THE DAY BEFORE REFORM: CAUSES OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1970-2005

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ABSTRACT

State legislative campaign finance reform varies considerably among states and over time. Over the past 35 years states have adopted increasingly stronger reform policies; however, many disparities between states still exist. Current state legislative campaign finance laws range from disclosure only to clean elections programs. All states have disclosure laws, while only three have clean elections regulations. Many studies of state campaign finance reform examine the regulatory effects on campaigns and elections (e.g., Thompson and Moncrief 1998; Francia and Herrnson 2003) but none consider the causes of such reforms. This dissertation employs a unique research strategy by individually analyzing the specific types of state legislative campaign finance reform: 1) disclosure, 2) contribution limits, and 3) expenditure limits and public funding from 1970-2005. What emerges from these analyses indicates the conditions under which states have adopted more and less stringent types of legislative campaign finance reform. It examines the extent to which legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and the initiative affect the stringency of campaign finance reform in the states. Just because a state requires legislative candidates to disclose campaign finance figures does not mean that the requirement is strong when compared to what other states are doing. Measuring the type of campaign finance reform based on a unique stringency scale allows us to understand the conditions under which a state supports strong or weak campaign finance laws.

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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

The cost of running for elected office in America is an expensive endeavor. Committed incumbents and serious challengers must raise large sums of money to engage in contested races. Few congressional or legislative districts across the country are immune from the high costs associated with running for public office. Over the past 30 years, campaign costs have especially grown, causing critics to lament the broken system and urge for reforms. Proponents of the current campaign finance system argue that any limitation on money in elections is a violation of free speech and association: two key components of our civil liberties. At the federal, state, and local government levels, critics and supporters of the various campaign finance systems have been at a standoff. Policy changes tend to be incremental rather than fundamentally new, or punctuated equilibriums as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) suggest. Research from this dissertation also supports this incremental change in campaign finance reform instead of radical new policies. At the federal level, efforts to regulate or limit money in elections have been sparse, while campaign finance reform is vigorous at the state level. Over the last 30 years every state has enacted at least one type of campaign finance reform while Congress has enacted only five (three of which are only amendments, not full-scale policies). Critics and members of Congress who call for more stringent levels of campaign finance reform would be wise to study the states. With a rich and varied history of reform types, the states earn their status as "laboratories of democracy." Congress ought to examine the specific states with positive reform experiences if they are serious about decreasing the influence of private money in elections. My study argues that campaign finance reform is flourishing at the state level despite the anemia that plagues reform efforts the federal level.

To date, much of the media and scholarly focus on money in politics is centered on Congress. The recent enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)[1] is the latest attempt at the federal level to balance the fundraising playing field since the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its subsequent amendments in 1974, 1976, and 1979. Though federal campaign finance reforms have been few and far between and laden with controversy, the activity at the state level has been much more vigorous. State attempts to regulate campaign finance have occurred in waves primarily determined by internal state events and to a lesser extent in response to national events like Watergate. Like many public policy areas in the age of devolution, the states are taking the initiative in adopting policies that are suitable to their residents without relying on strategic or financial help from the federal government. Campaign finance reform is one area where the states have thrived in the last 30 years without much guidance from the federal government. Regardless of the abundance of reforms at the state level, the literature tends to focus instead at the federal level: analyzing the effects of the FECA, BCRA, and money's effect on public policy. This research gap is surprising considering the enormous diversity and innovation in the states. There is a lot to be learned from studying state reform efforts, so why has the study of state campaign finance reform been neglected in favor of national campaign finance reform studies?

[1] The United States Supreme Court recently issued a decision regarding issue advertising in federal elections in *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life Inc* (2007). The Court lifted some of the bans that the BCRA had placed on the timing and specifics of these advertisements. Supporters of the decision champion the protection of free speech while critics argue that the decision seriously weakened the controversial law.

Thompson and Moncrief (1998) offer a few reasons why state studies have lagged behind congressional studies. The primary reason is because of data gathering problems. There is no state-level counterpart to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and there are myriad ways the states compile and publish campaign finance data. The lack of a state clearinghouse for campaign finance laws and the fact that each state uses different language to craft similar-type bills makes a 50-state comparison difficult. Compounding this data collection issue are 50 sets of laws and regulations (pp. 8-9). Despite an enormous effort and team of experienced researchers, Thompson and Moncrief were only able to collect similar data from 18 states! Thompson and Moncrief's study of 18 states differs from my study in that they examine the actual financial records of state legislative campaigns. When they were conducting the data collection portion of their study, they had to travel to state capitols and even local courthouses. Because they were examining specific races, their study mandated this type of research. My approach to studying campaign finance reform is different. I take a wider, more uniform approach to data gathering by examining the existing laws in the states. This allowed me to use a data compilation source like *The Book of the States* which publishes relatively uniform state laws dealing with various types of campaign finance reform. Of course, no single source is a perfect representation of data and so multiple sources must be consulted in some cases. Schultz (2002) also confronts a data collection problem and rectifies it by choosing 12 states that differ according to such criteria as their treatment of money in elections, geographic location, population, and political cultures (p. 16). Both studies by Thompson and Moncrief and Schultz take a deeper case-study approach, adding depth to our knowledge of state campaign finance reform. My study adds breadth to the knowledge of campaign finance reform by systematically analyzing all 50 states over a 35-year period. Malbin and Gais (1998) examine the role of regulating state campaign finance reforms but concentrate on just four states with “ambitious regulatory frameworks” (p. 6). All three of these important works illuminate state campaign finance systems and provide valuable insight into specific states’ experiences that otherwise might not be known, but the literature frustrates students of campaign finance reform who seek to make comparisons between states.

To improve upon this lack of comparison between the states’ campaign finance systems, I propose a systematic 50-state analysis measured by variables found in all states. Studying the 50 states’ campaign finance systems is daunting unless there is a way to classify the types of reforms. My study will overcome this problem by implementing an innovative research device that categorizes states through a typology of campaign finance regulation consisting of 1.) disclosure, 2.) contribution limits, and 3.) expenditure limits and public funding. Treating campaign finance reform as the dependent variable is important in two distinct ways. First it avoids judgments that partial public financing efforts, for example, are “better” than or “improvements” from disclosure laws. From a reformer’s perspective, any reform effort is better than no reform effort at all. What is considered a policy reinvention or improvement for Florida’s campaign finance system may be a policy innovation or brand new to Illinois.[2] Second, breaking up the dependent variables into categories allows for greater exploration into the causes of these campaign finance reforms. What is considered a novel approach to regulating election money in Pennsylvania may be a decades-old

[2] The terms “reinvention” and “innovation” are taken from the state policy diffusion literature. For a discussion on what is a policy reinvention, see Hays (1996b) and for a discussion on what a policy innovation is, see Walker (1969).

reform effort in Minnesota. Several factors influence how and when a state adopts a new policy. I argue that state campaign finance reforms are influenced by the following independent variables: 1.) legislative professionalism, 2.) the presence or absence of the initiative, 3.) political scandal, and 4.) partisan breakdown of state government. The point of this study is to understand what causes states to adopt stronger or weaker types of campaign finance reform through a 50-state analysis. It is unfair to assume that the same variables will impact the adoption of simple disclosure laws as full public financing. Thus, I am interested in the policy inputs to state campaign finance reforms—and not the effects, whether intended or not, of the reforms.

My study departs from previous research in two important ways. First, no published studies have systematically examined the disparities between state campaign finance reforms and what contributes to the variation in the states. My study examines both the causes and impediments to state campaign finance reform. Knowing the conditions under which campaign finance reform is adopted can help scholars and practitioners alike in their quest to limit or expand campaign finance reform in the states. In my study, campaign finance reform is treated as the dependent variable: what causes a state to adopt a full public financing scheme, for example, instead of how these reforms affect the political system. Unlike other studies that examine state campaign finance reform as an independent variable (e.g., Goidel and Gross 1996; Francia and Herrnson 2003) my analysis looks beyond the "haves" and the "have nots" of state campaign finance reform. Because my study focuses on policy inputs it is necessary to treat the reform variations as the dependent variable. This approach alone is a great departure from previous research that is concerned with the outputs of campaign finance reform, or how the law influences elections and candidates. I examine the causes of reform and not the effects.

The second way my study departs from previous research is in the conceptualization of campaign finance reforms. Reforms are broken into categories instead of grouping together all types. Others have used a version of this measurement tool (Gross, Goidel, and Shields 2002; and Hogan 2005 and 2000) but only for a particular type of reform effort. Gross, Goidel and Shields (2002) examine contribution limits and partial public financing and Hogan examines PAC contribution limits (2005) and contribution limits and partial public financing (2000). While these works are not intended to be comprehensive analyses of state campaign finance reform, I argue that to gain a genuine sense of a state's commitment to reform, all types of campaign finance reform must be analyzed. It is unreasonable to assume that the same variables affect the adoption of disclosure laws as they do full public finance laws. Taking a state-level approach and conceptualizing campaign finance reform as categories for dependent variables will add another layer of understanding of how state characteristics affect reform efforts and possibly how these characteristics affect public policymaking in general. The primary research question this study addresses is: why are there such drastic differences in the types of campaign finance reforms in the states? This question can be answered by analyzing the factors that lead to state legislative campaign finance reform. The title of this study reflects this research commitment: The Day *Before* Reform and is inspired from the many books written, contributed, or edited by the campaign finance scholar, Michael J. Malbin (Malbin 2006; Malbin 2003; and Malbin and Gais 1998). To better understand campaign finance reform today, we must look to yesterday to the contributing factors.

Campaign Finance Reform as a Regulatory Policy

Both Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1980) offer simplified typologies of public policies. Lowi's three policy categories consist of: distributive, redistributive, and regulatory. Whereas Wilson classifies policies differently by focusing on the costs versus the benefits and whether the costs and benefits are narrow or diffuse. With respect to my study, campaign finance reform fits into the regulatory policy arena because "it involves the use of government authority to constrain the behavior of private actors" (Gerber and Teske 2000, p. 852). In this case, private actors are political actors, campaign donors, and candidates for public office. Regulatory policy is highly dependent on the technical expertise of bureaucrats to implement and enforce such policies—a point that Malbin and Gais (1998) make clear in their study.

Beyond regulatory policies, the broader policymaking literature focuses mainly on federal actors and policies. There is a well-developed body of literature on agenda setting and inputs to the policymaking process (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 1993; and Kingdon 1995). At this stage in the policymaking process, researchers are concerned with many questions pertaining to policy inputs such as: How do issues earn agenda status? And what caused this issue to be important today whereas yesterday it was little-known? As an issue before the legislature, campaign finance reform is generally not conducive to garnering eager majorities of supporters. For both ideological and issue-definition reasons, legislators have different opinions about reforming campaign finance. Many supporters of the status quo, for example, believe that campaign finance is a form of political speech and deserves the highest protections under the First Amendment. Opponents, on the other hand, recognize the sanctity of the First Amendment but place a greater emphasis on political equality and the principle of one person equals one vote. The way that legislators define what a campaign finance "problem" is also makes coalition forming difficult. Further complicating the issue within legislatures is that campaign finance reform does not meet the typical pork barrel or log rolling politics that characterize much of congressional and professional legislature behavior. Campaign finance reform does not directly benefit constituents and it may interfere in the existing delicate coalition structures in Congress and state legislatures that aid in the passage of necessary legislation. Working on campaign finance reform may exact opportunity costs from working on more effective and productive legislation that helps congressional and legislative colleagues and constituents. Despite the marginal attention legislatures pay to campaign finance reform, reform efforts do occur rather often at the state level. As an unpopular issue among many legislators, campaign finance reform is thriving at the state level. Why is this the case? And if campaign finance reform was more respected, would more states have more of it?

State Campaign Finance Reform Literature

While much of the literature in this area focuses on federal campaign finance reform, scholars have begun to notice opportunities to study campaign finance reform at the state level. Adamany (1969) was one of the first to mention state campaign finance reform but it was only in the epilogue. In the late 1960s, few states had what were considered "reforms." Most regulations on the campaign finance system were to protect against vote buying and intimidation; candidate spending levels did not seem to bother anyone then. By the mid-1970s Alexander (1976) had assembled an edited volume on 10 states and their campaign finance systems immediately after Watergate. The volume notes that the post-Watergate reforms strengthened the existing laws but few states adopted far reaching and fundamentally new reforms; reform efforts were extensions of existing laws. In a book review on Alexander's work, Adamany (1977) observes that this volume lacks a systematic way to compare the reform efforts of the 10 states. Thus, it is difficult to generalize overall state experience with reform. This important comment surprisingly has not encouraged contemporary scholars to analyze states more systematically. Notable exceptions include Thompson and Moncrief (1998) and Malbin and Gais (1998).

More recently, the study of campaign finance reform has broadened with an emphasis toward reform efforts in a single state or a limited number of states (Donnay and Ramsden 1995; Mayer and Wood 1995; Redfield 1996). The persistent lack of systematic analysis is probably related to the complexities associated with analyzing multiple-state campaign finance systems. And as Gross, Goidel, and Shields (2002) point out, most of the work on campaign finance concentrates on the impact of money on the outcomes of legislative elections (e.g., Goidel and Gross 1996; Hogan 1999, 2000; Jacobson 1980; Krasno and Green 1993; Thompson and Moncrief 1998) and less work has focused on campaign finance and gubernatorial elections. Gross, Goidel, and Shields (2002) attempt to bridge the gap between studies on the effects of campaign finance reforms on legislative elections to gubernatorial contests and later Gross and Goidel (2003) follow up with a book-length account of money in gubernatorial elections.

Perhaps the most comprehensive study of campaign finance reform in the states is by Thompson and Moncrief (1998). They explore the factors affecting state-by-state variation, including cost of elections, legislative professionalism, partisan competition, and legal structure. To do so, they study 18 states and their legislative races from 1986 to 1992. In the same volume, Gierzynski presents a framework for studying campaign finance in the states. He suggests that there are four categories of factors that affect reform: political, legal, structural, and electoral. Political factors affect campaign finance reform both directly and indirectly and include party competition, political culture, interest group strength, legislative professionalism, decentralization of the policymaking process, party organizational strength, and the importance of elections. Legal factors include state campaign finance laws, federal campaign finance laws, election laws in general, and term limits. Structural factors include the pool of available money, the size of the district, district population, number of seats in the district, and party balance in the district. Electoral factors include incumbency, competitiveness of the election, challenger quality, and candidate characteristics (gender, age, race, ethnicity). Since my study focuses mainly on the policy inputs and not necessarily on the consequences of reform efforts, I will utilize portions of Gierzynski's framework and rely mainly on the political and legal factors to explain variation in state legislative campaign finance reform. To the structural category that Gierzynski proposes, I add party balance in the legislature (partisan breakdown) and to electoral factors I add political scandals.

Not all of the variables proposed by Gierzynski are used in my study. For instance, few of the electoral and structural factors are considered because my research purposes are different. I am less concerned with the results of campaign finance reform and more concerned with the causes. To date, most studies of state or campaign finance reform are interested in the effects of reform on political behavior. I am interested in the effects of political behavior on campaign finance reform. Political behavior includes formal influences like legislature and lawmaking structures, but also informal and dynamic influences such as political corruption and policy diffusion. These formal and informal influences affect not only the adoption of campaign finance reform, but equally as important, they serve as impediments to successful adoption. Thus, for some states the legislative and lawmaking structure may be conducive to citizen-based initiatives that call for reform, but in other states the legislative and lawmaking structures may discourage, or prohibit, the popular initiative or other grassroots efforts to enact reform. Awareness of the causes and impediments to state reform gives us a better understanding of the effects of state campaign finance reforms today. My study initiates a dialog that addresses the following questions: Why is reform present in some states but not others? What impact does political behavior have on the adoption rate of state campaign finance reform? What do states need to achieve reform? What blocks the passage of campaign finance reform? Answers to these questions allow us to evaluate the intentions of state campaign finance reform and predict when reform efforts will succeed or fail.

In addition to Thompson and Moncrief (1998) and Gierzynski (1998), other studies influence the literature. Malbin and Gais (1998) survey the effectiveness of states to enforce their very own campaign finance reform efforts. They explore the disconnect between campaign finance reform theory and practice, arguing that there has been persistent lack of “clarity about purpose, a lack of honesty about trade-offs, excessive ambitiousness on the part of reformers, persistent mismatches between means and ends, and an almost naïve unwillingness to design laws with an eye toward how they will be received and used by political professionals" (p. 3). Malbin and Gais are interested in analyzing the agencies responsible for overseeing the campaign finance regulations and they conduct a survey of these state agencies. They find that while the agencies' intentions are good, they lack the funding to adequately perform the duties with which they are charged and as a result, strict enforcement is impossible. Their suggestions for improving reform and enforcement include restoring accountability to the agencies charged with monitoring the finance laws, restraining the relationship between officeholders and contributors, promoting competition, and enhancing public participation (p. 163). These are lofty goals but they provide few roadmaps or suggestions for implementing these objectives. Malbin and Gais relate the problems of enforcing state campaign finance laws to a fundamental problem with American democracy: Congress and state legislatures enact laws but they do not often perform the necessary watchdog function of overseeing the bureaucratic agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing these laws. They suggest that until there is more bureaucratic accountability and funding, campaign finance reform is only a partial reality.

Schultz (2002) offers less of a prescription for reforming the "reformed" system (as Malbin and Gais 1998 suggest) and instead focuses on current reform efforts in 12 states. Schultz argues that state campaigns are starting to face the same problems with money and politics as federal campaigns, ranging from expensive media costs to the influx of the number of PACs and registered lobbyists in the states. The selection of states for the study is based on state campaign finance reform laws, geographic location, population, and political culture, but almost half of the included states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, and Michigan) are located in the Midwest, a few are the usual subjects in studies on campaign finance reform (California, Texas, and Florida) because they are large, diverse states with different approaches to campaign finance reform, and the remaining states seem to be a rather odd combination (Wyoming, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma). The result is a collection of case studies outlining the problems leading to reform and the problems associated with the reforms after their adoption. But the drawback with compiled case study research like this is that the reader is left wondering if there is a better way to compare states' reforms besides just tracing their individual paths to adoption. It is useful for historical purposes to know why and how a state enacted reform but it is also useful to know if that experience is applicable to other states. This complaint echoes Adamany's (1977) criticism of Alexander's (1976) early multi-state compilation. To better understand the state legislative campaign reform efforts, more research should be conducted in the systematic way that Gierzynski (1998) proposes, or by selecting several state characteristics (like my study) that apply to all 50 states to better understand what explains the adoption of reform.

My study finds its place among the literature by analyzing the determinants of and impediments to state legislative campaign finance reform. Rather than using a dichotomous variable for overall legislative campaign finance reform, this study will analyze each type of reform separately and the individual states that have those reform efforts. The determinants for disclosure, a minimal reform, are most likely different than the determinants for clean elections, an onerous reform. Where the differences lie is the focus of this exploration. The next section identifies the range of state campaign finance reform types.

Types of Reforms and Dependent Variables

There are three types of campaign finance reforms in the states. These reforms range from disclosure, contribution limits, and expenditure limits and public funding.[3] It is easy to visualize these reforms along a continuum, with disclosure representing the bare-minimum of reform on the left end and clean elections representing maximum reform on the right end.[4] At various points between these two extremes lie contribution limits and expenditure limits and public funding. But just because states use disclosure or contribution limits, for example, does not mean that each state has identical laws. The reality is that within each of these categories is a rich variety of restrictions, for example, ranging from loose to tight disclosure laws to a range of low to high contribution limits. Some of these reforms are more meaningful than others—an area that my study explores further. The following is a breakdown of the specific types of reforms.

Disclosure

At the low end of the continuum of campaign finance reform is disclosure. Disclosure of campaign funds and expenditures is required by all 50 states. This is an effort to bring attention to the monetary activities of political actors, with the anticipation that they will behave more responsibly when receiving and spending campaign contributions (Lochner and Cain 1999). For example, sunshine, or shedding light onto, is the premise behind Illinois' campaign finance law which requires reporting and disclosure to regulate the flow of money in the state. Beyond electronic filing and viewing of these records, no other form of campaign finance regulation exists in Illinois (Redfield 2002). Five states count disclosure as their only credible type of campaign

[3] Full public funding programs are often referred to as "clean elections" programs.
[4] See Appendix A

finance law: Illinois, Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas.[5] Even among these five states there is great disparity in the law itself that includes such factors as electronic filing, accessibility, and usability according to The Campaign Disclosure Project (2005), which conducts annual rankings on state disclosure law. The purpose of The Campaign Disclosure Project is to offer a uniform set of standards to compare states' disclosure laws. Based on a high standard of disclosure, the project grades each state according to campaign disclosure laws, electronic filing programs, disclosure content accessibility, and online contextual and technical usability. State grades are based on a 300-point scale and are not curved, weighted, or scaled in order to more accurately measure change over time. Based on the 2005 rankings of the disclosure-only states, Illinois earned the overall top grade of B. Texas earned a B-, Pennsylvania earned a D, and both Mississippi and North Dakota earned F's. Because these states largely differ with respect to their disclosure laws, it behooves us to understand the conditions under which they adopted theoretically-similar yet realistically-different reforms.

Contribution Limits

In the arsenal of campaign finance reforms, disclosure is the least a state can do to regulate its campaign finance system. Next on the minimum-maximum reform continuum is contribution limits. According to Gross and Goidel, "[t]hree central

[5] According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2005), Illinois is the only state in this group that places absolutely no limits on any campaign contributions. Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas have minimal contribution limits because they limit contributions by corporations and/or unions. In these states corporate and union contributions are limited, but PAC contributions to candidates are not. So while corporations and/or unions generally cannot give outright (except in Mississippi with $1,000 to a candidate per calendar year), they are free to donate unlimited amounts through PACs. Although these states technically have a "contribution limit," there are such egregious loopholes that they are treated in the disclosure category as their only "serious" campaign finance reform effort. My study is not alone in acknowledging this glaring issue with "prohibitions" on corporate and/or union contributions. Re-routing corporate and/or union contributions in the form of PACs is formalized at the federal level in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Beatty 2007).

rationales exist for contribution limits. They: (1) reduce corruption—or at least public perception of corruption—resulting from large contributions; (2) make the fundraising process more democratic by forcing candidates to raise money from a broader base of political supporters; and (3) reduce the overall level of candidate campaign spending by making the fundraising process more burdensome" (p. 20). Contribution limits are the second most popular method of campaign finance reform with 37 states[6] limiting the amount of money candidates for office can receive from individuals, political action committees (PACs), and political parties. Specifically within this category, 37 states have limits on individual to candidate contributions, 36 have limits on PAC to candidate contributions, and 27 limit political party to candidate contributions. Although the majority of states have contribution limits, there are 18 states for which this is the most stringent level of campaign finance regulation. The 19 other states in this category also support either partial public financing, clean elections, or both.

Like disclosure, there are vast disparities among contribution levels within each subcategory. Among the states for which contribution limits are the greatest level of campaign finance reform, Montana, for example, places a $130 limit in either the primary or general election to a legislative candidate, while New York has an $8,500 limit for general election senate candidates (NCSL 2005b). The National Conference of State Legislators (2005a) notes that limits on PAC contributions are generally comparable to individual limits in each state. Political party contributions to candidates range from $15,000 each year for Alaska senate candidates to $1,000 for Kansas senate candidates in a contested primary election (NCSL 2005a). The majority of states support some version of contribution limits from individuals, PACs, and political parties. But why are there

[6] As of 2005.

such vast differences in the limits? And why do 18 states have contribution limits as their most stringent level of campaign finance reform?

Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

What makes a state limit not just campaign contributions but also arrange for taxpayer money to partially finance campaigns? Public funding programs come in two varieties: partial and full. Full public funding programs are often referred to as clean elections. Expenditure limits, or limits on what a candidate may spend in his or campaign, are tied to the voluntary acceptance of partial or full public funding.

Partial public financing programs inch closer to clean elections or full public financing of elections. Many partial public financing programs got their start in the post-Watergate era as Jones (1981, p. 1) reports, "[b]etween 1972 and 1980 seventeen states enacted legislation to provide public funding of state-level election campaigns." Partial public funding efforts were enacted to help candidates with increasing campaign expenses and are intended to cover a portion of the expenses, never the entire amount. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), almost half of the states support some form of public financing for candidates either through check-offs on taxes or legislative appropriation (2007). Along with the acceptance of partial public financing, candidates volunteer to abide by spending limits. *Requiring* candidates to abide by spending limits was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976). The Supreme Court argued that involuntary spending limits on candidates for public office violates First Amendment rights to free speech. In this case, the Court did allow voluntary spending limits if they are predicated on the acceptance of public financing.

Among the states for which partial public financing is their most stringent level of campaign finance regulation, Minnesota and Wisconsin have different experiences with the amount and type of support they provide to candidates. Though geographical neighbors and identified as moralistic states (Elazar 1984), each state has had different degrees of success with their partial public financing schemes. Minnesota's is often hailed as a successful policy, in part because the public funding is enough to entice more candidates to enroll. Minnesota's system is more attractive to taxpayers who have the option of allocating $5.00 on their state income tax form to the Democratic Farmer-Labor party, the Independent Republicans, or a general campaign fund. This system allows the contributions to remain local (because they are managed at the county level) while allowing taxpayers to choose between parties (Donnay and Ramsden 1995). To the East, Wisconsin's experience with partial public funding has had not as much success. Taxpayer participation has decreased steadily since the adoption of the law in 1977, so there is less money in the public coffers to allocate to candidates. When candidates do announce their intention to receive public funding and abide by spending limits, the public funding is deeply inadequate to mount a serious challenge for office (Mayer and Wood 1995). Preliminary research indicates that Minnesota's system is more attractive to taxpayers (and eventually candidates) because it allows taxpayers to essentially choose where their allocation will go. In Wisconsin, the tax check-offs accumulate in a general pool to be distributed to candidates running for the State Assembly and Senate. How can two states with similar geography, demographics, political structure and culture have such dissimilar experiences with partial public financing systems?

Clean Elections

Full public financing for statewide and legislative candidates, or clean elections, is the newest trend in state campaign finance reform. Clean election programs work by requiring participating candidates to gather small contributions (for example, five dollars) from a specified number of sources. This demonstrates their widespread public support. Once candidates qualify for public funding based upon certification of the small contributions, they agree to abide by strict spending laws and are prohibited from gathering additional private contributions. In place of private contributions, candidates receive a grant from the state to cover the cost of the campaign. Clean elections candidates may receive less grant money if they run uncontested (NCSL 2007). Participation in clean election programs is voluntary in both Arizona and Maine but the number of participants varies between the states. In the 2006 primary and general elections, 59 percent of Arizona legislative candidates participated (Citizens Clean Elections Commission 2006) and 83 percent of Maine general election legislative candidates participated (www.maincleanelections.org). At this writing, just Arizona and Maine have clean election programs, while Vermont's was recently overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Randall v. Sorrell* (2006) and New Jersey is in the process of revising its clean elections pilot program after an unsuccessful trial run in the 2005 election (Schwaneberg 2007). The programs in Arizona and Maine were introduced through the ballot initiative, while Vermont's was introduced through the legislature. Vermont's law was invalidated on the basis that it infringed on free speech and the Supreme Court ruled that the contribution limits to legislative and gubernatorial candidates were too low (Sneyd 2007). At the time of this writing, the Vermont

Legislature is at a standstill in terms of replacing the failed effort. This study explores the conditions under which the clean elections programs in Arizona, Maine and Vermont were enacted.[7] Maine and Vermont are neighbors and one could argue that they share similarities in political culture, geography, population and lawmaking style, but they are dissimilar from Arizona. Why are clean elections thriving in Maine and Arizona, and why did the experiment fail in Vermont? What would lead a state to employ such a stringent level of campaign finance reform? What happened in these states to permit them to go beyond contribution limits and partial public funding?

State Legislative Campaign Finance Reform

Another way my study makes contributions to the political science literature is by examining campaign finance reform directed at state legislative candidates. My study utilizes the growing area of state campaign finance reform specifically targeted at state legislatures, instead of grouping legislative and gubernatorial campaign finance reform together. My study is not alone in utilizing this scheme: several state campaign finance pieces follow this bifurcated research method (e.g. Thompson and Moncrief 1998; Goidel and Gross 2002). The main reason for the legislative focus is the variety of reforms targeted at a variety of legislatures. Like Congress, state legislatures often bear the brunt of bad press and public relations because they are such public and open branches of government. To larger extents the presidency and the Supreme Court are shielded from close public scrutiny. Democracy, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) note, is a messy process and nowhere in government is democracy spotlighted more than in the legislative branch. At the state level, Gross and Goidel (2003) suggest that legislatures are more apt

[7] Since this study will examine the conditions that lead to the adoption of campaign finance reform, the constitutionality of Vermont's law has little to do with the driving forces for the initial campaign finance reform.

to place campaign finance reforms on the governor than on themselves, but since there are so many types of reforms targeted at state legislatures, there is much more to this story than Gross and Goidel admit. Regardless of how the legislative campaign finance reform was instituted, either through initiative or legislative act, legislatures are the institutions that must support the reform and delegate its enforcement to a capable, well-funded state agency. As Malbin and Gais (1998) point out, genuine support and competent delegation in campaign finance regulation are rare phenomena, but they do occasionally occur. One such example is Vermont's legislature, which adopted a far-reaching but now-invalidated public financing law without the help of the formal initiative process. At the other end of the spectrum, and more typical of legislatures, Pennsylvania's lawmaking body has done little in the way of regulating campaign finance.

State legislative campaign finance reforms did not happen all at once. Rather, the contrary is true: reform efforts are ongoing and dynamic. In light of political scandal, for example, the media sometimes suggest that reforms are needed. So just because states are locked into a particular type of campaign finance scheme today does not mean that the scheme is here to stay, as is the case with the repeal of Vermont's full public financing scheme.[8] Although campaign finance reform is not static, there is a definite starting point to modern reform efforts. That starting point occurs in the pre-Watergate era and continues to the present. My study will focus on the time period in campaign finance reforms from 1970 to 2005. This 35-year period encompasses the pre- and post-Watergate reform efforts that mainly included toughening disclosure laws, but also

[8] The scheme was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court case in *Randall v. Sorrell* (2006).

witnesses the period in which states took extra steps to enact more stringent reforms such as contribution limits, expenditure limits and full public funding schemes.

Before Watergate, states enacted a hodgepodge of responses to specific issues such as vote buying and scandals (Gross and Goidel 2003, p. 2). For instance, Maryland outlawed the practice of giving liquor to voters in 1811 while other states soon followed suit. In 1883, New York enacted its own Civil Service Reform Act which protected government employees from being solicited for campaign contributions at work and from passing a political test as a condition of employment (Gross and Goidel 2003, pp. 2-3). The post-Watergate era is considered the contemporary era in the study of campaign finance reform, and it is also the era in which all states enacted some reforms.

As research continues for this study, states, along with concerned groups such as Common Cause, are continuously debating the nature and type of campaign finance reform contributing to a dynamic process that sometimes makes classification and generalizations cumbersome. Because of these difficulties, many studies tend to treat similar reform efforts equally instead of highlighting or acknowledging their unique differences. While this may be an intentional decision related to the aforementioned reasons a few examples include Malbin and Gais (1998) who feature disclosure laws, Gierzynski (1999) who assesses spending limits and partial public financing, and Gross and Goidel (2003) who investigate the role of contribution limits on gubernatorial elections. These approaches, while providing much-needed analysis into the world of campaign finance reform, are incomplete for several reasons, most notably because they do not allow room to acknowledge the vast and comprehensive differences, for example, between a state with symbolic disclosure laws and one with tough laws. Moreover, they do not allow for the nuances in reform types that emerge when one digs a little deeper and discovers that partial public funding in Minnesota is not the same as partial public funding in Wisconsin. Witko (2005) supports this critique of the literature and argues for more comprehensive, systematic analyses of state campaign finance reform.

Bowler and Donovan (2004) also acknowledge a similar problem with studies on states with the initiative. By merely listing all the states with the initiative and those without it, the authors note that a wealth of understanding is missing by allowing states with frequent use of the initiative to be categorized the same as states that seldom make use of this direct democracy apparatus.[9] My study applies Witko's and Bowler's and Donovan's argument that there needs to be better division of campaign finance reform "haves" and "have nots" in categories to better understand the uniqueness of each state and how those characteristics relate to the extent of campaign finance reform. My study rectifies this categorization problem by classifying states according to their most significant campaign finance reform, whether it is simply disclosure, or something more stringent such as contribution limits, partial public financing, or clean elections. Because state laws vary even within these categories, highlighting one or two typical or atypical states will offer readers a thorough picture of the range of reforms in the states and the causes of them.

A recent study by Witko (2005) measures the stringency of state campaign finance laws by scoring states on the degree to which they permit outside spending in elections, among other variables. Witko's study is a valuable contribution to the area of state campaign finance reform but ranking states according to their reforms does little to

[9] My study examines the total number of initiatives offered each year in each state. This separates the casual users from the more robust state users. See the explanation of independent variables for more details on the treatment of the initiative in this dissertation.

satisfy our appetite as to why these states have lax or rigid reforms in the first place. My study will draw on Witko's index of the stringency of state campaign finance regulation, but differs in that mine will delineate the policy inputs rather than just ranking states according to a stringency factor. Since this index is based on state statutes in 2002 it is not a practical device for explaining early reform efforts but will be useful in understanding more contemporary reform efforts. How stringent a state's campaign finance reforms are is determined by the scores they receive through data collection and analysis. A lower score indicates a less stringent law whereas a higher score indicates a more stringent law.

Independent Variables and Hypotheses

Up to this point, a discussion has ensued explaining the categorization of the dependent variable. To explore why there are differences in the types and stringency of state legislative campaign finance reforms, my study analyzes several independent variables based on factors important to previous 50-state studies. A 50-state ranking system is common among studies of state politics. There are indices for stringency of campaign finance reform (Witko 2005), legislative professionalism (Squire 1992, 2000), policy liberalism (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Gray 2005), interest group influence (Thomas and Hrebenar 2005), and strength of governors (Beyle 2005) to name a few. The methods of choice in these studies are regression analyses. My study will use correlations and ordinary least square regressions to determine the extent to which each of the following independent variables affect the adoption of campaign finance reform in the states: 1.) legislative professionalism, 2.) the initiative, 3.) political scandal, and 4.) partisan breakdown of state government. These variables are selected for several reasons which are presented below. The following includes a brief literature review of these variables and how they have been examined in the past. Because my study examines the adoption of campaign finance reform, it is important to note that state characteristics and variables may be different for their adoption year than they are today. Legislative professionalism exemplifies this stipulation: state legislatures have generally professionalized in the last 30 years, so a state may have been a hybrid or citizen legislature at the time of the reform but may have progressed to a professional or hybrid legislature today.

Legislative Professionalism

Legislative professionalism indicates the degree to which state legislatures look and act like the U.S. Congress. Congress is the benchmark against which state legislatures are compared to draw conclusions about their lawmaking styles. The more professionalized a legislature is, the longer the session lasts, there more staff there is to aid lawmakers, legislative salaries are higher, and lawmakers generally do not hold outside jobs; lawmaking is their full-time job. The bulk of the scholarship on legislative professionalism suggests that the higher salaries, larger staffs, and longer sessions lead to a more entrenched and efficient body. This professional body enables lawmakers to make decisions more independent of the executive (Thompson 1986) and increases the propensity to reform government personnel practices (Kellough and Selden 2003). Legislative professionalism also increases the willingness of states to adopt increasingly complex and technical policies (Ka and Teske 2002). In addition, there is evidence to suggest that the more professional the legislature the more money the legislature will authorize for state spending (Owings and Borck 2000). Legislative scholars Squire and

Hamm (2005) contend that the level of legislative professionalism is related to the state's wealth, with wealthier states supporting more professionalism within the legislature. However, the bulk of these studies are based on the idea that legislators are concerned only with the thought of enacting legislation—and not with the thought of reelection. In Mayhew's seminal work, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974), he demonstrates this rational choice approach to understanding member behavior. Mayhew shows us that members of Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection and will stop at nothing to keep their jobs. If legislative professionalism scholars are intent on comparing the most professional state legislatures to Congress, then they must also heed Mayhew's findings that suggest state legislators might also shirk their lawmaking responsibilities when it comes to enacting campaign finance reforms out of fear of increasing their electoral competition and potentially losing their seats.

Hypothesis One (H1)

States with higher levels of legislative professionalism are less likely to have stringent campaign finance reforms. Hybrid and citizen legislatures are more likely to have stringent reforms.

Legislative professionalism is part of the political factors that Gierzynski (1998) introduces. Regarding the causes of campaign finance reform, this study expects to find less stringent reforms in more professional legislatures. The presence of a professional legislatures leads to minimal reform efforts such as disclosure or high contribution limits. This study will rely on two professionalism indices: Mooney (1994) offers a composite index that relies on five different professionalism indices depending on the timeframe while Squire's index (2000) provides a more recent measure. Since legislatures have become generally more professionalized over the last few decades, earlier adopters of a type of campaign finance reform may have been less professionalized than they are today. Adoptions occurring in the 1970s may have been by hybrid or citizen legislatures that are now considered professionalized. For the quantitative analysis, I am interested in the characteristics of a state at the point of adoption and not necessarily their characteristics today.

Definition

Legislative professionalism is the degree to which a state legislature looks and acts like the United States Congress. Congress is considered the most professional legislature in the world, but not all state legislatures are similar to Congress. Most state legislatures are citizen-based and semi-professional (hybrid).

Data Source and Rationale

Squire’s 2007 study offered data for legislative professionalism scores. Squire’s legislative professionalism index is the preeminent index for measuring the extent to which state legislatures look and act like the United States Congress. Scores for the years 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003 are used as baselines for my study. Although Squire’s index only goes back to 1979, I chose to use his index because it offers a consistent measure of legislative professionalism for the four decades of my study. There are earlier studies and indices of legislative professionalism (e.g., Citizens’ Conference on State Legislatures [1971] and Grumm [1970 and 1971]) but these indices are not updated to reflect the increased professionalism of state legislatures since the 1970s. Using one professionalism score per decade should not be a problem because legislative change is gradual over time. Because there are professionalism indices for each decade of my study, I used each index in the corresponding decade.

The Initiative

There are three types of direct democracy present in the states: the initiative, referendum, and recall. The initiative is of most concern in my study because it provides a method for outsiders to participate in the lawmaking process. Outsiders include citizens and grassroots groups, but also interest groups, PACs, and "concerned" groups from outside the affected state (Ellis 2002; Sabato et al 2001; Smith 1998; Bowler, Donovan, and Tolbert 1998; Magleby 1984). Groups use the initiative to attempt to overcome legislative reluctance to acknowledge an issue and change policy. Research on the initiative's effects on state policy is mixed. In states with the initiative, some researchers have found a closer match between policy outputs and public opinion (Arceneaux 2002; Gerber 1999; Gerber 1996; Matsusaka 1995). At the same time others have found no such effect (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Camobreco 1998). One area where most agree on the initiative's effects on public policy is in what Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan (1998) call "governance" policies. Voters find success when they try to change the political system itself in areas such as term limits for legislators, supermajority requirements for new taxes, and campaign finance reform (Bowler and Donovan 2004). Bowler and Donovan (2004, p. 562) find the use of the initiative popular in campaign finance reforms: "In the 30 years prior to 1984, campaign finance was a rare initiative topic, and only eight measures qualified for state ballots (half occurred in 1974, in the wake of Watergate). Between 1984 and 2000, however, 30 citizen initiatives and one popular referendum on campaign finance rules have been placed before voters in 11 different direct democracy states. Sixty-one percent of these passed, far more than the historic average of 39% for all initiative subjects reported by Magleby (1994)." Despite this apparent success at modifying the political structure, initiatives fail more than they succeed and if they do happen to succeed, the legislature can employ tactics to stall its implementation and deny the proposition the appropriate funding for its continuation (Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins 2004). This case is illustrated by the recent events in Massachusetts. In 1998 voters approved clean elections public funding for state-wide and legislative candidates through an initiative. By 2002 the law was repealed before it had a chance to be fully implemented. It had faced staunch resistance from the Massachusetts General Assembly from the start and opponents of clean elections in Massachusetts ironically claimed initiative organizers engaged in "dirty" politics during the entire process, beginning with the initiative's wording (Finneran 2005; Gross and Goidel 2003).

Hypothesis Two (H2)

States with the initiative—and frequent use of it—have stringent campaign finance reforms. States without the initiative are more likely to support minimal reforms such as disclosure or high contribution limits.

This study will follow the lead that Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan (2002) present by measuring the frequency of initiative use, expecting that states with more frequent use will also utilize it in the area of reforming campaign finance. It is not enough for states to have the initiative; it must be used to change policy. Failed campaign finance initiative attempts and those with minimal governmental assistance, such as in Massachusetts, will also receive special attention. This study expects to find that more stringent campaign finance reforms, that is, lower contribution levels, partial public funding, and clean elections, are enacted through the initiative.

Definition

The initiative is the provision that allows citizens to propose legislation on the ballot for a popular vote. Not all states have the initiative; it is up to each state to decide whether they would like to use this tool. Only 24 states support the initiative.

Data Source and Rationale

Two resources were consulted for initiative data: The Initiative and Referendum Institute website http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) website www.ncsl.org. Data presented in this study are from 1970 to 2005.

The coding resource for initiatives was adopted from Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan (2002) and Bowler and Donovan (2004). Previous studies of direct democracy, specifically the initiative, used a dichotomous coding scheme to indicate whether a state possessed initiative powers (Gerber 1996, 1999; Camobreco 1998; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996). More recent research indicates that this method unfairly treats all initiative states the same while ignoring the frequency with which states turn to the initiative for policy change (Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan 2002; Bowler and Donovan 2004). Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan (2002) argue that it is insufficient to measure only whether a state possesses the initiative or not. For a more accurate picture of policymaking in states with the initiative, we must measure the frequency of initiative usage. Recognizing whether a state has the initiative and how frequently it is used is important, so I use a combination of the two to code the states that have the initiative and to measure the frequency of usage in those states.

Relying on data from the Initiative and Referendum Institute and the National Conference of State Legislatures, I counted the number of initiatives on the ballot each year from 1970-2007. This coding procedure minimizes the importance placed on states with little initiative usage in the state history and maximizes the importance of states with frequent initiative usage. Currently 24 states have the initiative.

Political Scandal

Political scandal is the next independent variable. In the political science literature there are plenty of anecdotal accounts of corruption and scandal in American politics, but few systematic studies. Fortunately in the state politics literature, Meier and Holbrook (1992) provide a measurement of political corruption in the American states. This study will replicate their methods by using U.S. Department of Justice Public Integrity Section reports on corruption among state officials. For example, scandal served as the catalyst for campaign finance reform (the enactment of contribution limits) in South Carolina with the discoveries from Operation Lost Trust (Cooper and Nownes 2002). Operation Lost Trust involved a former state representative turned lobbyist, Robb Cobb, who agreed to participate in an FBI sting operation in exchange for leniency over charges involving a drug deal. As a result of Cobb's secretly-videotaped meetings with other lobbyists and lawmakers, 17 members of the South Carolina General Assembly (almost one-tenth of the entire body), nearly a dozen lobbyists, and a prominent aide to the governor were arrested on a variety of charges, including bribery and drug possession (Cooper and Nownes 2002, p. 139). It is predicted that the presence of political scandal serves as a lightning rod in introducing campaign finance reform, either by ballot initiative or the legislature.

Hypothesis Three (H3)

Political scandals serve as a catalyst for initiative efforts or legislative pressure for more stringent campaign finance reforms. States without high profile scandals or high numbers of scandals do not have stringent reforms.

When the media publicize a story on political corruption, lawmakers feel compelled to react. At the federal level, the 2001 Enron scandal is purported to have spurred the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Cigler 2004). State corruption might not reach Enron-like proportions but it can initiate a discussion to reform the system. In states with a history of corruption or even in those for whom corruption is not expected, campaign finance reform may emerge. My study aims to uncover whether reforms enacted in the wake of scandals are symbolic or tough by classifying them in one of the categories of campaign finance reform.

Definition

Political scandal is defined in this dissertation as the number of political corruption convictions in each state investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section.

Data Source and Rationale

United States Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section (http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/) data is available annually from 1976 to 2005. The Public Integrity Section did not begin tracking the number of officials convicted of elections crimes until 1976. No other source systematically tracks convictions of state and federal officials in these early years. Because I was missing data for 1970-1975, I averaged the number of convictions from 1976-1979 and used those numbers as a baseline for convictions in each state from 1970-1975. All other data are real conviction rates from each state for 1976-2006.

Other studies also use these data. Meier and Holbrook (1992) use data from the US Department of Justice Public Integrity Section to examine political corruption in the states. Their study produced results similar to Nice (1983), Johnston (1983), and Peters and Welch (1978) who relied on similar data to conduct their analyses.

Partisanship in State Government

Finally, partisan breakdown of state government serves as an independent variable. There is a vast literature on the effects of divided government on policymaking at both the federal and state levels (e.g., Mayhew 2005; Fiorina 1994, 1996; Squire 1997). Several of these studies evaluate the connection between legislative professionalism and divided government (Fiorina 1996, Squire 1997) while in terms of campaign finance reform, Hays (1996b) argues that Democrats favor campaign finance reforms more than Republicans. He finds that campaign finance laws are more comprehensive when Democrats control more of the state's political institutions. Jones (1981) also finds that at least in partial-public financing schemes, Democrats appear to benefit more than Republicans.

In this study, I identify the partisan breakdown of the state government for each of the years with campaign finance reform—ranging from disclosure to clean elections. Preliminary research finds that coding states 0, 1, 2, or 3 according to the number of institutions (governor and two legislative chambers) controlled by Democrats is an acceptable methodological practice (Hays 1996b).

Hypothesis Four (H4)

Democratic-controlled state governments are more likely to support stringent campaign finance reforms. Divided and Republican-controlled state governments are less likely to support stringent campaign finance reforms.

Definition

State government partisanship means the number of government institutions controlled by either Republicans, Democrats, or both.

Data Source and Rationale

Klarner's 2007 data were consulted for this dissertation. This data indicates which political party controls each legislative chamber and the governor's office. Klarner provided his data to the *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* online data depository based on research for an *SPPQ* journal article (Klarner 2003). Klarner collected his data from three sources: *The Book of the States* (Council of State Governments 1960-2000); *Supplement Number I to The Book of the States* (Council of State Governments 1960-2000)*; and the Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Bureau of the Census 1960-2001). Data used in this dissertation are from 1971 to 2005.

Hayes (1996) specifically examines the impact of Democratically-controlled government institutions on state campaign finance reform. He creates a coding scheme based on the number of government institutions (governor and two legislative chambers) controlled by Democrats. I adopted this coding method and applied it to this dissertation. The following coding scheme was used.

States are coded annually 0, 1, 2, or 3 based on how many institutions Democrats control. The higher the score the more Democratic the state is.

- 0 = neither legislative chamber nor the governor's office is controlled by Democrats
- 1 = at least one legislative chamber or the governor's office is controlled by Democrats
- 2 = both legislative chambers, or one legislative chamber and the governor's office are controlled by Democrats
- 3 = both legislative chambers and the governor's office are controlled by Democrats

Research Design

Although all 50 states have some form of campaign finance reform based on disclosure requirements, this study will focus on three types of reforms and the states within each category for which that is their most stringent level of reform. For example, this study examines what the disclosure-only states have in common that prevent them from following other states' leads and adopting more meaningful reforms. Money affects campaigns in every state, so why are these five disclosure-only states different from other states that have more stringent types of reform? Of the 37 states that have contribution limits to candidates, 18 of them stop their reforms with this mechanism. Of the 27 states that have some version of partial public financing, 25 of them stop at this level. As of 2005, two states had full public financing, or clean elections: Arizona and Maine. A chapter is devoted to the exploration of each of these dependent variables to better understand their determinants.

Within each category of campaign finance reform levels, there will be a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods thereby strengthening the design. King, Keohane, and Verba (1995) advocate using a variety of methods to strengthen the research design. A few of their suggestions include to "[collect] more observations on [the] dependent variable, [observe] the same variable in another context, or [observe] another dependent variable that is an implication of the same theory" (p. 479). My study heeds King's, Keohane's, and Verba's advice and measures state campaign finance reform in a categorical way and treats it as the dependent variable. A 50-state quantitative analysis broken up by decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) will provide a time-series analysis to study the impacts on state campaign finance reform at those particular times. It is predicted that the impacts to campaign finance reform may be different for the 1970s adoptions than from the 2000s adoptions.

Research Justification

Why is it important to understand the determinants of and impediments to campaign finance reform? The state legislative research to date is concerned mainly with descriptions of reform and evaluations of reform (Ramsden 2002). In these realms, the descriptive studies identify what states are doing to regulate money in legislative elections and the evaluations attempt to judge which reforms work best. Some work argues that nothing is working and any reforms are infringements on our civil liberties (Samples 2005). Beyond the normative effects of campaign finance reform, there is a need to better understand campaign finance reform as a policy and under what political conditions this policy succeeds or fails. Understanding the causes and impediments to state campaign finance reform will benefit both opponents and proponents to change as they work to prevent or instigate new policies. This study fills a void in the campaign finance reform literature by analyzing the causes of and impediments to this policy in an area that is mainly focused on the effects of campaign finance reform. The combination of individual state case studies and broader 50-state quantitative analysis will provide a fuller picture of what causes and impedes campaign finance reform in the states. Specifically, this study examines why some states have more stringent campaign finance reforms than others. It explains why states are adopting more or less stringent types of campaign finance reforms.

This dissertation will contribute to our knowledge of state campaign finance reform in the following ways. First, it examines campaign finance reform in all 50 states for a 35-year period. None of the existing literature has examined the states as systematically as this. The existing studies tend to take a case study approach which is beneficial for learning more about a particular state or grouping of states, but makes it hard to generalize to all states. Second, it disaggregates campaign finance reform into three distinct categories: disclosure, contribution limits, and expenditure and full public funding. This is contrary to other studies that only examine the particular type of campaign finance reform existing in a state or states while ignoring other types. Third, this study develops a campaign finance score for every state based on the specific type of reform (disclosure, contribution limits, and expenditure limits and public funding). The higher the score, the more stringent that state's laws are in that specific campaign finance reform area. Fourth, the same independent variables are measured and tested for all states over the 35-year period. This uncovers more than just a state's experience with campaign finance reform; it discovers how professionalized the state's legislature has become, the partisan breakdown of state government, the history of initiative usage, and how many political scandals the state has weathered. So, in the larger context, this study is about more than just state campaign finance reform. It is a miniature historical analysis of a state's political environment over 35 years.

Chapter Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction to state campaign finance reform, research design, literature review.

Chapter 2: Disclosure

This chapter describes disclosure and the range of disclosure categories into which states can fall. It categorizes states according to their disclosure score, grouping strong disclosure states and weak disclosure states.

Chapter 3: Contribution Limits

This chapter describes contribution limits and the extent to which states have varying types. Like disclosure, states with strong and weak contribution limit scores are grouped together for comparison and analysis.

Chapter 4: Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

This chapter describes how and why expenditure limits are tied to the voluntary acceptance of public funding in the states. Like previous chapters, it examines the strongest scoring states and the weakest scoring ones.

Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusion and Implications for Future Research

This chapter wraps up the study with aggregate analysis and areas for future research.

CHAPTER 2
DISCLOSURE

What is Disclosure?

Disclosure is the most basic type of campaign finance regulation. While few states have elaborate clean elections laws, all states require disclosure reports some more detailed than others. Disclosure is a way "to inform voters of the amounts and sources of [campaign] donations and the amounts, purposes and payees of the [campaign] disbursements" (Congressional Quarterly 1971, 15). Disclosure is intended to publicize contributions to candidates so that voters can identify to whom the candidate may be beholden or by whom or what they are influenced. Disclosure reports should "expose to the public all the financial transactions of politicians" ("Loophole Legislation: State Campaign Finance Laws" 1967, 985). Ideally, candidates should file disclosure reports both before and after elections with emphasis on *before* elections so that voters may consider the outside influences on a candidate while considering whether to vote for him or her. Disclosure is the backbone of any other type of campaign finance reform but its contribution to fair and open elections is often overlooked in favor of more sophisticated types of reform such as clean elections. Without detailed reports of campaign contributions and expenditures, though, more extensive types of reform collapse.

Personal Financial Disclosure

There are two types of disclosure: personal financial disclosure and campaign finance disclosure. Each state has different laws regarding personal and campaign disclosure, but members of Congress and candidates for federal office have had to file annual personal financial disclosure statements since the 1978 Ethics in Government Act

(Center for Responsive Politics 2008, 1). These federal reports must list income, honoraria, assets, transactions, liabilities, non-governmental positions, agreements, travel, and gifts (Center for Responsive Politics 2008, 1). Federal personal financial disclosure statements are required each year, regardless of whether an election takes place.

Unlike Congress, not all states require personal financial disclosure for state legislators. According to the Center for Public Integrity (2007), as of 2006, 47 states require state legislators to file personal financial disclosure statements. Idaho, Michigan, and Vermont do not require legislators to file personal financial disclosure statements. For those states that do require state legislative personal financial disclosure statements the specifics vary according to the state. In the 2006 Center for Public Integrity ranking of state personal finance disclosure, Washington ranked at the top of the list, requiring the most detailed information from state legislators while maintaining an easy and convenient way for the public to access this data. In addition to the three states that do not require personal financial disclosure statements (Idaho, Michigan, and Vermont), 20 states in the Center for Public Integrity report earned failing grades for their poor filing, extent of information mandated, access, and enforcement requirements (2007). Altogether, nearly half of the states do not require extensive personal financial disclosure statements for state legislators. Many of these failing states also rank poorly in studies analyzing campaign finance disclosure, indicating that states with weak disclosure laws in one area are consistently weak in other areas of disclosure.[10]

[10] Other studies that compare campaign finance laws across the states include Grading State Disclosure, a joint effort on the part of the Campaign Disclosure Project, a collaboration of the UCLA School of Law, the Center for Governmental Studies, and the California Voter Foundation; and the National Conference of State Legislatures online database.

Campaign Finance Disclosure

While personal financial disclosure is an important part of government openness and sunshine in politics the focus of this study is on campaign finance disclosure and the requirements for state legislative candidates and the political parties and interest groups interested in legislative elections. The Council of State Governments' biennial publication, *The Book of the States*, serves as a suitable starting place for evaluating the differences in state campaign finance reform. Since the early 1970s, *The Book of the States* has recorded state disclosure laws rather consistently with a focus on filing requirements. According to these biennial volumes, state campaign finance disclosure can generally be broken into three broad categories: statements required from, statements filed with, and time for filing.

The *statements filed from* category indicates who must file disclosure statements: candidates, campaign treasurers, political parties, committees, individuals, corporations, labor unions, public utilities, referendum and initiative groups, and members of certain state boards and commissions, for example, the state gaming commission. Information in this category details whether disclosure statements must include itemized contribution and expenditure information, at what monetary amount itemizations must occur, and whether contributions, expenditures, or both need to be listed on the report. In 2007 all states required contributors' names released, but the states vary according to whether additional information about contributors, such as their occupation and employer, must be reported as well (Campaign Disclosure Project 2007).

The *statements filed with* category lists the department, board, or agency charged with receiving, monitoring, and enforcing campaign finance regulations in the state.

Many states use the secretary of state for this job, while others have committed resources and personnel to separate commissions like Alaska's Fair Political Practices Commission, Hawaii's Campaign Spending Commission, and Washington's Public Disclosure Commission (National Conference of State Legislatures 2008).

The *time for filing* category indicates dates to file disclosure reports. State laws differ depending on whether it is an election year or not, how many times before and after the election campaigns must file reports, and whether there are provisions for filing last minute or late contributions (Campaign Disclosure Project 2007). The frequency of reports before an election is often a good indicator of the strength of a state's disclosure laws. California and Oregon, for example, rank high in studies of the stringency of disclosure laws in part because they require separate reports for last minute contributions and independent expenditures. Other states, like Wyoming and Utah, do not require the disclosure of last-minute contributions or independent expenditures until after Election Day (Campaign Disclosure Project 2007).[11]

Today all 50 states require disclosure reports with the intention to inform the public of the receipts and expenditures of campaign funds. In practice, however, the laws across the states vary with some states supporting detailed reports with capable enforcement agencies while others require disclosure but have lax enforcement of those laws.[12] Even though disclosure laws vary across the states, states have made efforts to

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[11] While disclosure is treated as a separate category of state campaign finance reform in this paper, it is not truly distinct from the other types of reform such as contribution limits and partial and full public financing. Disclosure reports list details about contributions and expenditures but the purpose of this paper is to discuss what is required for disclosure and not argue about specific contribution, expenditure, and public financing specifics.

[12] According to The Campaign Disclosure Project (2005), states with strong disclosure laws and capable enforcement agencies include Washington, California, Oregon, and Florida. States with weak disclosure laws and weak enforcement agencies are Montana, South Dakota, Alabama, and Wyoming. The Campaign Disclosure Project will be discussed later in this paper.

reform these over the years. The next section will detail the history of disclosure and the transition in the states from inconsistent and neglected disclosure laws in the first half of the 20th century to strong and enforceable laws in the early part of the 21st century.

History of State Disclosure Laws

Pre-Watergate State Disclosure Laws

Disclosure laws are among the oldest campaign finance reforms in America with the states, not the federal government, initially exploring this option to help clean up corruption that was prevalent in 19th and early 20th century elections (Campbell 2005). The first "campaign finance laws" in the states were general laws aimed at preventing or stopping political corruption, such as vote buying, providing free alcohol and food to voters, and voting more than once. The focus of these early disclosure laws was prevention through publicity (Overacker [1932] 1974, 291). Disclosure laws were initially termed *publicity* laws in an effort to bring attention to and publicize the sources and expenditures of campaign money. States based these anti-corruption and publicity laws on the English Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883 (Fox 1905, 171; Overacker [1932] 1974, 291). New York was the first state to enact an anti-corruption and publicity law in 1890 which required candidates to file sworn financial statements (Congressional Quarterly 1971). Colorado and Michigan soon followed in 1891 and by 1905, twenty states adopted some version of the English Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act [13] (Fox 1905, 171-172).

From 1905 through 1910, sixteen states adopted publicity laws and between 1910 and 1920, fourteen more states adopted publicity laws based on the models of other states

[13] Massachusetts (1892); California, Missouri, and Kansas (1893); Connecticut, North Carolina, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Nevada (1895); Ohio (1896); Tennessee, Florida, Wisconsin, and Nebraska (1897); Vermont and Virginia (1903); and Texas (1905).

and the English law. From 1920 to 1927, Tennessee was the only state to adopt a publicity law and by the early 1930s, all but three states, Illinois, Mississippi, and Rhode Island, had publicity laws (Overacker [1932] 1971, 294). See Table 1.

While these publicity laws aimed to bring public attention to the financial transactions of state candidates, they varied in terms of scope, detail, and enforcement. Not all states required publicity statements before primary and general elections; some states required statements from candidates only, while others requested reports from candidates, parties, committees, and individuals contributing threshold amounts. All states required reports filed with a public official, but to whom, where, and when varied (Overacker [1932] 1971, 295-296). These early attempts had good intentions, but candidates, parties, committees, and individuals soon learned that these laws were easily evaded through a multitude of loopholes ("Loophole Legislation: State Campaign Finance Laws" 1967). Indeed, many states had no penalty for the failure to file reports and no incentive for officials designated the recipients of the publicity statements to follow up with candidates for their reports (Overacker [1932] 1971, 321). See Table 2.1 for a breakdown of early state publicity laws.

Table 2.1. Waves of Early State Publicity Laws

1890-1904	1905-1910	1911-1927
New York	South Carolina	Indiana
Colorado	Texas	North Dakota
Michigan	Pennsylvania	Wyoming
Massachusetts	Iowa	New Jersey
California	South Dakota	Maine
Missouri	Washington	Ohio
Kansas*	Oklahoma	New Mexico
Arizona	Oregon	Louisiana
Kentucky	Maryland	Nevada
Minnesota	West Virginia	North Carolina
Montana	Georgia	Alabama
North Carolina*	Connecticut	Kentucky
Nevada*	Florida	Utah
Utah*	Arkansas	Delaware
Ohio*	Idaho	Tennessee
Wisconsin	Kansas	
Nebraska*		
Vermont		
Virginia		

*Later repealed
Compiled from:
Overacker, Louise. [1932] 1974. Money in Elections. New York: Arno Press.
Fox, George L. 1905. "Corrupt Practices and Elections Laws in the United States Since 1890." *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association* 2:171-86.
Aylsworth, Leon E. 1909. "Corrupt Practices." *The American Political Science Review* 3 (1):50-6.
Belmont, Perry. 1905 February. "Publicity of Election Expenditures." *North American Review* 180 (2):166-85.

By the mid-20th century Florida responded to the continued corruption in state politics by enacting the strongest campaign finance disclosure law to date in 1951 called the "Who Gave It, Who Got It" law. This law required candidates to report all contributions and expenditures and required state legislative candidates to file monthly disclosure reports (Paulson 2002, 220). This "sunshine law" was the first one in the country to mandate the disclosure of all sources of campaign contributions and expenditures for specific candidates (statewide and other) and firm deadlines for reports. Florida's law was so novel at the time that by 1962 the Kennedy Commission on

Campaign Costs urged Congress to establish a regulation much like the model represented in Florida (Adamany and Agree 1975a, 203). The Florida law appeared tough on paper, but suffered from the malady that all disclosure laws suffered up to this point: a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms to catch and punish violators who underreported, manipulated reporting, or failed to report altogether. While Florida's law essentially lacked enforcement, it was truly the first real "disclosure" law in the states. The earlier publicity laws were really no more than political pledges that candidates made if they thought the public was really watching them. In fact, there were no real punishments for violating the political pledges in any state (Overacker [1932] 1974, 321).

Because of Florida's experience with the "Who Gave It, Who Got It" law, all but nine states had adopted similar provisions for statewide and legislative candidates by 1971—the year of FECA. The remaining states included: Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont (Council of State Governments 1971). In the early decades of the 20th Century, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, and Vermont had some versions of publicity laws on the books, but by 1971 candidates no longer treated these as serious requirements.

The lesson learned from early state disclosure laws is that they lacked clear enforcement strategies. Another shortcoming of these Pre-Watergate laws was the lack of comprehensive filing requirements for state legislative candidates. For example, South Carolina's law epitomized this by indicating that disclosure statements must be filed only "before and after elections" (Council of State Governments 1971). Ironically, this statement is an improvement from the 1969 law that only required the filing of disclosure statements "after elections" (Council of State Governments 1969). By 1971 most states ignored disclosure statements for primary elections, but required filing statements after the general election due somewhere from 15 to 45 days or at least the day before the winner takes his or her seat in office (Council of State Governments 1971). Only seventeen states required disclosure reports before elections—including South Carolina with its vague "before elections" statement (Council of State Governments 1971).[14]

Post-Watergate State Disclosure Laws

By 1973 the nation was feeling the full effects of the Watergate scandal. As a result, many states toughened up their campaign finance regulations with increasing attention toward basic disclosure practices. States started to realize that without more comprehensive regulations and enforcement mechanisms, other types of reform were merely words on paper.

Texas was the first state to enact a post-Watergate campaign finance law in 1973—a reinvention of its pre-Watergate disclosure provisions. It specified tighter restrictions on disclosure by requiring the source and amount of any contribution over $100. The law also mandated the reporting of all contributors to a political committee and defined the uses of campaign funds. An interesting part of Texas's post-Watergate campaign finance law involves a system of strong civil penalties for violating any part of it. For example, "[a] key provision makes any candidate, political committee, or contributor civilly liable to all other opposing candidates for attorneys' fees and for double the amount of any unlawful contribution or expenditure, and civilly liable to the State for triple the amount" (Smolka 1975, 28).

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[14] States requiring disclosure statements before an election as of 1971 are: Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

By late 1975, eight of the nine states that had not adopted state legislative campaign disclosure requirements before Watergate did enact disclosure requirements. Nevada enacted disclosure in 1973; Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Vermont enacted disclosure laws in 1974; and Idaho, Illinois, and Louisiana adopted disclosure laws in 1975. Vermont only required state legislative candidates to file reports in primary elections; they were exempt from filing after general elections (Council of State Governments 1975, 1977 and Congressional Quarterly 1974). See Table 2.2.

Along with the flurry of campaign finance reform activity in the early part of the 1970s ushering in stricter disclosure requirements and limits on contributions and expenditures came a backlash against these regulations. Campaign finance laws came under attack in the 1976 U.S. Supreme Court case, *Buckley v. Valeo*, (424 U.S. 1). Until 1976 state legislatures had taken the lead in initiating changes in election law and campaign finance through innovation and reinvention and there were indeed major adoptions regarding disclosure requirements. By 1976, however, the impetus behind election and campaign finance law had shifted from the legislatures to the courts as the rush to establish ground rules for fair elections had tapered off and questions were raised regarding the constitutionality of these laws.

In *Buckley* the Court touched upon several issues critical to campaign finance reform: disclosure, contribution and expenditure limits, express and issue advocacy, and public financing of campaigns. While all of these issues are important for the overall understanding of campaign finance regulation in America, disclosure is at the root of all reform efforts and the Court's attention to this is most important for this chapter. Regarding disclosure, the Court decided three things. First, disclosure is important for voters so that they can evaluate where a candidate receives and spends his or her money. Second, disclosure can highlight large contributions and expenditures and deter or expose corruption. Third, disclosure requirements support the efforts of more extensive types of campaign finance reform, such as contribution limits, helping to keep track if candidates are abiding by these limits or not. The Court ruled that as long as any of these three criteria are met, disclosure is constitutional (Schultz 2002, 11).

The *Buckley* decision cemented the role of disclosure in state and federal campaigns but there was one state disclosure holdout. Nearly 100 years after New York adopted the first publicity law, North Dakota became the last state to adopt a disclosure law in 1981. (N.D. Century Code, § 16.1-08.1-01). Part of the explanation for North Dakota's endurance against disclosure may be found in the citizen nature of its state legislature which only meets once every other year and its moralist political culture with an emphasis on citizen participation (Elazar 1984). North Dakota may indeed have thought it did not need a disclosure law because of a general state attitude toward civic engagement and attention to politics. By the early 1980s the pace of disclosure adoption slowed as states shifted their focus to different types of reform including contribution limits and partial public financing of gubernatorial and legislative elections. Among the few issues to cause a stir in response to the disclosure laws were issues with third parties and their disclosure reports. In *Brown v. Socialist Workers* (81-776 [1982]) the Court ruled that if minor parties were forced to disclose the names of people who contribute and the expenditures of those parties those individuals and business could face harassment and other retaliations for supporting a third party. The Supreme Court found that a "minor party who faces a 'reasonable probability' of harassment cannot be forced to disclose the identity of either its campaign contributors or the recipients of its campaign funds" (Greenhouse 1982). The Court extended the protection initially granted to third parties in the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act and upheld in *Buckley v. Valeo*.

Table 2.2 displays the waves of the first modern disclosure laws in the country. Many states indeed had disclosure laws on the books before the Watergate scandal took place.

Table 2.2. Watergate Era State Disclosure Laws

Pre-Watergate 1952-1971	Watergate 1972-1978	Post-Watergate 1978-1992
AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, HI, IN, IA, KS, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, MO, MT, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, PA, SD, TN, UT, VA, WA, WV, WI, WY	AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, NV, RI, SC, TX, VT	ND

Compiled from:
The Council of State Governments. Various years. *The Book of the States*. Lexington, KY.
Congressional Quarterly. 1974. *Dollar Politics*. Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.

Electronic Disclosure

Beyond the initial push to enact basic disclosure laws, states have occasionally modified their laws to increase disclosure requirements by lowering threshold amounts for itemized contribution and expenditure reports, requiring candidates' spouses to report all contributions, and requiring the itemization of in-kind contributions to candidates, among other things. The most notable recent development in the history of disclosure law is the adoption of electronic disclosure requirements, or e-disclosure. States have slowly migrated from paper reports to floppy disks and CD-ROMs to Internet reporting methods so that information is more readily available to the public. The electronic disclosure movement emerged out of election administration staff frustrated with trying to keep up with the paper trail. For election administrators disclosure laws were working too well—they could not keep up with the demand for publicized information. Manual data entry was time consuming and inefficient (Holman and Stern 2000). Texas took the lead in the early 1990s by establishing criteria for campaigns to submit information electronically. By 1994 Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and New Mexico experimented with electronic filing (Holman and Stern 2000). The benefits to electronic disclosure are apparent to many. For campaign managers electronic disclosure decreases time and errors with manually completing forms; for monitoring agencies it is easier to audit reports; and for the public it is more convenient to research contribution and expenditure patterns. By 1996, five states had implemented electronic filing systems although participation was voluntary and participation rates were low: Colorado, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and Washington (Holman and Stern 2000). Three other states: Hawaii, Kentucky, and Missouri passed legislation in 1996 requiring mandatory electronic filing for gubernatorial candidates (Holman and Stern 2000).

By 2001 all but four states: Montana, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming used computers to facilitate some form of electronic filing. In these states, however, state employees either scan disclosure reports or enter data manually into them. Campaigns do not file electronic copies (Center for Governmental Studies 2001).

More states made electronic disclosure progress in 2007 when 40 states had either mandatory or voluntary electronic disclosure reporting requirements. The ten states without electronic provisions are: Alabama, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming (Campaign Disclosure Project 2007). But not all states embrace mandatory electronic filing for state legislative candidates. Sixteen states require mandatory filing for state legislative candidates, while only seven states require statewide candidates to file electronically. According to the Campaign Disclosure Project's Grading State Disclosure 2007 report, the states with the strongest electronic filing requirements are: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington.

Figure 2.1. 2007 Electronic Disclosure Laws in the States



Compiled from:
Grading State Disclosure 2007. *Campaign Disclosure Project 2007*. Available from http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/index.html

Contemporary Disclosure and Model Laws

States have been adjusting and modifying disclosure laws for over 100 years, so what can be left to do? According to the elections watchdog group, the Campaign Disclosure Project, states still have a long way to go to achieve perfect disclosure laws. This organization analyzes state disclosure laws biennially according to the following criteria: contributor information, in-kind contributions and loans, expenditures, number of reports filed, independent expenditures, auditing and enforcement, electronic filing, and various dimensions of citizen access to information.[15] Highly ranked states in this report must require details in each of these categories, provide adequate funding to support the law, and enforce penalties for delinquent, late, or modified reports. The top ten states for strong overall disclosure laws according to this survey are: Washington, California, Oregon, Florida and Hawaii (tied for 4th), Michigan, Virginia, Georgia, Illinois, and New Jersey and Ohio (tied for 10th). The states with the weakest overall disclosure laws in 2007 are: Delaware and Nebraska (tied for 41st), New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, Mississippi, Montana, South Dakota, Alabama, and Wyoming.

South Dakota, Alabama, and Wyoming earned F grades in every disclosure category, while Montana earned a B+ grade for its law, but failed in the electronic filing, accessibility, and usability categories. This could be a case of good intentions but failure to provide adequate resources to make these good intentions turn into reality.

The Campaign Disclosure Project, in addition to the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws (COGEL) and the Center for Responsive Politics, offers a model disclosure law listing the ten most important criteria for strong disclosure laws: 1) mandatory occupation and employer information for contributors; 2) electioneering communications (issue ad) reporting; 3) mandatory electronic filing; 4) subvendor information; 5) late contribution reporting; 6) independent expenditure and late independent expenditure reporting; 7) reasonable thresholds for contributions and expenditures; 8) searchable online databases; 9) annual summaries; and 10) charitable solicitations disclosed. States

[15] The Campaign Disclosure Project and Grading the States reports is affiliated with the UCLA School of Law, the Center for Governmental Studies, the California Voter Foundation, and The Pew Charitable Trusts.

ranking high in their overall disclosure scores come close to this but do not meet all the criteria.

Disclosure Literature Review

Academic literature often treats disclosure as part of the larger context of campaign finance reform and rarely considers it separately. But to fully appreciate the work states have done in campaign finance reform, we must break apart the large campaign finance reform collection into smaller pieces. Each piece of reform has a different intent and different outcome in the political process (Gross and Goidel 2003).

One of the earliest efforts to catalog and analyze state campaign reform efforts is *Money in Elections* by Louise Overacker ([1932] 1974). Overacker meticulously classified state laws according to year and purpose and provides a detailed history of the earliest state campaign finance reforms in the country. Along with Overacker ([1932] 1974), Fox (1905), Belmont (1905), and Aylsworth (1909) all supported the concept of disclosure but acknowledged the shortcomings of the early state publicity laws. Adamany and Agree (1975b) concur with earlier observers that disclosure is a worthy idea but for different reasons. They argue that disclosure laws are ineffective not because there is not enough filing participation or enforcement mechanisms but because there is too much information and the public and media do not know how to cope with everything that is disclosed (113-115). Adamany and Agree call this the “disappointment of disclosure” (ibid). Of course, Adamany and Agree were writing in a time when no one could fathom the power of the Internet for democracy, and thus might be pleased with the current standardization of disclosure requirements happening in the current electronic environment comparable information available at our fingertips. More recently, Gross and Goidel (2003) argue that disclosure has merits and the theory behind it is admirable, but it is hard to believe that voters pour over campaign finance reports to see, for example, which political action committees (PACs) are supporting which candidates (pp. 18-20). Even if voters do engage in this practice, by the very fact that many states still do not require timely reports before elections makes ideal disclosure impossible.

Controversy over Disclosure

States have made substantial progress over the last century with disclosure laws and bringing sunlight to campaign finance has had its share of fans and critics. Proponents of disclosure argue that shining a spotlight on candidates' campaign activities provides an incentive to act responsibly when accepting contributions or spending money on the campaign. To avoid corruption or perceived corruption, candidates must be forthcoming with the amounts and sources of campaign contributions and the purposes and recipients of campaign expenditures. Supporters argue that anything less than full disclosure is an indication that the candidate has something to hide and may be engaging in improprieties (Lane 1962). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of disclosure in *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976).

Opponents of disclosure maintain that identifying a donor's name, address, occupation, and employer violates privacy laws. Potential donors may be discouraged from donating to an unpopular or extremist candidate out of fear that their names and other personal information would be made public. Indeed this very point was supported in *Brown v. Socialist Workers* (1982). The American Civil Liberties Union has sharply opposed disclosure laws from the start, arguing that the disclosure requirement "punishes unpopular political activity" (Congressional Quarterly 1974, 34). While proponents fear not enough information is disclosed in filing reports and opponents claim that too much information is required, in reality neither one of these fears has been fully reached for the simple reason that enforcement of disclosure laws is conducted sporadically, unevenly, or not at all. Failure to comply with filing dates results in a reprimand in many states but does not disqualify a candidate from continuing with his or her campaign.

Disclosure Methodology

Disclosure is the most prevalent type of campaign finance reform with all 50 states subscribing to some version of it. But not all states have the same type of disclosure or even have stringent laws mandating specific types of information that must be included on the disclosure forms. So why do some states have more stringent levels of disclosure than others? What causes states to adopt the types of disclosure laws that they do? Because disclosure is the basis for all campaign finance reform, it is important to analyze the states' adoption experiences with it.

To measure the degree or stringency of state disclosure laws, states were given one point per question based on an analysis of state laws from 1971-2005 as researched from the *Book of the States*. Witko (2007) uses a similar approach to measure the stringency of state campaign finance reform. This is helpful to determine the degree to which a state supports a type of campaign finance reform.

Definition

Disclosure laws are the most basic type of campaign finance reform. The purpose behind disclosure is to publicize a candidate's campaign contributions and expenditures so that voters can identify to whom the candidate may be beholden or by whom or what they are unduly influenced. All 50 states have disclosure laws, with some states having more stringent laws than others.

Data Source and Rationale

The Book of the States publishes a biennial listing of each state's campaign finance laws. Because these laws seldom change on a yearly basis and most likely change over a period of several years, this database provides a snapshot of nearly every legislative session from 1970-2005.[16]

After the raw data were gathered, the methodology discussed in Jensen and Beyle (2003) offered a coding resource for disclosure. They analyze campaign finance laws specifically aimed at state gubernatorial candidates but the coding resource can apply to legislative campaign finance laws as well. Jensen and Beyle study most of the same years as I do and disclosure requirements for gubernatorial and legislative candidates in the states are relatively the same, though, in some states gubernatorial disclosure requirements are more stringent than what is required for legislators.

A ten-point scale captures the extent of each state's disclosure law. This scale was adopted from the most common types of data offered in *The Book of the States* and by heeding the methodology explained in Jensen and Beyle (2003). Because all 50 states require disclosure, this scale can separate the minimal-disclosure states from the ones that require much more frequent and detailed information over the years.

1. Must legislative candidate file a report? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
2. Is filing required 30-60 days before an election? (1 = yes; 0 = no)

[16] Not all years presented in The Book of the States included accurate information. Because of this data used in this dissertation are from years 1971, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005.

3. Is filing required 5-29 days before an election? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
4. Do late donations or expenditures trigger filing a special report? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
5. Is filing required within 30 days after an election? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
6. Quarterly filing in election years? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
7. Quarterly filing in nonelection years? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
8. Semi-annual filing in election years? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
9. Semi-annual filing in nonelection years? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
10. Annual filing in nonelection years? (1 = yes; 0 = no)

Based on the coding results, Washington had the highest disclosure score with seven out of ten possible points in 2005. No state ranked higher than Washington during the 38-year data analysis. States with the lowest disclosure scores in 2005 included Maine, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Each of these states earned two points out of a possible ten. The average disclosure score in the 2000s was 3.64 (analyzing data years 2002 and 2005 only). See Table 2.3 for a summary of disclosure data from 1971-2005.

Table 2.3. Summary of Disclosure Data

	Average State Disclosure Score	Standard Deviation	High Disclosure States (Score in parentheses)	Low Disclosure States (Score in parentheses)
1970s	2.61	1.36	MA (5 – 1975)	AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, NV, ND, RI, SC, VT (0 – 1971); AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, ND, RI (0 – 1973); ND (0 – 1975, 1976, 1978)
1980s	3.49	1.02	OR (6 – 1981) GA (6 – 1984) FL (6 – 1986)	AL (1 – 1981, 1984, 1986, 1988); RI (1 – 1984)
1990s	3.45	1.07	NM, NY, OR, VA, WA (6 – 1999)	GA, IL, IA, KS, ME, MA, MN, NV, NC, ND, UT, WY (2 – 1992, 1994); GA (1 – 1996); IN, KS, ME, NV, OK, SD (2- 1999)
2000s	3.64	1.15	WA (7 – 2005)	IN, IA, KS, ME, MA, MS, NV, OH, OK, WY (2 – 2002); ME, NV, SD, WY (2 – 2005)
Total All Years	3.29	1.15	WA (7 – 2005)	AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, NV, ND, RI, SC, VT (0 – 1971); AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, ND, RI (0 – 1973); ND (0 – 1975, 1976, 1978)

*Compiled by author from *The Book of the States*, various years.

Disclosure laws in the states are a reflection of changing times and circumstances. The changes in state disclosure law may be the result of several variables including legislative professionalism, government partisanship, the initiative, and political scandal. Uncovering the causes of reform efforts can help us to better predict the future of campaign finance reform in the states. The level of state comfort with disclosure is a good indication of that state's basic commitment to promoting fair and open elections and protecting democracy. So what can research tell us about a state's propensity to adopt disclosure laws?

Descriptive Statistics

Means and standard deviations were tabulated by disclosure score (dependent variable) and legislative professionalism, Democratic control of state government, political scandals, and initiatives (independent variables)[17] and grouped by states per decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s)[18]. Based on this classification, several trends emerged. There were expected strong state disclosure programs and states with very limited disclosure programs. Within each category there were a few unexpected results. The results presented below center on the seven states with the most stringent disclosure scores and eight states with the weakest disclosure scores. This analysis excludes states with scores outside of these two extreme categories.

Strong Disclosure States

Seven states lead with the highest average disclosure score, with scores of 4.0 and higher. New York tops all states with the highest disclosure score at 4.60. New York had, on average, 4.6 types of campaign finance disclosure each year. New York's high disclosure score may result from the fact that it was the very first state to adopt publicity laws (or early campaign finance disclosure laws) in 1890. Following New York, in order of highest average score to lowest are: Alaska, Oregon and Kentucky (tie), Missouri, and California and Maryland (tie). If early adoptions of campaign finance laws are any indication of stringency, then California, Kentucky, and Missouri all fit this pattern. They followed New York with adopting early publicity laws in the first wave of state campaign finance laws from 1890 to 1904 (Overacker [1932] 1974).

Table 2.4. 1971-2005 State Leaders in Disclosure Scores: Means and Standard Deviations

	Alaska	California	Kentucky	Maryland	Missouri	New York	Oregon
M (SD)	4.33 (1.07)	4.00 (1.36)	4.13 (0.74)	4.00 (0.75)	4.07 (1.03)	4.60 (0.82)	4.13 (1.30)

[17] See independent variable description in Chapter 1.
[18] When using averages to compare and contrast variables, specific details are inadvertently wiped away in favor of the larger picture. Averages were used as a way to condense 15 years worth of 50 state data.

Table 2.5 presents the states with the highest disclosure scores and their independent variables. New York, with the highest average disclosure score ranks first in terms of the average number of political scandals over time and second in terms of legislative professionalism, meaning that there were almost 62 convictions for politicians over the years while New York ranked second only to California in terms of how professional its legislature is. However, New York government remained rather bipartisan over the years, with a Democratic control of government average score of 1.47, indicating that there was a fairly divided government without one party maintaining control for long periods of time. In this group of states, New York ranks second to last in terms of Democratic control of government, out ranking only Alaska. Rounding out the other independent variables, Maryland ranks highest in Democratic control of government with a score of 2.93, meaning that Democrats maintained a rather tight control over state government there. Oregon ranks highest with average number of initiatives with at least 5.47 offered each election.

Table 2.5. 1971-2005 State Leaders by Independent Variable: Means and Standard Deviations

	Alaska	California	Kentucky	Maryland	Missouri	New York	Oregon
Legislative Professionalism Score[19] M (SD)	0.28 (0.04)	0.58 (0.04)	0.15 (0.02)	0.21 (0.03)	0.24 (0.05)	0.51 (0.10)	0.19 (0.03)
Democratic Control of Government Score[20] M (SD)	1.33 (0.72)	2.27 (0.70)	2.73 (0.59)	2.93 (0.26)	2.20 (0.77)	1.47 (0.74)	2.00 (0.76)
Number of Political Scandals[21] M (SD)	2.68 (3.02)	56.30 (39.22)	12.10 (7.63)	11.92 (7.52)	11.18 (9.07)	61.75 (39.78)	1.72 (2.34)
Number of Initiatives[22] M (SD)	1.00 (1.13)	5.20 (5.23)	0.00 --	0.00 --	1.40 (1.41)	0.00 --	5.47 (5.73)

Weak Disclosure States

Eight states ranked the lowest with average disclosure scores ranging from 1.87 to 2.47. North Dakota ranks last in terms of stringency of disclosure laws. This is not surprising considering North Dakota was the last state to adopt any form of disclosure in 1981. North Dakota's average disclosure score over the years is 1.87, meaning that on average, North Dakota had just fewer than two types of disclosure requirements each year. Filling out the bottom eight states with the lowest average disclosure scores in

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[19] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 1.0, with scores closer to 1.0 indicating that the state legislature is more professional and looks and acts more like the U.S. Congress. In theory scores range from 0.0 to 1.0, but in reality they range from 0.044 – 0.577.
[20] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 3.0, with 0.0 indicating that Republicans control both chambers of the state legislature and the governor's office and 3.0 indicating that Democrats control both chambers and the governor's office.
[21] This is a flat out average, with no data coding and tabulation involved. Numbers based on the Department of Justice reports for these years.
[22] 0.00 scores indicate that the initiative does not exist in those states.

order of lowest to highest are: Alabama, Wyoming, Indiana, Illinois and Nevada (tie), Iowa, and Maine.

Table 2.6: 1971-2005 Weaker States in Disclosure Scores: Means and Standard Deviations

	Alabama	Illinois	Indiana	Iowa	Maine	Nevada	North Dakota	Wyoming
M (SD)	2.00 (1.07)	2.27 (1.22)	2.20 (1.01)	2.33 (0.62)	2.47 (0.83)	2.27 (0.80)	1.87 (1.46)	2.13 (0.35)

Table 2.7 (below) presents data for the weaker disclosure score states and their independent variables. The lowest ranking state, North Dakota, while not bottoming out any independent variable score here, is second to last in almost every category except for the average number of initiatives per election. In the other categories, North Dakota ranks second to Wyoming in legislative professionalism and Democratic control of state government and third to last in terms of average number of political scandals. Incidentally, North Dakota ranks highest among the low-disclosure states in terms of average number of initiatives offered each election. Wyoming ranks last in legislative professionalism, Democratic control of state government, and number of political scandals.

Table 2.7. 1971-2005 Weaker States by Independent Variable: Means and Standard Deviations

	Alabama	Illinois	Indiana	Iowa	Maine	Nevada	North Dakota	Wyoming
Legislative Professionalism Score[23] M (SD)	0.10 (0.04)	0.29 (0.05)	0.13 (0.02)	0.22 (0.04)	0.14 (0.04)	0.15 (0.01)	0.07 (0.01)	0.06 (0.01)
Democratic Control of Government Score[24] M (SD)	2.73 (0.46)	1.67 (0.90)	0.80 (0.86)	1.27 (0.80)	1.67 (0.90)	2.13 (0.83)	0.80 (0.68)	0.60 (0.51)
Number of Political Scandals[25] M (SD)	17.47 (8.52)	49.18 (33.83)	9.05 (5.03)	2.90 (3.12)	2.27 (2.31)	2.43 (2.56)	2.32 (3.23)	1.45 (2.17)
Number of Initiatives[26] M (SD)	0.00 --	0.40 (1.50)	0.00 --	0.00 --	0.73 (0.96)	0.87 (1.60)	1.67 (1.45)	0.40 (0.91)

The descriptive statistics examine the states with the strongest and weakest disclosure scores to draw comparisons. The analysis below presents findings for all 50 states.

Correlations and Regression Analysis

Two different analytic strategies were applied using correlations and linear regression. All 50 states were examined in these analyses. Table 2.8 presents the correlation table and Table 2.9 presents the regression model for all states.

[23] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 1.0, with scores closer to 1.0 indicating that the state legislature is more professional and looks and acts more like the U.S. Congress. In theory scores range from 0.0 to 1.0, but in reality they range from 0.044 – 0.577.

[24] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 3.0, with 0.0 indicating that Republicans control both chambers of the state legislature and the governor's office and 3.0 indicating that Democrats control both chambers and the governor's office.

[25] This is a flat out average, with no data coding and tabulation involved. Numbers based on the Department of Justice reports for these years.

[26] 0.00 scores indicate that the initiative does not exist in those states.

Table 2.8. Disclosure Correlation Table for all 50 States

Measure	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Disclosure	--	.333**	.115**	.068	.160**	.158**
2. Year	.333**	--	-.096**	-.220**	.248**	.115**
3. Legislative Professionalism	.115**	-.096**	--	.071	.488**	.169**
4. Democratic Control of Government	.068	-.220**	.071	--	.016	-.078*
5. Number of Scandals	.160**	.248**	.488**	.016	--	.122**
6. Number of Initiatives	.158**	.115**	.169**	-.078*	.122**	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

When all 50 states disclosure scores are correlated, there are several statistically significant relationships that emerge. Disclosure score has a statistically significant relationship with year, legislative professionalism, number of political scandals, and number of initiatives. All of these relationships are positive. This means that, over time, as legislatures professionalized, and as the number of scandals and initiatives increased, so did states' disclosure scores. All of these results are significant at the 0.01 level. The only independent variable without a statistically significant relationship with disclosure score is Democratic control of government. This portends that the majority party in power does not affect whether a state adopts more stringent disclosure laws or not. There are several instances of multicollinearity, indicating a relationship between the individual variables, including year. For future research efforts, the independent variables must be examined closely and correlated with one another to determine if one or more of the independent variables should be omitted or not. Eliminating one or more of the independent variables for this current analysis would significantly affect the research design and evaluation.[27] However, some degree of multicollinearity will be present as it is very unlikely the independent variables will be totally uncorrelated, especially when examining internal state factors (Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986).

Table 2.9 shows the linear regression model for all 50 states' disclosure scores. The overall model is significant (p = .0001). Year, legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, and initiatives were all significantly related to disclosure score in this regression model. The only independent variable not significantly related to disclosure score is scandals. The R^2 for this model is .163, meaning that year, legislative professionalism, Democratic control, scandals, and initiatives together explain 16% of the variance in disclosure score.

Table 2.9. Disclosure Linear Regression for all 50 States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	9.941	.035, .052	.000
Legislative Pro.	3.124	.479, 2.101	.002
Democratic Control	4.299	.095, .256	.000
Scandals	-.196	-.006, .005	.845
Initiatives	3.104	.026, .117	.002

Overall Model= F (5/744) = 28.880, p = .0001
R = .403; R^2 = .163

Conclusion

The data in this chapter produce mixed results. Looking beyond individual states' experiences with adopting disclosure laws, what are some general trends for all 50 states and their disclosure adoptions? First, it is important to reiterate that most states had disclosure laws on the books before the Watergate scandals. Thus, the impact of

[27] Cohen and Cohen (1975) suggest three ways to control for multicollinearity: (1) reduce or eliminate redundant independent variables, (2) create a correlation matrix by regressing each independent variable on each and every independent variable and examine the R^2 to see how close it approaches 1.0; and (3) get rid of or combine the variables that are highly correlated with one another.

Watergate on the most basic type of campaign finance reform is overstated. If Watergate had any influence over states and disclosure laws it was to increase the stringency of the disclosure laws already enacted. Policy diffusion experts call this action policy reinvention and not policy innovation (or adoption) because the laws already exist; they are only being revised. Future chapters may indeed find that Watergate served as a greater catalyst for more stringent types of campaign finance reform such as contribution limits and variations of public financing systems.

The second general trend that emerges from this chapter is that disclosure laws are dynamic; they wax and wane for states over the years. States with high disclosure scores in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, are not the same states with high disclosure scores in the 1990s and 2000s. Massachusetts, Oregon, Florida, and Georgia all had the highest disclosure scores in the 1970s and 1980s, but only Oregon remained among the states with the most stringent disclosure laws in the 1990s and 2000s, joined by New Mexico, New York, Virginia, and Washington. At the low end of the disclosure scores, states like Illinois were among the states with the lowest disclosure scores in the country in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. By 2000, Illinois had improved its disclosure laws and was no longer a state with lax disclosure. States like Nevada and Wyoming, however, rank near the bottom of disclosure scores for all four decades analyzed in this study.

The third general trend emerging is that the independent variables (legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and initiatives) have statistically significant relationships with states' disclosure scores. Over time, as states enacted more stringent disclosure laws their disclosure scores increased.

Regardless of where states rank according to disclosure and how influential political scandals and the initiative are at affecting disclosure scores, it is important to remember that the results in this chapter only recognize disclosure laws. The data have the potential to produce more statistically significant results for the more stringent campaign finance reforms: contribution limits and expenditure limits and public funding.

CHAPTER 3
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

What are Contribution Limits?

Do contribution limits to political candidates help to make elections more competitive? Do limits on contributions to candidates violate the First Amendment right to free speech? These questions are central to the arguments for and against contribution limits as a piece of campaign finance reform.

After disclosure policies, the next most popular campaign finance reform in the states is contribution limits. Contribution limits take reform a step farther by establishing restrictions on the sums of money a political actor may accept. In theory, contribution limits are a significant step from disclosure-only laws which simply demand that campaigns submit a record of their financial accounts to state elections officials who eventually release these records to the public. The theory behind contribution limits is that too much money from any single source corrupts. Restricting the amount of money donated to individuals running for office forces candidates to rely on multiple sources for funds instead of only a few donors with deep pockets. Theoretical arguments suggest stemming the tide up front helps to make elections more competitive and removes the notion of impropriety: a quid pro quo relationship between large contributors and winning candidates. In practice, however, the impact and enforcement of contribution limits varies among the 44 states that have some version of a law limiting campaign contributions to legislative candidates (Bowser 2010).[28] For example, of the 44 states

[28] As of January 2010. Illinois and New Mexico were among the 6 states without limits but recently passed legislation establishing contribution limits. According to Bowser (2010) and the National Conference of State Legislatures, New Mexico's contribution limits law will take effect the day after the November 2010 elections and Illinois's law will take effect on January 1, 2011.

with contribution limits, seven have such minimal requirements that it is a stretch to acknowledge that their laws actually place limits on campaign contributions (Bowser 2010).

Contribution limits in the states run the gamut from nearly nonexistent limits to limits so low that their fairness has been challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court. Pennsylvania allows unlimited individual, political action committee (PAC), and state party contributions to candidates and only prohibits corporate and labor union donations (NCSL 2010). Vermont's contribution limits, on the other hand, were challenged in *Randall v. Sorrell* (2006). Opponents argued that contribution limits of $200-$400 were so low that candidates had trouble raising money to fund their elections and ultimately stymied free speech (Legal Information Institute 2011). The Supreme Court agreed, ruling in part that Vermont's contribution limits were too severe. So while the conditions in Pennsylvania and Vermont are extremes they illustrate the different approaches states have to the notion of campaign contribution limits. In general, most states place limits of between $500 and $1,000 on the donations individuals give to candidates and prohibit corporate and labor union contributions altogether (Bowser 2010).

Because contribution limits set parameters on the amount of money given to political actors in campaigns, there are different approaches to the regulation of donors and perceptions of what their relationship with recipients will be. Donors include individuals, political parties, PACs, corporations, and labor unions. Recipients include candidates, political parties, and PACs. The most prevalent form of contribution limits places regulations on what candidates may receive from donors rather than on what political parties and PACs and may accept. Of the 44 states that place contribution limits, all of them limit what individual candidates can receive. But only 23 states place limits on contributions to political parties (National Conference of State Legislatures 2010a) and 13 limit contributions to PACs (National Conference of State Legislatures 2010b). Because this study focuses on state legislative campaign finance reform and the majority of states with contribution limits regulate donations to individuals, this chapter examines only contribution limits to individual candidates rather than contribution limits to political parties, corporations, PACs, and labor unions. By making this differentiation, the data can show us whether there are contribution limits to legislative candidates. Including data on contribution limits to political parties, corporations, PACs, and labor unions may also limit the contributions to executive and judicial branch candidates, and is beyond the scope of this project. So, the relationship examined in this chapter includes candidates (individuals) as the receiver and individuals, political parties, PACs, corporations, and unions as the donors (See Table 3.1). Together, limits on organizations and individuals make up a state's contribution limits score.

Table 3.1. Two Categories of Individual Contribution Limits

Organization-to-Individual Limits	Individual-to-Individual Limits
Corporations	Adults (includes specific amounts and whether anonymous contributions are prohibited)
Unions	Limits to one's own campaign
Political Parties	Does public funding trigger limits by candidate?
Political Action Committees (PACs)	Limits by candidate's family

Early Contribution Limits in the States

Contribution limits in the states go back at least as far as 1883 as a result, in part, of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of that same year (Campaign Finance Reform, 1946 to 1975). Overacker ([1932] 1974) provides a history of early state-level campaign finance reform efforts, including contribution limits. As early as 1883 and 1884 New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts instituted preliminary regulations concerning contribution limits (Overacker [1932] 1974, 291). Limits on contributions picked up after these first three states experimented with regulations. By 1932, every state but seven had provisions that regulated (to various extents) the source of campaign contributions.[29] The early 1930s also ushered in specific prohibitions against corporate contributions and, in two states, prohibitions against insurance companies giving to campaigns (Overacker [1932] 1974, 303).[30] But, while many states prohibited contributions from corporations, only two states, Massachusetts and Nebraska, limited the size of contributions from individuals to candidates (Overacker [1932] 1974, 305). These early state adopters set a precedent that Congress would follow with the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act which barred corporate and labor union contributions to federal campaigns (Campaign Finance Reform, 1946 to 1975).

Contribution Limits 1970 – 2005

At the time that Congress passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act in 1971, 35 states had some form of contribution limits in their statutes. The early contribution limits tended to be broad and general with a typical limit stating: "Solicitation from state employees prohibited" (Council of State Governments 1971). These early contribution limit laws set a precedent for future laws by focusing on two broad categories: organizations and individuals. Organizations primarily included corporations and labor unions but several states eventually expanded their policies to limit political parties, political action committees (PACs), and regulated industries such as gaming and

[29] The seven states not regulating contribution limits were Arkansas, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington (Overacker [1932] 1974, p. 303).
[30] Colorado and North Carolina specifically prohibited insurance companies from donating to campaigns.

insurance. In addition to the stipulations on labor unions and PACs, many states also placed limits on regulated industries out of fear that these industries would unduly influence their political contribution recipients. For example, Florida's 1971 contribution limits law stipulated that "contributions are prohibited from holders of dog racing permits or jai alai fronton persons" (Council of State Governments 1973). Illinois's 1988 law prohibited political contributions from "insurance companies doing business in Illinois or for anyone holding 5% or more stock in a horse racing organization" (Council of State Governments 1990). Kentucky's 1999 law prohibited major lottery vendors and lottery auditors from contributing. Many states throughout the years prohibited public utility companies from donating money to individuals running for public office.

Limits on individuals included adults, candidates, candidates' families, and state (and sometimes local) government employees. Contemporary state laws continue to classify contribution limits as either organization based or individual (Council of State Governments 1971-2005).

In 2005, the stiffest contribution limits among the states prohibited corporate and labor union contributions outright and assigned monetary limits to contributions from individuals and candidates' families (Drage Bowser 2005abcd). The weakest contribution limits among the states in 2005 allowed for unlimited corporate, PAC, and individual contributions to candidates or enacted high thresholds for contributions from organizations and individuals (Drage Bowser 2005abcd). It is not surprising that contribution limits vary among the states; states have seldom been united on any type of law, including campaign finance regulation. History shows that states cycle through periods of regulation and deregulation and campaign finance reform, specifically contribution limits, are no exception.

Contribution Limits Methodology

After disclosure laws, contribution limits are the next most prevalent type of campaign finance reform in the states.

Definition

Contributions are defined as monetary donations to candidates for legislative office. Limits are the amounts allowed under law that certain groups, including in some cases individuals, may give to legislative candidates. This dissertation excludes contribution limits to political action committees (PACs), labor unions, corporations, and political parties and instead concentrates on limits to individual candidates, specifically legislative candidates. Differentiating between limits to types of organizations (PACs, unions, corporations) and individual candidates allows the data to target only candidates and thus presents a more accurate portrait of the types of contribution limits affecting legislative candidates in the states.

Data Source and Rationale

The Book of the States publishes a biennial listing of each state's campaign finance laws. Because these laws seldom change on a yearly basis and most likely change over a period of several years, this database provides a snapshot of nearly every legislative session from 1970-2005. For later years, the National Conference of State Legislatures provided additional explanation on contribution limits in the states.

No one has systematically analyzed contribution limits in the states over a multi-decade period. To remain consistent with other chapters, this chapter used data published in *The Book of the States* over several decades to formulate a unique coding scheme. The contribution limits scale is 1-8 based on two types of limits: limits on organizations and limits on individuals. Organizations are defined as corporations, labor unions, political parties, and political action committees (PACs). Individuals are adults, candidates, and family. An eighth variable measures whether the acceptance of public funding triggers contributions limits to candidates (from any source) and is question seven on my list. Data were coded based on these questions from 1970-2005. The higher the score, the more stringent a state's contribution limits are for legislative candidates. The eight-point questions to code a state's contribution limit score are:

Organizations:

1. Are corporate contributions prohibited (or limited in amount)?
2. Are labor union contributions prohibited (or limited in amount)?
3. Are political party contributions limited in amount?
4. Are PAC contributions prohibited (or limited in amount)?

Individuals:

5. Are there limits on contributions from adults?
6. Are there limits on contributions to one's own campaign?
7. Does public funding trigger limits by candidate?
8. Are there limits on contributions from candidate's family?

Analysis by Question[31]

Question 1: Are corporate contributions prohibited (or limited in amount)[32]

[31] Questions 1-4 deal with types of contributions limits on organizations (corporations, labor unions, political parties, and PACs).

[32] Until June 25, 2012, states could effectively make their own laws banning corporate contributions to state candidates. In the summary decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, *American Tradition Partnership, Inc,*

Bans on corporate contributions in elections have been around since at least the early 20th century. The rationale behind these bans stems from the notion that companies have deep pockets and, therefore, would be able to buy the candidate of their choosing by donating the most money to their election bid. By the end of the 1970s, 37 states prohibited or limited corporate contributions. By the end of the 1980s, 4 states had dropped this law, leaving 33 states prohibiting or limiting corporate contributions. Popularity for banning or limiting corporate contributions increased in the 1990s, as 42 states limited or banned direct corporate contributions to candidates in 1999. And by 2005, 45 states joined in the limits or ban. Even though corporations were limited or banned from directly contributing to a candidate's campaign, they circumvented this by forming their own political action committees (PACs) whereby they could bundle money and donate indirectly to candidates.

Question 2: Are labor union contributions prohibited (or limited in amount)?

Fewer states in the 1970s saw labor unions as much of a threat to corrupting campaigns as they did corporate donations. That is because after the 1947 passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress prohibited direct labor union contributions to federal campaigns. By the end of the 1970s, just 19 states had bans or limits on labor union contributions (compared with 37 banning corporate contributions in the same decade). The number of states banning or limiting labor contributions in the 1980s rose to 24 and at the end of the 1990s, 39 states joined the ranks to ban labor union donations. Finally, by 2005, 45 states (the same number banning corporate contributions) also banned or

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FKA Western Tradition Partnership, Inc, et al. v. Bullock the Court ruled that the 2010 *Citizens United* case allowing unlimited corporate contributions to candidates stands, and shall take precedence over any state law banning corporate contributions. The data collected and analyzed for this project ended at 2005, so state laws banning corporate contributions are discussed.

limited labor contributions. So while more states started off banning or limiting corporate donations rather than labor union funds, they number of states equaled out by 2005.

Question 3: Are political party contributions limited?

Some states have specified what political parties can give to qualified candidates. In many cases, the amounts are limited per election. In 1975, five states limited the amounts political parties could give to candidates, the highest number that decade. By the decade's end, no states limited what parties could give to candidates.

In the 1980s, 11 states limited what parties could give to candidates and that number doubled to 22 states at the end of the 1990s. By 2005, over half of the states (28) limited political party contributions to candidates.

Question 4: Are PAC contributions prohibited (or limited in amount)?

Political action committees (PACs) have existed since the late 1940s after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor unions sought a way to stay involved in elections and needed an indirect way to contribute to campaigns. PACs emerged in the late 1940s but were only regulated after the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and subsequent 1974 amendments to it defining how a PAC could function. The states were slow to adopt their own laws regulating PAC contributions to legislative campaigns, and no state in the 1970s had laws doing so. By 1984, though, 15 states regulated PAC campaign contributions. At the end of the 1980s, 19 states regulated PAC contributions. As PACs became more and more successful at gathering donations and influencing campaigns, states took notice. By the end of the 1990s, 33 states regulated PAC contributions to candidates. And by 2006, three more states joined to regulate PAC contributions, bringing the total number to 36.

Question 5: Are there limits on contributions from adults?[33]

The "adults" in this question include individuals, government employees, and anonymous contributions. The most popular component to this question was state prohibition of anonymous contributions. Of all the contribution limits, limits on contributions from adults is the most popular, with all 50 states placing some form of limit on adult contributors since the mid-1990s. Even in the 1970s, 46 states had limits on adult contributions to campaigns.

Question 6: Are there limits on contributions to one's own campaign?

Unless candidates for legislative office are accepting public funding for their campaigns (Chapter 4 discusses public funding provisions), states allow candidates unlimited contributions to their own campaigns. This question was included in the coding scheme to differentiate those states that had stricter-than-average contribution limits laws. From 1970 to 2005, 15 states scored a "1" for this question.[34]

Question 7: Does public funding trigger limits by candidate?

This question was included in the coding scheme because it further differentiates those states with stricter-than-average contribution limits scores from those with merely average scores. Similar to question six, this question only applies if states offer partial or full public funding programs to legislative candidates (see Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion of public funding programs and the stipulations involved). From 1970 to

[33] Questions 5-8 deal with limits on types of individual contributions.
34 The states were Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia.

2005, 12 states scored a "1" for this question, although none of them were in the 1970s or 1980s.[35]

Question 8: Are there limits on contributions from candidate's family?

From 1970 to 2005, approximately half the states have regulated how much family members can contribute to a candidate's campaign. Usually spouses are unlimited. Michigan's 1975 law was one of the first ones to limit what family members could contribute, essentially capping contributions at $50,000 for governor or lieutenant governor, $25,000 for candidates for other statewide elected office, $10,000 for candid for state senate, and $5,000 for candid for state representative (Council of State Governments 1977). By the end of the 1980s, 14 states limited what family members could contribute, with most of these 14 states indicating that family member contribution limits are the same as the contribution limits for regular individuals. All other states either had no law applying to family member contributions, or that spouses could contribute unlimited amounts of money. New York's 1988 law regulating family contributions allowed for unlimited spousal contributions, but had a complex formula of $0.025 multiplied by the number of voters in the party in the state or district for family contributions to statewide or legislative candidates, respectively (Council of State Governments 1990).

In 1996, almost half the states (24) limited what family members could contribute to candidates, and this is the most amount of states in the 1970 to 2005 period. In 2002, 18 states limited family contributions. Arkansas's law stated: "Family [is] limited to $1,000 per candid per elect (if candid is opposed)" (Federal Election Commission 2002).

35 The states were Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.

Massachusetts limited family members to $500 donations per candidates per year and minors to $25 per year (ibid).

Analysis by Decade

1970s

In the 1970s, states were experimenting with contribution limits on top of disclosure laws and many states' efforts waxed and waned throughout this decade. The most common type of limit placed restrictions on contributions by adults in some form. Forty-six states addressed this by prohibiting anonymous donations or donations in another's name. The next most common type of limit, adopted by 37 states, prohibited direct corporate contributions. Fewer states, just 19, prohibited contributions from labor unions. No state addressed political party or PAC contributions in the 1970s. Notably, Delaware was the only state in the 1970s to place limits on a candidate's contributions to him or herself in addition to limiting family contributions to candidates. Because of these efforts, Delaware had the most consistently tight contribution limits in the country by regulating five different areas. While Delaware was the strictest, Colorado, South Carolina, and Virginia each had no laws at all pertaining to contribution limits.

1980s

Delaware continued to show that it was serious about contribution limits in the 1980s and was among the states with the most contribution limits. Hawaii, however, was the standout with seven contribution regulations adopted in this decade. Joining Delaware and Hawaii as the strictest states on contribution limits are Alaska, Arkansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia with six regulations each. States ranking at the bottom with the fewest contribution limits include the 1970s anti-regulators Colorado, South Carolina, and Virginia, but also Connecticut, Nevada, Vermont, and Wyoming.

The 1980 aggregate statistics are slightly different from the 1970s. The number of states prohibiting corporate contributions stayed the same at 37 in the 1980s, but the number of states prohibiting labor union contributions increased from 19 to 24. The 1980s witnessed the first limits on PAC contributions. In 1984, 15 states limited PAC contributions to some extent and by 1988 this number had grown to 19. By the mid-1980s, 11 states placed limits on political party contributions, an increase from zero states in 1981 and 1984. Also by the mid-decade mark, three states placed limits on candidate contributions to their own campaign, but this was short-lived as Delaware remained the only state at the end of the decade to still have this law. In addition, by the end of the decade, 48 states placed some limits on contributions to campaigns. Some states placed monetary limits on the amount donated to a campaign while other states simply prohibited anonymous contributions. Other limits by the end of the decade included 14 states limiting family contributions to candidates. Most of these states pegged family contributions to the same limits they placed on individual adult contributions.

1990s

States continued to experiment with different types of contribution limits in the 1990s. Some of the previous decades' standouts with strict contribution limits like Delaware and Hawaii continued to have them in the 1990s. A total of, 17 different states had at least six types of contribution limits during this decade. South Carolina, one of the few states in the 1970s and 1980s with no contribution limits became serious about them in the 1990s. South Carolina is among the 17 states with at least six types of contribution limits this decade. Virginia continued to be the lone holdout with no contribution limits until 1996. In addition to Virginia, 11 other states in the 1990s either had zero or only one type of contribution limit.

Aggregate data for the 1990s show that 42 states limited contributions from corporations and 39 limited contributions from labor unions. About two-thirds of the states (33) limited PAC contributions and almost half (22) limited political party contributions. All 50 states in the 1990s had some limitation on individual contributions, even if the law just prohibited state employees from being solicited during working hours or prohibiting anonymous contributions, even if unlimited. And, at the end of the 1990s, just seven states placed limits on how much a candidate could give to his or her own campaign.

2000s[36]

Hawaii led the 2000s with the most contribution limits in the country at seven types. Closely following Hawaii was New Hampshire with six types of limits. As in previous decades, though, Virginia continued its nonsupport for contribution limits, with only one type. Four other states (Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah) join Virginia in the 2000s as having only one type of contributions limit – prohibiting anonymous contributions.

Aggregate data in the 2000s show that 45 states prohibited contributions from corporations and labor unions. The same five states that only had one type of contribution limit also allowed unlimited contributions from corporations and labor unions. Regarding political party contributions, 29 states placed limits on monetary amounts to candidates and 36 states prohibited or limited PAC contributions. On a

[36] 2000s data includes 2000, 2002, and 2005. Data collection ends at 2005.

positive note, all 50 states still prohibited anonymous contributions and prohibited state employees from campaign solicitations during work hours.

Table 3.2 lists the average number of contribution limits in the states by decade. The average number of limits has consistently risen throughout the years.

Table 3.2: Average Number of Contribution Limits in the States by Decade

1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
2.07	2.68	3.97	4.24

Descriptive Statistics

Means and standard deviations were tabulated by contribution limit score (dependent variable) and legislative professionalism, Democratic control of state government, political scandals, and initiatives (independent variables)[37] and grouped by states per decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s)[38]. Based on this classification, several trends emerged. There were expected states with strong contribution scores and states with weak scores. Within each category there were a few unexpected results. The results presented below center on the 11 states with strong contribution limit scores and eight states with the weakest contribution limit scores. The descriptive statistics analysis excludes states with scores outside of these two extreme categories.

Strong States

States with higher contribution limit scores mean they have tough laws concerning the areas from which candidates can receive campaign funding. The contribution limits score possibilities ranged from zero to eight. Eleven states scored

[37] See independent variable description in Chapter 1.
[38] When using averages to compare and contrast variables, specific details are inadvertently wiped away in favor of the larger picture. Averages were used as a way to condense 15 years of 50 state data.

4.00 or higher, with no state averaging a score higher than Minnesota's at 4.47 from 1970 to 2005. Table 3.3 lists the 11 states with the highest average contribution scores. States like Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, and Minnesota were not surprises because they showed a commitment to strong disclosure laws in Chapter 2. Over time, the states with the highest contribution limit scores saw their scores increase each year, ranging from scores of zero to two in the 1970s to scores of five or six in the 2000s. States like Arkansas, Montana, and West Virginia, for example, are not states that scored highly in the disclosure chapter, but redeemed themselves with their contribution limits score. The pattern for their higher scores increased each decade.

Table 3.3. 1971-2005 State Leaders in Contribution Limit Scores: Means and Standard Deviations

	AR	DE	FL	HI	ME	MI	MN	MT	NH	OK	WV
Mean (SD)	4.27 (2.05)	4.40 (2.02)	4.00 (1.81)	4.40 (2.56)	4.07 (1.53)	4.27 (1.43)	4.47 (1.73)	4.20 (1.82)	4.40 (1.45)	4.07 (2.01)	4.20 (1.90)

Strong States Averages and Independent Variables

States with the highest average contribution limit scores were tabulated based also on their independent variable scores from 1970 to 2005.

Table 3.4. 1971-2005 State Leaders by Independent Variable: Means and Standard Deviations

	AR	DE	FL	HI	ME	MI	MN	MT	NH	OK	WV
Legislative Professionalism Score[39] M (SD)	0.11 (.00)	0.17 0.02)	0.24 (0.01)	0.25 (0.02)	0.14 (0.04)	0.51 (0.10)	0.19 0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)	0.22 (0.03)	0.13 (0.01)
Democratic Control of Government Score[40] M (SD)	2.67 (0.49)	1.67 (0.82)	2.20 (1.21)	2.93 (0.26)	1.67 (0.90)	1.20 (0.86)	2.13 (0.83)	1.53 (1.06)	0.33 (0.62)	2.67 (0.49)	2.53 (0.52)
Number of Political Scandals[41] M (SD)	3.93 (2.46)	1.87 (1.73)	35.0 (34.66)	2.8 (3.51)	2.27 (2.31)	16.13 (11.96)	3.62 (3.50)	2.58 (3.51)	1.30 (1.34)	12.15 (17.53)	7.50 (5.68)
Number of Initiatives[42] M (SD)	1.13 (1.30)	--	1.33 (1.63)	--	0.73 (0.96)	0.73 (1.16)	--	1.87 (1.80)	--	0.60 (0.63)	--

Minnesota, the state with the highest contribution limits score, did not lead any of the independent variable categories. Michigan, however, who tied for the third highest contribution limits score with Arkansas, leads the way in this chart with the most professional legislature and the second highest number of political scandals. New Hampshire, with a respectable average contribution limits score of 4.40, has the least professional state legislature (in fact, New Hampshire's legislature is often touted as having the most citizen-oriented legislature in the country), has the most Republican government over the years, and has the fewest political scandals.

[39] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 1.0, with scores closer to 1.0 indicating that the state legislature is more professional and looks and acts more like the U.S. Congress. In theory scores range from 0.0 to 1.0, but in reality they range from 0.044 – 0.577.

[40] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 3.0, with 0.0 indicating that Republicans control both chambers of the state legislature and the governor's office and 3.0 indicating that Democrats control both chambers and the governor's office.

[41] This is a flat out average, with no data coding and tabulation involved. Numbers based on the Department of Justice reports for these years.

[42] -- indicates that the initiative does not exist in those states.

Weak States

All states have some form of contribution limit, even if it is only prohibiting anonymous contributions or prohibiting state employees for soliciting for funds while on the job. Eight states were among the lowest with contribution limit scores of 0.40 to 1.93. Virginia ranks last among all 50 states with an average contribution limits score of 0.40. Virginia's pattern of contribution limits ranges from nothing in the 1970s to 0.25 in the 1980s to 0.75 in the 1990s to 1.00 in the 2000s. So, although Virginia did not start out strong (and neither did any of the states with the highest averages), it made very limited gains throughout the years. Alabama and Colorado both mimicked Virginia's limited gains throughout the years, but nonetheless did increase their averages over time. Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah all jumped around, starting off with higher average scores, then dipping, and then rising in the 2000s. The inconsistent nature of their contribution limit laws averaged out to low scores.

Table 3.5. 1971-2005 Weaker States in Contribution Limit Scores: Means and Standard Deviations

	AL	CO	IL	MS	NM	OR	UT	VA
Mean (SD)	1.93 (0.26)	1.40 (1.76)	1.07 (0.26)	1.93 (1.03)	1.07 (0.26)	1.73 (1.33)	1.27 (0.59)	0.40 (0.51)

Weak States Averages and Independent Variables

How do the weaker states in contribution limit scores compare? Table 3.6 examines the state averages for legislative professionalism, Democratic control of state government, political scandals, and initiatives.

Table 3.6: 1971-2005 Weaker States by Independent Variable: Means and Standard Deviation

	AL	CO	IL	MS	NM	OR	UT	VA
Legislative Professionalism Score[43] M (SD)	0.10 (0.04)	0.24 (0.56)	0.29 (0.04)	0.15 (0.03)	0.09 (0.02)	0.19 (0.03)	0.08 (0.01)	0.16 (0.01)
Democratic Control of Government Score[44] M (SD)	2.73 (0.46)	1.00 (0.65)	1.67 (0.90)	2.67 (0.49)	2.60 (0.63)	2.00 (0.76)	0.87 (1.12)	1.93 (0.88)
Number of Political Scandals[45] M (SD)	17.47 (8.51)	3.37 (5.42)	49.18 (33.83)	15.32 (14.53)	4.48 (2.78)	1.72 (2.34)	2.12 (2.50)	15.52 (11.99)
Number of Initiatives[46] M (SD)	--	2.73 (3.57)	0.40 (1.55)	0.07 (0.26)	--	5.47 (5.73)	0.67 (1.05)	--

Virginia, although last in contribution limits scores, stands out in no distinct way in this table. Compared with Colorado and Illinois, it has a more citizen type of legislature, but is not the most citizen-based in this group (Utah wins in that category). Control over Virginia's state government does lean more Democratic, but is not overtly so and the number of political scandals in the state is less than half of Illinois's average during this same period. From these data it is unclear as to why Virginia ranks lowest in contribution limit scores. Illinois is tied for the second lowest contribution limits score

[43] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 1.0, with scores closer to 1.0 indicating that the state legislature is more professional and looks and acts more like the U.S. Congress. In theory scores range from 0.0 to 1.0, but in reality they range from 0.044 – 0.577.

[44] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 3.0, with 0.0 indicating that Republicans control both chambers of the state legislature and the governor's office and 3.0 indicating that Democrats control both chambers and the governor's office.

[45] This is a flat out average, with no data coding and tabulation involved. Numbers based on the Department of Justice reports for these years.

[46] -- indicates that the initiative does not exist in those states.

with New Mexico at 1.07. Illinois stands out in the independent variables chart by having the most professional legislature but also the most political scandals. If having a high number of political scandals paves the way for campaign finance reform, Illinois did not follow this rule from 1970 to 2005. New Mexico, tied with Illinois for the second lowest contribution limits score, does rank among the least professional and more citizen-based legislatures in this chart and is among the most Democratic-controlled states in this list, just trailing behind Alabama and Mississippi.

Correlations and Regression Analysis

Like the analytic strategy applied in Chapter 2 on disclosure, two different analytic strategies were applied using correlations and linear regression for contribution limits. All 50 states are included in the correlation table (Table 3.7) and regression model (Table 3.8) below. The results for both analyses are significant.

Table 3.7. Contribution Limits Correlation Table for all 50 States

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
1. Contribution Limits	--	.543**	.004	-.082*	.049	.042
2. Year	.543**	--	-.096**	-.220**	.248**	.115**
3. Legislative Professionalism	.004	-.096**	--	.071	.488**	.169**
4. Democratic Control of Government	-.082*	-.220**	.071	--	.016	-.078*
5. Number of Scandals	.049	.248**	.488**	.016	--	.122**
6. Number of Initiatives	.042	.115**	.169**	-.078*	.122**	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Two of the independent variables, year and Democratic control of government, are statistically significant in the correlation table. The relationship between contribution limits and year is positive, indicating that over time states have enacted more stringent types of contribution limits. The relationship between contribution limits and Democratic control of government, however, is negative. This indicates that as more Republicans, and not Democrats, controlled state government, more contribution limits were enacted in the states. Legislative professionalism, scandals, and initiatives were not significantly related to the contribution limit score.

Table 3.8 presents the regression model for contribution limits. The overall model is significant (p = .0001) and year, legislative professionalism, and scandals are significantly associated with contribution limits in the 50 states. Year and legislative professionalism's relationships with contribution limits are positive. This indicates that over time and as legislatures professionalized in the states, more contribution limits were enacted in the states. Political scandals, however, were inversely related to contribution limits score. As contribution limits increased over time, the number of scandals decreased. Why this is significantly related to contribution limits is an interesting area for future research. One possible explanation for the inverse relationship may be the type of political scandal and the extent to which it is especially egregious. The number of scandals may not have made enough of an impact for critics to call for campaign finance reform or there may not have been one headline-grabbing scandal that prompted reform measures.

The other independent variables, Democratic control and initiatives, were not significantly associated with the contribution limits score. The R^2 for the overall model is

.320, indicating that the independent variables account for 32% of the variance in contribution limits score.

Table 3.8. Contribution Limits Linear Regression for all 50 States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	18.396	.096, .119	.000
Legislative Pro.	4.107	1.185, 3.354	.000
Democratic Control	1.395	-.031, .183	.163
Scandals	-4.689	-.023, -.010	.000
Initiatives	-.952	-.090, .031	.341

Overall Model= F (5/744) = 69.976, p = .0001
R = .566; R^2 = .320

Conclusion

State contribution limits attempt to place restrictions on how and when a candidate may accept money to run for public office. This chapter demonstrates the complexity of contribution limit laws in the states and explores why some states have stronger contribution limits than others. As with all studies that examine the 50 states, each state is different. The most common reason for states adopting contribution limits was year, or time. Over time, more states have adopted contribution limits. The regression model suggests that legislative professionalism and scandals also influence a state's contribution limits score. Other factors at work in states with strong contribution limits include a Democratic majority controlling one or both chambers of the legislature, the governor's office, or all three bodies; and a rising number of initiatives on the ballot. Still, for other states, there were other factors at work as to why a state had a strong or weak contribution limit score. For these states and why they have strong or weak scores beyond the independent variables I tested is an area for future research.

CHAPTER 4

EXPENDITURE LIMITS AND PUBLIC FUNDING PROGRAMS

What are Expenditure Limits?

Expenditure limits are another form of campaign finance reform in the states. They combine voluntary campaign spending limits with partial or full public financing paid for by taxes or legislative appropriation. Tying expenditure limits to public funding programs is a concept that has existed for decades. The idea of providing money to candidates to run for public office rests on the assumption that money will come from more wholesome places, i.e., concerned citizens, rather than from big business, unions, political action committees (PACs), and other sources of money that could lead to corruption among officeholders. The idealistic notion in turn suggests that campaigns would be on a more even playing field and electoral competition would increase. But the acceptance of free money is not without a consequence: participating candidates must agree to abide by spending limits throughout their campaign, even if they face a competitor who does not accept public money and spending limits.[47] Expenditure limits and public funding programs do not exist independently of one another. Expenditure limits are only legal if they are tied to the acceptance of voluntary public funding programs.

In states that have tied expenditure limits to public funding over the years, different combinations of recipients have been included. States can offer expenditure limits and public funding programs to different groups of candidates: gubernatorial, statewide (such as secretary of state or state treasurer), legislative, judicial or a

[47] The historical section addresses specific spending limits throughout the decades.

combination of several, but not all of them. In the history of expenditure limits and public funding programs, no state has offered it to all executive, legislative, and judicial candidates. This chapter explores expenditure limits and public funding programs aimed only towards legislative candidates, thereby excluding a discussion on states that support executive and judicial branch candidates. In states that have expenditure limits and public funding programs, more of them are aimed at candidates running for executive branch offices than for legislative offices. For example, starting in the 1990s, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey had strong public finance systems for candidates running for governor and lieutenant governor but no public funding options for legislative candidates.

Public Funding

Before mandatory expenditure limits were banned as a result of the United States Supreme Court case *Buckley v. Valeo* in 1976 public funding programs did not exist. They emerged as a result of the *Buckley* decision in states that wanted to continue with expenditure limits. One way to encourage candidates to accept spending limits in their campaigns was to entice them with public funding. There are two kinds of public funding: partial and full. The level of funding is determined by state law and is supported usually by tax provisions, and in a few circumstances, by legislative appropriation. States with partial public funding programs offer small grants to participants. Often this is not enough to cover the cost of the campaign and participants must rely on other sources of private funds to fully finance their campaigns. The amount of funding allowed from private sources varies by state (NCSL 2010). For example, Maryland's partial public funding program, available only to candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, stipulates that participating candidates may receive grants equal to 30 cents multiplied by the number of qualified voters, which adjusts each January 1 (Feigenbaum and Palmer 2002). Another example of partial public funding is available in Hawaii. The chart below displays the amount of matching grants available to participating candidates provided they meet the minimum amount of qualifying contributions to receive public funding.

Table 4.1: Hawaii's 2005 Partial Public Funding System

Office	Required Qualifying Contributions	Funding Available
Governor	$100,000	$2.50 x number of qualified voters
Lieutenant governor	$50,000	$1.40 x number of qualified voters
Mayor	$5,000-$50,000 (depending on location)	$2.00 x number of qualified voters
State Senate	$2,500	$1.40 x number of qualified voters
State House	$1,500	$1.40 x number of qualified voters
Others (non-federal offices)	$1,500	$0.20 x number of qualified voters

Source: Adapted from State of Hawaii, http://hawaii.gov/campaign/forms/cc/PublicFundingGuidebook

Full public funding programs are often referred to as "clean elections," a term that many proponents of the system prefer to use because it places a positive meaning on the system. A few states, like Arizona, have established clean elections systems. Depending on the state, candidates for statewide, legislative, and judicial office may choose to participate in these programs. Unlike candidates who may participate in partial public funding programs, clean elections candidates may not rely on any private funding for their campaigns. Clean elections programs are attractive to first time office seekers or challengers, who do not have established name recognition or a team of fundraisers behind them. But many incumbents do not participate in clean elections because of the complex rules and regulations stipulating the use of the money (Malbin and Gais 1998). Take for example, Nebraska's complicated partial public funding law: if both legislative candidates agree to voluntary spending limits, then neither one receives public funding. If one candidate refuses to abide by voluntary spending limits, then he or she must file spending estimates with the state. The state reviews this and determines the difference between what the non-abiding candidate predicts to spend and the abiding candidate's voluntary spending limits. The abiding candidate then receives the difference in funding (Malbin and Gais 1998, p. 60).

See Figure 4.1 for a visual representation of the differences between Arizona's relatively straightforward clean elections program and Figure 4.2 for Nebraska's relatively complex program.

Figure 4.1. Arizona's Simple Clean Elections Program



Figure 4.2. Nebraska's Complicated Partial Public Funding Program



Despite the variety of full or partial public funding systems in the states, many systems are struggling financially. Taxpayer participation is dwindling and there are frequent judicial challenges to the constitutionality of them (NCSL 2010). Regardless of smaller coffers, monetary support for these programs comes in a variety of forms: direct contributions from citizens, tax check-offs or add-ons for political parties, and citizen tax incentives. Many states use a combination of two or three of these methods. I concentrate here on direct contributions to candidates and citizen tax incentives.[48]

[48] Specific descriptions of tax incentives are discussed below in the Analysis by Question section.

Donations to political parties cannot be attributed to aiding particular legislative candidates and thus are beyond the scope of this project.

Brief History of Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

Federal expenditure limits were established during the Progressive period of 1907-1925 (La Raja 2011). The Federal Corrupt Practices Act limited expenditures to amounts permitted by state law and established a $5,000 spending limit for nomination and election for the U.S. House of Representatives and $20,000 for U.S. Senate candidates (La Raja 2011). There were exceptions for expenses tied to personal traveling, living expenses, and communication (La Raja 2011). Enforcement mechanisms were weak and punishments for violating these stipulations were rarely imposed. At this same time, many states were restricting the use of campaign funding to reduce bribery and voter incentives. Prohibiting the use of campaign money on the purchase of alcohol to distribute to voters was a popular state law during the early half of the twentieth century (Gross and Goidel 2003). Some states did limit what candidates could spend on certain items, such as alcohol. These early spending limits gave way to broader campaign spending limits but the focus was on limiting spending to gubernatorial and statewide candidates, not legislative candidates (Gross and Goidel 2003). By 1964, 30 states limited total campaign expenditures, mostly for gubernatorial and statewide candidates. Until 1966 Congress did little to formally address expenditure limits or public funding, but in 1966 a system was created to offer public funding for presidential candidates[49] and in 1974, the Federal Election Commission was formed to supervise campaign and election funding and spending. By the early 1970s most state laws

[49] Contemporary public funding programs for governors tend to parallel the presidential public funding system (Malbin and Gais 1998).

regulating campaign expenditures were poorly written and poorly enforced while at the same time spending by outside parties on behalf of candidates was becoming increasingly difficult to control and track (Gross and Goidel 2003).

The history of public funding programs prior to the 1970s is sparser than the history for expenditure limits. According to Gross and Goidel (2003), Oregon was the only state to experiment with public funding. This system gave each political party a portion of money equal to the amount of votes cast for each party's gubernatorial candidate in the previous election. Nothing was offered to state legislative candidates and the public subsidy was quickly declared unconstitutional by the Oregon Supreme Court and repealed by the state legislature. The remainder of this chapter picks up in the 1970s when the modern era of campaign expenditure limits and public funding for legislative candidates begins.

Expenditure Limits and Public Funding Methodology

Definition

Expenditure limits are caps on what a candidate may spend during the campaign for election. Expenditure limits, though initially legal, are no longer constitutional unless they are tied to public funding programs and a candidate voluntarily chooses to participate in the program. As of 2005, only five states had public funding programs and expenditure limits.

Data Source and Rationale

Several sources were consulted for expenditure limits and public funding programs: *The Book of the States*, 1970-2005 50-state campaign finance laws, Federal Election Commission (FEC), and National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).

The Book of the States served as the resource for the more historical data, while the FEC and NCSL offered more contemporary data. FEC reports were consulted for 1999 and 2002 data. Although serving as a watchdog group for congressional and presidential elections, the FEC website does contain limited state data (Feigenbaum and Palmer 2000, 2002). NCSL was consulted for 2005 data since this is a more contemporary source and offers comprehensive information on more recent campaign finance events.

No one has systematically coded and analyzed state expenditure limits and public funding programs. Based on the data resources available and past chapter decisions on coding, I developed my own scale. To accurately measure whether there is public funding available to state legislative candidates (and thereby excluding state-wide, judicial, and local candidates), question five is of extreme importance to this study. Some states, such as Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey were excluded because they offered (as of 2005) public funding only to gubernatorial candidates only.

The five questions to determine a state's expenditure limits and public funding score are:

1. Are there expenditure limits? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
2. Are there certain restrictions on spending? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
3. Are there restrictions on surplus funding? (1 yes; 0 = no)
4. Are there tax provisions available for individuals? (1 = yes; 0 = no)
5. Is there public funding available for legislative candidates? (1 = yes; 0 = no)

The coding results indicate the higher the score, the more likely a state is to have expenditure limits and public funding available to state legislative candidates. Several states earned scores of four or five from 1992 to 2005. The highest scoring states were

Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin in 1999 and those four states plus the addition of Arizona in 2002 and 2005. Illinois has never had an expenditure limit or any form of public funding for legislative candidates. Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington all had the next lowest scores from 1971 to 2005.

Analysis by Question

Question 1: Are there expenditure limits?

In the early 1970s, during the pre-*Buckley* era, expenditure limits among the states were popular. The first year of my data, 1971, shows 32 states with expenditure limits. By 1975, 39 total states had adopted expenditure limits, the highest of all the years of data (1971-2005). By 1976 and year of the *Buckley* case, the number of states dropped to 15, and by the end of the decade just seven states still had some form of expenditure limits.

The 1980s had shifting expenditure limits. The decade started the way the 1970s ended, with seven states having expenditure limits. By 1984, no states had expenditure limits, but in 1986 nine states did. The decade ended with just five states having limits.

The 1990s remained somewhat consistent with a low of three states having expenditure limits in 1992 and 1994, followed by four states in 1996, and nine states, and a decade high, in 1999.

For the two years' worth of data in the 2000s, both 2002 and 2005 found eight states with expenditure limits. Clearly the peak of expenditure limits in the states was in the years leading up to the 1976 *Buckley v. Valeo* case. States struggled with implementing voluntary spending limits in the years following *Buckley*.

Question 2: Are there certain restrictions on spending?

Just because a state had expenditure limit laws does not mean that there were certain restrictions on the types of spending legislative candidates could make. For instance, in the prime expenditure limit years of the early 1970s, there were always fewer states with specific restrictions on spending than general expenditure limits altogether. This means that while states may have had "expenditure limits" on the books, there may not have been any specifics in those law books pertaining to how exactly those spending limits apply. Further, while there may have been expenditure limits on the books, the states lacked the impetus to fully restrict spending among candidates. Therefore, a state could have expenditure limits but no specific types of limits, other than the theory of limits.

Following the *Buckley* case, a general pattern emerges, however. For the states that adopted voluntary spending limits, they also adopted specific spending restrictions on participating candidates to go along with general spending limits. As mentioned previously, more states had spending limits tied to the acceptance of public funding for executive branch candidates than for legislative candidates. The pattern of the same or nearly the same number of states implementing expenditure limits and commenting on specific spending categories remained consistent until 2005.

Question 3: Are there restrictions on surplus funding?

Surplus funding means any money left over following the election. Restrictions on surplus funding did not appear in state campaign finance law until 1986, when nine states supported this provision. Ten years later, 27 states had restrictions on how legislative candidates could spend their extra campaign money. The laws in 1996 specifically indicated that candidates could not use extra campaign money for personal use. Candidates had several choices on where to spend their extra money, including towards their next campaign, to charities, to other candidates, or returned to contributors. Typical phrases used in state laws regarding the use of surplus funds were to use the funds for "lawful expenditures[50]" and "personal use of funds by candidates prohibited.[51] By the end of 2005, just six states placed restrictions on how legislative candidates could spend their surplus campaign funds.

Although this question does not relate directly to spending during a campaign, it is necessary to include it in the total expenditure limits score to acknowledge that some states treated the spending of campaign money stricter than others.[52]

Question 4: Are there tax provisions for individuals?[53]

This question measures whether there are tax credits, deductions, check-offs, or surcharges that taxpayers can take advantage of to support public funding programs for campaigns. While somewhat different, the point of each of these provisions is to allow taxpayers to help contribute to public funding systems and encourage a larger base of small contributors so that contributions are not concentrated in a few large donors. These tax provisions contribute to the vast majority of the public funds available to candidates in those states. A credit is deducted from the total amount a taxpayer owes to the state.

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[50] The 1999 Alabama law states: "Unlimited as to officeholder expenses, contributions to charity, transfers to another committee, donations to state agencies or funds, or uses for other non-personal lawful purposes."

[51] The 1996 Rhode Island law states: "Campaign funds not used to pay for the expenses of gaining or holding public office may be maintained in campaign accounts; be donated to a candidate for public office, a political organization, or a PAC, subject to the statutory limitations on contributions; be transferred in whole or in party to a newly established PAC; be donated to a tax-exempt charitable organization; be donated to the state; or be returned to the donor. Personal use of funds by candidates prohibited."

[52] Data on expenditure limits was difficult to come by, so this question is included to help further differentiate states from one another with their expenditure limits scores.

[53] States are coded as "0" for "Tax Provisions for Individuals" category if the law does not specifically say the money goes to legislative candidates. Most tax provisions go to political parties, so in those cases I coded "0." In the instances where there was no indication where the money went, but there are tax provisions, I left it as a "1."

A deduction allows taxpayers to subtract the amount of their contribution to public funding systems from their tax bill, ranging from \$25 to \$500 with most states offering a maximum limit of \$50. Check-offs do not increase a taxpayers' liability because they direct the state government where to place a portion of their owed taxes (such as to campaign public funding programs), while surcharges do increase liability, meaning that the desired amount going towards public funding programs will be added to the amount the taxpayer owes. State allowances for check-offs and surcharges range from \$1 to \$25, with most states allowing between \$1 and \$5 (NCSL 2010). Tax provisions for public funding systems did not exist until 1984 when seven states allowed for any of these. The peak year for the number of states offering tax provisions was 1988 when 11 states offered some sort of provision. By 2005, just seven states had any of these. The funds designated through tax provisions go to various sources. Most tax provisions go to political parties, followed by candidates for governor and lieutenant governor so in those cases I coded "0." In the instances where there was no indication where the money went, but there are tax provisions, I left it as a "1," which leaves open the possibility that tax provisions could go towards legislative candidates. The only states in 2005 that specifically mention tax provisions going to legislative candidates are Arizona, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Nebraska.

Question 5: Is public funding (partial or full) available for legislative candidates?

Unlike the data for tax provisions, *The Book of States* did indicate (in most cases) whether public funding was available for legislative candidates. Because of the focus on legislators, these numbers are lower than what they would have been had public funding programs for governors and statewide candidates been included. A nominal amount of states offered public funding programs for some judicial candidates. Question five eliminated many states from higher scores because I focused only on public funding programs available for state legislative candidates.

The earliest public funding programs in the states appeared in 1981. Hawaii and Minnesota were the first states to offer some public money to legislative candidates. The peak year for public funding programs for state legislators was 1999 with eight states. By 2005 five states still had a version of public funding for legislative candidates, either partial or full funding.

Analysis by Decade

1970s

The early half of the 1970s had over half of states with either expenditure limits or restrictions on spending. The numbers peaked in 1975 (one year before the *Buckley* case) when 78% of states had either limits or restrictions. After *Buckley*, these numbers plummeted and by the end of the 1970s, just seven states had voluntary spending limits or restrictions. No state in the 1970s had an expenditure score of more than two and no state placed restrictions on spending, offered tax provisions for public funding, or offered public funding for legislative candidates. This means that the form of expenditure limits most popular in the states during the 1970s was a limit on surplus spending.

1980s

State expenditure scores remained low in the early part of the 1980s but new strategies emerged towards the middle of the decade. In 1984, seven states allowed tax provisions for individuals to allocate a portion of their tax liability to go towards public funding programs. This is the first year for this type of law and the only type of expenditure limit among the states in 1984.

Perhaps evaluating the success of certain tax provisions in 1984, by 1986 states began to reenter expenditure limits territory, this time making all limits and associated provisions strictly voluntary. Hawaii and Minnesota led the states with the highest expenditure limit scores of four. A handful of states closely followed with expenditure limit scores of three. Hawaii and Minnesota continued to lead the states with expenditure limit scores of four by the end of the 1980s.

1990s

In the first half of this decade, Hawaii and Minnesota continued to lead with the highest scores. They were joined by Wisconsin and were the only three states with any type of expenditure limit or public funding program in the early 1990s. Together, Minnesota and Wisconsin proved to have the most comprehensive public funding systems for statewide and legislative candidates. Their experiences paved the way for other states to adopt public funding systems in the second half of the 1990s.

In the middle part of the decade, Minnesota and Wisconsin pulled ahead of Hawaii in terms of the most comprehensive voluntary spending limits combined with public funding programs. Both states had expenditure limit scores of five. By the decade midpoint, over half of the states had instituted laws concerning how candidates could spend their surplus campaign funds. At the end of the decade, 13 of the 27 states who had restrictions on surplus funding in 1996 had dropped them, mainly because of constitutional questions related to spending money and the right to free speech.

The most significant expenditure limits development in the 1990s occurred at the end of decade when four additional states had joined Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin to offer public funding for legislative candidates. Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, and Rhode Island[54] together offered either partial or full public funding to candidates running for the state legislature. Maine was the first state to approve a voter initiative for Clean Elections in 1996, although the law did not take effect until 2000 (Public Campaign 2011).

2000s

Arizona was the biggest story in campaign finance reform in the early 2000s. In previous years Arizona had low expenditure limit scores of zero, one, or two (and not necessarily in numeric order) but by 2000 increased its expenditure limits score to five. This is a result of the passage of its Clean Elections system by citizen initiative in 1998 and put into effect for the 2000 elections. Like other public funding programs in the states, Arizona's Clean Elections Act is voluntary. According to the Citizens Clean Elections Commission, the program "levels the playing field" for participating candidates while allowing non-participating candidates the right to raise and spend their campaign money as they wish (2012a). To be eligible for Arizona candidates for statewide and legislative office must collect a specified number of $5 donations (either statewide or locally within the legislative district) and agree not to accept money from political action committees (PACs), lobbyists, or other special interests. In return participating candidates receive Clean Elections money to spend on their campaigns. Legislative

[54] The reason Vermont is not included in this list is because the public funding program only covers candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, despite the fact that it was enacted by the state legislature.

candidates seeking Clean Elections money must gather signatures and $5 donations from 220 different individuals.[55]

Arizona's Clean Elections program does not take money from the state's general fund. The majority of funding comes from court assessments, which include a 10% surcharge on all civil penalties and criminal fines, and from voluntary state income tax check-offs and tax credits (Citizens Clean Elections Commission 2012b). Together these sources make up nearly 100% of the funding for Clean Elections candidates. In 2000, the first year of the program, 26% of primary election candidates used clean elections funding (Citizens Clean Elections Commission 2012a).

Following the success of clean elections programs in both Maine and Arizona, New Jersey adopted a pilot program to test clean elections in 2004. A major difference between the Maine and Arizona programs, however, was that New Jersey's was just a pilot program offered only in two out of the 40 legislative districts in 2005.[56] Participating candidates in the two selected legislative districts had to raise between 400 and 800 $10 contributions from registered voters in that district. In addition, participating candidates had to refuse to accept contributions from any other sources, with the exception of smaller seed money contributions from registered voters in the state of New Jersey (State of New Jersey 2012).

Descriptive Statistics

Means and standard deviations were tabulated by expenditure limit score (dependent variable) and legislative professionalism, Democratic control of state

[55] See Exhibit 4.1 for a visual representation.

[56] The New Jersey Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Program was expanded in 2007 to include three legislative districts. Following the 2007 legislative elections, however, the program received criticism and was eventually abandoned in 2008, in part because of constitutional questions surrounding the validity of the program.

government, political scandals, and initiatives (independent variables)[57] and grouped by states per decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s)[58]. Based on this classification, several trends emerged. There were expected strong state expenditure limits and public funding programs, weak state programs, and states with no expenditure limits or public funding programs at all. Within each category there were a few unexpected results. The results presented below center on the seven states with strong expenditure limit scores and eight states with the weakest expenditure limit scores. The analysis excludes states with scores outside of these two extreme categories.

Strong States

States with higher expenditure scores mean they have tougher laws about how a candidate can spend his or her campaign money and these expenditure limits are tied to the acceptance of partial or full public funding programs. There were seven states with an average expenditure score of 1.0 or higher. This indicates that from 1971 to 2005 these states supported at least one type of regulation about legislative campaign expenditures or some type of public funding program. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were not surprises because they have well publicized partial- and full-public funding programs. Alabama and Ohio, however, were surprising. Alabama had a strong public funding programs in the 1970s and 1980s but support for these programs tapered off in the 1990s and 2000s. Alabama's average expenditure score from 1971-2005 was 1.07, and is the result of early public funding programs, and not more recent programs. Ohio's average expenditure score was 1.0 and its history with

[57] See independent variable description in Chapter 1.
[58] When using averages to compare and contrast variables, specific details are inadvertently wiped away in favor of the larger picture. Averages were used as a way to condense 15 years of 50 state data.

expenditure limits is best illustrated by peaks and valleys. Ohio started out in the 1970s with a strong expenditure score, dipped in the 1980s, increased in the 1990s, and finally peaked in the 2000s with an average score of 3.0. The table below illustrates the state leaders in expenditure scores and public funding programs:

Table 4.2. 1971-2005 State Leaders in Expenditure and Public Funding Scores: Means and Standard Deviations

	Alabama	Arizona	Hawaii	Maine	Minnesota	Ohio	Wisconsin
M (SD)	1.07 (1.10)	1.33 (1.68)	2.60 (2.06)	1.60 (1.92)	3.26 (1.39)	1.00 (1.20)	3.33 (1.23)

Strong States and Independent Variables

How do the leaders in expenditure scores and public funding programs (dependent variable) compare in terms of their independent variables? Table 4.3 displays the results.

Table 4.3. 1971-2005 State Leaders by Independent Variable: Means and Standard Deviations

	Alabama	Arizona	Hawaii	Maine	Minnesota	Ohio	Wisconsin
Legislative Professionalism Score[59] M (SD)	0.10 (0.04)	0.24 (0.03)	0.25 (0.02)	0.14 (0.04)	0.19 (0.02)	0.33 (0.02)	0.33 (0.10)
Democratic Control of Legislature Score[60] M (SD)	2.73 (0.46)	0.73 (0.80)	2.93 (0.26)	1.67 (0.90)	2.13 (0.83)	1.27 (0.96)	1.93 (0.96)
Number of Political Scandals[61] M (SD)	17.46 (8.52)	7.57 (11.66)	2.80 (3.51)	2.27 (2.31)	3.62 (3.50)	30.60 (15.70)	5.75 (5.16)
Number of Initiatives[62] M (SD)	0.00 (0.00)	1.40 (1.63)	0.00 (0.00)	0.73 (0.96)	0.00 (0.00)	1.47 (1.68)	0.00 (0.00)

One possible explanation for Ohio's surprisingly strong expenditure score may be because of the average number of political scandals that has rocked the state over the years. Among the expenditure score leaders, Ohio's average number of political scandals is almost double the next closest state in this category, which happens to be Alabama, another surprising member of the expenditure leaders. In fact, an argument can be made that Ohio's and Alabama's average political scandals, in part, led to increased expenditure limits. Another possible contributor to Ohio's unexpected membership in the

[59] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 1.0, with scores closer to 1.0 indicating that the state legislature is more professional and looks and acts more like the U.S. Congress. In theory scores range from 0.0 to 1.0, but in reality they range from 0.044 – 0.577.
[60] Scores based on a range of 0.0 – 3.0, with 0.0 indicating that Republicans control both chambers of the state legislature and the governor's office and 3.0 indicating that Democrats control both chambers and the governor's office.
[61] This is a flat out average, with no data coding and tabulation involved. Numbers based on the Department of Justice reports for these years.
[62] 0.00 scores indicate that the initiative does not exist in those states.

tough expenditure limits category is its use of initiatives. Among this group, Ohio's use of the initiative beats out every other state. Ohio is also tied with Wisconsin for legislative professionalism. Overall, Ohio is the leader or tied for the leader of the leaders in legislative professionalism, number of political scandals, and number of initiatives. All the more surprising about Ohio is the fact that it has never had public funding available for state legislative candidates. Ohio's expenditure limits score is solely indicated by a one dollar income tax check-off with proceeds going equally to all political parties with a candidate for state legislature, and a $50 credit on income taxes to go towards candidate contributions (NCSL 2010). Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have all instituted public funding programs for legislative candidates and stand out as leaders in this category.

Weaker States

Most states do not have expenditure limits and public funding programs. Eight states were among the lowest with expenditure and public funding scores of 0.0 to 0.07. The states with mean scores of 0.07 are Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. Illinois ranks last among all 50 states with an expenditure score of zero. Illinois has never regulated the amount of money a legislative candidate can spend, nor has the state ever provided public funding for legislative candidates. Excluding Illinois, the other low-ranking states all made a modest effort to regulate expenditures during one decade, but nothing more.

Table 4.4. 1971-2005 Weaker States in Expenditure and Public Funding Scores: Means and Standard Deviations

	Arkansas	Idaho	Illinois	Louisiana	New Mexico	Tennessee	Virginia	Washington
M (SD)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.26)	0.0 (0.00)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.26)

Weaker States and Independent Variables

How do the weaker state in expenditure limits and public funding programs compare? Table 4.5 examines the state averages for legislative professionalism, Democratic control of state legislature, political scandals, and initiatives.

Table 4.5. 1971-2005 Weaker States by Independent Variable: Means and Standard Deviations

	Arkansas	Idaho	Illinois	Louisiana	New Mexico	Tennessee	Virginia	Washington
Legislative Professionalism Score M (SD)	0.11 (0.00)	0.14 (0.03)	0.29 (0.04)	0.15 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.13 (0.01)	0.16 (0.01)	0.21 (0.01)
Democratic Control of Government Score M (SD)	2.67 (0.49)	0.73 (0.46)	1.67 (0.90)	2.73 (0.46)	2.60 (0.63)	2.40 (0.51)	1.93 (0.88)	2.20 (0.86)
Number of Political Scandals M (SD)	3.93 (2.46)	1.93 (2.43)	49.18 (33.82)	19.53 (13.84)	4.48 (2.78)	16.57 (9.95)	15.52 (11.99)	4.80 (4.39)
Number of Initiatives M (SD)	1.13 (1.30)	0.73 (1.10)	0.40 (1.55)	0.07 (0.26)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	2.00 (1.41)

Illinois, in last place with an expenditure and public funding score of zero, stands out in notable ways according to this chart. Illinois tops the loser list in terms of legislative professionalism and number of political scandals. This means that Illinois has the most professional legislature among this list but also has the most corrupt politicians. If any state were in need of campaign finance reform, one would think that Illinois would be a prime candidate.

Other notables emerging from this chart are that New Mexico, Tennessee, and Virginia do not have the initiative. The other states in this list made little use of this tool over the 1971 to 2005 period. All states but Idaho have had a fairly strong Democratic control over the two houses of the legislature and the governor's office, with scores of nearly two and higher.

Correlations and Regression Analysis

This chapter follows the same analytic strategy as the chapters on disclosure and contribution limits. Two different analytic strategies were applied using correlations and linear regression. All 50 states are included in the correlation table (Table 4.6) and regression model (Table 4.7) below. The results for both analyses are significant.

There is a statistically significant relationship between expenditure limits and public funding in the states and legislative professionalism and number of scandals in the correlation table. The relationship between expenditure limits and public funding and legislative professionalism is positive, indicating that more professionalized legislatures have adopted more stringent expenditure limits and public funding programs in their states. In contrast, the relationship between expenditure limits and public funding and political scandal was negative, just as it was with contribution limits in Chapter 3.

Surprisingly, year was not significantly related to expenditure limits and public funding, even though clean elections (the most stringent type of public funding program) were only adopted in the 1990s for Arizona and Maine. The relationships with Democratic control of government and number of initiatives were also not significant according to the correlation table.

Table 4.6. Expenditure Limits and Public Funding Correlation Table for all 50 States

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
1. Expenditure Limits and Public Funding	--	-.071	.093*	.000	-.117**	-.069
2. Year	-.071	--	-.096**	-.220**	.248**	.115**
3. Legislative Professionalism	.093*	-.096**	--	.071	.488**	.169**
4. Democratic Control of Government	.000	-.220**	.071	--	.016	-.078*
5. Number of Scandals	-.117**	.248**	.488**	.016	--	.122**
6. Number of Initiatives	-.069	.115**	.169**	-.078*	.122**	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The overall linear regression model is significant (p = .0001). Legislative professionalism and scandals are both significantly related to expenditure limits and public funding scores. This indicates that more professionalized legislatures are, the higher the state's expenditure limit and public funding score. Political scandals are inversely related to expenditure limits and public funding. As was the case with scandals and contribution limits, the number of scandal convictions each year in the states may not have caused enough critics to call for campaign finance reform, especially the most stringent type of reform involving public funding. The R^2 for the model is just .049, so there are other factors at work that influence a state's expenditure limits and public funding score in this case. This is an area for future research.

Table 4.7. Expenditure Limits and Public Funding Linear Regression for all 50 States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.193	-.007, .009	.847
Legislative Pro.	4.933	1.179, 2.739	.000
Democratic Control	-.443	-.094, .060	.658
Scandals	-4.857	-.017, -.007	.000
Initiatives	-2.229	-.093, -.006	.026

Overall Model= F (5/744) = 7.742, p = .0001
R = .222; R^2 = .049

Conclusion

This chapter presents expenditure limits and public funding programs. Early state adopters of this type of campaign finance reform did not modify their programs to comply with Supreme Court rulings. The system of expenditure limits has evolved from limiting what candidates could spend on campaigns in the early 1970s to states offering full-blown public funding programs (or clean elections programs) to candidates who voluntarily participate. While several states have robust public funding programs, many of these are struggling financially as citizen contributors question whether the programs are really leveling the playing field to ensure competitive elections. In the spectrum of campaign finance reforms, expenditure limits and public funding programs are the most extensive and limiting to candidates. That is why so few states have them.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

This dissertation has discussed campaign finance reform in the states and introduced the problem: why do some states have more types of campaign finance reform than others? What is happening in the states to cause campaign finance reform? This study is different than other examinations of campaign finance reform in that it examines the causes of reform, and not the effects of reform. To examine the causes of reform, this study breaks up campaign finance reform into three main types: disclosure, contribution limits, and expenditure limits and public funding. The type of campaign finance reform is the dependent variable, which is another departure from current literature on campaign finance reform which treats the reform as the independent variable and examines the impact of the reform on certain actors within the state. The independent variables, or what I tested as the causes of campaign finance reform are: legislative professionalism, the initiative, partisan breakdown of state government, and number of political scandals. I researched, gathered, and coded data for the years 1970 to 2005. Certain patterns emerged and will be uncovered in the next section as I return to the research hypotheses.

Each hypothesis is included below with a breakdown of the individual variables by type of campaign finance reform. Hypothesis One examines legislative professionalism, Hypothesis Two examines the initiative, Hypothesis Three examines scandals, and Hypothesis Four examines partisan breakdown of state government.

Hypotheses One (H1):

States with higher levels of legislative professionalism are less likely to have stringent campaign finance reforms. Hybrid and citizen legislatures are more likely to have stringent reforms.

Hypothesis One and Disclosure

For the seven states with the highest average disclosure scores from 1970 to 2005 (Alaska, California, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New York, and Oregon) California and New York are ranked first and second, respectively (Squire 2007). Table 5.1 shows the legislative professionalism ranking for the states with the top disclosure scores over time. The strongest disclosure score states clearly have highly professionalized and hybrid legislatures, lending evidence that indicates professionalized legislatures support disclosure laws.

Table 5.1. Legislative Professionalism Rankings 1979 to 2003[63] for the Strong Disclosure States

Legislative Professionalism Ranking	State
1	California
2	New York
11	Alaska
18	Maryland
21	Missouri
25	Oregon
27	Kentucky

Table 5.2 shows the states with the weakest disclosure scores and how they are ranked according to their legislative professionalism scores (Squire 2007).

[63] Raw data are from Squire 2007, compiled and ranked by author.

Table 5.2. Legislative Professionalism Rankings 1979 to 2003 for the Weak Disclosure States

Legislative Professionalism Ranking	State
8	Illinois
22	Iowa
30	Nevada
42	Indiana
43	Maine
45	Alabama
48	Wyoming
49	North Dakota

While there is one more state (8 total) in the weakest disclosure score category, the results are nearly opposite from those in the strongest disclosure score category. The weak disclosure score states all have hybrid and citizen-type legislatures, with the exception of Illinois. This portends that states with higher levels of legislative professionalism support strong disclosure laws, while states with lower levels of legislative professionalism do not support disclosure laws.

The correlation table and regression model in Chapters 2 supports this finding. In those analyses, professionalized legislatures were significantly related to higher disclosure scores.

Hypothesis One and Contribution Limits

Eleven states had the highest average contribution limits score from 1970 to 2005. They are Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.

Table 5.3: Legislative Professionalism Rankings 1979 to 2003 for the Strong Contribution Limit States

Legislative Professionalism Ranking	State
5	Michigan
12	Hawaii
13	Florida
20	Oklahoma
23	Minnesota
26	Delaware
35	West Virginia
41	Arkansas
43	Maine
44	Montana
50	New Hampshire

Three of the states with the highest contribution limits scores are also professionalized legislatures: Michigan, Hawaii, and Florida. Oklahoma, Minnesota, Delaware, and West Virginia have hybrid legislatures, and Arkansas, Maine, Montana, and New Hampshire are citizen-based legislatures, with New Hampshire having the most citizen-based legislature in the country.[64]

Table 5.4 displays legislative professionalism rankings for the states with the weakest contribution limits scores.

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[64] New Hampshire's General Court has 424 members (up to 400 members of the House of Representatives and 24 Senators) and is the largest state legislative institution in the country. Legislator salaries are $200 per term (or $100 per year) and legislators meet annually starting in January and ending in June for a few days each month (http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/Senate/default.aspx).

Table 5.4: Legislative Professionalism Rankings 1979 to 2003 for the Weak Contribution Limit States

Legislative Professionalism Ranking	State
8	Illinois
14	Colorado
25	Oregon
32	Virginia
39	New Mexico
40	Mississippi
45	Alabama
46	Utah

With the exception of Illinois and Colorado, both with professional legislatures, the other states with the lowest contribution limits scores also rank lower on the legislative professionalism scale. Oregon, Virginia, New Mexico, Mississippi, Alabama, and Utah all have hybrid and citizen-type legislatures.

There are more states in the strong contribution limits category than the weak category, nevertheless, the legislative professionalism rankings look similar in both cases. Both groups have a highly professionalized legislature (strong states have Michigan and weak states have Illinois), then several states with hybrid legislatures, and finally a few states with some of the most citizen-based legislatures in the country. Based on strict comparisons of legislative professionalism ranking by strong and weak scoring states, as shown in these tables, there does not seem to be a strong relationship with contribution limits. But the correlation table and regression model in Chapter 3 show otherwise. Those analyses show a significant and positive relationship between contribution limits and legislative professionalism for all 50 states. As state legislatures professionalized, more contribution limits were enacted in the states, and states' scores increased. This is a fascinating finding and one that deserves more attention in future research. As legislatures professionalized (hired more staff, increased their salaries, and scheduled longer sessions), the types and amounts of campaign contributions they could lawfully accept were encroached upon. Even though they were operating in a more professional institution, the era of accepting unlimited campaign donations from everyone was over.

Hypothesis One and Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show how states with the strongest and weakest expenditure limit and public funding scores compare with one another. Seven states have the strongest expenditure and public funding scores while eight states have the weakest scores.

Table 5.5: Legislative Professionalism Rankings 1979 to 2003 for the Strong Expenditure Limits and Public Funding States

Legislative Professionalism Ranking	State
3	Wisconsin
7	Ohio
10	Arizona
12	Hawaii
23	Minnesota
43	Maine
45	Alabama

Wisconsin and Ohio have professional legislatures, while Arizona and Hawaii are not far behind, with lower-ranking professional and hybrid legislatures. Minnesota has a hybrid body, while Maine and Alabama are among the most citizen-based institutions in the country.

Comparing the states with the weakest expenditure limits and public funding scores (Table 5.6), besides Illinois, all of the states clearly have hybrid and citizen based legislatures.

Table 5.6: Legislative Professionalism Rankings 1979 to 2003 for the Weak Expenditure Limits and Public Funding States

Legislative Professionalism Ranking	State
8	Illinois
17	Washington
29	Idaho
32	Virginia
33	Louisiana
38	Tennessee
39	New Mexico
41	Arkansas

Based on the 50-state correlation table and regression analysis in Chapter 4, however, there is a significant and positive relationship between legislative professionalism and expenditure limits and public funding and legislative professionalism. This is intriguing for many reasons, but mainly because in the states with clean elections (Arizona and Maine) and the states with other types of exceptionally strong expenditure limits and public funding programs (Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin), this means that legislative candidates may decide to voluntarily accept public funding in exchange for abiding by expenditure limits. While clean elections programs are touted as helping to level the playing field and increase electoral competition, most incumbents still do not accept these voluntary programs and instead raise their own campaign funds privately. Perhaps this is because the states with the most stringent expenditure limit and public funding scores are also among the states with the most professionalized or hybrid legislatures and these incumbents wish to be reelected.

Hypotheses Two (H2):

States with the initiative—and frequent use of it—have stringent campaign finance reforms. States without the initiative are more likely to support minimum reforms such as disclosure or high contribution limits.

Just under half of the states (24) have the initiative. State rankings presented below in the initiative tables are out of 1 to 24.

Hypothesis Two and Disclosure

California and Oregon, the top two most prolific initiative states are among those with the highest disclosure scores over time. Three states, Kentucky, Maryland, and New York, do not have the initiative. Table 5.7 presents the rankings of the states with the highest disclosure scores and their ranking according to how frequently initiatives are on the ballot in the respective state.

Table 5.7. Initiative Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Disclosure States

Initiative Ranking	State
1	California
2	Oregon
11	Alaska
13	Missouri
No initiative	Kentucky
No initiative	Maryland
No initiative	New York

Five states with the initiative are among the states with the weakest disclosure scores (Table 5.8). Alabama, Indiana, and Iowa do not have the initiative, while Illinois and Wyoming, although technically have the initiative, rank near the bottom in terms of frequency of use. For example, between the years 1970 and 2005, Illinois had just seven initiatives on the ballot and Wyoming had just six. To compare the top two states for initiative use (and among the states with the strongest disclosure scores), California had 161 initiatives over the same time period and Oregon had 137 (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2008).

Table 5.8: Initiative Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Disclosure States

Initiative Ranking	State
8	North Dakota
9	Maine
14	Nevada
22	Illinois
23	Wyoming
No initiative	Alabama
No initiative	Indiana
No initiative	Iowa

The 50-state correlation table and regression model presented in Chapter 2 indicates a significant and positive relationship between the initiative and disclosure score. This means that states that use the initiative more often tend to have stronger disclosure scores than states who do not frequently use the initiative or who do not have it altogether.

Hypothesis Two and Contribution Limits

Eleven states had the highest average contribution limits score from 1970 to 2005. Of those 11 states, however, six of them do not have the initiative. The other five states have moderate initiative use.

Table 5.9. Initiative Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Contribution Limit States

Initiative Ranking	State
6	Montana
9	Maine
15	Florida
17	Michigan
19	Oklahoma
No initiative	Arkansas
No initiative	Delaware
No initiative	Hawaii
No initiative	Minnesota
No initiative	New Hampshire
No initiative	West Virginia

The initiative rankings for the states with the weakest contribution scores are telling. They involve states with high initiative usage (Oregon and Colorado) and also states with minimal usage (Illinois and Mississippi). Three of the states with the weakest contribution scores do not have the initiative.

Table 5.10. Initiative Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Contribution Limit States

Initiative Ranking	State
2	Oregon
4	Colorado
21	Utah
22	Illinois
24	Mississippi
No initiative	Alabama
No initiative	New Mexico
No initiative	Virginia

Unlike the significant positive relationship between the initiative and disclosure score, the 50-state correlation and regression analyses in Chapter 3 do not support the same findings for contribution limits. Based on these analyses it is difficult to pinpoint the strength of relationship between initiative use and contribution limits.

Hypothesis Two and Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

One way for major policy changes to occur in the states is through the citizen initiative. Expenditure limits and public funding are the most stringent type of campaign finance reform in place today. Three of the states with the highest expenditure and public funding scores are moderate users of the initiatives; the other four states do not have such a provision. This is especially telling considering that Minnesota and Wisconsin have the highest expenditure limits and public funding scores over time (3.26 and 3.33, respectively).

Table 5.11. Initiative Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Initiative Ranking	State
5	Arizona
9	Maine
12	Ohio
No initiative	Alabama
No initiative	Hawaii
No initiative	Minnesota
No initiative	Wisconsin

The majority of the states with the weakest expenditure limit and public funding scores do not have the initiative. Washington, however, is the third most prolific user of initiatives among all the states with it.

Table 5.12. Initiative Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Initiative Ranking	State
3	Washington
20	Idaho
22	Illinois
No initiative	Arkansas
No initiative	Louisiana
No initiative	New Mexico
No initiative	Tennessee
No initiative	Virginia

Just like the 50-state correlation and regression analysis for contribution limits and initiative use, the analyses in Chapter 4 show weak relationships between the initiative and expenditure limits and public funding score. This is surprising considering in at least one state (Arizona) adopted clean elections from a citizen initiative. One case, however, does not support a trend or a strong relationship. If anything, this result should caution us from making grand general statements such as "public funding programs result from citizen initiatives."

To return to Hypothesis Two, states with heavy use of the initiative do have stringent disclosure, contribution limits, and expenditure limits and public funding schemes, but the results are specific to individual states. In general terms, as the correlation and regression analysis show, states that use the initiative more tend to have stronger disclosure laws. The same cannot be generalized for initiative usage and stronger contribution limits and expenditure limits and public funding programs.

Hypotheses Three (H3):

Political scandals serve as a catalyst for initiative efforts or legislative pressure for more stringent campaign finance reforms. States without high profile scandals or high numbers of scandals do not have stringent reforms.

Hypothesis Three and Disclosure

New York and California rank first and second respectively in terms of the number of convictions of state political officials by federal officials. Oregon is at the other extreme, among the fewest state political official convictions. The other states have moderate amounts of corruption.

Table 5.13. Scandal Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Disclosure States

Scandal Ranking	State
1	New York
2	California
18	Kentucky
19	Maryland
21	Missouri
36	Alaska
46	Oregon

Other than Illinois, which ranks third in political corruption, all other states in this table have moderate to low amounts of corruption. Wyoming ranks second to last for state corruption.

Table 5.14. Scandal Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Disclosure States

Scandal Ranking	State
3	Illinois
13	Alabama
22	Indiana
34	Iowa
39	North Dakota
40	Nevada
41	Maine
49	Wyoming

The 50-state correlation table in Chapter 2 shows a significant and positive relationship between political scandals and disclosure. The same relationship was not supported in the 50-state regression model for disclosure. There is limited support, then, for a definitive statement on the relationship between scandals and disclosure score.

Hypothesis Three and Contribution Limits

Table 5.15 presents the scandal rankings for the states with the strongest contribution limits. Other than Florida, which ranks fourth in the nation in terms of the number of political officials convicted of a crime, the other states listed in this table have moderate to low numbers of scandals.

Table 5.15. Scandal Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Contribution Limit States

Scandal Ranking	State
5	Florida
14	Michigan
20	Oklahoma
24	West Virginia
29	Arkansas
32	Minnesota
35	Hawaii
37	Montana
41	Maine
47	Delaware
48	New Hampshire

The states presented in Table 5.16 have the weakest contribution limit scores. Their scandal rankings closely mirror the results presented above with the states with the strongest contribution limit scores (Table 5.15). With the exception of Illinois, which ranks third overall with scandals, the other states in this category have moderate to low amounts of political corruption.

Table 5.16. Scandal Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Contribution Limit States

Scandal Ranking	State
3	Illinois
12	Virginia
13	Alabama
15	Mississippi
31	Colorado
33	New Mexico
42	Utah
46	Oregon

The 50-state correlation in Chapter 3 on contribution limits does not show a strong relationship with scandals. A different scenario appears in the 50-state regression model, however. This model does indeed show a significant, but negative relationship between the number of scandals and contribution limits score. That the relationship is negative, or inverse, indicates that the number of political scandals decreased as the states' contribution limits scores increased. As stated previously in Chapter 3, this is not the expected relationship direction, but one that requires future attention.

Hypothesis Three and Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

The states with the strongest expenditure limits and public funding scores have similar scandal rankings as the disclosure and contribution limits categories. Ohio, ranking sixth in terms of number of political officials convicted of a crime, is among the states with the strongest expenditure limits and public funding scores. Other states in this category have moderate to low amounts of political official scandal.

Table 5.17. Scandal Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Scandal Ranking	State
6	Ohio
13	Alabama
26	Wisconsin
27	Arizona
32	Minnesota
35	Hawaii
41	Maine

Illinois, Tennessee, and Louisiana all rank in the top ten states for the most political scandal. Virginia is not far behind, coming in at 12^{th}. Surprisingly, these political scandal-ridden states do not have strong expenditure limits and public funding programs. The other states in this category have moderate to low amounts of scandal.

Table 5.18. Scandal Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Scandal Ranking	State
3	Illinois
9	Tennessee
10	Louisiana
12	Virginia
28	Washington
29	Arkansas
33	New Mexico
44	Idaho

The 50-state analyses in Chapter 4 tell a slightly different story. When all states are analyzed (as opposed to just the strong and weak states), the relationship between expenditure limits and public funding scores and scandals is significant but inverse. As speculated previously, this surprising discovery may not necessarily be related to the actual number of convictions involving state and local political officials, but instead related to the amount of attention a political scandal received. Although those convicted have been found to have broken the law, the actual degree of offense is not coded or accounted for here in this study. Thus, conviction rates may include several different levels of political scandal and not necessarily one or two high-profile cases that tend to polarize public opinion, which in turn can lead to policy reform. This is an area ripe for future research.

To summarize, the strong and weak state ranking analysis for Hypothesis Three indicates that both relatively scandal-ridden and scandal-free states make the lists, appearing on both strong campaign finance reform lists and weak ones. States in the top ten most scandal-ridden list appear in the categories for both the strongest and weakest campaign finance reforms. New York, California, Florida, and Ohio appear on the lists with some of the strongest campaign finance reform, while Illinois, Tennessee, and Louisiana appear on the lists for some of the weakest or nonexistent campaign finance reform. These seven states are in the top ten most scandal-ridden list.

States with the lowest scandal scores also appear in the strongest and weakest campaign finance reforms. For example, Delaware, Maine, and Oregon all have low scandal rankings (in the bottom 10) and yet they appear on lists with strong campaign finance reforms. Incidentally, Maine and Oregon also appear on lists with weak campaign finance reforms, along with Idaho, Nevada, and Utah.

Hypothesis Five (H4):

Democratic-controlled state governments are more likely to support stringent campaign finance reforms. Divided and Republican-controlled state governments are less likely to support stringent campaign finance reforms.

The higher the ranking (1-50) the more Democratic a state is, meaning the state is a Democratic stronghold.[65] The lower the ranking, the more Republican a state is. Within the ranking, there are several ties among states.

Hypothesis Four and Disclosure

What types of state governments adopt strong disclosure laws? Table 5.19 indicates that two of the most Democratic states, Maryland and Kentucky, support strong disclosure, while the remaining states in this category lean more towards divided governments.

Table 5.19. Partisan Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Disclosure States

Partisan Ranking	State
1	Maryland
4	Kentucky
17	California
18	Missouri
25	Oregon
32	New York
36	Alaska

[65] There were several ties in the ranking because the scores are calculate based on a rating of 0, 1, 2, or 3 and then averaged. See the explanation in Chapter 1 and Appendix A of this dissertation for details on the coding system.

The states with weak disclosure scores appear to have divided government and Republican strongholds. With the exception of Democratic Alabama, Table 5.20 illustrates that the other weak disclosure states have divided governments and some of the most Republican-dominated institutions in the country.

Table 5.20. Partisan Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Disclosure States

Partisan Ranking	State
4	Alabama
21	Nevada
28	Illinois
28	Maine
37	Iowa
42	Indiana
42	North Dakota
49	Wyoming

The 50-state regression model from Chapter 2 shows a significant and positive relationship between Democratic-control of state government and disclosure score. Thus, we can generalize that state governments with more Democratic-controlled institutions tend to have stronger disclosure laws.

Hypothesis Four and Contribution Limits

States with strong contribution limits include several strong Democratic states: Hawaii, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. Others in this category include states with divided government and the most Republican state in the country: New Hampshire.

Table 5.21. Partisan Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Contribution Limit States

Partisan Ranking	State
1	Hawaii
7	Arkansas
7	Oklahoma
11	West Virginia
18	Florida
21	Minnesota
28	Maine
28	Delaware
31	Montana
39	Michigan
50	New Hampshire

States with weak contribution limit scores include strong Democratic states: Alabama, Mississippi, and New Mexico. Other states in this category have divided governments over time.

Table 5.22. Partisan Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Contribution Limit States

Partisan Ranking	State
4	Alabama
7	Mississippi
10	New Mexico
25	Oregon
26	Virginia
28	Illinois
40	Colorado
41	Utah

The 50-state correlation table in Chapter 3 displays a significant and negative relationship between Democratic-controlled state government and contribution limits. This means that the more Republicans, and not Democrats, that control state government institutions, the stronger a state's contribution limits score is. The same relationship was not replicated in the 50-state regression model, however.

Hypothesis Four and Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

States with strong expenditure limits and public funding scores range from strong Democratic governments, to divided governments, to strong Republican governments. There appears to be nothing unique with the partisanship variable and strong expenditure limits and public funding.

Table 5.23. Partisan Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Partisan Ranking	State
1	Hawaii
4	Alabama
21	Minnesota
26	Wisconsin
28	Maine
37	Ohio
44	Arizona

States with weak expenditure limits and public funding scores follow a similar pattern as the states with strong expenditure limits and public funding: there is little unique with the results presented in Table 5.24.

Table 5.24. Partisan Rankings 1970 to 2005 for the Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Partisan Ranking	State
4	Louisiana
7	Arkansas
10	New Mexico
15	Tennessee
18	Washington
26	Virginia
28	Illinois
44	Idaho

In the Chapter 4 50-state correlation and regression analysis, there was no discernible relationship between Democratic-controlled state government and expenditure limits and public funding scores.

Following the pattern that emerged from the analysis of the ranking of the sates according to independent variable and type of campaign finance reform, both strong and weak expenditure limits and public funding states tend to have both strong Democratic and Republican governments over time. A partisan state government does not indicate the extent to which a state will have strong or weak campaign finance laws.

A Return to the Initial Research Questions

Chapter 1 of this dissertation presents several research questions. Based on the analysis in previous chapters, I return to the questions here.

Why have states adopted different types of campaign finance reforms when there is a strong argument that suggests money has a negative impact on the democratic process?

States have different political cultures, government structures, histories, and populations. States with high numbers of political scandals, such as Illinois, have traditionally avoided all types of campaign finance reform, adopting an “anything goes” standard. Other states, such as Arizona, have used high profile political scandals as catalysts to reform. After the scandal involving Governor Evan Mecham, concerned citizens banded together to propose a clean elections system of full public funding. The clean elections initiative passed in 1999, ushering in a brand new system of campaign finance reform in the state. Still, other states with moderate amounts of scandal, such as Pennsylvania, have done little to stem the tide of political corruption through campaign finance reform.

One of the reasons why more states do not have credible full public funding systems for legislative candidates is that legislatures are hesitant to govern themselves. This is an institutional challenge that is overcome in the 24 states that allow for the initiative. With the initiative, citizens may propose legislation and have it added to the ballot without involving the legislature. In some states, citizen initiatives have ushered in sweeping campaign finance reforms. But just because a state has the initiative does not mean the state frequently uses it. There is little beyond the use of the initiative for citizens to propose legislation. And since legislators are loathe to govern themselves through ethics or campaign finance laws, the chances of legislatures enacting policies to limit how they may be reelected are slim. Only through intense public outcry can voters influence how a legislature governs themselves. Backing pro-campaign finance reform candidates is another way to change the policies in the state.

States may take on the mentality that disclosure is enough. Requiring anything more than record keeping of campaign funding and expenditures can be construed as infringing upon free speech rights, and has been ruled unconstitutional. Despite the numerous studies that report that candidates who raise and spend the most amounts of money win elections, requiring anything more than disclosure of those funds raises questions of constitutionality.

Then there is the argument that states *are* doing enough. This is a free society with free speech and requiring any leveling of the campaign playing field seems undemocratic. Forty-five states have campaign finance reforms beyond disclosure which underpins their acknowledgment perhaps a free for all system of financing campaigns is not in the best interest of anyone. However, with many of these post-disclosure reform efforts, little accountability is paid to regulating and policing the reform policies to ensure that all candidates are in compliance. Malbin and Gais (1998) make a strong argument that campaign finance reform is alive and well in the states, and has been for many decades, but the bureaucratic agencies charged with overseeing the enforcement of campaign finance laws are chronically understaffed with miniscule budgets charged with a massive task of ensuring all candidates for public office in the state are following all rules. The system, according to Malbin and Gias, is in theory good, but in reality cannot effectively work.

Legislators resist change. According to Mayhew (1974), members of Congress are "single minded seekers of reelection." If legislative professionalism scores measure the extent to which state legislatures look and act like the United States Congress, then we can infer that the most professionalized legislatures in the country (California, New

York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, for example) will have representatives and senators who are against limiting their reelection chances. Data from my study show that these states have campaign finance reforms beyond disclosure, but none of them are among the states with the most stringent laws on the books.

Why have more states not adopted reforms considering the high cost of campaigning?

Many states have in fact adopted campaign finance reforms beyond disclosure. And, over time, more states have adopted more reforms. But most states stop short of implementing full policy changes for a number of reasons. First implementing full change often requires a paradigm shift or some catalyst that promotes full-fledged change. We have seen in this study that states gradually shift back and forth between Republican, Democratic, and divided government control. No party is in power long enough to institute widespread sweeping campaign finance change. And the counter argument also has some merit to it: no party wants to be labeled with the campaign finance reform badge for fear of it harming them in the future. Another reason states have stopped short of implementing widespread campaign finance change is because of budgetary issues. One might ask, what does the state budget have to do with regulating private donations to candidates? The answer is that legislatures rarely allot appropriate amounts of funding to bureaucratic agencies charged with monitoring and overseeing compliance with campaign finance laws. So, while a state may have reform on the books, actual implementation of the reform does not exist.

Many states have adopted campaign finance reforms beyond disclosure, but no states with the strongest disclosure scores are among the states with the strongest contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public funding scores. Three states, however, are among the states with the highest contribution limit scores and expenditure limit and public funding scores. They are Hawaii, Maine, and Minnesota. See this table as an example of how the top-scoring states stack up (total average scores 1970-2005).

Table 5.25: Strongest Campaign Finance Reform States, by Type of Reform

Disclosure Score Leaders (out of 10)	**Contribution Limit Score Leaders (out of 7)**	**Expenditure Limit and Public Funding Score Leaders (out of 5)**
New York (4.60)	Minnesota (4.47)	Wisconsin (3.33)
Alaska (4.33)	Delaware (4.40)	Minnesota (3.26)
Kentucky (4.13)	Hawaii (4.40)	Hawaii (2.60)
Oregon (4.13)	New Hampshire (4.40)	Maine (1.60)
Missouri (4.07)	Arkansas (4.27)	Arizona (1.33)
California (4.00)	Michigan (4.27)	Alabama (1.07)
Maryland (4.00)	Montana (4.20)	Ohio (1.00)
	West Virginia (4.20)	
	Maine (4.07)	
	Oklahoma (4.07)	
	Florida (4.00)	

States with the highest levels of legislative professionalism from 1970 to 2005 include California and New York, which also rank highest in disclosure scores. This research finding does not support the hypothesis that states with higher levels of legislative professionalism do not support stringent campaign finance reform. Michigan and Wisconsin, among the top five most professionalized legislatures over 1970 to 2005, make an appearance among the leaders for most stringent contribution limits and expenditure limits and public funding. They do share this honor, however, with far less professionalized states such as West Virginia and Maine.

States with the lowest disclosure scores also appear among the states with the lowest contribution limits scores and expenditure and public funding scores. Alabama and Illinois appear on the lowest lists for disclosure and contribution limits, while Illinois appears on the lowest lists for all three categories. New Mexico and Virginia join Illinois (and Alabama) on the list for the states with the lowest contribution limits and expenditure limits and public funding scores. Here are the states with the weakest campaign finance reforms in the country (total average scores 1970-2005).

Table 5.26: Weakest Campaign Finance Reform States, by Type of Reform

Weakest Disclosure Scores (out of 10)	**Weakest Contribution Limit Scores (out of 7)**	**Weakest Expenditure Limit and Public Funding Scores (out of 5)**
North Dakota (1.87)	Virginia (0.40)	Illinois (0.00)
Alabama (2.00)	Illinois (1.07)	Arkansas (0.07)
Wyoming (2.13)	New Mexico (1.07)	Idaho (0.07)
Indiana (2.20)	Utah (1.27)	Louisiana (0.07)
Illinois (2.27)	Colorado (1.40)	New Mexico (0.07)
Nevada (2.27)	Oregon (1.73)	Tennessee (0.07)
Iowa (2.33)	Alabama (1.93)	Virginia (0.07)
Maine (2.47)	Mississippi (1.93)	Washington (0.07)

Areas for Future Research

Campaign finance reform will be an ongoing battle between advocates and critics. Several states have shown us that stringent reforms do indeed work, while other states have neglected to adopt anything serious. This study has presented a broad examination of the 50 states and their campaign finance reforms from 1970 to 2005. Because of the breadth of the study, it does not have much depth. This study is unique because it systematically analyzes from a historical perspective when and to what extent states have supported campaign finance reform. The possible causes of campaign finance reform presented here are legislative professionalism, the initiative, political scandals, and partisanship of the state government. Areas for future research include a deeper analysis into select states, to closer examine why a state like Arizona, while highly Republican and frequent user of the initiative, has a model clean elections system, while a state like

Pennsylvania, with divided government, no initiative, yet highly professionalized legislature just cannot seem to regulate or police campaign finance. Deeper case studies on certain states should be considered. This study has scratched the surface and should be considered part one. Part two research should include a deeper analysis of certain states.

Conclusion

States adopt campaign finance reforms for various reasons. Some do it in response to a political scandal, others do it because of perceptions of unfair play. Regardless, campaign finance reform is alive and well in the states. In terms of raw numbers, as of 2005, all 50 states have disclosure, 37 have some type of contribution limits, and 30 have some type of expenditure limits and public funding (whether partial or full). This is quite remarkable considering that the federal government has far fewer campaign finance reforms on the books.

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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY DATA

Chapter 2: Campaign Finance Disclosure

Dependent Variable = Disclosure

Coding Results

- The higher the score, the more stringent the disclosure laws are in each state.
- No states earned a full score of 10.
- The highest scoring state was Washington in 2005 with a score of 7.
- Several states earned scores of 0 in 1971 and beyond including: Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Utah.
- North Dakota was the last state to adopt disclosure laws and in 1981 it earned a score of 3.

Table A.1. Summary of Disclosure Data

	Average State Disclosure Score	Standard Deviation	Strong Disclosure States	Weak Disclosure States
1970s	2.61	1.36	MA (5 – 1975)	AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, NV, ND, RI, SC, VT (0 – 1971); AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, ND, RI (0 – 1973); ND (0 – 1975, 1976, 1978)
1980s	3.49	1.02	OR (6 – 1981) GA (6 – 1984) FL (6 – 1986)	AL (1 – 1981, 1984, 1986, 1988); RI (1 – 1984)
1990s	3.45	1.07	NM, NY, OR, VA, WA (6 – 1999)	GA, IL, IA, KS, ME, MA, MN, NV, NC, ND, UT, WY (2 – 1992, 1994); GA (1 – 1996); IN, KS, ME, NV, OK, SD (2- 1999)
2000s	3.64	1.15	WA (7 – 2005)	IN, IA, KS, ME, MA, MS, NV, OH, OK, WY (2 – 2002); ME, NV, SD, WY (2 – 2005)
Total All Years	3.29	1.15	WA (7 – 2005)	AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, NV, ND, RI, SC, VT (0 – 1971); AK, DE, GA, ID, IL, LA, ND, RI (0 – 1973); ND (0 – 1975, 1976, 1978)

Chapter 3: Contribution Limits

Dependent Variable = Contribution Limits

Coding Results

- The higher the score, the more stringent a state’s contribution limits are for legislative candidates.

Table A.2. Summary of Contribution Limits Data

	Average State Contribution Limit Score	Standard Deviation	Strong Contribution Score States	Weak Contribution Score States
1970s	1.74	1.04	DE (5-1976, 1978)	AK, AL, CO, GA, ID, KS, NV, RI, SC, VT, VA, WA (0)
1980s	2.68	1.76	HI (7-1984); AK, DE (6-1984); AR, HI, MI, MN, MT, OK, WA, WV (6-1986); AR, DE, HI, MI, MN, OK, WI, WY (6-1988)	CO, CT, NV, RI, SC, VT, VA, WY (0)
1990s	3.96	1.89	FL, HI, (7-1994); HI, ID, NH, RI (7-1999)	VA (0)
2000s	4.24	1.69	HI (7-2000, 2002)	VA (0)
Total All Years	3.16	1.60		

Chapter 4: Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

Dependent Variable = Expenditure Limits and Public Funding

Coding Results

- The higher the score, the more likely a state is to have expenditure limits and public funding available to state legislative candidates.
- Several states earned scores of four or five from 1992 to 2005.
- The highest scoring states were Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin in 1999 and those four states plus the addition of Arizona in 2002 and 2005.
- Illinois has never had an expenditure limit or any form of public funding for legislative candidates. Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington all had the next lowest scores from 1971 to 2005.

Table A.3. Summary of Expenditure Limit and Public Funding Data

	Average State Expenditure and Public Funding Score	Standard Deviation	Strong Expenditure and Public Funding Score States	Weak Expenditure and Public Funding Score States
1970s	.868	.928	WI (3-1978) 26 states (2–1976)	42 states (0-1978)
1980s	.395	.873	MN, WI (3-1981); HI, MN (4-1986); HI (4-1988)	43 states (0 – 1984)
1990s	.560	1.255	HI, MN, WI (4-1992, 1994, 1996);	47 states (0-1992, 1994)
2000s	.680	1.588	AZ, HI, ME, MN, WI (5-2002, 2005)	41 states (0-2002, 2005)
Total All Years	.625	1.161		

Independent Variable 1 = State Legislative Professionalism

Coding Results

- I followed Squire's indices for all data years 1971-2005. The higher the score, the more professional the legislature is.

Table A.4. Summary of Legislative Professionalism Data 1970-2003

	Average Legislative Pro. Score	Median Legislative Pro. Score	Top 5 Professional Legislatures	Bottom 5 Citizen Legislatures
1970s	.209	.188	CA, MI, NY, MA, OH	NH, WY, ND, KY, UT
1980s	.221	.186	NY, MI, CA, MA, PA	NH, WY, ND, UT, SD
1990s	.182	.152	CA, MI, NY, WI, MA	NH, NM, WY, ND, SD
2000s	.185	.154	CA, NY, WI, MA, MI	NH, WY, ND, SD, UT
Total All Years	.199	.170	CA, NY, WI, MA, MI	NH, ND, WY, SD, UT

Independent Variable 2 = State Government Partisanship

Coding Results

- Some states are decidedly more Democratic than others with average scores of 3.
- Beginning in the 1980s, more states were strongly Republican than strongly Democratic.
- During 1970-2007 party realignment took place and many Southern states represent this change, shifting from Democratic-dominated governments to Republican-dominated governments.

- Divided party government is more commonplace in the states today than it was during the 1970s and 1980s.

Table A.5. Summary of State Partisanship Data 1970-2005

	50-state Average	Standard Deviation	Strong Democratic States (Avg. = 3)	Strong Republican States (Avg. = under 1)	Divided Party States (Avg. = 1.5)
1970s	1.94	1.08	AL, GA, HI, LA, MD, MS, RI	NH, VT, WY, CO, IN	DE, IL, MI, OH
1980s	1.94	1.00	GA, HI, KY, MD, MA, MS	AZ, IN, KS, NE, NH, SD, UT	IA, MT
1990s	1.63	1.03	GA, HI, KY, MD	AK, AZ, CO, ID, KS, MI, MT, NE, NH, NJ, ND, OH, SD, UT, WY	NY, SC
2000s	1.39	1.07	(Avg. = at least 2.5) NM, NC, WV	AK, AZ, FL, ID, KS, MT, NE, ND, OH, PA, SC, SD, TX, UT, WY	KY, OR
Total All Years	1.73	1.05	GA, HI, KY, MD	AZ, KS, NE, SD, UT, WY	

Independent Variable 3 – Number of Political Scandals

Coding Results

- Larger, more populated states have higher numbers of corruption convictions than smaller, less populated states.
- The total number of convictions increases each decade, except for the 2000s. This may be because data only cover to year 2007.
- The average number of corruption convictions per state increases each decade, including in the 2000s, despite being three years short of a full decade (2000-2007).
- Idaho had zero convictions until 1983, when it had two. Hawaii had zero convictions until 1982, when it had three.

Table A.6. Political Scandal Data 1970-2006

	Total 50-state Corruption Convictions	Average Number of Convictions per State	5 Most Corrupt States	5 Least Corrupt States
1970s	3,235	6.47	PA, NY, OH, IL, TX	HI, ID, RI, OR, VT, WY (3-way tie)
1980s	7,150	14.52	NY, CA, IL, PA, TX	VT, WY, DE, ND, ID, NH (2-way tie)
1990s	8,315	16.80	CA, NY, IL, FL, OH	NH, VT, NE, AL, DE
2000s	6,358	18.17	FL, CA, NY, PA, TX	VT, NE, NH, WY, IA
Total All Years	25,058	13.99	NY (2,514), CA (2,191), IL (1,722), PA (1,688), FL (1,533)	VT (23), WY (42), NH (43), DE (72), OR (72)

Independent Variable 4 – Number of Initiatives

Coding Results

- The results support previous research that a handful of states make use of the initiative more frequently than others. Just because a state possesses the initiative does not mean that the state uses it.
- Illinois and Wyoming rarely use the initiative.
- California, Oregon, and Washington frequently use the initiative.
- When states use the initiative, they tend to use them in even-numbered years because of the amount of attention focused on the gubernatorial, congressional, and presidential elections occurring at the same time.
- The chart below lists all initiative measures on the ballot, regardless of whether they ultimately passed or failed.

Table A.7. Summary of Initiative Data 1970-2007

	Total Number of Initiatives by Decade	Average Number of Initiatives per State	Frequent Initiative Users (top 5)	Irregular Initiative Users (bottom 5)
1970s	175	7.61	CA (22); WA (20); OR (18); CO (18); OH (12)	WY (0); NV (0); FL (2); NE (2); UT (3); ID (3)
1980s	242	10.52	CA (41); OR (32); MT (16); SD (13); WA (13)	WY (0); IL (1); NE (3); OK (4); FL (4)
1990s	376	15.67	CA (60); OR (56); CO (38); WA (29); AZ (22)	IL (0); MS (2); UT (3); AR (5); MI (6); WY (6)
2000s	294	12.25	CA (47); OR (41); WA (25); AZ (21); CO (20)	IL (0); WY (0); MS (0); OK (2); ID (3)
Total All Years	1,087	11.51	CA (170); OR (147); CO (87); WA (87); MT (50)	MS (2); WY (6); IL (7); UT (16); ID (19); OK (19)

APPENDIX B
COMPILATION OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION TABLES BY CHAPTER

This appendix provides additional data analysis not contained in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. It offers exhaustive individualized state analysis based on stringency of campaign finance reform score as well as aggregated analyses of these same states. The analyses and explanation are presented by chapter below.

Chapter 2 Additional Tables

Strong Disclosure Score States Correlations

The tables below present details on specific states with the strongest disclosure scores over time.

Table B.1. Summary of Correlations for the State of Alaska 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.494	-.197	.059	.308
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.494	--	.781**	.111	-.127
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.197	.781**	--	.101	-.087
4. Number of Scandals	.059	.111	.101	--	-.088
5. Number of Initiatives	.308	-.127	.087	-.088	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.2. Summary of Correlations for the State of California 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	.814**	-.074	.770**	.642**
2. Legislative Professionalism	.814**	--	-.016	.573*	.413
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.074	-.016	--	-.420	-.520*
4. Number of Scandals	.770**	.573*	-.420	--	.680**
5. Number of Initiatives	.642**	.413	-.520*	.680**	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.3. Summary of Correlations for the State of Kentucky 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Disclosure Score	--	.155	.248	.224
2. Legislative Professionalism	.155	--	-.723**	.471
3. Democratic Control of Government	.248	-.723**	--	-.222
4. Number of Scandals	.224	.471	-.222	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.4. Summary of Correlations for the State of Maryland 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Disclosure Score	--	.034	.000	.044
2. Legislative Professionalism	.034	--	.205	-.023
3. Democratic Control of Government	.000	.205	--	-.187
4. Number of Scandals	.044	-.023	-.187	--

Table B.5. Summary of Correlations for the State of Missouri 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.450	-.196	.723**	.350
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.450	--	.090	-.591*	-.206
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.196	.090	--	.007	.295
4. Number of Scandals	.723**	-.591*	.007	--	.221
5. Number of Initiatives	.350	-.206	.295	.221	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.6. Summary of Correlations for the State of New York 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Disclosure Score	--	.418	.441	.520*
2. Legislative Professionalism	.418	--	.459	.652**
3. Democratic Control of Government	.441	.459	--	.179
4. Number of Scandals	.520*	.652**	.179	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.7. Summary of Correlations for the State of Oregon 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.603*	-.073	.376	.230
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.603*	--	.502	-.416	-.445
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.073	.502	--	-.121	-.115
4. Number of Scandals	.376	-.416	-.121	--	.086
5. Number of Initiatives	.230	-.445	-.115	.086	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Weak Disclosure Score States Correlations

These tables present data for the specific states with the weakest disclosure scores over time.

Table B.8. Summary of Correlations for the State of Alabama 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.708**	-.438	.235
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.708**	--	.115	.111
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.438	.115	--	.199
4. Number of Scandals	.235	.111	.199	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.9. Summary of Correlations for the State of Indiana 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.588*	-.033	.492
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.588*	--	-.641*	-.303
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.033	-.641*	--	-.171
4. Number of Scandals	.492	-.303	-.171	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.10. Summary of Correlations for the State of North Dakota 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.536*	-.391	.412	-.023
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.536*	--	.436	-.682**	-.048
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.391	.436	--	-.100	.438
4. Number of Scandals	.412	-.682**	-.100	--	.005
5. Number of Initiatives	-.023	-.048	.438	.005	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.11. Summary of Correlations for the State of Illinois 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
7. Disclosure Score	--	-.231	.346	.107	.166
8. Legislative Professionalism	-.231	--	.386	-.594*	.314
9. Democratic Control of Government	.346	.386	--	-.156	.102
10. Number of Scandals	.107	-.594*	-.156	--	-.173
11. Number of Initiatives	.166	.314	.102	-.173	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.12. Summary of Correlations for the State of Iowa 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.172	.241	.482
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.172	--	.040	-.267
3. Democratic Control of Government	.241	.040	--	.398
4. Number of Scandals	.482	-.267	.398	--

Table B.13. Summary of Correlations for the State of Maine 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	.386	.222	-.180	-.012
2. Legislative Professionalism	.386	--	-.139	-.348	-.224
3. Democratic Control of Government	.222	-.139	--	.114	-.193
4. Number of Scandals	-.180	-.348	.114	--	.227
5. Number of Initiatives	-.012	-.224	-.193	.227	--

Table B.14. Summary of Correlations for the State of Nevada 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	.306	.265	-.095	-.082
2. Legislative Professionalism	.306	--	-.299	.285	.392
3. Democratic Control of Government	.265	-.299	--	-.664**	-.415
4. Number of Scandals	-.095	.285	-.664**	--	.320
5. Number of Initiatives	-.082	.392	-.415	.320	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.15. Summary of Correlations for the State of Wyoming 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	-.276	.320	.009	-.178
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.276	--	-.287	-.462	-.270
3. Democratic Control of Government	.320	-.287	--	.257	.217
4. Number of Scandals	.009	-.462	.257	--	.192
5. Number of Initiatives	-.178	-.270	.217	.192	--

Strong Disclosure Score States Regressions

Linear regression models for the states with the strongest disclosure scores over time are below.

Table B.16. Alaska: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	*t*	*95% CI*	*p*
Year	2.408	.013, .410	.039
Legislative Pro.	.568	-41.826, 69.878	.584
Democratic Control	1.372	-.724, 2.958	.203
Scandals	-.367	-.350, .252	.722
Initiatives	.654	-.542, .982	.530

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 3.218, p = .061
R = .801; R^2 = .641

Table B.17. California: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.338	-.026, .100	.214
Legislative Pro.	2.870	2.753, 23.234	.018
Democratic Control	1.106	-.350, 1.019	.297
Scandals	.549	-.016, .026	.596
Initiatives	1.957	-.013, .181	.082

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 14.385, p = .0001
R = .943; R^2 = .889

Table B.18. Kentucky: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	2.401	.004, .113	.037
Legislative Pro.	.352	-24.310, 33.433	.732
Democratic Control	2.009	-.086, 1.663	.072
Scandals	-1.023	-.092, .034	.331

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 3.139, p = .065
R = .746; R^2 = .557

Table B.19. Maryland: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.625	-.154, .087	.546
Legislative Pro.	-.511	-52.816, 33.113	.621
Democratic Control	-.359	-2.998, 2.165	.727
Scandals	.163	-.065, .076	.873

Overall Model= F (4/10) = .106, p = .978
R = .201; R^2 = .041

Table B.20. Missouri: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.613	-.029, .171	.141
Legislative Pro.	1.181	-6.837, 21.775	.268
Democratic Control	-.494	-.806, .517	.633
Scandals	.682	-.064, .118	.512
Initiative	1.464	-.106, .493	.177

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 4.575, p = .024
R = .847; R^2 = .718

Table B.21. New York: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	4.147	.026, .087	.002
Legislative Pro.	.083	-3.897, 4.200	.935
Democratic Control	2.404	.033, .877	.037
Scandals	.043	-.011, .011	.967

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 8.827, p = .003
R = .883; R^2 = .779

Table B.22. Oregon: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiative Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.905	-.223, .095	.389
Legislative Pro.	-1.870	-106.760, 10.136	.094
Democratic Control	1.183	-.521, 1.661	.267
Scandals	.302	-.290, .379	.770
Initiative	-.491	-.174, .112	.635

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 1.775, p = .214
R = .705; R^2 = .497

Weak Disclosure Score States Regressions

Linear regression models for the states with the weakest disclosure scores over time are below.

Table B.23. Alabama: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	2.690	.008, .085	.023
Legislative Pro.	-4.592	-23.573, -8.171	.001
Democratic Control	-1.063	-1.181, .418	.313
Scandals	.802	-.028, .059	.441

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 17.327, p = .0001
R = .935; R^2 = .874

Table B.24. Indiana: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.211	-.049, .167	.254
Legislative Pro.	-.641	-89.275, 49.387	.536
Democratic Control	-2.003	-1.379, .073	.073
Scandals	-.079	-.108, .101	.939

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 5.388, p = .014
R = .826; R^2 = .683

Table B.25. North Dakota: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	3.544	.084, .379	.006
Legislative Pro.	2.212	-3.289, 292.612	.054
Democratic Control	-.403	-1.435, 1.001	.696
Scandals	-.355	-.321, .234	.731
Initiative	-.403	-.579, .404	.697

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 4.725, p = .021
R = .851; R^2 = .724

Table B.26. Illinois: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.584	-.123, .209	.573
Legislative Pro.	-.292	-50.905, 39.248	.777
Democratic Control	1.401	-.372, 1.585	.195
Scandals	-.396	-.032, .022	.701
Initiative	.884	-.306, .699	.400

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 1.082, p = .431
R = .613; R^2 = .375

Table B.27. Iowa: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.958	-.056, .141	.361
Legislative Pro.	.820	-15.115, 32.713	.431
Democratic Control	.054	-.499, .524	.958
Scandals	1.273	-.058, .212	.232

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 1.081, p = .416
R = .549; R^2 = .302

Table B.28. Maine: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.961	-.092, .227	.362
Legislative Pro.	1.384	-16.736, 69.505	.200
Democratic Control	.500	-.542, .849	.629
Scandals	-.250	-.271, .217	.808
Initiative	.489	-.454, .704	.636

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .870, p = .537
R = .571; R^2 = .326

Table B.29. Nevada: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.860	-.049, .109	.412
Legislative Pro.	.990	-23.121, 59.086	.348
Democratic Control	1.350	-.465, 1.842	.210
Scandals	.390	-.223, .316	.706
Initiative	-.432	-.434, .295	.676

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .786, p = .585
R = .551; R^2 = .304

Table B.30. Wyoming: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Disclosure Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.750	-.063, .032	.473
Legislative Pro.	-1.220	-75.019, 22.454	.253
Democratic Control	.594	-.398, .681	.567
Scandals	-.003	-.145, .145	.998
Initiative	-.902	-.365, .157	.391

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .769, p = .595
R = .547; R^2 = .299

Additional Chapter 2 Data Analysis

In addition to analyzing states individually in correlation tables and regression models, the states were also analyzed in two groups according to strong and weak disclosure scores. Two different analytic strategies were applied using correlations and linear regression. First, the states with the strongest (Alaska, California, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New York, and Oregon) and weakest (Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nevada, North Dakota, and Wyoming) disclosure scores were analyzed individually. For example, each state was examined by itself with the DV (disclosure) and the IVs (legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and initiative). There were several statistically significant differences when individual states were examined in the model. Second, the states with the strongest disclosure scores were combined into either the strongest category or the weakest category.

The results of the individual tests are summarized below while Tables B.31 and B.32 present the aggregated correlation data for the states with the strongest disclosure laws and the weakest disclosure laws, respectively. Tables B.33 and B.34 present the aggregated linear regression data for the states with the strongest and weakest disclosure laws, respectively.

Analyses were run for the states with the seven strongest and eight weakest disclosure scores because these two categories have the most to tell us. States outside of these two extreme categories do not offer much of an analysis in terms of why they have average disclosure scores. The findings suggest a mixed bag of results.

Summarized Correlation Results for Individual Strong and Weak Disclosure States

Strong Disclosure States

California, Missouri, New York, and Oregon all have statistically significant results. California's disclosure score was significantly related to legislative professionalism, the number of scandals, and the number of initiatives. This indicates that as California's legislature grew more professional, as more Democrats took control over the state government, and as the number of initiatives rose, California enacted more disclosure laws. Missouri shows a statistically significant relationship between disclosure score and number of scandals. As the number of scandals increased in the state, Missouri adopted more disclosure laws. New York, with the highest ranking disclosure score, shows a statistically significant relationship between disclosure score and number of political scandals. This indicates that the high number of political scandals may have something to do with the high disclosure score in the state. Oregon shows a statistically significant negative relationship between disclosure score and legislative professionalism, indicating that a less professionalized legislature has a stronger relationship over disclosure laws than a more professional legislature.

Weak Disclosure States

Three of the eight states with the weakest disclosure laws showed statistically significant correlation results. Alabama's correlations show a statistically significant negative relationship between disclosure score and legislative professionalism. This indicates that Alabama's citizen-type (and therefore less professional) legislature did have an impact on the state's relatively low disclosure score. Indiana also has a statistically significant negative relationship between its disclosure score and degree of legislative professionalism. This indicates that Indiana's relatively citizen-oriented legislature (and therefore less professionalized) has an influence over the weak disclosure score in the state. Similar to Alabama and Indiana, North Dakota has a statistically significant negative relationship between its disclosure score and legislative professionalism.

Aggregated Correlation Results for Strong and Weak Disclosure States

The aggregated correlations for the strong and weak disclosure states show slightly different results from the individual states' results. The aggregated data indicate a statistically significant positive relationship between the strong states' disclosure scores and the number of scandals and the number of initiatives. This indicates that as more political scandals emerged in the strong disclosure states and as the number of initiatives rose in these states, these states enacted more disclosure laws. Table B.31 displays the aggregated correlation results. (The statistically significant relationship between some of the independent variables listed in the table is an issue of multicollinearity).

Table B.31. Aggregated Correlations for the Strong Disclosure States

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	.051	-.111	.294**	.193*
2. Legislative Professionalism	.051	--	-.204*	.722**	.158
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.111	-.204*	--	-.136	-.125
4. Number of Scandals	.294**	.722**	-.136	--	.197*
5. Number of Initiatives	.193*	.158	-.125	.197*	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Unlike the correlation results from several of the states with the weakest disclosure laws in the country, the aggregated correlation results from these same states indicate no statistically significant relationships between weak states' disclosure laws and legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, number of scandals, and number of initiatives. Table B.32 displays the results. (The statistically significant relationship between some of the independent variables listed in the table is an issue of multicollinearity).

Table B.32. Aggregated Correlations for the Weak Disclosure States

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Disclosure Score	--	.020	.047	.076	-.020
2. Legislative Professionalism	.020	--	.148	.435**	-.111
3. Democratic Control of Government	.047	.148	--	.132	-.072
4. Number of Scandals	.076	.435**	.132	--	-.126
5. Number of Initiatives	-.020	-.111	-.072	-.126	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Summarized Linear Regression Results for Individual Strong and Weak Disclosure States

Strong Disclosure States

Of the seven states with the strongest disclosure laws in the country, California ($p = .0001$), Missouri ($p = .024$), and New York ($p = .003$) all had significant overall models. California and New York, however, were the only states with both significant overall models and at least one independent variable associated with the disclosure score. For California, legislative professionalism was associated with the disclosure score, meaning that as California's legislature grew more professional, the state enacted stronger disclosure laws for legislative candidates. The other independent variables (year, Democratic control of government, scandals, and initiatives) were not associated with disclosure in CaliforniB. For New York, year and Democratic control were associated with the disclosure score, meaning that over time and as more Democrats seized control of government, the state enacted stronger disclosure laws for legislative candidates. Legislative professionalism and scandals were not associated with disclosure in New York.

Alaska and Kentucky's overall models were not significant, however, year was associated with disclosure score in both states. This means that over time the disclosure score increased and both states enacted stronger disclosure laws for legislative candidates. Maryland and Oregon had neither significant overall models nor any association between their disclosure scores and independent variables, according to the linear regression model.

Weak Disclosure States

Of the eight states with the weakest disclosure scores, Alabama (p = .0001) and North Dakota (p = .021) had both significant overall models and at least one independent variable associated with their disclosure score. For Alabama, year and legislative professionalism were associated with disclosure score. Over time, as Alabama's legislature became more professional, the state enacted stronger disclosure laws, despite its position on the weak disclosure states list. For North Dakota, only year was associated with disclosure score. Indiana's overall regression model was significant (p = .014) but no variables were associated with disclosure. All other weak disclosure score states (Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Nevada, and Wyoming) had neither significant overall models nor any independent variables associated with disclosure.

Aggregated Linear Regression Results for Strong and Weak Disclosure States

The overall model for all the strong disclosure states is significant (p = .0001) and year was statistically significant. However, none of the independent variables is significant in this aggregated example. Over time, disclosure scores increased in the strong disclosure states. Table B.33 displays the results for the states with the strongest disclosure scores.

Table B.33. Aggregated Linear Regression for the Strong Disclosure States

Variable	*t*	*95% CI*	*p*
Year	5.012	.033, .075	.0001
Legislative Pro.	-.458	-2.219, 1.387	.648
Democratic Control	.269	-.204, .268	.789
Scandals	1.307	-.003, .017	.194
Initiatives	.979	-.027, .079	.330

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 10.124, p = .0001
R = .582; R2 = .338

Like the overall model for all the strong disclosure states, the model for the weak disclosure states is significant (*p* = .0001). Year is also statistically significant for the weak disclosure states. None of the other variables was associated with weak disclosure scores in these states. Table B.34 displays the aggregated linear regression results for the weak states.

Table B.34. Aggregated Linear Regression for the Weak Disclosure States

Variable	*t*	*95% CI*	*p*
Year	4.868	.025, .058	.0001
Legislative Pro.	1.546	-.541, 4.384	.125
Democratic Control	.734	-.103, .223	.464
Scandals	-.969	-.015, .005	.335
Initiatives	-.640	-.189, .097	.523

Overall Model= F (5/114) = 4.950, p = .0001
R = .422; R2 = .178

Chapter 3 Additional Tables

Strong Contribution Limit Score States Correlations

These tables offer specific correlation tables for states with the strongest contribution limit scores over time.

Table B.35. Summary of Correlations for the State of Arkansas 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.887**	-.333	.414	.547*
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.887**	--	.467	-.432	-.398
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.333	.467	--	.218	.075
4. Number of Scandals	.414	-.432	.218	--	.471
5. Number of Initiatives	.547*	-.398	-.075	.471	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.36. Summary of Correlations for the State of Delaware 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.301	.431	.179
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.301	--	-.246	-.041
3. Democratic Control of Government	.431	-.246	--	.220
4. Number of Scandals	.179	-.041	.220	--

Table B.37. Summary of Correlations for the State of Florida 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.458	-.555*	.662**	.603*
2. Legislative Professionalism	.458	--	.110	.407	.142
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.555*	.110	--	-.721**	-.290
4. Number of Scandals	.662**	.407	-.721**	--	.250
5. Number of Initiatives	.603*	.142	-.290	.250	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.38. Summary of Correlations for the State of Hawaii 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.192	-.065	.718**
2. Legislative Professionalism	.192	--	.459	-.150
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.065	-.459	--	-.095
4. Number of Scandals	.718**	-.150	-.095	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.39. Summary of Correlations for the State of Maine 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.620*	.483	.397	.110
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.620*	--	-.139	-.348	-.224
3. Democratic Control of Government	.483	-.139	--	.114	-.193
4. Number of Scandals	.397	-.348	.114	--	.227
5. Number of Initiatives	.110	-.224	-.193	.227	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.40. Summary of Correlations for the State of Michigan 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.257	-.161	.704**	-.404
2. Legislative Professionalism	.257	--	.462	.307	-.192
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.161	.462	--	-.169	-.157
4. Number of Scandals	.704**	.307	-.169	--	-.079
5. Number of Initiatives	-.040	-.192	-.157	-.079	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.41. Summary of Correlations for the State of Minnesota 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.786**	-.344	.771**
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.786**	--	.668**	-.505
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.344	.668**	--	-.306
4. Number of Scandals	.771**	-.505	-.306	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.42. Summary of Correlations for the State of Montana 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.779**	-.540*	.464	.182
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.779**	--	.587*	-.309	-.081
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.540*	.587*	--	-.474	-.072
4. Number of Scandals	.464	-.309	-.474	--	.075
5. Number of Initiatives	.182	-.081	-.072	.075	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.43. Summary of Correlations for the State of New Hampshire 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.832**	.557*	.208
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.832**	--	-.497	-.421
3. Democratic Control of Government	.557*	-.497	--	.473
4. Number of Scandals	.208	-.421	.473	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.44. Summary of Correlations for the State of Oklahoma 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.735**	-.629*	-.278	.246
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.735**	--	.578*	.110	-.536*
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.629*	.578*	--	.081	.000
4. Number of Scandals	-.278	.110	.081	--	-.054
5. Number of Initiatives	.246	-.536*	.000	-.054	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.45. Summary of Correlations for the State of West Virginia 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.886**	.248	-.202
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.886**	--	-.474	.410
3. Democratic Control of Government	.248	-.474	--	-.317
4. Number of Scandals	-.202	.410	-.317	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Weak Contribution Limit Score States Correlations

Table B.46: Summary of Correlations for the State of Colorado 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.587*	.062	.551*	-.265
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.587*	--	.058	-.038	-.455
3. Democratic Control of Government	.062	.058	--	.191	.183
4. Number of Scandals	.551*	-.038	.191	--	-.365
5. Number of Initiatives	-.265	-.455	.183	-.365	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.47: Summary of Correlations for the State of Utah 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.379	.592*	-.167	-.307
2. Legislative Professionalism	.379	--	.649**	-.409	.134
3. Democratic Control of Government	.592*	.649**	--	-.305	.081
4. Number of Scandals	-.167	-.409	-.305	--	-.278
5. Number of Initiatives	-.307	.134	.081	-.278	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.48. Summary of Correlations for the State of Virginia 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.667**	-.733**	.316
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.667**	--	.642**	-.414
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.733**	.642**	--	-.003
4. Number of Scandals	.316	-.414	-.003	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.49. Summary of Correlations for the State of Alabama 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.092	-.161	.243
2. Legislative Professionalism	.092	--	.115	.111
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.161	.115	--	.199
4. Number of Scandals	.243	.111	.199	--

Table B.50. Summary of Correlations for the State of Illinois 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.314	.410	-.269	-.071
2. Legislative Professionalism	.314	--	.386	-.594*	.314
3. Democratic Control of Government	.410	.386	--	-.156	.102
4. Number of Scandals	-.269	-.594*	-.156	--	-.173
5. Number of Initiatives	-.071	.314	.102	-.173	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.51. Summary of Correlations for the State of Mississippi 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.251	-.189	.150	.018
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.251	--	.729**	-.447	-.238
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.189	.729**	--	-.367	-.378
4. Number of Scandals	.150	-.447	-.367	--	.832**
5. Number of Initiatives	.018	-.238	-.378	.832**	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.52: Summary of Correlations for the State of New Mexico 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	.086	.175	-.347
2. Legislative Professionalism	.086	--	.020	-.060
3. Democratic Control of Government	.175	.020	--	.321
4. Number of Scandals	-.347	-.060	.321	--

Table B.53: Summary of Correlations for the State of Oregon 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Contribution Limits Score	--	-.016	-.212	-.397	.288
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.016	--	.502	-.416	-.445
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.212	.502	--	-.121	-.115
4. Number of Scandals	-.397	-.416	-.121	--	.086
5. Number of Initiatives	.288	-.445	-.115	.086	--

Strong Contribution Limit Score States Regressions

Table B.54. Arkansas: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	4.509	.060, .180	.001
Legislative Pro.	-3.085	-317.474, -48.837	.013
Democratic Control	2.632	.175, 2.316	.027
Scandals	-.603	-.240, .139	.561
Initiatives	2.834	.080, .712	.020

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 33.997, p = .0001
R = .975; R^2 = .950

Table B.55. Delaware: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	3.635	.078, .324	.005
Legislative Pro.	2.076	-4.902, 138.631	.065
Democratic Control	2.259	.015, 2.152	.047
Scandals	-1.094	-.802, .274	.300

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 5.081, p = .017
R = .819; R^2 = .670

Table B.56. Florida: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.507	-.056, .280	.166
Legislative Pro.	.652	-54.002, 97.690	.531
Democratic Control	.328	-1.411, 1.890	.750
Scandals	.403	-.031, .045	.697
Initiatives	.244	-.224, .767	.247

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 6.331, p = .009
R = .882; R^2 = .779

Table B.57. Hawaii: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	5.614	.116, .268	.0001
Legislative Pro.	3.643	23.119, 95.956	.005
Democratic Control	1.321	-1.091, 4.272	.216
Scandals	1.936	-.028, .398	.082

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 25.523, p = .0001
R = .954; R^2 = .911

Table B.58. Maine: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.826	-.038, .360	.101
Legislative Pro.	.917	-32.023, 75.700	.383
Democratic Control	.858	-.539, 1.198	.413
Scandals	1.033	-.166, .444	.328
Initiatives	.010	-.720, .272	.993

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 3.990, p = .035
R = .830; R^2 = .689

Table B.59. Michigan: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	2.466	.008, .187	.036
Legislative Pro.	1.018	-4.076, 10.747	.335
Democratic Control	.882	-.591, 1.345	.401
Scandals	.922	-.043, .101	.381
Initiatives	-.356	-.611, .445	-.356

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 4.282, p = .029
R = .839; R^2 = .704

Table B.60. Minnesota: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.094	-.239, .219	.927
Legislative Pro.	-1.251	-235.713, 66.222	.239
Democratic Control	1.781	-.158, 1.420	.105
Scandals	2.758	.047, .446	.020

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 14.761, p = .0001
R = .925; R^2 = .855

Table B.61. Montana: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.802	-.163, .205	.802
Legislative Pro.	-1.275	-151.913, 42.417	.234
Democratic Control	-.072	-1.014, .952	.944
Scandals	.797	-.192, .401	.446
Initiatives	.555	-.328, .541	.592

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 3.768, p = .041
R = .823; R^2 = .677

Table B.62. New Hampshire: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	3.049	.039, .249	.012
Legislative Pro.	.518	-63.240, 101.543	.616
Democratic Control	.138	-.418, 1.069	.352
Scandals	-.198	-.525, .098	.157

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 18.479, p = .0001
R = .939; R^2 = .881

B.63. Oklahoma: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	3.444	.085, .410	.007
Legislative Pro.	.475	-35.173, 53.893	.646
Democratic Control	1.363	-.928, 3.741	.206
Scandals	-2.885	-.087, -.011	.018
Initiatives	-1.482	-2.153, .448	.172

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 9.939, p = .002
R = .920; R^2 = .847

Table B.64. West Virginia: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.134	-.041, .126	.283
Legislative Pro.	-3.740	-177.138, -44.862	.004
Democratic Control	-1.680	-1.997, .280	.124
Scandals	.892	-.061, .142	.393

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 15.635, p = .0001
R = .929; R^2 = .862

Weak Contribution Limit Score States Regressions

Table B.65. Alabama: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.336	-.021, .028	.744
Legislative Pro.	.403	-4.021, 5.796	.695
Democratic Control	-.336	-.586, .433	.744
Scandals	.459	-.022, .033	.656

Overall Model= F (4/10) = .347, p = .840
R = .349; R^2 = .122

Table B.66. Colorado: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	2.739	.019, .194	.023
Legislative Pro.	-1.519	-26.585, 5.226	.163
Democratic Control	.876	-.441, .997	.404
Scandals	-.056	-.122, .116	.957
Initiatives	-4.089	-.442, -.127	.003

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 16.098, p = .0001
R = .948; R^2 = .899

Table B.67. Illinois: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.504	.047, .030	.626
Legislative Pro.	-.264	11.538, 9.122	.797
Democratic Control	1.230	-.102, .346	.250
Scandals	-.405	-.007, .005	.695
Initiatives	-.500	-.141, .090	.629

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .647, p = .671
R = .514; R^2 = .264

Table B.68. Mississippi: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.390	-.112, .467	.198
Legislative Pro.	1.236	-49.887, 170.122	.248
Democratic Control	-.412	-2.700, 1.869	.690
Scandals	.295	-.089, .116	.774
Initiatives	-.643	-7.052, 3.931	.536

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .607, p = .698
R = .502; R^2 = .252

Table B.69. New Mexico: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-1.354	-.027, .007	.206
Legislative Pro.	-.233	-8.247, 6.685	.820
Democratic Control	.696	-.179, .341	.502
Scandals	-2.045	-.119, .005	.068

Overall Model= F (4/10) = .1.265, p = .346
R = .580; R^2 = .336

Table B.70. Oregon: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.456	-.225, .150	.659
Legislative Pro.	-.275	-77.225, 60.508	.790
Democratic Control	-.801	-1.740, .830	.444
Scandals	-1.423	-.642, .146	.189
Initiatives	.940	-.098, .238	.372

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .905, p = .518
R = .578; R^2 = .335

Table B.71. Utah: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	-.889	-.137, .060	.397
Legislative Pro.	-.715	-125.001, 64.964	.493
Democratic Control	.783	-.327, .674	.454
Scandals	.223	-.153, .186	.828
Initiatives	-1.010	-.499, .191	.339

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .1.991, p = .174
R = .725; R^2 = .525

Table B.72. Virginia: Year, Legislative, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Contribution Limit Score

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	1.912	-.006, .072	.085
Legislative Pro.	.653	-18.854, 34.472	.529
Democratic Control	-2.234	-.598, -.001	.049
Scandals	-.412	-.030, .021	.689

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 7.158, p = .005
R = .861; R^2 = .741

Additional Chapter 3 Data Analysis

Like the additional analytic strategy applied for the states with strong and weak disclosure, two different analytic strategies were applied using correlations and linear regression for contribution limits. First, the states with the strongest (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) and weakest (Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia) contribution limit scores were analyzed individually. Specifically, each state was examined by itself with the dependent variable (contribution limits) and the independent variables (legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and initiative). There were several statistically significant differences when individual states were examined in the model.

Second, the strong scoring contribution limit states were grouped entirely together and the weak scoring contribution limit states were grouped together. The results of the individual tests are summarized below while Table 3.6 and 3.7 present the aggregated correlation data for the states with the strongest contribution limit laws and the weakest contribution limit laws, respectively. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the aggregated linear regression data for the states with the strongest and weakest contribution limit laws, respectively.

Summarized Correlation Results for Individual Strong and Weak Disclosure States

Strong Contribution Limit States

All of the strong scoring contribution limit states except for Delaware showed statistically significant relationships between their contribution limits score and at least one independent variable. Arkansas has statistically significant relationships between the state contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and the initiative. The negative significant relationship between the contribution limits score and legislative professionalism purports that Arkansas' relatively low degree of legislative professionalism led to a higher contribution limits score. As the citizens in the state had the opportunity to vote on more initiatives, the state's contribution limits score rose in turn.

Florida's contribution limits score has statistically significant relationships with Democratic control of state government, the number of political scandals, and the number of initiatives. More specifically, as fewer Democrats (and more Republicans) controlled the state over the decades, the contribution limits score increased. As the number of political scandals rose over time, so did the number of contribution limits in the state; and as citizens had more initiatives to vote on, the number of contribution limits in the state also rose.

Hawaii had a statistically significant relationship between its contribution limits score and the number of political scandals. Thus, in this state, as the number of scandals rose over time, so did the number of contribution limits. No other variables were significant.

Maine had a statistically significant relationship between its contribution limits score and the degree of legislative professionalism, albeit a negative relationship. The state legislature trended more towards a citizen-type body over the decades, with legislative professionalism scores dipping to .089 from .180. So, as Maine's legislature became less professionalized, its contribution limits score rose during the same time.

Michigan had a statistically significant relationship between its contribution limits score and the number of political scandals in the state. Thus, as the number of political scandals increased over the years, so did the number of contribution limits.

Minnesota had statistically significant relationships between its contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and the number of political scandals. Like Maine, as Minnesota's legislature became less professionalized over the years, the number of contribution limits in the state increased. And, as the number of political scandals rose, so did the number of contribution limits.

Montana shows a relatively strong but negative relationship between the contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and Democratic control of state government. Like Maine and Minnesota's legislative professionalism score, Montana's score decreased over time, which means that as Montana's legislative became less professionalized, it increased the number of contribution limits in the state. And, as more Republicans controlled state government (and fewer Democrats) the state enacted more contribution limits over time.

New Hampshire, like Montana, also has significant relationships between its contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and Democratic control of state government. New Hampshire's legislative professionalism score decreased over the years as the number of contribution limits in the state rose. But, unlike some of the other states in this section, New Hampshire has a moderate, but statistically significant relationship between the contribution limits score and Democratic control of state government. This positive relationship indicates that as more Democrats controlled state government, the more contribution limits were enacted in the state.

Oklahoma follows a pattern like Montana's. Oklahoma has statistically significant relationships between its contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and Democratic control of state government. This means that as Oklahoma's legislature became less professionalized over the years, it at the same time increased the number of contribution limits in the state. And, as more Republicans, and less Democrats controlled government, Oklahoma enacted more contribution limits.

West Virginia showed a statistically strong relationship between the contribution limits score and the level of legislative professionalism in the state. While West Virginia's degree of legislative professionalism remained citizen-based over time, just fluctuating between more or less citizen-based, it also enacted more contribution limits.

Delaware's contribution limits score does not have any significant relationships with the independent variables.

Weak Contribution Limit States

Of the eight states with the lowest contribution limits scores from 1971 to 2005, only three states had statistically significant relationships between contribution limits and independent variables. Those states are Colorado, Utah, and Virginia.

The relationship between Colorado's contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and number of political scandals was moderate, but significant. This indicates that as Colorado's legislature fluctuated between varying levels of hybrid status, the number of contribution limits rose slightly. And, as the number of political scandals increased in the state, so did the number of contribution limits.

There is a moderate relationship between Utah's contribution limits score and Democratic control of government. This means that as more Democrats controlled or maintained control of state government, the number of contribution limits in the state rose. The relationship is moderate, however.

Virginia had statistically significant relationships between its contribution limits score and legislative professionalism and Democratic control of state government. As the level of legislative professionalism decreased in the state over the years, the number of contribution limits rose, and as more Republicans (and fewer Democrats) controlled state government, the number of contributions also rose.

There are no statistically significant relationships between the contribution limits score and the independent variables in Alabama, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Oregon.

Aggregated Correlation Results for Strong and Weak Contribution Limit States

When the strong scoring contribution limit states are grouped together and run as one correlation, the aggregated results differ from the individual state results. None of the relationships between contribution limit score and independent variables is statistically significant. See Table B.73 below for details. There is an issue of multicollinearity between some of the independent variables and is a data limitation.

Table B.73. Aggregated Correlations for the Strong Contribution Limit States

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Contribution Limit Score	--	-.059	-.040	.097	.100
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.059	--	.075	.451**	-.058
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.040	.075	--	.006	-.055
4. Number of Scandals	.097	.451**	.006	--	.038
5. Number of Initiatives	.100	-.058	-.055	.038	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The aggregated correlation results for all of the weak contribution limit states are similar to the aggregated results for the strong contribution limit states. The relationships between contribution limits score and the independent variables are not statistically significant. See Table B.74 for specifics.

Table B.74. Aggregated Correlations for the Weak Contribution Limit States

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Contribution Limit Score	--	-.143	.096	-.029	.098
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.143	--	-.119	.292**	.115
3. Democratic Control of Government	.096	-.119	--	.023	-.117
4. Number of Scandals	-.029	.292**	.023	--	-.202*
5. Number of Initiatives	.098	.115	-.117	-.202*	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Summarized Linear Regression Results for Individual Strong and Weak Contribution Limit States

Strong Contribution Limit States

The individual linear regression results for the strongest contribution limit states are overwhelmingly statistically significant. All 11 states with the strongest scores had significant overall models (ranging from p = .0001 to p = .041). Of these states, eight of them also had statistically significant associations with at least one independent variable. For the other three states (Florida, Maine, and Montana) there were other factors relating to the high contribution limit scores.

For Arkansas, year (p = .001), legislative professionalism (p = .013), Democratic control (p = .027), and initiatives (p = .020) were all significantly associated with the contribution limits score. This indicates that overtime, as Arkansas's legislature grew more professional, as Democrats controlled state institutions, and as more initiatives were offered on the ballot, more types of limits on campaign contributions were enacted in the state. There is a positive relationship between year, degree of legislative professionalism, Democratic control, initiatives, and the contribution limits score.

For Delaware, year ($p = .005$) and Democratic control ($p = .047$) were significantly associated with the contribution limits score. This indicates that over time, and as more Democrats took control of the chambers of the legislature and the governor's office, Delaware supported more contribution limits.

In Hawaii, year ($p = .0001$) and legislative professionalism ($p = .005$) were significantly associated with the contribution limits score, meaning that over time, as Hawaii's legislature grew more professional, more contribution limits were enacted in the state.

In Michigan and New Hampshire, year was significantly associated with the contribution limits score ($p = .036$ and $p = .012$, respectively) meaning that over time Michigan and New Hampshire enacted more contribution limits.

Scandals were significantly associated with the contribution limits score ($p = .020$) in Minnesota, meaning that as the number of political scandals rose in that state, more contribution limits were enacted.

For Oklahoma, year ($p = .007$) and scandals ($p = .018$) were significantly associated with the contribution limits score. Over time and as more political scandals were prosecuted in Oklahoma, the contribution limits score increased. Oklahoma supported more contribution limits over time and as more political scandals rocked the state.

Finally, for West Virginia, legislative professionalism is significantly associated with the contribution limits score. As West Virginia's legislature grew more professional, more contribution limits were enacted in the state.

Weak Contribution Limit States

Linear regression analysis for the states with the weakest contribution limit scores shows that Colorado and Virginia had both statistically significant overall models and at least one independent variable significantly associated with the state's contribution limits score. For Colorado, year (p = .023) and initiatives (p = .003) were significant, indicating over time and as more initiatives were placed on the ballot, Colorado enacted more contribution limits, despite its relatively low score. In Virginia, Democratic control (p = .049) is significant, meaning that as more Democrats controlled one or both of the legislative chambers, the governor's office, or all three, more contribution limits were enacted in Virginia.

Alabama, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah had neither statistically significant overall models or strong associations between their contribution limits score and independent variables.

Aggregated Linear Regression Results for Strong and Weak Contribution Limit States

The overall model for all the strong contribution limit states is significant (p = .0001) and year was statistically significant. However, none of the independent variables is significant in this aggregated example. Over time, contribution limit scores increased in the strong contribution limit states. Table B.75 displays the results.

Table B.75. Aggregated Linear Regression for the Strong Contribution Limit States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	14.558	.119, .156	.000
Legislative Pro.	1.211	-.654, 2.724	.228
Democratic Control	1.261	-.066, .300	.209
Scandals	-1.236	-.042, .010	.219
Initiatives	.565	-.130, .235	.573

Overall Model= F (5/144) = 44.658, p = .0001
R = .780; R^2 = .608

The aggregated linear regression model for the weak contribution limit states reports an overall model that is not statistically significant (p = .070), however, year is related to the weak contribution limit scores. This indicates that over time the weak states did in fact increase their commitments to contribution limits in state legislative elections. See Table B.76 for regression specifics.

Table B.76. Aggregated Linear Regression for the Weak Contribution Limit States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	2.256	.003, .045	.026
Legislative Pro.	-.408	-3.282, 2.162	.684
Democratic Control	1.817	-.016, .378	.072
Scandals	-.614	-.014, .007	.540
Initiatives	.912	-.034, .093	.364

Overall Model= F (5/114) = 2.107, p = .070
R = .291; R^2 = .085

Chapter 4 Additional Tables

Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding Score States Correlations

Table B.77. Summary of Correlations for the State of Alabama 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	.241	.605*	-.415
2. Legislative Professionalism	.241	--	.115	.111
3. Democratic Control of Government	.605*	.115	--	.199
4. Number of Scandals	-.415	.111	.199	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.78. Summary of Correlations for the State of Arizona 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	.273	-.089	.503	-.052
2. Legislative Professionalism	.273	--	.462	-.232	-.615*
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.089	.462	--	-.055	-.295
4. Number of Scandals	.503	-.232	-.055	--	-.112
5. Number of Initiatives	-.052	-.615*	-.295	-.112	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.79. Summary of Correlations for the State of Hawaii 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.151	-.322	.560*
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.151	--	.459	-.150
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.322	.459	--	.095
4. Number of Scandals	.560*	-.150	-.095	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.80. Summary of Correlations for the State of Maine 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.489	.083	-.248	-.023
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.489	--	-.139	-.348	-.224
3. Democratic Control of Government	.083	-.139	--	.114	-.193
4. Number of Scandals	-.248	-.348	.114	--	.227
5. Number of Initiatives	-.023	-.224	-.193	.227	--

Table B.81. Summary of Correlations for the State of Minnesota 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.884**	-.712**	.607*
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.884**	--	.668**	-.505
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.712**	.668**	--	-.306
4. Number of Scandals	.607*	-.505	-.306	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.82. Summary of Correlations for the State of Ohio 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.183	-.560*	.373	.142
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.183	--	.666**	-.784**	-.022
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.560*	.666**	--	-.556*	-.171
4. Number of Scandals	.373	-.784**	-.556*	--	-.125
5. Number of Initiatives	.142	-.022	-.171	-.125	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.83. Summary of Correlations for the State of Wisconsin 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	.915**	.823**	.516*
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.915**	--	-.820	.436
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.823**	-.820**	--	-.410
4. Number of Scandals	.516*	.436	-.419	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Weak States Correlations

Table B.84. Summary of Correlations for the State of Arkansas 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.176	.189	.232	.397
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.176	--	.467	-.432	-.398
3. Democratic Control of Government	.189	.467	--	.218	.075
4. Number of Scandals	.232	-.432	.218	--	.471
5. Number of Initiatives	.397	-.398	.075	.471	--

Table B.85. Summary of Correlations for the State of Idaho 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.265	-.443	.349	-.184
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.265	--	.310	-.512	-.439
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.443	.310	--	-.594*	-.293
4. Number of Scandals	.349	-.512	-.594*	--	.313
5. Number of Initiatives	-.184	-.439	-.293	.313	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.86. Summary of Correlations for the State of Louisiana 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.068	.161	-.151	-.071
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.068	--	.139	-.284	-.068
3. Democratic Control of Government	.161	.139	--	-.449	.161
4. Number of Scandals	-.151	-.284	-.449	--	-.151
5. Number of Initiatives	-.071	-.068	.161	-.151	--

Table B.87. Summary of Correlations for the State of New Mexico 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.428	-.262	.051
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.428	--	.020	-.060
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.262	.020	--	.321
4. Number of Scandals	.051	-.060	.321	--

Table B.88. Summary of Correlations for the State of Tennessee 1971-2005

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.295	-.218	.068
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.295	--	.216	-.611*
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.218	.216	--	-.253
4. Number of Scandals	.068	-.611	-.253	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table B.89. Summary of Correlations for the State of Virginia 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.156	-.292	-.173
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.156	--	.642**	-.414
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.292	.642**	--	-.003
4. Number of Scandals	-.173	-.414	-.003	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table B.90. Summary of Correlations for the State of Washington 1971-2005

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.270	-.064	.201	.587*
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.270	--	-.255	-.300	-.343
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.064	-.255	--	.124	.059
4. Number of Scandals	.201	-.300	.124	--	.632*
5. Number of Initiatives	.587*	-.343	.059	.632*	--

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Strong States Regressions

Table B.91. Alabama: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-.651	-.076, .041	.530
Legislative Pro.	.975	-6.561, 16.766	.353
Democratic Control	2.641	.224, 2.645	.025
Scandals	-2.115	-.127, .003	.061

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 6.648, p = .007
R = .852; R^2=.727

Table B.92. Arizona: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	1.782	-.029, .248	.108
Legislative Pro.	3.848	23.858, 91.907	.004
Democratic Control	-1.286	-1.501, .413	.231
Scandals	1.247	-.042, .146	.240
Initiatives	1.093	-.313, .899	.303

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 4.646, p = .023
R = .849; R^2= .721

Table B.93. Hawaii: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	5.586	.119, .277	.0001
Legislative Pro.	.560	-28.319, 47.336	.588
Democratic Control	.768	-1.825, 3.745	.460
Scandals	-.622	-.283, .160	.548

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 14.401, p = .0001
R = .923; R^2= .852

Table B.94. Maine: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	1.652	-.079, .506	.133
Legislative Pro.	.644	-.56.535, 101.546	.536
Democratic Control	-.711	-1.676, .874	.495
Scandals	-1.783	-.801, .095	.108
Initiatives	-.409	-1.254, .870	.692

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 2.412, p = .119
R = .757; R^2= .573

Table B.95. Minnesota: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	.370	-.157, .220	.719
Legislative Pro.	-.5.84	-156.886, 91.739	.572
Democratic Control	-1.450	-1.073, .227	.178
Scandals	.985	-.092, .236	.348

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 13.929, p = .0001
R = .921; R^2=.848

Table B.96. Ohio: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-.037	-.290, .281	.971
Legislative Pro.	.816	-77.975, 165.974	.436
Democratic Control	-2.107	-1.873, .067	.064
Scandals	1.124	-.045, .134	.290
Initiatives	.425	-.333, .487	.681

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 1.771, p = .215.
R = .704; R^2 = .496

Table B.97. Wisconsin: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	3.294	.028, .143	.008
Legislative Pro.	.415	-5.215, 7.598	.687
Democratic Control	-1.810	-7.32, .076	.100
Scandals	-1.127	-.097, .032	.286

Overall Model= F (4/10) = 36.752, p = .0001
R = .968 ; R^2= .936

Weak Score States

Table B.98. Arkansas: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-.642	-.038, .021	.537
Legislative Pro.	-.769	-88.254, 43.457	.461
Democratic Control	.344	-.445, .605	.739
Scandals	-.219	-.102, .084	.831
Initiatives	.931	-.091, .219	.376

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .558, p = .730
R = .487; R^2= .237

Table B.99. Idaho: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-1.351	-.053, .013	.210
Legislative Pro.	-1.664	-14.977, 2.282	.130
Democratic Control	-1.958	-1.207, .087	.082
Scandals	.156	-.073, .084	.880
Initiatives	-1.906	-.266, .023	.089

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 1.734, p = .223
R = .701; R^2= .491

Regression analysis could not be completed for Illinois because its expenditure limits score is zero.

Table B.100. Louisiana: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-1.349	-.043, .011	.210
Legislative Pro.	-.897	-13.548, 5.854	.393
Democratic Control	.173	-.396, .462	.867
Scandals	.538	-.014, .023	.604
Initiatives	-.990	-1.106, .433	.348

Overall Model= F (5/9) = .508, p = .764
R = .469; R^2= .220

Table B.101. New Mexico: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	.105	-.015, .020	.760
Legislative Pro.	-.386	-12.595, 3.085	.206
Democratic Control	-.264	-.381, .165	.400
Scandals	.161	-.050, .080	.619

Overall Model= F (4/10) =.914, p = .492
R = .517; R^2= .268

Table B.102. Tennessee: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-.260	-.065, .051	.800
Legislative Pro.	-.632	-50.842, 28.384	.542
Democratic Control	-.613	-.439, .249	.554
Scandals	-.354	-.030, .021	.731

Overall Model= F (4/10) = .430, p = .784
R = .383; R^2 = .147

Table B.103. Virginia: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, and Scandals Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	1.824	-.006, .058	.098
Legislative Pro.	.916	-12.768, 30.609	.381
Democratic Control	-.178	-.262, .224	.862
Scandals	-1.778	-.037, .004	.106

Overall Model= F (4/10) = .1.284, p = .339
R = .583; R^2 = .339

Table B.104. Washington: Year, Legislative Professionalism, Democratic Control, Scandals, and Initiatives Impact on Expenditure Limit Score

Variable	***t***	**95% CI**	***p***
Year	-.346	-.025, .018	.737
Legislative Pro.	-.569	-16.523, 9.882	.583
Democratic Control	-.195	-.219, .184	.850
Scandals	-.744	-.061, .031	.476
Initiatives	2.143	-.008, .290	.061

Overall Model= F (5/9) = 1.303, p = .343
R = .648; R^2 = .420

Additional Chapter 4 Data Analysis

This chapter follows the same analytic strategy as the chapters on disclosure and contribution limits. Two different analytic strategies were applied using correlations and linear regression. First, the states with the strongest (Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and weakest (Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington) expenditure limit and public funding scores were analyzed individually. Specifically, each state was examined by itself with the dependent variable (expenditure limits and public funding) and the independent variables (legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and initiative). There were several statistically significant differences when individual states were examined in the model.

Second, the strongest scoring states in terms of expenditure limits and public funding were combined into one large correlation and regression model and the same tactic was taken with the weakest scoring states.

The results of the individual tests are summarized below while Tables B.105 and B.106 present the aggregated correlation data for the states with the strongest expenditure limit and public funding laws and the weakest expenditure limit and public funding laws, respectively. Tables B.107 and B.108 present the aggregated linear regression data for the states with the strongest and weakest expenditure and public funding laws, respectively.

Summarized Correlation Results for Individual Strong and Weak Expenditure Limits and Public Funding States

Strong Expenditure Limits and Public Funding States

Of the seven states with the strongest expenditure limits and public funding scores, five of them had statistically significant relationships. Surprisingly, for the correlations for Arizona and Maine, the two states with the most established and respected clean elections programs, there were no statistically significant relationships between their expenditure limits and public funding scores and the independent variables.

Minnesota and Wisconsin led the way with the most telling results. Both states had statistically significant relationships between their scores and legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, and scandals. All of these relationships were statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). Specifically, this means that as the degree of legislative professionalism declined over the decades, the expenditure limits score increased; as fewer Democrats controlled the state government (meaning more Republicans controlled the legislature and the governor's office) the expenditure limits score also rose. As the number of political scandals rocked the state, the expenditure limits score increased. So, for both Minnesota and Wisconsin's particular brand of expenditure limits and public funding available to state legislative candidates, Republicans were in charge, the degree of legislative professionalism was not great, and there were many political scandals. (The results exclude initiatives as an independent variable because Minnesota and Wisconsin do not have the initiative).

Both Alabama and Ohio have expenditure limit and public funding scores significantly related to Democratic control of state government. For Alabama, this relationship positive, meaning that the more Democrats that were in office, the more support there was for expenditure limits tied to the state public funding system. Ohio's expenditure limits score has a significant negative relationship with Democratic control of state government. As fewer Democrats controlled state institutions (and more Republicans did), the stronger the expenditure limits in that state became. More research is needed on the internal factors in each state that determined these different relationships.

Hawaii showed a significant relationship between the number of scandals and its high expenditure score from 1971 to 2005. Thus, as the number of scandals increased over the years, so did the state's expenditure limits score and commitment to public funding for candidates running for state legislature. (Initiatives as an independent variable are excluded from the table below because Hawaii does not have the initiative).

Weak Expenditure Limits and Public Funding States

No significant relationships were determined between expenditure limits and the independent variables for any state except for Washington. There was a moderate, but statistically significant, relationship between Washington's meager expenditure score and the number of initiatives in the state. Thus, as the number of initiatives rose in Washington from 1971 to 2005, so did its weak expenditure score.

Aggregated Correlation Results for Strong and Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

The aggregated correlation results for the states with the strongest expenditure and public funding scores mirrors the general results for the individual states. The expenditure limits and public funding score is significantly related to legislative professionalism and the number of initiatives in these states. This means that as the legislatures became more professionalized and as fewer initiatives were on the ballots, the more stringent the states expenditure limits and public funding scores became.

Table B.105. Aggregated Correlations for the Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Measure	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	.196*	-.035	-.129	-.194*
2. Legislative Professionalism	.196*	--	-.266**	.147	.083
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.035	-.266**	--	-.231*	-.434**
4. Number of Scandals	-.129	.147	-.231*	--	.165
5. Number of Initiatives	-.194*	.083	-.434**	.165	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The weak states' aggregated correlation results also mirror the individual states' outcomes. There were no statistically significant relationships between the states with weak expenditure limits and public funding scores and the independent variables. This portends that other factors are at work in these states that contribute to their weak scores.

Table B.106. Aggregated Correlations for the Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Measure	1	2	3	4	5
1. Expenditure Limits Score	--	-.098	-.097	-.014	.143
2. Legislative Professionalism	-.098	--	-.082	.016	.253**
3. Democratic Control of Government	-.097	-.082	--	.128	-.066
4. Number of Scandals	-.014	.016	.128	--	-.194*
5. Number of Initiatives	.143	.253**	-.066	-.194*	--

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Summarized Linear Regression Results for Individual Strong and Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Of the seven states with the strongest scores, four of them had both significant overall models and at least one independent variable with a statistically significant relationship with the expenditure limit and public funding score.

Alabama's overall model was significant ($p = .007$) and Democratic control was significantly associated with the expenditure limits score ($p = .025$), meaning that as

Democrats seized control of more branches of government (two legislative chambers and the governor's office), more expenditure limits were enacted.

Arizona's overall model was significant (p = .014). Legislative professionalism was significantly associated with expenditure limit score (p = .004), meaning that as the Arizona legislature became more professional (with the legislative professionalism score increasing over the years) the expenditure limits score also increased.

Hawaii's overall model was significant (p = .0001). Year was associated with the expenditure limits score, meaning that over the years the expenditure limit score increased, or Hawaii enacted stronger limits on campaign expenditures for legislative candidates.

Wisconsin's overall model was significant (p = .0001). Year was associated with the expenditure limits score, meaning that over the years the expenditure limit score increased, or Wisconsin enacted stronger limits on campaign expenditures for legislative candidates.

Minnesota's overall model was significant (p = .0001), however none of the independent variables was associated with the expenditure limit and public funding score.

Maine and Ohio had neither significant overall models nor any associations between the independent variables and the expenditure limit and public funding score. Maine's position in this category is surprising considering its strong commitment to clean elections in that state. There are other factors at play in Maine and these should be explored in future research.

Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

The seven states with the weakest scores had neither significant overall models nor were any of the independent variables associated with the expenditure limit and public funding scores.

Aggregated Linear Regression Results for Strong and Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

The overall linear regression model for the strong scoring states is statistically significant (p = .0001). Additionally, year, legislative professionalism, scandals, and initiatives were all associated with strong expenditure limits and public funding scores. Only Democratic control of government was not associated with the high scoring states. Over time, as the legislatures in this category professionalized, as the number of scandals increased, and as the number of initiatives on the ballots increased, more expenditure limits and public funding provisions were adopted in these states. Table B.107 shows the specifics.

Table B.107. Aggregated Linear Regression for the Strong Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	6.826	.071, .128	.000
Legislative Pro.	3.625	2.540, 8.685	.000
Democratic Control	.515	-.234, .399	.608
Scandals	-3.943	-.071, -.023	.000
Initiatives	-2.537	-.622, -.076	.013

Overall Model= F (5/99) = 12.910, p = .0001
R = .628; R^2 = .395

For the weak scoring states, the aggregated results are nearly the opposite from the strong scoring states. For example, the overall model is not statistically significant and the independent variables were not associated with the expenditure limits and public funding score. Table B.108 displays the aggregated results for the weak scoring states.

Table B.108. Aggregated Linear Regression for the Weak Expenditure Limit and Public Funding States

Variable	***t***	***95% CI***	***p***
Year	.326	-.005, .007	.745
Legislative Pro.	-1.260	-2.178, .487	.211
Democratic Control	-.878	-.084, .032	.382
Scandals	.151	-.005, .006	.881
Initiatives	1.512	-.012, .090	.134

Overall Model= F (5/99) = 12.910, p = .378
R = .227; R^2 = .052

Regression results indicate that for states with high expenditure limit scores the independent variables are a better predictor (more significant) of higher expenditure limits than for states with low expenditure limit scores. In other words, there is more significance between the variables in the high expenditure limit score states than in the low expenditure limit states. Many of the states with strong expenditure limit scores have established legitimate expenditure limits and worthwhile public funding programs. Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin all have accepted public funding programs that a majority of legislative candidates take advantage of when running for office.

For the seven weaker expenditure limit states, these are states with various types of campaign finance reforms. While Washington has one of the toughest disclosure laws in the country, it does not place the same emphasis on expenditure limits and public funding programs. With the exceptions of Illinois and Washington, the other five states with lower expenditure limit scores all have hybrid or citizen type legislatures. However, it was determined that the degree of legislative professionalism did not impact the low expenditure limits score. There are other factors at play for these seven weaker states than the five independent variables measured in the regression analysis.