance of Delany’s attempt and his rationale for translating the ancient Egyptian texts in Chapter X of the text, among other important objectives found in the work. Both Levine and Adeleke’s work suggest that *Principia of Ethnology*, a text on “race relations,” simply reveals the flowering of Delany’s nationalism (Levine) or his involving integrationism (Adeleke).\(^{13}\)

Chapter X, along with the balance of the second half of the text, is Delany’s assertion of a classical heritage for African people the world over, premised on scientific attitudes about African and African American intellectual capabilities as well as ponder their social and political futures in the form of historical and socio-political methods in the case of *Condition* and in literary fiction in *Blake*. For a collection of other Delany works, see Robert Levine, ed. *Martin Delany: A Documentary Reader* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

grounds. 14 While this in itself is not unusual, Delany’s novel attempt to fuse a systematic translation of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, provide a historical and spiritual basis for African national identity, and to place all of this in the context of world development, was at once a dismissal of normative Western global history and the basis for a reimagined history of the world from an African perspective.

Chapter X on hieroglyphs is followed by a rumination on Egyptian and Ethiopian spiritual traditions, the latter representing the nineteenth century tradition of Ethiopianism, prevalent in the African world community. 15 This is followed by Delany’s “Garden of the Hesperides” which was the fusion of the African “domestic, social, moral, religious, literary, and political economy” represented in a grand seal. 16 The inclusion of this seal, replete with a full articulation of African humanity, clearly shows Delany’s long-range objective of conceptualizing a complete and coherent African historical consciousness as the grounds for African regeneration. Delany includes in the section explaining the emblem:

Our compendium is designed to illustrate (unlike the Garden of Hesperides) not what had been attained by great efforts and the high civilization of the ancient Africans, but that which is now required demanded of the people of the present day of that race. A continent and race are to be redeemed and regenerated; this can only be accomplished by their own efforts, under the guidance of an all-wise Providence and His grace; and in addition, the aid of the civilization of the Christian nations of the earth should be tendered them. 17

15. On Ethiopanism, the idea that African future development was a matter of prophesy, see inter alia Wilson Jeremiah Moses, Afrotopia: The Roots of African American Popular History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 26-27.
17. Ibid, 81.
*Principia of Ethnology* suggests that far beyond connecting African historical fortunes to Western science, its future must rest on African ideas. Clearly there is more at work here than mere political propaganda for integration or pluralism on the one hand, or race nationalism on the other.\(^{18}\)

Not until Mario H. Beatty’s 2005 article, “Martin Delany: The First African American to Translate Egyptian Hieroglyphs,” was there an attempt to analyze specifically the methodology pursued by Delany in *Principia of Ethnology* with regard to ancient Egyptian language.\(^{19}\) Beatty’s article frames Delany’s discussion and translation of the ancient Egyptian language within a larger context of an explicit challenge to the prevailing scientific norms characteristic of Egyptology, ethnology, and the study of classical archaeology.\(^{20}\) For Beatty, the intellectual milieu was epitomized by the “American school of ethnology” and its endorsement of racial-scientific epistemologies. The article journeys through the intellectual background of thinkers associated with this school including Josiah Nott (1804-1873), Samuel Morton (1799-1851), and George Gliddon (1809-1857). Their work in the mid-nineteenth century established what came to be foundational scientific norms about Africans in terms of intellectual capacity, based

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19. Mario H. Beatty, “Martin Delany: The First African American to Translate Egyptian Hieroglyphs,” *International Journal of Africana Studies* 11 (Fall 2005): 131-153. Beatty states that it is important to note the continuities of this work with prior works, but ultimately “insufficient to account for the significant alterations that Delany makes.” In his view, Delany use of hieroglyphics was meant to partially construct a historical genealogy for African humanity. Ibid, 133.

20. Beatty states: “In *Principia of Ethnology*, Delany attempted to refute some of the racist ideas in the emerging scientific discourse of Egyptology, ethnology, and archaeology that perpetuated and promoted the idea that the inferior status of African people had been virtually unchanged since antiquity and their future destiny would inevitably conform to the stability of the past.” Ibid, 132.
upon biological rather than environmental theories.\textsuperscript{21} Their work in Egyptology and archaeology\textsuperscript{22} set the stage for later generations of “objective” science on and about African people, which Delany challenges.

The Beatty article then takes us to the section in \textit{Principia of Ethnology} where Delany gives his translation of the Luxor obelisk of Ramses II, based upon a previous translation by George Gliddon. Beatty is able to show both the technical deficiencies and assumptions of both Delany’s and Gliddon’s work by juxtaposing their various translations. Despite the deficiencies, he is able to conclude from Delany’s translation, the attempt to challenge Gliddon’s position that Africans were not genealogically connected to the works of art and science of Egyptian civilization. Delany’s ability to grapple with ancient Egyptian and Ethiopian language helped to properly situate African history based upon the records left by Africans themselves. This for Beatty represented a challenge to the “very stability of the conceptual and political universe of White supremacy.”\textsuperscript{23}

Delany’s “discarding” of the prevailing theories of Western ethnological sciences represent conceptualizations inherent within African intellectual traditions that had been

\textsuperscript{21} Quoting from William Stanton’s \textit{The Leopard’s Spots}, Beatty shows that the combined efforts of these three men: Gliddon, Morton, and Nott, among others would produce the 1854 work, \textit{Types of Mankind}, which according to Beatty asserted that “the comprehension of Black inferiority could no longer be understood through the medium of environmental explanations, but rather, had to be sought through more enduring biological explanations.” Ibid, 135-136. Beatty’s quotes from and suggests the following chapter of Stanton’s for context on the prevailing “niggerology,” to use Nott’s term, and discussion of \textit{Types of Mankind}: William Stanton, \textit{The Leopard’s Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America, 1815-1859} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 161-173. See also Josiah Nott and George Gliddon, \textit{Types of Mankind, Or Ethnological Researches Based upon Ancient Monuments Sculptures, and Crania of Races and upon their Natural, Geographical, Philological and Biblical History} (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, & Co, 1855).

\textsuperscript{22} See Mario H. Beatty, “Martin Delany: The First African American to Translate Egyptian Hieroglyphs,” 135- 136 and William Stanton, \textit{The Leopard’s Spots}, 70.

\textsuperscript{23} Mario H. Beatty, “Martin Delany: The First African American to Translate Egyptian Hieroglyphs,” 143.
characteristic in the works of other thinkers including Frederick Douglass, almost twenty years earlier.\textsuperscript{24} Challenging American race science was for Delany and others, both an attempt to properly understand the African past as part and parcel of the project for political and social empowerment for the African world. Also essential to our reading of Delany in Africana Studies is his work on African languages, recognizing that they are in fact the key in unlocking the potential grounds for thinking about African culture in new and meaningful ways. Delany’s work set the standard and momentum for translating and recovering those memories necessary for truly understanding African ideas.

\textbf{b. Edward Wilmot Blyden}

A second exemplar, and contemporary of Delany was the St. Thomas-U.S. Virgin Islands born educator, Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-1912). Blyden was an early Pan-African political thinker, eventually moving from the Caribbean to Liberia where he participated in the modern educational transformation of various parts of West Africa. While Africana Studies thinkers have variously remembered Blyden as an early theorist on African culture and on Pan-Africanist political thought, it appears that a signal contribution was Blyden’s interpretation of the humanities.\textsuperscript{25} The idea of human culture,

\textsuperscript{24} See the Martin Delany, \textit{Principia of Ethnology}, 10, for his declarative intent to “discard” the theories of Champollion, Nott, and Gliddon. In 1854, Frederick Douglass speaking before an audience of scientists at Case Western Reserve offered his critique of race science. See Frederick Douglass, \textit{The Claims of the Negro, Ethnologically Considered: An Address Before the Literary Societies of Western Reserve College, at Commencement, July 12, 1854} (Rochester, NY: Press of Lee, Mann, & Co., 1854). See the brief discussion of the synergy between their ideas on scientific racism in Robert S. Levine, \textit{Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative Identity}, 8-10.

\textsuperscript{25} Blyden has been tied to political genealogies of Pan-African thought in the works of inter alia, Wilson Jeremiah Moses, \textit{The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) and Jacob Carruthers, \textit{Intellectual Warfare} (Chicago: Third World Press, 1999). These dissimilar works represent approaches to Blyden originating largely from different epistemological foundations. For Moses, Blyden’s, and the other personalities he discusses, nationalism or Pan-Africanism was predicated on Anglo-American values and concepts.
read and studied in the forms of literature, arts, and history, was during the late 1800s, an important part of Western curriculums, especially those prepared for the colonized and/or native intellectual class in imperial educational centers. This provides some context to the ways in which Blyden would enter and confront the West.

Of his many writings, which included ruminations on African politics, culture, and Western religions, his inaugural address at Liberia College, “The Aims and Methods of Liberal Education for Africans” (1881) continues to impart a sense of his Africana nationalist leanings as conceptualized via his intellectual and academic work. “The Aims and Methods of Liberal Education for Africans” argued for a reconceptualization of African education that relied primarily on African culture as opposed to the Western model of liberal culture that had characterized American and European universities traditionally.26 In an address full of quotable statements, many point to his edict that “Africans must advance by methods of his own,” as a quintessential declaration for the creation and/or utilization of African-centered methodologies and pedagogies.27

Blyden asserted in this address that Liberia College was in a reconstruction phase in its evolution, and for him that phase required a re-assessment of its general curricular assumptions, in what he terms a “generative” moment.28 He then situated the existing modes of education, showing how they have failed to adequately prepare African students

27. Ibid, 11.
28. He continued: “It [the college] must create a sentiment favorable to its existence. It must generate the intellectual and moral state in the community which will give it not only a congenial atmosphere in which to thrive, but food and nutriment for its enlargement and growth; and out of this will naturally come the material conditions of its success.” Ibid, 5.
for national and/or community leadership and advancement. The combination of negative symbolic representations of Blackness and quasi-scientific race theories are what Blyden suggested created these various failures in the educational system regarding the development of cultural consciousness.\(^29\) After outlining these historical failures, Blyden, speaking in large part to a group of Americo-Liberians, insisted that the proper aim of education and the curriculum as it attempts to further the race should be “to preserve an accurate balance to the studies which carry the mind out of itself, and to those which recall it home again” and to develop men and women of “ability.”\(^30\) This “home” for Blyden was the realization that Africans had within themselves the tools for which to eventually liberate themselves from the mental incarcerations that the current educational systems had intended to enforce. And further, the upshot was that they were surrounded by viable alternatives. He stated emphatically that

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\text{…in looking over the whole civilized world I see no place where this sort of culture for the Negro can be better secured than in Liberia, where he may with less interruption from surrounding influences, find out his place and his world, develop his gifts and powers; and for the training of Negro youth upon the basis of their own idiosyncracy, with a sense of race, individuality, self-respect, and liberty, there is no institution so well adapted as Liberia College with its Negro faculty and Negro students.}^{31}
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One of the more important biographies of Blyden, Hollis Lynch’s *Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot* (1967) outlines that the objective of this address within the context of Blyden’s larger objectives for Liberia College was “to counteract the evil influences which European ideas and teachings had had on the Negro, to correct European

\[^{29}\text{He explained the result: “Having embraced, or at least assented to these falsehoods about himself, he concludes that his only hope of rising in the scale of respectable manhood, is to strive after whatever is most unlike himself and most alien to his peculiar tastes.” Ibid, 10.}\]

\[^{30}\text{Ibid, 14.}\]

\[^{31}\text{Ibid.}\]
misrepresentation of Africa and the Negro, and to play the leading role in interpreting Africa to the rest of the world.” Lynch’s biography also interprets Blyden’s comments on the evolution of the curriculum, in which he kept intact much of the Graeco-Roman classical heritage, as an attempt to temporarily remove vestiges of modern racist science and eventually “foster more and more African subjects.” From Blyden’s own words, it is clear that he intended for Liberia College to one day be the clear leader in the study of African cultures and languages, underpinned by explicit socio-political implications.

James Conyers’ dissertation, “An Afrocentric Study of the Philosophy of Edward Wilmot Blyden” (1998), suggests that this educational philosophy was in fact an early Afrocentric paradigmatic model. Conyers views “The Aims and Methods of Liberal Education for Africans” as the “apex” of Blyden’s educational philosophy and points to his inclusion of women and his strong background in classical African history as important components of his educational philosophy. A more recent text, Teshale Tibebu’s Edward Wilmot Blyden and the Racial Nationalist Imagination (2012) views Blyden’s address as a important critique of Eurocentrism and as a call for the need to develop “an African methodology” for education. Tibebu explains that while Blyden does not suggest

33. Ibid, 151. The balance of the chapter is devoted to discussing the reasons and consequences behind Liberia College’s failure to implement the idea.
that we ignore other cultures, the prevailing assertion is that African education must rest
upon African foundations as a matter of course.36

Blyden’s idea that African culture could stand alone as the “generative” force for
an African university continued to influence and initiate the development and continuity
of African thinkers in this period, and in Tibebu’s view, those which were to come in the
mid-twentieth century.37 As Tibebu suggests in his text, Blyden’s other works including
*African Life and Customs* (1908), *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (1887) and *From West
Africa To Palestine* (1873), indicate his commitments to understanding and importing
African history and culture within frameworks to achieve the intellectual independence of
Africana educational institutions and socio-political structures.38 His works became the
foundation for many scholars, including the thinkers associated with the Harlem History
Club in the 1930s.39

The idea that one could be educated in what it means to be “human” using
African foundations could not be found in anything resembling Western educational
structures. But as Africans through various historical events were thrust into these same
halls of knowledge, they would not forget—or thinkers like Edward Wilmot Blyden would

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37. See Ibid, 148-172. Tibebu asserts that Blyden helped to prepare the ground for Leopold Sedar Senghor, Frantz Fanon, Cheikh Anta Diop, and Amilcar Cabral.
38. Ibid, 21-75 and passim.
not allow them to forget—that they did indeed came from cultures and intellectual traditions that could prepare them for being human, even in Western contexts. Combined with Delany’s work in history and language, Blyden’s vision for a liberated future depended on exercising the latent memory found in African cultural norms. Both thinkers were simultaneously part of an insurgent and reimaginative impulse that seemed to characterize an influential majority of thinkers during the periods in which they wrote.

**c. Antenor Firmin**

One of the most virulent critics of the emerging science of Western anthropology was the Haitian-born thinker, Joseph Antenor Firmin (1850-1911). Following in the traditions of the Haitian revolutionaries, but also of the work of Prince Saunders (1775-1839) and others, as well as anticipating the work of Jean Price-Mars (1876-1969), Firmin constructed one of the more cogent analyses of the narrowness and racism inherent in Western anthropological traditions, in his *De L’égalité des Races Humaines* (1885) translated as *The Equality of the Human Races*, in 2002 by Asselin Charles.

This text effectively challenges the normative strains of the discipline that attempted to articulate universal norms of humanity based upon African and other non-Europeans’ inferiority. Firmin who had been a member of the highest professional organization for the study of anthropology, in France, the Societe d’Anthropologie de Paris, developed *The Equality of the Human Races* out of the disagreements about the nature of humanity which had been articulated by among others, Paul Broca (1824-1880) and
Count Artur de Gobineau (1816-1882). Methodologically, Western anthropology was underpinned simply by the idea of anthropometrics. Firmin begins the work by articulating an alternative definition of the discipline rooted in a more sensible approach to humanity, underpinned by a holistic, if not transdisciplinary, appraisal of human qualities which asserted that what made one human went beyond mere physical biology. He stated:

Consequently, I define anthropology as the study of Man in his physical, intellectual, and moral dimensions, as he is found among the different races which constitute the human species. This definition differs noticeably from those of the scientists who are rightly considered the authorities in the discipline. Still, I do not feel obliged to embrace their opinion, however weighty it may be. My own definition may not be any better, but it suits my book’s purpose admirably and gives a clear idea of the different disciplines which I think an anthropologist must be knowledgeable.

Weaving through dominant anthropological debates, Firmin’s work sets out to affirm the humanity of his fellow African-descended persons throughout the world. He challenges the idea that race-mixing was an exercise in extending inferiority, while also challenging polygenetic theses which were based upon an assumed inferiority of those who were born of non-European stock. If left here, it is easy to see how Firmin’s work

42. Antenor Firmin, The Equality of the Human Races, 10. Firmin draws on and improvises upon many different European philosophical traditions to allow himself to move beyond the physical definitions of the major anthropologists of the time, like Paul Topinard, Paul Broca, Alphonse Bertillon, and Jean Louis Armand de Quatrefages de Breau. See Ibid, 1-10. On his unique read of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and others, see Lewis Gordon, An Introduction to Africana Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 60-61.
should have prepared the ground for a critique of structural anthropology which was to emerge in the twentieth century. Yet, the work was ignored.

While the work intended to build a more “positivist” anthropology, which Firmin meant to mean a rendering of truth based on the factual representation of all human actors, it also added a historical background of the African that was based on the classical and ancient civilizational antecedents. The second half of the work explores ancient Africa to show that the notion of a biological inferiority could not hold given the development of civilizations in Africa by the same human groups, who thousands of years later were the test case for this assumed inferiority. Firmin deals with Egypt in order to ascertain the foundations of the genealogy of the race—the same race Firmin affirms as responsible for the Haitian revolution of his homeland. For Firmin, these two historical events were crucial to showing how Africans were human—as all races were.

According to the introduction to the reprinting of The Equality of the Human Races by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Firmin’s remembrance had been rooted solely in his Pan-African activities in the English speaking world. In the French speaking world, particularly his native Haiti where he had participated in political movements, Firmin’s work was still remembered. Jean Price-Mars has written one of the more well

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44. See Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Introduction, xiii.
45. On Firmin’s reading of Auguste Comte and positivism, see Lewis Gordon, An Introduction to Africana Philosophy, 62-63.
documented accounts of his life, in his *Joseph Antenor Firmin* (1964). Recent works such as *An Introduction to Africana Philosophy* (2008), by philosopher Lewis Gordon, and by Asa Hilliard and other Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations (ASCAC) figures, have begun to include Firmin in this important Africana intellectual tradition. Theophile Obenga’s “Hommage à Anténor Firmin” (2008) properly situates Firmin as more than a mere contributor to an equalitarian anthropology, but as a thinker concerned with providing grounding to the study of African life, in its ancient history. While Firmin challenges the work of racist traditions within anthropology, he provides a new foundation for understanding the ways in which Africans can then “regenerate” themselves in the face of the imposition of the West. Clearly, then Antenor Firmin belongs among the best of the intellectual traditions represented by the individuals in this chapter, and his work promises yet another way of orienting the future work of Africana Studies.

d. Anna Julia Cooper

The life of Anna Julia Haywood Cooper (1858-1964) spanned almost the entirety of the period discussed in this chapter. Born to an enslaved mother in Raleigh, North Carolina, Cooper emerged as one of many powerful voices analyzing the question of systems of oppression during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. She has been remembered as both an early feminist and “race woman”—part of an intellectual class.

that attempted to marshal the voices that were silenced by the very systems of oppression she sought to understand. Both a scholar and an educator, the influence of Cooper on her contemporaries—practically all the figures discussed here—has only recently come to the fore.

Cooper biographers, Louise Daniel Hutchison and Leona Gabel have been generally credited with rescuing her from the obscurity with which she had been relegated, with their works *Anna J. Cooper: A Voice from the South* (1981) and *From Slavery to the Sorbonne and Beyond* (1982), respectively. Most works regarding Cooper connect her to the emergent Black feminist theory of the past three decades. Hutchison’s work clearly fits here, as does the introduction to the Schomburg Library of Nineteenth-Century Black Women Writer’s version of *A Voice from the South*, authored by Mary Helen Washington, which critiques Cooper’s feminist ideology. Perhaps the most important feminist history of Black women in America to emerge in this era, *When and Where I Enter* (1984) by Paula Giddings uses Cooper’s words in the title, framing the conversation almost entirely with her idea. One of the more recent works on Cooper, Vivian May’s *Anna Julia Cooper, Visionary Feminist* (2007) represents her as an early feminist and progenitor of


52. Mary Helen Washington, introduction to *A Voice from the South*, by Anna Julia Cooper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For Washington, Cooper’s critique bore “little resemblance to the lives of black women of the 1890s, most of whom were sharecroppers, struggling farmers, or domestic servants, few of whom could aspire to anything beyond an elementary education.” Ibid, xlix.

53. Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York: William Morrow, 1984). The source for the title of this text is Cooper most oft-quoted dictum: “Only the BLACK WOMAN can say “when and where I enter, in the quiet undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, then and there the whole Negro race enters with me.” Anna Julia Cooper, *A Voice from the South*, 31. This quote alone has been read as indicative of Cooper’s proto-Black feminism.
intersectionality, while reviewing the entire corpus of her work. May suggests that scholars develop more stringent methods for linking Cooper and others to feminist theory, asserting that “new imaginaries” should be developed as opposed to inserting her into “existing frameworks.”

A recent dissertation on Cooper, authored by Errol Teskani Browne, “Anna Julia Cooper and the Black Women’s Intellectual Tradition” (2008) asserts that while feminist theory is important in embracing Cooper, so are her Black nationalist-intellectual contributions. More important than simply appropriating Cooper into what Valethia Watkins has termed the “Black Feminist History Revisionist Project,” is conceptualizing the ways in which she utilized gender to frame the larger societal norms that cut across mere questions of gender and broached questions of Western ideas of society and knowledge.

Browne views *A Voice from the South* (1892) and her 1925 Sorbonne dissertation, “Slavery and the French Revolutionists, 1788-1805” as works which bracket Cooper’s consciousness about the problems of race in Western society. Cooper seemed to embrace the importance of a full awareness of the plight of African people throughout the world and how their situations might be connected and linked to larger systems of power.

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55. Browne’s work examines “Cooper’s body of scholarly work between the 1890s and 1920s in order to highlight the particular ways that intellectuals and activists struggled with and made sense of complicated questions of nationality and self-determination at the turn of the twentieth century. It examines the way that Anna Julia Cooper and other Black intellectuals sought to purposely gender nationalist discourse as alternatively male or female, and it underscores Black women's particular contributions (both recognized and unacknowledged) to the nationalist tradition.” Errol Teskani Browne, “Anna Julia Cooper and the Black Women’s Intellectual Tradition: Race, Gender and Nation in the Making of a Modern Race Woman 1892-1925,” (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2008), 31.

In the first part of *A Voice from the South*, Cooper placed the African into conversation with institutions like feudalism, Christianity, and the educational system, which clearly set particular ideals regarding the role of gender in the manifestations under which they thrived. Cooper argued that for the race to survive, it must rely on normative principles that allow womanhood to thrive in ways heretofore unconsidered, linking her nationalism to her womanhood. It in this section that she also declared that Black women’s experiences have not always dovetailed with other women’s and that race, but also culture, seemed to present to them alternative routes to both understanding and solving problems. Exhibiting a desire to conserve these viewpoints, she argued that social equality, does not necessary equal social acceptance, the former and not the latter was the solution to the amelioration of the race problem.

Challenging the “Woman’s movement” and anticipating W.E.B. Du Bois, Cooper declared that her cause, was “the cause of human kind,” and not based upon the interest of a single interest group.

Cooper continues this way of reasoning in the second part of the text which considered in more detail the question of race and its impact upon society. Here Cooper challenged the notion that civilization must be yoked to a notion of superiority. From

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57. See Anna Julia Cooper, *A Voice from the South*, 9-79. In this section Cooper anticipates the idea of “women’s ways of knowing” arguing that there “is a feminine as well as a masculine side to truth” and they are “complements” and not competing. See Ibid, 60.

58. For Cooper, this “double signification” to the idea of social equality has obscured the need to remove legal segregation with social civility. She asserts: “The “social equality” implied by civility to the Negro is a very different thing from forced association with him socially.” See Ibid, 109-110. Civil rights attorney and former federal judge, Constance Baker Motley has made similar comments regarding the differences between state segregation and social segregation, especially regarding the role of private historically Black colleges and universities as potential cultural institutions in the Black community. See her *Equal Justice Under the Law: An Autobiography* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), 239-240.

59. Ibid, 21. She continues: “It is not the intelligent woman vs. the ignorant woman; nor the white woman vs. the black, the brown, and the red,— it is not even the cause of woman vs. man. Nay, ‘tis woman’s strongest vindication for her speaking that the world needs to hear her voice.” Ibid.
here Cooper offered an analysis of how race was filtered through American literary culture, ultimately resulting in ethnocentric, and not universal appraisals of Black humanity.\textsuperscript{60} She then concludes with two chapters that consider the impact of the value of the African and philosophical analysis of the role of “belief” in the creation of a better society.\textsuperscript{61}

While \textit{A Voice from the South} is considered in some ways a manifesto, Cooper’s dissertation, completed at the age of sixty-six provides a sense of her scholarly acumen and approach to historiography. Originally written in French, “L’attitude de la France à l’égard de l’esclavage pendant la révolution,” translated in English as \textit{Slavery and the French and Haitian Revolutionists} (2006), by Frances R. Keller, continues the long tradition of African diasporic interest in Haiti.\textsuperscript{62} No doubt influenced by the identifications with Haiti that characterized African American intellectual traditions, Cooper focused in on the political climates in both France and Haiti during this era.\textsuperscript{63} The work endeavored to explore the dynamics of French revolutionary ideals and abolitionism and the concomitant institutions of slavery and the fomenting of revolution in Haiti, a former French colony.

\textsuperscript{60} See Anna Julia Cooper, \textit{A Voice from the South}, 175-227. Here, again Cooper asserts that the experiences of Black women reveal an alternative site of knowledge than that which held sway in normative depictions of race by American authors.

\textsuperscript{61} Lewis Gordon emphasizes Cooper’s importance in the understanding of the idea of value, which is for him a signal philosophical contribution. See Lewis Gordon, \textit{An Introduction to Africana Philosophy}, 72-73. Errol Teskani Browne argues that Part Two of the text has been “under-analyzed” and that it is crucial to an appreciation of Cooper’s feminism-nationalism. See Errol Teskani Browne, “Anna Julia Cooper and the Black Women’s Intellectual Tradition,” 149.

\textsuperscript{62} Anna Julia Cooper, \textit{Slavery and the French and Haitian Revolutionists} (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006).

\textsuperscript{63} On this relationship, see inter alia, Bruce Dain, “Haiti and Egypt in Early Black Radical Discourse in the United States,” \textit{Slavery and Abolition} 14, (December, 1993): 139-161 and Maurice Jackson and Jacqueline Bacon, eds., \textit{African Americans and the Haitian Revolution: Selected Essays and Documents} (New York: Routledge, 2009).
There have been very few attempts to link Anna Julia Cooper to Africana Studies. The best and most recent is the article, “Gendering Africana Studies” (2009) authored by Shirley Moody-Turner and James Stewart. Arguing that accepting and using Cooper’s work as an exemplar for the discipline answers the age-old conundrum of Black women’s belonging to Africana Studies, Moody-Turner and Stewart show that Cooper’s connection to this genealogy was cemented in both her activist orientation and her approach to knowledge. Regarding the latter, they assert that inherent in Cooper’s work is a methodological approach that decenters the West and allows for other ways of knowing to exist and inform truth claims. For Cooper, they argue, these alternative sites were the intellectual traditions of African people.

The foregoing is a mere sampling of the ideas found in the large corpus of work of Anna Julia Cooper and some of the emerging scholarship which considers her life. Cooper saw that the particular identities thrust upon people merely enforced boundaries, that ultimately limited the full expressions of their humanity, expressions that without which, civilization would falter. In this manner, Cooper’s work constitutes and informs traditions which we can only place within the genealogy of African ideas, especially those which have emerged in the face of the current sojourn through a Western oriented world.


65. They assert: Central to Cooper’s theoretical position is a critique of Western ethnocentric epistemologies and a call for both new sites of knowledge and new approaches to interpreting such knowledge. Positivism, as well as claims to “objectivity” and “pure reason,” bore the brunt of Cooper critiques; especially when these epistemological approaches were employed to draw conclusions about "the Negro." Ibid, 39. They give the example of Cooper’s work with the Hampton Folklore Society where we see how she was able to suggest ways of resolving this by attempting “to foreground black folklore as collected by black folklorists and to locate agency with the producers of such cultural knowledge…” Ibid, 41.
Cooper along with Firmin represented a consistent tendency to confront the dominant ideas of the West as they continued to mute the ideals of large swaths of human beings. As such, they are both pre-eminent examples of an insurgent scholarly tradition among African deep thinkers.

e. W.E.B. Du Bois

One of the more prominent if not most recognizable exemplars from this era and continuing into a major part of the next, is W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963), another polymath, born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, and considered by many, notable for the development of the Atlanta University Studies, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) Crisis, the intellectual apparatus of Pan-Africanism, and other seminal contributions. Importantly, the intellectual work of Du Bois was situated in the cultural norms applied to the social worlds out of which his consciousness was formed, which have bequeathed still relevant and applicable insights regarding the contemporary era. In addition to setting the ground for numerous social, political, and intellectual movements, Du Bois’ life work should continue to be understood as part of the distinct ideational constructs that have characterized African intellectual history over the past few centuries. This trajectory, responsible for the discipline of Africana Studies, emerged institutionally with the ideas of Du Bois and others in tow, and as a confrontation to the established orders of knowledge, or Western disciplinarity. This is an aspect of Du Bois’ work that has been under-discussed, but essential to conceptualizations of his relationship to Africana Studies. Here we will review some of the recent scholarship on Du Bois before examining his specific challenges to the
social sciences and history as part of the larger affront to Western knowledge and disciplinarity, and connecting these to the trajectory that led to Africana Studies.

i. Contemporary Approaches to Du Bois Studies

The intellectual work of W.E.B. Du Bois has been the subject of much academic inquiry the past twenty-five years. Buoyed by David Levering Lewis’s major two-volume biography, and other important biographical work by Manning Marable, Gerald Horne, and others, scholars have attempted to frame Du Bois’ contributions to knowledge most consistently through disciplinary lenses ranging from sociology, mainstream philosophy, educational philosophy, and history and increasingly through paradigmatic conceptualizations ranging from Marxism and feminism to prophetic theology. These works are important for they have tied Du Bois’ oeuvre to the disciplines, many arguing for Du Bois’ “interdisciplinarity” as a way for connecting to him what they assume is an “interdisciplinary Africana Studies.” The lone book length attempt to connect Du Bois to

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the discipline of Africana Studies, Nagueyalti Warren’s *W.E.B. Du Bois: Grandfather of Black Studies* (2011) is a work that employs this methodology.  

Connecting Du Bois to sociology are Robert A. Wortham’s *W.E.B. Du Bois and the Sociological Imagination* (2009) and Dan S. Green and Edwin S. Driver’s *W.E.B. Du Bois on Sociology and the Black Community* (1978), two volumes that bring together what they consider to be Du Bois’ contributions to sociology. Other works which consider Du Bois as a sociologist include Reiland Rabaka’s *Against Epistemic Apartheid* (2010), and Aldon Morris’ forthcoming work which suggests that Du Bois be considered a founder of American sociology. They argue in different ways that among Du Bois’ contributions to knowledge are methodological advances in sociology that he helped initiate—advances which predated the figures which dominate sociology’s disciplinary histories. Earl Wright’s brief histories of the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory chronicle Du Bois’ attempts to establish his brand of engagement with the disciplinary tools of sociology, which he oversaw after the publications of “The Study of Negro Problems” (1898) and


The Philadelphia Negro (1899). Wright’s “Using the Master’s Tools” (2002) is a recent treatment of the Atlanta University Studies largely concerned with establishing the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory as the first sociological school in the United States, by considering how Du Bois uniquely envisioned this project. As Wright relates, the Atlanta University Studies were completed under Du Bois’ editorship from 1898 until 1914, and represented a unique scholarly approach to the study of the urban Negro characterized by systematic rather than descriptive analysis, an “insider” approach, and both theory and method triangulation. Wright suggests that an understanding of Du Bois’ and the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory’s contributions this way, can begin to radically “reorganize” rather than “dismantle” the master’s house—the discipline of sociology.

Du Bois has also been linked to various traditions within academic philosophy writ large, including the subfields of educational philosophy and political philosophy. In these areas, scholars attempt to show that Du Bois’ ideological leanings represent cogent philosophical ideas, necessary for engaging how he envisioned the questions of race, social and economic questions of power, and resistance. Included in this category are Reiland Wright’s larger purpose is to date the emergence of a distinct school of sociological thought at Atlanta University before the generally acknowledged first sociological school at the University of Chicago. The balance of the article is spent showing how the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory between 1896-1924 met the criteria of a “school” as established Martin Bulmer, who initially created these criteria in his work on the Chicago school. See Earl Wright, II, “Using the Master’s Tools: The Atlanta Sociological Laboratory and American Sociology, 1896-1924,” Sociological Spectrum 2 (2002): 16-20. In a later article, Wright critically analyzes the only other seminal article on the subject, written by Elliot M. Rudwick in 1957. See Earl Wright, II, “W.E.B. Du Bois and the Atlanta University Studies on the Negro Revisited,” Journal of African American Studies 9 (Spring 2006): 3-17.

Earl Wright, II, “Using the Master’s Tools,” 26-32. Du Bois’ stamp on the project, which had begun before his arrival, was a scientific and systematic based inquiry as opposed to a descriptive one, as well as an approach that singled out one aspect of the Negro experience.

Ibid, 36.

Robert Gooding-Williams, Adolph Reed, and Shamoon Zamir are concerned with developing Du Bois’ conception of political philosophy, reading his work as an important link in “Afro-modern” political thought, as a complicated exemplar of the many currents of African American political thought, and comparatively against mainstream American philosophy, respectively.

Very much related to the ways in which Du Bois’ work is discussed in political philosophy is the relationships drawn in his work to philosophy of history. Earl Thorpe’s *The Black Historians* (1958) and Wilson Jeremiah Moses’ *Afrotopia* (1998), along with some of the works mentioned above, include Du Bois’ historiography in their comprehensive

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73. Reiland Rabaka, *Du Bois’s Dialectics: Black Radical Politics and the Reconstruction of Critical Social Theory* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008). Africana critical theory is for a Rabaka lens from which to view the ways in which Africans have confronted Western imperialism. His work suggests and provides methods for broadening critical theory to include these thinkers. See also *W.E.B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007) and *Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition from W.E.B. Du Bois and C.L.R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), where he connects Du Bois to other African critical theorists.

works considering African American historical writing and philosophies of history. Whether or not Du Bois consciously rejected what Thorpe has termed “the traditional sense” of scholarship, it is clear that as a champion for the race “he gave a great impetus to interest in the black race and to the scientific study of its history and culture,” an approach central to his philosophy of history. Moses’ Afrotopia views Du Boisian historiography as a synthesis of dialectical socialist and Pan-African sensibilities rooted in a belief that civilizations were the material results of effective uses of power and authority. Looking primarily at his religious scholarship as well as his The Negro (1915), Moses frames Du Bois’ engagement with scientific history as in part, an attempt to articulate a progressive direction of society which should ultimately introduce and utilize the positive constituent elements that the past African civilizations had bequeathed to its progeny. A similar reading of Du Bios’ historiography that maps the ways in which he understood the ideas of progress and civilization is James Stewart’s “In Search of a Theory of Human History” (1997). Stewart examines how Du Bois ideas were spread over two models of human history: 1) the earlier “development of a people” model; and 2) a model based upon a critique of the Pitirim Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937-41) that Du Bois co-authored in 1942. Stewart asserts that a synthesis of these two models was then applied to works he authored after 1942, including his fiction, The Black Flame.

76. See Wilson Jeremiah Moses, Afrotopia, 167.
77. The chapter on Du Bois is split into two parts. The first section deals with his framing of Du Bois religious historiography/commentary. The second looks at his historiography through works such as “The Conservation of the Races,” The Souls of Black Folk, and The Negro. Ibid, 136-168.
trilogy (The Ordeal of Mansart [1957], Mansart Builds a School [1957], and Worlds of Color [1961]).

Cedric Robinson in his aforementioned Black Marxism reads Du Bois’ historiography as part of a Black radical intelligentsia, characteristic of scholars that developed historical appraisals of Black radicalism (as opposed to Western radicalism) by utilizing the rhythms of Black resistance as models. Greg Carr’s “The African-Centered Philosophy of History” (1997) understands Du Bois’ philosophy of history as an attempt to utilize empirical historical knowledge in an effort to politicize the narrative of the African past with the objective of the development of a global identity among Africans across the world.

In educational philosophy, the importance of the now overdrawn distinction between Du Bois’ ideas and those of Booker T. Washington has commanded attention. These ideas are discussed in Derrick P. Alridge’s The Educational Thought of W.E.B. Du Bois (2008), which relies in part on the ideas expressed in two major volumes of Du Bois’


educational ideas, the Herbert Aptheker edited *The Education of Black People* (1973) and the Eugene Provenzo edited *Du Bois on Education* (2002).\textsuperscript{81}

Black feminist thinkers in the academy have developed analyses on Du Bois and gender. Key works include the articles by Farah Jasmine Griffin in the 2000 special edition of the *Annals of the Academy of American Political and Social Science* on Du Bois and Joy James’s contribution to the James Stewart, Bernard Bell, and Emily Grosholz edited *W.E.B. Du Bois on Race and Culture* (1997) as well as her *Transcending the Talented Tenth* (2007). Griffin and James explore the dynamics of Du Bois’ comments on gender as both “profeminist” [i.e. his works like “The Damnation of Women” (1920)] and masculinist, and James links Du Bois career and work to his relationship to Anna Julia Cooper and Ida B. Wells.\textsuperscript{82}

Finally, recent work on Du Bois has placed emphasis on the theological basis (or lack thereof) in his work. Along with work that has begun to link Du Bois both to the prophetic tradition and Black liberation theology, Edward Blum’s *W.E.B. Du Bois:*

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ii. Du Bois in Africana Studies

The range of disciplines and paradigms that have appropriated Du Bois could lead one, as it has led many, to conclude that Du Bois was positively an interdisciplinary thinker. But is it not more complicated than this? Lewis Gordon recently commented on the often-easy, yet ultimately inaccurate framing of W.E.B. Du Bois as pioneer of “interdisciplinary” studies of Africana life. At a 2012 colloquium honoring his work at the University of Pennsylvania, Gordon commented on the faulty characterization of Du Bois as a thinker that utilized a “naive application of the other disciplines,” positing instead that his work challenged the “fetishized notions of legitimacy by which those disciplines assert themselves as true meta-critical positions on knowledge itself.”84 Imploring us to essentially take Du Bois’ work on its own terms, Gordon, speaking on a


panel linking to Du Bois to Africana Studies, critically asserts the need to read Du Bois at the very least, as a challenge to normative positions of academic intellectual work. Similarly, Anthony Monteiro and Robert Birt have commented informally about the possibilities of moving beyond conversations that link Du Bois to Western figures, philosophies, and ideologies. Monteiro has challenged the academic appropriation of Du Bois in disparate fields of study, characterizing them as attempts to create a “Du Bois as...” model in whatever field they so chose. The philosopher, Robert Birt has also commented on this tendency in recent comments given at the 2012 Alain Locke Conference at Howard University. Reflecting on the argument between Robert Gooding-Williams and Cornel West regarding whether or not Du Bois was Hegelian or Jamesian, Birt simply poses “Why can’t Du Bois be Du Bois?”

In addition to the comments discussed above, Anthony Monteiro, in two scholarly articles, “Being an African in the World (2000) and “The Epistemic Crisis of African American Studies” (2011), asserts that Du Bois provides some direction for critical confrontation to the West on the terms of the African. The former addresses itself to the critical epistemological importance of establishing Du Bois “as African” and allied with other Africans throughout the world, and in the latter article, he suggests that the critical terms employed by Du Bois for engaging the West, modeled by Du Bois, should resolve the questions of approach (i.e. the logic) that now beset the discipline. Monteiro

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87. According to Monteiro, Du Bois’ intellectual evolution included a “crucial rupture with European thought” and the establishment of a trajectory that increasingly approached studies of the African
continues projects that link Du Bois to radical thought, much like Cedric Robinson and Gerald Horne in his *Black and Red* (1986) as well as with African-centered approaches to knowledge, found in the aforementioned work of Greg Carr and Wilson Jeremiah Moses.88

Like any other academic enterprise, in Africana Studies, there have been a myriad of ways of approaching Du Bois. Africana Studies, however, had begun the discussion of the importance of Du Bois long before it was academically popular. James Turner and C. Steven McGann would include among their 1980 intellectual history, “Black Studies as Integral Tradition in African-American Intellectual History,” none other than Du Bois as one of its originators. Their work, which stretches the chronology of the movement, begins with the development of the Atlanta University Studies under the intellectual editorship of Du Bois. Turner and McGann assert that much of what would become Africana Studies in the academy is indebted to Du Bois, the “preeminent” thinker of the race from groundings inherent in their culture. See Anthony Monteiro, “Being African in the World: The Du Boisian Epistemology,” *Annals of the Academy of American Political and Social Science* 568 (March 2000): 221-222. Echoing the comments mentioned above, in the later article Monteiro states: “...there is a need to do more than cite Du Bois and to append him to other more mainstream academic projects. We must recover the essence and meaning of his oeuvre and deploy them in understanding the problems of the twenty-first century.” Anthony Monteiro, “The Epistemic Crisis of African American Studies: A Du Boisian Resolution,” *Socialism and Democracy* 25 (March 2011): 192. He continues: What he began and then carried out for most of his life, was a decisive break with the European view of humanity. He created new foundations of social knowledge. He invents a new way of scientifically studying Africans and ultimately humanity. His is the first decisive break with the idea that knowledge is essentially a European thing, and that European knowledge was universal. He insists and demonstrates in practice that the study of history and modernity from a European standpoint distorts knowledge. What comes out of European philosophy and human studies was Eurocentric and prejudiced in favor of humanity’s minority, white folk.” Ibid, 195.

early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{89} Though this article is important for establishing a sense of continuity between Du Bois and the “modern Black Studies Movement,”\textsuperscript{90} Turner and McGann do not necessarily consider the methodological import of Du Boisian thinking and how that would inform the disciplinary direction of Africana Studies.

The latter would have to wait until the 1984 publication of James B. Stewart’s “The Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois for Contemporary Black Studies.” Stewart in this article shows the importance of exemplar development in the construction of a field of academic inquiry. For Black Studies, it is clear that such exemplary would have to be Du Bois.\textsuperscript{91} Stewart, among other ideas, shows how through a nuanced use of science, Du Bois would subvert normative predilections of academic work to suggest future avenues for studying and applying methods for improving the situations of Africans across the world. Stewart rightly asserts, that Du Bois understood that science alone would not achieve his ultimate objective of academic work, which has been elsewhere understood by Ngugi wa Thiong’o as the “freeing of African subjectivities” in the global human pursuit of a better society.\textsuperscript{92} Du Bois’ violation of scientific norms (though these would eventually be incorporated too) was his insistence that academic work serve these larger interests. This type of positioning, makes him clearly part of an extended genealogy of Africana Studies thinkers involved in the use of academic work for the solving of human problems [contemporary experiences]

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\item[90.] Ibid, 59. They do, however, briefly deal with the question of “value-free” knowledge and its importance as an academic ideal.
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but also for the connecting of human memories [historical experiences] to solve these problems. Finally, the aforementioned *W.E.B. Du Bois: Grandfather of Black Studies* (2011), by Nagueyalti Warren is important for its continued attempt to rightly assert the only real “disciplinary” home for Du Bois. Warren’s work nevertheless articulates this home as linked to the West—via the conglomeration of interdisciplinary areas of knowledge applied to the experience of Africans. The Western training of Du Bois is a fact that cannot be denied, however, with a clearer understanding of Du Bois’ methodological separation from established norms, we can posit that his work challenged the ways in which the West understood what counts as knowledge more generally, and knowledge about the African, particularly. Du Bois was after something much larger than the mere application of “the tools of the master.”

**iii. Science Hesitant: Du Bois and the Traditions of Western Knowledge**

This “something much larger” can be seen throughout Du Bois’ bibliography. Here we will discuss four representative examples that shall serve to illustrate the point.

In 1897, W.E.B. Du Bois, following Delany, Blyden, Cooper, and Firmin would also assert that Africans were indeed human—and as human as all other humans. His address read at the initial meeting of Alexander Crummell’s American Negro Academy (c. 1897), and later published, was entitled “The Conservation of Races.” In this brief essay, Du Bois challenged the anti-African establishment of not simply anthropology and biology—but of science writ large, which at the time included new advances in the social

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sciences and history. Coupled with a century-long European background of science-driven anti-“othering” yielded by Enlightenment thought, was the American foray into global imperialist ambitions, with the American universities as well as scientific institutions such as the Smithsonian, becoming the place to study other cultures, or different ethnicities.⁹⁵ These institutions as a consequence of the foregoing helped to establish norms where Africans were subjected to minstrelized depictions of their humanity, constructions and images reified by “scientific” knowledge that defined humanity on the basis of the physiological and cultural normativity of the (Western) European. Science itself, far from an objective reading of natural truths regarding the human, was based on humanity being linked to simply one of Du Bois “eight distinctively differentiated races.”⁹⁶ The result was that every other “race” was either not human or subhuman.

In “The Conservation of Races” Du Bois wrote that this order of arrangements defied human history. Du Bois first challenged this idea, by redefining what the idea of race was and has meant throughout history. Going beyond physical appearances, Du Bois’ famously opined that “races” actually constituted

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\text{a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.}⁹⁷
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⁹⁷. Ibid.
This definition accomplishes a number of things, two of which we will examine here. Firstly, it created a more “democratic” way of speaking about all human beings. In other words, all individuals, groups, and communities could be tied to a larger “racial” group under Du Bois’ definition. Secondly, it freed Du Bois to have a conversation about the illogical proposition, inherent in race science, that the Negro was an inferior being. Anchoring the Negro in history, Du Bois showed that he or she was tethered to more than simply a racial group of American subjectivities, but that the Negro belonged to a larger group, a race. This race was perhaps the central shaper of what was known as “American,” itself. Showing that those cultural contributions that many considered uniquely American, were truly the Negro’s contribution, Du Bois argued for the conservation of these intellectual endowments and spiritual ideals, even as he argues for racial equality.98

By viewing race on these alternative terms, Du Bois provided a rationale for its conservation. For in this conception of race, we have freed human groups to contribute out of their own understanding, the particular “ideals of life” that can benefit the larger global society.99 The oft-quoted first aim of the American Negro Academy as posited by Du Bois was the idea that the “Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to civilization and humanity, which no other race can make.”100 It is out of this contribution that Du Bois considered the problems of the Negro in America could be adequately addressed and a better society built.

98. Ibid, 489.
99. Ibid, 486.
100. Ibid, 491.
The construction of the unique idea of race in the work of Du Bois has been hotly debated among scholars in disciplines ranging from philosophy to political science. The most famous of these debates is perhaps the contribution of the philosopher, Kwame Anthony Appiah. In his *In My Father’s House* (1992), Appiah delivers a challenge to Du Bois’ construction of race that was lodged in the need to dissolve differences in order to appreciate the humanity of all peoples. Appiah deconstructs each element of the aforementioned definition, in order to show how Du Bois could not escape the racial essentialism he was nevertheless challenging. In short, for Appiah, the definition of race that Du Bois outlines, is not “real” and thus cannot hold.  

Responses to Appiah’s work have been widespread, but the response by Lucius Outlaw, briefly catalyzes the current attempt to understand the ways in which Du Bois’ work fits into Africana Studies’ challenge to the West. Outlaw’s “Conserve’ Races?” (1997) challenges Appiah’s denial of the importance and/or saliency of those non-biological factors in Du Bois’ definition. Essentially, the question for both Appiah and Outlaw was the importance of culture in Du Bois’ defining mode of inquiry. Outlaw asserts that it was indeed more important than Appiah was willing to allow. Outlaw’s reading emphasizes that Du Bois’ contention that human beings contribute to humanity based on upon distinct activities that conserve meaning and reality. For him it is this idea

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that Du Bois wanted to reconstruct and extend in his essay. Outlaw’s essay argues, against Appiah, that these “communities of meanings,” otherwise known as “races” are both real and worthy of being conserved.

Outlaw’s position is far more tenable for Africana Studies. In this particular discipline, it will become increasingly essential to allow for understandings of the special ways in which Africana peoples have understood the world—its historical and contemporary iterations—and how these ideas can be conserved and accessed to inform first-order assumptions with which to study African experiences. In addition, these ideas should also be leveraged to address African issues, as Du Bois eloquently asserted in this important nineteenth century essay.

The second example is Du Bois’ “The Study of Negro Problems,” presented before the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1897. This article was Du Bois’ attempt to frame for the academic world a sense of the need for attuning the prevailing scientific methods to a more thorough knowledge of what he deemed “social problems affecting American Negroes.” The essay is divided into five parts. The first is concerned with accurately historicizing the status of the African in the United States and the development of these “social problems.” Du Bois operated under the assumption that many times science fails to account for the historical realities that underpin, explain, and situate how many of these problems have emerged. For Du Bois, any contemporary


104. Ibid, 31-32.

“problem” regardless of its current nature must be linked to the historical experiences of slavery and the ways in which that experience complicated certain social realities. 106 Thus, any inquiry must be savvy enough to account for different issues as they varied “from time to time and place to place,” during the “two centuries” that Africans were brought to the United States as labor. 107 This anchoring of the conversation had the methodological advantage of widening the narrow scope of socio-scientific inquiry beyond the concrete and limited conception of presentist research agendas.

The second section outlines the current problems of the period in which the presentation was given, and Du Bois described these social problems as belonging to two categories or interrelated parts: 1) problems arising from the result of a failure to acquire “a high grade of culture;” and 2) problems arising from the dominant culture’s desire to retard the integration of the African into national life, regardless of their “cultural” status. 108 In the first category, Du Bois characterized this failure as rooted in the experience of slavery and the generational contingencies it wrought. Manifesting themselves as both economic and social ramifications, these problems worked to preclude the African from participating in political decisions and social arenas because of what would be considered their “backward” status. Du Bois was able to show that this “backwardness” was however part of the genetic makeup, not of the African, but of American society. The latter belonged to the second category, which Du Bois defined as being the

106. In Du Bois’ view many of these problems were rooted in historical contingencies, and thus likely to continue if not addressed. See Ibid, 2-6.
107. Ibid, 3.
widespread conviction among Americans that no persons of Negro
descent should become constituent members of the social body. This
feeling gives rise to economic problems, to educational problems, and
nice questions of social morality; it makes it more difficult for black men
to earn a living or spend their earnings as they will; it gives them poorer
school facilities and restricted contact with cultured classes; and it
becomes, throughout the land, a cause and excuse for discontent,
lawlessness, laziness and injustice. 109

In a fashion similar to the earlier “The Conservation of Races,” Du Bois is able to show
that the normative condition of American society had much to do with the question of
Negro degradation—as opposed to an innate Negro inferiority. 110

The third section outlines components of what Du Bois believed should be present
in future studies of the Negro. He believed that studies that attempt to extend knowledge
about African Americans had to proceed from the best historical and, still developing
sociological methods. This according to Du Bois was distinct from the current studies,
which proceeded from matters of “faith than of knowledge”—that faith being lodged in
the foreconceptions of race(d) science. 111 As the American social sciences were
undergoing their initial gestation, Du Bois in this essay offered general criteria and
approaches to knowledge about the Negro, that if not undertaken seriously, would
woefully limit their effectiveness in establishing truth. Du Bois viewed systematic studies of

109. Ibid, 8.
110. Lucius Outlaw states the importance of reading this article in tandem with his “The Conservation
    of Races,” given the fact that it was given six months after. Also it is important to note the different
    audiences each paper was presented for. See Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., “W.E.B. Du Bois on the Study
    284-285.
    the possibilities of science that is grounded in accurate representations of reality: “Whenever any
    nation allows impulse, whim or hasty conjecture to usurp the place of conscious, normative,
    intelligent action, it is in grave danger. The sole aim of any society is to settle its problems in
    accordance with its highest ideals, and the only rational method of accomplishing this is to study
    those problems in the light of the best scientific research.” Ibid.
the Negro as a means of establishing not only truth about their reality, but in many ways as the litmus test for the possibilities of science.112

These criticisms are linked to the fourth section of the article where Du Bois castigated current scholarship on Negro problems pointing out the academy’s and by extension, social science’s failure to develop systematic appraisals of truths about African life in America. These were in his view a result of a lack of thoroughness, the prevalence of unsystematic inquiries, and conclusions based on uncritical interpretations.113 This tripartite criticism argued for a more holistic examination and stringent interpretation of facts pertaining to the Negro, such that thinkers in the future should have wider access to truths. Linked to the last and most fleshed out point, the uncritical nature of these studies was the question of the relationship between the researcher and the group.114 Du Bois points to the problems of developing critical appraisals of Negro life from the positions of those living as non-Negro. This of course predated much of the now almost obvious theoretical insights connected to “outsider versus insider” approaches in the social sciences. Perhaps more critically, and an idea less accepted than the “insider approach,” is how Du Bois then articulated a criticism regarding the tendency to study the Negro

112. He stated: “No such opportunity to watch and measure the history and development of a great race of men ever presented itself to the scholars of a modern nation. If they miss this opportunity—if they do the work in a slip-shod, unsystematic manner—if they dally with the truth to humor the whims of the day, they do far more than hurt the good name of the American people; they hurt the cause of scientific truth the world over, they voluntarily decrease human knowledge of a universe of which we are ignorant enough, and they degrade the high end of truth-seeking in a day when they need more and more to dwell upon its sanctity.” Ibid, 10-11.

113. He opined: “Moreover the studies made hitherto can as a whole be justly criticised in three particulars: (1) They have not been based on a thorough knowledge of details; (2) they have been unsystematical; (3) they have been uncritical.” Ibid, 11-12.

114. Du Bois articulated three ways in which the study of the Negro has been uncritical, uncritical from lack of discrimination in the selection and weighing of evidence; uncritical in choosing the proper point of view from which to study these problems, and, finally, uncritical from the distinct bias in the minds of so many writers.” Ibid, 13.
only from the standpoint “of his influence on white inhabitants.” This amounts to an uncritical, ahistorical and limiting interpretation. Much of these considerations began with the manifestations of established (biased) truths regarding the Negro in the canons of social science, it is clear that Du Bois wanted to divorce his notion of an ideal research agenda away from these “worthless” scientific norms.

In the last section Du Bois suggests places where work like this may flourish, advocating that southern historically Black colleges (Hampton, Tuskegee, and Atlanta) serve as bases, with greater collaboration with major social science research universities (Harvard, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Pennsylvania). This harps back to the earlier conclusion in “The Conservation of Races” regarding the importance of Negro organizations to carry out this work. Du Bois would never abandon the importance of the Negro university as a special place and base from which to develop these more critical studies.

In his close reading of the article, Lucius Outlaw’s “W.E.B. Du Bois and the Study of Social Problems” (2000), views Du Bois’ articulation of the need for greater understanding of the relationship between accurate scientific knowledge and social well-being as a component of his philosophy of sciences that remains relevant in the context of

115. Ibid, 14.
116. Du Bois asserted: “The most baneful cause of uncritical study of the Negro is the manifest and far-reaching bias of writers. Americans are born in many cases with deep, fierce convictions on the Negro question, and in other cases imbibe them from their environment. When such men come to write on the subject, without technical training, without breadth of view, and in some cases without a deep sense of the sanctity of scientific truth, their testimony, however interesting as opinion, must of necessity be worthless as science.” Ibid, 14-15.
117. Ibid, 22-23.
118. See his The Education of Black People cited in note 81.
contemporary debates. For Outlaw, Du Bois was one of few thinkers able to see these links and courageously apply them through the “prism” of the group of which he viewed himself as “bone of the bone, and flesh of the flesh.” Any of the considerations for socio-scientific methodology that Du Bois advocated were clearly articulated to serve this very important end. The result of the application of this novel way of viewing science and social advocacy, were the studies primarily seen as precursors to modern Africana Studies social inquiry, the aforementioned *The Philadelphia Negro* and the Atlanta University Studies, under his editorship.

Linked to the Du Bois’ “The Study of Negro Problems,” was another foray into the development of a serious theory of meta-scientific thinking, and the third example, his 1904, “Sociology Hesitant.” This essay was little known among the academic community and has only recently been incorporated into conversations on Du Bois’ work with the publication of the Ronald Judy edited special edition of *boundary 2* in 2000. The terms of this challenge are Du Bois’ inclination that the failure of sociology, which then, was in reality a critique of all social sciences, was linked to a genealogy of thinkers ill-prepared to

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119. Throughout his essay, Outlaw frames Du Bois’ presentation as attempting to establish a philosophy of science suitable to the study of the Negro and aimed at the alleviation of many of these problems. He states: “As perhaps very few persons at the time had the courage or perspicacity to see, Du Bois understood exceedingly well the intimate, pragmatic relationships of truthful and adequate scientific knowledge of social reality, social problematics, and progressive social evolution, and how utterly crucial such knowledge was for resolving America’s great racial curse. "The Study of the Negro Problems" remains one of the most astute articulations of such understanding, an exemplary case of a philosophy of social science appropriate to a U.S. context-then and now.” See Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., “W.E.B. Du Bois on the Study of Social Problems,” 296.

120. Ibid, 288.


accurately create what can truly be considered a science of society. This inability for Du Bois was connected to the larger problem of understanding the ideas of “Law and Chance.” What Michael Finkenthal calls “disciplinarian thinking” introduced the hallmark principles of the modern sciences that Du Bois explored. Chief among them were the ideas of empiricism and the creation of scientific laws, which have had the effect of the creation of academic silos that study specific problems and/or observe phenomena independently from other disciplines that study specific problems and/or observe phenomena. These emergent sciences then constituted separate disciplines as the academic community increasingly developed along these boundaries and lines.\textsuperscript{123} In “Sociology Hesitant,” W.E.B. Du Bois briefly considers what this type of organization has wrought.

Within the first few paragraphs of the essay, Du Bois outlined the general posture that has created the malaise and “confusion” of the social sciences.\textsuperscript{124} Quoting a thinker, Auguste Comte, whom many consider a pioneer, Du Bois articulated that it was the attempt to study an abstraction that foiled true attempts to study the rhythms of human action. Perhaps Comte had bit off more than he or his successors could chew.

Du Bois then placed emphasis on what should have foregrounded studies of human groups—not simply the groups themselves—but what causes groups to move and make history.\textsuperscript{125} For Du Bois, sociology’s hesitance to study this phenomenon was the complication of being able to craft laws out of human experiences. Du Bois asserts that a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{123} See Michael Finkenthal, \textit{Interdisciplinarity: Toward the Definition of a Metadiscipline?} (New York: Peter Lang, 2001),1-6; 43-60 and the discussion of his work in Chapters Three and Four.
\item \textsuperscript{124} W.E.B. Du Bois, “Sociology Hesitant,” \textit{boundary 2} 27(Fall 2000): 38.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid, 38-39.
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truer science should not necessarily resolve to create laws, but to act as middle ground between understanding causalities vis-à-vis the imposition of “Chance.” For Du Bois, the social sciences, would continue to fail as long as it sought to reduce human action into the same terms that attempted to order the natural sciences. In a word, disciplines built on models of the Galileo-Newton revolution and welded to study the dynamics of humanity, were “preposterous.” “Chance,” for Du Bois, was for all intents and purposes, within the realm of possibility for studying human life:

… It must be provisionally assumed that this is a world of Law and Chance. That in time and space, Law covers the major part of the universe, but that, in significance, the area left in that world to Chance is of tremendous import.

Du Bois’ critique suggests the impossibility of being able to produce a manual for measuring and prefiguring how humans will behave. In short, disciplinarian thinking cannot grasp the complexity of human reality, especially the non-Western subject in the context of a racialized society. Du Bois in “Sociology Hesitant,” argues for multiple ways of interpreting phenomena and against the impulse to think in academic silos, which were of course designed simply to advance research agendas of varying scope and interests.

Ronald Judy’s close reading of “Sociology Hesitant” in his “Introduction: On W.E.B. Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking” (2000) begins to reveal some implications for Africana Studies. In reviewing Du Bois’ work, Judy notes agendas of positivist sociological enterprise were not understood by Du Bois as “neutral.” In fact, it was premised on

126. Ibid, 41-43.
127. Ibid, 41.
128. Ibid, 43.
complex social process, whereby racism could not be de-linked. 129 Laws, the accumulation of Western discipline-based ideas, were themselves, based on upon “Chance” or human actions. 130 Du Bois’ challenge is similar to that of Jacob Carruthers in Science and Oppression (1972), where he shows the relative importance of understanding how fundamental ideas about oppression have their origins in philosophies of science, originally applied to the natural or non-human world. 131 For Africana Studies, then, it is important to question at the very least the resultant methodologies and knowledge (“Chance”) foundations that characterize the academy, but also to create new foundations—elsewhere pursued by Du Bois and assumed to also emanate from Africana peoples.

The fourth example, which represents Du Bois’ historiography, is the massive 746-page volume Black Reconstruction in America (1935), Du Bois’ unique foray Marxist theory. A work, which had been conceived as early as 1910, and one which was highly controversial in the Black intellectual class at the time of its writing, Black Reconstruction examines how the inability to properly engage, assess, and apply the *logoi* that African peoples attempted to import into American society during Reconstruction contributed to

129. Judy explains: “Du Bois knows that the formation of an objective field of analysis and the application of knowledge to the facts of that field in the form of action, does not derive from purely logical or methodological sources, but can be understood only in the context of material social processes. For Du Bois, not only are facts products of complex social and historical processes, but also science itself, as a particular activity, is a moment in the social processes of production and as a result, not self-sufficient. The fact that concerns Du Bois above all others is the Negro, his status as an object of analysis within the particular and various fields of science, both physical and social. This involves the relation of the cognitive to the given that is at the crux of his positining of the Negro as a valid object of positive study so as to betray the dissemblance of racism in deterministic sociologies that assume an empirical basis for racial differentiation and hierarchy. Ronald T. Judy, “Introduction: On W.E.B. Du Bois and Hyperbolic Thinking,” 28-29.

130. Ibid, 15-35.

the failure and concomitant counter-revolution of the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{132} This text presents the opportunity to examine many important theoretical influences and methodological principles for Africana Studies; here we explore two of them.

First, the text subverts two traditions of Western philosophical theory. The first is Du Bois’ opposition to the dominant Dunning school historiography among other impulses in American history departments.\textsuperscript{133} In the final chapter, we see Du Bois show how what preceding this chapter had articulated an alternative, indeed accurate, way of viewing the African role in Reconstruction. Du Bois argued against established historical opinion that the African was central in the development of a new society, not responsible for its downfall as per thinkers like John Burgess would have us believe. But perhaps the larger consideration is how Du Bois subverted Marxian theory to achieve an understanding of the African role in Reconstruction. According to Cedric Robinson, Du Bois challenges classical Marxism on its ability to apply to a uniquely “raced” American situation on at least three terms. These were “the emergence of capitalism; the nature of revolutionary consciousness; and the nature of revolutionary organization.”\textsuperscript{134} On these three ideas Robinson shows that Du Bois understood the African link to the development of the American system and predicated his analysis of that genesis on their role in it. He shows that among Africans there was necessarily a consciousness, which guided their


\textsuperscript{134} Cedric Robinson, \textit{Black Marxism}, 228.
revolutionary actions. Lastly, organizational politics, were for the African, premised on different principles than that which would characterize Marxian revolutionary organizations.135

This leads to the second methodological consideration which is that Du Bois constantly asserts the active role of African people and African thought in the eventual overthrow of the Confederacy as well as the attempts to “reconstruct democracy” in America.136 This notion is encapsulated in the often-quoted line from the first chapter, “The Black Worker:”

It was thus the black worker, as a founding stone of a new economic system in the nineteenth century and for the modern world who brought civil war in America, He was its underlying cause, in spite of every effort to base the strife upon union and national power.137

To truly understand the history of this period, Du Bois sought to understand the “genius” of the central actors in the period. Du Bois subverts traditional historical methodologies by attempting to access and apply a theory of group a consciousness that could be used to explain group action.138 Critics have called the Du Boisian interpretation of this situation at best ‘naïve’ and ‘untenable.’139 However, Du Bois interpretation not only shows his heavy engagement with the ideas of Karl Marx, but it reveals his unwavering commitment to showing the humanity of African people. In other words, much of the critique of the general strike concept as it relates to enslaved Africans, flowed from the idea of that it was unconscionable for the ‘ignorant’ African to be able to

135. See Ibid, 229-240.
136. Part of the original, 1935 title to the work.
comprehend how his disruptions of the economy actually brought about the termination of the war and/or an attack of Southern capital. This, Du Bois contends was unconvincing, and these assertions are bolstered with clear evidence. With regards to some of the reasons offered by “anti-Negro” historiography, Du Bois responded thusly:

At first, the rush of the Negroes from the plantations came as a surprise and was variously interpreted. The easiest thing to say was that Negroes were tired of work and wanted to live at the expense of the government; wanted to travel and see things and place. But in contradiction to this was the extent of the movement and the terrible suffering of the refugees. If they were seeking peace and quiet, they were much better off on the plantations than trailing in the footsteps of the army or squatting miserably in the camps. 140

It is clear then, that enslaved Africans in this era sacrificed much in order to attain freedom and some measure of sovereignty from their former masters. According to Du Bois, a half million were participants in this strike to injure the plantation economy, a figure that further strengthens the validity of his claim. 141 As they fled the plantations, many of these newly freedman sought opportunities to participate in the Union army as laborers, in exchange for provisions and protection, but also to be active agents in the cause of the preservation of the Union. Others sought to set up autonomous settlements and towns with acreage seized by the Union armies.142 Similarly, Du Bois reinterpreted the history of Reconstruction governments as attempts by African politicians to reorient the state toward at the very least a more representative democracy. Du Bois utilized records to show the number of Black voters who registered and participated in the elections, oftentimes to show their widespread participation but also to demonstrate the

140. Ibid, 67.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid, 68-72.
sometimes successful use of terror against them to disparage their participation. From there he embarked upon an analysis of the origin and character of the many Black politicians who came to represent the populaces in the South. Du Bois gave detailed profiles of the key Black officials who occupied seats at the various state conventions, legislatures, and even Washington. Du Bois not only gave personal information regarding the character of these individuals, but he showed a common thread of their commitments regarding policy. Many of the Black politicians who would come to occupy key offices during this era were staunch advocates of universal suffrage, of public assistance for the African American laborer, and were genuine believers in effective public education. Du Bois attacked the prevalent notion that Black politicians during this era were incompetent, uninformed, puppets of Northern carpetbaggers. He also empirically defended these legislators against the charges of corruption and graft that was often found in Reconstruction historiography. These politicians were also acting out of their “cultures.” In properly framing these experiences, Robinson shows that Du Bois would have to theorize that they acted out of their own generative traditions in order to act and contribute to revolutionary movements in America.

This basis for historical theory, similar to C.L.R. James’ *The Black Jacobins* (1938), was not to be de-linked from contemporary issues among Africana communities. As both thinkers prove, it was the use of history to solve and critique contemporary problems and

144. See W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America*, 13-16 and Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 238, where he states: The slaves had produced their own culture and their own consciousness by adapting the forms of the non-Black society the conceptualizations derived from their own historical roots and social conditions.”
contemporary theories of resolution to these problems. For Du Bois, the resolution to any problem involving African people, seemed to be as evidenced in *Black Reconstruction in America*, a simple matter of understanding the process as well as the context from which African people resisted. Du Bois’ historical works relies on a clear theory that is premised on the terms on which African people understood themselves. Africana Studies as the only area of study which attempts to conceptualize knowledge this way, should continue to leverage this work to answer these very questions in our contemporary reality.

As discussed above, Cedric Robinson’s reading of Du Boisian historiography considers his rupture with normative radicalisms. In examining the text, he comes to the conclusion that although it was a historiographical work, *Black Reconstruction* was “history subjected to theory. The emphasis was on the relation of things.”\(^{145}\) Robinson’s interpretation calls for the viewing the work not as simple historical correction, which it certainly was, but also as a critique of the ideologies of “American socialist movements and revision of Marx’s theory of revolution and class struggle.”\(^{146}\) Robinson places the text in temporal context, coming at time when the Communist Party USA had widespread influence in America and the emergence of Marxist-Leninist thought. According to Robinson, Du Bois had as a purpose in writing the text the objective of viewing the period of Reconstruction as “labor history,”\(^{147}\) showing the historical dilemma of white and Black class unity. Robinson then organizes the analysis around the various sections of the text examining Du Bois’ conception of the relationship between

\(^{146}\) Ibid, 196.
\(^{147}\) Ibid, 197.
slavery and capitalism, the former two institutions and labor, as well as the relationship of the Black elite to Reconstruction. He then summarizes Du Bois’ engagement with Marx as an attempt by Du Bois to reassess Marx in light of the ideological dogma, the existential creed and theoretical orthodoxy on the question of Blacks exhibited by the Communist Party.148

The aforementioned works of Earl Thorpe and Greg Carr, both treat Black Reconstruction in America in the context of Du Bois’ other historical works: The Suppression of the African-Slave Trade to the United States (1896), the aforementioned The Philadelphia Negro (1899), John Brown (1909), The Negro (1915), The Gift of Black Folk (1924), Black Reconstruction in America (1935), Black Folk Then and Now (1939), and The World and Africa (1945). In Thorpe’s view, although Black Reconstruction did have an effect on the narrative of Reconstruction, Du Bois’ place in historiographical genealogy was guaranteed through his early texts The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States and The Philadelphia Negro.149 Carr’s work links Black Reconstruction to these works to show that Du Bois was consistently a propagandist, who utilizes the tools of the historian to work through questions of African identities. Moving beyond Marxist interpretations of history, Carr argues that Black Reconstruction in America is a “reexamination of the African experience in

148. Ibid., 208.
149. According to Thorpe: “Du Bois reached his zenith as a scholar—in the traditional sense—at the outset of his career. The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States; his sociological study, The Philadelphia Negro, and the Atlanta University Studies represent his most thorough and objective products. More and more, as he drifted deeper into causes centering around the “race issue,” the character of his scholarly productivity changed. Still, perhaps as much because of his “bad” as well as good qualities as a scholar, he gave great impetus to interest in the black race and to the scientific study of its history and culture. The body of writings which he contributed to black studies helped mightily to attract attention to the field of black history.” Earl Thorpe, Black Historians: A Critique, 107.
the antebellum and postbellum periods” grounded in exploring how African people were able to exert their cultural influence in the United States.150

Du Bois, along with Delany, Blyden, Firmin, and Cooper, rightly belong to the intellectual or “academic dimension of what Cedric Robinson has termed “The Black Radical Tradition.”151 Their works spanned “disciplines” and traversed genres, all the while incorporating narratives and appropriating sites of knowledge from different communities of meaning than that which informed Western knowledge. The objective for these thinkers went beyond academic standards, in fact their relationship to the academy was not their reason for existing as thinkers. And eventually neither was “the race problem.” While like Du Bois “race was thrust” upon each of them, their resolutions went beyond the corrective of simply “improving race relations.”152 As the works reviewed above suggest, their approach gestured toward a human conversation that was premised on the African voice. A voice and perspective that had to be accessed not by “any means necessary” but by the appropriate and responsible means which allowed it its proper space in the world of human consciousness. These were the principles which underlay the

150. Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 339. Carr bases this in part on the beginning of Black Reconstruction, where Du Bois states the slaves were “everything African” and begins there to discern the particular cultural contributions that were made and would continue to be made throughout the periods covered in the text. See W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 3


methodologies chosen to do intellectual work. These thinkers were not alone. The generations to come would learn from, critique, and extend their works—many with the same overarching objective in mind.

II. African Thought and Three Sites of Contestation in the Early-Mid Twentieth Century

We have no philosophers or thinkers who command the respect of the intellectual community at large. I am not talking about the few teachers of philosophy who have read Hegel or Kant or James and memorized their thoughts. I am talking about men who have reflected upon the fundamental problems which have always concerned philosophers such as the nature of human knowledge the meaning or lack of meaning of human existence.

We have no philosophers from the standpoint of the Negro’s unique experience in this world. I am not talking about the puerile opportunistic rationalizations of the Negro’s effort to survive in a hostile world. The philosophy implicit in the Negro’s folklore is infinitely superior to the opportunistic philosophy of Negro intellectuals who want to save their jobs and enjoy material comforts.

-E. Franklin Frazier, “The Failure of the Negro Intellectual”

The momentum established by the late nineteenth century thinkers continued full force into the twentieth century. The American Negro Academy, the brainchild of Alexander Crummell emerged as a space where African thinkers both trained and untrained came together to develop what Alfred Moss in his work on the organization, The American Negro Academy (1981), characterizes as a mission to “intellectually defend their people, justify their own existence and challenge ideas, habits, attitudes and legal proscriptions that seemed to be locking their race permanently into an inferior caste.”

The stakes were high. But by the 1900s, as W.E.B. Du Bois and Anna Julia Cooper’s analyses would also confront, academic work had begun to manifest itself into broad areas of scientific, historical, and social inquiry as they were emptied into the now well-oiled engines of academic specialization; a shifting of the boards that remains in place today. The “research” orientation in Western academic life engendered a break with the broader training of thinkers that was common in nineteenth century academic settings.\textsuperscript{155} C.P. Snow’s two cultures (humanities and natural sciences) or Jerome Kagan’s three cultures (humanities, natural sciences, and the social sciences), became the normative means for categorizing knowledge.\textsuperscript{156} At the same time there was an increase in African degree holders throughout the Western world and increasingly so on the continent. This section explores the ways in which they interrogated and rethought the dynamics of disciplinarity as it emerged during this period. The paradox that E. Franklin Frazier outlines in the above epigraph is in reality the paradox of thinking within the normative bounds of disciplines. African thinkers, particularly in the American version of disciplinarity, had to grapple with a complex intellectual project that was filtered through limiting paradigms like race relations, and others. For Frazier, this crippled their abilities to deal with more substantive human problems, especially among social scientists. In

\footnote{On “research” see Laurence Vesey, \textit{The Emergence of the American University} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Thomas Kuhn, \textit{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969); and Ian F. McNeely and Lisa Wolverton, \textit{Reinventing Knowledge: From Alexandria to the Internet} (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2008), 163-250, among others discussed in Chapter Four.}

short, they had “failed to achieve any intellectual freedom” due to the embrace of “safe and conventional ideas current in American society,” which were connected to the constraints of paradigmatic American disciplinarities. This section examines the individuals who would become embroiled into this discussion.

While many African thinkers would participate in insurgent and reimaginative intellectual work within the natural sciences, this section focuses primarily on the social sciences, the humanities, with a separate section on history, with which we shall begin. Despite the organization of disciplines, Africans in the academy as well as “street scholars” would combine historical analysis with social inquiry to produce a synthesis of scholarship that attempted to both connect Africans with their antecedents and solve current problems.

a. History and Historiography

As Laurie Maffly-Kipp’s Setting Down the Sacred Past (2010), Stephen Hall’s A Faithful Account of the Race (2009) and John Ernest’s Liberation Historiography (2004) all show, African American historical writing has a long history rooted in eighteenth, and most

158. Clearly the contributions of George Washington Carver, Ernest Everett Just, and Charles Drew, among others, and their challenges to the natural sciences could easily be included in this work. The current work focuses on the humanities and social sciences only because they are most consistently thought to directly impinge on the disciplinary ground of Africana Studies. It should be obvious that the work of reimagining the natural sciences, represented by the thinkers listed above, is strongly related to the overarching objectives out of which Africana Studies emerges. Only recently have scholars in the discipline attempted to re-embrace this aspect, although inconsistently. The challenge for this area is the same as the challenges for all other disciplinary areas, the clearing of intellectual space to understand African ideas on their own terms. See inter alia, the chapter on science and technology in James Stewart and Talmadge Anderson, Introduction to African American Studies: Transdisciplinary Approaches (Baltimore, MD: Inprint Editions, 2007), 347-377 and for a genealogy of Black scientists and a cursory review of their accomplishments, see the contributions to the second half of Ivan Van Sertima, ed., Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002).
prominently, nineteenth century thinkers.\textsuperscript{159} These historical writers prepared the ground for a robust tradition of historiography that emerged not merely to contribute to academic knowledge, but to participate in what Ngugi wa Thiong’o terms “remembering practices” and what Greg Carr asserts are identity-building practices.\textsuperscript{160} An earlier contribution, Laurie Maffly-Kipp’s “Mapping the World, Mapping the Race” (1995) explains that this tradition, emerging from the Black church, would capitalize on the new avenues toward literacy available to Africans in America, and as Alexander Crummell (1819-1898) and James Theodore Holly (1829-1911), among others would embody, throughout the African world.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, as Selwyn Cudjoe explores in his \textit{Beyond Boundaries} (2003), nineteenth century precursors abounded throughout the African diaspora. In particular his examination of their beginnings in Trinidad and Tobago is crucial, as this island would be a constant tributary to the river of African intellectual and historiographical traditions in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{162}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} She asserts: “Race histories, in the guise of objective recordings of ongoing tradition, constructed expanded notions of religious and racial communities that had persevered through time. Grounded in Protestant valuations of literacy as a moral and spiritual virtue, their dissemination encouraged by the accessibility of publishing technology through black denominational presses and increasingly through northern white-controlled presses as well, race histories fostered racial and religious commitments to an enlarged African-American diasporic community.” Laurie Maffly-Kipp, “Mapping the World, Mapping the Race: The Negro Race History, 1874-1915,” \textit{Church History} 64 (December 1995): 613.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Selwyn R. Cudjoe, \textit{Beyond Boundaries: The Intellectual Tradition of Trinidad and Tobago in the Nineteenth Century} (Wellesley, MA: Calaloux Publications, 2003). “History” (as well as other ‘disciplines’) in the imagination of Trinidadian intellectuals in nineteenth century was “written” in a myriad of ways. Cudjoe explores these variations, showing that the historical monograph was not the only approach for these thinkers.
\end{itemize}
Perhaps the most seminal historiographical work on Black historical writing is Earl Thorpe’s *Black Historians: A Critique*, first published in 1958. Among his many works, *Black Historians* is aimed at understanding how African American thinkers utilized the tools of historical inquiry for their own benefit. Thorpe distinguishes Black historiography from normative American historiography by explaining that its accent and emphases have been on the point of view and perspective of Afro-Americans, with a central theme of “freedom, equality, and manhood.” This work shows continuity between nineteenth century historical inquiry and that which would emerge in the twentieth century, despite the academic training of many of the practitioners of the latter. For Thorpe, the most important historical thinkers of the nineteenth century were Williams Wells Brown and George Washington Williams, based on criteria including quantity of work, its impact, and their development of historical philosophy and methodologies. Further, Thorpe asserts that the two most important Black historians of the twentieth century had been W.E.B. Du Bois and Carter Godwin Woodson (1875-1950).

In the first half of the twentieth century, Du Bois would offer historical scholarship aimed at reimagining the African past in light of the production of studies that either minimized or neglected their historical contributions and experiences. As shown above, much of Du Bois’ works would inhabit the historical-sociological approach he advocated in “The Study of Negro Problems.” Following Du Bois, was the Harvard trained Woodson, whose influence upon Africana historical thought was through the development of a popular historical agenda that was actualized via independent

164. Ibid, vi.
institutions. Thorpe and August Meier and Elliott Rudwick in their seminal *Black History and the Historical Profession* (1986), point to this aspect of Woodson’s approach as among his most significant achievements.\(^{165}\) Both Woodson and Du Bois were trained under Harvard historian, Albert Bushnell Hart. While they would nevertheless diverge on the historical role of the African in civilization, Woodson’s philosophy of history was based in part on Hart’s idea of the relationship between facts and historical truth, and the potential of *truth* to reframe human and group relationships in the world.\(^{166}\) Woodson would later assert that history should be more than the accumulation of facts, but truth should be accessed and understood “as the complement of poetry, a picture.”\(^{167}\) In other words, Woodson wanted to bring about a broader portrayal of history through the experiences of the Negro. Asserting that Negro history should be more about the “Negro in history,” Woodson implored historical thinkers to move beyond the worship of heroes and toward the history of individuals and groups that have been the “benefactors of humanity.”\(^{168}\)

According to Pero Dagbovie, writing in *The Early Black History Movement* (2007), Woodson thought that history approached in this manner could help to not only “end race prejudice” but inspire Blacks to act in their own best interests.\(^ {169}\) In Dagbovie’s view,

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Woodson believed this could best be done through the development of institutions to popularize the study and dissemination of Black history.

Woodson biographer, Jacqueline Goggin chronicles in large part Woodson’s establishment of the historical school of thought from a Black perspective through the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History (c. 1915), the Journal of Negro History (c. 1916), Associated Publishers (c. 1921), Negro History Week (c. 1926) and the Negro History Bulletin (c. 1937). Goggin’s Carter G. Woodson: A Life in Black History (1997) views Woodson’s historical work as explicit and “highly political acts.” Widely considered the “Father of Black History,” many of the scholars concerned with Negro history during the first half of the twentieth century would work under Woodson’s tutelage and within the organizations he founded. Along with serving as the head of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Woodson would publish or edit works dealing with the social status of African Americans including: Education of the Negro Prior to 1861 (1919), A Century of Negro Migration (1918), The Rural Negro (1930), The Negro Wage Earner, with Lorenzo Johnston Greene (1930); their institutions: The History of the Negro Church (1921); and historical monographs summarizing their African past: The Negro in Our History (1922), The African Background Outlined, or Handbook for the Study of the Negro (1936), African Myths (1928) and African Heroes and Heroines (1939). All in all, according to Pero Dagbovie, Woodson published twenty-two historical works between 1915-1942 in addition to numerous

articles and essays within *The Journal of Negro History* and *The Negro History Bulletin*. A cross-section of representative examples of these articles is provided in the James L. Conyers edited *Carter G. Woodson: A Historical Reader* (2000). For Dagbovie, Carter G. Woodson’s legacy of historical scholarly production is essential to the development of Africana Studies, terming it “proto-Black Studies.”

As Woodson’s life’s work reveals, the sites from which these initiatives were launched were critical to the production of historical knowledge. Many of the academically-trained historians of this period in the United States found institutional homes in Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). These spaces not only afforded them job opportunities in the era of *de jure* segregation, they created important knowledge communities among Black thinkers at the turn of the century and continuing through its first few decades. W.E.B. Du Bois spent twenty-three years at Atlanta University in two stints, from 1897-1910 and 1934-1944, while Woodson would only spend one early year at Howard University. His apprentices in the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History (ASNLH), however, spent considerable parts of their careers working in the history departments of HBCUs. This list includes but is not limited to: Luther P. Jackson (1892-1950), who taught at Voorhees College and Virginia State

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173. Pero Dagbovie, *The Early Black History Movement*, 44. Dagbovie adds to the literature on Woodson by linking him to a “proto-Black studies” movement that continued a tradition that sought to combine socio-political concerns with historical science.

University; Alrutheus Ambush Taylor (1893-1955), who taught at Tuskegee University and West Virginia State University; Lawrence D. Reddick (1910-1995) who taught at Dillard University, Alabama State University, and Kentucky State University; and Lorenzo Johnston Greene (1899-1988), who taught at Lincoln University (MO).

Earlier thinkers at HBCUs included Benjamin Griffith Brawley (1882-1939), the Morehouse College thinker, who published important texts such as *A Short History of the American Negro* (1913), *The Negro in Literature and Art* (1918) and *A Social History of the Negro* (1921). While he was not a trained historian, these works were widely used in university courses, along with the work of the independent scholar, John W. Cromwell, *The History of the Negro American* (1914).

Another scholar who mounted a challenge against the prevailing historical assumptions of the African during this early twentieth century era was Monroe Nathan Work (1866-1945). Trained at the University of Chicago, Work published numerous articles within periodicals during his long tenure as Director of Records and Research at Tuskegee Institute and likely ghostwrote Booker T. Washington’s two-volume, *The Story of the Negro* (1909), which appeared in Thorpe’s *Black Historians* as a pioneer historical text. Work, who was formally trained in the social sciences, also compiled one of the earlier

175. On Brawley, see Earl E. Thorpe, *Black Historians: A Critique*, 55-59. Along with these more popular titles, he would publish a history of Morehouse College, a text on African American women achievement, on scientists, and a work on the relationship of Africa to the war. His work within literary criticism will be discussed infra.

176. This is according to the survey conducted by Willis Nathaniel Huggins in his *A Guide to Studies in African History* (New York: Federation of History Clubs, 1934), 40. This survey and text will be discussed infra.

bibliographies on scholarship on the Negro. His *Bibliography of the Negro in Africa and America* (1928) served an important role for many of these pioneer scholars, as did his *Negro Year Book*, which was published yearly by Tuskegee. In her biography of Work, *Recorder of the Black Experience* (1984), Linda O. McMurry frames Work’s career as attempting to synthesize in some respects the tension between the socio-political programs of Booker T. Washington and the Niagara movement. Exploring Work’s time working with Du Bois and the Atlanta University Studies and his eventual transition to Tuskegee, McMurry views Work’s approach to understanding the African American experience as rooted in fact-based, pragmatic research.\(^{178}\)

In *The Early Black History Movement*, Dagbovie juxtaposes Woodson’s work with the work of his disciple and one time research assistant, Lorenzo Johnston Greene, of whom Arvarh E. Strickland has published, *Working with Carter G. Woodson* (1989) and *Selling Black History* (1996), two volumes of diaries detailing the two’s relationship to each other and their organizational and programmatic initiatives.\(^{179}\) While establishing an overview of Woodson’s contributions to early Black studies and African American history, Dagbovie’s work traces the historical career of Greene who would go on to publish works such as *The

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\(^{178}\) Work’s publications in *The Southern Workman* along with his other research projects show his interest in understanding African history as a lens through which to interrogate the African American condition. See Linda O. McMurry, *Recorder of the Black Experience: A Biography of Monroe Nathan Work* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1984). These *Southern Workman* articles ranged from histories of African civilization, folklore, and agriculture and are listed and discussed in Ibid, 91-96.

Negro in Colonial New England (1942), and create a firm foundation for historical productivity from his base at historically black Lincoln University in Missouri.  

After Woodson’s year-long tenure, the Howard University’s history department would continue to develop during this period. In the 1920s, Howard historian Walter Dyson had edited the Howard University Studies in History, which served as base from which many African American thinkers would enter their voices into the fray. James Turner and Steven McGann view this series as part of the trajectory and tradition of Africana Studies. Howard University also was the home for historians, Charles Harris Wesley (1891-1987) and Rayford Whittingham Logan (1897-1982), thinkers also connected to Woodson’s Association. Both Wesley and Logan were trained at Harvard and contributed to the second generation of African American historians in the twentieth century. Janette Hoston Harris’s “Woodson and Wesley” (1998) points to the importance of Charles Wesley in Woodson’s organization and the advancement of African American historiography. Among Wesley’s many publications include his seminal Negro Labor in the United States (1927) and histories of Black Greek letter organizations and Black

180. The second half of the text is one of very few treatments of Greene’s work at the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History and the work done to promote Black history from Lincoln University (MO). See Pero Dagbovie, The Early Black History Movement, 109-211. See also the discussion of Greene in Earl E. Thorpe, Black Historians: A Critique, 176-177.

181. In the front matter of the first volume, Walter Dyson states: “These studies, to be published from time to time, will comprise works of original research by teachers of Howard University and by students in the Department of History. The studies will also include collections of documents, bibliographies, and reprints of rare tracts.” Walter Dyson, “Front Matter,” in Howard University Studies in History, Volume I, ed. Walter Dyson (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1921). Contributors included Dyson, Charles Wesley and William Leo Hansberry.


183. Janette Hoston Harris, “Woodson and Wesley: A Partnership in Building the Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History,” Journal of Negro History 83 (Spring 1998): 109-119. The women, however contentiously, involved with Woodson, Wesley, and Greene within the Association garnered a separate treatment in Dagbovie’s work. See Pero Dagbovie, The Early Black History Movement, 83-106. Among the women involved were Jessie Parkhurst Guzman, Lucy Harth Smith, and Mary McLeod Bethune.
participation in the U.S. Civil War. Wesley would later become president of Wilberforce University, where he authored his work *Neglected History* (1969), a series of essays on African American history and historiography.184

Along with works such as *The Betrayal of the Negro* (1965) and his edited *What the Negro Wants* (1944), Rayford Logan’s concept of the nadir advanced in his *The Negro in American Life and Thought* (1954) has been instrumental in the understanding of African American history. Along with his work at Howard, his early involvement in the Pan-African movement is chronicled in Kenneth Janken’s biography, *Rayford Logan and the Dilemma of the African American Intellectual* (1993).185 Also within this generation was John Hope Franklin (1915-2009), who started at Howard University and the prolific Morgan State historian Benjamin Quarles (1904-1996). In the 1940s, Franklin would publish his seminal *From Slavery to Freedom* (1947) and Quarles, his biography *Frederick Douglass* (1948), before authoring the seminal *The Negro in the Making of America* (1964).

Finally, there was the Howard University scholar that bridged the gaps between the academy and the street. Pioneering the historical work on ancient African history within the academy was William Leo Hansberry (1895-1965). Kwame Wes Alford, who has written the lone PhD dissertation on Hansberry, reveals in an article in the *Journal of

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**Black Studies**, that Hansberry, inspired by Du Bois' *The Negro* would earn his degrees from Atlanta University and Harvard University before starting the African Civilizations section within the Department of History at Howard University in 1922.186 Amidst much controversy and resistance, Hansberry’s perseverance and assertion of a very real and living African past as well as his penchant for training thinkers for over thirty years at Howard would lay the foundation for much of the work that was bequeathed to Africana Studies departments. His surviving publications, *Pillars in Ethiopian History* (1974) and *African and Africans as Seen By Classical Writers* (1977) have been edited by Joseph Harris in two volumes and include lectures on ancient African civilization in Ethiopia as well as reviews of Greek writings on ancient African peoples.187 Devoted in many ways to these teaching and social advocacy functions, Hansberry was unable to devote much time to ensuring the publication of his own work.188

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Institutional homes at HBCUs were responsible for a number thinkers who helped to craft African American history. While it would be impossible to produce a coherent philosophy of history out of the production of these thinkers, Earl Thorpe and Jacob Carruthers have provided some ways of measuring the guiding philosophy of many of these institutionally trained thinkers. While it is clear that they are products of the same insurgent tradition, that sought to “crusade” against the absence of Negro history in the popular and academic mainstream, the historians whom Thorpe considers “the new school” began to develop a style that was more “professional” than the scholars who produced works between 1900-1930. Perhaps in Carruthers’ estimation, these scholars were part of a vindicationist tendency that persisted among many historians in the academy (and among their nineteenth century precursors), whereby their philosophies of history revolved around the question of racial contributionism—the ways in which Africans have contributed and participated in making, as Benjamin Quarles puts it, “America what it was and what it is.”

William Leo Hansberry, who in fact never received the PhD in history, was one of these thinkers very much involved with the works of historians who were often not academically trained or university professors. Termed by Thorpe as “historians-without-portfolio,” these thinkers were directly involved in establishing a foundation for Africana

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Studies in the early twentieth century. As such, their challenge to existing historical scholarship about Africana peoples must be acknowledged. Both Carr’s “The African-Centered Philosophy of History” and his aforementioned dissertation, acknowledge the important link “historians-without-portfolio” forged between the institutional trained thinkers (Du Bois, Woodson, et al.) and the “street academies” from which they operated.\textsuperscript{191} Included in this lineage in Thorpe’s \textit{Black Historians} are the bibliophile, Arturo Alfonso Schomburg (1874-1938) and John Edward Bruce (1856-1924) who, along with William Henry Ferris (1874-1941), in 1911 found the Negro Society for Historical Research.\textsuperscript{192} Bruce, born enslaved, would rise to become one of the most important Pan-Africanist journalists of his era, while Ferris, a Yale graduate and movement veteran would also work with Du Bois, William Monroe Trotter, and others in the Niagara movement before publishing his impressive \textit{The African Abroad} (1913). Both thinkers became heavily involved and wrote important historical articles in Marcus Garvey’s \textit{Negro World}, the organ of the UNIA.\textsuperscript{193} Schomburg’s most famous work, “The Negro Digs Up His Past” was published in Alain Locke’s \textit{The New Negro} (1925), and advocated the need for the continued development of a historical scholarship that serves the interest of the African world.\textsuperscript{194} Twelve years earlier, his \textit{Racial Integrity} (1913) read before teachers at

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\item \textsuperscript{191} For Thorpe, these thinkers are generally “non-professional persons, in all periods, who have a fondness for the discipline of history, feeling that their life experiences peculiarly fit them for chronicling some historical events.” See Earl E. Thorpe, \textit{Black Historians: A Critique}, 144.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Ibid, 145-146; 149. See also Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 345.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Arturo A. Schomburg, “The Negro Digs Up His Past,” in \textit{The New Negro}, ed. Alain Locke (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 231-237. Schomburg’s importance for other scholars and their research
\end{itemize}
Cheyney Institute, masterfully weaved through elements of African history while demonstrating the need for the establishment of departments of Negro history in various institutional settings. This work was published as one of the occasional papers of the Negro Society for Historical Research.

According to Carr, The Negro Society for Historical Research led to in the early 1930s, the establishment of the Harlem History Club, another organization of lay historians under the leadership of Willis Nathaniel Huggins (1886-1941), a schoolteacher, bookshop owner, and the only person in the group with a PhD. Other members of the club included Joel Augustus Rogers (1883-1966), Richard B. Moore (1893-1978), John Glover Jackson (1907-1993), and a young John Henrik Clarke (1915-1998). The group would later change its name to the Blyden Society, and out of this collective two main published works emerged. Huggins’ 1934 text, *A Guide to Studies in African History* (1934) is an overview of the constituent elements of African history as an intellectual enterprise as

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195. Arturo A. Schomburg, *Racial Integrity: A Plea for the Establishment of a Chair of Negro History in our Schools and Colleges, etc.*: Negro Society for Historical Research Occasional Paper No. 3 (New York: August Valentine Bernier, 1913). He relates his purpose: “I am here with a sincere desire to awaken the sensibilities, to kindle the dormant fibres in the soul, and to fire the racial patriotism by the study of the Negro books. We often feel that so many things around us are warped and alienated. Let us see, if we cannot agree to arrange a formula or create a basic construction, for the establishment of a substantial method of instruction for our young women and men in the material and the useful. The object of this paper is not to revolutionize existing standards, but simply to improve them by amending them so that they include the practical history of the Negro race, from the dawn of civilization to the present time.” Ibid, 5. Carr’s dissertation discusses this work showing the importance of cultural and pedagogical traditions among these thinkers. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 346-347.

196. He states: “New York City was the incubator for the intergenerational dialogue between these lay scholars and their immediate apprentices.” See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Centered Philosophy of History,” 306.
well as a survey of select scholars’ view of the enterprise and the existing course offerings in a few early historically black colleges. The origins of Huggins’ survey of representative scholars and of course catalogs were in the context of his attempt to “institute courses in African history in the A. and M. College, Huntsville, Alabama.”\footnote{Ibid, 35. Select scholars who responded to Huggins were W.E.B. Du Bois, John W. Cromwell, John Edward Bruce, Benjamin Brawley, Robert E. Park, and J.E. Moorland. Huggins included the course offerings of Atlanta, Fisk, Wilberforce, Howard, Morehouse, Paine, Hampton, Virginia Union, Spelman, Tuskegee, and Selma University. Huggins concludes this section saying that as a whole, “there is no apparent tendency here on the part of these educators to identify the needs, interests, or future of the Negro as fundamentally different from what may be the common lot of all groups participating in American life.” Ibid, 42.}

It also includes a working bibliography and overview of the existing literature that could potentially be used to instruct African history both within and outside the academy.\footnote{This working bibliography, categorized by region, includes a contextual overview and introduction before a listing of the associated works is provided can be found in Willis N. Huggins, \textit{A Guide to Studies in African History}, 43-92. In contextualizing his study and articulating his philosophy of history, Huggins states: “The history of our people, rightly envisioned, is a thrilling story. Our children need it. They cannot fully understand the world as it affects us without knowing something, indeed a great deal, of what we were in the past and how we have come to our present condition. We cannot be fully intelligent American citizens, unless we add to what we know of a modern governments and social institutions, a wider knowledge of governments and institutions which we have created and in which we were dominant actors.” See Ibid, 20. For general background of Huggins, see also the biographical essay by Ralph L. Crowder, “Willis Nathaniel Huggins (1886-1941): Historian, Activist, and Community Mentor,” \textit{Afro Americans in New York Life and History} 30 (July 2006): 127-151.} The second text was authored by Huggins and Jackson and entitled, \textit{An Introduction to African Civilization, With Main Currents in Ethiopian History} (1937). This work has been considered a classic contribution to the understanding of the ancient African past and its connection to recent African history.\footnote{Carr places the context of this publication within the symbolic and very real support for Africans in Ethiopia embroiled in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in the mid-1930s. Their victories stimulated “African pride, resistance, and excellence, after a fashion similar to the valorization of Haiti at the beginning of the nineteenth century.” The Blyden Society had been involved intimately with the Ethiopian leadership, Huggins having met with Emperor Haile Selassie previously and helping to organize the American Friends of Ethiopia. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 330.} The historians of the Blyden Society offered a collective challenge to the contention, existent in both the historical scholarship and social sciences, that Africans
were somehow separated intellectually from the achievements of great civilizations on the African continent.\textsuperscript{200} In doing so, this collective helped to marshal an approach to knowledge that can be directly traced to the Freedom Schools and community education institutions that marked later periods of the twentieth century.

Carr continues with the importance of the concurrent contributions of Drusilla Dunjee Houston (1876-1941), the Oklahoman journalist who would publish \textit{Wonderful Ethiopians of the Ancient Cushite Empire} (1926), which re-links Africans to Egypt and ancient Kush as well as establishes the theory of African influence throughout the world including Europe, early America, and southwestern Asia.\textsuperscript{201} In her \textit{Wonderful Ethiopians}, Houston understood her historical work as a means by which to incite change in the ideas of world leadership and ultimately the political situation of African people. She prudently claimed that “we cannot solve the stupendous problems that the world faces until we can read aright the riddle of the evolution of races.”\textsuperscript{202} One of the assumed two lost volumes in the installment has surfaced and has been since published by historian and Dunjee Houston scholar, Peggy Brooks-Bertram. According to Brooks-Bertram, this work, \textit{Origin of

\textsuperscript{200} See Ibid, 347-354. This remains one of the most extended examinations of the Blyden Society.
\textsuperscript{201} See Ibid, 344-345 as well as Drusilla Dunjee Houston, \textit{Wonderful Ethiopians of the Ancient Cushite Empire} (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1985), 10-11. As her recent biographer, Peggy-Ann Brooks-Bertram reminds us, Houston was not only the earliest known African woman to author a multi-volume history of ancient Africa, she wrote more than two thousand editorials and poems from 1914-1939 in her brother’s organ, \textit{The Black Dispatch}. She also ran the McAlester Seminary For Girls for twelve years and worked heavily with the Black Baptist Convention and the Federated Women’s Clubs of Oklahoma. See Peggy-Ann Brooks Bertram, “Drusilla Dunjee Houston: Uncrowned Queen in the African American Literary Tradition,” (PhD Diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2002). See also W. Paul Coates, “Drusilla Dunjee Houston: An Introductory Note about the Author and Her Work,” in \textit{Wonderful Ethiopians of the Ancient Cushite Empire}, i-v and John Mark Rhea, “Farewell to My Beloved Ethiopia: Drusilla Dunjee Houston as the Voice of Elite African American Women During the Decline and Fall of “Racial Uplift”, 1917-1933” (MA thesis, University of Oklahoma, 2004).
\textsuperscript{202} Drusilla Dunjee Houston, \textit{Wonderful Ethiopians of the Ancient Cushite Empire}, 7.
Civilization from the Cushites (2007), was completed around the same time as Wonderful Ethiopians and continues Houston’s quest to understand the foundations of Western (Aryan) culture and ideas could be found in ancient African ways of knowing as well as socio-political processes grounded on the continent of Africa.\footnote{See Peggy Brooks-Bertram, editor’s comments to Wonderful Ethiopians of the Ancient Cushite Empire: Book II: Origin of Civilization from the Cushites, by Drusilla Dunjee Houston (Buffalo, NY: Peggy Bertram Publishing, 2007), vi-lvii. Accordingly, Peggy Brooks-Bertram explains that Houston’s philosophy of history anticipated the work of George James and Martin Bernal and much of the work to come surrounding the “origin” of culture and civilization; the work however was never published as Houston, a “historian-without-portfolio,” did not have the backing or support of the established publishing apparatus. See Ibid, xxxvi.}

Thorpe’s genealogy of historians, while it does not include the Blyden society, continues from Schomburg and Bruce to the work of the aforementioned John W. Cromwell (1846-1927), as well as John R. Lynch (1847-1939), Henry A. Wallace (1856-1923), Laura Eliza Wilkes (1871-1922), William Crogman (1841-1931), Edward Austin Johnson (1860-1944), and Theophilus Gould Steward (1843-1924).\footnote{See Earl E. Thorpe, Black Historians: A Critique, 146-153. With the exception of J.A. Rogers, whose works receive attention, Thorpe does not mention Huggins, Jackson, or any other scholars who were intimately connected to the Blyden Society.} These lay and/or non-institutionally trained historians, many of whom were grounded in community work, all produced historical works in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that broke with traditional historical philosophies, which attempted to divorce Africans from any sense of a past.

This emergence was of course not limited to the United States. On the continent, thinkers trained in Western languages, began to reassert their African heritages, using the power of the pen. Carr outlines the work of these thinkers in the nineteenth century, a genealogy which includes Abbe Boilat (1814-1901), Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1809-1891),
and Africanus James Beale Horton (1835-1883). Early twentieth century thinkers included A.B.C. Sibthorpe (1829-1916), Carl C. Reindorf (1834-1917), J.B. Danquah (1895-1965), Jomo Kenyatta (1894-1978), Samuel Johnson (1846-1901), J.C. Casely-Hayford (1866-1930), and J.C. DeGraft-Johnson (1919-). These thinkers would author important works which considered the influence of their emergent “national” cultures on the changing dynamics of the colonial situations. This was qualitatively different than the much of the contemporaneous work which had been written on Africans, authored by anthropologists and historians in the West, most prominent in America were Franz Boas and Melville Herskovits, whose seminal *Myth of the Negr* (1941), was based on field research experience in Africa.

As independence movements in African gained steam in the 1940s and 1950s, historical writing experienced a renewed burst of energy. The writer with the most resounding effect was the Senegalese thinker, Cheikh Anta Diop (1923-1986) who would author important scientific texts first proving the link between ancient Africa and the contemporary African society and then linking their intellectual traditions to explain and interpret the current issues and possibilities of African peoples, as they presented themselves in what he considered their historical, linguistic, and psychological factors.

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205. Carr discusses the importance of some of these thinkers during the nineteenth century and up to the twentieth as they emerged, trained in missionary schools, and as they began to confront the issue of colonization. The aforementioned Edward Wilmot Blyden is also a part of this lineage. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 297-310.

The translation of Diop’s works into English established his wide following in the United States in the 1970s and 80s among Africana Studies thinkers.  

Important to understanding Diop’s approach to knowledge is the intellectual apprenticeship he would receive from his upbringing in the Muridiyya sect of Islam in Senegal. His Mouride training established his foundation, as the group increasingly sought to envision the function of the sciences through their own cultural motifs within Wolof language. Clearly, this is in part responsible for Diop’s belief that language was central to historical and cultural reclamation. This influence was carried with Diop as he embarked upon his secondary training in the social sciences, and from there his work at Paris in historical linguistics. It was during his time at Paris that Diop would begin to publish works that in large part attempted to re-orient African people to their historical reality. His collection of essays, *Toward the African Renaissance* (1948), included attempts to

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207. Greg Carr includes in his work the initial reflections from James Baldwin and John Henrik Clarke, showing that it was the latter’s initial interest after reading the proceedings of Diop’s participation at the First and Second Conferences of Negro Writers that began the process of introducing his work to audiences in the United States during the Black Arts/Black Power movement by the late 1960s. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 375-377; 394-402.

208. The bulk of the biographical work on Cheikh Anta Diop is written in French. At least two of these book-length works emphasize Diop’s Mouride upbringing. It was here that Diop’s cultural foundation was defined. Diop came from a genealogy of thinkers who increasingly sought to oppose the French acculturation process through the development of pedagogical practices that were inherent and central to African (Wolof) cultural norms. As we will see, Diop’s emphasis on historical linguistics was well known. For a discussion of Diop’s early life, see Mama Yatassaye Ndiade, *Cheikh Anta Diop: Le Dernier des Pharaons* (Dakar: Editions Tokossel, 2003) and Pathe Diagne, *Cheikh Anta Diop et l’Afrique dans l’Histoire du Monde* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), as well as the useful short introduction on the Murid training of Diop published by Majalis, “Cheikh Anta Diop, un Chantre Mouride de la Renaissance Africaine,” Majalis, accessed June 21, 2011, http://www.majalis.org. See also works in English listed in Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “The African-Centered Philosophy of History,” 309n68. The more prominent English biographical treatments do not emphasize in detail Diop’s early years. These are Chris Gray, *Conceptions of History: Cheikh Anta Diop and Theophile Obenga* (London: Karnak House, 1989) and the more recent Molefi Kete Asante, *Cheikh Anta Diop: An Intellectual Portrait* (Los Angeles: The University of Sankore Press, 2007).
frame understanding of the African past as being accessed through the use of what he later termed “the African human sciences.”

Among Diop’s early works, his dissertation theses would eventually be published as *Nations Negre et Culture* (1954). This work was later popularized among Africans in the United States as it was published in English under the title, *The African Origin of Civilization* (1974). His *L’Unite culturelle de l’Afrique Noire* (1959) and *L’Afrique Noire precoloniale* (1960) indicated a serious engagement with anthropological and cultural studies. It was also during this time that Diop’s interest in radiocarbon technology helped establish the radiocarbon laboratory at the Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire. This, as well as prior training in physics, chemistry, and historical linguistics combined with his interests in anthropology and archaeology aided Diop in his quest to scientifically challenge dominant (Western) ideas about the ancient African past. Chris Gray’s *Conceptions of History* (1989) along with a series of interviews with Diop in the 1970s reveal that Diop was not simply concerned with countering European distortions by articulating the existence of an African personality, but with doing so through scholarly documentation of

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210. These two texts would be published in the United States in English in 1973 and 1987, respectively. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr’s discussion of these works in “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 378-380. Asante also attempts to understand the archaeological contributions within these two works. See Molefi Kete Asante, *Cheikh Anta Diop: An Intellectual Portrait*, 37-50.

211. See Chris Gray *Conceptions of History*, 10-11. Diop published a series of articles from 1971-1977 in the IFAN organ, entitled “Datations par la method du radiocarbone,” which indicates both his interest and his belief that this method would be of use in restoring African historical memory.

observable cultural realities. Thought not allowed to teach formally within the Senegalese university system, Diop exacted influence through his presentations at UNESCO in the 1970s, his publications, and his training of protégés, including Theophile Obenga and Aboubacry Moussa Lam. Diop’s Mouride training inculcated a sense of resistance to the dominant forms of knowledge that in turn led Diop to utilize scientific training in a myriad of areas to uncover a “historical consciousness” of the

213. See Carlos Moore, “Interview with Cheikh Anta Diop,” in Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 121-122 and Chris Gray, Conceptions of History, 12. In the Moore interview, Diop differentiates from the Negritude thinkers ideas by implicating the need to study realities as opposed to generalities, the former for him were observable by correctly employing historical, linguistic and sociological tools.

214. In 1974, Diop’s presentation at the UNESCO Symposium on the Peopling of Ancient Egypt and the Deciphering of the Meroitic Script along with his protégé Theophile Obenga’s contribution comprised what Greg Carr calls the “single most important intellectual challenge to Western ownership of classical Africa made to that date.” See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Centered Philosophy of History,” 394. Diop’s presentation attempted to utilize methods ranging from physical anthropology to iconography to measurements of epidermal melanin to prove the African origins of ancient Egyptians. Obenga’s presentation was centered on the linguistic relationships. His paper was published in the proceedings, while Diop’s presentation appeared in Volume Two of UNESCO’s General history of Africa. See Theophile Obenga, “The Genetic Linguistic Relationship Between Egyptian (Ancient Egyptian and Coptic) and Modern Negro-African Languages,” in The Peopling of Ancient Egypt and the Deciphering of the Meroitic Script: Proceedings of the Symposium held in Cairo from 28 January to 3 February 1974 (Paris: UNESCO, 1978), 65-71 and Cheikh Anta Diop, “Origine des Anciens Egyptiens,” in General History of Africa, Vol. 2, ed. Gamal Mokhtar (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 27-82. Lafayette Gaston’s “Past Afrocentricity” gives an account of the 1974 symposium that is strengthened by more background information about Diop’s own participation. Though it is well known that Diop was a principal organizer, Gaston quoting from Cheikh M’Backe Diop’s account, reveals Diop’s conditions for participation in UNESCO’s larger project of constructing a General History of Africa: “Diop set three conditions in exchange for his participation. The first was a colloquium gathering known researchers in the field to 1) engage in a scientific debate concerning the ancient peopling of the Nile Valley and 2) discuss the then current state of the decipherment of the Meroitic Script. The third request was for an aerial survey of the continent in search of potentially significant archaeological sites.” See Lafayette Gaston, “Past Afrocentricity: Reassessing Cheikh Anta Diop’s Place In the Afrocentric Frame,” The Liberator 23 (2009): 4. Chris Gray sees this conference as an important “triumph” for both Diop and Obenga in their quests to “promote their ideas about the origins of Ancient Egypt and African history in general.” Gray also lists two other conferences (one sponsored by UNESCO) during this time, where both Diop and Obenga participated. See Chris Gray, Conceptions of History, 13-15. Gaston’s work in part, looks at what he terms the “Dakar school” which emerged after Diop’s death and produced other important Diop disciples such as Aboubacry Moussa Lam and Babacar Sall, and in Cameroon, Gilbert Ngom and Oum Ndigi. See Lafayette Gaston, “Past Afrocentricity,” 5. Their work obviously must be increasingly understood, read, and linked within Africana Studies spaces.
linkages between Egypt, Nubia, and other ancient civilizations and develop from this knowledge useful ways of freeing African from their “cultural alienation.”

In his *Intellectual Warfare* (1999), Carruthers points to these earlier aspects of Diop’s intellectual legacy, but also emphasized the “vocation” of Diop, which was to develop “pluridisciplinary teams” of scholars well versed in the African human sciences. Similarly, Lafayette Gaston’s “Past Afrocentricity” (2009), enlists Diop’s call to not “accept his conclusions at face value” but to seriously consider and extend the main impetus to his work, that of seriously and scientifically analyzing the African past. Gaston compares Diop’s work with that of Temple University thinker, Molefi Kete Asante, showing that the latter has contributed to a largely African American symbolic application of Diop’s historical conclusions aimed at defining and operationalizing a composite African cultural personality.

Diop has also been considered by Greg Carr, as one of the key thinkers concerned with the development of an African-centered philosophy of history. Walking through

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217. He states: “Although the aim of his [Diop’s] work, in part, was to establish a new, multidisciplinary means of resurrecting the African past, he himself did not wish for everything he wrote to be taken at face value. The critiques laid on him by his students and followers are evidence of this spirit. His stated wish towards the end of his life, in addition to his political designs, was the establishment of a team of scientists in various fields of African history to find, analyze and publish cutting-edge work in their respective areas. Treating his findings as “proof” for his assertions without developing a means to engage it does not do his work justice. Diop once said that he did not “impose” *Nations Nègres*, or any of this other works, but rather that they were meant to be critiqued and analyzed. However, since Diop’s passing, there have been very few people in the Diaspora who have done this.” See Lafayette Gaston, “Past Afrocentricity,” 5.
most of his theoretical contributions, including his work in linguistics and cultural adaptation, Diop’s methodological approach is seen in Carr’s work as characterized by its disciplined scientific inquiry aimed at establishing an Africana cultural identity through historical lenses.\footnote{Similar to his characterization of Du Bois’ approach, Carr sees Diop’s work as “politically informed but carefully attentive to detail.” See Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 376.} Carr, along with Karanja Carroll in his PhD dissertation, “The Influence of Cheikh Anta Diop’s ‘Two Cradle’ Theory on Africana Academic Discourse” (2007) establish connections between Diop and the work which would come from the Black social sciences.\footnote{See Ibid, 379-380. See also Karanja Keita Carroll, “The Influence of Cheikh Anta Diop’s ‘Two Cradle’ Theory on Africana Academic Discourse: Implications for Africana Studies” [PhD diss., Temple University, 2007].} With the exclusion of his magnum opus, \textit{Civilization of Barbarism} (1991), Diop’s work was composed between the 1950s and mid-1970s, and would profoundly influence Africana Studies’ historical and social inquiry in the early stages of its institutionalization by providing an alternative base for the extraction of knowledge as it existed in historical African realities and contemporary experiences as they ranged across different sites of observation. Diop’s work proclaims that the unity of African ideas should serve as the intellectual fulcrum for an African and collective human future— Africana Studies must play its part.

In 1966, W.E.B. Du Bois and Cheikh Anta Diop were the co-recipients of the First World Festival of Arts and Culture award for the scholar who had exerted the greatest influence on Negro thought in the twentieth century.\footnote{Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 378.} Both scholars, as well as those thinkers listed above, were part of a sacred mission of restoring historical
consciousness to African people. This mission clearly did not require a degree in history nor did it require one to participate in the discipline-building of history and its subfields. What it required was what African people required—a commitment to the restoration of historical memory. This explains the importance of history to the folk, or what some considered the masses; an embrace of the past rooted in knowing and participating in the great circle of life and experience that is at once at odds with Western historical thought and beyond its full comprehension. The legacy just outlined must then be reattached to these longer traditions of African deep thought.

b. Between the Social Sciences and Radical Philosophy

With the continued development of the social science disciplines, namely sociology/anthropology, political science, and economics in the early twentieth century, thinkers of African descent concerned with the pernicious affects of Western modernity begin to reflect on the modalities of inquiry provided by these nascent disciplines. In addition, Western radical thought provided a complicated lens for assessing the modern moment for many Black thinkers. Those institutionally trained as well as lay thinkers involved in social and political movements would broach the subjects studied under the broad realm of social science to attempt to reach solutions. This aspect of Black intellectual life increasingly grappled with the contentious nature of the American/Western capitalist and imperial project and its relationship to race, while at the same time attempting to locate Western radicalism in the grand scheme of this
conversation. The results were a complex mix of ideas, woven together by the impulse to see Africans “survive as free people.”

i. Sociology and Anthropology

The early literature on the Black sociological tradition includes the John Bracey, Elliot Rudwick, and August Meier edited *Black Sociologists: The First Half Century* (1971), which assesses the pioneering thought of W.E.B. Du Bois, and others, while reproducing components of their work. The volume includes an introductory piece which characterizes the era between 1899 and 1945 as the “golden era” of Black sociology, borne out of an environment of “extreme racism” inherent in mainstream studies. This period saw intense intellectual production and the germination of a “Black social science.” This essay along with Rhett Jones’ 1971 article, “Black Sociology: 1890-1917,” offers historical background to the “first generation” of African American scholars tinkering with the theoretical tools of sociological inquiry. Jones denotes that these thinkers understood the African background of the African American population and in contradistinction to mainstream sociology, studied the effects of oppression with an aim at social reform. James E. Blackwell and Morris Janowitz’s edited *Black Sociologists: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (1974) covers much of the same ground but adds to the conversation, the development of the genealogy of professionally trained sociologists

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223. John Bracey, Jr., et al., ed., *Black Sociologists: The First Half Century* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1971), 1. They conclude by indicating that this coterie of thinkers was concerned with the linkages between “oppression and discrimination” and the social issues in Black life. See Ibid, 12.

that began to appear in the 1930s. Contributors to the volume attempt to uncover how these thinkers developed theories that sought to bend sociological analysis to the experiences of African Americans. It examines the advent of Black thinkers drawn to sociological thought through the lens of their development as professionals within the academy. Lastly, Robert E. Washington and Donald Cunnigen’s edited *Confronting the American Dilemma of Race* (2002) brings together critical essays assessing both the theoretical and professional development of the second generation of Black sociologists. They view the period, 1931-1959, as the heyday of many of these thinkers, who, Donald Cunnigen in particular, understands as primarily institutionally trained professionals acquiescent to the dominant theoretical paradigms within sociology.

In the time covering Du Bois’ departure from Atlanta University and his arrival and tenure at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, younger scholars many of whom were trained at the research-oriented University of Chicago began attempts to apply sociological and anthropological language to the experiences of African-descendants in the United States, as well as other parts of the Diaspora. These

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225. James E. Blackwell and Morris Janowitz, eds., *Black Sociologists: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974). The volume brings together contributions about the early founding figures such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Charles S. Johnson, and E. Franklin Frazier and the work of sociologists before the “integration” of the discipline at historically black colleges and universities. It then moves on to contemporary theoretical and professional issues among the Black sociological community that would emerge from these foundations. The volume is largely an attempt to broaden the heritage of the discipline of sociology by including the genealogy of black thinkers associated with the discipline.


thinkers included, among others, William Boyd Allison Davis, St. Clair Drake, Horace Cayton, Jr., Charles Spurgeon Johnson, Oliver Cromwell Cox, and Edward Franklin Frazier.

Allison Davis (1902-1983) was a Harvard and University of Chicago trained social scientist, who approached the social world in the United States through the problems associated with educational attainment for Africans. Davis’ three main works, *Children of Bondage* (1940, with John Dollard), *Deep South* (1941, with Burleigh B. Gardner and Mary R. Gardner), and *Social Caste Influences on Learning* (1948) have been virtually unnoticed by intellectual historians of sociology. Writing on the notion that culturally relevant education was represented in the work of Davis, Michael R. Hillis in his 1995 article, “Allison Davis and the Study of Race, Social Class, and Schooling” asserts that these studies show a career-long commitment to understanding the impact of “race, class, and culture on educational development” within African American populations.

As the migrations north created new types of African American communities, the ways in which society impacted their lives had to be reassessed. The University of Chicago emerged as a space for Black scholars to attempt such an analysis. The St. Clair Drake (1911-1990) and Horace Cayton (1903-1970) authored *Black Metropolis* (1945) has been viewed as a signal contribution to the Black social scientific tradition. Drake, a student in anthropology and Cayton a student in sociology, were both drawn to these fields to contemplate how research could be used to meet social ends. The work has been

229. Ibid. While Hillis is concerned with Davis’ positions on the relevance of culture to education, he nonetheless provides a holistic view of some of the major works of Davis’ career as well as useful biographical information.
hailed as such an attempt, as it explored the dominant social structure’s imposition on urban African American life.\textsuperscript{230}

Another Chicago trained thinker in the social sciences was Charles Spurgeon Johnson (1893-1956). A Robert Park mentee, his extensive bibliography includes \textit{The Negro in Chicago} (1922), \textit{The Negro in American Civilization} (1930), \textit{The Shadow of The Plantation} (1934), \textit{Growing up in the Black Belt} (1941), and a myriad of works aimed at understanding race relations.\textsuperscript{231} Richard Robbins’ intellectual-biographic account in Blackwell and Janowitz’s \textit{Black Sociologists: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives} views Johnson’s work as important in extending the early sociological tradition that preceded “the new black and Afro-American studies.”\textsuperscript{232} According to Robbins, in his analysis of Johnson’s work on tenantry and youth development, his “indirection” proved invaluable in accurately assessing the existing race relations in the Deep South.\textsuperscript{233} Of the three themes Robbins’ essay establishes as characteristics of Johnson’s contribution, his explicit to challenge disciplinary sociology was the idea that studies of African American populations should move beyond accentuating their victimhood.\textsuperscript{234} This is an aspect of Johnson’s work that should be emphasized. Implicit in many of these studies is the understanding that African

\textsuperscript{230}. See Drake’s reminiscences on the work, thirty years later, within the context of the development of Black perspectives within social science during the 1970s, St. Clair Drake, “Reflections on Anthropology and the Black Experience,” \textit{Anthropology and Education Quarterly} 9 (Summer 1978): 85-109.


\textsuperscript{233}. Ibid, 73. Robbins views this as an important strategy of Johnson’s, he continues: “The impact of \textit{Shadow of the Plantation}, \textit{Growing Up in the Black Belt}, and \textit{Patterns of Segregation}, is in the anger they provoke in us, not in any anger in the texts themselves.”

\textsuperscript{234}. See Ibid, 77.
American populations are complex and cannot be understood simply through the normative lens of the “Negro problem.” Johnson’s approach helped to generate important institutions. His ideas would inform particular movements both inside and outside academia, during his tenures as the editor of the National Urban League’s organ, *Opportunity*, as well as the director of sociology and president of historically Black Fisk University. In these two capacities, he was able to shape conceptions of Negro art and renaissance and to provide a “Black space” the opportunity to train its own lineage of social scientists. Patrick J. Gilpin and Marybeth Gasman’s biography, *Charles S. Johnson: Leadership Beyond the Veil in the Age of Jim Crow* (2003) explores not only Johnson’s methodological approach in the sociology of race relations, but also his contributions and style of race leadership during the 1930s and 40s.  

Another thinker who seemed to be influenced by both Johnson and W.E.B. Du Bois was Ira de Augustine Reid (1901-1968). During his life, Reid, who earned a PhD in sociology from Columbia, worked at Johnson’s *Opportunity* and with Du Bois during his second tenure at Atlanta University, eventually becoming the editor of *Phylon*, the creator of People’s College, an adult education institution, and holding professorships at a number of universities in sociology. Among his many works which range from the study of Black immigrants to sharecroppers, Reid’s notable contributions include *The Negro Immigrant* (1939), *In a Minor Key: Negro Youth in Story and Fact* (1940), in addition to sociological surveys of Black communities in the Hill District (Pittsburgh), Denver, as well

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as a five-volume work, *The Negro in New Jersey* (1932). A contemporary of Reid’s was the Atlanta University graduate and Morgan State University anthropologist, Ellen Irene Diggs (1906-1998). Diggs also worked very closely with Du Bois, eventually helping to co-found *Phylon*, before engaging in primary research in Cuba studying the continuity of African culture in Latin America. Diggs was in this way a precursor to what would become African diaspora or Black Atlantic studies. Her early works on Afro-Latino history and culture appeared in African American periodicals like *Phylon, Crisis* and *The Journal of Negro History*.

The corpus of Trinidadian-American thinker, Oliver Cromwell Cox’s (1901-1974) published work reveals an intense attempt to imagine structural and systemic forces, mainly capitalism and the world system, as the key instigators of the imbalance of the material conditions between racial groups. Cox wrote and taught from historically Black colleges, Tuskegee, and for over twenty years in Jefferson City, Missouri at Lincoln University. His works, *Caste, Class, and Race* (1948), *Foundations of Capitalism* (1959), *Capitalism and American Leadership* (1962), and *Capitalism as a System* (1964) all cohered around his understanding of Western modernity’s imposition upon Africans, and other non-Europeans for that matter through the constructions of racial and class-based (both political and social) polarizations. Both Herbert M. Hunter in his introduction to *The Sociology of Oliver C. Cox* (2000) and Anthony J. Lemelle’s “Oliver Cromwell Cox: Toward a Pan-Africanist Epistemology of Community Action” (2001) point to these positions as

reasons his work was not widely received and recognized as other Black sociologists writing roughly in the same period.\footnote{According to Hunter, Cox’s challenge to the normatively constructed paradigms of “social stratification and race relations” coupled with his critical attack on highly regarded figures such as Robert E. Park and W. Lloyd Warner, contributed to the exclusion of his work. See Herbert M. Hunter, “Introduction: The Legacy of Oliver C. Cox,” in \textit{The Sociology of Oliver C. Cox: New Perspectives}, ed. Herbert M. Hunter (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 2000), 13. See also Anthony J. Lemelle, Jr., “Oliver Cromwell Cox: Toward a Pan-Africanist Epistemology of Community Action,” \textit{Journal of Black Studies} 31 (January 2001): 325. Lemelle offers a critique of Cox’s works that stem from his divergence from Robert Park, while also offering a comparative analysis of Cox’s and Eugene Genovese’s understanding of hegemony and political class theories, respectively.} Herbert M. Hunter, one of the early Cox scholars, writes that Cox’s advocacy of an approach to sociology that proceeded by way of a “critical analysis of racial exploitation within the socio-historical context of capitalism” placed him fundamentally at odds with major social scientists, such as Gunnar Myrdal, W. Lloyd Warner, and Robert Ezra Park.\footnote{Herbert M. Hunter, “Introduction: The Legacy of Oliver C. Cox,” 3-4. Hunter offered early biographical essays on Cox. See, inter alia, Herbert M. Hunter, “Oliver C. Cox: A Biographical Sketch of His Life and Work,” \textit{Phylon} 19 (November 1983): 249-261.} Cox’s work challenged the existing power structure not only within the discipline, but within the academy and its larger social structure. His challenges were also directed to other Black sociologists. Nathan Hare’s contribution to the Hunter edited, \textit{The Sociology of Oliver C. Cox} is an examination of Cox’s critique of fellow University of Chicago trained Edward Franklin Frazier and the aforementioned Charles S. Johnson and of certain tendencies within Black nationalism.\footnote{Nathan Hare, “Cox’s Critique of the Black ‘Bourgeoisie’ School”, in \textit{The Sociology of Oliver C. Cox: New Perspectives}, ed. Herbert M. Hunter, 21-40.} The early volumes on Black sociologists almost routinely excluded Cox’s career. More recent works which correct this are Hunter’s aforementioned work and his earlier \textit{Race, Class, and the World System} (1986), co-edited with Sameer F. Abraham, as well as the more recent biography, \textit{The Mind of Oliver C. Cox} (2004), authored by Christopher A. McAuley.
that have begun to examine his career and contributions, albeit under the broader banner of mainstream intellectual histories of American sociology.  


A chapter devoted to Frazier’s contributions authored by G. Franklin Edwards can be found in *Black Sociologists: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Edwards’ essay

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explores Frazier’s intellectual influence and scholarly productions, concluding that although he made no methodological advances within the discipline, his many works on “race relations and Negro institutions and behavior” revealed his belief that an accurate social rendering of the African American community could be measured. Edwards also devotes considerable space to discussing the prevalence in Frazier’s sociology of the idea of cultural and racial assimilation. According to his assessment, Edwards indicates that Frazier viewed America’s race-based society as the primary determinant of African American socio-cultural development.

Earlier depictions of Frazier’s work, which suggested a strong linkage to the Moynihan report and an indebtedness to the ideas of Robert Park, have begun to be reassessed over the last two decades, resulting in works that approach his sociology on new grounds. Anthony M. Platt’s *E. Franklin Frazier Reconsidered* (1991) reviews and critiques characterizations of Frazier, which have ranged from viewing Frazier as a Parkian bourgeois sociologist to a socialist activist. Platt raises the issue of five problematic assessments of Frazier’s work and reconsiders them throughout the text, in an attempt to properly frame Frazier as an original thinker. These characterizations include: 1) Frazier as a dependent/student of other scholars (i.e. Robert Park); 2) Frazier as a strictly

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244. See Ibid, 92-103. Edwards briefly gestures the controversy surrounding Frazier and white anthropologist Melville Herskovits over the extent to which Africanisms were retained within African American culture. In Edwards’ as well as many other scholars’ view, it was however Frazier’s intent to show the damages wrought by American social structures in the disruption of African American socio-cultural life as well as a to show concern with both the consequences of social disorganization and the possibilities of reorganization in African American life. See Ibid, 100-101.
academic writer; 3) The singular influence of the Chicago school upon Frazier’s notion of
the family; 4) The linkage of Frazier with the ideas about African American culture
expressed by the Moynihan report; and 5) The tendency to “depoliticize his contributions
and emphasize his cooptation by the Chicago School.”

A few years prior to Platt’s text, Clovis E. Semmes’ “The Sociological Tradition of E. Franklin Frazier” (1987)
examined Frazier’s work in view of its implications for Black studies, suggested that in
Frazier’s view, sociology should be approached by a fundamental understanding of
“systems of social relationships.” He conceptualizes Frazier’s work as essentially
grappling with how these relationships, whether within family structures or institutional
structures, were impacted by cultural hegemonic forces, which in turn led to a “central
problem of assimilation.” The article also touches on the relationships between Frazier
and Robert Park’s race relations theories, revealing the complexity that characterized
Frazier’s engagement with these as well as understandings of social organization and
culture. Semmes’ piece ends with Frazier’s biting criticism, “The Failure of the Negro
Intellectual (1962),” where he castigates the African American scholar for failing to

245. See Anthony M. Platt, E. Franklin Frazier Reconsidered (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
246. E. Franklin Frazier, “Theoretical Structure of Sociology and Sociological Research,” quoted in
Clovis Semmes, “The Sociological Tradition of E. Franklin Frazier: Implications for Black
247. Ibid, 484.
248. Semmes states: “Despite this biological and implicitly racist dimension of Park’s theory [that of
racial temperament] Frazier found that its sociological dimensions had possibilities for providing a
dynamic approach to race relations research. In fact, Frazier almost completely adopted Park’s
methodological and theoretical approach to the study of race relations. However, Frazier moved
beyond Park in the application of this theory and method to the study of Black Americans. Also,
Frazier’s research gave greater emphasis to political power in the natural history of race relations.
Furthermore Park focused primarily on the mechanism of competition and accommodation,
whereas Frazier was more concerned with empirically testing the assimilation question.” Ibid, 489.
develop intellectual work that sought to move beyond the debilitating lens of race, as had scholars from the Caribbean and the African continent.249

ii. Political Economy and Radical Thought

During Frazier’s tenure as a faculty member at Howard University, he would form one of the cornerstones of the Young Turks: a collective that included Ralph Bunche in political science, and Abram Harris in economics, among others. David Levering Lewis’s biography of W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Fight for Equality and the American Century*, summarizes the infamous meeting at Amenia in 1933 between among others, the young Howard thinkers and the elder Du Bois. This push-and-pull of the young thinkers who were deeply engaged with Marxian analysis and Du Bois’ “racialist” tendencies engendered a broader conversation among Black intellectuals as to whether race or class was the primary determinant of Negro oppression. 250

250. Lewis describes the group: “The consistency and duration of the Young Turks’ Marxism varied greatly, but they were unanimously critical of what they saw as the incorrigible, petit-bourgeois parochialisms of the black leadership class, the Horatio Alger creed of collective betterment, on the one hand, and the prescriptions for separatist nostrums on the other.” David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century*, 320. Ralph Bunche and Abram Harris presented proposals that viewed class issues as more dominant than racial ones, while E. Franklin Frazier presented a view that advocated the fusion of nationalism and socialism; a view, Lewis believes Du Bois shared. Lewis continues, documenting Du Bois’ reflections of the conference: “To many, if not the majority of those who attended, the consensus for change that emerged from Amenia II—despite the incompatibilities and ambiguities—was exciting in its promise of ongoing momentum. ‘Four threads of thought entered into our conference,’ Du Bois recounted. First came recommitment to the fight against all forms of racial segregation and color discrimination. The second thread was the thin but strong one of Marxism and economic determinism. The third thread coiled around the entire group. According to Du Bois, no one dissented from the criticism that ‘we had been thinking of the exceptional folk, the Talented Tenth, the well-to-do; that we must now turn our attention toward the welfare and the social uplift of the masses.’ Out of the seeming catharsis off the Sunday-night session filled with disquisitions and applause, then, came the section of what Du Bois describes as a ‘continuation committee,’ temporarily chaired by [Charles Hamilton] Houston and composed of [Ralph] Bunche, [E. Franklin] Frazier, [Abram] Harris, [Ira] Reid, [Roy] Wilkins, and one woman, Mabel Byrd, an economist whose diligence in investigating discrimination under the NRA codes would earn notice in the black community.” Ibid, 323.
According to Jonathan Holloway in his *Confronting the Veil* (2002), a collective biography of Frazier, Harris, and Bunche, their work took the “persistent economic problems” as opposed to intraracial organization and civil rights liberalism to be the central problematic concerning the African in America.\textsuperscript{251} As Francille R. Wilson’s *The Segregated Scholars* (2006) shows, the economic question was certainly not a new approach; earlier thinkers, including R.R. Wright (1878-1967), George Edmund Haynes (1880-1960), as well as contemporaries of this group, the aforementioned Charles Wesley, Lorenzo Johnston Green, Charles Johnson, Ira de Augustine Reid, Gertrude McDougal (1884-1971), Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander (1898-1989), and Robert C. Weaver (1907-1997), among others sought to examine primarily questions regarding labor studies. In fact, Wilson argues that this group initiated social scientific studies of labor from an African American perspective.\textsuperscript{252} But in distinction to these thinkers, the Howard group was decidedly more radical.

Similar to Holloway’s effort is the Zachery Williams text, *In Search of the Talented Tenth* (2009) which considers the Howard thinkers as a group, adding the aforementioned Rayford Logan, as well as Charles H. Houston (1895-1950), Lorraine A. Williams (1923-1996), Merze Tate (1905-1996), Sterling Brown (1901-1989) and Alain Locke (1886-1954) to the group. Williams’ work, bracketed by the years 1927 and 1970 frames these thinkers as “public intellectuals” primarily concerned with discussions centered on issues

\textsuperscript{251.} Jonathan Holloway, *Confronting the Veil*, 10-11.
that affected the vast majorities of Black folk.\textsuperscript{253} While a large portion of these thinkers were concerned with policy, the literature they produced suggested a broader approach to the understanding of the Negro socio-cultural realities. Within the social sciences, thinkers such as Frazier, Bunche, and Harris, were as Williams suggests, involved with theorizing the role of race and class in American and global society.\textsuperscript{254} An earlier work, Charles P. Henry’s “Abram Harris, E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph Bunche: The Howard School of Thought on the Problem of Race” (1995, concludes that this group was important for they extended the analysis that debunked the widely held notions of biological inferiority and advanced the notion that racial groups were constrained by socio-economic differences.\textsuperscript{255} Clearly this group represented early attempts to push the agenda of social science inquiry toward considerations central to the African American and Pan-African agenda. Williams argues that they constituted the prototypical “black studies institute,” and established a “nascent Africana/black policy studies discipline.” He defines the latter as a “vehicle for developing, critiquing, and analyzing public policy that

\textsuperscript{253} See Zachery R. Williams, \textit{In Search of a Talented Tenth: Howard University Public Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Race, 1926-1970} (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 1-6. Williams views the Black public intellectual in ways that are similar to Patricia Hill-Collins and Houston A. Baker, as a group “shaped by the struggles and triumphs of the black experience and are committed to engage that public and the larger public on issues of importance to the black community.” Ibid,1. Williams draws parallels between the Howard group, and who he views as their predecessor, W.E.B. Du Bois, as well as their successors, the Harvard “Dream Team” of the early 1990s.

\textsuperscript{254} While Williams does not fully engage the unique Marxian analysis of this group during the 1930s, he nonetheless gestures to the role that analysis played in the larger Black intellectual community. In other words, the Howard group advanced a significant and influential view of the problem. See Ibid, 107; 149.

specially affects Africana peoples globally.” Ralph Bunche’s *A World View of Race* (1936) as well as Abram Harris’ *The Black Worker* (1930), co-authored with Sterling Spero, are representative works that frame the problem of Negro oppression within the context of class struggle.

Harris was a Columbia-trained economist, and the second African American thinker to receive a “pure” doctorate in economics in 1930, following Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander who received hers nine years earlier. William Darity and Julian Ellison’s study of Harris’ economic thought (some fifty or so published works) conceives of his work on as operating on a continuum between radicalism and libertarianism. They understand Harris’ early engagement with race and class as a consequence of his time spent at Howard and his libertarian leanings as a consequence of a changing political environment during his time at the University of Chicago.

While at Howard, Bunche established the political science department, published his *A World View of Race*, which challenged normative conceptions about race relations, and convened important conferences around the subject of the economic analysis of race,

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258. See William Darity and Julian Ellison, “Abram Harris, Jr.: The Economics of Race and Social Reform,” *History of Political Economy* 22 (Winter 1990): 611-627. The authors discuss this evolution from Harris’ days as a student at Columbia through his final years at the University of Chicago. They, along with Zachery Williams, note Harris’ well known rift with Howard University president, Mordecai Johnson. See Ibid, 618, and Zachery Williams, *In Search of the Talented Tenth*, 112-113. Because of these differences, Harris “jumped at” the chance to teach at the University of Chicago, where he encountered more difficulty. Harris interests included the economic theories of Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, which he along with Melville Herskovits welded with studies of culture to produce what Darity and Ellison termed economic anthropology, a social scientific area they consider important to establishing Black Studies. See Ibid, 624-626. See also the biographical introduction to Abram L. Harris and William Darity, Jr., ed., *Race Radicalism and Reform* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989).
which attracted such attendees as W.E.B. Du Bois.259 Charles P. Henry’s *Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other* (1999) views the “radical pessimism” inherent in *A World View of Race* as a product of his growing interest in economic forces impinging on the plight of Africans across the world and his growing dissatisfaction with the research apparatuses at Howard.260 According to Henry, the key purpose of the text was to succinctly analyze the role of economics in the construction of race relations between “racial minorities” and majorities in West Africa and the United States.261 Whether as a result of accusations of communism or the failure of his National Negro Congress, Bunche would gravitate towards more reformist measures, and eventually leave Howard and becoming best remembered for his career as an international diplomat.262

Another important precursor was the Trinidadian-born Howard thinker Eric Eustace Williams (1911-1981). Known primarily for his historical and economic study, *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944), which placed emphasis on the economic role of slavery in the as the foundation of modern capitalism, Williams also would author histories of the Caribbean including *The Negro in the Caribbean* (1962) and *The History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago* (1942) before publishing his well-know text *From Columbus to Castro* (1970).

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261. See Henry’s full discussion of the text, where he links some of Bunche’s conclusions to positions similar to the later thinkers, Eric Williams and William Julius Wilson. Ibid, 73-75.
262. His growing dissatisfaction with Howard and controversy over his supposed Communist party membership have been concluded as possible reasons. See Zachery R. Williams, *In Search of the Talented Tenth*, 113-114. His declining radicalism was however another matter. Henry points to the failure of the National Negro Congress, the possibility of fascism, and his work with Gunnar Myrdal, as factors that may have caused him to switch from a radical thinker to a reformer within the system. See Charles P. Henry, *Ralph J. Bunche: Model Negro or American Other?*, 246.
Zachery R. Williams’ *In Search of the Talented Tenth* deals with Eric Williams’ time at Howard very briefly, possibly due to his short four-year tenure.263

It is clear, however, that along with Oliver Cromwell Cox, Williams, and other non-institutionally trained left thinkers to be discussed infra were concerned largely with how labor history and the capitalist world system impacted the present and future prospects of African people. Their later work and positions notwithstanding, both Bunche and Harris, as well as the other trained intellectuals of the 1930s and 1940s aimed to radicalize academic discursive spaces and disciplinary methodologies for the benefit of African people worldwide. How these thinkers envisaged the disciplinary conceptualizations inherent in sociological, economic, and anthropological research served as early formulations of Africana Studies social inquiry. A number of scholars in this tradition were instrumental in the publication of the Carnegie-funded and oft-quoted *An American Dilemma* (1944), published by the Swedish thinker Gunnar Myrdal.264 Had they been free to embark upon such a study on their own terms, we would have a clearer grasp how they understood the uses and politics behind the various scientific methodologies and their relationship to studies of African Americans, not to mention the


264. Charles P. Henry, inter alia, have shown that Gunnar Myrdal’s study was impacted by Ralph Bunche, and other Black thinkers. Bunche, who was chosen directly by Myrdal, was instrumental in collecting viewpoints from both African American social scientists and in conducting instrumental research himself. Henry gleans three themes from Bunche’s writing in the Myrdal project: “1) the looseness and corruption of political practices; 2) the extent of the disfranchisement of both Negroes and Whites; and 3) the lack of effective reform movements at the grassroots level.” See Charles P. Henry, *Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other?*, 95-96. See also Jonathan Holloway, *Confronting the Veil*, 182-184.
ways in which Myrdal’s work prepared the ground for a certain type of liberalism which many African thinkers had both then and since deplored. However, we can see from these thinkers’ publications, that their work in large part explored the ways in which social structures impinged upon the life-chances of individuals within African American communities, and the best ways of utilizing this knowledge to improve society.

While, much has been said about the “historians-without-portfolio,” there was also a cadre of non-institutionally trained thinkers who operated within discursive spaces associated with political economy and its subfields. Many of these thinkers were theorists who like, Frazier, Bunche, Harris, Cox, and Williams attempted to understand how a uniquely racialized labor force could be conceptualized through Marxian analysis. These thinkers helped to inaugurate outside the academy and in social and political organizations, the economic analyses which would eventually influence social movements of the 1960s, one of which was of course the discipline of Africana Studies inside the academy. Their impact on the pre-disciplinary Africana Studies social inquiry is thus important to consider.

Winston James’ *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia* (1998) was a much-heralded examination of many of these Left Caribbean intellectuals and their attempts to enter a global conversation around the true meanings of race and class in the construction of power. James includes discussions of the organization, the African Blood Brotherhood, and figures such as the aforementioned Arturo Schomburg, as well as George Padmore (1903-1959), Otto Huiswoud (1893-1961), Cyril Briggs (1888-1966), Wilfred A. Domingo

However, his discussion of Crucian-born Hubert Henry Harrison (1883-1927)—the A. Philip Randolph branded “Father of Harlem Radicalism” and the John G. Jackson named “Black Socrates”—garners attention here.

Hubert Henry Harrison was a self-trained thinker that defied any neat categorization, certainly with regard to disciplines, and represented the sort of polymath tradition that helped to usher in the twentieth century, characterized by the thinkers discussed in the first section. His intellectual acumen and his brand of radicalism, premised on African ideas, places him squarely in the same Black radical tradition, and perhaps more so. Prior to the chapter in Winston James’ text, fellow Caribbean radical historian, Joel Augustus Rogers in World’s Great Men of Color (1947), provided the only extended treatment of Harrison’s life.

In James’ chapter he curiously views Harrison as the intellectual force behind what he understands as two opposing camps of Black radicalism: the early socialist movement headed by Asa Philip Randolph (1889-1979) and Chandler Owen (1889-1967) and the Black nationalism of Marcus Mosiah Garvey (1887-1940). James chronicles Harrison’s challenge to the socialist party’s views upon the racial situation, although he

266. Winston James, Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth Century America (London: Verso, 1998). James defines radicalism as the “challenging of the status quo either on the basis of social class, race (or ethnicity) or a combination of the two. See Ibid, 292n1. Many of these thinkers were associated with either the aforementioned Harlem History Club, the Universal Negro Improvement Association, (UNIA) or the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB). The ABB was however, considerably more Leftist. On the latter two, see Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Dover, MA: Majority Press, 1976) and Ronald A. Kuykendall, “African Blood Brotherhood, Independent Marxist during the Harlem Renaissance,” Western Journal of Black Studies 26 (Spring 2002): 16-21.


268. Winston James, Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia, 126.
concludes that Harrison remained committed to the socialist cause until his death. At the time of Winston James’ writing, Jeffrey Perry’s biography, *Hubert Harrison* was still in its formative stages. Finally appearing in 2008, Perry views Harrison’s radical thought within a trajectory that initiated analyses of African oppression first through the lens of race, then proceeded to class, science (freethought), and finally an internationalist vision. Both Perry and James gesture to Harrison’s love and appreciation for the writing and studying of Africana and world history and science. His associates within the Blyden Society, as Greg Carr suggests, however understood this “love” to be the expression of an affirmation of the possibilities that studies of Africana history afforded for African humanity. Harrison’s two monographs, *The Negro and the Nation* (1917) and *When Africa Awakes* (1920) represent his “encyclopedic” knowledge and his mastery of the ideas, influences, and history that affected the prospects of African liberation.

Harrison was able to in his lifetime, play the roles of writer/journalist, activist, and lecturer with equal virtuosity. His untimely passing in 1927 came not before he was unable to exert influence upon the generation of thinkers who would initiate the

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269. James states: “In a fundamental sense, Harrison remained a socialist from the time he discovered Marx to the end of his life. He never wavered from the materialist analysis of society and always felt that the capitalist system could never serve the interest of black people, the most proletarianized layer of the American population.” Ibid. He continues, “Harrison’s black nationalism was the last resort of a black socialists in a racist land; a land of white workers and black workers, where race is elevated above social class in politics as well as social life.” Ibid, 128.


272. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” 347-349. The historical study of Africa was underpinned by an interest in the phenomena of the constitutive elements of African cultural logic, which the Blyden Society influenced in part by what Jeffrey Perry called Harrison’s “freethought,” increasingly studied.
begins of the long civil rights era in the United States and the Pan-African anti-colonial struggles worldwide.

Curiously missing from Winston James’ text is the Trinidadian-born Claudia Cumberbatch Jones (1915-1964). This left thinker would come to influence radical thought in America, and after her deportation, in London. According to her biographer, Carol Boyce Davies in *Left of Karl Marx* (2008), her radicalism combined elements of race and class, but also gender.273 As such, she has been conceptualized within an expanded genealogy of scholars who have added to the unique discursive space that gender-based, cultural, and socio-economic discussions inhabit.

Cedric J. Robinson’s *Black Marxism* considers the work of Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901-1989) as an exemplar of what he and others considers, a Black Radical tradition. James, born in Trinidad was one of many African thinkers who would engage the Left tradition in the form of Marxism, Trotyskism, and the works of Lenin, among many others. Viewing the liberation of Africans through the prism of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle, James in Robinson’s view would eventually advocate the need for Africans to “seek the liberation of their people by their own means.”274 His *Black Marxism*...
Jacobins (1938) models the Haitian avengers as a proletariat, despite the fact they would not have been considered a classic Marxian proletariat. In James’ view, however, they represented for African theorists the best “example to study.” After exploring this and other works, including his Notes on Dialectics (1936), Robinson frames James’ work as an example of Black radical historiography that increasingly attempted to “level Marxist theory” to its particular requirements as opposed to swallowing whole the theoretical underpinnings of its entire conceptual system. In addition to being seen as a literary progenitor of cultural studies, James’ analysis has been considered crucial to broad nationalist, leftist, and Pan-African movements. For a reading of James’ life, the political biographies written by Kent Worcester, C.L.R. James: A Political Biography (1996) and the intellectual biographies of Aldon Lynn Nielsen, C.L.R. James: a Critical Introduction (1997) and Frank Rosengarten entitled Urbane Revolutionary (2008) offer examinations which trace the complexities of his radicalism. The most comprehensive exploration of the oeuvre of James are the thirty-one contributions to the Selwyn Cudjoe and William E. Cain edited C.L.R. James: His Intellectual Legacies (1995).

275. C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins quoted in Ibid, 274. Robinson shows James’ divergence from Marx and Engels by pointing out that Haitian proletariat had created their own revolutionary cultures. This as well as James’ continued critique of professional revolutionists and their role vis-à-vis the masses contributed to James’ contribution to radical thought. See Ibid, 274-278.

276. Ibid, 276.

Also part of this specific lineage is the aforementioned Oliver Cromwell Cox. In an article entitled, “Oliver Cromwell Cox and the Historiography of the West” (1990), Cedric Robinson explores the ways in which (institutionally-trained) Oliver C. Cox attempted to bring historical scholarship to bear upon issues of racial and class analyses. Robinson critiques Cox’s attempt in the *Foundations of Capitalism* (1959) to explicate the foundations of class within racial hierarchies. According to Robinson, these were for Cox concomitant entities,278 and central to his much larger attempt to understand them more fully by deconstructing Western historiographical practices. Robinson shows that these existing historiographical norms were characterized by notions of moral progress and democracy.279 As Robinson explains, Cox forcefully reimagines Western historiography and its metanarrative of capitalist democracy as in many ways a history of an intellectual genealogy marked by its acceptance of racial capitalist oppression as an universal norm.280 His use of Cox as an exemplar for this idea reflects Robinson’s understanding of the former’s scholarship as a clear challenge to normative understanding of Western ontological constructions.

278. In explaining Cox’s conception Robinson understands that in his view: “Capitalism and racism were historical concomitants. As the executors of an expansionist world system, capitalists required racism in order to police and rationalize the exploitation of workers. Cox insists that, by ignoring this relationship, those social scientists engaged in the study and eradication of racism could be of little value. Cedric J. Robinson, “Oliver Cromwell Cox and the Historiography of the West,” *Cultural Critique* 17 (Winter 1990): 12.

279. On the link between the Western knowledge production and the idea of democracy, Robinson asserts: “But consistently one of the principal domains of capitalist democracy has been the production of history, the genealogy of the West, its ideological conduit.” Ibid, 7.

280. According to Robinson, Cox’s work refutes many of these notions offering explicit challenges to Robert Park, first in his work *Caste, Class, and Race* (1948). *Foundations of Capitalism* continues via a critique of the prevailing Marxist tenants of national economy, capitalism’s origins in modern technology, and its fortuitousness. He summarizes: “For Cox, capitalism, the core of Western identity, had effected a most perverse consequence: Since the age of the discoveries, the world view of all other peoples has been progressively subordinated to the dominant, sophisticated view of Europeans. Hence, to know has generally come to mean knowledge from the European point of view.” Ibid, 10.
These four thinkers, then, represent an important representative sampling of the thinkers who, with the exception of Cox, operated without formal training or an academic institutional base. In fact, it can be said that Cox’s academic obscurity, placed him in many ways in the same position as the others. Their impact upon Africana intellectual traditions and the Black radical tradition in the twentieth century is nonetheless clear.

iii. Psychology and Psychoanalysis

The discipline of psychology would not escape the critical eye of Black intellectuals. The thinkers who received their foundation from this disciplinary base ran the gamut of political and social ideologies, however much of what was considered Black psychology were perspectives that tended to frame the prevalence of mental issues as a result of societal forces as opposed to their origins within a doctrine of Black inferiority. As stated in his “Francis Cecil Sumner: His Views and Influence on African American Higher Education,” (2000) Thomas F. Sawyer asserts that Francis Cecil Sumner (1895-1954), widely considered “The Father of Black Psychology,” grappled with the ideas implicit in normative psychological thought. Sawyer hypothesizes that in two articles in which Sumner goes against the grain of dominant Black intellectual ideas, he was actually doing so in order to obtain political and economic footing to advance a hidden agenda.281

281. See Thomas F. Sawyer, “Francis Cecil Sumner: His Views and Influence on African American Higher Education,” History of Psychology 3 (2000): 123-126. In these articles, Sumner articulates theories of African cultural inferiority, which reflected training within the psychological sciences, which were at the time rooted in natural science traditions and social Darwinism. Rather than emphasizing this, Sawyer attempts to vindicate Sumner by advancing the notion that he was secretly advancing an agenda that attempted garner resources from white philanthropic organizations. For biographical information on Sumner, see Robert V. Guthrie, Even the Rat Was White: A Historical View of Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2004) 214-232
Whatever his initial views, Sumner’s eventual construction of the Howard University psychology department in the 1930s, provided a space to train the first cadre of Black psychologists, including Kenneth B. Clark (1914-2005), who along with Mamie P. Clark (1917-1983) developed a psychological study using Black and white dolls which had an early impact on applied social science in *Brown v. Board of Education.*

The Martinican born Frantz Fanon’s (1925-1961) work has been linked to studies of the psychology of oppression among colonized groups. His *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) and *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) continue to be considered seminal contributions and inspired, like C.L.R. James, many of the socio-political organizations to emerge in the 1960s. Similarly, Ama Mazama has considered him an important precursor to the theory of Afrocentricity as developed by the Temple circle. Fanon’s work traverses the spheres of psychoanalysis and existentialism to show the ramifications that the *maaafa* has had upon African peoples. Critical works on Fanon range from examinations of his training and methodological approach to considerations of his long-range contributions to psychoanalysis and post-colonialism.

The scholarly production within these three broad areas of social science inquiry follows trajectories set forth by early intellectual work produced within African intellectual life cycles. They represent most consistently the tradition of insurgency—the need to

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confront and critique the West and the institutions and ideas that normative social science assumed, such as the nation-state, capitalism, and the like. The intellectual genealogies out of which the 1970s iteration of the Black social sciences would emerge must be placed in conversation with it as they only brought to maturation aspects of deep thought that had been previously discussed by the thinkers reviewed above. Less prominent among these early social theorists were those attempts to go beyond Western disciplines completely. While many, especially the non-academic exemplars, developed inter- and transdisciplinary approaches, scholars in this iteration were less willingly to eschew the concerns about science that Du Bois and others had articulated. The reimagining of knowledge on African terms would however find proponents in areas which might be classified under the humanities.

   c. Humanities, Cultural Meaning-Making, and Criticism

   Attempts to place African thought into conceptual areas demarcated by disciplines commonly associated with the humanities have been often fraught with definitional languages that fail to encompass the essence and object of these complex knowledge systems. As discussed in an earlier section, conversations of ancient African literature or traditional African philosophy are complicated when attached to disciplines which are tied to Western intellectual history.285 The humanities, as discussed in Chapter Three, represent the West’s attempt to uncover norms of what it means to be human—utilizing the ideas that are found in art and increasingly in contemporary intellectual formations, the domains of philosophy—for the training of a cultural and intellectual elite. The

285. See Chapter Five, note 27.
concept of cultural meaning-making systems, however, is a more expansive concept that captures all human attempts to explain reality through different forms.\textsuperscript{286} Africans have both participated in and commented on many of these forms. This section will limit the discussion to works that explain African attempts to utilize literary criticist methodologies, and/or training within Western philosophy to uniquely identify those aspects of African culture, which were often denied or misunderstood during the period under discussion. During the early twentieth century, the New Negro Movement/Harlem Renaissance and the Negritude movement provided a clear opportunity for this type of thinking.

The theorists came from many directions. Hubert Henry Harrison, mentioned in the previous section, participated in this discussion within the domain of literary criticism. In fact, biographer, Jeffrey Perry considers this activity as one of the core areas of his intellectual work. His passing at the tail end of the proliferation of Negro art during the 1920s afforded him to opportunity to produce critiques of poetry and drama.\textsuperscript{287} Harrison’s writings on the Harlem Renaissance, particularly “No Negro Literary Renaissance” (1917), have not been as widely acknowledged as those of W.E.B. Du Bois, whose “Negro Art” (1921) and “Criteria for Negro Art” (1926) established Du Bois’ particular philosophy of the movement. While Du Bois asserts that art should be


\textsuperscript{287} See Jeffrey B. Perry, ed., A Hubert Harrison Reader (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press), 28-29. According to Perry, Harrison would compose over seventy reviews of books, drama, and poetry. For Harrison’s writings see Ibid, 369-396.
propaganda, Harrison had previously suggested that this proliferation of energy in the art needed to access the rhythm of the continuous stream of Black artistic production that represented the “soul” of the masses.288

But it was Du Bois, along with Charles S. Johnson, who would establish the important literary contests within the NAACP’s Crisis and the Urban League’s Opportunity magazines, respectively. The second volume of David Levering Lewis’ biography of Du Bois as well as William Banks’ Black Intellectuals (1996) place importance on these contests in establishing the careers of many of the Renaissance intellectuals.289 This group includes Langston Hughes (1902-1967), Jean Toomer (1894-1967), Wallace Thurman (1902-1934), Countee Cullen (1903-1946), Claude McKay (1889-1946), and many others.

The thinker and work most often tied to the movement is Alain Leroy Locke (1885-1954) and his edited volume, The New Negro (1925).290 A Harvard-trained philosopher and Howard University professor, Locke’s own contributions within the volume attempted to define and contextualize the meaning of this “molding” of a New

288. According to Jeffrey Perry, Hubert Harrison would take issue with the assumption that art was the preserve of the Talented Tenth intellectuals and pushed an art grounded by the “soul” of the masses. (Perry assumes that there is a link between Du Bois’ view of art and the Talented Tenth perspective for race leadership). See Jeffrey Perry, ed., A Hubert Harrison Reader, 291. From the beginning, Du Bois would espouse a purpose for art within the movement centered on its use as propaganda. His 1921 editorial, “Negro Art” established his insistence that “our Art and Propaganda be one.” See W.E.B. Du Bois, “Negro Art,” Crisis 22 (1921): 55. This perspective would be maintained through the next few ruminations on the topic and eventually grew to include the Crisis’ “Negro In Art Symposium” which was Du Bois’ attempt to engage artists and publishers on the issue. See David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 174-181.


Negro, and as an editor he endeavored to include the work “of” the Negro as opposed to works that were simply about them.  

For Locke, the changing demographics of urban centers, Harlem being his key example, set the conditions for Africans from across the Western hemisphere to assert expressions of their humanity. Locke considers these cultural and artistic expressions as indicative of the attitudes that challenged sociological norms that viewed the Negro as “a social ward or minor” or as a “sick man of American democracy.”

The philosopher, Leonard Harris, has produced the most important works on Alain Locke’s ideas. His co-authored biography of Locke, as well as his edited _Philosophy of Alain Locke_ (1989), situates many of the scholar’s ideas and contributions to theories of value, cultural relativism, race, art, and education. In their biography, _Alain L. Locke_ (2008) Harris and Charles Molesworth assert that Locke’s life work revolved around the three core ideas of philosophies of value, race relations, and the philosophy of the aesthetic experience. Locke’s post-Renaissance works would be centered on understanding the nature and character of African and African American culture, supported by his work as the editor of the Associates in Negro Folk Education’s Bronze

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293. See Leonard Harris, “Rendering the Text,” in _The Philosophy of Alain Locke_, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 3-27 and Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, _Alain L. Locke: Biography of a Philosopher_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1. Though he consistently characterizes Locke as a thinker who questioned the norms and idea scientific objectivity and as a theorist who viewed the African American as culturally African, Harris is intent on viewing Locke through the lens of pragmatism. Viewing him as a pragmatist and scientific humanist, Harris explains Locke as philosopher that never was “entrapped and imprisoned” by philosophical ideas, choosing instead to emphasize the historical and cultural contingencies on which identity was constructed.
Harrison, Du Bois, and Locke advanced similar views about the origins and force of artistic production among African-descended groups in Harlem. However there were clear divergences. Regarding the purpose of art, there existed a tension between Locke and Du Bois revolving around a conception of art as an expression of beauty and culture and art as an expression of propaganda. While Harrison argued for a view of the genealogy of Negro artistic production that dated back to at least 1850, stating that there was no “renaissance” as such. He understands the proliferation of the idea as a consequence of “Neurotic Greenwich villagers who invented it.” A true literary renaissance for him was the use of art that will initiate a release of creative energy which will face the task of expressing the life values of our people in prose-forms redolent with the tang of great literature, with poetry that bubbles up honestly and spontaneously out of the wide experience and understanding of the Head: out of the warm intuitions of the Heart.

Many of these ideas would find voices in the practitioner-critics in the periods to follow. The influence of Locke upon Zora Neale Hurston’s (1891-1960) work on folk culture is evident. Trained as an anthropologist and folklorist, Hurston’s *Mules and Men* (1937) and *Tell My Horse* (1938) collected folk tales of African descended peoples in the American south as well as the Caribbean. Her works sought to explore the dynamics of African folk life to show that cultural continuity was both vibrant and central to

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295. In Harrison’s conception, the litmus test for claiming a “Renaissance” would have been art too “real” to be exploitable by the white liberal class. See Hubert Harrison “No Negro Literary Renaissance,” in *A Hubert Harrison Reader*, ed. Jeffrey B. Perry, 354.
understanding how African peoples engaged with the world. The recent proliferation of scholarship on Hurston views her work through the lens of a number of dominant disciplinary perspectives ranging from anthropology to American literature. A representative work is the Deborah Platt edited The Inside Light (2010). Others like the contributors to the Gloria L. Cronin edited Critical Essays on Zora Neale Hurston (1998) and Lynda Marion Hill’s Social Rituals and the Verbal Art of Zora Neale Hurston (1996), utilize disciplinary frames but attempt in part to understand the unique approach grounded in African cultural logic that Hurston increasingly employed. In her introduction to the volume, Conlin states that Hurston represented a “womanist ethnological critique” to the prevailing socio-political norms within Western-Christian society. Hill’s text views Hurston’s work as a dismantling of the bifurcation of life and art as well as folklore and political realities inherent in many disciplinary and academic conceptualizations. Her work reframes Hurston’s fiction and folkloric endeavors as Hurston using new modes to explain or perform reality.

This kind of “womanist,” or more humanistic anthropology/ethnology also informs and/or characterizes the work the dancer, Katherine Dunham (1909-2006) and the activist, Eslanda Goode Robeson (1896-1965). Trained in the early iterations of what would become symbolic interactionism, Dunham would utilize anthropological tools to explore the different dance traditions within the African diaspora, in works like her


Robeson, Dunham, Hurston, Locke, and other scholars often defied disciplinary boundaries in their studies and compilations of African American folk life that went against the prevailing scientist ideas about folk culture. This important work was also connected to the subsequent explication of appropriate literary criticisms that were based in understanding how “folk culture” or the masses accurately represented African lives throughout the globe. This transition in literary criticism proved to be difficult, as scholars had to dispense with evaluative tools that revolved around normative Western “high” culture.

Darwin T. Turner’s “Afro-American Literary Critics,” an essay on the tradition of literary criticism in the early twentieth century establishes an expanded genealogy that included most prominently Locke, Benjamin Brawley, J. Saunders Redding (1906-1988), Hugh Gloster (1911-2002), Nick Aaron Ford (1904-1982), and its “dean” Sterling Brown (1901-1989). Turner’s essay includes literary critics from six categories: 1) those writing...
within mainstream circles on white authors; 2) essayists; 3) historians of literature; 4) writers critiquing other writers; 5) academic critics; and 6) the new critics. Indeed, they represented both insurgent and reimaginative strains.\textsuperscript{301}

The most influential among these thinkers was Sterling Brown. His collections of poetry were applications of his studies of African American folk cultures. Original collections like \textit{Southern Road} (1932), his critical works which included \textit{The Negro in American Fiction} and \textit{Negro Poetry and Drama} (1937) and his long-standing classic compilation of African American literature with Arthur P. Davis and Ulysses Lee, \textit{Negro Caravan} (1941), were according to Houston Baker, works that would influence generations of African artists and intellectuals.\textsuperscript{302} Joanne V. Gabbin’s \textit{Sterling Brown: Building the Black Aesthetic Tradition} (1985), also grounds his work within a genealogy that would lead to the radical art associated with the Black Arts Movement. Gabbin frames Brown as one of the key academics who recognized the importance of folk culture as the “wellspring” of Black creativity. Contributors to the John Edgar Tidwell and Steven C. Tracy edited \textit{After Winter} (2009) explore the different aspects of Brown’s work and its influences on subsequent generations of critics.\textsuperscript{303}

\textsuperscript{301} The last category will be discussed infra. The academic critics are listed above because within this group they attempted to develop the beginnings of a theory to explain and critique Africana intellectual work. See Darwin T. Turner, “Afro-American Literary Critics: an Introduction,” in \textit{The Black Aesthetic}, ed. Addison Gayle (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 63-64. Also important were the works produced by thinkers from the fourth category, which included the critical works of Langston Hughes, Richard Wright, and Ralph Ellison, among others.

\textsuperscript{302} See Houston Baker quoted in Zachery R. Williams, \textit{In Search of the Talented Tenth}, 107.

For, Lawrence P. Jackson the group that carried this baton could be characterized as *The Indignant Generation* (2011). Redding and others would begin the generation which ended up featuring the works of Richard Wright (1908-1960), Lorraine Hansberry (1930-1965), Ann Petry (1908-1997), Gwendolyn Brooks (1917-2000), and James Baldwin (1924-1987), the critics and writers of the period after the Harlem Renaissance and before the Black Arts Movement. For Jackson, the “anguished artistic and political choices” made in this period are crucial to understanding “the deep suspicion toward Western society that encouraged the younger generation of black artist to advocate a radical departure from the Western models” in the 1950s and 60s.304

Also essential to the conversations in the humanities was the work of Lorenzo Dow Turner’s (1890-1972). His linguistic work was also predicated on an understanding of African folk culture. Turner, who was trained at the University of Chicago, would eventually chair the English departments at Howard University and Fisk University and publish his *Africanisms in the Gullah Dialect* (1949) which established that there were indeed clear phonetic influences of African antecedent languages within Gullah linguistic culture, Africans who were born and reared in the American south.305 As Margaret Wade-Lewis indicates in her *Lorenzo Dow Turner* (2007), Turner’s work was influential in debunking existing sociological theories of African cultural retention and is a precursor to theorists of

305. According to Margaret Wade Lewis, Turner’s research “legitimized the study of a nonstandard variety of English spoken by working class members in the African American population, challenging the prevailing assumption that low-prestige varieties were unworthy of detailed attention and analysis.” She views the study as forever altering the landscape of linguistic studies. See Margaret Wade Lewis, *Lorenzo Dow Turner: Father of Gullah Studies* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 206.
African American Vernacular English, who she considers his intellectual children and grandchildren.\(^{306}\)

Prior to 1950, Pan-Africanism was essentially the worldwide African conversation linked to destroying colonialism on the African continent and throughout the Caribbean. The character of African intellectual thought, however, ranged through more than purely classical social scientific inquiry, as it attempted in many ways to “grand theorize” on the past, present, and future of African humanity. These impulses were actualized in the intellectual activities of a number of continental African thinkers who along with the aforementioned C.L.R. James, Eric Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, Claudia Jones, and many others, attempted to instigate anti-colonial resistance. Many of these thinkers were trained in the European academies and within traditional disciplinary frameworks and as such the extent of their challenge to Western scientific and epistemological structures varied.\(^{307}\) Yet, they were able to develop a cultural program.

Across the Atlantic in Paris, the idea of Negritude emerged. Premised on what F. Abiola Irele in his *The Negritude Moment* (2011) calls an African cultural nationalism,

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306. She reviews his work and in the influence on his “intellectual children and grandchildren.” These include, J.L. Dillard, Robert W. Fasold and Roger W. Shuy, Geneva Smitherman, and the school of Gullah Studies. Ibid, xix-xx. She does not include Melville Herskovits in this particular section, whose *Myth of the Negro Past* (1941), published eight years prior relied heavily on Turner’s work. See Ibid, 155.

307. Cedric Robinson explains that the tools given by Western classical education were re-vitalized in a sense to then confront the West. Among those tools was the conceptual vocabulary of Western thought. He states: “Among the vitalizing tools of the radical intelligentsia, of course the most crucial was words. Words were their means of placement and signification, the implements for discovery and revelation. With words they might and did construct new meanings, new alternatives, new realities for themselves and others. But languages, that is Western culture, was more than some recumbent artifact to be used or not as the intelligentsia saw fit. Its place in their lives had been established long before they found the means of mastering it. Indeed, they were themselves in part defined by those languages of rule and commerce.” Cedric Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 183.
Negritude is usually associated with Leopold Sedar Senghor (1906-2001), Leon G. Damas (1912-1978), and Aime Cesaire (1913-2008). But also central to this discussion, as T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting discusses in her *Negritude Women* (2002), were Paulette Nardal (1896-1985) as well as Suzanne Cesaire (1915-1966), and Alioune Diop (1910-1980), the founder of the important organ *Presence Africaine*. As discussed above, Negritude did not occur in a vacuum; Irele considers the New Negro Movement, Afro-Cubanism, and the Haitian literary renaissance as important influences upon the movement. In his 1966 essay, “Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century,” Leopold Sedar Senghor asserted that the literature which emerged under the banner of Negritude was essentially a movement premised on understanding the “African personality;” one that responded to the displacement of colonialism by asserted the need to root “oneself in oneself.” It represented those attempts to among Africans to articulate a “way of conceiving life and of living it.”

While not without its challenges, this literature represented an important attempt to grapple with the imposition of the West. A work which collects these literatures is Lilyan Kesteloot’s edited *Black Writers in French: A Literary History of Negritude* (1996). In outlining the thematic ideas in Negritude work, Irele asserts that three crucial ones were


alienation, revolt, and rediscovery. But the Negritude thinkers were more than literary thinkers, these figures sought to champion African cultural values as crucial to Pan-African decolonization movements. Part of the recovery of African governance and independence was a cultural orientation that sought to reverse some of the alienation that colonization attempted to impart.

Before there was such a thing called “Black Studies” within American universities, African intellectuals in different ways and in different places had thought, had theorized, had written, continuing an intellectual legacy that was bequeathed to them. As disciplines were in the process of becoming the stringent, assumed exemplary form of categorizing knowledge they are today, these thinkers not only challenged the order, they confronted the function and assumptions embedded in these orders as well as the deep philosophical foundation out of which they came. The precursors who articulated this discontent, whether through insurgency or through its more long-term reimagination, simultaneously articulated the terms of out which African thinkers engaged Western intellectual norms and their concomitant tradition of discipline-based knowledge. These were the very terms that carried forth the determination to call for Black Studies departments—and the same terms from which responsible methodologies for the discipline should be produced. After 1965, a new cycle began.
Chapter 7
Toward a Black University or White Studies in Blackface?: The Genesis, Struggle, and Promise of Institutionalized Africana Studies Since 1965

The first point to be made clear in any discussion of the Black University is that the concept is not to be defined within the limits of the university as it traditionally has existed in this country and as it’s imagined by the academics. The concept is revolutionary; that is, it is concerned with breaking out of—indeed, leveling—the existing university structure and instituting in its stead new approaches to education.
-Hoyt Fuller, “Editor’s Notes”¹

Just as the stage and screen image of blacks wore a Sambo “face,” much of Black History writing then (and now) responded to the white invented Negro Question enterprise by projecting the Sambo image—White History in Black face! This answered the challenge to disguise “black inferiority” by attempting to “unite” (subsume) Black History with White History, an effort designed to inspire the black victim and absolve the white audience from feelings of guilt.
-Anderson Thompson, “Developing an African Historiography”²

People in Black Studies have become just like everyone else in the academy.
-Haile Gerima, “Developing an Ethical and Sustainable Practice”³

For many, Africa is more a concept than a bounded space, which means in turn: more “concepts” than simply one. It is at once part wish fulfillment and part reality, part projection and part historical distillation, part fiction and part memory.
-Wole Soyinka, Of Africa⁴

The story of Black Studies (the earliest name for the discipline) is one manifestly about resistance to the ideas grounding Western philosophies and knowledges, and thus the normative boundaries of the disciplines representative of these notions. Broadly speaking, its institutionalization came as a result of both the intellectual imperatives of the older generations of “pre-disciplinary” thinkers and as a consequence of the development

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¹ Hoyt Fuller, “Editor’s Notes,” Negro Digest, March 1969, 4.
³ Haile Gerima, “Developing an Ethical and Sustainable Practice,” (Lecture presentation at Master Class at Scribe Video Center, Philadelphia, PA, January 26, 2013).
of an global-African consciousness. The movements of the U.S.-based Civil Rights era coupled with the anti-colonial struggles across the Caribbean and Latin America and the independence movements on the continent of Africa spurred in many respects a heightened awareness among students of the importance of knowing Africa.\textsuperscript{5} In institutions of higher learning, which as a result of Civil Rights activism were becoming more open to students of African descent, Black Studies was part of an intellectual movement to emancipate knowledge of the African past and its relevance to the continued struggles of her descendants. The ways in which its stories are remembered by select contemporary thinkers are important and will be discussed in Part III.

Our intent in this chapter is to explore the ways in which African knowledges, at best, and at worst Black topics inside Western disciplinary norms, were organized as the initial thrusts of Black Studies blossomed throughout the United States. An essential part

\textsuperscript{5} See inter alia, Ronald W. Walters, \textit{Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements} (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), 54-126. Bracketed by the late 1950s and the mid 1970s, many Africans in America and the Caribbean would travel, study, and/or relocate to Africa. This long list includes individuals representing what would seem at first glance, mutually exclusive ideological tendencies. However, it seems a force greater than ideology had influenced African students and scholars to embrace Africa. Indeed, Africans throughout the Diaspora embraced knowledge of their African selves as crucial to the success of any movement toward liberation. This idea was formulated in ways that ranged from the arguably \textit{complementary}, as opposed to oppositional, ideas of cultural nationalism to political Pan-Africanism. An important exemplar for both students and professors alike on the importance of knowing Africa was John Henrik Clarke (1915-1998). Clarke was able to wield his knowledge of world history toward useful forms of engagement with Pan-African thought and practice, while expanding the boundaries of Black Studies to include this wide range of potential ideas and subject matter necessary for African liberation. On the relationship to this conceptualization of praxis and Africana Studies, see his 1980 reflection, John Henrik Clarke, “Africana Studies: A Decade of Change, Challenge and Conflict” in \textit{The Next Decade: Theoretical and Research Issues in Africana Studies} ed. James E Turner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Africana Studies and Research Center, 1980), 31-45. On Clarke generally, see Barbara Eleanor Adams, \textit{The Early Years} (Hampton, VA: United Brothers and Sisters, 1992); and \textit{John Henrik Clarke: Master Teacher} (Brooklyn, NY: A&B Publishing, 2000); Anna Swanston, \textit{Dr. John Henrik Clarke: His Life, His Words, His Works} (Atlanta, GA: I AM Unlimited Publishing, 2003); Greg Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era,” (PhD diss., Temple University, 1998), 396-403; and Ahati N. N. Toure, \textit{John Henrik Clarke and the Power of Africana History: Africological Question for Decolonization and Sovereignty} (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2008).
of its development was the *insurgency* work done within the broad areas of philosophy, history, the study of cultural-meaning making, and the “Black social sciences”. Those important aspects of this work and how it influenced what would become disciplinary Africana Studies will be revealed here and traced to the present. Many developments within the insurgency work in the disciplines would emerge parallel to the institutionalization of Africana Studies, in many ways complicating the very definitions that set the latter apart from the former. As such, the works which explore the terms of on which the latter conception of disciplinary Africana Studies will be explored and reconnected to the discussion of Chapter One.

As shown in the previous chapter, for many African thinkers the Western framed and constituted academic disciplines were not understood as the epistemological point of departure for knowledge and that which could be known, nor its logical categorization—let alone the ideological basis for what Martin R. Delany or Antenor Firmin might have called, “the regeneration” of Africa and Africans throughout the world. Likely the result of changing political landscapes, which allowed for more Africans to be trained in universities, the middle of the twentieth century saw an increase in thinkers who were more likely to eschew the ideas of Delany, Firmin, and others and move closer to the American concept of disciplinarity as expounded by the works in Chapter Four. Unfortunately, the paradox outlined by E. Franklin Frazier, in his “The Failure of the Negro Intellectual” (1962) discussed in the previous chapter, continued unabated and has in fact spread throughout the academy in ways anticipated by his analysis of the possible
effects of integration/assimilation. A similar paradox abounded in other parts of the African world, one anticipated by Cheikh Anta Diop in his 1948 essay, “When Can We Talk of an African Renaissance?” In both cases, as is now, theoretical distance from ideas grounded in African experiences were the terms through which to achieve academic prestige—which, interestingly was opposite of the motivations of the framers of the discipline, particularly the students.

Yet and still, many thinkers during this period understood their training, responsible for such ideas, to be inadequate, even as they brought it to bear on discipline-specific subject matters. As a result, they saw that the “discipline” could not contain African deep thought, just as their precursors saw that “Western philosophy” could not fully produce an appropriate rendering of the African conception of reality. The resulting complexities are both the struggle and promise of disciplinary African Studies—where just as Diop had opined in 1948 regarding the African renaissance, all our “work is yet to be done.”

I. Formative Moments and the Early Curriculum

These social and political movements animated important conferences geared towards conceptualizing, developing, and institutionalizing the study of global African experiences. Two of the most prominent of these conferences were the Toward a Black University Conference (TABU) at Howard University in November of 1968 and the

8. Ibid, 45.
Black Studies in the University Symposium on the campus of Yale University in the spring of 1968.

The discussion of institutionalized Black Studies begins in Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), majority-Black community colleges, and community education institutions in the Black community. One such discussion was TABU and the “Toward a Black University” series in the March 1968, 1969, and 1970 issues of Negro Digest/Black World. The March 1968 issue, which preceded the first Howard conference, includes preliminary commentary from Gerald McWorter (Abdul Alkalimat), Darwin Turner, Stephen Henderson, Vincent Harding, and Nathan Hare, among others, all of whom would prove instrumental to the development of the discipline in the years to come. In their ruminations on the idea, McWorter and Turner point to the need to come to grips with the fact that knowledge of Africana peoples’ experiences must be normative in the construction of a new, Black university.9 As Gerald McWorter asserts in his “The Nature and Needs of the Black University” this “new knowledge” was important to the practical objectives of ameliorating adverse conditions in the Black community. He asserts that “there is a need to find new styles of scholarship, new forms of knowledge, new ways of knowing.”10 In McWorter’s view, the objectives of the Black University would have to be linked to the development of schools in three areas: liberal arts, Afro-American Studies, and a community life foundation with a publishing apparatus, and

10. Ibid, 11.
linked to “radical change” in Black life experiences.\textsuperscript{11} Darwin T. Turner’s perspective outlined in his “The Black University: The Practical Approach” is also important to consider. His view that the development of holistic studies of the Black experience through historical, literary, and sociological perspectives is indicative of how early framers saw the categorization of knowledge most appropriate for this endeavor.\textsuperscript{12}

For the nearly 1900 “students, scholars, and artists” at the conference that November, the goal was more than the simple introduction of course content on Africana peoples and cultures, though this certainly was a clear objective.\textsuperscript{13} According to the commentators in the March 1969 volume after the first conference, Vincent Harding, Nathan Hare, and Sarah Webster Fabio, as well as in the essays and statements by Preston Wilcox, the staffs of The Communiversity, the Institute of the Black World, Malcolm X Liberation University, and the Center for Black Education, in the follow-up to the discussion published in March 1970, TABU inspired attempts to provide an autonomous space to seriously challenge and reimagine the Africana world experience.\textsuperscript{14}

Hoyt Fuller’s “Editor’s Notes” to the March 1969 issue characterizes the position, stating the Black university was to

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destroy in the minds of black people the validity of the values of the “mainstream,” those values which for nearly 400 years, have been used to debate and to dehumanize black people and to generally diminish the respect for human dignity, and to resurrect and to glorify within the black community the spirit of Muntu.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{15}
\bibitem{13} George B. Davis, “A Step Forward?: The Howard University Conference,” \textit{Negro Digest}, March 1969, 44.
\bibitem{15} Hoyt R. Fuller, “Editor’s Notes,” 4.
\end{thebibliography}
The responses to these ideas by the “powers that be” were the development of units of Black Studies, as opposed to the more comprehensive demands made by students, where they did not recommend an outright dismissal of such ideas. On white campuses, Black students recently “integrated” into these spaces, also began to raise their voices.

Less attended and more scrutinized, was the Yale conference of 1968. The proceedings published by the university, *Black Studies In the University: A Symposium* (1969) reveal the existence of a “push-and-pull” between various “factions” which were present at this gathering. Those supporting Black Studies offered similar perspectives as those culled from the Howard conference attendees. Presenting papers at this gathering were Harold Cruse (“The Integrationist Ethic as a Basis for Scholarly Endeavors”), Gerald McWhorter (“Deck the Ivy Racist Walls: The Case of Black Studies”), and Nathan Hare (“A Radical Perspective on Social Science Curricula”), among others. They viewed the emergent discipline as a space to understand and liberate African thought to aid in the socio-political and mental advancement of African communities. Similar to earlier

16. The March 1969 volume includes responses from four Black college presidents. See James R. Lawson, Benjamin E. Mays, Samuel D. Proctor, and Benjamin F. Payton, “A Symposium: Black Educators Respond,” 66-77; 96-98. See also the response from Howard University, where the Board of Trustees funded the initial conference as a concession to student protest, The Board of Trustees of Howard University, “A Policy Statement on the Black University,” *Journal of the National Medical Association* 61 (January 1969): 84. They collectively view as important the objectives and goals of the movements, but almost unanimously agree that the operationalization of a Black university would be racialist, and thus an unconscionable proposition. In an interview, Acklyn Lynch, a conference organizer responded that their intent was not to make Howard University, the Black university. In other words, the idea was bigger than any one institution. See George B. Davis, “A Step Forward?” 46.

conversations, these thinkers linked Black Studies to “nationalist” and/or “progressive” social movements that were flowering across the country. In addition to these ideological positions, were contributions which dealt with the nature of knowledge of the Black experience. The essays, Robert Farris Thompson’s “African Influence on the Art of the United States,” Boniface Obichere’s “African History and Western Civilization,” and Edwin S. Redkey’s “On Teaching and Learning Black History,” cohered around African/Black readings of the particular curricular content in these disciplines. Also present however, were the detracting voices of Ford Foundation director, McGeorge Bundy who in his “Some Thoughts of Afro-American Studies,” challenged the notion of a “political” orientation to academic knowledge. The latter point was and continued to be seen as a point of contention throughout the early history of Black Studies.


20. Bundy expressed reservations, viewing the university as an apolitical institution, in the sense that it should foster the types of change that nationalist politics support. See McGeorge Bundy, “Some Thoughts on Afro-American Studies,” in Ibid, 174-177. Martin Kilson expressed similar reservations and suspicions, likening the progressive attempts by Black nationalist thinkers to establish Black Studies to the “smelling of a rat,” which his “intellect must reject.” See Martin Kilson, Jr., “The Intellectual Validity of Studying the Black Experience,” In Ibid, 16.
history from white domination. According to Clarke, the African Heritage Studies Association was formulated to “reconstruct studies of African history and cultural studies along “Afro-centric” lines.” Many of these thinkers ended up in the nascent departments of Black Studies.

Lastly, key to the development of Black Studies at this juncture was the Institute of the Black World (IBW) in Atlanta, which included such thinkers as Vincent Harding, Stephen Henderson, and William Strickland. Derrick White’s historical assessment of the IBW, *The Challenge of Blackness* (2012), shows how this independent organization was able to participate in the theorization and analysis of the “nature, needs, and directions of Black Studies as a discipline.” White argues that this occurred in both the Institute’s early and later stages. Its associates, who would eventually include Lerone Bennett, Joyce Ladner, Walter Rodney, Robert Hill, Johnnetta Cole, and others, were involved in the conversations around the aforementioned “Black University” concept. According to White, the IBW was largely premised on the ideas of intellectual opposition, community relevance, and structural autonomy, principles that had and continue to have important ramifications for the possibilities of Black Studies. Further, in terms of its constitutive elements, Black Studies was to draw upon new interpretations of the social sciences and humanities. In addition to helping to articulate the idea of the “Black University,” White examines the IBW’s Black Studies Directors Seminar which convened in

November 1969, and resolved in part that the approach to Black Studies must be broader than the U.S. experience and than any single “disciplinary” approach or subject matter—and perhaps most importantly, relevant and practical to the community. While the thinkers involved with the IBW were inextricably linked to the early foundations of Black Studies, its particular approach to curriculum organization, premised on “independence” and curricula grounded in the African/Black experience as opposed to the West, has been sacrificed by subsequent generations.  

These formative moments, along with the more radical breaks with white control over institutions effected by student activists, allowed for the creation of space to be able to think about how a Black Studies curriculum would look in United States universities. They in turn led to the constructions of curriculums premised on available resources, both intellectually and institutionally, to create a fledgling Black Studies discipline.

One of the early formulations of a curriculum was developed at Merritt College in Oakland, California under the leadership of Sidney Walton, persuaded by students, Huey P. Newton Jr., and Bobby Seale, among others. In his *The Black Curriculum* (1969), Walton chronicles the development of the first Associate’s degree in the field in 1967. The Merritt

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25. See Ibid, 45-49. Elsewhere, White quotes Strickland, speaking at the IBW-sponsored Summer Research Symposium in 1971, as stating: “Our task then, goes beyond blackness, it is not only the resurrection of black history but the reinterpretation of the West. But this is simply not an arbitrary academic task . . . In contradistinction then to the white approach and the black fixated approach we must clarify one essential dynamic which characterizes our struggle. We must apprehend and counterpose to the individualism and materialism the movement of men and social forces, the contradictions of oppressor AND [sic] oppressed, the politics of class and mass movement, the relation between black movement and white resistance. This is the historical necessity to define the black liberation struggle and the stage in which it finds itself. It is also a precondition to glimpsing the future that lies ahead.” See Derrick White, “An Independent Approach to Black Studies: The Institute of the Black World (IBW) and its Evaluation and Support of Black Studies,” *Journal of African American Studies* 16 (March 2012): 81. See the Preface of this dissertation for a discussion of the “sacrifice” of these ideas.
College documents reveal the belief that the African/Black perspective must pervade all knowledge areas. The initial proposal for Afro-American Studies, as it was termed, included courses in areas ranging from the humanities and social sciences to also criminal justice and business.\footnote{See Sidney F. Walton, Jr., *The Black Curriculum: Developing a Program in Afro-American Studies* (East Palo Alto, CA: Black Liberation Publishers, 1969), 131-138.} Not only were the course proposals broad in terms of content they were equally as broad in terms of scope, as Walton shows, these courses dealt with the African cultural background to contextualize the Black perspective. In these early formulations, the discipline relied on relevant interpretations of disciplines as they sought to widen their scope to the experiences of Africans which would lead to revolutionary change.\footnote{See the proposed courses in Ibid, 117-120. As Ibram Rogers explains, the happenings at Merritt were linked to the development of Black Studies in its first institutionalization at nearby San Francisco State University. See Ibram Rogers, “The Black Campus Movement and the Institutionalization of Black Studies, 1965-1970” *Journal of African American Studies* 16 (March 2012): 23.} What is particularly prescient about Walton’s work is that it represents a robust disdain for the academy, one which stipulated interest in working in university spaces only to the extent that they are made to benefit the communities from which Blacks came. In Walton’s and other pioneers at Merrit’s estimation, the discipline of Afro-American Studies was envisaged to do just that.\footnote{These particular positions were articulated in the face of opposition to the new curriculum. See Sidney F. Walton, Jr., *The Black Curriculum*, 51-126 for an interesting depiction of the struggles of the discipline’s implementation during this time.}

Under the direction of its first chair, San Francisco State proposed the creation of courses under similar areas as those proposed at Merritt College.\footnote{On Hare and the early curriculum, see John H. Bunzel, “Black Studies at San Francisco State,” in *The African American Studies Reader*, ed. Nathaniel Norment, Jr. (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 255-267. The role of San Francisco State in Black Studies will be discussed in Chapter Eight.} Nathan Hare, who was involved with the push to create Black Studies at Howard, writes on the particular
types of courses that would comprise Black Studies in his “Questions and Answers About Black Studies” (1969). In answering the query of how a sample curriculum or program would look, Hare states that it should be divided “into two phases—the expressive and the pragmatic.” From here he lists the course descriptions of the sample program, which similar to Merritt’s had courses that sought to rework the humanities, social sciences, as well as professional areas geared toward their understanding and application to the Black experience (e.g. courses like “Black History,” “Black Math,” “The Music of Blackness,” “Black Fiction,” “Sociology of Blackness,” and “Demography of Blackness”). These were coupled with workshops that encompassed the pragmatic phase of training in the discipline.

In the John W. Blassingame edited, *New Perspectives on Black Studies* (1971), we see yet another model curriculum of Afro-American Studies being suggested. Blassingame views Afro-American Studies programs as contributing to the diversity of the American university experience by introducing students to the experience of “America’s largest minority group.” In this model he presents a type that would allow students to major in a traditional discipline while minoring in Black Studies. Another model was presented as the “departmental” model and included largely courses in the historical and social science

31. Ibid, 728-731.
purview, with scant attention to African or African American humanities. In a somewhat similar fashion, Martin Kilson argued in his “Reflections on Structure and Content in Black Studies” (1973), published in The Journal of Black Studies, that “the best approach to a field of such interdisciplinary complexity as Black Studies is through one of the established and academic and technical disciplines…” He suggests that its very viability depended on “the curricula control of an established discipline.” Even still, such an organization in Kilson’s estimation would make students “dilettantes at best, and charlatans at worst.”

For many thinkers, the established disciplines were the road to legitimacy and Kilson’s argument is presented as such, because this very idea established the legitimacy of those scholars who had preceded the moment in which he was writing, the same thinkers discussed in Chapter Six.

While the attempt to “Blacken” the traditional disciplines, a la Hare and Walton represented an influential approach to early Black Studies program models, Blassingame’s more moderate model was also replicated in many programs. A combination of both models was attached to the definitive textbooks that emerged shortly thereafter: Abdul Alkalimat and Associates’ An Introduction to Afro-American Studies (1973) and Maulana Karenga’s Introduction to Black Studies (1982). The reinterpretation and/or appropriation of the “disciplines” are considered by both to be an effective avenue toward the legitimation as well as the important holistic thrust of Black Studies.

33. See Ibid, 234-236.
35. For this argument, see Ibid, 297-302.
Maulana Karenga has labeled the components of Black Studies as “core fields” or “seven basic subject areas,” in a multidisciplinary formation for the discipline. For Karenga, the qualifier, “Black” reduces the broad disciplinary lens of traditional areas to particular fields of study that interrogate the Black experience. He asserts that “Black Studies must and does bring its own critique, challenge and contribution or it is not a specific discipline only a variant discourse within other disciplines.” These fields are then said to form the constitutive elements of the discipline. In his view Black Studies draws from the social sciences and humanities and include: Black History, Black Religion, Black Social Organization, Black Politics, Black Economics, Black Creative Production, and Black Psychology.

In a somewhat similar fashion, Abdul Alkalimat and Associates’ *Introduction to Afro-American Studies* views the disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities combined with an alternative intellectual history and underpinned by radical social movements as part of the makeup of the “academic field” of Afro-American Studies. That said, in their estimation, the most important “disciplinary contributor” to the field was sociology, even as they admit that it “exemplifies the limitations of the established disciplines.” They organize the text around the imposition of racism and the African experience in America as laborers, though attention is also paid to culture and religion.

36. The first edition of this text was published during the beginning stages of the discipline in 1982. The current edition was published in 2010, and retains the same categorizations. See Maulana Karenga, *Introduction to Black Studies* (Los Angeles, CA: University of Sankore Press, 2010), 23.


38. Ibid.


40. Ibid, 14.
Still, the idea for many thinkers in this period, following the influence of the IBW and other activist orientations, was that Black Studies courses should stand alone in order to foster many of the objectives that were proposed at the conferences discussed above: the development of a Black perspective and community-minded praxis. Of the ideas discussed in Chapter One, institutional autonomy was clearly more valued than conceptual or intellectual (disciplinary) self-authentication based on the uniqueness of the African worldview/experience. While the latter tendencies did exist at the outset, represented by exemplars to be discussed later in this chapter, the proclivity to link African/Black subject matters to the established orders of knowledge, buoyed by new perspectives within those bounds, represented the most visible norms. Insurgent works by those Africans trained in these disciplines supported these activities and the institutionalization of Black Studies.

II. The Development of Africana: Insurgent Work in the Disciplines

The ways in which Maulana Karenga’s and Abdul Alkalimat’s seminal textbooks have organized Africana Studies’ disciplinary subject matter have continued in more recent textbooks. In varying ways, that either increase or decrease the number of the core areas, Talmadge Anderson’s *Introduction to African American Studies* (1992) and its newer version, co-authored with James B. Stewart (2007), and the forthcoming *African American Studies: The Discipline and its Dimensions* authored by Nathaniel Norment all assume that insurgent work done under the umbrella of particular disciplines is part of the

While these authors and contributors shape these categories of knowledge in different ways, the commonalities of their work revolve around creating and operationalizing a multi- and/or interdisciplinary methodological approach that draws from and is informed by the experiences and culture(s) of African people at best, and the mere wielding of normative discipline-based methodologies as ready-made tools for the excavation of African phenomena, at worst. This section will detail the emergence of cognate areas for the study of African experiences and phenomena in their late

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twentieth century evolution, as this development was and continues to be weaved into Africana Studies curricula in its multiple expressions. It will reduce to four very broad, yet highly interrelated areas, those components most consistently taught and researched under the aegis of Africana Studies: philosophy, cultural-meaning making, history, and the social sciences.

a. Philosophy

In Part I we reviewed works that suggested the importance of philosophy in the development of the disciplines—in fact, the university itself. Its current role has been in some instances reduced to the covering term for the study and articulation of speculative thought. By the 1970s and continuing on into the current era, scholars from other “practical” disciplines had and continue to assert the “uselessness” of philosophy. As a result, its role in the development of Western ideas has been obscured from the purview of the average academic. African thinkers trained in the context of the West’s forgetfulness, have as a result, failed to imagine how first order ideas—the conceptual and theoretical ordering of ideas, the principal domain of philosophy—have been enshrined permanently in what they have considered to be more practical disciplines. Few scholars have attempted to enter into the conversation armed with what Jacob Carruthers has termed, “African deep thought,” as a means by which to go beyond the debilitating effects of Western disciplinarity. This has left the discipline in a state of native attachment to the West, even in those cases where there have been attempts to go beyond this.

42. This of course began far earlier than the period under discussion. Erin McKenna argues that in the United States, its roots lie in the development of the American Philosophical Association. See Erin McKenna, “Are We a Thoughtful Profession?” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (Spring 2007): 395-403. On philosophy as a residual discipline, see the discussion of the modern research university in Chapter Three.
Philosophy, or more accurately its role in the academy, is the foundation, the ground floor for any discussion on Western knowledge. As such, African participation in this conversation during the era of the institutionalization of Africana Studies is useful to consider.

African American Philosophy

In the United States, Africana Studies belatedly incorporated the disciplinary positions of academic philosophy. Though the traditional disciplines all stem from foundations within philosophy, and the approaches to disciplines by Africana thinkers can be considered philosophical in nature, John H. McClendon in his “The Afro-American Philosopher and the Philosophy of the Black Experience” (1982) asserts that academic philosophy was not widely considered as central to Black Studies. In this bibliographic essay on the subject, McClendon in effect gives a partial intellectual history of African American philosophical inquiry as defined and demarcated by Western definitions of speculative thought. McClendon’s compilation establishes useful categorizations of African American philosophical thought ranging from discussions of works which were founded upon radical-political philosophies and philosophies of history to more mainstream speculative inquiry, such as value theory. This work, in addition to early works such as Leonard Harris’ edited Philosophy Born of Struggle (1983), was an attempt to

44. See Ibid, 1-2. These five categories are: 1) philosophical reference materials; 2) philosophies on the black experience; 3) axiology; 4) philosophy of history; and 5) philosophy of science.
anthologize Black philosophical speculation. In the years after McClendon’s work, groups of academically trained African American philosophers began to impact the discipline of Africana Studies. Prominent among this rather diverse group of thinkers were McClendon, Harris, Cornel West, Lucius T. Outlaw, Charles W. Mills, Naomi Zack, Lewis Gordon, and others. Their discussions on the nexus between the discipline of philosophy and the African American experience have been anthologized in George Yancy’s *African American Philosophy: 17 Conversations* (1997), John Pittman’s edited *African American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions* (1996), the Pittman and Tommy Lott edited *Companion to African American Philosophy* (2006), and Naomi Zack’s edited *Women of Color and Philosophy* (2000). In addition, Paget Henry’s *Caliban’s Reason* (2000) is a work that

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45. Harris’ text brings together the philosophical ideas of thinkers who attempted to theorize social change in the African American community. Harris groups these thinkers into two categories, with a third encompassing elements of the both. These two categories are insurrectionist and suasionist, the former includes thinkers like Maria Stewart, David Walker, W.E.B. Du Bois, while the latter includes Martin Luther King, Jr., Frederick Douglass, and Anna Julia Cooper. Those not fitting into this bifurcation according to Harris include Martin Delany and Alexander Crummell. The second volume of this text appeared in 2000 and included a section on African American philosophy, which includes the perspectives of thinkers trained in Western academic philosophy. Harris states that the differences between African American philosophy and Western philosophy are not “hard and fast” and views the variant “non-exclusive” approach by African Americans as characterized by the “confrontation with unfulfilled democracy, human ravages of capitalism, colonial domination, and ontological designation by race.” See the introduction to Leonard Harris, ed., *Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, [1983], 2000), xxvi.

attempts to marshal the components of a unique philosophical tradition among thinkers from the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{47}

In most cases, African American philosophy has brought philosophy’s disciplinary language to the issues and problems of race and racism and increasingly, of class and gender. This conversation is often linked to European/Western political and cultural hegemony and the problem of modernity and related ideas. In some senses, it continues to revolve around the meanings of citizenship and/or beingness in the context of the state, but despite this and perhaps more importantly, it persistently revolves around the idea that philosophizing must be linked to African/Black versions of European ideas.\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{African Philosophy}

African ideas may indeed provide the conceptual foundations that some have argued are lacking in African American philosophy and Africana Studies, insofar as the latter, both, in some cases, have relied on European ideas. In John H. McClendon’s aforementioned bibliographical essay he includes thinkers who attempted to link the


African American philosophical conceptualization to older, pre-existing, or ancient African ideas. These thinkers relied on a number of philosophical works on Africans in order to establish these links. Mainstream studies of African philosophy are consistently linked to the Belgian missionary, Placide Tempels’ 1945 work, *La Bantoue Philosophie*, which attempted to establish core concepts of African philosophy. Though this was certainly not the first attempt, many of the current thinkers concerned with defining African philosophical thought respond intellectually to this particular work. Though they vary greatly in approach as well as scope, these thinkers include inter alia, John Mbiti, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Kwame Gyeke, Barry Hallen, Theophile Obenga, Kwasi Wiredu, Segun Gbadegesin, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Paulin Hountondji, Valentine Mudimbe, and the aforementioned Gordon and Outlaw. At its core, the central arguments surrounding many of these scholarly productions is on one level the articulation of the mere existence of a philosophizing tradition among African peoples, and on another, the extent to which we can characterize these systems of thought under Western rubrics of philosophy.

John Mbiti’s *African Religions and Philosophy* (1970) is one of the early attempts reviewed in this section to define and conceptualize African philosophy, building on the works of Jaheinz Jahn, Alexis Kagame, and Tempels. Throughout this effort, Mbiti is concerned largely with understanding the core ideals of contemporary African meaning-

making systems, arguing that it is very difficult to separate religion and philosophy in traditional African thought. Kwame Gyeke’s *An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme* (1987) and Segun Gbadegesin’s *African Philosophy: Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities* (1991) are specialized studies that argue the existence of philosophical thought among the Akan and Yoruba, respectively. Gyeke and Gbadegesin are representative of Western trained thinkers who have endeavored to trace the philosophical systems of traditional African “ethnic” groups. Their work has contributed to the conversation on the existence of African philosophy by showing that all cultural groups “philosophize” and as such the West has no patent on the ways in which the term can be used or defined. Both, however, have also taken the limits and strictures of Western philosophy to be too limiting to continue to link African ideas to their standards. In addition, their work asserts the need to excavate those ideas from the Akan and Yoruba that could help understand and solve contemporary issues.

Theophile Obenga’s *African Philosophy: The Pharaonic Era* (2004), as well as his earlier *A Lost Tradition* (1995), are among his many works that examine the nature of ancient Egyptian philosophical thought and its relationship to other African cultural groups in West and Central Africa. Obenga’s works, along with Henry Olela’s “The

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51. He also points to the concept of time as being central to the understanding of a philosophical tradition in Africa. This early work led to much more activity among scholars on the continent of Africa and in the Diaspora with regards to the study of African traditions. See John Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), 1-36.


53. Theophile Obenga brings his training in ancient Egyptian language to the table, linking their philosophical traditions to cultural groups deeper in Africa, showing the continuities of the ideas.
African Foundations of Greek Philosophy” and Lancinay Keita’s The African Philosophical Tradition,” which are contributions to the Richard A. Wright edited, African Philosophy: An Introduction (1979), show that this tradition predated Western philosophical ideas and was the source for many ideas that characterized the Greek system.\textsuperscript{54} For Obenga and others, more important than the so-called “Greek debt” thesis, were the ways in which a broad philosophizing tradition could be centered on the ancient Egyptian foundation.

Though they vary in their reservations, Paulin Hountondji in his African Philosophy: Myth or Reality (1983) and Valentine Mudimbe in his The Invention Africa (1988) are less convinced about the ways in which scholars have characterized African traditional idea as similar to Western philosophy. According to Hountondji, there can be no authentic philosophy without the self-reflection and individual contemplation that has characterized philosophy in the West.\textsuperscript{55} His work views this type of thinking as originating in a Western-scientific based milieu, and interrogates the studies that label traditional African thought as ethnophilosophy, which is the philosophy of the collective or group wisdom.


Problematicizing these previous studies, Hountondji nevertheless states that the development of a new African philosophy must be defined only through the geographical origin of writers who use Western philosophical tools to solve problems.\textsuperscript{56} Mudimbe is less concerned with excavating traditional African thought utilizing Western lenses as such. His work understands the “philosophical” categorization of African thought as part of ethnocentric “epistemological filiations” which affects how Africans trained thinkers have endeavored to understand themselves and their cultural traditions.\textsuperscript{57} Though he prefers the term “gnosis,” a Greek concept, Mudimbe is largely convinced that the intellectual baggage of utilizing terms in Western thought to construct African reality is too heavy to bear.\textsuperscript{58}

Amid the foregoing discussion, other thinkers that have offered important conceptual arguments concerning proper ways of characterizing African philosophical thought include Jacob H. Carruthers and Lucius Outlaw. Carruthers includes in his \textit{Mdw Ntr} (1995) a review of the arguments between those thinkers who support and those who deny the existence of a traditional African philosophy, explaining the nexus between intellectual commitments and conclusions of the two groups. These two camps, both of whom affirm the existence of “some form” of African philosophy, include Hountondji

\textsuperscript{56} See Ibid, 62-66. Kwame Gyeke, inter alia has challenged this notion of uniform thought in ethnophilosophy, and continues to evoke the wisdom of African thought as the basis for any definition of African Philosophy. See Kwame Gyeke, \textit{An Essay on African Philosophical Thought}, xvi-xxiii.

\textsuperscript{57} See V.Y. Mudimbe, \textit{The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 19.

\textsuperscript{58} He explains: “My own claim is that thus far the ways in which they [African traditional systems of thought] have been evaluated and the means used to explain them relate to theories and methods whose constraints, rules, and systems of operations suppose a non-African epistemological locus.” See Ibid, x.
and his cohort on one hand ("The Authentic Philosophers"), and thinkers such as Obenga, Cheikh Anta Diop, and nineteenth century thinkers such as Martin Delany, on the other (The Champions of African Thought). The former group, Carruthers argues, is characterized by their attempts to repair the "deficiency" of African thought (i.e. its lack of a scientific background), by connecting them to universal philosophical values (i.e. the West), and away from traditional African values. The latter group approaches the question through the African worldview, showing that what would become philosophy is itself based on traditional African ideas. Choosing to use the term, "deep thought," as opposed to philosophy, Carruthers is able to link ancient African worldviews with those of "basic Africa" through the use of the concepts of "divine speech" (mdw ntr) and "good speech" (mdw nfr). With regard to the "Greek debt" thesis, Carruthers understands that there may be evidence that the Greeks culled the term sophia from the Egyptian term, sba, as the work of Theophile Obenga and Martin Bernal has suggested. Carruthers states nonetheless, that the Greeks use of concepts from African origins was tailored to Eurasian interests, thus complicating and de-Africanizing these ideas in their new contexts. In *Intellectual Warfare*, Carruthers suggests the marshaling of an approach he calls, "the old tradition," in order to mitigate against the too neat similarities and differences regarding civilizations in antiquity.


Lucius T. Outlaw’s aims in his “African “Philosophy?”: Deconstructive and Reconstructive Challenges” and “Africana Philosophy,” which were republished in his collection of essays, *On Race and Philosophy* (1996), are to establish appropriate lenses from which to view “philosophizing” traditions among Africans and to theorize how this would appear conceptually. “African Philosophy?” is his contribution to the debate discussed above. Here Outlaw challenges the collected traditions and practices of disciplinary philosophy, showing that it was indeed not an enterprise which could extract universal norms of the human experience based on constructions of the Western legacy—a dying concept itself. He argues that the latter should then, not be the norms on to which to graft anything resembling an “African philosophy.” From here follows an evaluation of those attempts to move beyond this conceptual ordering showing their successes and failures.61 In “Africana Philosophy,” Outlaw formulates ways of ordering the subfield or discipline of Africana philosophy through the compilation of African ideas through a third-order process of surveying and interrogating the extant and contemporary ideas that have emerged from a common African and African-descended origin. For Outlaw, this resolves the contradictions inherent in the assumed transcendence of temporal-spatial contexts in some conceptualizations of Africana philosophy.62 Outlaw’s process is fashioned to understand how the constitutive elements of a conceptualization of Africana philosophy emerge, and then how best to develop ways of understanding and studying them.

Along with Carruthers and Outlaw, Theophile Obenga has also considered seriously the link between African philosophical concepts and the worldviews of African descendants in the West. Though Obenga’s work largely traverses the linkages between African classical traditions and contemporary continental African thought, his *A Lost Tradition* also implies that these linkages can be extended to Africans throughout the Diaspora.63


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Finally, other important texts include Barry Hallen’s introductory volume, *A Short History of African Philosophy* (2009), which builds upon the idea that African traditions are distinct and philosophical ideas, relative, as well as Lewis Gordon’s introductory text, *Introduction to Africana Philosophy* (2008), which includes a comprehensive review of the historical and contemporary philosophical perspectives of Africana peoples, utilized in fashioning resistance to the imposition of Euro-modernity.

The works discussed here, though not uncomplicated nor univocal, are essential to Africana Studies, as both their insurgent and reimaginative aspects have created space from which to delink African ideas from the West, as Jacob Carruthers’ well-known words have reassured us has indeed been made possible. The work of the combined areas reviewed, or *Africana philosophy*, all cohere around the need to construct a new knowledge edifice, based upon African systems of thought. This alone, should be enough reason for Africana Studies to connect itself to this conversation. Clearly, it is now incumbent for Africana Studies thinkers to begin to use this work to fashion from a new foundation, that is, from African deep thought, the means to articulate a unique and distinct methodological approach to Africana Studies. This of course should not, and

65. For this schema and a brief overview of the controversies and debates, see Tsenay Serequeberhan, “African Philosophy: The Point in Question,” in *African Philosophy: The Essential Readings*, 4-28. Serequeberhan himself views the correct approach in philosophy as the investigation of ways of knowing that aid in the process of distilling a sense of African identity in order to disengage the baggage of Western hegemony, a “deconstructive” challenge. See Ibid, 22.


67. See the second epigraph to this dissertation for Carruthers’ statement.
perhaps could not be done in isolation from the insurgent works in the three areas to be discussed below—as they too represent the same impulse.

b. Cultural Meaning-Making

According to Greg Carr, cultural meaning-making systems speak to the forms in which Africans have created and expressed “their thoughts and emotions to others.”68 Within Western categories of knowledge these would be placed under the broad rubric of the arts, and in the academy, under the fine arts and the humanities. But as the insurgent works to be discussed in these expressive areas imply, these cultural meaning-making systems did not always revolve around the “the good” or “the beautiful”—the aesthetic. In a truer sense, the more expansive categories of African intellectual traditions naturally include those ideas which ground artistic expression. As thinkers like Amadou Hampate Ba in his seminal “The Living Tradition” (1981) and Nissio Fiagbedzi’s Nature of the Aesthetic in Musical Arts (2005) argue, within various African traditions there is no separation as such between the “scholar” and the poet, between the “researcher” and the musician.69 These practices were intertwined and linked to important roles in the


construction and well-being of their communities. Functionality was linked to clear and defined roles, and not functionality for functionality’s sake.

The cultural logics which ground these traditional African practices were not all lost. In fact, in Africana Studies it should come as no surprise that many of the first professors were also cultural practitioners—poets, writers, jazz artists, painters, etc. In many ways, this continued a tradition which had long been underway in African communities throughout the New World. Building on the foundations of earlier intellectual currents in the Africana community, the increased awareness and understanding of Black/African cultural norms as they manifested in these various meaning-making systems became central to the development of Black Studies during its inception. Under the broad rubric of the humanities, the intellectual work in Black Studies began to locate differences in what constituted “culture” for Africans around the world. These conversations concerning the nature of African and African-descended cultural meaning-making systems manifested themselves in two interrelated realms. The first was the nature of the “aesthetic” in Black/African artistic and cultural productions. Secondly, many discussions revolved around the extent to which African-descended cultures exhibited “Africanisms,” and the value inherent in uncovering these particular attributes.

Key texts that provide the important impetus to the theorization of Black aesthetic traditions were the anthologies edited by Addison Gayle, *The Black Aesthetic* (1971) as well as the more famous, *Black Fire* (1968) edited by Amiri Baraka and Larry Neal. Both of these anthologies included contributions that established criteria and norms for the study
of the African American traditions in artistic, literary, and cultural creations. A later work, stemming from the Temple School of Afrocentricity, asserted that more accurate conceptualizations of the aesthetic must stem from African philosophies and ways of knowing. Kariamu Welsh-Asante’s edited *The African Aesthetic* (1993) included contributions that ranged from discussions on reconceptualizing the nature of African aesthetic on these terms, as well as how it might be applied to literary criticism and proper ways of understanding African cultural productions in the forms of dance, theater, and other forms of production. Clyde R. Taylor’s *The Mask of Art* (1998) goes one step further, advocating “the breaking of the aesthetic contract.” For Taylor, propensity to theorize an aesthetic consciousness out of the African or Black experience fails to consider the ways in which the aesthetic is essentially a concept which re-inscribes Western perceptions of the other, in ways that make it impossible to create a self-authenticated “aesthetic” as such. Taylor’s analysis articulates the need to link cultural productions to a robust conception he characterizes as “the politics of representation”—by linking criticism to the nature of the relationship between artist/producer and the terms of their domination. The implications this work might have for understanding and studying

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70. See Addison Gayle, Jr., ed., *The Black Aesthetic* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971) and LeRoi Jones and Larry Neal, eds., *Black Fire: An Anthology of Afro-American Writing* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1968). Though the latter has achieved wide acclaim for its important essays, poems, short stories, and plays, it was the former, which would establish the norms and criteria for Black aesthetic traditions. Important to Gayle’s understanding of the Black aesthetic was not simply the articulation of one, but the development of “unique critical tools for evaluation.” See Addison Gayle, “Introduction,” in *The Black Aesthetic*, xxiv. This development grounded the attempt to develop an African American literary criticist project.


Along with the work done in the area of the aesthetic, there were also works which aimed to link the African cultural norms to those cultural productions that have emerged in New World African contexts, as scholars and activists alike were concerned with developing this connection. Interestingly, as Greg Carr asserts in his “Towards an Intellectual History of Africana Studies” (2006) the work done in this vein has engendered “very little argument about the durability of the processes and intuitions” which have oversaw the transmissions of cultural meaning-making systems from the African contexts to the present.\footnote{Greg E. Carr, “Towards an Intellectual History of Africana Studies,” 439.} Texts like Robert Farris Thompson’s \textit{African Art in Motion} (1974) and \textit{Flash of the Spirit} (1983) traversed the normative strains of African cultural logic, showing the continuities which accompanied these various ideas throughout different Africana cultures.\footnote{Establishing what he terms the “the canons of fine form,” a useful criteria for defining African aesthetics, Thompson’s \textit{African Art In Motion} applies these ideas to continental African cultures. His \textit{The Flash of the Spirit}, looks at particularly the Yoruba, Kongo, Dahomean, Mande, and Ejagham ethnic groups in order to discern how art and philosophical traditions were transferred along specific cultural lines to Africans in the Western hemisphere. See Robert Farris Thompson, \textit{African Art in Motion: Icon and Art} (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974) and \textit{Flash of the Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and Philosophy} (New York: Random House, 1983).} Other works have entered elements of Africana philosophy and developments in Black social science into the conversation. This is seen in the contributions to Joseph Holloway’s edited \textit{Africanisms in American Culture} (1990), Sterling Stuckey’s \textit{Slave Culture} (1987), and the edited work of Kariamu Welsh Asante and Molefi Kete Asante’s \textit{African Culture: The Rhythms of Unity} (1990). The scholars represented in this literature all aim to
connect African American and Caribbean culture to African antecedent traditions. In addition to these, Marimba Ani’s *Let the Circle Be Unbroken* (1980) and Greg Carr’s “Inscribing African World History” (forthcoming), both assume this cultural continuity and suggest that from these norms, African people employ different frames for more appropriate approaches to knowledge. While Ani traces the cultural survivals of Africans in North America through a process that examines the linkages between ethos and worldview as they manifested themselves through African American spiritual and musical traditions, Carr proposes ways of developing a historiography, amenable to African cultural norms and accessible through traditional African inscription systems.

Other works have attempted to apply or tailor these general understandings of artistic and cultural traditions to specific areas of knowledge associated with the ways in which they are separated in Western intellectual traditions and discipline formations. Thinkers in Africana Studies and others with traditional humanities disciplines focusing on Africana culture have produced works seeking to understand African ideas as they have manifested in such areas as music/dance, visual art, and film/theater. Finally, the

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idea of literary criticism was impacted by these broader categories of meaning-making. Scholars and artists discussed here have attempted to distinguish African cultural and artistic production and meaning-making from other cultural groups’ similar productions, thereby allowing them to “speak on their own.” Clearly, then they contribute to the theoretical postures associated with Africana Studies. Here we will discuss how work in these areas represented the continuity of the insurgent work to emerge in the traditional disciplines over the past forty or so years.

Music/Dance

Earlier studies of African music include J. H. Kwabena Nketia’s *The Music of Africa* (1974), Ortiz M. Walton’s *Music: Black, White, and Blue* (1972), LeRoi Jones’ *Blues People* (1963), and John Storm Roberts’ *Black Music of Two Worlds* (1974). These studies combined with later works such as Samuel A. Floyd’s *The Power of Black Music* (1995) and Portia K. Maultsby’s contribution to *Africanisms in American Culture* examine the distinguishing features of the musical productions of African people on the continent and throughout the Diaspora. Works like Nketia’s *The Music of Africa*, perhaps one of the more comprehensive discussions of African music, and Floyd’s *The Power of Black Music* are intense examinations of technical aspects of the traditions, while Walton and Jones detail both technical aspects and the surrounding milieu of African American musical production, understanding African cultural antecedents as central to the development of distinct musical traditions among African Americans. Walton and Jones also explore

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the historical and sociological environment which contextualized the flowering of these traditions, though cautioning us, is Walton who asserts, these conditions do not explain their character. 79 John Storm Roberts’ *Black Music of Two Worlds* and Maultsby’s “Africanisms in African American Music” combine both elements, but like Floyd, trace their extensions in the United States, and for Roberts, the larger Diaspora. 80 Many of the foregoing texts stipulate the unbroken nature of African musical traditions as they originated in older contexts and were transferred to their new ones.

An important part of conceptualizing music is the extent to which we can draw upon appropriate norms for understanding their significance to the communities from which they represent. This is the purpose of Kalamu ya Salaam’s “It Didn’t Jes Grow” part of a special issue edited by him in *The African American Review* (Summer 1995). Salaam argues for the comprehension of blues, gospel jazz, and Black pop/R&B as well as other forms of “Great Black Music” as the true language of African deep thought. 81

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79. For Walton: “The problem cannot be simply reduced to one of social oppression, inasmuch as poor whites, who have had an equally long history of poverty, and now make up the majority of welfare recipients did not create the Blues, Jazz or Spirituals. Although the social conditions peculiar to America have obviously been an economic disadvantage to Blacks, they have coalesced with African retention to produce a new and highly influential culture and world view. The Blues cannot be reduced to a reaction against what white people do and have done; rather they would be more accurately conceived of as a positive form that affirms and preserves Afro-American culture.” Ortiz Walton, *Music: Black, White and Blue*, 34.


81. He asserts: “Africans in the diaspora are probably the only modern people whose soul is expressed almost solely through our music. On the African continent, sculpture (and specific crafts ranging
The study of hip hop has recently become popular in the cognate interdisciplines of cultural studies and ethnic studies. Recently, texts have been produced attempting to establish the sociological and historical significance of hip hop, though with rare exception, they have routinely disengaged hip-hop cultural production from older genealogies of Africana music traditions, in order to focus on these more socio-historical aspects of hip hop’s emergence. The exception is Imani Perry’s *Prophets of the Hood* (2004), where she asserts that it is important to understand hip hop and the community from which it emerged. Her work foundationalizes the study of hip hop with an understanding of its life force, Black American culture. Along with tendencies to move away from “jazz” as a covering term beginning with Duke Ellington and continuing with Nicholas Payton, hip hop studies and the larger studies of music (including reggae, soca, and other Pan-African forms) must continue to articulate self-authenticated grounds from textiles to ceramics), dance, and sociological ritual systems represent defining expressions in addition to music. But in the diaspora, where our people were uniformly denied the opportunities of concrete expression and mass assembly, all our soul was poured into the ephemerality of music. Indeed, it is possible to know and understand African Americans by studying our music and its history without ever reading a novel or viewing a piece of art—especially since the most successful of all our other art forms owe some measure of their inspiration, if not their articulation, to the influence of GBM on the artist.” Kalamu ya Salaam, “It Didn’t Jes Grew: The Social and Aesthetic Significance of African American Music,” *The African American Review* (Summer 1995): 333.

82. Most of these works including but not limited to Jeff Chang, *Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop Generation* (New York: Picador, 2005), Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal, eds., *That’s the Joint: The Hip Hop Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2004), Bakari Kitwana, *The Hip Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in African American Culture* (New York: Basic Civitas, 2003), and Tricia Rose, *Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1994) devote most of the attention to the specific environment that occasioned the rise of hip hop as cultural and musical traditions. These works largely view hip-hop as “original” and often distinct cultural productions.

which to uncover its nature, a process which lends itself to the disciplinary project of Africana Studies.84

In African traditions any discussion of music cannot be delinked from dance. Kariamu Welsh-Asante’s work which considers African dance traditions in Africa form the core around which much of Africana Studies work in the area has emerged. Contributing both edited volumes and scholarly monographs, her examinations of Africana dance culture include *African Dance* (2000), *Zimbabwe Dance* (2000), and *Umfundalai: An African Dance Technique* (2003), which is a Pan-African dance technique that connects continental dance traditions to Africans across the world. According to Welsh-Asante, “African dance belongs to several families—the family of ritual and ceremony, the family of performance arts, the family of religions and cosmology, and the family of art.”85 This holistic conception has grounded the work of other scholars contributing to her edited volumes who have also routinely stressed the distinctions in terms of both function and style between African traditions and other cultural groups. Working to establish specific norms about dance traditions throughout the Diaspora is Yvonne

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Daniel’s *Dancing Wisdom* (2005), which examines the cultural life-worlds of Haitian, Cuban, and Brazilian (Bahian) Africans. In addition, Aimee Glocke and Lawrence M. Jackson have recently edited a special issue of the *Journal of Pan African Studies* (September 2011), which attempts to strengthen the relationship between Africana Studies and dance.

*Visual Art*

In visual art, Michael Harris and the aforementioned Robert Farris Thompson have offered perhaps the most salient understandings of African visual artistic and cultural production. Anchoring the discussion in classical African art traditions, Harris’ contribution to the Asa G. Hilliard edited *African/African-American Baseline Essays* (1987) develops our conceptual understandings of African paintings, sculpture, and other visual representations that have been created among Africans, arguing that far more important than style are the “meaning, context and the “values its creators assign” art. Thompson’s *African Art in Motion* similarly establishes useful criteria for the examination of African art traditions, which aid in developing norms for studying and applying cultural

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87. See Aimee Glocke and Lawrence M. Jackson, “Dancin’ On the Shoulders of Our Ancestors: An Introduction,” *Journal of Pan African Studies* 4 (September 2011): 2-3. They argue that as a body of knowledge in Africana Studies, dance has not been embraced to reflect to extent to which it is essential to African life in general. Following the earlier special issue of *Caribe* (1983), edited by Marta Vega, the contributors examine how to best re-integrate dance into the discipline.

88. Giving a history of African art that dates back to ancient Africa, Harris states that across time and space: “The art of African cannot be defined only by form or style, but form and style as a part of the work and may be appreciated. The work must be defined by meaning, context, and the meaning and value its creators assign it.” Michael D. Harris, “African-American Art Traditions and Developments,” in *Portland Public Schools Geocultural Baseline Essay Series*, eds., Asa G. Hilliard and Carolyn M. Leonard (Portland: Portland Public Schools, 1998), 16. This work includes a bibliography of additional sources for the study of African art. See Ibid, 54-64.
information culled from these creative expressions. In establishing the links between these traditional African forms and that which would emerge across the Atlantic, a representative sampling of works including Harris’ Colored Pictures (2003), Alva J. Wardlaw and Robert V. Rozelle’s edited Black Art: Ancestral Legacy (1989), Samella Lewis’ African American Art and Artists (1990), and the David C. Driskell edited African American Visual Aesthetics (1995) view African American art traditions as a means of resistance to racial representation and Eurocentric norms. However, these works do differ in their understanding of the sources of this resistance. Harris explains the history of how African artists have visually represented racial constructs in the United States. He states that “blacks did not passively agree to, or accept, racial designations. Due to the disparities in access to power, black agency often took complex strategies to undermine or neutralize the imposed identities as much as possible.”

Black Art: Ancestral Legacy brings together thinkers seeking to place the origins of African American art traditions squarely in the African past. This is indicated throughout the volume and the discussion is grounded in understandings of African culture as opposed to academic designations inherent in art history. Samella Lewis’ work traces traditions in African American art to other attempts to establish new aesthetic traditions that are functional to the Black community. Finally, many of the contributors to African American Visual Aesthetics connect the theoretical aspects of the contributors to Black Art: Ancestral Legacy and Lewis’ African American Art and Artists to

89. See the discussions of the linkages between motion, movement, and structure in African sculpting traditions in art in Robert Farris Thompson, African Art in Motion, 1-47 as well as their continuities in Diasporic traditions throughout Idem, Flash of the Spirit, passim.


develop a theory of African American art that is understood through African American artistic post-modernism. Clearly many of these same traditions were transmitted throughout the Diaspora, with contemporary visual art being one of many true Pan-African cultural expressions.

Film/Theater

In film and theater, critiques have come from what could be considered both social science and humanities bases. These critiques examine both the processes of institutional racism in the film industry as well as develop criteria for the establishment of Black aesthetic traditions in film. Most of the work, as Anna Everett’s *Returning the Gaze* (2006) shows, dates back to the turn of the century and engages the former. These include most prominently Donald Bogle’s 1973 work, *Toms, Bucks, Mullatoes, Mammies, and Bucks*, Thomas Cripps’ *Making Movies Black* (1993), *Black Film as Genre* (1978), *Slow Fade To Black* (1977), and more recently Gladstone L. Yearwood’s *Black Film as Signifying Practice* (2000) and Cedric Robinson’s *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning* (2007). Gladstone Yearwood and Tommy Lott in his “A No-Theory Theory of Black Cinema” (1991) have

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in part attempted to analyze Black film production within the context of African or African American culture. Yearwood’s work acknowledges the need to understand the fact that “Black film—as a mode of inquiry—examines fundamental issues related to the existence of blacks,” and as such it “draws on aesthetic sources that often exist outside the established canons of art legitimized by the dominant society.”

Tommy Lott’s “no-theory theory” of Black film seeks to determine both the cultural and socio-political parameters of “Black film.” Lott asserts the need for a “political theory of black cinema that incorporates a plurality of aesthetic values which are consistent with the fate and destiny of black people as a group engaged in a protracted struggle for social equality.”

Among other objectives in the text, Cedric Robinson’s *Forgeries of Memory and Meaning* examines how Black filmmaker, Oscar Micheaux, was able to capture the unique confluence of Black culture by “employing the expressive voice of a collective Black stratagem of hidden transcripts asserted against narratives of oppression.” For Robinson, this unique approach placed Micheaux within a genealogy of cultural practitioners that linked African American cultural norms to their productions in order to use them as a vehicle to meet the requirements of Lott’s “Black” film.

In theater, the critical works include those of Woodie King in his *Black Theater, Present Condition* (1981), and the contributions to Errol Hill’s edited *The Theater of Black*...
Important edited anthologies include King’s *Black Drama Anthology* (1971), Leo Hamalian and James Vernon Hatch’s *The Roots of African American Drama* (1992), Hatch’s and Ted W. Shine’s *Black Theatre, USA* (1996), and Darwin T. Turner’s *Black Drama in America* (1994). In some of the essays included in Hill’s volume, as well as book-length works such as Kimmika Williams-Witherspoon’s *The Secret Messages in African American Theater* (2006) and Niyi Coker’s *Ola Rotimi’s African Theater* (2005) African traditional theater is drawn upon as a source to connect contemporary Black and African aesthetic values in theater.

**Literature**

These works developed in music/dance, visual art, and film/theater are welded together by the articulation of ways of knowing and cultural meaning-making systems that exist and are similar in their expressive capacities regardless of their particular forms.

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99. See Woodie King, *Black Theater, Present Condition* (New York, NY: National Black Theatre Touring Circuit, 1981). King details the politics of Black theaters and includes a chapter that articulates the need to break with European traditions in theater. Quoting the director of the Lafayette Theater, Robert Macbeth, King states: “And Black theatre cannot emerge, until it is free of the European concept, ‘until we change our language, yeah. As we won’t be free until we change our music, or we won’t be free until we change our theatre; until we begin to do the rituals again, when we start doing the rituals again and stop doing plays.” Ibid, 30. See also the contributions to Errol Hill, ed., *The Theater of Black Americans: A Collection of Critical Essays* (New York: Applause Theater Book Publishers, 1971).


Linking these back to the grand characterizations of African arts and culture is crucial. But just as essential are the ways in which this link should inform the projects of criticism. The tradition of African literary and cultural criticism is vast. Works analyzing Africans written and oral literary traditions have attempted in large measure to formulate from their elements, a distinctive voice. Following in the footsteps of the work of Sterling Brown and others, thinkers such as Robert Stepto, Henry Louis Gates, Houston A. Baker, Eleanor Traylor, Joyce A. Joyce, Selwyn Cudjoe, and George Lamming, among many others have offered ways of understanding and critiquing the literary production of African American and Caribbean authors. Others such as Ayi Kwei Armah, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, and Oyekan Owomoyela have done similar work in continental African literary production.

With the publication of Addison Gayle’s *Black Expression* in 1969, the development of a new crop of literary critics had fully emerged and attempted to base their criticism on the actual life experiences of African Americans. As Darwin T. Turner points out, many of these thinkers, which included James Emmanuel, W. Edward Farrison, Stephen Henderson, and Gayle, had their voices heard through publications such as *Freedomways* and *Negro Digest*.102 Their works were attempts to establish theoretical language to interpret the cultural contributions of Black writers.

By 1979, we see attempts to weld institutional Africana Studies to literary criticism. The Dexter Fisher and Robert Stepto edited work, *Afro-American Literature: The Reconstruction of Instruction* (1979) includes contributions seeking to generate ways of

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explaining and teaching African American literature. As Stepto indicates, these were to go beyond the current methods of teaching and researching the “existence” of African American literature. Rather, these authors aim at achieving a sense of that which is “literary” about African American literature, and for Stepto this could be accomplished through an understanding of the “pregeneric myth” which grounded African American thought.

Other contributions, including that of Robert Hemenway, view African American folklore as central to the African American literary tradition.

Following Stepto and others were perhaps the most famous literary critics of the era, Houston A. Baker and Henry Louis Gates. Having successfully articulated in previous works the grounds on which we can view African American literature as distinct, Baker sought to generate in *Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature* (1984), a way of viewing literary production in African America through the lens of the blues tradition. The “blues matrix” is what Baker has considered a useful way of constructing ways in which African Americans have made sense of American society through their

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103. Dexter Fisher and Robert B. Stepto, eds., *Afro-American Literature: The Reconstruction of Instruction* (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1979). This volume includes works that articulate proper pedagogical methods for teaching survey courses in African American literature. This necessitated the development of ways of understanding African American literary production through the lens of literary theory. This work and similar works that approach the cognate area in this manner attempted at this particular juncture to move discussions of African American literature away from its more holistic understandings. Instead of historical, sociological, and philosophical approaches, these were surveys of the African American experience that attempted to understanding specifically literary productions.


expressive works.¹⁰⁸ This vernacular trope serves in the project of deconstructing normative American literary history to broaden its parameters to include those productions not only marginalized, but misinterpreted.¹⁰⁹ Baker’s project of taking African musical motifs as exemplars of African cultural ideas and then importing them to cement the foundation of literary theory has been replicated or reoriented in Craig Hansen Werner’s Playing the Changes (1994), Alfonso W. Hawkins’ The Jazz Trope (2008) and in the work of the contributors to Thriving on a Riff (2009), edited by Graham Lock and David Murray.¹¹⁰

Henry Louis Gates’ The Signifying Monkey (1989) has received wide acclaim for its development of literary criticist frames to understand the African American tradition. His work views African-American literature as an expressive technique grounded in the African cultural idea of “signifyin(g),” employed to analyze and explain society through literary creations.¹¹¹ Gates has clearly identified cultural foundations in the interpretive

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¹⁰⁸. For Baker, this lens is what “constitute(s) a vibrant network” of African American “input and output,” that which is “always ready” to be tapped into for expressive production among the African artist. See Houston A. Baker, Jr. Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 3-4. He further connects these ideas to the debate/discussion around a Black aesthetic tradition. See Ibid, 87-112.

¹⁰⁹. Ibid, 11-12; 200.


¹¹¹. For Gates: “The black tradition has inscribed within it the very principles by which it can be read.” His work is an attempt to read these lived traditions in the literature in order to develop a critique centered in the Black “vernacular culture.” See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African American Literary Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), xxiii-xxiv. This work is notable for its influence on other forms of African American criticism including the work of Samuel A. Floyd and Gladstone L. Yearwood discussed above. Baker had
tropology of African meaning-making for African and African American literature that could be usefully employed by the literary critic to understand these distinct texts. Gates’ work traces in part this “tropological revision” in the figures of the Yoruba figure, Esu-Elegbara, and its African American counterpart, the Signifying Monkey to what he considers “The Talking Book” as a literary product. Gates employs post-modernist techniques to free the idea of the Black practice of “signifyin(g)” in order to employ it as a normative practice orienting African literary productions.

Feminist literary criticism emerged also during this time and the subsequent development of Black feminist literary criticism articulated many Black women’s reading of African literatures and on African subject matters, though the extent to which they embraced mainstream (white) feminism varies. And it is also clear that not all Black women in literature embraced feminism. Among a large group of writers in literary criticism writing around some of these challenges are Barbara Christian, Alice Walker, Barbara Smith, and Hortense Spillers. Christian’s seminal Black Feminist Criticism (1985), Alice Walker’s In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens (1982) as well as Smith’s “Toward a Black Feminist Criticism (1979) helped shaped a field where Spillers and others have linked the particulars of the African woman’s experience to postmodernist literary criticism.

previously viewed the blues as a signifying practice. See Houston A. Baker, Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature, 5-6.


Joyce Ann Joyce’s *Warriors, Conjurers, and Priests* (1994), while not a feminist text, establishes the ever-growing need to take African cultural foundations and develop more comprehensive ways of analyzing them without the aid of Western analytical tools. According to Joyce, Africana literary criticism has been embroiled with attempts to play the games of Western academic or intellectual practice, and as such been “estranged from indigenous African American culture,” which as a result, compromises their ability to criticize texts that draw from these various traditions. Her text offers critical essays that attempt to correct this disengagement with African American culture among literary critics of the African American canon.

Themes of Caribbean literature include questions of space, identity, class, and resistance, in terms their relatedness to Black Atlantic consciousness. A sampling of these works reveal the ways in which Black Caribbean thinkers have intended to frame these creative expressions as a result of the improvisations and experiences of Africanness in the Caribbean. As such, scholars have focused not simply on resistance, but in perhaps one of the long-standing metaphors, they have developed a criticist project around the Shakespearean heuristic of Caliban, drawn from his *The Tempest*. In addition, many thinkers in this area have focused on the African background in Caribbean life, maroonage, and on comparisons with Caribbean and other Black literatures. Works along these lines include: Edward Baugh’s *Critics on Caribbean Literature* (1978), Selwyn R. Cudjoe’s *Resistance and Caribbean Literature* (1981) and his edited *Caribbean Women Writers*

115. Ibid, 22.

Similar works on the continental African traditional literary scene have emerged. While the works of Oyekan Owomoyela, Isidore Okpewho, and others have countered the claims that African literature had no visible traditions,\(^{117}\) it has been the critical works of Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemie, and Ihechukwu Madubuike’s *Towards the Decolonization of African Literature* (1983), Ngugi Wa Thiong’o’s *Decolonising the Mind* (1986), and Ayi Kwei Armah’s *The Eloquence of the Scribes* (2006) which characterize traditions of African literary criticism. These particular works, among others, have forcefully problematized the colonial worldview and its centrality in the linguistic and elemental makeup of some African literary works as well as these ability of these worldviews to inform analytical tools to guide and critique obviously traditional African productions.

*Towards the Decolonization of African Literature* proceeds by analyzing this state of affairs in a larger attempt to free those expressive modes of African cultural thought from...


what the authors term the “death-grip of the West.”\textsuperscript{118} Ngugi’s \textit{Decolonising the Mind} catalyzes the conversations around the uses of language in African literature. Along with Owomoyela in his \textit{African Literatures} (1979), he has envisioned a literary tradition that is expressly based upon African languages as opposed to one enlivened by European languages and stylistic structures.\textsuperscript{119} His \textit{Something Torn and New} (2009) follows this general impulse and views African language literature as part of the process of “translation and recovery” of African culture, a wholly different objective than approaching literary contributions in order to achieve the recognition of the West.\textsuperscript{120} Ayi Kwei Armah’s work, \textit{The Eloquence of the Scribes} largely shares this view of the status of African literature. His critical work places emphasis on African language, but for Armah this process must begin in Ancient Egyptian culture. The classical culture and language found in the extant wisdom of the Nile Valley, in Armah’s view, serves as the foundations for any understanding of a Pan-African literary tradition and its criticism.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{118} Chinweizu, et al., \textit{Towards the Decolonization of African Literature, Vol. 1.} (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1983), 6. These Nigerian writers excoriates the cultural colonialism that had manifested itself African literary criticism. Like Joyce A. Joyce’s work, they view these critical tools as fundamentally inept at grasping the constitutive norms inherent in African literature, which they link to older traditions in African culture.


\textsuperscript{120} He links the consequences of Europe’s Renaissance within these central processes, showing how classical knowledge served as foundations for their concomitant rise. These aspects of memory are what African thinkers must translate in their own traditions to recover the dismembered cultural traditions of Africa. See Ngugi wa Thiong’o, \textit{Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance} (New York: Basic Civitas, 2009), 82-88.

\textsuperscript{121} Ayi Kwei Armah, \textit{The Eloquence of the Scribes: A Memoir on the Sources and Resources of African Literature} (Popenguine, Senegal: Per Ankh Books, 2006), 242-243. Armah views the choice of writing and
The means and methods of freeing the study of African cultural meaning-making systems from normative disciplinary constructs have varied within our broad conceptualizations of insurgent and reimaginiative trends in African intellectual history. The most consistent form, the insurgent strand, has correctly articulated the need to project the uniqueness of African cultural ideas and graft them onto the study and application of their various forms. Regarding these forms, many scholars have determined that the true essence of their uniqueness lies in the expressions of the “folk.”

Indeed, the deep thought which inhered in the “average” Africans’ engagement with their environment are what Ngugi wa Thiong’o calls the “collective griot,” as was discussed in Chapter One. In reimagining our contemporary moment, African thinkers must be able to connect the sources of cultural ideas to the older, even ancient foundations of African cultural meaning-making. This is perhaps the fundamental way to elucidate the holistic character of these systems, while also becoming the centripetal force by which to clarify and resolve their complexities. For Africana Studies, the answer lies in linking these cultures together though the avenues of linguistic commonalties. The link between language and cultural survival is well-studied. Language carries the means by using tribal languages as necessary, but even more so are the uses of a common language to speak across ethnic identities. For Armah, this language should be the oldest, which is Egyptian medew netcher. He states earlier in the text that: “Thematic matches, in which philosophical ideas occur in identical forms in ancient Egyptian and later African literary works, have a subtler, more, durable effect, comparable to a soft, continuous drizzle of insight.” See Ibid, 212.

This was indeed the position of scholars like Zora Neale Hurston, Katherine Dunham, and Alain Leroy Locke. See Chapter Six for a discussion of these thinkers.

Ngugi wa Thiong’o, *Something Torn and New*, 50.
which to determine the true character and meaning of the ideas themselves, and as such, how we should continue to interpret and apply them to our various studies.\textsuperscript{124}

c. History

As stated in Chapters One and Six, the African embrace of history is at once a challenge to the dominant historiographical approach of the West and a broader “quest for wholeness.”\textsuperscript{125} As Cheikh Anta Diop asserts, for Africans, history must be about providing access to “cultural security” in contexts of “cultural aggression” so that Africans can have at their ready, “a cultural weapon” which provides them the memory by which to “know and to live” in ways that affirm their humanity.\textsuperscript{126} The extent to which African historians have employed the normative methodological norms (i.e. objectivity, consensus) of Western historiography varies, and is in many ways irrelevant to this larger purpose. Beyond the Rankean goal of “scientifically” derived objective facts geared toward the explanation of historical movements and power, the grand purpose of much of African historical writing has been to reintroduce as many Africans possible to their pasts, or to “re-member.”\textsuperscript{127} Indeed, this was the purpose of Carter G. Woodson’s work, and while his conceptions geared toward his particular approach and rationale for writing and popularizing Black history began to wane in the period under discussion, the larger genealogy of which he is representative continues to persist. The age-old bifurcation between the autodidact and the university-trained historians has declined, with much

\textsuperscript{124} For Greg Carr, African language across time and space should be the “grounding element for Africana Studies.” See Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not: Moving From Crisis to Liberation in Africana Intellectual Work,” \textit{Socialism and Democracy} 25 (March 2011): 189. See also Chapter One, note 175.

\textsuperscript{125} Ngugi wa Thiong’o, \textit{Something Torn and New}, 35.

\textsuperscript{126} Cheikh Anta Diop, \textit{Civilization or Barbarism} (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1991), 212.

\textsuperscript{127} On “re-membering,” see Chapter One and Ngugi and wa Thiong’o, \textit{Something Torn and New}, 31-66.
more thinkers being trained in departments of history across the United States. This has resulted in interesting contemporary historiographical pursuits. However the sensibilities and energies of the elder “historians-without-portfolio” remain, and in some ways, it was their ideas and contributions which helped to develop the “Black university” concept and its subsequent iteration, the discipline of Africana Studies.

Because of the importance African people have attached to historical memory, writ large, the pioneers of Africana Studies have widely considered historical knowledge to be the core, or foundation, for the discipline. For them it was the clearest way to explain the far-reaching experiences of Africana peoples. As founding director of Africana Studies at Cornell University, James Turner asserts in his seminal “Africana Studies and Epistemology” (1980):

As a methodology, history, in Black Studies constitutes the foundation for theoretical construction of an analysis of the fundamental relationship between the political economy of societal developments and the racial divisions of labor and privilege, and the common patterns of life chances peculiar to the social conditions of Black people.

In what is an unfortunate misreading, many thinkers in the academy as well as individuals outside of it have conflated Black history with Africana Studies, and this powerful


embrace may be reason behind the confusion. The work of scholars operating within what could be considered four broad traditions within Africana history have formed the well of thought that Africana Studies has drawn from with regard to this particular body of knowledge.

_African American History_

The first approach has been linked to the thinkers that have generally followed in the lineage of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, now the Association for the Study of African American Life and History (ASALH), which has generally focused on framing the Black experience as “the missing pages” and perspectives of American history. These thinkers include such historians as Benjamin Quarles, John Hope Franklin, Darlene Clark Hine, John W. Blassingame, Mary Frances Berry, Vincent Harding, Lerone Bennett, and Robin D.G. Kelley. Their work most consistently focuses on the historical experiences of Africans in the United States. Though they may largely vary in terms of their historical angles, as well as their ideological lenses, they cohere around the investigation of the contributions, experiences, and the forces impinging upon the life-worlds of Africans in the United States over the last five hundred years.

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131. In a conceptualization of African American history that is perhaps now widely embraced, John Hope Franklin asserts: “As a relatively new field, at least only recently recognized as a respectable field of intellectual endeavor it [Afro-American history] is alive and vibrant. This is why it can easily attract and excite a large number of graduate and undergraduate students. It provides, moreover, a very important context in which much, if not the whole, of the history of the United States can be taught and studied. It also provides an important context in which much of the history of the United States can be reexamined and rewritten. In its unique position as one of the most recent areas of intellectual inquiry, it invites the attention of those who genuinely seek new avenues to solve some of the nation’s most difficult historical problems. And, if it is a valid area of intellectual inquiry, it cannot be segregated by sex, religion, or race. Historians must be judged by what they do, not by how they look.” John Hope Franklin, “On the Evolution of Scholarship in Afro-American History,” in _The State of Afro-American History_, ed. Darlene Clark Hine (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 22.
years. General historical texts that have taken this approach have largely attempted to place before the academy as well as the general public a different perspective centered upon the experiences of African Americans.

These works, which include: John Hope Franklin and Evelyn Higginbotham’s *From Slavery to Freedom* (9th ed., 2010), Robin D.G. Kelley’s and Earl Lewis’ edited *To Make Our World Anew* (2000), and Lerone Bennett’s *Before the Mayflower* (1961) offer comprehensive accounts of this experience. Works that explore different aspects include Mary Frances Berry and John W. Blassingame’s *Long Memory* (1982) and Vincent Harding’s *There is a River* (1981). *Long Memory* discusses thematic elements of the historical experience of African Americans, including chapters that investigate areas such as education, Blacks and criminal justice, and a specialized treatment of socio-economics. Harding’s text orients the discussion of African American history to a conceptualization of the resistance to racial oppression among African Americans, likening these particular events to a metaphorical river. Similar works include V.P. Franklin’s *Black Self*


134. Vincent Harding, *There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace, 1981). See also his *Beyond Chaos: Black History and the Search for the New Land* (Atlanta, GA: Institute of the Black World, 1970), where he distinguishes “Negro history” from “Black history.” The latter was more than accumulating the facts and contributions about the Negro, but to do so in order to reinterpret the entire American past and to cast new light on the project of democracy.
Determination (1984), Cedric Robinson’s Black Movements in America (1997), and Robin D.G. Kelley’s Freedom Dreams (2002).135 These works examine the historical processes that necessitated and grounded African resistance, and how in differing ways, Africans responded to these particular processes.

A large part of the histories produced during the 1970s and 80s were critical volumes that retold the stories of the African experience in slavery. These works attempted to shed light on the statistical facts regarding the era of slavery and how Africans utilized an accessible cultural tradition to both survive and resist slavery. They also endeavored to counter the dominant propositions of Black inferiority inherent in the academic work on the institutions of slavery. Studies of this nature include among others: John W. Blassingame’s The Slave Community (1972), Leslie Howard Owens’s This Species of Property (1977), Lawrence Levine’s Black Culture and Black Consciousness (1977), Eugene Genovese’s Roll, Jordan, Roll (1976), Herbert Gutman’s The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom (1976), Nathan Irvin Huggins’ Black Odyssey (1990), and two volumes authored by Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture (1987) and Going Through the Storm (1994).136 These combined

and equality via their experiences. For more on the river metaphor, see Chapter Six of this dissertation.


with more recent studies such as Michael Gomez’s *Exchanging Our Country Marks* (1998), Walter Rucker’s *The River Flows On* (2006) and Gwendolyn Midlo Hall’s *Slavery and African Ethnicities in the Americas* (2007), and others which considered the African values that informed survival, round out the ways in which historians have discussed experiences in slavery.\(^{137}\) According to Cedric Robinson, the best elements of the work in this area have importantly and against received academic opinion of the time, articulated the basic humanity of Africans, characterizing how they retained particular cultural ideas, despite their status of being enslaved.\(^{138}\)

Important work on the African American women in history also appeared as waves of feminist critique impacted the academy during the 1970s and 1980s. As evidenced in *Telling Histories* (2008), edited by Deborah Gray Write, Black women historians have been instrumental to the development of African American history and the historical interpretation of the experience of African American women. This genealogy includes such historians as Sharon Harley, Bettye Collier-Thomas, Darlene Clark Hine, Deborah Gray White, Paula Giddings, Nell Irvin Painter, and Rosalyn Terborg-Penn.\(^{139}\) Their works interrogating the role of women in the African American experience include general histories like Paula Giddings’ *When and Where I Enter* (1984),


Darlene Clark Hines’ edited *Black Women in America* (1993) and specialized studies such as Jacqueline Jones’ *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow* (1985) and Deborah Gray White’s *A’rn’t I a Woman*? (1985).  


This work adds another layer to the dynamic African American historical profession. According to

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Peniel Joseph, these works have ushered “Black Power Studies” into being, a subfield of the overarching discipline of African American history. Joseph’s works are notable for their attempts to view the 1960s era struggle, particularly the nationalist elements, as solely a means by which to achieve equality and a share of American democracy.142

Critical volumes have also been produced under the banner of African American history, and include works that consider the meaning, methodology, and mode of inquiry that should characterize the field. They include the Darlene Clark Hine edited, The State of African American History (1986) and the Thomas C. Holt and Elsa Barkley Brown edited Major Problems in African-American History (2000). The contributors to The State of Afro-American History present not only the research objectives, but also the continued mission of this generation of African American historians, which included the areas of slavery studies, emancipation studies, urban studies, and examinations into the status of the profession by assessing its relationships to the community and its relationship to the academy. The Holt and Brown volumes include primary source documents, followed by essays from historians, which are grouped to consider different aspects of the African American experience. Important is the first volume, which is on “Interpreting African-
American History,” where contributors envision the differences in perspective as it relates to the topics included in the volumes.  

Building on Earl Thorpe’s prodigious work in the understanding and developing of a historiography of African American history, writers such as August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, Wilson Jeremiah Moses, and Pero Dagbovie have contributed studies that attempt interpretations of the philosophical underpinnings of African American history. Meier and Rudwick’s *Black History and the Historical Profession* (1986) critically examines the work of Carter G. Woodson, W.E.B. Du Bois, and John Hope Franklin but also the work of white historians including Eugene Genovese, Kenneth Stamp, and Stanley Elkins. The text is centered around the “shaping of a specialty” which had occurred across the academy during and after the career of Woodson. Moses’ *Afrotopia* (1998) links the roots of African American popular history to their current manifestations in the work of Molefi Asante and other Afrocentrists in the academy. He argues that the historical work of Afrocentrists and Egyptocentrists are the indeed not novel and is framed in much the same ways that African American historians of the nineteenth century employed. Finally, Pero Dagbovie’s *African American History Reconsidered* (2010) is centered on developing a critical appraisal of the philosophy of Black history, as well its struggles for development in the academy and its future prospects. His work critically views the


144. They assert the importance of Woodson in helping to fashion this specialty. See August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *Black History and the Historical Profession*, passim.

scholarship produced since 1980 as the “golden age” of African American history, assessing the meaning of this era for future generations of African American historians.\textsuperscript{146}

*African Diasporan History*


\textsuperscript{146} Dagbovie considers the possibility of designating the decade of the 1980s as the “golden age” of Black history. This proposition is for him, strengthened by the academic legitimacy and increased production of scholarship that characterized the era. See Pero Dagbovie, *African American History Reconsidered* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 2; 203-204n1. Following Thorpe, Dagbovie’s work is also useful for its attempt to develop a sense of an African American philosophy of history culled from the thinking of such historians as Carter G. Woodson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Lawrence Reddick, and more contemporary thinkers, Darlene Clark Hine, John Hope Franklin, Vincent Harding, Lerone Bennett, Robert Harris, John Henrik Clarke, as well as Malcolm X. See Ibid, 17-47.

cultures in the U.S. South are works that trace various ethnicities throughout the diaspora. Kwasi Konadu’s *The Akan Diaspora in the Americas* (2010) and the Toyin Falola and Matt Childs edited *The Yoruba Diaspora in the Atlantic World* (2004) could give much theoretical direction to Africana Studies’ pursuit of foundations for cultural ideas and continuities.¹⁴⁸

Many of these works, though not all, give historical background on the development of the Black Atlantic and/or cohere around attempts to establish a conceptual lens to examine the nature of Black Atlantic consciousness—their common experiences as Diasporan Africans—which is thought to determine how they move culturally about the world. Others point to the saliency of African culture, which improvised to meet the demands of the New World, informed the methods of self-determination and survival. A third categorization of this work combines both ideas. The trajectory of this discussion begins with the historical works of Joseph Harris and the conceptual work of Paul Gilroy.¹⁴⁹ Later works broadened the historical coverage of diasporan history, eventually leading to the founding of The Association for the Study of

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the Worldwide African Diaspora (ASWAD), with much of these works considering the historical nexus of the Atlantic Ocean as a space to interrogate Africana. This has led to the development of a subfield, African Diaspora Studies, which is tied to the methodological proclivities of this strand of historiography, with anthropology and the humanities following close behind, as shown in Tejumola Olaniyan and James Sweet edited *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines* (2010). Kim Butler’s “Clio and the Griot,” appearing in this volume, investigates the linkages between African Diaspora studies and the discipline of history detailing the challenges and prospects of approaches within and beyond these areas. Her essay intimates that “the greatest challenges for historians will be reconciling Euro-American disciplinary traditions with the unique historical philosophies represented throughout the African diaspora.”

150

Continental African History

The third approach is based on the continent of Africa. As we showed above, John Henrik Clarke and other members of the African Heritage Studies Association lodged their dissatisfaction with the ways in which members of the African Studies Association approached these early studies. Many of those contributions were considered “colonial histories” which only mapped the progress of the African experience through the lens of European interaction with them. In other words, early continental histories were marked by the arrival of Europeans. We also discussed earlier the work of William Leo Hansberry. His *Africana at Nsukka* (1972) address lists a genealogy of African thinkers

150. Ibid, 39.
from whom Clarke and other thinkers would build upon to reconstruct African histories on African terms.\textsuperscript{151}

By the time of the birth of Africana Studies in the United States, this process was underway with the wheels set in motion by Cheikh Anta Diop and others. Perhaps the single-most important source to date that assesses the history of the continent is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) \textit{General History of Africa} in eight volumes, published from 1981 to 1993.\textsuperscript{152} Envisaged to correct ignorance of African history and promote an African perspective, the contributions to its first volume, \textit{Methodology and African Prehistory} (1981) offer some cardinal features which could begin to solve Kim Butler’s conundrum; that is, the articulation of African ways of knowing to inform new methodologies for Africana history.

Specifically the articles authored by Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Boubou Hama, Pathe Diagne, and Amadou Hampate Ba, propose to establish African ways of knowing as potential approaches to viewing and writing African history. Ki-Zerbo asserts that “African history must at least be seen from within, and not measured by the yardstick of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151.] Hansberry characterizes these individuals as “strong and independent-minded” Africans “who spent much, if not most, of their lives in efforts to keep the flickering torch of self-respect from being altogether extinguished in their less stalwart fellowmen.” These thinkers include the aforementioned, Edward Wilmot Blyden, W.E.B. Du Bois and Carter G. Woodson, but also J.C. Casely Hayford, John Sarbah, Apolo Kagwa, Samuel Johnson, Herbert Macaulay, Solomon Plaatje, J.B. Danquah, Dim Dolobson, J.A. Rogers, Jacob Egharevba, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and Mbonu Ojike. William Leo Hansberry, \textit{Africana at Nsukka} (Washington, DC: Howard University Department of History, 1972), 31.
\end{footnotes}
alien values.” Also linking these ideas to African philosophical understandings is his co-authored “The Place of History in African Society” with Hama, which establishes an African orientation of history, but also of time in general. Their work emphasizes the interconnected, yet dynamic, animism, which characterizes African historical and cultural memory. Diagne’s contribution explores the linguistic orientations to history in the African sense, showing how traditionally, language was linked to historical wisdom. Lastly, Ba examines the particular individuals in Bambara society who were responsible for transmitting this wisdom, the dielis. His “The Living Tradition” seeks to explain that in African conceptions, historical knowledge or wisdom, served as a life-force for the community.

Other scholars that have presented similar methodological approaches include the South African thinker, C. Tsheloane Keto whose The Africa Centered Perspective of History (1989) and Vision Time (2001) are works that fashion ways of interrogating the African past from African cultural bases. Keto, an important member of the Temple University Department of African American Studies, helped to place African history as an important component of the discipline of Africana Studies. The Africa Centered Perspective of History is

155. See Pathe Diagne, “History and Linguistics, in Ibid, 233-260. This discussion is similar to the works of Diop and Obenga discussed above.
156. These traditional roles include not the simple “storytelling” function as what most rendering of the traditional African griot imply. As Ba shows these thinkers were concerned with how everything was linked historically, which naturally led to their training in what the West has termed, “the sciences.” Ba demonstrates the importance of understanding the dieli’s role, by explaining that the most important class, the djeli faama, translates to “royal blood,” the life force of the community. Amadou Hampate Ba, “The Living Tradition,” in Ibid, 188.
largely predicated on the idea that scholars of African descent should declare their own non-hegemonic standpoint from which to articulate their world experiences, while *Vision and Time* takes this initial step further by declaring how this approach might look in practice.\(^{158}\)

Similarly, the contribution of the Kenyan thinker, E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo to the Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings edited *Africanizing Knowledge* (2002), advances the proposition that African thinkers should adopt a method of African philosophy of history that would render it uniquely attuned to the African experience, and as a result more relevant. Atieno-Odhiambo notes that during the colonial era, Africans were largely excluded from normative conversations about world history, despite the fact that they too were engaged in “second order reflections on the thoughts of historians about the historical process.” These Africans, engaged with the memory of “their own histories,” for Atieno-Odhiambo provide the models for the development of this autonomous philosophy of history.\(^{159}\)

Known as the quadrivium, the resident historians of the Africana nationalist movement have also generated studies of central importance to Africana Studies.\(^{160}\) The works of Yosef Ben-Jochannan (*Black Man of the Nile and His Family* [1972], *Africa: Mother of

\(^{158}\) This requires the development of a broad perspective of history that resists the universalizing impulse of European-interpreted history, but does so on African terms. See C. Tsheloane Keto, *The African Centered Perspective of History*, 1-6. This approach would yield an “alternative basis for Africa’s rebirth.” See Idem, *Vision and Time*, 120.


Western Civilization [1971]), Chancellor Williams (The Destruction of African Civilization [1974]), John G. Jackson (Introduction to African Civilizations), and John Henrik Clarke (Africans at the Crossroads [1991], New Dimensions in African History [1991, with Ben-Jochannan), Africans In World History [1993]), have together introduced the need for African history to date back to ancient African past.161 Their work helped to marshal a new era for African history and its relationship to Africana Studies. Though premised on the work of the early forerunners discussed above, the work of these thinkers was characterized by an extended examination of classical Africa that linked both theoretically and practically the development of world African consciousness of the past.162 Much of their insight, along with prodigious work of Diop, has allowed for the development of general African histories grounded in ancient Africa. These works have generally been approached along normative historiographical lines and include the collective works of Basil Davidson such as African in History (1996) and The African Genius (1969), Vincent Khapoya’s The African Experience (1998), Kevin Shillington’s History of Africa


162. The best critical work on Williams, Jackson, Clarke, and Ben-Jochannan’s historical philosophies continues to be Greg Carr’s dissertation. He links them to a genealogy of African thinkers that worked to develop a real link between historical consciousness and African identity. See Greg E. Kimathi Carr, “African Philosophy of History in the Contemporary Era, 402-412.
(1989), Toyin Falola’s five-volume *Africa* (2000-2003) and Molefi Asante’s *The History of Africa* (2007).\(^{163}\)

**African World History**

African world history is the fourth and last area. It combines aspects of the three preceding approaches, and has been the preserve of thinkers associated with The Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations’ (ASCAC) African World History Project, in development over the past thirty years. Its first volume, *The Preliminary Challenge* was released in 1997. In this volume, the work to develop an African world history was predicated on the fundamental difference between African historiographical traditions and those which would emerge amid the legacies of the Western disciplinary practice of history. Anderson Thompson’s “The Development of an Afrikan Historiography,” first published in 1975, coupled with the continued production of Cheikh Anta Diop and the preliminary work surrounding the UNESCO *General History of Africa* were the springboards to these conversations.\(^{164}\) Thompson’s work both represented and defined the fundamental split between African-descended thinkers concerned with

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the study of the past. Similar to Harold Cruse’ delineation of the two strands of African thought in some ways, yet distinct in others, Thompson’s work opened the door to an African interpretation of the past unfettered by European philosophical framings.\textsuperscript{165} Thompson’s explanation of Sambo/Negro historiography and its epistemological foundation in a European historiography, characterized by the framing of events within the interests of European world domination, delineates the position of the African historiographers as distinct from Western historiography.\textsuperscript{166}

For Thompson and the Chicago school, which included Jacob H. Carruthers, Harold Pates, and others, the UNESCO \textit{General History of Africa}, though an important step, lacked the proper interpretive lens necessary for a useful understanding of the past, as it corresponded to normative historiography. This was made clear in Jacob Carruthers’ “Memorandum on an African World History Project” delivered in January of 1982.\textsuperscript{167} In this short memorandum, Carruthers echoes the work of the Chicago school, as well as the new guard of African-centered historians, by further uncovering the intellectual commitments of European historiography. For Carruthers, perhaps the most important

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{165}. Harold Cruse’s infamous \textit{The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual} delineates thinkers as belonging to ideological camps ranging from nationalist to integrationist, the former being “the rejected strain” following Theodore Draper’s description. See Harold Cruse, \textit{The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual} (New York: Morrow, 1967), 4. Jacob Carruthers has also employed this in his \textit{Intellectual Warfare}, passim.

\textsuperscript{166}. African native elites play an important role in the development of Sambo/Negro historiography as their work is often subsumed under European (world) history and is promoted as the official narrative: “Thus, in the absence of an African viewpoint vis-à-vis white supremacy, Black History has been a compilation of the old, white contrived formula of written dialogue, with an unseen white authority debating the question of Negro inferiority with the black historian and question the Negro’s fitness for admission into Western Civilization. Such excuses and sympathies have led to the creation and perpetuation of the black experience in America as a series of “white and black together” slave narratives and chronicles palmed off as Black History.” Anderson Thompson, “Developing an African Historiography,” 23.

\end{flushleft}
member of the intellectual genealogy of European historiography was Ibn Khaldun.\textsuperscript{168} It was the work of Khaldun that catalyzed what Carruthers terms, “nomad historiography,” an important (defining) characteristic of European historical logic. This methodological approach to historiography understood the rise and fall of civilizations as the result of power struggles between dominant, warring (nomadic) societies versus peaceful, complacent (sedentary) societies. Though they preceded Khaldun, Carruthers briefly shows the prevalence of similar ways of understanding the past in the works of the fathers of Western historical inquiry, Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius, and those which followed Khaldun, the works of John Gibbon and Montesquieu.\textsuperscript{169}

While Thompson’s essay and Carruthers’ memo are essential methodological reflections on African world history, an indispensible component of the ASCAC approach is “Appendix 1: Inaugural Meeting of the African World History Project” also published in \textit{The Preliminary Challenge}. Here, a group of thinkers associated with ASCAC, which also included Theophile Obenga, the aforementioned philosopher, meeting in 1996, decided that in order to meet the dictates of an African-centered view of world

\textsuperscript{168} Ibn Khaldun was an Arabic thinker writing in the fourteenth century. As Carruthers shows, he is not generally credited with provided the frame for historical thinking adopted by the Enlightenment historians and intellectuals. He states: “European historiography, which has of course been incorporated into the framework of Egyptology as well as African and world history generally is largely based upon the ideas of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth century Arab historian, who is given little credit by his European benefactors.” Ibid, 357.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. According to William McNeill, the Enlightenment historians, which include Gibbon, Montesquieu, as well as Vico, Voltaire, and Herder developed understandings of world history first through their understandings of Christian providential imaginings, before importing into the Christian narrative the importance of human will and actions. He continues showing how this idea was translated into the national legends, specifically in America, of freedom, which effectively replaced the notion of the divine in post-Enlightenment historiography. Stated differently, historical actors were acting toward the will of a notion of collective freedom. This, as Cedric Robinson, among others, has shown had at its antithesis a Eurocentric vision of anti-freedom, or the subjugation of the other. The Western practice of history was approached upon these terms. See William McNeill, “The Changing Shape of World History,” \textit{History and Theory} 34 (May 1995): 11. For Robinson’s discussion see Cedric J. Robinson, \textit{Black Marxism}, 186-187.
history, that these central concepts had to be clarified: 1) time and space; 2) a new philosophy of history; 3) the importance of language; and 4) intellectual genealogy.\textsuperscript{170} The continued work of the African World History Project will be premised on these ideas.

Kwasi Konadu’s recent \textit{Reading the World} (2010) is premised on the absence of African voices in the subfield of world history. In this work, Konadu attempts to fill the void, by relying on the dominant approaches to world history but from an African perspective.\textsuperscript{171} Konadu implies that part of the development of these narratives should be

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\item[\textsuperscript{170}] See Greg Kimathi Carr and Valethia Watkins, “Appendix 1: Inaugural Meeting of the African World History Project,” 329-341. Regarding time and space, Thompson consistently called for an African world history that challenged the conventions of time and space, as these ideas often removed Africans from their foundational memories. The project sought to answer to what extent an African world history could be rendered utilizing the time and space conventions of classical African culture? Carruthers forcefully suggested the adoption of a “philosophy of history” tied to African ways of knowing. The key, operational concept was the \textit{wım msw}, which simultaneously oriented African historical thought to a concept of reclamation and rebirth while importing a useful methodological standard (culled from Kemetic deep thought) to the discussion. Along with Carruthers, Theophile Obenga challenged the committee to go beyond normative historiographical practices by framing African world history on African philosophical terms, the latter having living roots in the collective memories of African people. Linked to the preceding ideas of time and space and philosophy of history was the need to develop approaches to understanding and applying African languages to the discussion of African world history. For this group, the study of language was also key to clarifying conceptual issues at the heart of the study of African world history and Kemetic studies in particular. Lastly, the committee members asserted the importance of understanding the genealogy of thinkers of African descent who had preceded them in similar efforts. Part of the work of the group was to develop an African Library series along these lines. The extent to which foundationalist thought preceded the current generation in the development of African historiography was to be measured and extended in the creation of an African world history.
\item[\textsuperscript{171}] Konadu’s rationale: “Scholars of African birth or descent are acutely absent in the writing of and debates concerning world history (though international and comparative perspectives existed among diasporic African thinkers for at least two centuries), inept in answering the foregoing questions, and invisible in the production of worldly historical knowledge in print or otherwise. Yet, their predicament is instructive. Once known as the continent without history or historical consciousness, Africa and its intellectuals represent a much larger segment of the marginalized (intellectual) world; far too few substantive histories on themselves have been written in a world they have existed longer than most humans. In fact, the African Network in Global History, founded in 2009 at the University of Ilorin (Nigeria), is the clearest evidence of African scholars’ tardy entry into a world history discourse, as well as support for studies in world history that address Africa and the world as seen from African perspectives. We can only begin to answer the above questions when the former peoples and places without history rewrite world history and, by doing so, envision that history as a series of unfinished conversations. Certainly, the world should constitute and make a “world history” driven by perspectives on the world rather than a Eurasian worldview.
\end{itemize}
read as cultural histories, and therefore the subtitle of the work “an African perspective” is operationalized as a history written “from a child of the first peoples on this planet.”172 From this limited methodological consideration, it seems that what makes this world history “African” is simply African authorship. Konadu’s lack of coherent explanation of the implications of African cultural knowledge’s insertion into the production of world historical knowledge is a severe limitation of this discussion. It seems that Konadu’s text combines methodologies that Patrick O’Brien terms, “the connexions” and the “the comparisons” approaches as he examines the history of the world.173 Konadu’s work and the ASCAC African World History Project’s approaches to world history represent the differences in insurgency and reimagination that we have been discussing throughout Part II of this dissertation.

With the vast amount of literatures being producing under the rubric of history and with the conception of a still vibrant and assumed connection to this discipline as a body of knowledge in Africana Studies, the theoretical and methodological ideas as well as the breadth and scope of these four areas of Africana history should be understood. The work done in this area over the past forty years should be appropriately linked to Africana Studies by examining its intellectual commitments and conceptualizing how their approaches to knowledge may fulfill the discipline’s objectives of using history as “a


172. Ibid, 11.

clock that (African) people use to tell their political time of day” and as a “compass that
(African) people use to find themselves on the map of human geography” as well as to
“allow the ancestors to speak.”174 For human survival relies on memory.

d. The Black Social Sciences

The foundations of social science inquiry established by African thinkers in the
early half of the twentieth century firmly established the springboard from which the full
evocation of what may be termed the “Black social sciences” would emerge in the early
1970s. African American thinkers developed from these disciplinary areas, the conceptual
tools from which to understand the societal forces affecting both Africans in America and
throughout the world. Much like the three areas discussed above, intellectual work by
African thinkers in sociology, economics, political science, anthropology, and psychology
had to be filtered through an African/Black perspective, and in some cases completely
reoriented to fulfill the mandates required by the realities and truths of the African
experience.

As Ronald W. Walters, a pioneer of Black politics, asserted in his “Toward A
Definition of Black Social Science” (1973), even in their embryonic iterations Black social
scientists had successfully shown that “Black life has been distinctive and separate enough
to constitute its own uniqueness, and it is on the basis of that uniqueness that the ideology
and the methodology of Black social science rests.”175 The works to be discussed below
were attempts to go beyond the strictures of the West by crafting this “ideology and

174. The former quote is a well-known saying from John Henrik Clarke. See his African People in World
History, 11. The latter quote is a defining approach to historical knowledge exemplified by the
Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations.
175. Ronald W. Walters, “Toward A Definition of a Black Social Science,” in The Death of White
methodology,” utilizing what Walters called a “Black framework for their analyses.”176 The stark reality, however, was that the academic disciplines in which they were trained were based on the genealogies of knowledge formulated in the crafting of Europe, and as such were implicitly “the sum of white experiences” which for Walters “does not add up to Black “fact” or reality.”177 Walters in this essay had not only helped to set out the agenda for the Black social sciences, he showed its challenges, which included grappling with the pervasive and majoritarian influence of White or Western social science—without question challenges that still exist.

Sociology

The earliest and most consistent activity among Black thinkers, as has been shown in the previous chapter, was in the discipline of sociology. By the late 1960s and 1970s, African American sociological works had blossomed into more radical critiques of society, ranging from the reconceptualization of the Black family amid the 1965 Moynihan report to the development of new approaches to studies of urban society. Thinkers which included among others, Nathan Hare, Robert Staples, Abdul Alkalimat, Joyce Ladner, Andrew Billingsley, and Vivian V. Gordon developed studies, monographs, and critical works which advanced the idea of a Black approach to studies of society. The seminal Joyce Ladner edited The Death of White Sociology (1973) provides an in-depth sampling of the theoretical and methodological positions of these and other thinkers. Ladner’s introduction provided the rationale for the development of the field of Black sociology, which she views as necessitated by the need to move beyond biases in liberal ideology and

176. Ibid, 193.
177. Ibid, 191. See Chapter Three on the development of the social sciences in Europe.
to develop more useful theories to affect the lives of African Americans.\(^{178}\) Nathan Hare’s “The Challenge of a Black Scholar” continues by detailing the fallacies of objective or value-free science, the foundation of mainstream sociology.\(^{179}\) Other contributions, including the aforementioned Ronald W. Walter’s “Toward the Definition of Black Social Science,” and those from James Turner, Abdul Alkalimat, Robert Staples, and Dennis Forsythe were consistent in their declaration of space free of white norms to engage the experiences of African Americans and their attempts to establish foundations for doing so.\(^{180}\)

Other important works during the 1970s were Robert Staples’ introductory *Introduction to Black Sociology* (1972) and Abdul Alkalimat's aforementioned sociological-oriented *Introduction to Afro-American Studies*. Staples is largely concerned with the development of a sociology that is predicated on articulating an approach to the study of Black life that is cognizant of the lived reality of African American people.\(^{181}\) Among the institutions which had become central to Black sociologists during this period, was the Black family. Seminal works here challenged the idea of the inferiority of the family and moreover castigated the larger social structure for their role in its status. These works included: Andrew Billingsley’s *Black Families in White America* (1968) and *Climbing Jacob’s\(^{178}\)

\(\text{She lists the two reasons for the evolvement of the field, as: “1) a reaction, and revolt against, the biases of ‘mainstream’ bourgeois, liberal sociology; and 2) as a positive step toward setting forth basic definitions, concepts, and theory-building that utilize the experiences and histories of Afro-Americans.” See Joyce Ladner, “Introduction” in Ibid, xix-xx.}\(^{179}\)

\(\text{See Nathan Hare, “The Challenge of a Black Scholar,” in Ibid, 73.}\(^{180}\)

\(\text{See their contributions in “Part III: Black Sociology: Toward a Definition of Theory” of Ibid, 161-252.}\(^{181}\)

\(\text{Robert Staples, *Introduction to Black Sociology* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976). Staples establishes the foundations for these ideas in his essay in *The Death of White Sociology*. Here he suggests that because white sociology had been linked to and/or justified the oppressive conditions of Black Americans, that a new approach grounded must be linked to and/or justify the institutions that have sustained Black life. See his “What is Black Sociology?: Toward a Sociology of Black Liberation,” 161-172.}\)

As mentioned above, Alkalimat’s text considers the sociological perspective to be central to a holistic understanding of the African American experience, which coupled with other disciplines, forms the corpus of Afro-American Studies. Maurice Jackson’s “Toward a Sociology of Black Studies” (1970) similarly views the discipline of sociology as a key contributor to Black Studies’ curricular and theoretical development. Jackson argues in this essay that Black identity is understood in “social and not racial terms,” and thereby, sociological approaches Black Studies would offer the best way to explore Black Studies’ “basic orientation.”

Other edited volumes such as the aforementioned James Blackwell and Morris Janowitz edited *Black Sociologists: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives* (1974) include articles that link contemporary sociological conversations to Black Studies. These combined with recent works such as Bruce Hare’s *2001 Race Odyssey* (2002) and Delores Aldridge’s *Imagine A World* (2009), provide important contemporary discussions to the distinct theoretical assumptions of Black sociology, as had been outlined by the earlier

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thinkers. Hare’s volume brings together the sociological perspectives of Africans from the United States, the Caribbean, and the continent of Africa, while Aldridge examines the lives of African American woman sociological pioneers.186

Further, African continental sociology has been theorized by the South African thinker, Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane who views much of the work done under this guise as a conceptual tool of Western hegemony. Likening African sociology to ethnocentric social anthropology, Magubane in his “Crisis in African Sociology” (1999) problematizes the de-emphasis of the effects of the colonial project on African society.187

Finally, regarding Caribbean sociology, Paget Henry’s contribution to the aforementioned *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines* (2010), shows the problems inherent in delinking Caribbean sociological thought from the more expansive Caribbean intellectual tradition, the former being a process of the academic training grounds of many of the thinkers, and the latter as an Africana response to the challenges of colonialism.188

Will the new crop of African thinkers in sociology embrace the challenges set forth by these thinkers? Or will they simply repackage Western sociological theory to the study of African-based communities? The extent to which contemporary work in this area of knowledge has followed Walters’ edict by employing new forms of analysis to the

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understanding and eradication of asymmetrical relationships between Africans and the social structures governing their lives, will be the extent to which they should be embraced by Africana Studies. Clearly, however, the pioneer work that started at the turn of the twentieth century and was recharged in the Black social sciences explosion helped to offer a new conceptualization of the subjectivity of normative sociological inquiry.

**Economics**

Martin Ijeri’s 1972 article, “Wither Economics in a Black Studies Program?” showed a grave concern regarding the lack of economic analyses within the newly erected discipline. His article examines the possible research areas within economics he considers important to examine within studies of Black social experiences: 1) Black contributions in American economic history; 2) economics of the ghetto; 3) problems of human capital formation; and 4) economic problems of the Third World. In Ijeri’s work and others, the approach to economics was rooted in an attempt to explain the forces impinging on Black survival, not merely as an academic foundation to support and mimic American capitalism. As the aforementioned Ronald Walters essay details, many of the earlier thinkers surrounding political economy, thinkers like Earl Ofari and James Boggs, were radical leftists who viewed capitalism as systemically irreconcilable with collective Black progress. As many Blacks embraced the left, their approaches to economics would have

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189. Of these four, Ijeri devotes the most attention to the first two, considering the contributions to economic theory of W.E.B. Du Bois (and the practices of a range of Black businessman and inventors) as well as the uniqueness of the Black ghetto, as key components of study with regard Black social life. See Martin Ijeri, “Whither Economics in a Black Studies Program?” *Journal of Black Studies* 3 (December 1972): 150.

been markedly different from thinkers trained in economics, for as Dorothy Ross has revealed, the discipline of economics was built around the assumed continuity of capitalism.191

This may explain the more recent status of economics as a body of knowledge in the discipline. Works like Julianne Malveaux’s “Why Is Economic Content Missing From African American Studies?” (2008) query the discipline as to its neglect of the discipline and its policy implications for African Americans. Interestingly, this essay does not address the persistence of the radical left critique of political economy that formed around Black Studies departments and 1960s social movements.192 Added to these have been chapters devoted to the discussion of economics in both Maulana Karenga’s Introduction to Black Studies and Talmadge Anderson and James Stewart’s Introduction to African American Studies.193

Important also to a conception of a Black economics has been the work of the Black Economic Research Center and the journal, The Review of Black Political Economy. Co-founded by Robert S. Browne in October 1969, this think tank sought to increase

Black economic development in the form of banking and philanthropy as well as a key initiative of advocating land ownership, an area which Browne and others studied extensively.\(^{194}\) In addition, during this period there were attempts to develop a culturally grounded framework for Black economics. The African American economist, Vernon J. Dixon’s “The Di-Unital Approach to ‘Black Economics’” (1970) and “African-Oriented and Euro-American Oriented Worldviews: Research Methodologies and Economics” (1977) are two important attempts. The former suggests that we value the uniqueness of African cultural foundations and from this basis that there should be “as many economics as there are cultures,” while the latter suggests that worldviews frame research methodologies and maps out some of the differences between the African and European conceptions of reality.\(^{195}\)

Finally, important insights as to the Black perspective in economics can be gleaned from Thomas Boston’s edited two-volume edited, *A Different Vision* (1997). This text includes essays chronicling the development of African American economic thought. Contributions to Volume I introduces the concept of Black economic thought and traces it throughout history via the personalities of Sadie Alexander, Booker T. Washington, as well as the aforementioned Oliver C. Cox and Abram Harris, discussed in Chapter Six.


The second volume include essays and studies that delve into contemporary examinations of political economy in African American urban settings, historical economic events, and the relationship between African and African American economic development throughout the world.196

Should an Africana Studies discussion regarding the disciplinary practice of economics seek to reify capitalist (or socialist) logic? This seems to be the deep conundrum facing thinkers tied to both the Black radical tradition and the academy. The development of appropriate ways of rendering African relationships to the modern world system may in fact lie outside the disciplinary strictures of economics. The development of a methodology for understanding that relationship which provides both useful and appropriate insights still seems to be on the horizon, but it is also true that the precursors discussed here may have correctly articulated the terms.

Political Science

The development of critical analyses of the American as well as the global political system characterized the early development of Black political science among thinkers in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Central to this mode of reasoning was an alternative methodology centered on African American experiences as they engaged the larger political system (not simply the electoral). According to Adolph Reed, Jr., thinkers associated with this theoretical turn were largely produced by the departments of

political science at Howard University and Atlanta University, under Ronald W. Walters and Mack Jones, respectively.¹⁹⁷

At its onset, Black politics challenged the dominant behavioralist analysis strains of thought within American political science, which intended to predict and model how groups and individuals would assert their interests, and often contribute to policies and strategies based on such predictions. Three important articles that were critical to this conceptualization were authored by Mack H. Jones, who would help to found the National Conference of Black Political Sciences (NCOBPS) in 1969. His “Scientific Method, Value Judgments, and the Black Predicament in the U.S.” (1976) proposed the understanding of Black political situations through the development of qualitative distinctions based on empirical truth and concept formation. In this article, Jones laments the simple dichotomy at work between those who view science as “value-less” and those who outright eschew scientism, stating that it is the oppressed that suffers the most from this false choice.¹⁹⁸ For Jones, it was only through a rigorous process of developing the concepts which ground Black political life and approaches that the aims of the field would be best served.¹⁹⁹ His earlier, “A Frame of Reference for Black Politics” (1972) and his


¹⁹⁸. He continues: “Social scientists if they are to be creative must be immersed in social problem situations, but their contributions as social scientists should be measured in terms of their ability to clarify social reality so that the masses and their leaders can make more intelligent choices among competing alternatives. We would begin by examining the description of reality upon which a particular group bases its analysis. Once that description is examined thoroughly and broken down into relevant propositional statements, the validity of these propositions can be determined by applying them to the empirical reality with which they purport to deal.” Mack Jones, “Scientific Method, Value Judgments and the Black Predicament in the U.S.,” Review of Black Political Economy 7 (Fall 1976): 16-17

1992 essay, “Political Science and the Black Political Experience: Issues in Epistemology and Relevance,” tackle many of the same issues asserting that the ground under which examinations of Black political behavior were not “objective” grounds but were informed by particular experiences.200

Important to Walters, Jones, and other Black political scientists such as Hanes Walton, Matthew Holden, Shelby Lewis, Robert C. Smith, and Georgia Anne Persons was the development of a methodology of Black politics that was scientifically grounded in the truths of the Black political experience, but as understood by the group themselves. Many of these perspectives can be found in the voluminous bodies of literature produced by the NCOBPS. The volumes of *The National Political Science Review* have attempted to accomplish some of what Jones, and others, have envisaged as the proper lens from which to view Black politics.201


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examinations of the positions of Black political science. These texts view Black political theory as operational areas of examination of the role of American political systems in the lives of Blacks, as opposed to simple de-contextualized examinations of Black behaviorism. Yet, the quest for clear conceptual developments of what Mack Jones called for in the beginning (i.e. work that establishes “alternative interpretations of reality”) continues.


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203. Mack Jones quoted in Robert C. Smith, “The Epistemological Quest of Mack Jones,” 247. This conversation, as Jones asserts had waned by 1990, but he states that it must be revisited.

The work of Black politics has succeeded in articulating the necessary and alternative forms of analysis that have grounded African political experiences. However, what must continue to be linked to these discussions is a robust reading of the ways in which African people throughout the world have engaged the idea of the state itself. As shown in Chapter Four, political science relies and was founded upon the normative assumptions that inform the character and behavior of the nation-state. As such, the objective of Africana Studies and part of rethinking and employing a Black perspective to this phenomenon of politics, necessarily involves tracing the ways in which these assumptions have been embodied in political studies affecting Blacks. This is nothing less than the agenda Jacob Carruthers articulates for Black political scientists in his *Intellectual Warfare* (1999). For Africana Studies, there must be engagement that goes beyond the important, if not essential, studies that understand the processes of achieving and applying power as lodged in Western nation-state apparatuses. What remains, however, is the work of reimagining and/or re-linking ourselves to new forms of governance, based on the historical re-embrace of the “wisdom of African governance,” especially in African-controlled states.\(^{205}\)

\[\textit{Anthropology}\]

The development of an “Afro-American” anthropology subfield also garnered interest during the era of the institutionalization of Black Studies. Key contributors such as Sidney W. Mintz, Richard Price, among others contributed ethnographic studies of Africans across the Caribbean. However, it was the influence of St. Clair Drake whose earlier work, *Black Metropolis* (1945), co-authored with Horace Cayton established a model for what can be termed, “nativist anthropology” among Black thinkers. In his “Anthropology and the Black Experience” (1980), he states that the small but important uptick in interest in anthropology among Blacks can be linked in part to the development of nationalist politics aimed at “cultivating values that have arised out of the black experience” which encouraged “the study of black communities and institutions of black themselves.”

Drake also points out that this interest was not reduced to viewing these communities as “laboratories,” an important distinction that could also be made regarding the other Black social sciences. Also important to the work of Black anthropologists, according to Drake was the “reopening” of critical issues surrounding racial inferiority, though thinly veiled during this era.

Considered important to the development of this perspective were the edited works of Norman E. Whitten, Jr. and John F. Szwed edited *Afro-American Anthropology: Contemporary Perspectives* (1970) and Charles A. Valentine’s *Black Studies and Anthropology* (1972). In the foreword to *Afro-American Anthropology*, Sidney W. Mintz asserts that anthropological investigation on Black life is, and should be, grounded in cultural understandings as

207. Ibid.
208. Ibid, 28.
opposed to race-based ideas.\textsuperscript{209} For Valentine, the new approaches to the Black social sciences offered insights and ways for linking political work to academic work. He argues for a convergence of Black Studies and anthropology premised on the “participant” methodology of fieldwork.\textsuperscript{210}

The pioneering work of Drake has been continued with the Association of Black Anthropologists, originally a caucus of the American Anthropological Association, founded in the early 1970s. A crucial addition to the literature on Black anthropology is the Faye Harrison edited Decolonizing Anthropology (1991). In this text, Harrison and other contributors explore the dynamics of race-based anthropological discussions, arguing for the need to construct a methodology based on non-Western epistemologies, ultimately a liberatory approach to the discipline.\textsuperscript{211} According to the work of Black anthropologist, Lee D. Baker, it was the normative constructions of anthropology that in many ways codified racial distinctions and designations of the “other.” His From Savage to Negro (1998) chronicles these developments in studies of the African.\textsuperscript{212}

The impetus that led to ideological orientations of Faye Harrison and other Black anthropologists lay in the political use of the discipline throughout history. Scholars have well documented the links between anthropology, area studies, and their employment in colonial domination on the continent of Africa. Both of these areas were envisaged as


\textsuperscript{210}. See Charles Valentine, Black Studies and Anthropology: Scholarly and Political Interests in Afro-American Culture (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1972), 37-44.


gathering data about the indigenous systems of thought in Africa, which was premised on the development of colonial policy.\textsuperscript{213} Kwesi Otabil’s \textit{The Agonistic Imperative} (1994) distinguishes Black Studies from the area studies discipline, African Studies on similar lines.\textsuperscript{214}

Most of what can be rightly viewed as Black anthropology has focused on both Africa and the Caribbean, uncovering the processes of cultural and political phenomena in these locations, without the added baggage of linking this knowledge to colonial and imperial ambitions. While anthropological research’s late entry into the conceptual areas of Africana Studies may in fact be a consequence of its colonial uses, it recently has become more widely viewed as a body of knowledge in the discipline. In addition to the important information surfacing from history and the other social sciences, Africana Studies would do well to add to its corpus the insights about maroonage from such anthropologists as Richard and Sally Price and the archaeological field work being done across the African world, as these ideas, concepts, and materials, rely and are premised on understanding the ways in which African ideas and institutions can serve as intellectual

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\textsuperscript{213} See Mario Azevedo, “African Studies and the State of the Art,” in \textit{Africana Studies: A Survey of Africa and the African Diaspora} (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), 11-12. Lyn Schumaker’s \textit{Africanizing Anthropology} is an attempt to challenge normative representations of anthropology as the handmaiden of colonialism. This challenge is premised on the idea that African research aides and White researchers are denied agency in these formulations. According to her proposition, specific examples do not always reveal the colonial-subject relationship in anthropological investigations, notwithstanding the overarching theme. The work nonetheless privileges Western structuring of knowledge. See Lyn Schumaker, \textit{Africanizing Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa} (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 7-11.
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\textsuperscript{214} He states: “‘African Studies’, I maintain, so as to underscore its incongruence with Black Studies. Both in motivations and objectives, the two are antipodal. African Studies, along with Africanism, is largely a Euro-American creation, a neo-tarzanist caricature made to the measure of professed academic tolerance. “Black Studies: on the other hand, challenges the caricature.” Kwesi Otabil, \textit{The Agonistic Imperative: The Rational Burden of African Centeredness} (Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, 1994), 3.
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points of departure. In addition, as Cheryl Rodríguez asserts, many trained Africans in anthropology share the activist orientation, which Valentine earlier viewed as essential to Africana Studies.

**Psychology**

The development of a Black/African-Centered perspective within psychology has been perhaps one of the more productive outcomes of the Black social sciences. African-centered psychological ideas have congealed around the understanding of the uniqueness of the deep structure of African culture, the ramifications and prevalence of racism in both society and scholarship, and the linkages between accurate psychological appraisals and changes in educational systems and social structures. With the development of the Association of Black Psychologists in the late 1960s, these thinkers have consistently challenged Western approaches to the study of the mind and human behavior.

The seminal sources for the development and application of Black psychology has been the volume edited by Reginald Jones, *Black Psychology* (1970), now in its fourth

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215. See Richard Price and Sally Price, *The Roots of Roots; or, How Afro-American Anthropology Got Its Start* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003) and *Maroon Arts: Cultural Vitality in the African Diaspora* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999). On archaeology, see Theresa Singleton, “African Diaspora and Archaeology,” in *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines*, eds. Tejumola Olaniyan and James H. Sweet, 119-141. Archaeology will increasingly become an important are of study as deposits of African material culture can be paired with work done in Africana Studies that re-links the deep thought of African people across time and space. As such, the Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations has been associated with a number of trained archaeologists. In addition, the Society of Black Archaeologists has emerged to do similar work within the context of Africana Studies. See Justin Dunnavant, Blair Starnes, Ayana Flewellen, and Paula Sanders, “Our Things Remembered: Unearthing Relations Between Archaeology and Black Studies,” (Panel presentation at Annual Meeting of the National Council of Black Studies, Atlanta, GA, March 10, 2012).

edition, and the journal of the Association of Black Psychologists, *The Journal of Black Psychology*. Following some of the key pioneers of Black psychology, Joseph White’s seminal 1970 essay, “Toward a Black Psychology,” states the rationale for the development of Black psychology during the era of the development of Black social sciences, which for him is based on the inadequacies of white psychology. Key contributions to the volume have been works centered on the understanding of African culture and its links to African Americans. These include contributions from Wade Nobles, Daudi Ajani ya Azibo, Na’im Akbar, Kobi Kambon, Cheryl Tawede Grills, and Linda James Myers.


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work places before psychologists the implication that “rhythms” of African philosophy inform much of African American behavior, a contention that links him to many Black Studies theorists of the era. Kambon in his *Africa/Black Psychology in the American Context* (1992) shows as well that these cultural worldviews are central to understanding the psychology of African Americans. The contributions of Linda James Myers, whose optimal theory is premised on understanding cultural contexts in Africana communities and Na’im Akbar, Daudi Ajani ya Azibo, and Cheryl Tawede Grills whose works are also predicated on African foundations, extend many of these ideas which have characterized Black psychology. This work builds upon the seminal, “Voodoo or IQ” (1975), authored by Cedric X. (Clark), Wade Nobles, M. Phillip McGee, and Luther Weems (Akbar), which was based upon the presumption that an African psychology must be based upon African deep thought. The work premised on developing an African psychology was inspired by the work of Cheikh Anta Diop and what many have named his “two cradle theory” as well as other thinkers like Schwaller de Lubicz and his work,


In his work on uncovering the genealogy of the use of African worldview concepts and frameworks in the Black social sciences, Karanja Keita Carroll shows that perhaps most consistently, it was this group of psychologists embodied that particular lineage.224

Other key contributions, no less approached via these foundations, revolve around race in Western society and the applications of psychological studies to practical areas such as African and African American education. The works of Camara Jules P. Harrell, Asa G. Hilliard, Bobby Wright, and Amos Wilson, all influential in Africana Studies, fit here.225 Part V of Jones’ *Black Psychology* includes contributions that theorize how applications of these ideas can best serve different areas of Black life. It also includes the attempts to develop the paradigmatic language necessary for the standardization of Black psychology.226 Lastly Dereef Jamison’s “Through the Prism of Black Psychology,” (2008)

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is an article that presents Black psychological methodologies as possible influences on the continued development of Africana Studies. 227

Insofar as these psychologists are in fact able to tap into the ways in which Africans perceive and act upon reality in their original African foundations as well as despite the dismemberment of racism and colonialism, their work would generate usable data for Africana Studies, and the larger objectives underlying this scholarly praxis. In either case, the clear intent is to move beyond the structures and ideas guiding Western psychology, particularly those clinical practices (i.e. psychiatry, IQ testing) which have led to both physical and mental damages among Africans throughout the world.

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The Black social sciences as they developed in the 1970s and 1980s provided the conceptual tools for excavating scientific knowledge of Black social reality, married to both a Black perspective and praxis. Not only did the research in these areas occur within interdisciplinary Black Studies formations, they would develop into interdisciplinary areas including but not limited to, gender studies, theology, education, and legal studies. However, the successes of developing the types of methodologies with which we began have varied. The “Black framework of analysis” as articulated by Walters has only been partially applied. As such, the relationship to Africana Studies among scholars trained in the Black social sciences has suffered. In fact, today, many scholars who may have been trained, inspired, or influenced by the early Black social scientists (of whom many were

Black Studies pioneers), remain within traditional Western social scientific departments and have not contributed to the fashioning of a distinct, disciplinary approach to Africana Studies. What explains this phenomenon? Are the commitments that grounded the impulse to articulate this Black framework of analysis still present? If so, is this the end goal? Clearly, these and other questions will determine the future relationships between the Black social sciences (if such a term is even still appropriate) and the trajectory of an autonomous disciplinary Africana Studies.

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If nothing else, the progression of work in philosophy, studies of cultural-meaning making, history, and the Black social sciences has provided what Nathaniel Norment calls “bodies of knowledge” which should serve as point of departure for assembling the content base for the discipline. This mass of content produced by thinkers who have struggled in white-oriented departments and disciplines over the past fifty years must now be emptied into a new (or improvised) way of approaching knowledge, or disciplinary Africana Studies.

Works like the aforementioned edited collection of Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings, *Africanizing Knowledge*, as well as Robert Bates and V.Y. Mudimbe, and Jean F. O’Barr’s *Africa and the Disciplines* (1992), and Tejumola Olaniyan and James H. Sweet’s *The African Diaspora and the Disciplines* (2010) all revolve around the challenges poised by Western disciplines of knowledge regarding Africana content. These problems or challenges are indeed rooted in their specific emergence in university contexts as

discussed in Part I. In other words, academic disciplines, were not designed, never intended, and arguably inherently unable to properly account for the perspective and worldview-generated approaches of the “the other.” Indeed, as Greg Carr asserts, “besides Black Studies, every other discipline in the academy is White Studies, and sometimes Black Studies is too.” Stated another way, the framing of what we now call disciplinary identities, theories, methodologies, and traditions are founded upon and innately tied to Western intellectual genealogies.

Despite this, the insurgent work done in these disciplines show that important work can still emerge from its bowels, while also showing its ever-present limitations. Africana Studies, as a discipline, or a meta-discipline, if you will, is premised upon erecting a new edifice, an alternative entity. Drawing from the energies of the tradition which informed the insurgent work by African thinkers in the disciplines, Africana Studies, by the 1980s was in search of a unitary theoretical and methodological approach from which to train scholars, which combined all areas of the Africana experience, reimagining it from the foundation of the rhythms of African deep thought.

III. Toward Disciplinary Africana Studies

Disciplinary Africana Studies is the attempt to move Africa from mere “wish” to “reality,” from “projection” to “distillation,” and from “fiction” to “memory,” a la Wole Soyinka in the epigraph above. It seeks to render it part of the conceptual foundation of a truly autonomous intellectual practice. In 1975, Chief Fela Sowande, the Nigerian

musician and scholar of ethnomusicology, authored a little-known contribution to Kent State University’s African American Affairs Monograph Series, entitled *The Africanization of Black Studies*. With this publication, Sowande introduced this idea as part of the ongoing crisis and opportunity for the nascent discipline. Arguing that the process of discipline-building must be Africanized, Sowande asserted that Black Studies should not be a discipline of mere add-ons to other disciplines, couched in politics, ideology, and surface change by professors with Africanized names and new clothes. Sowande, anticipating much of the work discussed in this section, opined that the Africanization of Black Studies implied the “total adoption of the World-View of Traditional Africa as the foundation on which to build.” For Sowande, anything less meant the uncomfortable position of “borrowing of bits and piece from the very system” that Africana Studies sought to confront, even though this “borrowing” may stem from well-meaning and genuine attitudes. This attachment to traditional Western disciplines sowed the seeds of Black Studies’ eventual dissolution.

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232. Here Sowande offers some important insights regarding the activist’s role and orientation within Black Studies. Stating that Black Studies owes its very existence to these individuals, but also that: “The main flaw is the character-type of the activist-leader is that he lacks creative imagination and can function smoothly, efficient and efficiently only when he is handling concrete situations in concrete terms.” Sowande asserts that education must go beyond breeding “estranged and enflamed black youths always at war with what they have been taught to regard as an “institutionalized racism” that is the sole cause of all their problems and woes…” He continues: “Even where this is not the case, even when black activist leaders are genuinely anxious to produce a complete and effectively meaningful program to cater for blacks, they are forced to adopt the only pattern open to them which is, to borrow bits and pieces from the very system they set out to destroy, and give these bits and pieces a top layer of black paint in any way possible; the result they then beam against the established system, by infusing into it the sense of a legitimate revolt against “a racist society” as it is designated.” Ibid, 7.
Black Studies Programs often ensure their own eventual disappearance from the scene by borrowing seemingly harmless elements from contemporary Western Educational Systems, on to which they hope to graft something new, something fresh, something relevant, which would transform these borrowed elements into useful aids for Black Studies. This is a serious miscalculation, as would be the intention merely to incorporate Lecture Periods on this or that aspect of African Traditional Culture,—for example: Drumming or Singing or Weaving or Dancing, etcetera—and consider that Black Studies has therefore and thereby become “Africanized.” Such a procedure will never yield any real dividends.  

Sowande’s intervention not only made the necessary “rhetorical” break, The Africanization of Black Studies articulated ways of reimagining the disciplinary assumptions of Black Studies, as they were to be situated “within the terms of reference of traditional African thought.” Arguing that the mere replacing of Western concepts with corollary terms in African languages was not enough, Sowande states that the true Africanization of the discipline would only occur once it allowed the “golden thread” of African deep thought, the animating force which determined the nature of the relationship between “individuals and the cosmos and the World of Nature,” the space to inform the other aspects of beingness, where in the West, these aspects led to academic disciplines. Sowande, like Cheikh Anta Diop, posited that this “golden thread” was to be found among Blacks “no matter where domiciled” and was the fundamental indicator of the primary assumptions that informed the lives of African people. Indeed, as Sowande asserts, the life of the

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233. Ibid, 11-12.
234. Ibid, 26. He states: “What I am saying here is, of course, that the most painstakingly careful translation of an approved textbook on Sociology for Political Science or “X” into an African Language in such a manner that the transition is as authoritative as it is accurate in the minutest detail... and the teaching of that Discipline in that African Language, does not begin to approximate even remotely to the Africanization of that discipline.”
235. Ibid, 29. Earlier, he had asserted, “Black” signified more than a political slogan, it defined “the primary assumptions” about reality held by Black people and “their place in the evolutionary history of humankind.” Ibid, 15.
mind was not rooted in one’s ability to become a great historian or political scientist, African intellectual traditions taught that one must achieve character, to achieve the status of Omoluwabi, the offspring of the “God of Character.”

The types of ideas put into the fray by thinkers like Sowande were unfortunately cast aside at the point when it became time to determine how Black Studies would distinguish and organize itself. Arguments as to whether they were considered anti-intellectual, nonacademic, illegitimate, or difficult to implement is less important than the ramifications of their dismissal at this crucial stage. Contra the ideas of Sowande, the first decade of Black Studies, as shown in the beginning of this chapter, was based on “Black” versions of the traditional Western disciplines. By the 1980s, however, it was clear that what Sowande and others had prefigured would indeed be necessary.

Beginning in this decade, thinkers within the discipline of Africana Studies had begun the process of developing an autonomous discipline. However, early on this work, predictably sought to combine the aforementioned four areas [philosophy, studies of cultural meaning-making, history, and the Black social sciences] in a coherent manner in order to train undergraduates and graduate students to be well-versed in the study of Africana peoples. For example, Philip T.K. Daniel’s 1980 article, “Black Studies: Discipline or Field of Study,” views traditional disciplines as holistic ways of understanding the Black experience, and advocates a multidisciplinary method of approaching knowledge. His formulation is premised on the idea that the solving of

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236. Ibid, 22.

“the Black community’s basic problems,” must encompass a systemic utilization of all available tools.\textsuperscript{238} Karla Spurlock, writing in the \textit{Western Journal of Black Studies} in 1977, views multidisciplinary work in Black Studies as largely ineffective in developing holistic theories and studies of Black life.\textsuperscript{239} Her “Toward the Evolution of a Unitary Discipline,” proposes the continued development of the discipline along interdisciplinary lines in order to eventually create a unidisciplinary formation based upon the “coalescence” of interdisciplinary work.\textsuperscript{240}

This is also clear in the 1980 curriculum developed by the National Council of Black Studies (NCBS) (c.1975), where although its authors viewed African-centered ways of knowing as important, they organized the disciplinary structure on Western separations of knowledge.\textsuperscript{241} Similar approaches and challenges characterized seminal works seeking to develop a disciplinary base for Africana Studies including in these essential volumes: James Turner’s \textit{The Next Decade} (1980), Floyd Hayes’ \textit{A Turbulent Voyage} (1992), Talmadge Anderson’s \textit{Black Studies} (1990), James Conyers’ \textit{Africana Studies} (1997), Delores Aldridge and Carlene Young’s \textit{Out of the Revolution} (2000), Manning Marable’s \textit{Dispatches From the Ebony Tower} (2000), Molefi Asante and Maulana Karenga’s \textit{Handbook of Black Studies} (2005), and Nathaniel Norment’s \textit{The African American Studies Reader} (2007).

However, a select few of the contributions to these volumes attempted to stake out a disciplinary space for Africana Studies. One such example is James Turner’s seminal

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid, 66.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Karla J. Spurlock, “Toward the Evolution of a Unitary Discipline: Maximizing the Interdisciplinary Concept in African/Afro-American Studies,” \textit{Western Journal of Black Studies} 1 (September 1977): 225
\item \textsuperscript{240} Ibid, 226.
\end{itemize}
essay, “Africana Studies and Epistemology” (1980), which foregrounds the conversation on Africana Studies’ distinct approach to knowledge production. This work penned as the foreword to *The Next Decade*, a collection of essays compiled ten years after the institutionalization of the discipline, established the need to develop a frame of understanding Africana content that “supersedes the traditional disciplines by pursing a holistic structural interpretation in its research and teaching methodology.” Africana Studies in Turner’s conception was not simply a matter of selecting the best of traditional disciplinary perspectives and methods to study the Black experience, but a reinterpretation of the intellectual traditions that created these various separations of knowledge, or in his words, “voids.” In addition, Turner posits that it was in fact these traditional disciplines which constituted the academic mechanism by which the status quo was essentially maintained. Africana Studies then was to be formulated to develop its own “social construction of knowledge.”

Part of the problems inherent in the early pioneers’ reluctance to abandon the West’s organizing structure was, of course, their training in these same areas. How would one recognize what Turner, Sowande, and others had recognized, when the tools at one’s disposal simply reified the knowledge structures one sought to understand? Where some

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243. He states: “The intellectual task is not then simply to pick or choose among the conceptual and methodological toys of traditional disciplines but to reconceptualize the social fabric and rename the world in a way that obliterates the voids that inevitably occurred as a result of artificial disciplinary demarcations.” Ibid, x-xi.
244. Critiquing the myth of value-free knowledge, he explains that the “dominant fields of knowledge thus surreptitiously support the status quo, because the normative judgments germane to its technical procedures, and applications of their findings, are generally ignored and do not face the test of critical examination or empirical verification.” Ibid, xi-xii.
were, despite their training, able to see the problems, how would they erect something more appropriate?

Despite these seemingly intractable issues, African intellectuals have continuously challenged the idea of an objective and neutral space from which Western academic thought could theorize freely from culture to culture. Jacob Carruthers’ short 1972 tract, *Science and Oppression* challenges this idea by briefly articulating the context from which European science emerged. Now in its seventh edition, *Science and Oppression* establishes the impossibility of viewing the ideas that ground Western science, such as its propensity to dominate/control nature, as objective, universal, and thereby useful for oppressed peoples. Viewing scientific legitimization as the consequence of “widespread and long-standing agreements among members of the scientific community,” Carruthers states that this coupled with the original assumptive components of science render it “not neutral or objective” and ensconced with the idea of “control.” For Carruthers it is the conception that grounds not only the physical science but the social sciences as well as seen through the reduction of qualitative ideas to quantitative categorizations or structuring.  

Years later, Marimba Ani’s 1994 text, *Yurugu*, continued this conversation with an extended critique of Western philosophical thought: its origins, foundations, and manifestations in the world community. Ani sought to understand the ways in which the European structuring of knowledge has been transmitted in the construction of the modern world. Uncovering similar links to the use of knowledge and of oppression that Carruthers briefly articulates, Ani’s work further extends the idea that the Western

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knowledge cannot be usefully tailored or applied to fit the needs of non-Europeans. Ani’s tome has been widely cited as one of the few works which systematically attempt to understand Western/European knowledge constructs.246

Finally, a more recent essay that articulates similar ideas appears in the Lewis and Jane Anna Gordon edited Not Only the Master’s Tools (2006). This essay, entitled, “The Idea of Post-European Science” is authored by Kenneth Danziger Knies and articulates and attempts to resolve the question of the development of an appropriate way to approach knowledge, with an understanding that “European man’s self centering as an a priori standard” will no longer hold. Though less willing than Carruthers or Ani, to abandon or resituate Western science, Knies nevertheless allows for the construction of an alternative knowledge base which does not flow in and through European systems of knowing.247 Carruthers, Ani, and Knies’ works evoke the need to develop alternative cultural and philosophical (deep thought) foundations from which to ground Africana intellectual work.

Africana Studies thinkers have attempted to accomplish this task in a number of ways. But clearly the most well-known and consistent attempts within Africana Studies to bring these ideas toward the resolution of the problem of disciplinarity has been the school of Afrocentricity created at Temple University under Molefi Kete Asante. The articulation of the concept of Afrocentricity was geared towards claiming an autonomous space to engage Africana Studies phenomenon that at once distinguished itself from the


traditional Western disciplines and relied on African ideas to animate the discussion. This was necessary, as was discussed in Chapter One, for it tried to free Africana Studies from having to develop methodologies that relied on the traditional Western disciplines for its sustenance and legitimacy.

The basic assumption of Afrocentricity is that intellectual work purporting to represent the thoughts, history, and ethos of the African experience must place peoples of African descent at the “center” of such an analysis. Asante and the Temple Circle’s contribution was that not only must this occur, but that the discipline of Africana Studies must be built on these terms. In addition to the articulation of this idea, this group helped to craft the first graduate program of the discipline in 1988. The works that would come from this department were to embody a “disciplinary” approach to Africana Studies.

Among Asante’s early works that developed this conceptual frame are his *Afrocentricity* (1980) and *The Afrocentric Idea* (1987). These two texts in large manner represent conceptual idealizations and rationales for the development of an Afrocentric philosophical base for Africana peoples premised on rationales which explain and delineate different cultural bases. More concretely, *The Afrocentric Idea* proposes the creation of a metatheory that encompasses the rhetorical and aesthetic realities within Africana cultures.\(^{248}\) The text links Africana Studies to Afrocentric method by implying that rhetorical structures inherent within African cultural patterns constitute the formative

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\(^{248}\) This formulation of a “cluster of theories” for Asante “allows us to be open to the infinite potentialities of communication, and the constituents of this metatheory aid us in determining the innovation in African American communicative behavior without an undue concentration on either grammatical, syntactical, semantic, or lexical components.” This frame is envisaged to understand African cultural difference as the basis for Afrocentricity. See Molefi Kete Asante, *The Afrocentric Idea* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, [1987], 1998), 48.
means from which disciplinary methodology can be constructed. Paradigmatic language, for Asante must be extracted from Afrocentric locations to generate perspectives for “examining any branch of human science.” 249 The intellectual coherence of Afrocentricity for paradigm creation is also echoed in the work of Ama Mazama in her “The Afrocentric Paradigm” (2003). She argues for the continued formalization of Asante’s Afrocentric paradigmatic conceptualization in Africana Studies.250

Asante’s *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* (1990) further outlines his view of the relationship between Africana Studies and the Afrocentric matrix. As discussed in Chapter One, this text is the first extended to attempt to connect Kemet (ancient Egypt) to Afrocentric theory, viewing its classical culture as “the baseline frames for the discussion of African cultural phenomena.”251 Kemetic ideas then, in this particular conception, are the theoretical and cultural starting point for a methodologically coherent Africalogy, which Asante defines as the “the Afrocentric study of African phenomena, events, ideas, and personalities related to Africa.” The African center that Kemet provides is understood by Asante to provide the philosophical (deep structure) foundation from which intellectual inquiry in the discipline must proceed in the areas of society, communication, history, culture, politics, economics, and psychology, while giving the

249. Ibid, 192. He states the four areas from which an Afrocentric paradigm contribute to the discipline: 1) the provision of a “grammar or notational system;” 2) the ability to “trace the logical development of arguments;” 3) the ability to “build upon existing foundations;” and 4) the promotion of “analysis and synthesis rather than mere description.” Ostensibly the work of the Afrocentrist is to be able to trace Africanisms inherent in forms of resistance among Africana people. He continues stating this “tracing” is linked to understanding how well particular cultural and textual products contribute to the African notions of harmony and balance. See Ibid, 193.


“methodological direction for collecting and analyzing data, choosing and interpreting research themes, approaching and appreciating cultural artifacts, and isolating and evaluating facts.” 252

In his ruminations on disciplinary work in *An Afrocentric Manifesto*, written in 2007, Asante’s revisits many of the points first established in *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge*. Stating that the method by which Africology is liberated from becoming more than the study of “African phenomena from the trash heaps of older disciplines” is centeredness, the foundation of which is an attempt to excavate African agency. 253 This conceptualization, though envisaged to break down the conceptual hegemony of traditional disciplinary frames, however only reimagines the ways in which they can be utilized to interrogate agency from different perspectives in general and in African culture, particularly. In other words, centeredness only provides new frames of reference for ideas excavated on Western disciplinary conceptual terms and knowledges. This particular notion of centeredness is similar to Asante’s earlier evocation of the concept of “location.” His “Locating a Text” (1992) establishes Afrocentric norms for the declaration of a work as centered on African ideals.254 Such resituating of Western inquiries under

253. Molefi Kete Asante, *An Afrocentric Manifesto* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 51. Explaining that the use of traditional disciplinary lens are insufficient in themselves, Asante declares that centeredness and the understanding of African agency must be sought “in all methodological constructions” within these specific disciplinary areas. This discovery is “the primary task of the Afrocentric researcher.” Ibid, 52.
254. Asante states that “there are several elements that help to locate an African American or any text: language, attitude, and direction.” He states elsewhere that “in Afrocentric theory, location takes precedence over the topic or data under consideration.” He understands location as a central element in the liberalizing of knowledge from hegemonic bases. See Molefi Kete Asante, “Locating a Text: Implications of Afrocentric Theory,” in *The Afrocentric Paradigm*, ed. Ama Mazama, 238. For the “precedence” comment see Molefi Kete Asante, “Afrocentricity and Africology: Theory and Practice in the Discipline,” in *African American Studies*, ed. Jeanette R.
the imprimatur of African ideas has been the contribution of the Temple Circle, regarding the constitution of a truly disciplinary base for the study of African phenomena. Their work has been crucial in generating the initial break that others were unwilling to create; the follow-through on this initial break remains part of the continuing generations’ work.

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It is not necessary to revisit the critiques of Asante and the Temple Circle’s Afrocentricity. However, one must clarify that many critiques of this approach stem from the inability to imagine or unwillingness to see Africana Studies stand alone. Other critiques, the ones discussed in Section IV of Chapter One regarding methodology in Africana Studies, simply take the works of Asante, Ani, Carruthers, Sowande, and others as the starting point for a continued pursuit for what Greg Carr calls disciplinary Africana Studies. That is, an Africana Studies that functions “with intellectual techniques” that are “attuned to the foundational impact of Africana worldviews that aspire to normative explanatory force while recognize the recent sociopolitical exigencies that brought “world views” into existence.” 255 The works explored in this chapter complicatedly grapple with how to best get to this stage of the journey. Resolving the many issues which would

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Davidson (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburg University Press, 2010), 50. Afrocentric location is seen as the unifying link that would establish paradigmatic language that addresses both the interdisciplinarity and ideological diversity of the discipline. Similarly, Karenga’s Kawaida theory provides the conceptual foundation that undergirds his conception of the discipline. His essay, “Black Studies and the Problematic of Paradigm” animates Kuhnian definitions of paradigmatic development within Black Studies by linking it to Afrocentric logic. See Maulana Karenga, “Black Studies and the Problematic of Paradigm,” Journal of Black Studies 18 (June 1988): 395-414

render Africana Studies more than simply a collection of what can only be “White Studies in Blackface” will require the intellectual and political will to use African deep thought as an avenue toward the liberation of African ideas.

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Part of the long process of constructing disciplinary Africana Studies will be a deep understanding if not effusive embrace of the contributions of the African intellectual traditions on whose shoulders we stand. The ideas animating the creation and some current work Africana Studies, as the works discussed in Part II indicate, are indeed a part of a very long continuum. There must be the necessary framing of our discipline in this manner. The great theoretical, methodological, and organizational debates, which many argue are natural to any discipline, may be properly contextualized when linked to a real, vibrant intellectual history of the enterprise. As Chapter Five intimates, it can and should be framed by African intellectual thought traditions in general, before stretching the chronology back long before the 1960s, as discussed in Chapter Six. Part III will examine the extent to which works that are being framed as the histories of the discipline interrogate and explore this extensive intellectual history.
In theorizing the crafting an intellectual history of Africana Studies, one must consider other attempts to accomplish such an objective. The discipline of Africana Studies’ relative youth has rendered this area of engagement quite small. It is important, then, to assess how students are introduced and welcomed to the discipline, with regard to the intellectual genealogies they are presented. In addition, situating and analyzing the literatures that attempt, or in the process of other objectives, brush up against, an intellectual history will clarify the steps that need to be taken in the construction of a comprehensive project. Here, we shall discuss the most widely cited book length histories of the discipline, which may examine in part the nature of Africana Studies’ intellectual history and its relationships to conversations on disciplinarity, as well as the earlier short-form articles and essays that attempted to provide an intellectual foundation for the discipline. We are seeking to examine the basic question: In the most accessible written works, how is Africana Studies now re-membered?
Chapter 8

On hundreds of campuses, students linked such calls for relevancy to the formation of Black studies programs and departments. In halls hallowed and profane, with walls ivied or unadorned, in locales northern, southern, eastern and western, the arrival of Black Studies on predominantly white college campuses was often announced and preceded by cries of “Black Power!” and clenched fists raised in what was universally understood to be the Black Power salute.
-Noliwe Rooks, White Money/Black Power

The push for black studies revolved around black intellectuals, student groups, and the debates within the civil rights movement as concerning black power and cultural nationalism. Viewing the civil rights movement as a limited and underwhelming effort, nationalists adopted a more radical position, demanding the creation of institutions specifically dedicated to serving the African American community.
-Fabio Rojas, From Black Power to Black Studies

Most crucially, Black students demanded a role in the definition and production of scholarly knowledge. These students constituted the first critical mass of African Americans to attend historically white universities. Deeply inspired by the Autobiography of Malcolm X and the charismatic leadership of Stokely Carmichael, yet shaken by the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., they were engaged in a redefinition of the civil rights struggle at a time when cities were in flames, hundreds of thousands of young Americans were at war in southeast Asia, and political assassination was commonplace. These were “Malcolm’s children,” and they were inspired by the slain leader’s denunciation of American hypocrisy and his call for Black control over Black institutions. In essence, student leaders were turning the slogan “Black Power” into a grassroots social movement.
-Martha Biondi, The Black Revolution on Campus

What can be called the quasi-histories of Africana Studies, Noliwe Rooks’ White Money/Black Power (2006), Fabio Rojas’ From Black Power to Black Studies (2007), and Martha Biondi’s The Black Revolution of Campus (2012), all revolve around exploring different

aspects of the development of the discipline. In framing their particular projects, each correctly view the discipline as part of the movement and period that has come to be known as the Black Power Era. As discussed in the previous chapter, this aspect of African American history is quickly becoming a popular area for the current generation of thinkers in the academy. Within this field, most studies seek to understand the nuances of the phenomenon of Black Power by clarifying its manifold objectives, exposing or exploring its ideological discussions and debates, developing an interpretation of its leadership, as well as providing general historical accounts of neglected figures and/or organizations. In addition, characterizations have emerged among historians and social scientists studying Black Power that view it as an extension of American democratic ideals, as an exemplar for social movements theories, and as a force that would diversify American institutions, like universities. The works to be discussed in this chapter fit these aspects and stem from the paradigmatic lenses of what Peniel Joseph calls “Black Power Studies.” Neither of these dissimilar works purports to be the definitive history of Africana Studies, let alone examinations of its intellectual history. They all however explore the same basic historical event. Their framings of this event, which led to the appearance of the discipline in all institutions (not simply predominately white ones),

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5. Ibid, 752.
6. As intimated above, there are no definitive histories of the creation of Black/Africana Studies. There are a number of works which discuss local or regional iterations of the Black student movement, which had more objectives than the creation of Black/Africana Studies in the university. For a listing of these works, see Ibid, 771n38. Martha Biondi’s *The Black Revolution on Campus*, to be discussed shortly, comes closest to the definitive work on this subject, but only insofar as Black/Africana Studies represents an objective of the student movement. See the discussion on each of the authors’ objectives infra.
nevertheless involve some discussion on the ideas which informed the movement to institute what Greg Carr calls “the academic dimension” of the Black Radical tradition.\(^7\) In this chapter we will examine to what extent they link earlier intellectual traditions to not only the creation of the discipline, but its intellectual motivations and organization, as these works fairly or unfairly, will likely begin to stand in as the official memories of the institutionalization of the discipline, despite the authors’ intentions.

*Noliwe Rooks and the Question of Outside Funding*

Noliwe M. Rooks’ *White Money/ Black Power* is an attempt to map the history of Black Studies by showing the role of white philanthropy in its success in becoming an agent of change in higher education as one vehicle by which the university was diversified and its role as a space to explore the issue of race in the American academy. She is largely concerned with the ways in which this outside funding determined the intellectual and administrative makeup of Black Studies as an institutional and university housed venture.\(^8\) Her analysis thus centers on the role of the Ford Foundation in Black Studies, a discipline she understands centrally as a disciplinary venture concerned with clarifying race in American life and culture. Rooks laments the dominant view of Black Studies as a capitulation to the demands of Black students and as an affirmative action measure. She states that “Black Studies is rarely viewed as a successful example of social justice, a

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means of multiracial democratic reform, or a harbinger of widespread institutional and cultural change in relation to race, integration and desegregation at the postsecondary level.” For Rooks, the most important aspects of Black Studies was its role as a discipline which explored the dynamics of “race and racial difference” which are still central to university life as they were forty years ago when the discipline was founded.9

The text begins by focusing on the San Francisco State University student strikes of the mid-1960s. Limiting her view to a protracted historical lens of the civil rights era, she concludes that the successful efforts of a “multiracial” alliance of the students was responsible for the first department of Black Studies in 1968.10 For Rooks, this is important because the struggles associated with this initial implementation “persists in far too many minds as a constant theme and meaning attached to the field.”11 After detailing the complex dynamics that led to an eventual compromise at San Francisco State, Rooks briefly examines the takeover of Willard Straight Hall at Cornell University before concluding with her view that the initial objectives of higher education reform that these movements represented has been woefully neglected by administrators.12

The next section turns to discussing the figure and institution widely responsible for philanthropic efforts within Black Studies: McGeorge Bundy and the Ford Foundation. After giving sweeping context to the developing ideologies within Black

10. She states that the “battle for Black Studies was won on the day that the strike ended at San Francisco State,” Ibid, 56.
12. This neglect is in Rooks’ reconstruction due to the haste in which these programs were built. She consistently refers to the discipline of Black Studies as set of imbricated practices tied to reforming the American academy: “At San Francisco State, Black Studies was seen as a means of reforming higher education, but that idea got hopelessly lost as administrators rushed to implement Black Studies programs.” Ibid, 58.
Studies, Rooks concludes that an assimilationist/integrationist vs. nationalist binary persisted among African Americans during this era and supports this assumption through discussions of the 1969 Yale Conference, the 1967 election of Carl Stokes, and the 1969 Ocean Hill-Brownsville teacher strike.\textsuperscript{13} She views these events insofar as they stemmed from “Black power” initiatives as shaping the approach to funding that Bundy and other philanthropists would undertake in Black Studies, another “Black power” initiative.\textsuperscript{14} The “resulting political and media firestorms” of the initiatives which preceded the Foundation’s participation in Black Studies, as well as changes in the views about Black Power, in turn may have affected Bundy’s reluctance to support the “nationalist/separatist” departments.\textsuperscript{15} The binary she, and others, have constructed suggests that the assimilationist model, characterized by inter/multi-disciplinary structuring of Black Studies won both the favor and funding of The Ford Foundation.\textsuperscript{16} Rooks makes this claim by cross-checking the grant-receiving institutions with their ideological orientations and by accessing the ideological approach within Bundy’s own

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{14} According to Rooks: “During 1967 and 1968, the years preceding the Yale conference, Bundy used resources from the Ford Foundation to support a number of key, highly visible political contest and social strategies undertaken by Black Power proponents.” She gives as an example the Gray Areas program as well as the examples listed above. See Ibid, 83.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 89-92.
\textsuperscript{16} On the discussions of this binary as it related to specific departments’ funding possibilities see Ibid, 94-102. Rooks reviews interviews and documents from funding officers within the foundations to suggest that the funding was given to departments at institutions that fostered an integrationist position. On specific cases involving the schools associated with the first round of Foundation funding, see Ibid, 106-114, and on Bundy’s personal views see Ibid, 118-121.
writings and statements. According to Rooks, if not for the intervention of the foundation, institutionalized Black Studies may not have survived beyond its initial impulse.\textsuperscript{17}

She concludes the text by assessing the implications of this particular legacy in the present iteration of the discipline suggesting that it is important to keep in mind the academic structures and socio-cultural realities that influence variation and norms within disciplinary Africana Studies. The work then treats the emergence of Black Studies in the academy as an interdisciplinary race-driven field of study, as the sole result of the militant, direct action of the late 1960s, and its preservation in the academy as largely a mechanism for affirmative action and the institutional enclave of diversity initiatives.\textsuperscript{18}

A more expansive discussion of the intellectual genealogy of Africana Studies would have greatly enhanced any benefits of Rooks’ work. Because the work does not discuss the precursors to the discipline and their relationships to funding institutions, a chance to properly contextualize the current status of Africana Studies was missed. An analysis of the funding initiatives of organizations like the Rosenwald Fund or the Phelps-Stokes fund would have prefigured the “types” of Africana Studies funded by organizations like the Ford Foundation. Perhaps it is not ironic that earlier thinkers like Carter G. Woodson and W.E.B. Du Bois were rejected funding at different points of their


\textsuperscript{18} Having established this view of institutionalized Black Studies, Rooks offers her perspective of the current state of the discipline of African American Studies. She gives specific examples of departments of African American Studies that have been used to increase diversity among both students and the professoriate. See Ibid, 127-151; 165-177.
life for many of the same reasons that the Ford Foundation rejected the “nationalists.” And where they were embraced during the early going, the funding did not necessarily follow (e.g. The Institution of Black World). Given this complicated history and contemporary approaches in the discipline, it should thus come at no surprise that these thinkers and those who were similarly discussed in Chapter Six are either disconnected from Africana Studies’ intellectual history or sanitized and made palatable for academic consumption in the contemporary academy.

Finally, Rooks’ assertion that Black Studies survived as the result of the integrationist impulse has more than political implications. Clearly, the attempt to develop and craft an autonomous discipline both intellectually and institutionally would necessarily be at odds under the influence of an integrationist ethos, thereby, sacrificing the intellectual freedom that Du Bois and E. Franklin Frazier discussed at the altar of “legitimacy.” Rooks is correct to assert that these issues of identity still plague the discipline. The current analysis argues that the choices made regarding funding may have led to such confusion.

*Fabio Rojas and Social Movements Theory*


20. The Institute of the Black World received funding in the early going from the Ford Foundation as well as other foundations. By 1970, roughly around the time that the Foundation began to articulate the policy outlined by Rooks, the funding was discontinued. See Derrick White, *The Challenge of Blackness: The Institute of the Black World and Political Activism in the 1970s* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2012), 183-188. In addition see Fabio Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies*, 153 and Martha Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus*, 232.

Fabio Rojas’ sociological-historical account of Black Studies, *From Black Power to Black Studies*, views the history of the discipline as the result of an integrated social movement against authority. The study is mostly concerned with how social movements work to successfully alter organizational control of both resources and ideas. Viewing Black Studies’ institutionalization as an example, Rojas seeks to theorize how these processes can work to foster institutional change. The work then traverses the history of the San Francisco State strike, as well as other movements through sociological lenses attempting to explain how radicals endeavored to create a discipline, which Rojas attempts to define and characterize in the penultimate chapter.

*From Black Power to Black Studies* contextualizes the discipline squarely within the Civil Rights/Black Power era of the mid 1960s. Rojas views these events as the foundation that served as the springboard for its creation. The development of revolutionary Black Nationalism as students became “disillusioned” with the mainstream Civil Rights thinkers, became the specific mechanism for the creation and instigation of “calls for black courses.” According to Rojas, many of these radicals had “one foot in the university and another in the bourgeoning nationalist movement.” Rojas characterizes the 1968 movement as an “overnight” phenomenon that sparked interest in the institutionalization of the study of Black culture. He weaves through discussions of nationalism represented by organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating

23. Ibid, 42.
24. Ibid.
Committee, the Black Panther Party, and the Revolutionary Action Movement, viewing them as important “tools” in this process. For Rojas, their role as initiators is clearly identified as central to the discussion of Black Studies in the university.25

Rojas opens the next chapter discussing the prevalence of nineteenth century works he considers to be historical, sociological, and literary, yet he does not attempt to draw connections to even the twentieth century, or to the 1960s in particular. He views the absence of an element of nationalism as precluding this corpus of intellectual activity as having any real impact in the academy. Rojas then devotes a small section to some twentieth century African Americans forerunners involved in African intellectual work. He briefly mentions the fact that many historians compiled historical accounts of Africans during the Reconstruction era, before stating the names of W.E.B. Du Bois, St. Clair Drake, E. Franklin Frazier, and Cheikh Anta Diop as important thinkers. Rojas, however, does not link these thinkers with the later nationalist thinkers in any systematic way, choosing to emphasize that their research would not have as wide an impact as would the movement to force Black Studies onto American campuses.26

An extended analysis of the genealogy of African intellectual traditions would prove this to be a miscalculation. These two events were inextricably linked. The link is ever stronger, when we consider those attempts to create an autonomous disciplinary base for Africana Studies. This tendency was not only evidence of the influence of the work of Du Bois, Diop, John Henrik Clarke and others, it also was not premised solely on what


26. See Ibid 22; 43-44.
happened within the university. That is, the “social movements” that Rojas analyzes were broader than university cultures. In other words, the strain of ideas that would ultimately result in these movements, got their most logical impetus from the intellectual tradition that was responsible for the thinkers Rojas listed.

Rojas continues by bracketing the conversation on the rise and decline of Black studies programs with historical discussions of the San Francisco State strike and the Ford Foundation’s role within the discipline.27 His analysis of three cases of Black Studies at the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois-Chicago, and at Harvard is an attempt to explain how social movements built on similar grounds to that of Black Studies survive and fail. Rojas then takes these historical discussions and gives his “bird’s-eye view” of the discipline’s current intellectual makeup. His statistical analysis assesses how programs and departments who were engaged in disruptive institutional processes as opposed to non-disruptive institutional engagement varied in their development of stable disciplinary practices. Much like Rooks, Rojas is keen on pointing out the successes of programs or departments that were more amenable to the dominant knowledge structuring and administrative proclivities of academic life. Rojas gestures to the ideological variation inherent within departments of African American Studies as an outgrowth of its initial

27. In the middle chapters, Rojas gives a historical analysis of the San Francisco State strike and concludes in contradistinction to Rooks, that the Ford Foundation’s impact was minimal in sustaining African American Studies. He adds to Rooks’ analysis treatments of Howard University and the Institute of the Black World, concluding that despite its clear attempt to influence the discipline it ultimately had a “modest” effect. See Ibid, 163-164. On his extended discussion of San Francisco State, see 45-92. Rojas views the handling of the case at San Francisco State as examples of the methods of university bureaucratic and organizational control and their results.
foray into the academy. He concludes that the development of disciplinary characteristics of African American Studies is at best tenuous or dependent on outside disciplines, viewing the enterprise as a “permanent interdiscipline.”

Rojas’ conclusion to the text utilizes the sociological concept of “counter-center” to describe African American Studies in both its historical and contemporary iterations, viewing the discipline’s stability as a consequence of its rejection of community education and cultural nationalism. Much of Rojas’ work is centered on understanding the discipline through the lens of social movements theory, which renders an intellectual history of its disciplinary work as tied to a reduced pantheon of thought that emerged only within that social movement. Scholars and historians tied more concretely to the discipline have recognized that this is largely insufficient and have attempted to at least imply a very real connection with the thinkers who preceded them in the academic study of the Africana experience. Clearly, exploring intellectual history will uniquely show that the river of Black thought would uniquely alter both the characterization as well as the recommendations regarding the state of the discipline as explained by Rojas. It may well be true that social movements theory alone cannot fully explain the current construction of the discipline.

*Martha Biondi and the Contextualization of the Black Student Movement*

28. Rojas includes a section that profiles the professors within the discipline showing the intellectual variation by way of institutional differences and the different sources of disciplinarity. The professionalization impulse is also evident as many of the professors surveyed attempted to divorce themselves or delink themselves to the 1960s movement, often for ideological reasons. Ibid, 182-184.

29. This status of “permanent interdiscipline is understood by Rojas as an intellectual arena with autonomy but “dependent on and highly connected to other academic disciplines.” See Ibid, 205-206.

The most comprehensive of the three works explored, Martha Biondi’s *The Black Revolution on Campus* is an attempt to develop a broad historical narrative of the Black student movement’s of the 1960s. According to Biondi, the work is a combination of “activist and intellectual history” which discusses the discipline of Black Studies insofar as it represented one of the principal demands of the student activists of the period. Biondi traces this movement across different regions, different types of institutions (including HBCUs), as well as in community organizations. Her book largely asserts that the revolution of Black students helped to transform the nature and character of American higher education—Black studies has done so by offering an avenue toward what she characterizes as “innovative and influential scholarship.”

The first few chapters explore the “activist” history. Like Rooks and Rojas, Biondi also begins her examination at San Francisco State University, exploring how the bottom-up approach to the movement helped to influence other struggles across the nation. From here, she discusses the different approach at Northwestern University, which was far more peaceful than the demonstrations in San Francisco, as well as the attempts to create a community-controlled college in Chicago, where Crane Junior College was transformed to Malcolm X College as a result of student activism. Next, Biondi discusses New York City, where student activism was prevalent at Brooklyn College and the City College of New York. The latter would develop perhaps one of the most important early Black Studies departments in the country. These discussions are then linked to the goings-on at HBCUs. Biondi explores the concept of “the Black University” arguing that it was

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32. Ibid, 6.
manifestly about creating an institution that was part of and integral to the Black community. She then discusses movements that developed in such HBCUs as Howard University, Southern University, Voorhees College, and North Carolina A&T, among others. Here students grappled with a recalcitrant administration, ultimately in Biondi’s view transforming, if not preserving the HBCU during the age of integration. While this work does not connect the movements of the 1960s to other Black student movements or to any semblance of Black radicalism before this period in any consistent form, this narrative offers important context to the actual practices inherent in creating a discipline solely based on student activism.

In the final three chapters, which is the “intellectual” history component of the text, Biondi offers an assessment of Africana/Black Studies given this history of social activism. After exploring what she calls “the counterrevolution” of Black Studies and the community-based programs of the Institute of the Black World and the Nairobi Schools, she delivers somewhat of a “state of the discipline” analysis in the final chapter of the text. Like Rojas, Biondi mentions that Black intellectual activity did not begin with

33. For this social movement history, which forms the bulk of the text see Ibid, 43-173.
34. With the recent scholarship on the Long Civil Rights Movement, it is becoming popular begin analyses before the 1960s. While this has its own drawbacks, there is nevertheless the need to do to the same for student activism. See Ibram Rogers, The Black Campus Movement, 29-66 and Raymond Wolters, The New Negro on Campus: Black College Revolutions of the 1920s (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) for earlier iterations of Black student activism.
35. These two chapters are essential reads. Chapter Six of this text explores the evolution of the discipline amid the claims against its legitimacy. Scholars countered by positing that the Black perspective would ground any analysis emanating from the discipline. Indeed, this perspective was not linked to simply renaming the Black experience using the tools of the disciplines. It was more concretely the search for an African (American) perspective on truth and reality that would ultimately humanize the world. This echoes the call for Du Bois to “conserve races” in his 1896 essay mentioned throughout the current effort, and analyzed in Chapter Six of this dissertation. Chapter Seven of Biondi’s work on the Black revolution “off campus” explores the television project, Black Heritage, which brought this perspective to the average person. In addition, Biondi
Black Studies, mentioning primarily those scholars who helped to define the Black social sciences and Black history during the 1970s and 1980s were given a “new infrastructure” in which to work with the birth of Black Studies.\(^{36}\) Largely eschewing “Afrocentrism” for its lack of methodology, Biondi asserts that the given the activist history of the discipline of Black Studies, it should probably embrace that there will never be a single methodology, and that this should not be a point of contention.\(^{37}\) Further, the discipline should be congratulated for its innovative scholarly advances: the development of diaspora studies and Black women’s studies.\(^{38}\) In addition, Biondi asserts that Black Studies helped to usher in the movement of multiculturalism and ethnic studies in the academy, which she suggests should be another point of congratulation as well as a call to arms to strengthen the relationships between African American and other subaltern groups. In the conclusion to the text, she states

> Black Studies has ushered in a transformation of graduate training and knowledge production in the United States, putting categories of race and, ultimately, gender, class, ethnicity, at the center of intellectual analysis across disciplines. Moreover, its emphasis on experiential learning is now considered a normal part of higher education. And it has modeled a diasporic and transnational orientation increasingly adopted in American studies and long a part of ethnic studies.\(^{39}\)

\(^{36}\) Martha Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus*, 249.

\(^{37}\) Despite a lack of any demonstration of any engagement with Afrocentricity, which as we have shown was linked most consistently to the attempt to develop disciplinary Africana Studies, Biondi states: “Critics have offered various objections, notably that Afrocentricity reinforces troubling discourses and hierarchies, falls short as an actual research methodology, and lacks engagement with the actual history and culture of Africa.” She then asserts that Afrocentricity is more influential in programs of “community-based pedagogy, cultural programming, and heritage tours than in the production of research.” See Ibid, 246-247. While the statement could be easily be proved inaccurate, ironically, here, the community-based idea is seen as problematic.

\(^{38}\) On these two innovations, see Ibid, 249-264.

\(^{39}\) Ibid, 277.
In Biondi’s view, it seems that she favors the continuance of these types of initiatives under the imprimatur of Africana Studies, despite the clear objectives many of its pioneers and long distance runners had concerning the discipline. In her words, these objectives were “social transformation and Black community empowerment” and as the above shows these were transmuted into mere “academic transformation” by subsequent thinkers.40 Though she does point to some still-present challenges regarding racism in the university, her work seems to intimate that this change of objectives (or failure) has resulted in welcome dividends for Black students and professors in the academy. Perhaps, like Rojas, the “intellectual” part of this history would have been enhanced by connecting the Black student movement to the larger African intellectual tradition. What she terms, “innovative scholarship” could have been more appropriately seen as the African attempt to reconnect the disconnected or re-member the dismembered—which in fact, when properly contextualized is clearly not a question of academic licensure.41

These quasi-histories of Africana Studies rarely view Africana Studies as an extension of an intellectual tradition, let alone attempt to trace this said tradition. Africana Studies is often completely understood as the academic outpost of the late-1960s Black political and cultural “awakening.” Within interdisciplinary conceptualizations of knowledge, Africana Studies is characterized as one of many branches of knowledge that exist to fill gaps within the Western institutional-academic structure. As such, Africana

41. Taken from the title of Ayi Kwei Armah’s recent collection of essays, Remembering the Dismembered Continent (Popenguine, Senegal, Per Ankh Books, 2010).
Studies is viewed as *solely* a temporal reaction to Western intellectual and institutional hegemony, and often with a greatly reduced intellectual genealogy. And as a solution to solving America’s race problem. A broader intellectual history of Africana Studies suggests that beyond mere academic legitimacy and ideological debates, the forces responsible for Africana Studies are the same forces that have been responsible for the survival of the African way. Undoubtedly, paradigmatic tendencies within Black Power Studies have worked to compartmentalize our memories such that the 1960s exist in isolation from the whole.
Chapter 9
The “Integral Tradition:” Erecting a Foundation for Africana Studies

To assert that there was no significant activity in the area of Negro studies (now referred to as Black Studies) before 1967 is to deny facts…

-Nick Aaron Ford, *Black Studies: Threat or Challenge?*

Perhaps the first thing to note with regard to the nature of Black Studies is that those concerned with these studies today stand squarely on the shoulders of the precursors in the field of Black Studies.

-Martin Kilson, “Reflections on Structure an Content in Black Studies,”

To argue that Black Studies thinkers during the period of the disciplines’ birth were not aware of a more expansive tradition of African intellectual traditions would be dishonest. They were indeed aware, if not part of the same tradition. While the historians discussed in the previous chapter gesture to this awareness, much of the scholarly work in terms of elucidating the birth of the discipline privilege the student movements for social change. There are, however, examples of attempts by thinkers associated with Black Studies’ development to foundationalize the discipline with an articulation of its intellectual tradition. These works, usually in the form of scholarly articles, form a useful point of departure for the articulation of a robust intellectual history of Africana Studies. These essays and articles differ from the works of Noliwe Rooks, Fabio Rojas, and Martha Biondi by focusing more so on the continuity between earlier traditions of intellectual work within the African American academic and lay community.

3. Of these, Fabio Rojas’ sociological analysis most stringently place importance on the social movements as the direct cause of Black Studies. See Fabio Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Disciplines* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Lawrence P. Crouchett’s 1971 article in the *Journal of Black Studies*, “Early Black Studies Movements” is one such piece. In this essay, Crouchett examines studies of the African going back to the Quaker educational systems of the eighteenth century. He also however, gestures to the existence of “secret classrooms” where African teachers and preachers were able to give “private lessons” on African history and culture. The latter unnamed pioneers in Crouchett’s view gave rise to activists such as David Walker, Frederick Douglass, Charlotte Forten, and David Ruggles, who emphasized the importance of the study of history, which was put into the practice by African American writers including James W.C. Pennington, E.A. Johnson, and George Washington Williams, the authors of historical texts in the nineteenth century. Along with the early historical societies of the nineteenth century, Crouchett points to the development of the American Negro Academy (c. 1897) and the Association for the Study of the Negro Life and History (c. 1915) which both emphasized the importance of the study of Africana

University Press, 2007), 42-43. However, the academic space was a space for political engagement and nationalist space at HBCUs. Nick Aaron Ford traces studies of the Black experience in HBCUs to the 1920s. See Nick Aaron Ford, *Black Studies: Threat or Challenge?*, 47-52. The importance of the institutional space provided by Black colleges is important to the development of scholarship that attempted to understand the social structure and historically document the African past. This fact has been emphasized by inter alia, Darryl Zizwe Poe, “Black Studies in Historically Black Colleges and Universities,” in *Handbook of Black Studies*, eds. Molefi Kete Asante and Maulana Karenga (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 204-224.


history. Crouchett reveals their distinct character by quoting Lawrence Reddick on the differences between “the study of the Negro and Negro History.” 6 The article ends with a brief discussion of Carter G. Woodson’s 1919 report on the status of “course(s) bearing on Negro life and history” before linking the birth of the Black Studies movement of the 1960s to earlier intellectual movements of the 20s, 30s, and 40s. 7

While Crouchett focuses largely on the evolution of African American history, the intellectual development of the Black social sciences is traced in Robert L. Harris’ essay, “The Intellectual and Institutional Development of Africana Studies,” first appearing in *Three Essays: Black Studies in the United States* (1990), a Ford Foundation publication. Harris begins his analysis in the late nineteenth century, showing that W.E.B. Du Bois’ contributions found in his Atlanta University Studies constitute the beginnings of a “multidisciplinary” Africana Studies. This initial stage also included the development of African American history under Woodson’s tutelage. 8 He follows this initial stage with a second stage characterized by studies of the African American during the development of Gunnar Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* in 1939. Harris is able to traces the vestiges of Myrdalian logic through the 1950s in select works that attempted to view inferiority as not necessarily genetic but a process of enslavement and disavowal of middle class values. 9

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7. Ibid, 197.
9. Harris characterizes this era as a “setback.” See Ibid, 8. He collectively views the works of White scholars at this time as viewing African Americans “not with an inglorious past but with deficiencies occasioned by slavery, segregations, and discrimination.” He also implies that these
He views the third stage, the 1960s-1980s, as the explicit challenge to these notions of inferiority inherent in social science research and the institutionalization and legitimatization of Africana Studies.\textsuperscript{10} As show in Chapter Six, the social scientists to emerge in this period had to in fact grapple with normative depictions of Africans which revolved around an innate inferiority. They set the ground for the Black social sciences by showing that important role that society itself had to play in terms of the life chances of Africans in the United States. This insurgent work laid the groundwork for the discipline of Africana Studies to create an alternative approach.

James Turner and C. Steven McGann’s “Black Studies as an Integral Tradition in African-American Intellectual History” (1980) focuses more broadly on historical and social scientific precursors to the discipline. They situate its origins in 1913, though they trace it to Du Bois’ Department of Labor studies and the Atlanta University Studies almost a generation earlier. Turner and McGann also view the importance of Woodson and the development of Africana history.\textsuperscript{11} The next major period was 1930-1940, where they argue that Black Studies would develop as a “field” enlivened by multiple disciplinary perspectives, and not those simply of history.\textsuperscript{12}

Further, they point to the development of the idea that historical knowledge must be rooted in distinctly African interpretations and perspectives. Chronicling an Association for the Study of Negro Life and History proceeding, the authors quote Joseph scholars viewed the pathologies as generational and not simply reversible by the assuaging of racial oppression. See Ibid, 9-10.

\textsuperscript{10} This challenge was reversing a academic curriculum which had a Eurocentric focus. See Ibid, 11.


\textsuperscript{12} See Ibid, 55.
J. Rhoads and Lawrence Reddick’s questioning of the “modus operandi” of white scholarship and the “development of an independent Black inquiry.” Turner and McGann view Rhoads’ and Reddick’s words, buoyed by a new ideological consciousness, as a challenge to the conventional understanding of academic objectivity. They continue by stating that increasingly thinkers saw “not just historical documentation” as important but “also the exemplification of the motivation, direction, and self-conception of Black people.” In addition, Turner McGann identify the importance of the Howard University Studies in History series and a Howard University Studies in the Social Sciences series, in 1921 and 1938, respectively. The recasting of Black Studies in the 1930s saw the emergence of a number of exemplars, to which Turner and McGann’s use to support the idea that a field had been born:

The publication of seminal works forced the recognition of a new radical interpretation of the status of Black Americans and their past. Again in the forefront, Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction in America (1935), portions of Horace Mann Bond’s The Education of the Negro (1934), and A.L. Harris and S. P. Spero’s The Black Worker (1931) presented the beginnings of the different perspective in Black Studies.

They close this era with discussion of the Myrdal study viewing as important the contributions of E. Franklin Frazier and Ralph Bunche. The authors understand the period between 1940 and 1960, as an intellectual hiatus largely due to World War II and the following era of McCarthyism which they view as impinging upon the “free thought and critical comment” by scholars on various issues within African America. They close

13. Ibid.
15. Ibid, 55.
17. Ibid, 57.
viewing the years, 1960-1976, as the era of institutionalization of the discipline characterized by the development of Black consciousness among students within the academy.18

Similar to the foregoing is Jeffrey Lynn Woodyard’s “Evolution of a Discipline: Intellectual Antecedents of African American Studies,” (1991) which contextualizes all intellectual work by African Americans prior to the development of Temple’s school of Afrocentricity as “predisciplinary.”19 Woodyard’s article builds upon the work of both Crouchett and Turner and McGann, as well a section of Alan K. Colon’s Stanford dissertation, “A Critical Review of Black Studies Programs” (1980), and Ronald Bailey’s 1973 article, “Black Studies in Historical Perspective.” Utilizing Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm, Woodyard following Maulana Karenga and James B. Stewart, states that “without such an exemplar or disciplinary paradigm, there is no discipline—only rhetoric about discipline.”20

Another source of intellectual histories can be found in the textbooks of Africana Studies. Three of these textbooks give brief biographies or gesture to the importance of some intellectual precursors of Africana Studies. Abdul Alkalimat’s and Associates’ *Introduction to Afro-American Studies* (1973) includes among the discipline’s precursors:

W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson, E. Franklin Frazier, and Langston Hughes, arguing that these thinkers were broadly trained and developed a “paradigmatic text of the Black experience.”\textsuperscript{21} Maulana Karenga points out that Black Studies relies on the “activist-intellectual tradition” both “ancient and modern” as resources, listing figures ranging from Maria Stewart to Kwame Ture.\textsuperscript{22} Talmadge Anderson and James Stewart’s \textit{Introduction to African American Studies} (2007) includes the most expansive section of these intellectual forerunners as the foundation for the discipline. They provide extended biographies of such “philosophers and philosopher intellectuals” responsible for providing “the social theory and ideological bases on which African American Studies was founded.”\textsuperscript{23} These include: David Walker, Sojourner Truth, Maria Stewart, Henry Highland Garnet, Fredrick Douglass, Mary Ann Shadd Cary, Booker T. Washington, Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Mary Church Terrell, W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson, Alain L. Locke, Marcus Garvey, Zora Neale Hurston, Charles S. Johnson, and E. Franklin Frazier.\textsuperscript{24}

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The scholarly articles discussed in this chapter are useful early formulations of an extended genealogy of Africana Studies intellectual work. As initial attempts, the reviewed works suggest the need for a systematic analysis of the “pre-institutionalization” phase of Africana Studies that attempts to connect the multitude of variation and the simultaneous

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Maulana Karenga, \textit{Introduction to Black Studies} (Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press, [1982], 2010), 7-8.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Talmadge Anderson and James Stewart, \textit{Introduction to African American Studies} (Baltimore: Inprint Editions, 2007), 14.
\item \textsuperscript{24} For these biographies, see Ibid, 9-23.
\end{itemize}
unity of intellectual work to contemporary manifestations of Africana Studies, a connection Rojas, Rooks, and Biondi, did not deem essential to their historical analysis. These works begin to reveal the idea that for Africana Studies to truly embody the vast African intellectual tradition it represents, there must be a more concerted attempt to understand the objectives which have grounded the approaches to knowledge over the past two hundred years. We may find that they had important ideas regarding the organization, foundations, and overall disciplinary basis for intellectual work. With regards to disciplinary theoretical and methodological development, a connection to this genealogy would not only reveal the tradition which Africana Studies rests upon, it would present its traditional modus operandi.
Part Four: The Question of Approach

In the course of crafting an intellectual history within Africana Studies, it will be necessary to clarify the approach which would responsibly enliven the ideas, thoughts, worldviews, and genealogies that represent African people. Indeed, the question of approach constitutes the factor that will facilitate any intellectual history’s ability to speak to “after”—to remain.¹ Part of the issue, however, is that no such approaches have been effectively crafted, let alone modeled. As such, an extensive review of the ways in which African intellectual histories have been approached should foreground any new attempts at confronting the deep challenges inherent in the writing of the history of African thinking traditions.

The current effort is regrettably not that. However, Part IV will investigate two components of this conversation that will have to stand in for a more wide-ranging bibliographical study. After examining the nature of Western intellectual history and how intellectual historians have grappled with its immense methodological issues, we will explore via Greg Carr the dominant approaches to the excavation of African intellectual genealogies that have been undertaken in contemporary studies. The hope is to begin to “open the way” for an intellectual history that meets, perhaps most importantly, the cultural standards put in place by the conceptual markers of African deep thinking.

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Chapter 10
Anxious Confidence: Methodological Reflections in Western Intellectual History

For those who believe that history is the past restored, society is undoubtedly the only possible framework for its restoration. But for those who believe that history is the answer which the past gives to the questions of its successive futures, the common ground afforded by the rational forms of articulated ideas provides a communication through time that offsets their isolation from their contemporary society. And for those who believe that both reconstruction and restoration are required by the historical enterprise, conversation with the great dead joins the resurrection of the souls of the mute in a common perspective upon the autonomous role of ideas in our history.


Harold Bloom has described the “anxiety of influence” experienced by the poet who fears that competition with the great poetic fathers will render him speechless, without an identity. Intellectual historians face a different problem. In a sense, the historian’s anxiety today is “an anxiety in expectation of being flooded,” to cite Bloom—flooded not by the past, but by methodological competitors of our own day. Questions arise without answers; new developments seem only to confuse matters. Yet repression, the continuation of old ways, seems increasingly ineffective, that is to say, unrewarding. Adaptations must be made.

-Hans Kellner, “Triangular Anxieties”

Any evocation of the term “intellectual history” puts one, consciously or not, in the midst of one of the more convoluted methodological quandaries within Western knowledge production. And one that shows no evidence of being resolved within the strictures of the tradition it represents and seeks to understand. Yet, it is a field replete with much scholarly activity, a sub-discipline of history that has increasingly become central to many of the great issues of Western knowledge and society. There are clear reasons for this. Intellectual history, as David Harlan suggests, is the West’s preserver of

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“cultural memory” and the means by which its intellectual traditions remain “relevant.”

Methodological issues are important, but are subsumed under this larger purpose. Yet this should not obscure the fact that much of intellectual history, is empirically questionable at best, and downright ahistorical at worst, which would not necessarily be an issue, if not for its representation or claims as objective and universal truth.

What contributes to such a state of affairs?

The ways in which the term “intellectual history” is bandied about suggests that it is in fact a clear-cut part of the complex of the discipline and practice of history—the historiography of that which is “intellectual,” an obviously vast amount of knowledge. According to Leonard Krieger, intellectual history includes not only the history of ideas, itself a variant sub-discipline, but also the history of “articulate beliefs, amorphous beliefs, and unspoken assumptions.”

As Mark Poster suggests in his contribution to Modern European Intellectual History (1982), this wide variety of subject matters has produced “studies of individual thinkers, of intellectual movements, of disciplines, of collective consciousness, of elite and popular culture.” Indeed, as many thinkers have asserted, this is an area that is as complex as one would expect a field that “covers, in fact, the totality

5. Harlan asserts that history (i.e. the disciplinary practice) should cease attempting to be “history” as such. The attempts to write legitimate intellectual history have proved unable to overcome these methodological issues. As such, for Harlan, the only resolution lies not in “reconstructing the past but with providing the critical medium in which valuable works from the past might survive their past—might survive their past in order to tell us about our present.” Ibid, 609.
of forms of thought” to be.\textsuperscript{8} This chapter briefly traces the methodological issues examined by modern intellectual historians, as a means of clarifying how Western thinkers have approached the practice. This is necessary for clearing both the conceptual and methodological ground for an African-centered interpretation of the practices and roles which Western intellectual history is assumed to play for all human communities. These are none other than the roles Harlan has outlined.

The descriptor “Africana Studies” attached to “intellectual history” must mean more than the simple aping of Western tools of inquiry to explain how Africana Studies came to exist—especially given the anxieties inherent in the West’s use of these very tools. It must mean something more particular, even as it is merely a bridge to a more robust conception of African thought, which will be rendered moot once the recovery of languages, and thus African concepts, is fully actualized. The methodological issues raised by Western intellectual historians discussed below would unnecessarily complicate African thought—as it has complicated Western thought itself—if Africana Studies merely mimics the approaches now practiced in history. The following is presented to show what methodological issues are be avoided in the construction of a new, more viable alternative terms from which to extract African intellectual genealogies.

The field and practice of intellectual history, understood as a self-conscious enterprise, emerged with great scholarly fanfare in the early half of the twentieth century.

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\textsuperscript{8} Roger Chartier, “Intellectual History or Sociocultural History,” in Ibid, 14. See also the seminal work of Franklin Baumer, “Intellectual History and its Problems,” The Journal of Modern History 21 (September 1949): 191-203. For Baumer, as well as others who followed, intellectual history was not merely about the ideas but their relations to each other over time, the means by which they have appeared, and their concrete effects on issues on the ground.
According to Leonard Krieger, writing in the above-cited, “The Autonomy of Intellectual History” (1965), intellectual history was buoyed by two general trends: philosophical historicism and socio-intellectual history. There were the methodological and conceptual work of such thinkers as Wilhelm Dilthey, Friedrich Meinecke and Arthur O. Lovejoy and the strand that more so defined the field by “practice” which included in some ways, the Annales thinker, Lucien Febvre and the American pioneers, Vernon Louis Parrington and Perry Miller. In Krieger’s estimation, there were five dominant schools associated with these broad traditions, which were spread throughout the West.

Of particular importance are the philosophic-historicist interpretations of intellectual history. The German tradition, *Geistesgeschichte*, was characterized by the work of Dilthey and Meinecke and the early influences of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and attempted to link intellectual history to the “living experience” of ideas and productions of the mind. The work of French thinkers has been much more influential. Rooted in the work of Febvre, the French variant of intellectual history assumes that what explains movement is not what individuals think, but what limits their thinking. This

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11. He lists: “the German-Italian-historicist school featuring a mix of historical philosophers and philosophical historians running from Dilthey and Croce to Cassirer, Meinecke, and Carlo Antoni; second, the group of socio-intellectual historians centering on Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and the periodical Annales; third and fourth, the two schools which can be regarded as American counterparts of these two European tendencies, the History of Ideas group of Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas, and the New History of Robinson, Becker, and Beard; and fifth, the historians of assorted philosophical, literary, artistic, and politico-scientific theories and theorists—Bury, Barker, Randall, Sabine, Auerbach, Mornet, Hauser, Laski, and their ilk—who accommodated their special subjects to the new standard of historical research.” Leonard Krieger, “The Autonomy of Intellectual History, 504-505.
conceptualization, according to Roger Chartier writing on the French in *Modern European Intellectual History*, is rendered as the *historie des mentalites*, a term which only makes theoretical sense in its language of origin. With “mental equipment” as their conceptual marker for intellectual history, the French historiographical tradition sought to develop quantitative measures which attempted to trace the impact of ideas. Finally, regarding the American approach, it is most commonly associated with the work of Lovejoy and George Boas who attempted to formulate a methodological approach to intellectual history that was premised on the continuity of unit-ideas, an “object of study” which disaggregates “all the larger systems, creeds, and –isms,” which characterized Western thought. Lovejoy’s seminal, *The Great Chain of Being* (1933) established this approach and helped to initiate the methodological discussions that would dominate the field with his co-founding of *The Journal of the History of Ideas* in 1940.

According to John Higham, writing in the introduction to his and Paul K. Conkin’s edited *New Directions in American Intellectual History* (1979), the work of Lovejoy and the influential studies of Parrington, Miller, as well as Merle Curti and Richard Hofstadter, engendered a wide popularity for the sub-discipline during the 1940s and 1950s, which would only dissipate with the establishment of the even more popular field of social history in the 1960s. Despite its popularity, as John C. Greene writing in his seminal “Objectives and Methods in American Intellectual History” (1957) asserts, there

were still immense methodological issues to be resolved. These revolved around the meta-issues of interpretation and causation within history, issues that figured much larger in the realm of intellectual history as it was premised on the reconstruction of historical narratives of the much more amorphous subjects of ideas, concepts, and thoughts.

Then there was the methodological critique of Quentin Skinner. Representing the “Cambridge School” of intellectual history, along with other British thinkers, John Dunn and J.G.A Pocock, Skinner’s “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) took the sub-discipline to task, showing the inadequacies of its two major approaches that asserted: 1) “it is the context of “religious, political, and economic factors” which determines the meaning of any given text; and 2) “the autonomy of the text itself as the sole necessary key to its own meaning…” Skinner shows that both approaches in fact “share the same basic inadequacy,” that is, they lacked “a sufficient or even appropriate means of achieving a proper understanding of any given literary or philosophical work.” Skinner spends the majority of the essay showing how attempts to derive meaning from the text itself suffered from a number of mythologies regarding the attribution of doctrines to specific thinkers (the mythology of doctrines), the coherence of particular thinkers’ conceptual systems (the mythology of coherence), the idea that particular ideas could anticipate their futures (the mythology of prolepsism), and the idea that ideas could mean the same thing across particular contexts and in alien cultures (the

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18. Ibid, 3-4.
It is for the persistence of these particular mythologies that Skinner challenges the conceptualizations of the continuity of certain “unit-ideas,” so forcefully assumed in the work of Arthur Lovejoy. Regarding the first methodology, Skinner suggests that while context certainly helps, it cannot explain the historical actions taken. The only thing that can explain such actions is authorial intent, and the job of the intellectual historian was the recovery of such intent. Further, he states that intellectual history should not be the search for “perennial” concepts, but should be about the ways in which changes in ideas allows for “self-awareness.” This approach was modeled by Pocock and others of the Cambridge school, who traced the particular manifestations and radical shifts of different concepts as they emerged over time.

According to David Armitage’s recent article, “What’s the Big Idea?” (2012), the Cambridge school’s synchronic approach, inaugurated the rise of contextualism in intellectual history that has characterized the field in the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the emergence of social history, a reaction against the elite, “Great Books” and “Great Men” conceptualizations of history, led to the embrace of the contextualist, history of discourses methodology, which subsequently became the most influential tendency within intellectual history in this era. Higham shows that this generation of intellectual historians were less concerned with the gulf between the

19. For an explanation and examples of these particular mythologies, see Ibid, 7-30.
20. After stating the merits of the approach, Skinner states: “It may still be strenuously doubted, however, whether a knowledge of the causes of an action is really equivalent to an understanding of the action itself. For as well as—and quite apart from—the fact that such an understanding does presuppose a grasp of antecedent causal conditions of the actions taking place, it might equally be said to presuppose a grasp of the point of the action for the agent who performed it.” Ibid, 44.
historicists and the socio-historical thinkers, discussed by Krieger, and showed a great deal of concern with the nature of groups of thinkers and the ways in which they gave birth to ideas and concepts; an idea recently reiterated in a forum on American intellectual history appearing in the April 2012 issue of *Modern Intellectual History.*

Skinner, Pocock, Higham, and other thinkers perhaps could not anticipate the mélange of the French-inspired poststructuralism; thinkers whose ideas would not only challenge the process of historical writing (the historical narrative), but would challenge the text and the authors, the subjects of intellectual history, themselves. Associated with such figures as Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Michel Foucault, poststructuralists revealed the problematics in how the intellectual historians’ constituted meaning within the texts that supported their studies. The linguistic turn would challenge the sub-discipline of intellectual history on the following terms, outlined by David Harlan:

> ...the belief that language is an autonomous play of unintended transformations rather than a stable set of established references, a wayward economy of oppositions and differences that constitutes rather than reflects; the consequent doubts about language’s referential and representational capacities; the growing suspicion that narrative may be incapable of conveying fixed, determinate, accessible meaning; and finally the eclipse of the author as an autonomous, intending subject.

In this work, “Intellectual History and the Return of Literature (1989),” Harlan narrates the conceptual confusion and anxiety engendered by the linguistic turn. The responses by such intellectual historians as Skinner, Pocock, and other contextualist thinkers of which the earlier Higham and Conkin volume represent, are for Harlan, unsatisfactory rebuttals

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to the challenges of poststructuralism.\textsuperscript{25} He then suggests a recasting of the canon of intellectual history, following the typologies of Roland Barthes, among others, and the crafting of a historically conditioned identity of said texts. Harlan suggests that the latter should be based upon Rabbinic and Catholic interpretive traditions and the work of Hans Georg-Gadamer, which suggests that not the text itself, but the interpretive traditions that have emerged around the text constitute its historicity.\textsuperscript{26}

From here, Harlan asserts that historians must dispense with the idea that they can truly reconstruct and contextualize past \textit{zeitgeists, mentalites}, ideas, and values, that were central to particular peoples in the past. Following other less-embraced thinkers, Harlan suggests that intellectual historian be about the resituating of past ideas to aid humanity in the present. In this conceptualization, the interpretations of a text would “not point backward, to the historical context or putative intentions of their now-dead authors; they point forward, to the hidden possibilities of the present.”\textsuperscript{27}

If Armitage’s aforementioned article is any indication of recent trends in intellectual history, the recommendations and critiques of David Harlan have not been widely embraced. While Armitage outlines the genealogy of critique up to the intervention of Skinner, he like other contextualist historians continue to believe in the possibility of recontextualizing the ideas of the past. His methodological intervention, coming at a time of rebirth of the idea of “big” in history, is to craft a history \textit{in} ideas,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} These responses revolve around the need to maintain the centrality of the author’s intent and subject position. See Ibid, 593.
\item \textsuperscript{26} On the reconstruction of the canon and its historically conditioned identity, see Ibid, 596-602.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 604. See also note 5. For Harlan, exemplars of this approach include the work of Noam Chomsky’s \textit{Cartesian Linguistics} (1966), Michael Walzer’s \textit{Exodus and Revolution} (1965), and John P. Diggins’ intellectual biography of Thorstein Veblen, \textit{The Bard of Savagery} (1978). See Ibid, 604-608.
\end{itemize}
which relies on a serial contextualism and upon transtemporal historical investigation, both of which are thought to reconstruct the actual mechanisms responsible for the transmission of ideas. Such a methodology would insulate him and other thinkers from the critiques lodged against Lovejoy and others that asserted that ideas were “timeless” and “universal.” Yet, the poststructuralist challenge remains unresolved, even as Armitage indicates, we may soon be experiencing a “return to the history of ideas.”

At every turn in the few methodological discussions of intellectual history, one encounters both confidence (Lovejoy, Higham, Krieger, Armitage), and anxiety (Greene, Skinner, Harlan). One could only assume that the practice of writing about the ideas that may explain the constitution of political, social, and cultural change is both admittedly inexact and lies beyond the pale of scientific and methodological certitude. What one is left with then, is the existence of a impulse that sustains the writing of these particular histories and the essential question of how this intellectual work informs the ways in which certain entities (e.g., nation-states, transnational actors, media, small scale communities) act upon assumptions embedded in the established and recorded historical memories of this particular enterprise.

29. Ibid, 497. Of course, and Armitage suggests so, this will not be based purely on the Lovejoyian model. See also the aforementioned recent forum, “The Present and Future of American Intellectual History,” Modern Intellectual History 9 (April 2012): 149-248, featuring eminent American intellectual historians, which is another exhibit of their confidence. We will know more about the ways in which practitioners of contemporary approaches to intellectual history have responded to these methodological challenges with the appearance of the forthcoming, Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, eds., Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Chapter 11
“A First Order of Business:” Greg Carr and Approaches to African Intellectual Genealogy

Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu.
(A person is a person because of people).
-Zulu proverb

The intellectual genealogy of Africana Studies must be established as a first order of business…
-Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not”1

As Western intellectual history undergoes what may either be a continuation of its self-delusion or its forceful rebirth (or both), it is clear that the fortunes of African ideas may not figure in the ways that it should, regardless of what happens.2 Instead of the reconstruction of a more diverse academy or widening the scope of the disciplines, the African renaissance, broadly conceived, should perhaps represent the motive force behind attempts to organize Africana Studies’ disciplinary space in the near future.3 But as the analysis of the works in Part III reveal, there still remains the unfinished work with regards to the crafting of an intellectual history of the discipline of Africana Studies. This understanding of a scholarly tradition can only help to mark the discipline as a distinct

2. The “canonization of Frederick Douglass” and others in American intellectual history and the footnote to Leslie Butler’s recent “state-of-the-field” essay, notwithstanding. The specter of “inclusivity” which pervades such works and approaches to knowledge merely widen the dominant perspectival frame—an old, tired convention. See Leslie Butler, “From the History of Ideas to Ideas in History,” Modern Intellectual History 9 (April 2012): 158-159n3.
academic endeavor. Though there have been no extensive works which attempt to articulate a genealogy of thought for the discipline, there have been more general attempts to explain the evolution of Africana intellectual traditions.

Greg Carr, chair of Afro-American Studies at Howard University, has recently explained that his introduction to the concept of intellectual genealogy, broadly defined as “the relationship between human communities over time and space, be they family, bloodline, or nation, as well as communities of meaning-making, culture, and intellectual workers,” was through the prominent work of John Henrik Clarke, who gave the initial push, and Jacob H. Carruthers, Jr. who provided a model for this discussion. For Clarke and Carruthers, the impulse was to create a lens from which to view how “Africans were related to each other throughout world history.”

The prominence of intellectual genealogy in Carr’s work can be traced beginning with his 1997 contribution to ASCAC’s The African World History Project: Preliminary Challenge and continuing with his contribution to Nathaniel Norment’s The African American Studies Reader (2007), both of which were mentioned earlier.

But it was in his “What Black Studies is Not” (2011), where he captures and develops a typology of different approaches to the question of intellectual genealogy linking these to the practice of disciplinary Africana Studies. Viewing the discipline as intimately connected to a “preexisting constellation of African intellectual work, shaped by millennia and centuries of subsequent migration, adaptation and improvisation,” Carr

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asserts that it in fact seeks to “theorize out of long-view genealogies of African intellectual work.” As quoted above, he continues, asserting that an accurate understanding of the genealogy from which Africana Studies has emerged in the second half of the twentieth century should be the “first order of business” when defining the nature and character of the discipline.

Thus, Carr establishes five categories that help to explain the approaches that have been inaugurated to understand Africana intellectual genealogies: 1) the Black radical tradition approach; 2) the emic/etic approach; 3) the alternative epistemological approach; 4) the unbroken genealogy approach; and 5) the sui generis approach. This chapter will draw build upon this typology to suggest possible considerations regarding approaches that would enable the construction of a coherent disciplinary intellectual history for Africana Studies. We shall proceed by presenting Carr’s definition of each approach, then outlining the key texts of exemplars of the various approaches, and finally explaining the implications, similarities, and differences of each categorization.

The Black Radical Tradition Approach

Characterized by “the premise that ideas of “African cultural unity” emerge from the material contexts and circumstances of Western racialization and racial hierarchy,” texts utilizing the Black radical tradition approach view the resistance of an African intelligentsia as informed largely by Africana cultural logic and improvised to survive the

5. Ibid, 178.
6. He states that: “Many texts have purported to outline the trajectory and genealogy of African intellectual work. While a full range of thinkers and historical eras are increasingly incorporated in these narratives, the placement, attention and connective relevance they receive is indelibly informed by the place along the time/space continuum which the authors mark as their points of departure for thinking about African thought.” Ibid, 180.
circumstances of Western hegemony and political power. Two exemplars representing this approach listed by Carr are the political theorist, Cedric J. Robinson as well as the historian, Michael A. Gomez, both of whom we have discussed in earlier chapters.

Cedric J. Robinson’s *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (1983), outlines the process from which this conception emerged. The text constructs a genealogy of Africana resistance, or the Black radical tradition, as rooted not merely in expressive modes yielded by the present situational contexts, but in an accessible deep well of tradition. First situating the emergence of European radicalism as a distinct process, Robinson takes us through Africana history in an effort to explain the unique emergence of African resistance. Referencing Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation, he explains that Marx

had not realized fully that the cargoes of laborers also contained African cultures, critical mixes and admixtures of language and thought, of cosmology and metaphysics, of habits, beliefs, and morality. These were the actual terms of their humanity. These cargoes, then, did not consist of intellectual isolates or deculturated Blacks—men, women, and children separated from their previous universe. African labor brought the past with it, a past that had produced it and settled on it the first elements of consciousness and comprehension.8

He continues by showing against received convention, that the transatlantic slave trade

meant also the transfer of African ontological and cosmological systems; African presumptions of the organization and significance of social structure; African codes embodying historical consciousness and social experiences; and African ideological and behavioral constructions for the resolution of the inevitable conflict between the actual and the normative.9

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7. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
The context for the emergence of Black radical traditions and its concomitant, the intelligentsia was Western racial capitalism. However, as Robinson explains the “specific inspiration” of this tradition was premised on an existing shared conception of reality among Africans in the Western hemisphere, whose common struggle forced them to draw from similarities in each other’s still-functioning cultural logics. From this shared epistemology, Robinson shows how individual exemplars were able to coalesce into an Africana intelligentsia. He includes in his analysis, the figures, W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, and Richard Wright, who attempted to distinguish Africana resistance as culturally and epistemologically centered upon African ways of meaning, as they came to terms with Marxist thought.

The mass character of African American resistance is the subject of a later text authored by Robinson, *Black Movements in America* (1997), and a further example of this approach. This text traces in part the development of alternative political cultures within the African American community, one seeking to approximate its relationship to the power structure and the other clinging to African-based traditions and ways of knowing. Explaining an often overused and oversimplified binary between assimilationist and nationalist tendencies, Robinson describes these two alternative political cultures: “Among the two formations in the United States, the better publicized was the assimilationist Black political culture that appropriated the values and objectives of the dominant American creed.” He continues by explaining the other as “inventive rather

10. The African American actors who were associated with confronting the system were increasingly forced to (re)discover the reality of the “Black historical experience,” thus becoming “motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve the collective being, the ontological reality.” See Ibid, 170-171. These cultural logics were the existing worldviews, forced to respond to new problems.

11. See Ibid, 228-238; 270-286; 291.
than imitative, communitarian rather than individualistic, democratic rather than republican, Afro-Christian rather than secular and materialist, the social values of these largely agrarian people generated a political culture that distinguished between the inferior world of the political and the transcendent universe of moral goods.”

Michael A. Gomez’s *Exchanging our Country Marks* (1998), deals primarily with the transfer of these life-ways and traditions from specific ethnic beginnings to a shared racial identity, as Africans were transported for their labor to the Western hemisphere. Gomez traces the development of racial identity by first identifying the nature and character of the specific ethnic group-derived meaning-making systems that characterized the groups of Africans taken to North America. Relying on statistical data, Gomez determines the ethnic group makeup of the antebellum North American African population, and then traces these groups: the Bambara, the Mande speakers, the Akan, the Bantu speakers of Central West Africa, and the Igbo, to name a few, throughout the United States. He states:

> North American discriminatory tendencies resulted in distinct patterns of ethnic distribution throughout the colonies/states. The recovery of such patterns assists immeasurably in any analysis of subsequent sociocultural development, operating under the premise that black life and culture in a given area evolved out of and in creative tension with norms associated with specific ethnic groups imported via the slave trade. To be sure, people of African descent moved from locale to locale throughout North America and over time, so that their insularity was steadily mitigated the long their sojourn in America. However, it is necessary to identify the respective cultural milieu out of which they came in order to understand how they contributed to successive settings.13


From this foundation, he is able to trace the commonalities and differences within these various cultures extracting those ideas and worldviews which would inform how African Americans made meaning in both historical and contemporary settings.\textsuperscript{14}

Similar to these texts are the approaches taken by Vincent Harding in his historical take on African resistance, \textit{There is a River} (1981), and P. Sterling Stuckey’s \textit{Slave Culture} (1987), which is one foundation from which Gomez’s thesis builds upon. While Harding does not investigate directly the sources of African resistance, throughout the work one gets the sense that this “previous universe” is what uniquely informed the flow of the river. Stuckey interrogates the African cultural past to consider the proposition that the culture of the enslaved was unquestionably African. For Stuckey, this was premised on cultural memory.\textsuperscript{15}

Viewing intellectual history this way has a few implications. If an intellectual history for Africana Studies is constructed on these grounds, it would reveal the sources of culture and resistance that emptied into Western knowledge communities with the first trained scholars as well as add context to the eventual student movements which emerged on their heels. Africana Studies’ intellectual history, based upon this approach, can thus be viewed as part of an intelligentsia formulated from the core of the Black radical

\textsuperscript{14} Gomez views as important two realms of acculturation: inter-African and between Africans and the host society, the West. The former is considered the epistemological foundation from which identity was formulated from ethnicity to race, while the latter is considered the force that required it. Ibid, 8-13.

tradition. But importantly, this approach assumes that resistance to oppression is cultural and that pre-Maafan African origins have much to do with the development of racialized movements in the New World. Knowledge of the African background is thus essential to constructing a genealogy of thought under this approach, as it assumes such a genealogy is broader than contact with Europe.

The Emic/Etic Approach

For Carr, “the emic/etic approach” orders African intellectual history in such a way that “takes the examination of language, cultural contact and exchange and localized meaning-making as the central constitutive elements for creating frameworks for understanding historical and contemporary African life.” The term emic denotes the bare elements of a certain language or culture, while etic explains or describes broader, general, and non-structural conceptions of these languages or cultures. Within this approach genealogies of thought are understood by way of linguistic and cultural forms that are constituted in particular contexts. African intellectual traditions are then seen as original and sometimes improvised by-products of specific time-space coordinates and are thus given character by these different physical and conceptual locations. In Carr’s conceptualization, this approach is also characterized by its non-privileging of, as well as an overt rejection of long arc considerations of cultural relationships.

Carr considers J. Lorand Matory an exemplar of this particular approach. A trained cultural anthropologist who has completed field work in West Africa and Latin America, Matory’s work generally examines African traditional religions and their cultural relationships between similar life-ways throughout the African world, or what he terms, “Afro-Atlantic dialogues.” These various dialogues reveal the complex nature of cultural contact that have emerged as a consequence of movements of African people across the Atlantic world.

Matory’s most recent book-length text, *Black Atlantic Religion* (2005), has explored these various dynamics through the lens of Candomble, a constellation of Yoruba and Afro-Brazilian traditional meaning-making systems. Important to his conception of time and space, Matory views the existence of observable improvisations of meaning-making practices among West Atlantic Africans as originating from a preserve of underlying African cultural logics, but more importantly as a consequence of the need to select modalities based upon situational contexts. The latter characteristic according to Matory, renders these practices impermanent, yet African. For Matory, it is important to not talk solely about African survivals, but also the nature of and the meanings behind their

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20. Referring to Melville Herskovits’, Sidney Mintz and Richard Price’s, and John Thornton’s theories of African cultural retentions, Matory states: “However, I am less committed than Herskovits, Mintz and Price, or Thornton to view the bents, cognitive orientations, and underlying logics are what objectively constitutes the Africanness of African-American cultures. Such Africanness is also constituted by a genealogy of interested claims and practices, available for selective invocations as precedents.” See J. Lorand Matory, *Black Atlantic Religions*, 15.
improvisations as a result of their contact with different iterations of changing cultural modes in varying contexts, asserting that

the central features of local linguistic and ritual practices, as well as the meanings and motives that believers invest in them, resulted from a long-distance dialogue with colonial Africa and with other American locales, much of which took place after both the slave trade and slavery had ended.21

Along with Matory, Carr includes Yvonne Daniel, whose Dancing Wisdom (2005), explores expressive dance traditions as the embodiment of traditional ways of meaning and/or religious practices in African Diasporan cultures. Other thinkers who can be grouped here include Kyra Gaunt, whose The Games Black Girls Play (2006) applies specific African American time and space contexts to her study of the relationship between African American girls’ games and music. Historians of Africana music Samuel C. Floyd and John Storm Roberts apply similar logic to their studies of Diasporan music traditions.22

The implications of this approach to the construction of an Africana Studies intellectual genealogy are two-fold. First, it suggests that any genealogy of the discipline must be contextualized within the ideational logic of the broader group from which specific thinkers have emerged and to view the cultural meaning-making practices of that

21. Ibid, 32.
specific group as central. Therefore, Africana Studies’ intellectual history, for instance, could draw upon the cultural ideas of the Black Arts Movement, as it was a meaning-making process central to its construction. Or in another possible direction, it could rely on the specific cultural norms which grounded the student movement (e.g. “rapping” sessions, the importance of “soul”) as the constitutive elements of its history, tracing how they shifted and transformed during the periods under conversation. The second is the idea that the emic/etic approach to intellectual genealogy is centered on understanding the African cultural origin of linguistic and meaning-making practices of groups of African intellectuals but analyzing their approaches to knowledge production as specific to varying situational contexts. These varying situational contexts are not necessarily viewed as related to one another and thus no connective thread is assumed. The result is that the very ideas of the Black Arts Movement and the cultural postures of the student movement would be necessarily unconnected from Afrocentricity, Womanism, or other subsequent intellectual movements and their cultural concomitants.

The Alternative Epistemological Approach

Understandings of Africana intellectual history that can be considered as alternative epistemological, cohere around their attempts to “to generate the theories, methods, and reliability-standards necessary to establish academic legitimacy for their study of African people.” 23 They frame understandings of Africana intellectual genealogies in languages amenable to creating reputable typologies for sustained academic discourse. Inherent in this framing, however, is the pursuit to develop

categories of meaning excavated from African culture, meaning-making systems, and long-view genealogies. The development of an alternative epistemology to view African intellectual genealogies can be understood then as the creation of norms that align with African-derived realities.

Notable exemplars of this particular approach include the aforementioned Temple School of Afrocentricity, most notably linked to Molefi Kete Asante and Ama Mazama. Asante’s work, The Afrocentric Idea (1987) introduces his idea that African knowledge production must be conceptualized via the centrality of African agency.24 Building upon the latter conceptualization, his later volume, Kemet, Afrocentricity, and Knowledge (1990), posits ways in which conceptual categories, such as time and space, value systems, and cultural logic based on the African experience and understanding can be formulated and reified. Continuing the Afrocentric project, this text attempted to respond to pushes for the development of disciplinary norms. Asante’s concern here is with developing in Afrocentric terms, the conceptual categories that provide the discipline-building capacity for Africana Studies.25 Contributions to Mazama’s edited volume The Afrocentric Paradigm (2003) build upon Asante’s metatheory by viewing Afrocentric inquiry as a paradigmatic foundation for the discipline of Africana Studies.26

25. See this discussion in Molefi Kete Asante, Kemet, Afrocentricity, and Knowledge (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990), 8-40 and Chapter Seven.
26. Asante has defined metatheory, or paradigm as a “conception that includes a multiplicity of theories; as such it allows us to develop better interpretations, fuller understandings, and more effective articulations of the meaning of human goals and interactions.” See, Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea, 43. Ama Mazama views Afrocentricity, as developed at Temple University under Asante as a paradigm, which is considered to be an epistemologically distinct venture from
Afrocentricity, as outlined by the Temple Circle questions Western knowledge and inquiry as a useful epistemological frame to interrogate or understand the experiences of Africans in historical and contemporary epochs.

Similar in construction is Maulana Karenga’s notion of Kawaida. His *Kawaida Theory* (1980) attempts to develop for Africana Studies, ways of categorizing disciplinary knowledge of Africana experiences, through what he terms “the seven basic areas of culture.”  

In addition to Karenga, other thinkers in Africana Studies like James Stewart and Russell Adams have developed ideas premised on new norms that (should) constitute disciplinary Africana Studies’ critique, and in some ways extend attempts to utilize alternative epistemologies for the understanding of Africana experiences.  

As mentioned in Chapter One, Lucius T. Outlaw, in his text, *On Race and Philosophy* (1996), discusses the importance of developing conceptual normative lenses through which to view instances of African philosophizing traditions as well as the discipline of Africology. Outlaw’s work constitutes the search for ways in which to explain and “normalize” discussions of both African(a) philosophy and the discipline of Africana Studies. His work, however, is distinguished from many similar pursuits as it recognizes the various knowledge complexes in the West and in Africa, that foreground the understanding of any of these contested ideas. In other words, Outlaw’s work pursues a
trajectory that takes into account various communities of meaning as they have been defined in Western discourse as well as in African conceptions. These criteria, whether they be for definitions of discipline or for “philosophy” are often culled from language which seeks to legitimize or demarcate an academic area of inquiry.\textsuperscript{29} For Outlaw these new lenses must be grounded in African and/or African-descended peoples’ ways of meaning as opposed to imposed definitions bounded by ideas of race. These ways of meaning constitute the pursuit of guiding and measuring the “adequacy of all studies of Africa and her peoples.”\textsuperscript{30}

The aforementioned continental thinkers, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Amadou Hampate Ba, K. Kia Bunseki Fu-Kiau and Ngugi Wa Thiong’o have also written on the importance of understanding traditional languages and cultures that fundamentally ground how knowledge of African people is developed and construed. Both Ki-Zerbo and Ba’s contributions to the first volume of UNESCO’s \textit{General History of Africa} (1981) describe in part the nature of, and need to utilize African ways of accessing historical memory.\textsuperscript{31} Fu-Kiau, who has explored social structures within Africana communities, specifically the Bantu people, has along with Ngugi, asserted the need to explore the conceptual

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See the middle three essays in Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., \textit{On Race and Philosophy} (New York: Routledge, 1997), 51-134.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} He continues stating that the: “The anticipation of the existence and recovery of this logos, is I take it, what serves the heuristically to guide the “architectural” work preparatory for discipline building,” Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., “Africology: Normative Theory,” in Ibid, 101.
\end{itemize}
foundations of African languages as normative processes in recovery of African ways of knowing.\textsuperscript{32}

A new, or alternative epistemology, places the trajectory of Africana Studies’ intellectual history on completely different grounds. This development of what Outlaw and others have termed normative theory is essential to the understanding of Africana Studies as a disciplinary space.\textsuperscript{33} As indicated by the works above, alternative epistemologies imply the requisite construction of theoretical space out of the lived experiences of African people themselves. As such, Africana Studies intellectual history in the alternative epistemological frame, would attempt to re-situate and disengage Western epistemological and ontological reasoning, by viewing histories of African thought as internally constituted. The development of such a logic would then require a derivation, reassertion, and application of first and second order ideas as they were historically generated and continued among African peoples. Such a project would then be injected into the construction of an Africana Studies intellectual history, allowing it to escape the previously outlined problematic tendencies in Western intellectual historiography.

\textit{The Unbroken Genealogy Approach}

The unbroken genealogy approach conceptualizes Africana intellectual history as improvisations of a tradition that is unbroken and “central to informing the study of

\textsuperscript{32} For Fu-Kiau, the study of language is the only way in which a “systematic understanding” of a culture can be achieved. See Kimbwandende Kia Bunseki Fu-Kiau, \textit{African Cosmology of the Bantu-Kongo: Principles of Life and Living} (Brooklyn: Athelia Henrietta Press, 2001), 11. Ngugi’s notion of “translation and recovery” of African languages have long been his intellectual concern. See Ngugi wa Thiong’o, \textit{Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance} (New York: Basic Civitas, 2009), 69-98 and \textit{Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature} (Oxford: James Currey, 1986). See also Greg Carr, “What Black Studies is Not,” 1, and his view of “translation and recovery” as central acts for Africana Studies.

contemporary African social, political and cultural life.” It acknowledges but de-emphasizes the role of European modernity in shaping the cultural and linguistic norms, which characterize contemporary Africana intellectual life, choosing to link the latter to an “unbroken genealogy” originating in classical Africa. Thinkers conceptualizing African intellectual traditions as an unbroken chain recover the linguistic and cultural continuities that exist among Africans in antiquity and contemporary times as well as among Africans on the continent and the Diaspora.

Like the Black radical tradition approach, the unbroken genealogy approach views the terms of resistance among African intellectuals as extensions of African worldviews. And like the emic/etic approach, the proponents of the idea of an unbroken genealogy analyze the productions of language and culture. Unlike the emic/etic, however, it does so on a continuum stretching back to antiquity. Finally, it is also similar to the alternative epistemological approach, however the thinkers involved in articulating an unbroken genealogy are more concerned with creating conceptual categories that are tied more concretely to African ways of knowing as opposed to ways of legitimizing knowledge for academic consumption. Essential to this approach is the study of language and material culture. Training in ancient languages foregrounds the ability to extract remnants and extensions of Africana cultures and worldviews along this long continuum of thought.

The unbroken genealogy approach, as a consequence of the rigor and the often political implications of the endeavor, has attracted fewer proponents. In the past century,
the most important have been Cheikh Anta Diop, Theophile Obenga, and Jacob Carruthers. Diop, the Senegalese thinker, whose works were published in the United States in the 1970s, has repeatedly opined that any discussion of Africana intellectual thought must be first grounded in an understanding of its foundation in classical Africa. His copious body of work reveals an intense desire to uncover these connections through scientific investigation and exploration.36 His works, translated in English as *African Origins of Civilization* (1974), *Precolonial Black Africa* (1987), and *The Cultural Unity of Black Africa* (1978) all cohere around the idea of connecting Africans historically to their intellectual histories through the lens of culture and language.

Diop’s protégé, Theophile Obenga has also taken seriously the call to reconnect African culture to its origins in antiquity. The Congolese thinker has utilized linguistic investigation to link “inner” African philosophical thought to its antecedents in Kemet, in a masterful work entitled *African Philosophy: The Pharaonic Period, 2780-330 BC* (2004). This work includes commentaries and translations of Kemetic understandings of “first-order” questions of reality, or “what is.” Reviewing Ancient Egyptian texts that speak to “key issues” such as “humanity, society, the world and the universe, as well as with the absolute,” Obenga is able to translate from the *medew netcher*, African concepts rooted in Egyptian origins that were spread to such groups in other parts of Africa like the Dogon,

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Fang, and Mbochi. According to Obenga, the texts of Pharaonic Egypt belong to the
“history of African thought” and should become “merged from now on as embraced
heritage, with our practice and study of contemporary philosophy.”

Another student of African languages, Ayi Kwei Armah, has also written on the
importance of understanding this unbroken genealogy, in both critical discussions in *The
Eloquence of the Scribes* (2006) and his work in fiction. Diop’s progeny also includes a cadre
of thinkers whom Lafayette Gaston has dubbed, the Dakar School. Senegalese
intellectuals, Aboubacry Moussa Lam and Babacar Sall, have studied and effectively
linked aspects of material culture and language found in Kemetic legacies to African
groups on the Western coast of the continent.

Obenga’s and Diop’s work helped to provide a critical posture to African thinkers
in the Diaspora who have endeavored to trace this unbroken genealogy. Of them, Jacob
H. Carruthers, along with others in the Association for the Study of Classical
Civilizations, took up the study of Kemetic language. Carruthers’ *Mdw Ntr* (1995) is an

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41. Carruthers has commented on his meeting with Diop where he was directed toward the study of *mdw ntr*. See Jacob Carruthers, *Intellectual Warfare* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1999), 222.
important work that further connects traditions of “deep thought” from their origins in Kemet to not only other parts of Africa but to the Western hemisphere. The text is in part a genealogy that connects David Walker, Martin Delany, and other harbingers of African resistance in the West to a cultural grounding in Ancient Kemet. Viewing these thinkers as, “champions of African Deep Thought,” Carruthers not only articulates an alternative epistemology of African resistance, he utilizes the discussion of worldview to trace that epistemology to a specific origin.\textsuperscript{42} Other thinkers who have taken up the cudgels of this approach are Greg Carr, whose work involves tracing foundationalist genealogies, Mario Beatty who has studied and applied wisdom from Kemetic languages, and the continued collective work of the aforementioned Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations.\textsuperscript{43}

The distinct approach to understanding African intellectual history as operationalized by the proponents of an unbroken genealogy establishes a conceptual foundation for Africana Studies intellectual history. Diop’s evocation that the grounding of African thought must reside in classical Africa, established in effect a long view of intellectual history that has been traced and understood as the proper lens to view

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42} Along with articulating a two hundred year-lineage of what he terms the “champions of African deep thought,” in the West, Carruthers’ work establishes the existence of a classical African idea of reality, and then traces it throughout “basic Africa.” This unbroken genealogy of African thought is for Carruthers the foundations of African philosophical reality, African deep thought. See the first three chapters of Jacob H. Carruthers, \textit{Mdw Ntr: Divine Speech: A Historiographical Reflection of African Deep Thought From the Time of the Pharaohs to the Present} (London: Karnak House, 1995), 8-87 as well as the discussion of this approach in Chapters One and Six.

\end{footnotesize}
Africans in world history. The implications are that African Studies intellectual histories must be connected to every visible and traceable intellectual tradition that African people have generated. In other words, the intellectual foundations of the discipline itself would not be disconnected by time or space, from the particular patterns of African thought and the institutions that have supported them throughout human history. The establishment of this foundation would allow one to be able to characterize and trace African intellectual history without an undue focus on Western intellectual genealogies.

**The Sui Generis Approach**

Lastly, the sui generis approach views the West’s confrontation with Africa as the marker for all subsequent ways of acknowledging racial oppression and the resistance to it in the modern era among thinkers in African and Diasporan intellectual genealogies. This is the approach that

> takes the “modern era” (read as the construction of “The West” as an organizing set of cultural logics) as the point of departure for theorizing large-scale African identity and organizes itself around the principle of perpetual improvisation, poly-centered contestation and the idea of Blackness as a social construct drawing upon an indefinable range of characteristics, identities and/or experiences.

Many thinkers trained in the academy have been seduced away from considering the possibility that African thought can be grounded in any other ideational construct than racialized or class-based oppression, a set of ideas, as we have shown, which E. Franklin

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44. For Diop, “Ancient Egypt plays for Africa and blacks in general the same role which Greco-Latin plays for the western world.” Carlos Moore, “Interview with Cheikh Anta Diop,” in Cheikh Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1987), 120. In declaring this need to foundationalize African thought, Diop has consistently stated this need to link it to the origins in Egyptian antiquity. Far from the objective of instilling pride in a glorious African past, this objective creates an intellectual grounding from which to extend and explain cultural unities throughout Africa and the Diaspora. See also Cheikh Anta Diop, *The African Origin of Civilization*, xiv and Chapter Six.

Frazier would find unacceptable. As such, many of the thinkers concerned with Africana intellectual genealogies have looked at their development, as *sui generis*.

What Arturo Schomburg has termed “compendium” histories, have long been part of the intellectual production of African American thinkers. Such works such as William Wells Brown’s *The Rising Son* (1874) and William J. Simmons’ *Men of Mark* (1887) set out to record the accomplishments and achievements of African intellectuals in the West. Brown’s volume, however, does not begin with the period of enslavement, choosing to foreground his engagement with African American intellectuals with a discussion of the African past. Proponents of the *sui generis* approach have since then placed less emphasis on this past, choosing to highlight instead, the pernicious effects of the process of enslavement and/or colonialism.

One of the more widely known African American historical thinkers, John Hope Franklin, can be viewed as a representative exemplar of this approach, as his important text, *From Slavery to Freedom* (1947), along with other volumes gives only passing attention to discussions of any African past. Texts discussed elsewhere in the review have also been conceptualized in this manner. Earl E. Thorpe’s highly influential text, *Black Historians* (1958), William Bank’s *The Black Intellectuals* (1995), Zachery Williams’ *In Search of a Talented Tenth* (2011), Wilson Jeremiah Moses’ *Afrotopia* (1998) and *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism* (1978), and Winston James’ *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia* (1998) all view

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47. See John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947). The text is now in its ninth edition, and was recently reimagined by Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, though it retains a similar chronology.
Africana intellectual activity as responding primarily to Western hegemony in its various manifestations.

Valuable for its role in articulating the first instances of a “Black historical perspective,” Thorpe’s work focuses largely on how this perspective was fashioned out of the bowels of the American experience and centered on the problems of race. Though he spends a few pages outlining African precursors to intellectual life, Banks’ volume is similar to Thorpe’s in that respect. Williams, Moses, and James view race and class as central elements in the development of African consciousness, and view the knowledge production of African intellectuals through the lens of modern political ideology and literary theory.


Though all of these works view Western modernity as the point of departure, they nonetheless differ in terms of which point is most formative. In the introduction to *Renewing Black Intellectual History*, Adolph Reed and Kenneth Warren, state that “making sense of the black American experience requires situating it fundamentally within the larger cultural, political-economic, and ideological dynamics that shape American life in general.”

In her intellectual history of Black women in the academy, Evans uses theoretical tools extracted from the work of Patricia Hill-Collins and John Hope Franklin, which view intellectual activities as shaped by American racial and gender oppression and a genealogy of scholarship that has emerged since the nineteenth century, respectively. Similarly, Rabaka is concerned with constructing the African response to racial oppression, colonial domination, and radical politics in the West, which he labels “Africana critical theory.” Stating that the term must be decolonized from its European base. Rabaka states that philosophizing has roots in classical Africa, and thus “theory” cannot be taken to be a strictly European intellectual endeavor, but his work does not directly attempt to link these beginnings to their contemporary evocation in his exemplars, W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, Frantz Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral. His work is centered more so on the radicalism, which emerged among African thinkers in the


twentieth century, and less on its constitutive origins within African antecedent thought. Rabaka’s work is similar to the widely influential works of Robin D.G. Kelley and Michael Dawson who apply much of the same logic to radical politics and the development of Black ideologies, respectively.

John Ernest has attempted to fashion what he deems the elements of an approach to historiography found in nineteenth century African American thought, which is connected to conditions, (i.e., the specter of colonization schemes, the Fugitive slave act, the development of race pride) as opposed to older traditions of African thought. These older traditions, for thinkers such as Jacob Carruthers and Greg Carr, are important to consider with these nineteenth century thinkers.

Along with the balance of Black feminist thinkers, Patricia Hill-Collins’ text develops from what she considers to be the experiential reality of African American women, a perspective that extracts the “standpoint” of Black women’s intellectual tradition, linking it primarily to modernist conceptions of knowledge. Feminism, a sui generis idea, is the lens and conceptual background for considering Black women’s reality since the period of enslavement.

Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic* has influentially viewed the African experience as grappling with identity shaped solely by national boundaries and oppressive conditions in

these various spheres. While he creates a transnational lens, Gilroy’s approach is rooted in older traditions of intellectual history. Namely, those modeled by August Meier and Robert W. July, who theorize socio-political forces as primary determinants of African intellectual movements.57

This diverse sampling of texts reveals the widespread influence of this way of viewing African intellectual genealogies. For Africana Studies intellectual history, the sui generis approach allows us to see how Western hegemony has affected (or disrupted) the cultural grounding of the Africana community, in general and the intelligentsia, in particular. Not only this, by emphasizing the forces that they have had to contend with in the academy, in social organizations, and in the street, they represent valuable contributions. This emphasis however limits the discussions around the development of first-order constitution of African reality into truncated or disjointed ontological foundations. For framers of Africana Studies intellectual thought, this could end up reverting disciplinary norms to traditional Western-based markers of emergence, such as the Enlightenment in Europe or what has been most commonly asserted in Africana Studies, the 1960s social movements. These markers are often viewed in Western genealogies as “advances” in thought (e.g., Scientific Revolution, Postmodernism), but they reduce African ideas to mere responses to the West. As such an Africana Studies intellectual history constructed in such a manner would link the discipline and its foundations to various responses to racism, class, and or gender oppression as its sole

reason for existing. It would be understood as what Andrew Abbott describes, a problem-centered interdiscipline—and one which would dissolve or transform when problems of race, class, and/or gender oppression changed forms (as it has in the forty years since the creation of Black Studies). Unsurprisingly, very rarely have those conceptualizing African intellectual history as sui generis, also advocated for these same grounds to be the basis to secure autonomy of the discipline.

Carr asserts that “the contemporary struggle to define the discipline of Africana Studies is essentially a contestation over methodologies emanating from these various approaches to knowledge production.” Clearly, if Africana Studies is to develop an intellectual history it will be premised on one of the above approaches, or a mixture and/or variations of them. While there are merits and drawbacks to each of them, it should be evident that the question of disciplinarity is inextricably linked to the nature and conceptualization of each approach to intellectual history. Each of the above approaches, when linked to Africana Studies, would shape subsequent discipline-building activities and practices. The choice made regarding either of these approaches to intellectual history is thus not arbitrary. It is in rooted one’s conception of the discipline.

59. The aforementioned works of Reiland Rabaka and Patricia Hill-Collins come closest. Others advocating “race, gender, and class” sui generis approaches to Black life are unsurprisingly more willing to employ Western traditional disciplines in both the intellectual and administrative makeup of Black Studies. Additional in-depth examinations of early Black Studies programs along the lines of Nick Aaron Ford and Alan Colon would undoubtedly reveal more examples of departments that take this approach. See Nick Aaron Ford, *Black Studies: Threat or Challenge?* (New York: Kennikat Press, 1973) and Alan Colon, “A Critical Review of Black Studies Programs,” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1980).
This dissertation argues that the idea of intellectual and structural autonomy should be the standard guiding this decision.
Chapter 12

“Hands of Helpfulness:” A Conclusion

For people of color have always theorized—but in forms quite different form the Western form of abstract logic. And I am inclined to say that our theorizing (and I intentionally use the verb rather than the noun) is often in narrative forms, in the stories we create, in riddles and proverbs, in the play with language, because dynamic rather than fixed ideas seem more to our liking. How else have we managed to survive with such spiritedness the assault on our bodies, social institutions, countries, our very humanity? And women, at least the women I grew up around, continuously speculated about the nature of life through pithy language that unmasked the power relations of their world. It is this language, and the grace and pleasure with which they played with it, that I find celebrated, refined, critiqued in the works of writers like Toni Morrison and Alice Walker. My folk, in other words, have always been a race of theory—though more in the form of the hieroglyph, a written figure that is both sensual and abstract, both beautiful and communicative.

-Barbara Christian, “The Race For Theory”

The discipline-building practices of Africana Studies have been understood in this work as both an unfinished proposition and as the assumed province of African-informed assumptions. The review of the works in each section sought to clarify the particular nature of ideas as they have coalesced in disciplines and in the conceptual approaches to knowledge that African peoples have utilized, both insurgent and reimaginative. It is on the latter’s understanding of the former that any technique or methodological principle purporting to represent Africana Studies must be based. An appropriate disciplinary identity based on these assumptions ensures that circle will indeed remain unbroken, that older cycles of life will provide the foundation for how African ideas animate our worldly existence.²

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The above epigraph contextualizes the pursuit of language to identify and explain Africana ways of understanding the life of the mind. Much like Christian asserts, discussions of Africana Studies intellectual thought must be interrogated and understood through conceptual foundations that draw meaning from long-view cultural contexts, while acknowledging (rather than simply privileging) those important specific discontinuities. The work remains of producing the articulation of a contemporary iteration of Africana Studies intellectual histories, and then linking through language and deep thought traditions and conceptualizations, the ground, which these intellectual activities have emerged, or in Christian’s words, the long view “race of theory.”

Future research must continue to reveal the subjective terrain of Western disciplinarity, and move beyond the normative definitions of disciplinarity by contextualizing both its foundation as a concept as well its context. Secondly, it must reconsider the works of precursors to Africana Studies, for instance thinkers such as Anna Julia Cooper and Cheikh Anta Diop and others discussed in Part II, as contributors, not to traditional disciplinary areas but to a conception of thought that extends Africana intellectual traditions. Simply put, theoretical assumptions and methodological techniques must be understood and linked through genealogy. But an intellectual genealogy that takes us to the beginning of human history, and a genealogy which provide the generative beginnings of deep thought. This overarching concern connects African Studies in a manner, that by its very definition, reproduces and improvises upon scholarship that moves beyond normative or conventional representations of Africana thought, history, and culture—which was the original stated purpose of Black Studies.
If in fact, we are what Gerald Horne predicts future historians might term, “the lost generation,” then we must find ourselves. With our memories as our guide, we must work, we must struggle, for a world, both familiar to our ancestors and new; we will win. W.E.B. Du Bois’ words frame our possibilities, and with them, we end:

The hands which Ethiopia shall soon stretch out unto God are not mere hands of helplessness and supplication, but rather are they hands of pain and promise; hard, gnarled, and muscled for the world’s real work; they are hands of fellowship for the half-submerged masses of a distempered world; they are hands of helpfulness for an agonized God!4

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Books


Book Chapters


Periodicals


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**Unpublished Materials**


Chapter 12: “Hands of Helpfulness:” A Conclusion


